Women Intellectuals

Philadelphia, Ia. To the Editors: Your symposium on "The Woman Intellectual and the Church" (January 27) certainly raised many thought-provoking points. In this respect, I would like to make two points.

One suggestion concerns other stimulating reading on this general topic. A noted biblical scholar Professor Krister Stendahl has recently published a booklet The Bible and the Role of Woman (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1966, 85¢). This is a case study in hermeneutics, i.e. "how one interprets the Bible, not only as to what the text meant 'back there then' when it was written, but also as to what it means 'here and now," which originally appeared in Sweden during the course of a lengthy debate over the proposed ordination of women.

Dr. Stendahl concludes: "The question about the ordination of women is not a question about offices but a question about the right relationship between man and woman in Christ, whether it applies to political office, civil service, career, home life, the ministry, or to the episcopate." While Dr. Stendahl is considering the specific issue of ordination of women, he does so within a wider context. Hence, I find much of his thought applicable to any discussion on woman in the Church.

A second point I would like to raise is with respect to the discussants' use of the word institution. I find that in sever al places where the discussants spoke of the Church as institution, the word but reaucracy might have been more accu rate. It is one thing to speak of the bureaucratized Church today and quite another to speak of the institutiona Church. A bureaucracy is a hierarchica structure having considerable power and low circulation while an institution i characterized as a pattern of cultur traits specialized to the shaping and dis tribution of particular values or sets of values. While this is only a seminal dis tinction, it does point up the fact that

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THE CIA NIGHTMARE

STATINTL

The largest and most representative student organization in America, the United States National Student Association has been financed, to the tune of \$200,000 a year, by the Central Intelligence Agency. This fact has now been advertised the length and breadth of the land. It seems to have broken a log-jam; and a great wash of evidence is upon us, showing the hand of the CIA in a multitude of educational and organizational enterprises previously considered private and independent. The reactions, and perhaps the revelations, are only beginning. Two such reactions, different in tone and viewpoint, follow in this issue.

The CIA-NSA connection has been presented as a severe indictment of "established" American liberalism. And justly so. But the ironies are close to the surface. It was the very fact that private monies in American society would not support the international activities of liberal NSA which drove the student leaders into the arms of the intelligence agency in the first place. Furthermore, many of the projects funded through the CIA could have been quite successfully and quite openly sponsored by the State Department—were it not for the McCarthyite hysteria of certain blocs of Congressmen which rendered all international student activity, if not even all State Department activity, suspect. In this sense, the Congress of the United States, as much as the requirements of international espionage, was the cause of the secret character of the NSA financing. The implications of this fact are both profoundly anti-democratic and profoundly symptomatic of Congress' general incapacity to handle post-war foreign affairs.

At the moment, thanks to CIA omnipresence and other government extravaganzas like the Defense Department's ill-fated Project Camelot, anyone connected with things international must work in an increasingly night-marish atmosphere. Independent scholarship abroad becomes more difficult. Scholars feel their reputations compromised, their contacts disappearing. Last year's meeting of anthropologists heard a denunciation of the CIA's exploitation of that discipline either for information or "cover." Recently, in New York, at an open meeting of an organization dealing with Latin

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CPVRCHT

Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP75-00149R000200770001-8 [Father McCabe] is utterly said: "To say the least [Father McCabe] is utterly

American affairs, a speaker from the floor suggested that certain proposed activities should not be undertaken because they were of a sort easily manipulable by CIA influences which might be working in the group. Not long ago, such a comment would have appeared to be sheer paranoia. Today, it seems utterly realistic.

The demoralization and disaffection among young people is particularly extreme. President Kennedy hailed "a new generation of Americans" who will "serve the cause of freedom as servants of peace around the world." But that generation, passionately concerned with the destiny of the developing nations, is being forced into choosing between an almost Pavlovian suspicion of everything the U.S. does abroad or a morally eroding cynicism. There is no point in complaining about a growing attachment of the New Left to "conspiracy theories" when genuine conspiracies are popping up all around. Reportedly, the Peace Corps itself only fought off inroads by the CIA after a stiff battle by Sargent Shriver. But given the present revelations, who will believe it?

