


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**SOUTHEAST ASIA:**

*"It is a war of shadows in
the night which calls for
radical changes in organization,
combat doctrine
and equipment."*

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The Answer to*by Roger Hilsman,*

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An expert on counterinsurgency tactics suggests that "Vietnam's twilight war for the villages may yet rank as one of the decisive battles of world history." Secretary Hilsman, a former World War II guerrilla fighter himself, stresses that this form of "hidden aggression" poses a threat to the entire Free World—that the Communists see guerrilla wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as the best way to expand their empires with the least risk. To meet this exported aggression effectively, Secretary Hilsman says:

- We must adopt the methods of the guerrilla himself—the very tactics our ancestors learned from the Indians.
- Our long-range goal must be "nation-building"—aid which includes the many things an American pioneer village needed.
- The really important appeal of the West is the respect for the individual which is built into Western culture.

Secretary Hilsman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined counterinsurgency as the military, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by existing governments to defeat subversive insurgency. Would you subscribe to this definition?

That is a very reasonable definition, particularly as applied to the Far East—namely, the Philippines, Malaya, and currently Vietnam. But I would broaden it slightly by stating that the real problem is one of extending government control to areas where governments have never had control throughout history. In a broader sense this means providing government services to the villages, knitting the people into the fabric of the whole community and national life.

In Southeast Asia today, there is no pervasive national spirit as we know it. The villagers in the back country still feel no deep loyalty to their government, which seems much further from them than ours does from us. Since most of the villagers

*is to thwart
from the hemisphere . . .”*

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the need of surgery. But economic strategy has the larger role of developing and maintaining a healthful climate in which the dignity and creativity of man may flourish.

However, prosperity cannot be imposed by an outside agency. Any significant change must be accomplished by the people within a country—by the plans and efforts of those who live there.

Private Investment

Since 1958 U.S. private investment in Latin America has fallen off to practically nothing. Besides the decline in foreign investment, native Latin Americans have withdrawn an estimated 10 billion dollars capital and shipped it off to Europe and the U.S. Next to the presence of communism in Cuba, the hemisphere's worst problem is this flight of capital.

Not only Latin Americans, but often some in the U.S., appear to lack appreciation of the value of private enterprise in the foreign market. In the face of a barrage of propaganda against free enterprise, it is difficult for private businessmen in Latin America to operate and make the important contribution of which they are capable. And if public spokesmen for the United States do not defend and endorse the free enterprise system which has contributed so much to our own growth and strength, then Latin American policies which weaken free enterprise are likely to predominate. As a result, the ultimate good of the Alliance for Progress will be put off further into the future.

Productivity and Diversification

The third element of our over-all strategy must be a better approach to the problems of productivity and diversification. To obtain the capital goods necessary for industrialization, Latin American nations must expand their dollar volume of exports. Nearly all these countries, however, derive 50 per cent or more of their exchange earnings from only one or two commodities. A few are almost entirely dependent on one commodity and they suffer severely when the international price levels fluctuate. So until Latin America can diversify its export commodities and other goods, it is likely to continue to suffer from the world market price fluctuations which have been so common over the last decade.

Both exports and the general standard of living in Latin America can be improved greatly if

modern management, labor, capital, and technical methods are applied to agriculture. Land reform programs, in particular, must be centered around increased productivity and not around fractionalizing and splintering production limits.

Local Government

The fourth element in our broader strategy must be to encourage sound local government. Our government-to-government aid programs in Latin America have been carried out primarily at the level of the national governments, and hence have given an overemphasis to centralized government—to the neglect of local government.


Traditionally, local and state governments in Latin America have been assigned a minor role—a factor which has dampened the economic and social development of these countries. The development of sound local government should be encouraged, particularly since an untapped source of revenue is readily available to them in the form of a property tax.

Mobilize Our Best Minds

Professor William Stokes, at our Center's Conference on National Security, noted that we ought to be concerned not only with what we are against, with prohibiting further encroachments of Marxism-Leninism, and eliminating what is already there. We must also concern ourselves with “the alternative attitudes and values, with the alternative economic concepts and ideas, and with the alternative political methods, forms of organization, and procedures.”

He is right. We have not done nearly enough to mobilize our best minds and skills within this country—experts in land productivity, taxation, industrial pioneering, local management, education—to establish rapport with key individuals and groups in Latin America.

To summarize: our minimum strategic objective is to thwart and eliminate communism from the hemisphere as an alien and intolerable system. Our larger objectives are manifold, but a first step toward them is to establish a national priority to marshal the best people we have in search of ways to share with our Latin American neighbors the lessons of our own successful experiences. Then the Alliance becomes one for true knowledge out of which can spring the climate for progress—not of totalitarianism such as the Soviets seek, but of creativity, initiative, and self-reliance.



Exported Aggression

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

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make nearly all the material goods they use, they have relatively little commercial, political, or psychological contact with other villages or the provinces around them.

In such circumstances, there does not have to be a basic discontent with the government for a guerrilla unit to thrive. It is just a question of the villagers' isolation.

