

Congo: The Untold Story

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This much is certain: Continue to play the Nehru, Afro-Asian game and, as surely as Tshombe is not a "clown," the strategically vital Congo will be lost

CPYRGHT

Our Congo policy is now clearly at an impasse, and we seem to be headed in the direction of another round of bloodletting. The time has come to speak out and to tell the American people the incredible story of how and where our Congo policy went off the tracks.

In the Congo situation to date, we have sought to use the UN not as an essential vehicle of our foreign policy, which it is, but as a substitute for a foreign policy of our own, which it is not. We have supported the dangerous precedent of using military forces under UN command for the purpose of bringing about the reunification of the Congo or, to be more exact, for the purpose of forcing the submission of the Province of Katanga to the Central Government in Léopoldville.

Our Congo policy has been a product of the utopian tendency to regard the UN as a kind of neutral and benevolent international organism, which by its nature, seeks to compromise conflicting national interests in a manner that best benefits the international community. This utopian concept of the UN has led us, in a number of situations, to submit passively to the will of the massive Afro-Asian bloc. In reality, the UN is an organization with no policy of its own; its policy in any given situation is something that emerges from a contest between contending interests.


It should now be clear to all that the UN policy in the Congo is not paying off. The consequences of this policy, in fact, run completely counter to our stated objective in the Congo.

We seek unity in the Congo. But, with force and threats of force as our chief instruments, no formula has yet been found for regulating the relationship between Katanga and the Central Government. For that matter, it is generally admitted today that the authority of the Central Govern-

ment barely exists outside Léopoldville.

We seek to encourage the forces of moderation. But our policy has thus far only served to encourage the extremists in the Central Government who desire nothing less than the total submission of Katanga; while, on the other side, it has only served to inflame the spirit of nationalism among the peoples of Katanga and to harden their resistance.

We seek economic stability for the Congo. But the Congo, outside Katanga, is still spiraling down and down and down in the direction of total economic chaos. Industries are not operating; revenues are not being collected; unemployment is massive;



the budget is more than twice as great as the Government's anticipated income; and the corruption and inefficiency of the Léopoldville government have now become an international scandal.

We have committed ourselves to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of civil war as prime objectives in the Congo. But there has in recent weeks been talk in the press of the possibility that the UN will again take military action against Katanga, or else will support an invasion of Katanga by the National Congolese Army. Already the attempt is being made to institute broad economic sanctions against Katanga.

Civil war between Léopoldville and Katanga would not be a simple civil war, but a civil war superimposed on a tribal war and a UN war. Such a war might conceivably destroy whatever vestige of order still remains in the Congo, and turn the country

over, first to chaos, and then to Communism.

In order to understand what is happening today in the Congo, and where we have gone wrong, it is necessary to go back to the beginning and examine the sequence of events since July 1960, when the Congo received its independence.

Basic Facts

In evaluating the Congo crisis, there are three basic background facts that should always be kept in mind. The first fact is that the Free World and the Communist world are playing for enormously high economic stakes in the Congo.

Katanga is enormously rich in its own right. It provides 8 per cent of the world's copper, 70 per cent of the world's cobalt, 80 per cent of the world's germanium—from which transistors are made—and large quantities of other precious minerals. But beyond this, it is the heartland of the vast mineral wealth of the African Continent.

Most of this mineral wealth is contained in one large oval cluster, about 500 miles in width and 800 miles in depth. Within the perimeter of this oval, in addition to the mineral wealth of Katanga, there are the diamond mines of South Africa and Rhodesia, the gold mines of South Africa, bauxite, asbestos, manganese, platinum, chromium, iron, and many other minerals.

The second basic fact is that the Congo is also the center of what might be described as a belt of political vulnerability stretching across the southern portion of the African Continent. If political vulnerability were indicated by shadings, Portuguese Angola on the west of the Congo, Northern Rhodesia on the south, and Portuguese Mozambique on the east would have to be depicted in dark

The Third World War

Wandering Planet's Course

JAMES BURNHAM

CPYRGHT

our cars for almost everybody and our supermarkets loaded with a profusion of foods—appetizing or not—just *don't* mean as much to the masses of ordinary citizens as Sputnik, Telstar, Friendship, Aurora and Vostok. To appreciate the weight of the space factor in the world power equilibrium,

we need only ask ourselves how the Cold War score would stand today if the Communists had done nothing in space.

Toward the Stars

But whatever the net accounting in terms of rational purpose, this by no means settles the matter of our space program. There is a great deal more to man than is allowed for in either General Eisenhower's or Professor Weaver's philosophy. The overriding reality is the fact that man has decided to move out into space. Not for any reason, for no more reason than drives men up the slopes of Everest or in a tiny boat across the Atlantic or on a scaffolding for ten years under the Sistine ceiling. The "reasons" are, really—even if they happen to be valid in their own right—rationalizations of what springs from roots far deeper, and darker, than reason.

It makes no difference what the space program will cost—and of course it is going to cost double, triple, ten times as much in money as any figure anyone has so far mentioned, and very much, too, in suffering and death: not all space flights will have happy endings. It will make no difference whether anyone proves incontrovertibly that the whole program is worthless in economic, scientific, military and all other rational terms. The terrible cold and darkness, the destroying radiations, the silence and desolation and tragedy will make no difference, will only make the seduction of space more compelling.

Our souls, whose faculties can comprehend

The wondrous architecture of the world,

And measure ev'ry wandering planet's course,

Wills us to wear ourselves and never rest . . .

And Tamburlaine will no more find sweet fruitions in a galactic than in an earthly crown.

"Are We Headed in the Wrong Direction?" Dwight Eisenhower asks in the August 17 *Saturday Evening Post*. He concludes, if I have succeeded in penetrating the thickets of platitude, that where we are moving fast and up, in budgets or spaceships, the answer is Yes.