Furthermore, one of the most pressing problems facing everyone dealing with the developing nations is deciding what values and institutions of a free society can reasonably be demanded of a nation in the throes of drastic social and economic change. The CIA's manipulation and corruption of independent, non-government organizations, whose existence is taken as a mark of a nontotalitarian society, will certainly weaken the case of those who would see free institutions as a sign of, rather than an obstacle to, development.

Finally, we agree with Mr. McWilliams that at base the issue is substantive. The final objection to the manipulations of the CIA is an objection to American foreign policy in general, which the CIA both helps to formulate and carry out. That is the great gulf which separates student activists of yesteryear from those of today. The latter are not merely interested in "putting America's best foot forward." Instead, these students consider U.S. foreign policy both a threat to peace and an obstacle to world economic development. They see this foreign policy, in which the CIA plays a crucial role, as a great machine of anti-Communism which has gone wildly and disastrously out of whack. We can only concur.

THE CORRUPT CHURCH?

Anyone who said "it can't happen here," would be wrong. All we can say is that, so far, it hasn't happened, and we hope the folly of the authorities in England will be noted by the American hierarchy. For what is it other than sheer folly to remove a theologian of the stature of Father Herbert McCabe, O.P., from the editorship of New Blackfriars? And what is it other than a monumental blindness for someone to say, as the Apostolic Delegate to Great Britain, Igino Cardinale, was reported to have

said: "To say the least [Father McCabe] is utterly immature and not enlightened in his judgment. In either case he is irresponsible and undeserving of credit." Those of our readers who recall Father McCabe's brilliant exchange with Prof. Joseph Fletcher last year on the "New Morality" will be able to judge for themselves.

What was the horrible thing Father McCabe had done? He had written an editorial in the February issue of the New Blackfriars expressing sympathy for Charles Davis. In the editorial he said, among other things, that "The Church is quite plainly corrupt. . . . We have lived with this truth for so long that we have perhaps forgotten how scandalous and horrible it is: like people who live with racial discrimination and slavery."

Shocking words, no doubt, but are they accurate? Father McCabe provided some evidence for his assertion: "A Cardinal selects Christmas as the occasion for supporting the murder of Vietnamese civilians; the Pope alleges that the Church's teaching is not in doubt about birthcontrol; the Congregation of Rites has asserted that a family communion celebrated in a private home and followed by a meal is a practice 'alien to the Catholic religion' . . ." Father McCabe could have mentioned a dozen more incidents; any Catholic even moderately informed about the Church in the United States could add quite easily to Father McCabe's examples. If one started adding up all the incidents in the Church universal, the list would be—well, long.

Yet, somehow, we are meant to believe that Father McCabe, because he had the candor to say what everyone knows about, is "irresponsible and undeserving of credit." Morcover, quite apart from incidents of corruption, stupidity, or silliness, is it not part of the Church's teaching that she is made up of sinners and that no one in the Church is free of sin? If the Church herself teaches this, how can anyone complain when a Father McCabe points out what this sin and human weakness come to mean in the concrete life of the Church?

A reader recently inquired why, if we can express sympathy with Charles Davis' charges against the Church (and now, presumably, if we can agree with Father McCabe), we choose to remain Catholics? Father McCabe, in the same editorial, answered that question beautifully, and it is an answer we can make our own. "It is because," he wrote, "we believe that the hierarchical institutions of the Roman Catholic Church, with all their decadence, their corruption and their silliness, do in fact link us to areas of Christian truth beyond our own particular experience and ultimately to truths beyond any experience, that we remain, and see our lives in terms of remaining, members of this Church."

It takes an act of faith to make a statement like that, an act of faith in the face of a "plainly corrupt Church." The viability of the Church, fortunately, has never rested on the evidence provided by lives (as are our own) which are sinful.

