

A Communication

In a detailed communication published by The Washington Post on March 4 and released to the general press, Mr. Adrian Fisher, deputy director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has challenged certain of the assertions I made in a recent speech on the floor of the Senate and in a previous letter to the editor of The Post.

I welcome Mr. Fisher's statement because I feel that only good can come from a public discussion of the issues involved. Mr. Fisher, incidentally, was my colleague at the Nuremberg trials and while I disagree sharply with some of his statements on the test-ban issue, I have the greatest respect for him both as a man and as a Government official.

For almost two decades, the peace and security of the United States and the free world have rested upon the unchallengeable military power with which our nuclear technology has armed us. All of our honorable efforts toward lasting peace and disarmament through negotiation have failed, each in its turn, because of the calculated deceit and treachery of the Communists. Yet, because of our nuclear technology, we have preserved a form of peace.

Five years ago we began to fritter away our nuclear supremacy. We stopped testing and trusted the Soviets to stop. We halted or hobbled our development of a variety of new, revolutionary weapons. Then we awoke one September morning to find that the Soviets had cheated us again.

When the mushroom clouds of their awesome series of gigantic test shots had faded, we discovered that our precious nuclear supremacy had vanished and we suddenly entered the more perilous age of parity in nuclear technology.

Testimony Cited

Mr. Fisher disputes this loss of supremacy, but all scientists with the facts, from Edward Teller to Hans Bethe, have testified that the Soviets have cheat-

ed, our technological lead in the field of strategic nuclear weapons.

We are now asked by the Administration to end all further nuclear development by entering into a treaty with the Soviets to permanently stop all tests. We are asked to do this despite the fact that we are on the threshold of decisive new discoveries, denied us by the previous test ban, discoveries that might restore our lead and dramatically strengthen the security and peace of the free world.

The great question before us is: Does this treaty provide an adequate system of inspection with reasonable assurance that the Soviets are not secretly continuing nuclear tests that can give them the revolutionary weapons denied to us by our observance of the test ban?

I have laboriously pointed out in speeches and letters that there is no such assurance; that we have no way of detecting underground tests of a size below several kilotons; that we have no way of detecting test shots in outer space of any size. This has been conceded by Administration witnesses at congressional hearings. It is through hidden tests of these kinds that defy detection that the Soviets could develop a neutron bomb, an antimissile missile warhead and other decisive weapons.

Mr. Fisher's widely publicized letter purports to answer these statements. But the remarkable fact is that nowhere in his detailed defense of the Administration position is it said that this treaty gives us solid assurance that the Soviets cannot continue tests and develop new weapons while we are immobilized. On the contrary, he confirms my misgivings. He affirms that the proposed treaty does involve the risk of undetected cheating. He affirms that individual tests could go undetected. He concedes that there is only a

"probability" that a whole series of tests could be detected, not a certainty, but a probability, which means that there is a possibility that whole series of tests could not be detected. He says we must accept the risk of undetected Soviet cheating because other risks are more dangerous. I challenge this last contention, but before going on to it I want to nail down the fact that the proposed inspection terms do not give us a guarantee against cheating. This is the cardinal fact to which all other considerations must be subordinate.

'Reason' Is Given

The reason why the proposed inspection system is inadequate as I have tried to point out in the past, is that we have made so many retreats and concessions to the Soviets in five years of negotiations that our proposed system of monitoring stations and on-site inspections within the Soviet Union is now a hollow shell.

Mr. Fisher disputes this in two ways: First, he says that improvements in the science of detecting earthquakes and underground explosions have justified a vastly reduced inspection system within the Soviet Union. I dispute this. I say that advances in the science of deception have out-raced advances in the science of detection and I point to the fact that it is now possible for the Soviets to test secretly in outer space and to test large weapons underground without any possibility of detection. This situation did not exist five years ago and it makes any gain in earthquake science irrelevant and insignificant by comparison.

Second, he says that it does not matter, anyway, because our reliance is based, not upon monitoring inside the Soviet Union, but upon monitoring stations outside. Here the cardinal principle of American disarmament policy for 16 years goes down the drain. That principle was adequate on-site inspection and control. For 16 years the Soviets have rejected this principle and now yield to them by saying that our

reliance is on a system of outside monitoring and that the token inspection inside the Soviet Union is only "supplemental" and unimportant.

I do not take lightly the efforts of honest men to develop an inspection system that would get around the Soviet roadblock against on-site inspections, but I say to the American people: when we consider the vast land expanse of the Communist world, occupying one-fifth of the earth's surface; when we consider the limitless capacity of the Communists for fraud and deceit; when we consider their present capacity for undetectable tests underground and in space; when we consider the unknown possibilities for deception which perverted science will give them in the future, we can not, we must not, entrust our national survival to a treaty which denies us a reasonably foolproof inspection system inside the Soviet Union. We must not entrust the future of freedom to a system of absentee monitoring.

Called Speculation

I am willing to rest my case against the treaty right here, but for the sake of adequate reply I will take up Mr. Fisher's contentions that a treaty should be ratified which admittedly involves great risk and abandons adequate on-site inspection.

The reasons he advances are in the realm of political and strategic speculation. It is contended that the risks of not signing this treaty are greater than the acknowledged risks of signing it. These greater risks are continued testing by the Soviets and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations. This argument is entirely irrelevant because the proposed treaty does not prevent all testing by the Soviet Union and does not even pretend to prevent the spread of nuclear weaponry to other nations. France and China have already repudiated the negotiations.

I voted for the establish-

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