"What we need in this country is . . . to put first things first." "No reasonable person wants to endanger national security by cutting defense spending below safe limits." "Money alone cannot solve the problem [of the Red threat], and to spend more than necessary can damage our overall position as surely as spending too little." General Eisenhower deploys these invulnerable truisms as a screening force to cover the advance of a flanking paragraph on the space program.

"By all means," he continues, "we must carry on our explorations in space, but I frankly do not see the need for continuing this effort as such a fantastically expensive crash program. . . . Why the great hurry to get to the moon and the planets? . . . From here on, I think we should proceed in an orderly, scientific way, building one accomplishment on another, rather than engaging in a mad effort to win a space race.

"If we must compete with Soviet Russia for world 'prestige', why not channel the struggle along the lines in which we excel—and which mean so much to the masses of ordinary citizens? Let's put some other items in this 'prestige' race: . . . our cars for almost everybody instead of just the favored few . . . our supermarkets loaded with a profusion of appetizing foods."

Many of his readers will share these qualms—or would have until ten days ago—about our vast space programs, particularly about Project Apollo and its successors, designed to take man himself to the moon and other planets. General Eisenhower objects with a conservative rhetoric, protesting from a sound - dollar, balanced - budget

premise the "fantastic" cost and "mad" haste. But objections are also being launched from a Liberal base. In *Saturday Review*, for example, Professor Warren Weaver, one-time president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, mournfully lists all the welfare that could be bought with the moonshot billions: big salary hikes for all professors; juicy fellowships for oodles of scientists; ten new medical schools; complete new universities for all the new nations, etc.

Both conservative and Liberal critics are applying a utilitarian standard. In sum, they argue that the far-out space program is not "rational": by which they mean that it does not serve any useful economic, scientific or military purpose.

How Rational is Man?

Now whether the super-space program is in fact rational as so defined is, I think, arguable. No one knows what the economic consequences, direct and indirect, may be; but it does seem probable that a slower, less wrenching program would be preferable economically. The scientific balance is not so clear. Doubtless there is no strictly scientific reason in favor of a fast, all-out pace for Apollo and his offspring, but there are sure to be great scientific and technological gains, many of them unanticipated by-products, from the big projects.

In the military dimension, the first establishment of a permanent space platform or moon base might well yield overwhelming preponderance; and if we interpret "military" to include the whole range of conflict with the Communist enterprise, there is more than enough justification for a space program on our part even more grandiose than anything so far planned. Surely the world response to Vostok III and IV should put that beyond doubt. In spite of General Eisenhower's reasonable conviction,

gray. The establishment of a Communist regime in the Congo would enable the Kremlin to take over all of the countries within this band of political vulnerability, and this with very little effort or delay.

Once this were done, the Kremlin would have bases on both the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Having bisected the African Continent, it would then be in a position to push north and to push south, to complete its conquest of the African Continent.

The Congo, therefore, is the key to the control of the African Continent, economically, politically, and militarily. This is basic fact No. 2.

Basic fact No. 3 has to do with the strategy of political conquest which the Kremlin has designed for this portion of Africa. This strategy is incredibly simple, incredibly cruel, and has proved itself incredibly effective. It seeks to drive out the white people by violence and terror, thus creating a vacuum which only the Communists can fill. Indeed, I am informed that the Communists are offering large sums of cash to African nationalist leaders for "delivered" acts of violence against whites.

To the extent that the Congo is held together economically, it is dependent on the core of white technicians who work in its mines, its plantations and its industries, to the white teachers who staff its schools and universities, to the white doctors who will have to staff its hospitals for many years to come, to the missionaries who have done so much to bring peace and order and civilization to the Congo. A single incident, however, is sufficient to persuade thousands of white people to leave the Congo, taking with them their families and a critical portion of the fabric of order and civilization.

Before the massacre of the thirteen Italian airmen at Kindu last November there were approximately one thousand white technicians in the city, most of them associated with Kindu's great river port facilities. After the massacre, I was told, only fifty of these white technicians remained.

Such is the terrible price of the violence fanned by Lumumba and the agents of Moscow.

The Congo got its independence on June 30, 1960. On July 6, 1960, as

if at a given signal, soldiers throughout the Congo mutinied against their white officers, and berserk demonstrators rampaged through the residential areas of Congolese cities in a national orgy of murder, mayhem, rape, and pillaging. Instead of attempting to restrain his countrymen and restore order, Patrice Lumumba, as Prime Minister, fanned the flames and incited his people with demagogic appeals to black racism.

The reaction to the July events was a mass flight of Belgian technicians, administrators, and medical men. For more than a week, Sabena Airlines diverted its entire fleet to the Congo to remove the terrified refugees. To protect Belgian lives and property, the Belgian Government sent several units of paratroops back to the Congo. It was at this point that Lumumba appealed to the UN, requesting the urgent dispatch of UN military assistance to protect the Congo against Belgian military intervention. Meeting on the night of July 13 and 14, the Security Council adopted a Tunisian resolution calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorizing the Secretary General to provide such military assistance as might be necessary until the Congolese security forces were in a position to meet fully their tasks. This was the beginning of the UN Congo army which today numbers some fifteen thousand men.

Meanwhile, on July 11, President Tshombe had proclaimed Katanga an independent country, after moving resolutely to put down a mutiny among the troops stationed in Elisabethville and to restore public order in the Province. In explaining his action, President Tshombe pointed to the disorders that were rampant throughout the northern Congo. "I am seceding from chaos," he said.

The United Nations did not recognize Katanga's secession. On the other hand, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld refused Lumumba's

demand for UN intervention and took the stand that the UN force could not become a party to internal conflicts in the Congo.

During the months of July and August, Soviet and Czechoslovak and other Communist bloc technicians poured into the Congo by the hundreds. At the height, there were some six hundred of these experts in Léopoldville attached to the Communist embassies. Western intelligence agencies were also able to trace the influx of fantastic sums of Communist money. Communist arms and trucks and planes began to arrive, most of them through Stanleyville.

