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First, an article entitled, "The Speechmaker," which was published in the October 2 issue of the New Republic under the byline of Andrew Kopkind, with a subtitle, "Senator Fulbright as the Arkansas de Tocqueville"; second, a column written by Joseph Kraft and published in the Washington Post of recent date entitled, "Fulbright and His Critics"; third, a column written by Walter Lippmann entitled, "Soviet-American Relations," which was published in the Washington Post on September 28, 1965; fourth, a column under the byline of Marquis Childs, entitled "Tyranny of the Majority in United States," which appeared in the Washington Post on September 27; and, finally, an editorial entitled "Defending Intervention," which appeared in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch during the week of September 20-26.

There being no objection, the articles and editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SPEECHMAKER: SENATOR FULBRIGHT AS THE ARKANSAS DE TOCQUEVILLE

(By Andrew Kopkind)

For his troubles in detailing the errors of U.S. foreign policy, Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT has been rewarded with a congressional resolution compounding the error and doubling his troubles. A few days after Fulbright delivered a characteristically long, intelligent, and eloquent condemnation of American intervention in the Dominican Revolution, the House of Representatives passed (312 to 52) a sentimental endorsement of armed intervention anywhere in Latin America in the event of "subversive domination or the threat of it." The rebuke had the tacit approval of the State Department and bipartisan support of the House leadership.

It is not unusual for FULBRIGHT to find himself on the short side of a 6-to-1 vote, and in his own way he derives a certain moral superiority from being a minority of one. "More than a hundred years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville warned us . . . of the dangers that might be expected from the 'tyranny of the majority.' This is the tyranny that presently is growing in our country," FULBRIGHT said in a doom-laden speech on McCarthyism 11 years ago. Last week, privately, he repeated the same phrase, and predicted the same doom. He made his Senate speech not as a political leader but as an elder statesman-without-portfolio, an Arkansas de Tocqueville whose job it is not to make policy but to report it, and by reporting, influence in some small way its future course.

He has no taste for the heat of battle or the pitch of crisis. "At this time of relative calm," his speech began, "it is appropriate, desirable and, I think, necessary to review events in the Dominican Republic and the United States role in those events. The purpose of such a review—and its only purpose—is to develop guidelines for wise and effective policies in the future." Fulbright removed himself as much as he could from the onus of personal criticism: President Johnson's decision to send 20,000 troops to Santo Domingo was understandable under the circumstances. There were "no easy choices. Nonetheless, it is the task of diplomacy to make wise decisions when they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy failed to do so in the Dominican crisis."

The blame could not be placed on the President but was laid squarely to the sources of information: the CIA, State Department intelligence, and U.S. Embassy officials in Santo Domingo. The lack of reliable information—it was inadequate and inaccurate—gets congressional leaders off the hook, too. FULBRIGHT and the usual collection of Senators and Representatives

foreign policy were called to the White House during the crisis, told the President's plans, and, in effect, asked to ratify the decision to intervene. They offered no opposition, either because they agreed with the President, or (like FULBRIGHT, perhaps uniquely) they had no independent source of information on which to base any instinctive doubts.

FULBRIGHT got the opposite of help from the White House. "The whole affair . . ." FULBRIGHT said, "has been characterized by a lack of candor." He was told at the White House that hundreds or thousands of American lives were in danger, and that the protection of these compatriots was the reason for intervention. Later, he said, he knew that it was not exactly the case: "The danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention," he said. "The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated."

There was no doubt about whose bad judgment it was. FULBRIGHT conceived the Dominican episode as a "classic study" of policymaking with the "inevitability of a Greek tragedy." The antagonist was the American Ambassador in Santo Domingo, W. Tapley Bennett. It was he who refused to help the supporters of deposed President Bosch when they pleaded for a U.S. presence on April 25, the second day of the revolution, and it was he who refused U.S. mediation on April 27, when the rebels sought a negotiated settlement.

