



Cuban Freedom

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GEORGE H. FALLON

OF MARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, January 17, 1963

Mr. FALLON. Mr. Speaker, I com-
mend to the attention of our colleagues
the following speech delivered by Mrs.
Harold B. Chait, president of the Balti-
more Woman's Committee for Cuban
Freedom, on October 18, 1962:

SPEECH BY MRS. HAROLD B. CHAIT, PRESIDENT
OF BALTIMORE WOMAN'S COMMITTEE FOR
CUBAN FREEDOM, MONTHLY LUNCHEON
MEETING OF THE TOWSON INNER WHEEL,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1962

Thomas Jefferson once said that an in-
formed, alert American people were vital if
our liberties and our Nation itself were to
survive. That is why it is so desperately
important that women like you, community
leaders, thoughtful citizens, keep constantly
aware of developments affecting our security.
Our very survival hinges upon it. To para-
phrase Clemenceau, America is much too
important to be trusted blindly to bureau-
crats.

Cuba is the most dramatic example of that
danger—and I mean the Cuba of 4 years
ago as well as the Cuba of today. Cuba is
now a Soviet stronghold because in 1957 and
1958 there was a systematic campaign by
powerful groups in and out of our Govern-
ment to whitewash Fidel Castro from flaming
Red to pale pink.

Ladies, I have seen documentation pre-
pared as far back as 1948 citing Castro's
Communist affiliations and citing specific
acts he had performed in the services of
communism. Long before Castro launched his
revolution from Mexico, Robert C. Hill,
our Ambassador to that country warned,
bluntly, that Castro had surrounded himself
with Communists and that Communist aid
and direction was paramount in his move-
ment.

Despite massive evidence compiled to prove
unmistakably that Castro's revolution was
a monstrous Red hoax, a combination of offi-
cial policy and unofficial propaganda per-
mitted the Marxist-Leninists to conquer
Cuba. Few people realize the extent to
which Florida was privileged sanctuary for
Castro's forces during his revolution. I have
heard former Castro gunrunners laughingly
describe how they were sometimes given offi-
cial escorts when they wheeled Castro's
munitions through the streets of Miami

The FBI was forbidden to intervene against
the swarms of illegal Castro agents openly
operating throughout the United States.

Today, I might add, some of those gun-
nerstwhile agents complain that it is more dif-
ficult to slip arms out of the United States—
arms destined for Cuban freedom fighters—
than it is to slip them in Red Cuba itself.

The question of how Castro came to power
might seem ancient history—but for one
strange fact. History seems to have an odd
way of repeating itself regarding Cuba these
past few years. We make the same mistakes
again and again. The same people are try-
ing to impose the mantle of silence and ac-
quiescence which imposed communism on
Cuba in the first place.

Did you realize, for instance, that the mas-
sive Soviet buildup in Cuba—now getting
so much publicity—actually began many
months ago? And for many months it was
systematically swathed in silence by the peo-
ple charged with guiding our struggle for
survival. Do you realize that the arrival of
those shiploads of munitions and troops
was common knowledge in Cuban exile
circles in Miami long before they were known
to the American people? Do you realize that
exile spokesmen who attempted to alert the
American people were threatened by U.S.
agents? They were told to keep silence or
else. And do you realize that it was those
same exile spokesmen who, refusing to bow
to threats, finally succeeded in piercing that
curtain of silence and alerting the American
people to what was going on 100 miles from
their country? It would appear that we are
dependent on those Cuban exiles for knowl-
edge of what is happening along our southern
flank. It is significant that as late as August
30 the State Department was still doggedly
insisting that it had no knowledge of Rus-
sian troops in Cuba—and that the new ar-
rivals were merely agricultural and industrial
technicians.

From these repeatedly compounded errors
have sprung new fallacies. The most mis-
leading is that Cuba confronts us with only
two alternatives: Do nothing or face a clear
war. Cuban freedom fighters are said to be
too disunited to accomplish anything. To
fill the gap between the two main views, a
third view is now being leaked in Wash-
ington: That is that our intelligence service
have the capacity to vastly increase secret
anti-Castro operations inside Cuba. Let us
examine this situation more closely.

The great weakness of both the U.S. ser-
vices and the Cuban liberation movement is
the Bay of Pigs debacle in April 1961. Not
only was it a crushing defeat for the cause
of Cuban freedom—it was also the begin-
ning of a disastrous new policy orientation
toward Cuba. Responsible officials panicked
and began to act along lines unrelated to
reality. The end result was that Washington
in practice reversed its sponsorship of Cuban
liberation and systematically torpedoed exile-
underground operations against Castro.

One of the more fascinating aspects of
CIA operations in Cuba is its method of
supplying arms and ammunition to Cuban
liberation groups. Time and again, CIA cut-
ters make their dash to Cuba and deliver
such items as .45-caliber Thompson sub-
machineguns and .30-caliber ammunition.
On other occasions, CIA provides the patriots
with .57-millimeter recoilless rifles and .75-
millimeter rounds. One boat will run to
Oriente Province with C-4 explosives; the
needed detonators will be landed 700 miles
to the west in Pinar del Rio Province.

This sort of thing, done consistently, used
to baffle the anti-Castro freedom fighters to
the point of hysteria. But eventually, CIA's
reasoning became clear. The policy of deli-
berately separating weapons from ammunition
and explosives from their fuses serves two
purposes: (1) The munition will be
stockpiled until a given signal, at which time