It seemed as though nothing could save the Congo.

We have been told repeatedly over the past year that the UN saved the Congo from Communism. The UN did no such thing. The Congo was saved by the courageous action of two men, President Tshombe of Katanga, and Colonel Mobutu. As Colonel Mobutu—now General Mobutu—told me personally when I was in the Congo last November, the UN, under Rajeshwar Dayal, did everything in its power to undercut his position and to impede his operations against Lumumba and the Lumumbaists.

These are facts.

Recognizing Tshombe as an arch-enemy, Lumumba attempted to invade Katanga in the month of August. He suffered a disastrous and humiliating defeat, which weakened his hold on the government and facilitated his overthrow.

Lumumba's Legacy

In mid-September 1960, Colonel Mobutu overthrew the government of Lumumba, ordered the Communist embassies and technicians out of the Congo, and set up the so-called College of High Commissioners, consisting of university graduates, to administer the country on an interim basis.

But the damage wrought by Lumumba before he was overthrown was so great that, even given the most favorable developments, it will take years and conceivably decades for the Congo to recover. The fabric of social order in a primitive country like the Congo, once it is shattered, is about as difficult to put together again as Humpty Dumpty's fragile shell.

When I was in the Congo last No-



member, I was told that the Congolese National Army had remained in a state of chronic mutiny and banditry ever since the uprising of July 6, 1960. There are possibly several thousand soldiers in the army who may be considered reasonably disciplined. The rest of the 25,000 men, while receiving their pay, are terrorizing the populace and defying every effort to bring them under control. To my mind, there has probably never been a more preposterous situation. On the one hand, the American taxpayer is being called upon to subsidize an army of bandits and mutineers whose GIs get paid at the fantastic rate of more than \$180 per month, compared with \$85 per month for the American GI. On the other hand, the American taxpayer is being called upon to pay the lion's share of the bill for a UN army whose prime function, in the Congo north of Katanga, has been to defend the Congolese people against their own army. It is high time that an end was called to this nonsense.

When Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake arrived in the Congo in early July, 1960, it was immediately apparent to him that the restoration of discipline in the Congolese Army took precedence over everything else, and he made repeated representations to this effect. The UN might have brought the situation under control when it first came into the Congo had it acted resolutely and immediately to disarm the mutineers, disband the worst units, and restore order in the others. But the UN could not make up its mind that it had the authority to take such action; and, under the regime of Rajeshwar Dayal, who became UN director for the Congo on August 20, 1960, the UN seemed to be far more interested in supporting Lumumba and undermining Mobutu than it was in restoring discipline in the Congo Army.

The result was that nothing was done.

In any country which has only recently emerged from the jungle, the maintenance of order is the beginning of everything. In the absence of order and effective government, the once-rich Belgian Congo has become an economic wasteland. The production of staple crops like cotton and rice has fallen to one-third and one-fourth of pre-independence levels. In the city of Léopoldville almost half

the labor force is out of work. Government revenues are not being collected. Even with the massive subsidies from the UN, from Belgium, and from the United States, the Congo Government stands on the brink of insolvency and breakdown.

For much of this mess in the Congo, Patrice Lumumba and his racist and Muscovite cohorts are to blame. But frankness demands that at least a portion of the blame be assessed against the ineptness of a UN policy that has made the forced submission of Katanga its prime objective rather than the restoration of order in the rest of the Congo.

The overthrow of Lumumba encouraged the Congolese leaders, in Katanga and Kasai, as well as in Léopoldville, to think again in terms of national unity. They were further encouraged to think of unity because of the threat posed by Antoine Gizenga's rival government, which had been established in Stanleyville in mid-November with Soviet-bloc support, and because of their grave dissatisfaction with UN policy under Dayal.

On March 6, 1961, on the prime initiative of President Tshombe, a



conference of Congolese leaders convened at Tananarive, the capital of Madagascar, or Malagasy, as it is now known. Only Gizenga, among the top-ranking leaders, was absent. The conference terminated in an agreement—the so-called Tananarive Agreement—proposing a loose confederation of states, under the presidency of Mr. Kasavubu. The Tananarive Agreement had unique possibilities precisely because it was achieved voluntarily, and on the basis of Congolese initiative. I believe that had

we taken the Tananarive Agreement as a starting point, and had we used our influence in a friendly way to urge tightening up where we felt it needed tightening up, Tananarive might have led to a viable and enduring arrangement.

Perverted Intent

Tananarive was bitterly attacked by the Afro-Asian extremists and by the Communists. They attacked with particular virulence Tananarive's proposal to bypass or ignore the Lumumbaist-dominated Parliament. But I have reason to believe that there were in our Department of State those who looked upon Tananarive with an open mind, who felt that we should accept it as a point of departure, rather than reject it out of hand.

That was a period of bustling and mysterious activity on the question of the Congo. The Congolese Government had publicly and repeatedly demanded the recall of Dayal as chief United Nations representative. On April 4, 1961, for example, the *New York Times* reported:

Last Tuesday, Mario Cardoso, Congolese representative at the United Nations, charged that a solution of the Congo problem had been prevented by what he termed the refusal of Mr. Dayal to consult with officials of President Kasavubu's regime.

It was no secret, either, that the relations between Ambassador Timberlake and Rajeshwar Dayal had been embittered from the beginning. Ambassador Timberlake is a man who believes profoundly in the United Nations, and he was one of the first to urge that the UN be brought into the Congo. But he felt that the UN, in many respects, had failed to perform its essential functions, and that Dayal had perverted the intent of the UN's intervention in supporting Lumumba and undercutting Mobutu.