FULL SPEED AHEAD

Bennett seemed intent on helping the military junta stay in power. General Wessin y Wessin shot off a telegram to Washington accusing his opponents of being Communists. A quick check could only turn up three Communists, and Wessin was told that the reasons for intervention were not good enough. Only a threat to American lives would bring American troops. Several minutes later, thus prompted, Wessin discovered a threat to American lives. That was all that was needed; the troopships were already speeding toward Santo Domingo. It did not take long to see just how exaggerated the danger was; in fact, no American lives were lost until the marines landed. But by that time, someone found 56, or 58, or 77 verifiable Communists, some of them alive and some of them dead, some of them in the country and some of them out, some of them pro-Castro, some pro-Pelping, and some pro-Moscow, who could be associated with the revolution. Association soon became "control," and the United States had to put the country under military command.

FULBRIGHT slowly amassed these facts in 6 weeks and 13 sessions of secret Foreign Relations Committee hearings this summer, to which almost every administration official concerned with the intervention was invited. A great many came. McGeorge Bundy politely refused. Ambassador Bennett testified and was asked about those telegrams from General Wessin y Wessin; Bennett did not remember the episode, offhand. Other witnesses had better memories. FULBRIGHT was well prepared; the committee staff is one of the best in Congress, and it organized surveys and chronologies of the crisis from a wide variety of sources. So much so, in fact, that opponents of FULBRIGHT thought they detected some kind of conspiracy. "Someone had prepared a sheaf of cards, I should say 1½ inches thick," Senator LAUSCHER reported darkly of the hearings. "When the witnesses appeared, the questions on the cards were systematically asked. One question was read, and the card was turned over. Then the second question was read, and the third." The giveaway was the systematizing. LAUSCHER was not alone in

SUPPORT GROWING FOR SENATOR FULBRIGHT IN HIS VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, in my judgment, a consensus of informed opinion in this country is developing in support of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], both in his view that debate on foreign policy is a necessary part of our democratic process and in his further view that our activities in the Dominican Republic have brought us an unnecessary amount of trouble with nations in Latin America which should be our best friends.

I also note with dismay a resolution adopted by the House of Representatives under the leadership of Representative SELDEN, which would seem to indicate that the United States believes it has a right to intervene unilaterally, with force, in any Latin American country where, in our opinion, there is a threat of a Communist takeover.

The resolution which was adopted, so far as I can tell, without any effective opposition from the State Department, has caused a furor in Latin America almost equal to that caused by our overreaction to the Dominican Republic crisis.

I would hope that in short order the State Department would undertake to issue a statement, which I am confident a number of members of the Foreign Relations Committee—possibly a majority—would approve, which would indicate a return to the sound basis of standing firmly behind our treaty commitments entered into with our fellow members of the Organization of American States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the following articles and editorials which confirm the point of view which I have endeavored to express briefly this afternoon:

One of the six "criteria" Senator Dobb has for telling an out-and-out Communist revolution from the other kind is the systematic "pattern of the revolt itself." In his long speech opposing Fulbright, Dobb said, "Spontaneous revolutions, guided by indignant nationalists, are invariably characterized by a certain amount of bungling and amateurism. But the Dominican revolt was characterized, instead, by the highest degree of precision and professionalism."

The core of Fulbright's case was that the revolution was not controlled by Communists, even if it attracted Communist supporters:

"The administration . . . assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist-dominated, or would certainly become so, and that nothing short of forcible opposition could prevent a Communist takeover. In their apprehension lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba, some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some Communist support that there is an important difference between Communist support and Communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to compete with the Communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them, and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against Communist subversion."