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OBVIOUSLY NAIVE?

C.I.A. AND THE STUDENTS

The revelation of the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Students Association comes as no great shock to some of us who have been around the periphery of NSA over the years. It merely fills in detail what was, already, a dimly outlined picture built up from the mysterious ability of the Association to survive financial crises, the inexplicable occultism of its International Commission, the whispered conferences in hallways, the cryptic references of leaders which drew attention rather than concealed. A student association, after all, is not the ideal vehicle for espionage: besides being too verbal and too amateurish, there is a certain tendency among student leaders to feel a certain romantic glory in such a role, a glory which can be maximized only if outsiders have a certain awareness that they are outside. And many of us who have been "outside" were told quite enough to guess the nature of the "inside" that was being "concealed."

The relationship between NSA and CIA was, in at least two ways, harmful to the Association. Obviously, it prevented a completely honest and open communication between NSA and overseas student associations. More seriously, it impeded discussion between NSA leaders and their domestic constituents and exaggerated the tendency for the "national office" to become less of a democratic leadership and more of an oligarchy—a tendency which caused resentment on campuses as well as doubt and insecurity among national leaders themselves. Moreover, the tie to CIA almost certainly directed more of NSA's attention into the international field than the resolute parochialism of student governments found desirable. A consistent complaint at the National Congress of NSA was that the leadership had failed to give enough attention to local problems, and a "back to the campus" movement was a regular, annual "populistic" feature of NSA politics.

On the whole, however, these objections are procedural and psychological: they refer to the style and feeling of NSA politics, and not to the substance of NSA's programs and policies.

The substantive effect of NSA's relations with CIA may come as a surprise to the liberal mind: its ties to the Agency almost certainly pulled NSA to the left in its political stance. Edward Schwartz, National Affairs Vice-President of NSA, conceded that to his knowledge CIA financing and support had never been exerted or employed for other than liberal goals. I can recall an even more vivid and illustrative experience. In 1960, the International Commission of NSA had recommended to the National Congress a resolution which "supported the aims of the Cuban Revolution," expressed some doubt about

its current practices, and called for fraternal delegations of American students to visit Cuba. The Congress reaction was hostile, for a large number of student delegates were eager to proceed to a severe indictment of "Castroite totalitarianism," and national NSA leaders feared the Commission's resolution might be defeated. At this point, the "conspiracy machinery" began to grind into painfully public operation: national leaders held hurried "secret" sessions; mysterious calls and visitations occurred; mistaking me for an "insider," a national official eagerly told me just why the International Commission's resolution must be passed. Those who were "witty" (privy to the secret of the tie to CIA in the argot of the NSA leadership) had assured him, he said in stage-conspirator whispers, that NSA's influence overseas depended on the Association's being friendly toward the Cuban Revolution's goals; important "contacts" felt the resolution essential. And, in this case, the national officers of the Association staked much of their prestige and expended a great deal of their credit in getting the desired resolution through.

No Liberals Here

It is too much, perhaps, to ask the American liberal to judge the effects of CIA on NSA in substantive terms, wedded as liberals are to procedures and means—often at the expense of goals. Conservatives, however, are not so constrained. Donald Lukens, (R., Ohio), a freshman Congressman with a long history of involvement in ultrarightist student groups, asked as soon as the story became public why CIA had provided funds for an organization which "consistently opposed the strategic interests of the United States?" Lukens may have meant to imply the rather unlikely proposition that CIA had somehow been a "Communist dupe," for with the right all things are possible. What is clear, however, from Lukens statement is his horror in discovering that CIA's view of the "strategic interests of the United States" departed significantly and decisively from that of the American right. Nor did conservatives on the campuses miss the point during the years of CIA's relationship with the Association: whenever they were able, they took their colleges and universities out of the Association, which they regarded as a liberal pressure group or a "leftist propaganda agency." (It might be pointed out that so radical a group as SDS was born as a result of, and incubated during, the National Congresses of NSA, and SDS leaders like Paul Potter were national officers of the Association. There is a charm in the thought of CIA, however indirectly, financing SDS!)