The public record indicates that Prime Minister Nehru and his foreign policy adviser, Krishna Menon, bitterly resisted the demands that Dayal be recalled. In dealing with this matter, the *New York Times* said in the same article of April 4, 1961:

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru warned today that activities to oust Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian who heads the United Nations mission in the Congo, could have "some effect on the maintenance of our forces there." On April 24, shortly after Prime

Minister I have quoted—and I ask that this sequence be carefully noted—the Congolese political leaders convened at Coquilhatville, for the purpose of pursuing the discussions initiated at Tananarive in March.

What had happened in the interim period, I of course do not know. But it is clear that President Kasavubu, Foreign Minister Bomboko, and the other Léopoldville conferees had, for some reason, decided that the loose confederation to which they had agreed at Tananarive was no longer adequate. In addition, they had decided in favor of reconvening the Lumumbaist-dominated Parliament, which the Tananarive agreement had proposed to bypass. President Tshombe was imprisoned for six weeks, until he accepted the terms of a new agreement, calling for a more centralized form of government and for the reconvening of Parliament.

On May 13, President Kasavubu announced that Parliament would be reconvened in July. So Nehru's basic demand had then been met.

On May 25, Rajeshwar Dayal's resignation as UN Congo representative was announced by the UN.

In the June 5, 1961, issue *Newsweek's* "Periscope," reporting on the resignation of Dayal, stated that Dayal's chief critics, United States Ambassador Timberlake and British Ambassador Ian Scott, would be recalled within several weeks, as a sequel to Nehru's acceptance of Dayal's resignation.

The Turning Point

What happened then? In early June, without any explanation other than the questionable explanation that he needed a rest, Ambassador Timberlake was recalled. His recall, in my opinion, marked the turning point in our Congo policy. It marked a victory for officials and advisers in the Department of State who attach transcendent importance in the conduct of our foreign policy to the task of pleasing Nehru. Since Nehru believes in coalition governments with pro-Communist elements in Laos, the Congo, and other points, these advisers apparently also believe in the viability of such governments.

The recall of Timberlake raises many questions.

partment officer, with a record of more than thirty years of service in many countries, an Ambassador who was worshipped by his staff and who commanded the admiration and affection of every American correspondent in the Congo, an Ambassador who had not hesitated to stand up to the UN representative when he felt that this representative was violating the intent of the UN or failing to carry out his intent. After spending eleven months in the Congo, he had mastered the incredible intricacies of its politics, and had reached the point of maximum utility. And yet, for some mysterious reason it was decided to recall this Ambassador without any explanation—and to recall him so hurriedly that no replacement was available to take over at the point of his recall. Ambassador Gullion, who replaced Ambassador Timberlake, did not arrive in the Congo until early September, three months after Timberlake's departure.

Ambassador Timberlake's unceremonious recall was all the more perplexing because it coincided with one of the most critical periods in the history of the Congo. At the Coquilhatville Conference it had been decided that the Congolese Parliament would be reconvened at the University of Louvanium in Léopoldville toward the end of July. To this Parliament, with its heavily Lumumbaist majority, was to be entrusted the task of electing the future government of the Congo.

There was a serious danger that the Louvanium Conference might result in the election of a government headed by Gizenga or some other pro-Communist. It was obviously in our interests to use our influence—with propriety, but nevertheless with energy—to help assure the election of a middle-of-the-road government. But, during this entire critical period our Embassy remained without an Ambassador.

The State Department is a complex organization, and I do not pretend to know who in the Department was responsible for Ambassador Timberlake's recall. But from the sequence of events, it would almost appear that whoever were responsible were so determined to get Ambassador Timberlake out of the country before the Louvanium Conference that they

were recalled over the prospect of leaving the Embassy without an Ambassador.

As my final observation on the Timberlake matter. I find it disturbing that this senior and respected officer, upon his recall from the Congo, was assigned to an obscure position as State Department representative to the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Ala.

Coincidence?

Perhaps it was all a matter of coincidence. Perhaps it was also a matter of coincidence that Mr. Jerome Lavallee, the UN advisor in the State Department's Office of Central African Affairs, who had originally been assigned the task of maintaining friendly relations with the Katanga representative in this country, was transferred to the Commerce Department.

Perhaps it is also a matter of coincidence that within the past few days, Mr. Lewis Hoffacker, the American Consul in Elisabethville, has been transferred to another post. Mr. Hoffacker had performed the incredible diplomatic feat of maintaining a friendly relationship with Tshombe, while faithfully representing a State Department policy which Tshombe felt opposed him at every point. Indeed, at the present time, Hoffacker is probably the only member of the American Foreign Service who commands Tshombe's personal respect and for whom he has feelings of friendship.

I am constrained to ask whether this is the reason why this outstanding consular officer, after less than ten months in Elisabethville, has been transferred to another post?

As I see it, the positions of the interested parties in the period preceding the Louvanium Conference, were approximately as follows:

The Soviets were aiming for a Moscow-oriented government under Gizenga as Prime Minister, as their first choice. As a second choice, they were willing to consider a coalition in which the pro-Soviet and neutralist elements were properly represented.

Nehru and the Afro-Asian extremists were aiming for an Adoula-Gizenga coalition—and they might even have been willing to go along with a Gizenga-Adoula coalition, that is, a

coalition with Gizenga in the number-one spot, had such a thing come into being. The one variant all the Afro-Asian extremists would have found completely unacceptable was a moderate pro-Western coalition centered around the personalities of Adoula and Tshombe.

Coalition Combinations

The UN representatives, whose position and philosophy require that they attempt to satisfy all sides—the Communist bloc, the Afro-Asians, and the West—favored the creation of an across-the-board coalition containing pro-Communist elements, neutralists, moderates, conservatives, and some pro-Western elements. In short, they favored an Adoula-Gizenga coalition, and in this sense their policy ran parallel to that of Nehru and the Afro-Asian extremists.