From the evidence gathered at the hearings—at which all witnesses, with the exception of former Gov. Luis Muñoz-Marín, of Puerto Rico, were in the administration—Fulbright concluded that the charge of Communist control of the revolution does not stick. The motive behind U.S. intervention was a new dedication to preserve the status quo in Latin America against all revolutionary forces about which there is any suspicion of political instability. What happened between the coup against President Bosch in September 1963, and the attempted return of Bosch's party, the PRD, in April 1965, was a shift to the right in American foreign policy notably toward Latin America. Fulbright saw American policymakers increasingly preoccupied with the anti-Communist credentials to the exclusion of all other aspects of their roles.

The springs of the rightward surge were not clear. Fulbright senses an unwillingness on the part of State Department officials to take chances with the Latin American left after the dreadful experience of William Wieland, who fought for 5 years to regain his security clearance as a U.S. Foreign Service officer after he had the misfortune to be on the Cuba desk during Castro's accession to power. No doubt Fulbright believes Ambassador Bennett and a raft of lesser officials have Wieland's example before them.

More important, Fulbright thinks, is the loss of genuine commitment to social change which inspired Kennedy's policy, haphazard as it was, toward the Latin countries. Now, policy planners seem to conceive America's interest more mechanically, as a matter of who's with us and who's not. That sounds very toughminded, but it is often simpleminded: such a policy misses the long view of history as the politics of change. Fulbright sees the national interest coinciding more than casually with the revolutionary forces at work in the hemisphere.

His world view is an ever-changing subtly shifting abstraction, a mixture of Realpolitik and idealism unbetrayed by the demands of crisis politics. He is not obsessed by a fear of communism; he is more worried at the moment about anticommunism. He detests sentimentalism in foreign policy, on the part of the left as well as the right. He harks back to the mythological basis of America's

conduct of foreign affairs. In his first Senate speech, in March 1945, he began, "Myths are one of the greatest obstacles in the formulation of national policy." His famous speech last year concerned "old myths and new realities." He is convinced that America is captive of what he calls "the obsession with communism," and that is inevitably destructive.

"We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth," Fulbright said in his Senate speech. "We are . . . much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth." Later he added, "If any group or any movement with which the Communists associate themselves is going to be automatically condemned in the eyes of the United States, then we have indeed given up all hope of guiding or influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America."

PAPA KNOWS BEST

He is willing to go far in his analysis of U.S. policy, but he stops short of the most unthinkable thought of all. A real Communist revolution in Latin America would provide grounds for American intervention. He hopes that there are viable "democratic left" forces available to fulfill revolutionary missions, but if there are none, as there very well may not be in many countries, Fulbright is not at all sure he could stomach one or two or four more Castroite regimes in the Western Hemisphere. And yet that seems to be a necessary corollary of his speech. He may be right about the "essential legitimacy" of the Dominican revolution, that is, its derivation from Bosch and the PRD. On the other hand, he may be wrong; the difference between his position and his opponents' on that central issue is one of method, not of philosophy. Dedication to social change and revolutionary reform means accepting nasty consequences along with beneficial ones. It requires an extremely narrow definition of "threat to the national interest." The relationship between nations must be one of equality, and intervention conceived only as a last resort when there is a clear threat and imminent danger. Fulbright still clings, perhaps unconsciously, to a paternalistic approach to Latin America. In his view, what papa knows best is left-of-center social reform. That is much better than most American papas will admit, but it may not be enough.

Fulbright's speech was the best on any subject made on the floor of the Senate during this session. It was clear, elegantly styled, and subtly intellectual. It was also received with towering hostility, by many of Fulbright's Senate (and committee) colleagues, and in much of the press. The White House is said to have responded with predictable unhappiness. The best that was heard from the administration was the guarded comment of one aid—not at all in the inner circle—who ventured the opinion that he was "glad the speech was made."

