

VIETNAM

(Mr. BROWN of California (at the request of Mr. FARNUM) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, so that there can be no confusion or doubt as to the stand which I have taken in regard to the Vietnam conflict, I am sending the following report to my constituents in the 29th Congressional District of California:

On August 7, 1964, I voted for the Tonkin Bay resolution, submitted to the Congress by the President following the attack on U.S. forces by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. At that time, I said:

"I am of the very firm conviction that the peace and freedom which this country is dedicated to achieve in South Vietnam will not be achieved by the gradual escalation of this unfortunate war."

At that time the United States had about 18,000 troops in Vietnam—ostensibly as advisers. Today we have a quarter of a million troops engaged in active combat, plus a massive air and naval force. We are still no closer to either peace or victory than we were then.

I also suggested then—21 months ago—that instead of broadening the war we should be seeking, and supporting, the full-scale intervention of the United Nations—an intervention which we belatedly asked for a year and a half, later in January 1966.

On February 8, 1965, in a speech before the House of Representatives, I suggested that the southeast Asian area be neutralized through the creation of a U.N. "zone of peace" and that a Southeast Asian Development Bank be created through which economic aid could be channeled. Subsequently, the administration did propose such a development bank, and the bill authorizing our participation was signed into law on March 16, 1966.

At about the same time as I delivered that speech, the United States began the bombing of North Vietnam. The continued bombing makes much more difficult the achievement of a negotiated peace.

In another speech a few days later, on February 24, 1965, I said:

"The realities of the world today force us to recognize that our country is not all-powerful; that our national will cannot prevail in every situation; and that we may even be wrong in our evaluation of what is desired by, or desirable for, the citizens of other countries."

In the hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs a year later, this same view was expressed by some of this country's leading diplomatic figures, including George Kennan and former Generals Gavin and Ridgway. Additional emphasis has been given to this point by the recurrent mass demonstrations in South Vietnam displaying anti-U.S. sentiments.

On May 5, 1965, the President asked for a supplemental appropriation of \$700 million to continue the buildup of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. I voted against that appropriation, and at the same time made a speech calling for the adoption of a constitution and the holding of free elections in South Vietnam, so that the people of that country could determine for themselves the course they wished to follow. Instead of following that procedure, we continued to embrace the military dictators we had placed in office. Today, these military dictators have been forced to accede to such elections under massive public pressure and the United States has been reluctantly dragged along against its will.

I said in that speech:

"Mr. President, you have said that you 'will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.' I beg you to consider what I am saying here, for I know that with your vision and desire for peace you can do far more than what I am supporting. And, when you come to the Congress with a request for \$700 million for such a program—a program that points toward the goal of a world free from war—you will find me fighting for it."

On August 2, 1965, just after the President announced new steps in the escalation of our war efforts in South Vietnam, I made another speech on the floor of the House of Representatives, pointing out again the mistakes we were making in that unfortunate country. I concluded my speech with the following remarks:

"I desire that my country be the voice for freedom, justice, and economic progress in the world. I believe that our success in that role will do immeasurably more to roll back communism than will our support of petty dictators around the world, our devotion to a crumbling status quo that claims to be anti-Communist, and our willingness to allow our foreign policy to be controlled by the machinations of the CIA."

"I desire that my country lead the way toward a new world, a world based on law and respect for individual human beings. This is the road to victory today—not just victory for the United States, but victory for mankind. The other road, which is the road followed by all the great empires of the past—the road of power exercised for the sake of power and national honor—leads but to oblivion."

As 1965 drew to a close I made two major statements spelling out my position on Vietnam. On November 27, in Washington, D.C., before 25,000 people assembled at the Washington Monument, I offered my suggestions as to how we might bring an end to the war by negotiation. On December 2, I issued a position paper to the press summarizing briefly my views on Vietnam. In this statement I said:

"I accept and support the basic objectives set forth by the President—that we intend to resist and defeat any military solution by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (Vietcong), and that we are willing to unconditionally negotiate a solution to the conflict at the conference table. I do not advocate a unilateral withdrawal of American troops or a surrender of South Vietnam to North Vietnam by negotiation or in any other way."