The position of the State Department was somewhat more complicated. An Adoula-Gizenga coalition was acceptable to it, although I know there were members of the Department who had grave reservations about the viability of such a coalition. On the other hand, a government with Gizenga in the No. 1 position was completely unacceptable; if it appeared that the only choice was between a Gizenga government and an Adoula-Tshombe coalition, then despite the sensitivities of the Nehru bloc, the preference of everyone in the Department was clearly for the latter variant.

At this point, we come to another part of the untold story of the Congo.

The fact is that, for several days' time, when there appeared to be a serious possibility that Gizenga would emerge the victor at the Louvanium Conference, the State Department seemed to be veering in the direction of an Adoula-Tshombe government. It made strenuous efforts to persuade President Tshombe to send his parliamentarians to Louvanium and it even asked Mr. Michel Struelens, director of the Katanga Information Service in New York, to leave for the Congo on several hours' notice in an effort to effect an agreement with President Tshombe.

On July 28, 1961, Mr. Struelens visited the Department of State in the company of Jean-Marie Pwetto, Vice President of the Katanga Parliament,

Mr. Henri Kambolo, President of the Konakat Party, and Mr. Thomas Tshombe, brother of the President. He and his party were received by Mr. Vance, director of the Central African desk, and Mr. Jerome Lavallee, United Nations adviser to the Office of Central African Affairs, who told them that it was extremely important to have the Katanga parliamentarians go to Léopoldville in order to prevent a Gizenga majority.

Mr. Vance suggested that Struelens together with his three Katangan visitors, try to work out the text of an agreement between the Department of State and President Tshombe that would make possible the immediate dispatch of Katanga parliamentarians to Léopoldville.

The text of an agreement was worked out and sent upstairs to a



higher office, where it received approval. Whereupon, using Mr. Lavallee's telephone, Mr. Struelens dictated the proposed agreement to his secretary in New York for immediate transmission to President Tshombe via telex.

On the morning of July 31, Mr. Struelens received a call from Mr. Lavallee. Mr. Lavallee told him that the State Department had not yet received a reply to the telex of July 28, and that time was running out. He asked Mr. Struelens whether he could leave that afternoon for the Congo in an effort to persuade President Tshombe to accept the agreement and to dispatch his parliamentarians to the Louvanium Conference.

Mr. Struelens agreed to go, and he left that afternoon by Air France. Stopping at Brazzaville, capital of the former French Congo, Mr. Struelens had a meeting with Mr. Wilton W. Blancke, the American Ambassador, and with Mr. Robert Eisenberg, deputy director of the Office of Central African Affairs, who happened to be in Brazzaville at the time. That afternoon, Mr. Struelens left Brazzaville in the company of Mr. Eisenberg and flew directly to Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga. On August 3, President Tshombe accepted the proposed agreement without reservation. But that afternoon the radio brought the news that the Louvanium Conference had elected a government with Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister and Antoine Gizenga as Vice Premier.

President Tshombe has since charged that this coalition was a product of a desperate effort by the UN to head off the prospect of an Adoula-Tshombe coalition. I believe there is something to this charge, since the UN Secretariat could not help but be sensitive to the fact that an Adoula-Tshombe coalition would have been bitterly opposed not only by the Communist nations, but by Nehru and Sukarno and other Afro-Asian leaders.

When Mr. Struelens returned to the United States, he was thanked by the State Department for the job he had done. According to Mr. Struelens, however, the State Department officials now took the stand that Tshombe would have to bow to the accomplished fact of the Adoula-Gizenga government, and that if he did not bow, force would have to be used against him.

It would appear that the State Department performed this drastic about-turn because it felt that it no longer needed Tshombe to offset the threat of a Gizenga takeover in Léopoldville. An Adoula-Gizenga coalition was acceptable to us. It was highly acceptable to Nehru and the Afro-Asians. It was highly acceptable to Moscow. Everyone was happy.

There is still a tendency in official circles to defend the Louvanium Conference as a great triumph for American policy. It was no such thing. On the contrary, if it was a triumph for anyone, it was a triumph for Nehru and Krishna Menon and the anti-Western neutralists. And the Com-

minist press for the period indicates that the Communists at least regarded it as a step in the right direction.

It was not a triumph for the Free World when Adoula and Gizenga traveled together to the Belgrade Conference and voted for all of the malicious anti-Western resolutions adopted by the conference.

It was not a victory for the Free World when, just before the September action in Katanga, the Adoula government appointed Egide Bochely-Davidson, one of the most notorious pro-Communists in the Congo, as Administrator for Katanga. Let me state at this point, that while there are some politicians in the Congo about whose political views doubt exists, I have yet to meet a single person who will challenge the statement that Bochely-Davidson is one of the most confirmed and dangerous leftists in the Congo. Had the September military action succeeded in overthrowing the government of President Tshombe, and had Bochely-Davidson, backed by UN bayonets, been installed in power as Administrator for Katanga, the great mineral wealth of Katanga might today be a Soviet asset.

The September Action

Now we come to another untold portion of the Congo story—the true story of the September military action. The United Nations and the Department of State at the time defended the military action against the Government of Katanga in September as a matter of principle, necessity, and conformity with the UN resolution of February 21, 1961, which called for the removal of mercenaries and foreign advisers from Katanga. But there is now conclusive evidence that the September action was not ordered by UN headquarters and was, in fact, repudiated by Dag Hammarskjöld.

The so-called September action was preceded on the early morning of August 28 by a surprise action directed against the five hundred white officers and NCO's then openly serving with the Katangese armed forces. As a result of this operation, which was officially known as "Operation Decapitation," the majority of the non-Katangese military personnel was apprehended and deported.