But it is the measure of Fulbright's role in the Senate that his friends, as much as his enemies, were critical. He is the archetypal loner, the most antichub of all the Senators. He is stuck with an unwieldy (19 members) committee which he assumed is stacked against him. He may be right; it seems to be a question of how one counts the members. Fulbright counts them very much against him, at least as they stand in their pristine ignorance. Other members think that with pressure and tutoring, a majority of the 13 Democrats, and perhaps the entire committee, could be welded into a cohesive opinion bloc with a consistent point of view. It would require only minor compromise on Fulbright's part, but a great deal of effort and charm.

Fulbright apparently wants to expend little of either. He begins with an idea of the futility, if not exactly the inappropriateness, of Senate participation in specific matters of foreign policy. Crises are for executives. He admits that a strong leader could galvanize a willing Foreign Relations Committee and perhaps influence policy decisions, but at the same time he knows that he is not that man.

Neither are his committee fellows. Immediately under Fulbright is Senator SPARKMAN, then Senator MANSFIELD, then Senators MORSE, RUSSELL, LONG, GORE—and so on. The ranking Republican is Senator HICKENLOOPER. The truth is that there are no Borahs or Cabot Lodges (Senior, of course) available, and there is no one to lead the Senate in foreign affairs in a way which might even approach the authority of the Johnson administration.

ONE-MAN SHOW

Some wish that Fulbright would try, but he will not. He did not attempt to get a report to the committee on the Dominican investigation. One of his friends on the committee asked him to see about a majority and minority report (he might have won more than half the Democrats to his side), and muttering something about "bi-partisan" and "impossible," Fulbright let the suggestion go by. Only the loyal Senator CLARK, among his committee friends, was on hand in the Senate to support his position. He is not worried by the dire predictions of his banishment from the White House. His influence there is already severely circumscribed, both because of the divergence of his and the President's views, and also because the President wants very much to run his own show; the executive department advisors are part of his show, but the legislators are definitely not. Even with President Kennedy, with whom Fulbright was on quite good terms, his voice was small. Fulbright's brilliant Cuban memorandum, submitted shortly before the Bay of Pigs invasion, was not heeded. Neither was his argument to the invasion planners on the eve of the crisis. Arthur Schlesinger says, in his memoirs, that he was the only one in the White House planning session who shared Fulbright's doubts. Maybe the President did, too.

The more Fulbright looks at the possibilities for effectively influencing policy decisions, the more he is overcome with that sense of futility. It is almost an existential anguish; he periodically wonders (sometimes in public, on the floor of the Senate) whether he ought not, after all, resign as chairman of the committee and be done with it. He is restrained by a sense of responsibility and a sense of history, which amount to the same thing. His speeches seem to be prepared for instant anthologizing; they are addressed to posterity as much as to the Chair.

His friends say that he is inclined to moments of petulance, which are sometimes visible. Last spring, he announced that he was through with foreign aid bills until they were put on a more rational basis. He favored authorization terms longer than 1 year (so that the President would not have the drain of a yearly appropriation fight) and moves toward institutionalizing aid in international funds. Fulbright knows that the "ingratitude" of aid recipients, which shows up in the burnings of libraries and the stonings of embassies, grows out of the unbridgeable hostility between the giver and the getter. "Shakespeare said it," Fulbright says snappishly, "loan loses both itself and friend."

But by the end of the session, Fulbright was back at his post, managing the foreign aid bill in the Senate. He tried to get other committee members—MORSE, SPARKMAN, CHURCH—to take it over, and for their own good reasons they refused. Fulbright even

October 7, 1965

caved in on the 2-year authorization clause in an extended conference with House Members. He did not have the power to pull it off.

FULBRIGHT's constituency, of course, is far wider than the boundaries of Arkansas. It includes much of liberal intellectual America, and more than that, educated opinion in most of the non-Communist world. Most Latin Americans in Washington last week were overjoyed at FULBRIGHT's speech. One of the most important political leaders in South America sent him a telegram of warm congratulations. FULBRIGHT hopes that his consistent opposition to U.S. military adventure can keep American prestige alive in Latin America, something like Labour's opposition to Suez kept Britain's prestige viable, if barely so, in the Middle East, against the distant day when new policies could be formulated. Similarly, De Gaulle's repudiation of France's long-held Algerian policy made it seem as if it were never held at all.