However, the United States, while calling for peace through negotiation, has continued its course of military escalation, and has refused to recognize and accept the minimum conditions necessary for realistic negotiations. The Ky government, which we maintain in Saigon, has not only refused to consider negotiations of any sort, but, much like the situation in Korea 13 years ago under Syngman Rhee and in Formosa under Chiang Kai-shek—has called for complete defeat of the enemy, destruction of his cities, and the invasion of the Chinese mainland. This country, to a disastrous extent, is being manipulated in its basic foreign policy by a handful of petty tyrants who cannot maintain themselves for 1 day in their own country without the massive commitment of U.S. military and economic aid.

During 1966 a growing number of Congressmen have called on the President for an end to escalation, for intervention by the United Nations, and for a more realistic negotiating position. The President, seeking a course between the extremes of all-out war and unilateral withdrawal, has not yet found a satisfactory answer. He ordered a pause in bombing and a flamboyant peace drive

around the world, but made no basic changes in the U.S. negotiation position. He finally permitted the Vietnam problem to be presented to the U.N. Security Council, but ordered a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam at the same time. He accepted the goal of free elections for a civilian government in South Vietnam, but was caught unprepared by the Buddhist demand for action now.

The impact of the Vietnam war, which is still not a war, has grown with frightening speed. Ten billion dollars a year, moving up toward \$20 billion, has been committed to it. At the present time this amounts to a yearly cost of approximately \$50 for every man, woman, and child in the United States. Taxes are being increased or speeded up. Prices are rising. The casualty figures are increasing month by month.

Congress is not asked to determine the policy of our country as to continued escalation. We are not even asked to declare war, although only the Congress has the power to declare war under the U.S. Constitution. We are only asked to appropriate more and more money, to enact more and more controls, and to raise more and more tax revenues. At the same time, we are provided with less and less information and, if possible, less and less justification for our involvement in a bloody civil war 8,000 miles away—a war which would have ended years ago if we had not attempted to control that country—a war which even the people we are supposed to be helping no longer seem to want.

It is not enough for a Congressman to merely complain to his constituents, or his colleagues, or even the administration, that he is not happy with the course of events in Vietnam. It is his responsibility to use his vote, as provided in the Constitution. Therefore, during the first few months of 1966 I have used my vote to oppose further escalation in Vietnam. I have voted against the supplemental military appropriations for 1966, against the supplemental foreign aid appropriations for 1966, and against the tax increases to finance the war. I plan to continue to vote in this manner as long as I am a Member of Congress.

More than 2 months ago, before the outbreak of Buddhist-led demonstrations, I told my colleagues in the House of Representatives, as I voted against the \$4.8 billion supplemental military authorization for Vietnam:

"The contradictions of the U.S. course in Vietnam may soon be apparent for all our people and all the world to see. The political leaders of this country have contended that our efforts in Vietnam have been motivated by a desire only for the freedom of the people of that country. We are publicly committed to accept the free choice of the people of South Vietnam as to the kind of government which they desire. For 16 years, however, U.S. policies have prevented the expression of that free choice, despite all our protestations to the contrary. When the day comes that that choice is expressed—and that choice repudiates the United States and its hand-picked military dictators—the people of this country will be entitled to ask the question: 'Why have we labored and sacrificed so much, and in vain?'"

That day may be coming sooner than I thought at that time. For now it appears that we will have an election soon in the areas which are presumably under the control of the government we are helping. It is very likely that these people will elect a government which will seek peace by direct negotiation with the National Liberation Front. If this is the result of an election held among the 50 percent or less of the population that we are supposed to be helping, what would be the result of an election held among 100 percent of the people of

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South Vietnam? The answer is so obvious that even those advisers whose professional and political fortunes have been invested in almost a generation of mistaken policies will be unable to escape the consequences.

As a Congressman with two sons serving in the U.S. Navy, I am deeply concerned about how their lives are committed on behalf of this great Nation. They would give their lives, as any of us would, in defense of this country and in defense of the freedom of our allies or of the principles which we hold dear. However, to give those lives in support of policies which I believe are wrong,

where no vital interest of this country is involved, and where the people we are helping evidently do not want us, is the surest way to destroy all that we have sacrificed for over the years.