How the September action came about has been described with amazing frankness by Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, at the time chief UN representative in Katanga, in two articles written for the *London Sunday-Observer* in December 1961, subsequent to his separation from the UN. I would like to quote several paragraphs from Dr. O'Brien's account:

On September 10, Mr. Mahmoud Khiari and Mr. Vladimir Fabry arrived in Elisabethville with instructions for General Raja, commander of UN forces in Katanga, and for myself. Mr. Khiari, a Tunisian, was nominally head of the UN civilian operations in the Congo, but Dr. Linner had entrusted, or relinquished, to him great authority in the political field in which he had shown enormous ability. He was mainly responsible for the successful meeting of the Congolese Parliament, for the Adoula-Gizenga rapprochement, and for the emergence of a well-balanced Central Government.

Mr. Khiari gave us our instructions in the drawing room of *Les Roches*, my residence in Elisabethville. Those present at the main meeting at which the instructions were given included, as well as General Raja and myself, and Mr. Khiari and Mr. Fabry, Col. Jonas Waern, the Swedish officer commanding South Katanga; Col. Bjorn Egge, the Norwegian intelligence officer; and my deputy, Michel Tombelaine.

The instructions were as follows: to take over the post office, the radio studio and the transmitter; to raid the Sureté and Ministry of Information offices; to arrest any European official found there, and seize their files; and to arrest Godefroid Munongo, the Minister of the Interior; Jean-Baptiste Kibwe, Vice President and Minister of Finance, and Evariste Kimba, so-called Foreign Minister. Tshombe also was to be arrested, if absolutely necessary. Mr. Fabry, who was then legal adviser to the ONUC at Léopoldville, and who was to die in the crash at Ndola, produced from his briefcase *mandats d'amener*—roughly equivalent to warrants for arrest—for Tshombe, Munongo, and the others. These warrants bore the seal of the Central Government.

When I went to Léopoldville, several weeks after the close of hostilities, I found to my bewilderment that neither General McKeown nor Mr. Linner knew of the instructions I had received. In New York I found that neither Dr. Bunche nor General Rikhye—the military adviser—knew about them either. Dr. Bunche believes that Mr. Hammarskjöld did not know about them at all.

What emerges from all of this is

that the military action of the UN in Katanga in September 1961 was the product of neither principle nor necessity; it was the product, rather, of incredible recklessness or irresponsibility or worse.

The September roar inflamed passions on every side and probably made the December action inevitable.

Having fought this action to a standstill, and having achieved an agreement which was widely interpreted as a victory over the UN, the government of Katanga was probably less disposed to compromise than it had been previously. And the voices of the outright secessionists became louder.

Clamor in the UN

The UN forces in Katanga, having been humiliated in the first round of battle, itched for a second go, to re-establish their prestige and authority.

The Léopoldville government and the Nehru-Nkrumah faction in the UN, having seen the UN forces depart from Hammarskjöld's assurance that they would not be used to settle internal conflicts, began to clamor for more military action against Katanga.

In the Congo, more than one American commentator has made the observation that the United States was footing the bill for the operation but that UN policy, in effect, was being determined by Nehru. To be more precise, it was being determined by Nehru's guiding genius in the field of foreign affairs, Mr. Krishna Menon, who has, in my opinion, justly come to be regarded as the personification of crypto-Communism.

Certainly Nehru has enjoyed tremendous leverage in the Congo situation by virtue of the fact that India has supplied the bulk of the troops for the operation.

The Security Council resolution of November 24, which, if indirectly, led to the December fighting, had originally been opposed by Ambassador Stevenson because it was directed exclusively against Katanga and said nothing about the problem of Gizenga and Stanleyville or of secessionism elsewhere in the Congo. Ambassador Stevenson, indeed, endeavored to amend the resolution so that it would be directed equally against all secessionist activity in the Congo. But

when this amendment was vetoed by the Soviets, Ambassador Stevenson, after asking for a recess, returned to the Security Council and voted for the original Afro-Asian resolution which he had previously described as unsatisfactory. According to press accounts, he explained his actions with the words that he could not send Bomboko home empty-handed.

This, incidentally, is a prime example of what I meant when I spoke of submitting passively to the will of the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN rather than fighting militantly for our own position.

The December fighting did not produce as many casualties as the military action of September. But there was far more destruction in terms of physical damage to private property, to hospitals and other public institutions, and to industrial and business establishments. The damage in Elisabethville was particularly heavy. On-the-spot observers agreed that the UN forces had in several cases shelled and strafed clearly marked hospitals and had been guilty of atrocities against individual residents, both white and Congolese.

In the protracted argument as to who was responsible for the December action, we lost sight of fundamentals and concerned ourselves with the effects rather than with causes. The fighting of last December erupted in part because of provocative actions by both sides, in part because of the Security Council resolution of November 24. But the single most important contributing factor was the presence in Katanga of a UN army of eight thousand men. This force was doing nothing to maintain public order. It was obviously in Katanga for purposes of political pressure.

Such a situation is bound to produce tensions and incidents. The one sure way to avoid incidents and to avoid further bloodshed would be to eliminate the source of the tensions; to reduce the UN units in Katanga to the point where they no longer can be regarded as an army of occupation.

The December action resulted in the Kitona Agreement of December 21 in which President Tshombe accepted the application of the so-called *loi fondamentale* of May 1960; recognized President Kasavubu as chief of state; recognized the indivisibility of the Republic of the Congo;

recognized the authority of the Central Government over all of the Republic; and agreed to place the Katanga gendarmerie under the authority of the President of the Republic.

Speaking about the Kitona Agreement at the time, I warned that if this agreement were interpreted as a document of unconditional surrender, intended to lead, step by step, to the total destruction of those who had signed under duress, then the consequences would be disastrous.

I said that such an unconditional surrender could only be enforced if we were prepared to keep a UN army of occupation in Katanga for a period of decades. Since this is clearly impossible, we had no alternative, as I saw it, but to take Kitona as a starting point, and, using all our powers of suasion with both sides, strive for a formula for the unification of the Congo that reflected a genuine mutuality of interests.