America as a political monolith is a more dangerous image to project than a picture of America riven with dissent, FULBRIGHT thinks. The White House, of course, is terrified that the world will overestimate the importance of the dissenting opinions, and doubt the administration resolve. FULBRIGHT has no such nightmares.

It is all very simple for him. He went to some hearings, reviewed the record, wrote a speech with the help of his staff, and gave it one day to a near-empty Senate. Almost that simple: he did put it off for about 3 weeks while the provisional government of Hector Garcia Godoy was installed in Santo Domingo. Then, when there was absolutely no chance of having any effect on current events, he unwound.

He cannot understand what the fuss is all about. Journalists buzz around his office searching for hidden meanings and unrecorded connections. What is FULBRIGHT up to? Did he really mean Vietnam when he was saying Dominican Republic? (He did make one oblique reference to Vietnam in his speech; he wondered why the United States is so eager to keep "more ambiguous and less formal promises" made to Saigon and yet willing to disregard formal commitments to the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty.) Is he bitter because he was passed over for Secretary of State? Is he frustrated by the voting demands on a southern Senator (not only against voting rights this year, but also against such liberal measures as increased minimum wage and home rule for the District of Columbia)? His claim to represent a revolutionary spirit for social reform is seriously, if understandably, flawed. Perhaps an awareness of the inconsistency of his political behavior makes his outbursts more vivid.

FULBRIGHT advises all doubters to apply Occam's razor. The simple explanation is the true. He only appears to be a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. He is really an uncomplicated Rhodes scholar from Arkansas interested in the price of chickens and international relations.

His own theory to explain the extraordinary outcry which followed the Senate speech has to do with the constructions of consensus politics, as well as the sensitivity to criticism generated by the continuing foreign crisis. He is not alone in worrying about the anti-Communist hysteria which seems to be building up again in the United States, as it did during the Korean war. That, too, followed a period of mild liberal nonconformity, something like the early 1960's. Senator FULBRIGHT's speeches were heard then in lofty condemnation of McCarthyism. As always, they were cool, sensible, and well-reasoned. This time, it may take more than speechmaking to set things right.

FULBRIGHT AND HIS CRITICS

(By Joseph Kraft)

The doubts raised by Senator FULBRIGHT with respect to this country's policy in Latin America have been intensified by the cries of his critics.

Basically, the Senator was only posing a good question. He was asking whether this country had reverted to the policy of direct military intervention in South America.

With the Dominican case before him, he sensed a new disposition to identify all social protest with Communist subversion, and a connected tendency to shoot first and think later. He pointed out that there were important distinctions between protests backed by the Communists and protests under their control. He suggested that when trouble south of the border developed next, it might be appropriate for this country to think first and shoot next.

A reasonable, and I believe honest, response to Senator FULBRIGHT's question was available to the administration. It would have emphasized that there was no basic change in American policy; that there were matters open for debate in the Dominican record; but that the Dominican case, because of the special impact of the Trujillo dictatorship, was a special one without general application to Latin America.

The actual reaction was not unlike the stoning reserved by the high priests of primitive communities for those who question the efficacy of blood sacrifice.

For a starter there was Senator THOMAS DONN, of Connecticut, with his usual tactic of crying soft on communism. DONN charged that FULBRIGHT "suffers from an indiscriminating infatuation with revolutions of all kinds, national, democratic, or Communist."

Short remarks in similar vein were made by Senators FRANK LAUSCHE and RUSSELL LONG—a Member of Senator FULBRIGHT's Foreign Relations Committee who had not even bothered to attend the committee's recent hearings on the Dominican Republic. Then in defense of the American Ambassador in the Dominican Republic, Tapley Bennett, there boomed the big gun of the Senate, RICHARD RUSSELL, of Georgia.