Former agency head Allen Dulles commented that the

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agency had received full value for the money it spent in supporting a strong, articulate anti-Communist voice (if a left-liberal one) in the councils of the international student movement. So too, for twelve years NSA officials also obviously believed that they too received "full value" from the relationship. In the most limited sense, the financial security provided by the bond with CIA enabled the Association to undertake somewhat venturesome domestic programs: the disastrous deficit of NSA's experimental "book cooperative," for example, appears to have been underwritten by the Agency. This is not to assert that NSA's officials were right in their decision, but it is to indicate that the decision to receive CIA funds was a political decision in which the disadvantages to the Association were weighed against the gains which would accrue. The language of current NSA leaders, partly designed to minimize the unfavorable effects of the disclosure, misses the point.

In speaking in terms of the personal anguish and agony imposed by the relationship on NSA leaders, the terms of the decision are transferred from political ones to those of a moral apocalypse, in which good is arrayed on one side and evil on the other. Political decision is often agonizing and anguishing precisely because it involves a weighing of goods, a relative assessment of the importance of values. Officials of the Association in 1965-1966 decided that the disadvantages of the tie with CIA outweighed the gains, and that decision is easy enough to defend. The moralistic style of thought, however, transferred this assessment into a "salvation experience": it made it seem proper, for example, for an NSA officer to "leak" the material to another, unauthorized NSA employee who, in his turn, transformed it into sensational magazine material. Omitted from this process was any consideration for the good faith of previous NSA officials who had weighed the scales differently, or of any obligation or consideration due the good faith of the Agency. The officer responsible, who need not be named here, acted not as a political leader of a continuing political organization, but the style of the pietistic moralist concerned to purge his own soul of any taint of sin, whatever the consequences for others. In this sense, the "revelation" is as much of an indictment of the moral poverty of the "established" student movement as was the relationship with the Agency which preceded it—and perhaps a more serious one.

In fact, if anything emerges from the yellow journalism of the present discussion it is this: CIA is hardly dangerous to American institutions, at least on its past record. This is not necessarily because its aims and methods are so praiseworthy and democratic, but because the Agency is so obviously naive, so apparently defective in practicing the "Craft of Intelligence." No reader of Ian Fleming or John Le Carré could fall into the errors of the Agency, which in themselves form an almost unbelievable pattern: large amounts of money are donated to an autonomous organization, whose leaders are students approximately 22-23 years old, and subject to annual change—each change, of course, threatening the security and secrecy of the relationship; the money is made available through "cover" organizations but the student organization in question has direct contact with the Agency so that the relationship can in no way be denied or concealed once the information has "leaked." In fact, NSA, despite its rather obvious unreliability, may have been able to keep the relationship secret so long because of the obvious improbability of its existence.

Whatever the indictments of the past, however, they are independent of any assessment of the value of NSA's program, in domestic or in foreign affairs, as a national leadership body for American students. The record, while spotty and inadequate in parts, is an overwhelmingly positive one. It is ironic, and as horrible a comment on the state of American politics as the "revelations" will disclose, that NSA has only gained extensive national recognition, interest and publicity because of the disclosure of a secret relation with CIA. Its programs overseas, in Civil Rights, in educational reform cannot command the attention of a rather sordid story of the plots and dealings of amateur spies. The maxim of Madison Avenue and of politics alike that all publicity is in some sense favorable may apply, and venturing the hope that it will is not amiss: perhaps NSA can turn its new prominence to advantage in winning new public and student support for its goal of making the student "in his role as student" a full member of a free society. WILSON CAREY MCWILLIAMS.

WE WERE USED'

PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, C.I.A. STYLE

During the past fifteen years we and hundreds of other students in the United States have become deeply involved in the programs of the U.S. National Student Association. We felt that we were participating in a vital part of the democratic process, helping to stimulate the free exchange of ideas among students in this country

and with students abroad. We saw the responsibility of students to become active in both domestic and international affairs. The involvement was all the more real because we were responsible only to ourselves and to our ability to defend our actions among our colleagues.