What was called for, in short, was a supreme effort at conciliation, by



the United States, by the other Western powers, and by the United Nations. But during the period in question there has not been a single concrete manifestation of friendliness toward Tshombe by higher officials in the Department of State. Instead, Tshombe has been the target of abuse and threats and ridicule, and of actions he could only interpret as unfriendly. Our relations with Tshombe over the past year seemed to be governed by an unwritten rule that no ranking American official was to visit him or have personal contact with him.

Ambassador Gullion whose prime task in the Congo is to effect a reconciliation of Tshombe with Adoula, has to this day never visited Elisabethville. His personal relations with

President Tshombe are indeed so embittered, that I fear he lacks the personal leverage essential to a serious effort at conciliation. Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, during the course of his two trips to the Congo, visited minor cities, such as Stanleyville and Coquilhatville—but he studiously avoided Elisabethville.

Attitude Toward Tshombe

When President Tshombe, on three separate occasions applied for a visa to visit the United States, he was on each occasion refused. The aloofness of the State Department to Tshombe by itself would be bad enough. But the situation has been further aggravated by repeated threats of UN military action against Katanga, and by U Thant's historic contribution to diplomacy in the Congo when he recently described the Katanga leaders as "clowns."

I say in all frankness that I have considered several of President Tshombe's remarks about the State Department and U.S. capitalism most regrettable. But who can blame Tshombe if he has sometimes lost his temper and said rash things? I would point out that Prime Minister Adoula has said rash things with far less provocation or no provocation at all. I would point out that Prime Minister Adoula voted for a lot of rash anti-Western statements at the Belgrade Conference, and that he made the wild charge that Western imperialists were somehow responsible for the death of Hammarskjold. I cannot accept a standard of judgment which forgives Adoula all his rash statements and rash actions, but holds Tshombe fully accountable, in perpetuity, for every intemperate statement he has made in moments of stress, and with considerable provocation. We are dealing with human beings, not with robots, and not with clowns.

During the first few months, the Adoula government, apparently speaking with our encouragement, insisted on nothing less than an absolute adherence to the *loi fondamentale*, as prescribed by the first clause of the Kitona Agreement. When Tshombe came to Léopoldville for his first round of discussions with Prime Minister Adoula in March of this year,

one of Adoula's spokesmen told the press:

"If Tshombe is prepared to accept the *loi fondamentale*, there is nothing to discuss. If he is not prepared to accept it, there is nothing to discuss."

The *loi fondamentale* was drafted by the Belgian Government as a provisional constitution for the Congo, to remain in effect only until the Congolese Parliament had had an opportunity to adopt a constitution of its own. In this interim period it provided for a highly centralized form of government.

However, I know of no one who today believes in the possibility of a highly centralized government, at least in the early stages, for a sprawling, heterogeneous, loosely knit country such as the Congo. Centralization is something the Congo will have to grow into.

This, essentially, was the position taken by the UN Congo Conciliation Commission in its report of March 21, 1961, which specifically rejected the *loi fondamentale* as unsuitable for the Congo. And I believe the wisdom of this position is recognized by the State Department, by our allies, and by a great majority of the political leaders in the Congo.

Beyond the pointless insistence on the *loi fondamentale*, the attitude of Prime Minister Adoula and of the Léopoldville authorities during the first round of negotiations left much to be desired.

Impasse

I have received the impression that in the second round of negotiations which terminated on June 21, Prime Minister Adoula and his colleagues were more moderate and less insistent on the so-called *loi fondamentale*. I have also received the impression, from a distance, that on certain points President Tshombe's position seems to have hardened. All accounts are agreed that a kind of impasse seemed to have developed between the two leaders.

It is in the interests of Katanga, it is in the interests of the Congo as a whole, and it is in the interests of the entire Free World that a way be found to break the present impasse. I believe that it can be broken, because I believe that Tshombe and Adoula really do want to get together

I would not be prepared to say that everyone around Tshombe desires unity. But from a day and a half of conversations with Tshombe, I am convinced that he is wise enough to realize that if the rest of the Congo ever went under, and if the Kremlin established operation bases in Léopoldville and Stanleyville, an independent Katanga could not long survive. He is wise enough and moderate enough in his views to realize that, ultimately, the fate of Katanga is bound up inextricably with the fate of the Congo.

To a far greater degree than is commonly realized, I believe that the present impasse is due to the ineptness and corruption of the Léopoldville government and its complete failure, even with the massive assistance it is receiving from the United States, from Belgium, and from the UN, to establish economic order.

The scale of economic, fiscal, and political chaos in the northern Congo is almost incredible, even by African standards. The railroads are not running in most of the Congo, two-thirds of the nation's trucks are reported idle for lack of spare parts, and many of the roads have become impassable. Exports have fallen off 75 per cent from pre-independence levels.

The outrageous demands of the political parties which compose the Léopoldville government have forced Prime Minister Adoula to maintain a vastly inflated civil service. Between them, the Congolese army and the civil service eat up 80 per cent of the annual budget. There have also been a whole series of rifts and crises within the government. But within recent weeks, Prime Minister Adoula has taken energetic steps to improve the situation and his government is now made up of 28 instead of 44 members.

In relating all these facts, I do not mean to imply that all is disorder in the Léopoldville Congo, while all is order and integrity in Katanga. The Katanga Government, like every new government, anywhere in the world—and I am afraid that these phenomena are not altogether confined to new governments—has its quota of ineptness and corruption. But as the scholarly Methodist missionary, the Reverend James Brouwer wrote to me last year:

"To be sure it is far from being a

perfect government. But you are not going to get a better government in any newly independent African country for many years to come, and you may get far worse."

Reciprocal Tolerance

Knowing the facts I have here listed about Adoula, I still consider him one of the best of the available political elements in the Congo, and I favor supporting him and collaborating with him. I do not think it is too much to ask reciprocal tolerance toward Tshombe's side from Adoula's supporters in the State Department.