RUSSELL had known Ambassador Bennett "as a small boy." He had known "his father and his mother." He had known "both of his grandfathers." Only last year he had had a meal "with Ambassador Bennett's father and mother on their Franklin County farm in the rolling red clay hills of northeast Georgia." With that pedigree, and that solid rural background, how could anyone even begin to have doubts?

A day earlier, the House had expressed its reaction to Senator FULBRIGHT. It passed by an overwhelming vote a resolution that, in effect, endorsed direct military intervention by the United States in Latin America to prevent "subversive action or the threat of it."

By themselves, neither the House resolution nor the Senate statements have any practical force. But precisely because they are free of real content, they provide a good measure of the play of domestic and bureaucratic politics on foreign affairs.

At the base, plainly, there are politics with self-interested motives for raising anew the issue of softness on communism. The original author of the House resolution, ARMISTEAD SELDEN of Alabama, for instance, comes from a district that is being changed by reapportionment, by Federal registration of voters, and by possible action on the poll tax. With Negro voters due to figure in the Alabama primary next May, SELDEN can no longer fall back on the usual theme of protecting white supremacy. Instead, he is wrapping himself in the mantle of anticommunism.

Politicians with such an obvious interest in raising the Communist issue are, to be sure, limited in number. But their strength is as the strength of 10 because the administration is doing nothing to organize resistance against them.

On the contrary, the administration has promoted inside the State Department a group of regular Foreign Service officers, heading up in Under Secretary Thomas Mann and Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Douglas MacArthur II, who made their way in the era of unsophisticated, monolithic anticommunism. Their ideas, indeed their careers and reputations, are tied up with that era. Not surprisingly, they practically invited the Selden resolution.

Lastly, the White House itself seems to be holding anticommunism in reserve as a rod to discipline its congressional majority. Where there is a jingoist issue working, in other words, the President wants it working on his side. He has gone soft on Goldwaterism. And while he maintains that stance, it remains a question whether this country will be able to move in harmony with the vast social changes that are sweeping Latin America, and Africa and Asia, too.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 28, 1965]

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

(By Walter Lippmann)

Last week the world had a fleeting but tantalizing glimpse of what might become possible if the cold war subsided. The U.S.S.R. and the United States acting on their parallel interests in averting a war between Pakistan and India, made it possible for the United Nations to order a cease-fire. This show of unanimity discouraged the Chinese from intervening in the quarrel.

Parallelism is a long way short of positive cooperation, and there is no assurance that a settlement of the quarrel is in sight or even that the underlying hostility will not smolder on for a very long time. Nevertheless, the events of last week were a spectacular demonstration of how all hope and prospect of a reasonably peaceable world is tied up with an improvement in Soviet-American relations.

Is an improvement possible? What is there between us that now sets us against each other? It is, quite plainly, the conflict of ideology and interest, of emotion and of prejudice, over the revolutionary condition of the so-called third world—the world of the underdeveloped and emerging nations of the Southern Hemisphere—in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The revolutionary condition is an objective historical fact of this century, and it will continue to exist no matter what the Russians or we say or do about it.

The Soviet-American conflict is about this revolutionary condition. Thus, the conflict is no longer, as it was a generation ago, about what kind of social order is to exist in the highly developed countries of Europe and North America. As a matter of fact, in this whole area, which includes European Russia itself, the old argument between the Marxists and the laissez faire capitalists has been bypassed by events. For example, the economic philosophy of General Eisenhower and Senator Goldwater in America is as dead as the economic philosophy of Marx is among the European socialists. In the whole developed, progressive, industrial world, the prevailing economic order is a mixture in varying degrees of planning and the incentive of profit of fiscal management, and social regulation.

It is in regard to the turbulence of this third world—which was not foreseen a generation ago—that the Soviet Union and the

United States find themselves locked into what has the appearance of an irreconcilable conflict.