A natural bond grew among those so involved, among

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both NSA national staff and campus representatives, as well as students from abroad. Now we find that we were deceived, and that we were unwitting perpetrators of deception. We treasured the independence from government domination, and now we learn that this independence was a myth. We sought the confidence and truth of students in this country and abroad, and then we betrayed that confidence by being anknown to ourselves, a part of the U.S. government's intelligence establishment.

The National Student Association is organized through college and university student governments, and its policy has been formulated primarily through congresses held each summer, where more than a thousand students in a hectic ten-day session discuss and enact statements on a wide variety of topics of student interest. The degree of sophistication with which the topics are approached varies greatly. The national staff is then left to spend the year following up the areas of concern indicated by the Congress, responding as creatively as possible to the mandates presented to them.

But the knowledge that we now have that proposed programs were financed on the basis of priorities of a government intelligence agency whose policies were frequently at variance with those indicated by the Association's meetings, undermines many of the claims to democratic representation. It also undermines our own feeling of integrity.

Such deception, such duplicity—with, perhaps, the willing knowledge of some officers of the Association—comes not only as a surprise but also as an insult to those of us who worked believing in the essentially democratic nature of the organization.

But the organization itself is not the only one to suffer. We now each feel personal anguish at our own active involvement, no matter how open and independent our individual actions. We look back at what we did, knowing that it was for us legitimate, yet in retrospect realizing that these activities of ours served the purposes of the CIA.

Many such activities could be mentioned, for example, our promotion of foreign student exchange programs. We believed that we were expressing our solidarity with these students' efforts to overthrow colonialism, but instead these social revolutions may have been compromised by the very fact that the students from abroad were financed with the help of CIA funds. We participated in seminars designed to educate American students in international affairs, unique and stimulating experiences in themselves; but did they not in fact serve other functions coincident with policy formation by the CIA who funded the programs?

The tragedy is not ours alone. The arms of the CIA have reached out to touch hundreds of foreign students who came to the United States on programs sponsored by the NSA. Many of these students are now highly placed in their own governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America. All of them must share some of our bitterness at being used. Some, no doubt, suspected our motives from the beginning, and they have now simply found their suspicions justified.

The invisible government has woven its web throughout American society. Knowingly or not, private groups have sponsored hundreds of programs which were, in the final analysis, financed by the CIA. Most of these programs will now never attain their goals. Did the agency believe the secret could be kept? Have they placed questionable short-term goals ahead of long-term objectives (i.e., ensuring the democratic method)? We can only be appalled at the stupidity of this simple cloak-anddagger stuff, even in terms of realpolitik.

The whole affair has cast a pall over the willingness of responsible individuals to participate in organizational activity. This may well be one of its most disastrous and far-reaching effects.

HARVEY K. FLAD

MARY FOGARTY FLAD

(Harvey K. Flad and Mary Fogarty Flad were on the national staff of NSA during the early 1960's.)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ISIVALS FOR THE VIETCONG?

The repeated failure to get peace negotiations in Vietnam results, ultimately, from the fact that no one seems yet ready to negotiate anything of substance. The belief in victory—or at least in non-defeat—endures in Washington, Hanoi, and in the headquarters of the National Liberation Front. Why should it be otherwise? Nothing yet has happened to alter fundamentally the assumptions with which all of these first committed themselves to war. Only the crisis in China could yet—possibly, and only possibly—compel Hanoi to protect itself in its iso-

lation by compromising, for the present, at least, its position in this conflict.

But within Vietnam itself, the Communists have good reason to believe that they can eventually impose their will. The victory may be long delayed—until, as they insist will happen, the United States tires. But if the factor of American intervention is removed, the NFL is in by far the strongest position. This is a consequence not only of the Communists' own efforts but of the lack of serious opposition.