There is no easy way out in the Congo—and there may be no way out at all. But I feel that the history I have recorded here points to certain things that should not be done and indicates certain courses of action which may still be open to us.

We must not permit ourselves, out of impatience and frustration, to be maneuvered into another military action against Katanga. This we must avoid at all costs, because there is no course that could more certainly destroy the Congo.

I am convinced that there is no one in our State Department whose intentions *vis-à-vis* Tshombe parallel those of the Soviets. They do not wish to see Tshombe destroyed; at the worst, our own partisans of war in Katanga simply wish to cut Tshombe down a notch or two. The game they are playing, however, is an exceedingly risky one, because military actions, once they are initiated, cannot be controlled with precision. If they initiate another action, they may find that it goes much further than they have intended; they may find it winding up with Tshombe dead or supplanted by Katangese extremists. And if Tshombe were ever eliminated from the scene, I can assure you that we will find no substitute leader of comparable wisdom and moderation and understanding of world affairs.

We must choose between two alternatives: force and conciliation.

If we choose force, then let us have no illusions about the dangers or the cost. At the worst, the use of force to crush Katanga may very well destroy the Congo. At the best, it will require maintaining a UN army in Katanga for many years to come.

If we are not prepared to maintain

a UN army of occupation in Katanga for the next decade or more, then we must turn toward conciliation as the only realistic alternative. There is no third alternative. Since I reject the policy of force as dangerous and futile, I believe that the UN operation in the Congo must be completely re-oriented. We must abandon the disastrous negative diplomacy that has characterized our recent relations with Tshombe; and, while pressing our point of view, we must offer him our hand in friendship.

I believe that if we all concentrate our efforts and our assistance programs on the re-establishment of order in the Léopoldville Congo rather than on the military subjugation of Katanga, we will in the long run best be serving the ultimate cause of the unity of the Congo.

There are too many soldiers in the Congo—too many UN soldiers, too many soldiers of the National Congolese Army, too many Katangese soldiers. If we are to make conciliation and economic rehabilitation our chief objectives, it is essential that all three forces be substantially reduced.

I would point out that the eight-thousand-man UN army of occupation in Katanga alone is costing almost \$70 million a year—a figure, incidentally, double the \$40 million revenue which the Katanga Government receives from the Union Minière's operation. I believe that the UN forces in Katanga should be cut back to one-half of their present size, in return for comparable reductions in strength by the National Congolese Army and the Katanga armed forces.

In this first phase, the UN forces withdrawn from Katanga should be kept on a standby basis in the northern Congo while the least disciplined units of the National Congolese Army are in the process of being disarmed and disbanded.

In the second phase, when the task of disarming and disbanding these units has been completed and when a measure of order has been restored,



I believe the UN forces should be drastically reduced in size with a view to a rapid phasing out of the entire United Nations military operation in the Congo.

As the military operation in the Congo is reduced in size, I would propose that, in concert with our NATO allies, we work out a program of economic assistance and development covering the whole of the Congo and designed, among other things, to promote a tighter economic integration of its sprawling territory which has become so necessary.

But, above all, in seeking a successful consummation of the Adoula-Tshombe negotiations, we must seek to substitute friendship for force as the essential instrument of suasion. Who can blame Tshombe when he says:

"I cannot negotiate with a Ghurka knife on one side of my throat and a Malayan knife on the other."

The Congo also has many-sided implications for the conduct of our foreign policy. Here, within a single capsule, you can find three major phenomena that have plagued our foreign policy in recent years. First, there is the tendency to rely excessively on the UN. Second, there is the excessive deference to that fallen idol of liberalism, Jawaharlal Nehru, and his neutralist companions. Third, there is the tendency to believe that the conflict with Communism can be frozen, or that Communism can most effectively be resisted by setting up coalition governments with the Communists. It is not surprising that these three phenomena should coexist within the single capsule of the Congo, because these phenomena are organically interrelated; indeed, they constitute a kind of trinity of the philosophy of conciliation with the Communist world.

The Congo is of the greatest strategic significance to the Free World. Its position in the heart of Africa, and at the center of the band of political vulnerability to which I have preciously referred, makes it the key to the control of Africa. And if the Free World were to lose Africa, on top of its already very serious losses in Europe and Asia, the balance would be so heavily tipped against us that our very survival would be called into question.

THE WALL

(Continued from p. 134)

sistant, a former newspaper man who had untiringly tried to overcome the official military and diplomatic reluctance toward anti-Communist action. O'Donnell got his blue slip the morning after Clay left.

Berliners could choose between two explanations for Gen. Clay's departure. One version indicated he wished to return to his job as president of Continental Can. The other explanation given was that he felt he could serve Berlin better in this country than in Berlin itself. Most Berliners with whom I spoke were extremely sceptical about either alleged reason. While they did not know in detail the frustrations with which their hero had had to put up while in their city, they sensed that he had been badly frustrated. And they concluded that the toughness by which he—and they—had won the Battle of the Blockade over Communism was out of fashion in present-day Washington. Knowing the Communists as they do from unhappy experience, they fear that this new line will provoke new advances from the East which the West will not resist because to do so would be "too trivial" or "too provocative." No wonder they talk of surrender by the "salami technique."

When Berliners warn Americans against this course, they are likely to hear, first, that they themselves are suffering from "Berlin claustrophobia"—that they see the world only in the reflection of their relatively minor local problem; and second, that President Kennedy's calling back of the Reserves proved how serious his assurances of firmness in Berlin were. Their standard answer to that is that they have seen little evidence of any determination to use these troops, and General Clay's mission serves them as the case in point.

Yet the confidence of Berliners in the West is a prerequisite of their ability to remain firm themselves. It was Berlin morale as much as Allied aircraft which defeated the blockade. In the end, this morale may prove more decisive against new Soviet moves than the deployment of infantry divisions. But it will take more than public relations stunts to keep this morale high in the shadow of the Wall.