In its official ideology, the Soviet Union is committed to the support of the revolutionaries, to the incitement and supplying of "wars of national liberation."

In the American ideology, we are not absolutely opposed to wars of national liberation, provided they are not inspired or supported by Communists. We are very much disposed to feel, however, that all revolutions will be captured by the Communists who invariably participate in them.

Thus, Russia and America find themselves in a vicious circle. The Russians are disposed to intervene wherever there is a rebellion, and the United States is inclined to intervene to oppose as aggression the Communist intervention. In the Soviet Union there exists a prejudice in favor of rebellion as such, of rebellion against any established order. The Soviet Union is the product of a fairly recent revolution. In the United States, where the revolution occurred nearly two centuries ago, there is now a prejudice against revolution. The result is a vicious circle in which dogmatic communism and dogmatic anticommunism incite and exasperate each other.

The improvement of Soviet-American relations, which is prerequisite to an accommodation between the West and China, requires the breakup of this vicious circle. How? Essentially, I believe, by fostering the ascendancy of national interests over global ideology, by the reassertion in both countries of prudence and calculation against semireligious fanaticism and frenzy.

We had a glimpse last week of how this can happen. The hostilities in Kashmir began with an infiltration of guerrilla troops (recruited as a matter of fact from the Pakistan army though they wore different uniforms). The purpose of the guerrillas was to arouse the population and to liberate Moslem Kashmir from Hindu rule. Here was a war of national liberation which the Soviet Union, according to its theoretical doctrine, was bound to support. However, the fact of the matter is that it did not suit the Soviet Union that Pakistan, in cahoots with Red China, should defeat India, which is a tacit ally of the Soviet Union. So the Soviet Union acted in favor of peace, which is its real interest, rather than on behalf of an ideological prejudice.

At the same time, the United States, having learned something in recent months, resisted the temptation to take a lofty position against aggression, and instead, reticently and prudently, choose to work quietly and behind the scenes.

This is the way that Soviet-American relations can be improved—by encouraging the prudent and the practical to predominate over the ideological and the hot. In this country, at least, the process will require the resumption of public debate—the kind of debate which Senator FULBRIGHT has once again opened up.

For the issue which he has posed in his remarkable speech is the essential issue in our attitude and policy toward the revolutionary condition of our time. The question he posed is how to tolerate rebellion, which is often necessary and desirable, without surrendering the control of the rebellion to the Communists who will always be part of it.

There is no rule of thumb for answering this question. But there has to be some kind of accommodation, such as the Soviet Union made about the Kashmir freedom fighters and such as we made about the Chinese threat of military aggression. The discussion of this serious and difficult problem cannot be monopolized by the assorted hangers-on, often more Johnsonian than Johnson himself, who are presuming to lay down the rule that only those who conform with the current political improvisations are altogether respectable and quite loyal.

TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY IN UNITED STATES (By Marquis Childs)

The Johnson consensus is so powerful that large areas of policy—normally in past years a subject for debate—are now off limits. The zeal of a majority President, who by temperament and conviction draws the line against dissenters, underscores the fears of a time of troubles when revolutionary regimes threaten all order and stability.

Add to this an expanding Federal Government dispensing money in old ways—the House just passed a \$1.7 billion pork barrel rivers and harbors bill—and new ways such as huge defense and research contracts. The sum total in the view of pessimistic observers is a new America with little resemblance to the give and take democracy of the past.

A case in point is what happened to Chairman J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Waiting until after a provisional government had been established in the Dominican Republic, FULBRIGHT in a Senate speech delivered a carefully reasoned criticism of how the Dominican crisis had been handled. This was based on an inquiry before the Foreign Relations Committee with 13 sessions at which all the principals testified.

Immediately the full force of administration spokesmen, big and little, was leveled against him. The voices turned up high, did not so much seek to refute the criticism as to discredit the critic. At the lowest level, as represented by Senator RUSSELL LONG, of Louisiana, the majority whip, the suggestion was that if you didn't believe Communists were about to take over in the Dominican Republic then you must have more sympathy for communism than you knew.

On careful rereading of the Fulbright speech it is hard to discover why the reaction was as though it had been an offense against majesty. He was saying that aspects of America's policy in the Dominican Republic compounded these faults. The example of a Senator soundly birched for faulting the administration raises a troubling question: Is any dialog at all possible on the great issues of foreign policy?

To put it another way: Must the power of the Executive be so absolute in view of the threat to America's security that critics should keep silent? An American war in Vietnam is rapidly expanding with reports of 200,000 troops to be committed by the year's end and yet scarcely a doubt is expressed publicly over the authority of the Commander in Chief to direct an undeclared war.

Granted the stakes are awesome and the power of the Executive great in conducting policy with proper secrecy as in the India-Pakistan crisis. Granted, too, that nothing succeeds like the Johnson successes.

Nevertheless, the domination of the majority is so all-encompassing that a fundamental distortion of the American system seems for the time being at least to have resulted. More than a century ago Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most searching and at the same time sympathetic foreign critics, wrote in his "Democracy in America" of the danger of the "tyranny of the majority." Of the tyranny this French aristocrat considered the main evil of democratic institutions he wrote:

"... The smallest reproach irritates its sensibility and the slightest joke that has any foundation in truth renders it indignant; from the forms of its language up to the solid virtues of its character, everything must be made the subject of encomium. No writer, whatever his eminence, can escape paying this tribute of adulation to his fellow citizens."

De Tocqueville was writing of the majority itself but his words today might be applied to the master of the majority.

"I know of no country," he wrote, "in which the majority is so in the hands of a few."

ence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America. Profound changes have occurred since democracy in America first appeared and yet it may be asked whether recognition of the right of dissent has gained substantially in practice as well as in theory."

Senator FULBRIGHT discovered in 1957 what it meant to go against the majority. He opposed the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine embodied in a resolution giving the President power to use "the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary" in the Middle East and to spend \$200 million as he saw fit without congressional restrictions. The Senate majority leader then was Lyndon B. Johnson. He urged FULBRIGHT to back Eisenhower as he himself had.

Johnson has triple-starred consensus in the political lexicon. But, defined as "tyranny of the majority," consensus has another look.

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DEFENDING INTERVENTION

The best thing that can be said of the new House resolution on intervention in Latin America is that it is ineffectual. It is not binding on anyone, and merely expresses a point of view. But what a point of view.

Subversive domination of a New World nation, or even the threat of it, the resolution says, violates the Monroe Doctrine. Therefore any Western Hemisphere nation may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as resort to armed force . . . take steps to forestall or combat the subversion.

In sponsoring this proposal, Representative SELDEN, of Alabama, argued that a new type of collective security is needed to combat a new type of aggression—that of subversion inside a country. But the Selden resolution goes far beyond collective security. It suggests that one republic may intervene unilaterally in another. It is so worded.

Representative BINGHAM, of New York, asserts, that a Latin nation could intervene in the United States if the Latin neighbor concluded that, for example, the civil rights movement were Communist-inspired.

The idea of a Latin republic intervening in the United States is so patently absurd that the Selden resolution must be read the other way around—to justify U.S. intervention among its neighbors. Indeed, the resolution seems to be an ex post facto vindication for the American intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Perhaps this explains why the State Department is so timid in its view of the resolution. The department asked Mr. SELDEN to make clear in debate that the mere threat of subversion would not justify unilateral use of force, but the resolution does not say so. And when the House had voted by 312 to 52 for the measure, after only 40 minutes of debate, a press officer lamely explained that the State Department agreed with the sentiments expressed but questioned some of the language.

Opponents of the resolution have accused the State Department of lack of backbone. The accusation assumes that the Department still opposes unilateral intervention. Does it?