Recently, in Northeast Thailand, a government team visited 40 villages - not particularly isolated ones, either. In 10 of them the people had never seen a government official - no policemen, no firemen, no health inspectors, no one.

In villages like these, it is relatively easy for an outside subversive power to recruit young men for guerrilla bands by simply promising sheer adventure, just to get away from the boring, monotonous tasks of an agricultural life.

For example, in my personal experience with the OSS in Burma during World War II, we

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found only about 10 per cent of the people to be pro-West. Another 10 per cent were pro-enemy, but the rest were either indifferent or else just so isolated that they had no ideological convictions one way or the other. Yet we were able to recruit over 30,000 guerrillas for OSS operations in Burma, and in spite of our white faces.

To draw a parallel with a situation closer to home, one may ask whether the citizens of Chicago "supported" the hoodlum gangs which flourished during the 1920's. Certainly the shopkeeper hit by the protection racket did not support the gangs, but he often had no choice except to go along with them. The same thing is true in many of the isolated villages in some of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

In the past, you have defined this guerrilla activity in Southeast Asia as internal war, or hidden aggression. What do these terms imply?

As a former World War II fighter himself, Mr. Roger Hillsman knows first-hand the intricacies of this special kind of warfare. Wounded while serving with "Merrill's Marauders" in the China-Burma-India Theatre, he later commanded a guerrilla battalion operating behind enemy lines. In 1945, he was a member of a rescue mission that released his father, Colonel Roger Hillsman, from a prisoner-of-war camp in Manchuria.

After receiving his Ph.D. degree in 1950 from Yale, he spent the next three years in London and Frankfurt, engaged in NATO planning. From 1953 to 1956, he was a member of the faculty of international politics at Princeton's Center for International Studies. In February of 1961, he was appointed Director of Intelligence and Research for the Department of State. Mr. Hillsman was named Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs on April 25 of this year.

He has authored and co-authored several books, including *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*, *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, and *NATO and American Security*.



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"Our job in Vietnam
as it is military

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The terrorist activity in Vietnam is really aggression in the truest sense of the word. Over the centuries international law has categorized aggression as an overt attack. But here we have, as President Kennedy has said, "a subterranean war," which doesn't fit easily under the doctrines of international law.

I call it hidden aggression, or twilight warfare, because it is an attack directed across an international boundary. It is clearly an attempt by one state to bring down another by exported terror. From North Vietnam, the Communists are sending in trained cadre, propaganda, money, equipment, and directions to the Viet Cong terrorists in South Vietnam. All the while they try to maintain the fiction that it is an internal uprising.

The pattern of the Vietnam war so far has followed closely Mao Tse-Tung's three stages of guerrilla warfare. In the first stage, sympathizers are recruited and indoctrinated, and a base is built from which weapons, rice, and other supplies can be distributed. The second stage is one of terror, hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, night attacks, and assassinations. This is the stage in which we are engaged now. Finally, in the third stage Mao says there must be a change to a true civil war where the terrorist bands are turned into conventional armies to fight the regulars by conventional means. As a practical matter, the Communists hope to create enough political chaos and instability so that the government will fall by a *coup d'etat*, letting them move in and skip the third stage.

We Must Adopt Guerrilla Tactics

To fight this exported aggression effectively, we must adopt the methods of the guerrilla himself—the very tactics our ancestors learned from the

Indians. We must realize that the guerrilla does not care about north or south, or east or west. He doesn't care about this town or that piece of real estate. He lives to fight, to ambush, to kill. His only goal is to kill—not to seize and hold territory. It is nonsense to assume that regular forces trained for conventional war can handle jungle guerrillas adequately. Regular forces are essential for regular military tasks, but twilight warfare is something special. It is a war of shadows in the night which calls for radical changes in organization, combat doctrine, and equipment. The main ingredients for success are constant patrols, good communications, mobility, and a capacity for rapid concentration. Our key units might be decentralized groups of 50 men, self-reliant and able to operate autonomously, fanned out into the surrounding countryside.

Let me again draw on my experience in Burma. At one stage my outfit—consisting of four Americans and 200 Burmese—kept an entire 3,000-man Japanese regiment marching and countermarching through the mountains far away from the front where they would have done more good. What we would have feared most would have been smaller groups patrolling steadily. The Japanese were much better soldiers than our guerrillas. They were better trained, tougher, and more mobile. But they fought us as if we were regular troops. We never tried to take or hold ground. We laid ambushes, fired our weapons, and ran just as fast as we could. After a month of chasing us, this 3,000-man regiment had over a hundred casualties; we had only one.

One of History's Decisive Battles

Vietnam's twilight war for the villages may yet rank as one of the decisive battles of world history. In one sense, it is no more or less decisive than an effective deterrent against a Korea-type war, nor is it more or less decisive than an effective strategic nuclear deterrent. However, even as we have prepared for both conventional and nuclear wars, the Communists have been giving increased emphasis to internal warfare. Of course, we can take some credit for their change in strategy. Our nuclear force build-up has paid off, and so have our efforts to build ground forces, our alliances, and our sacrifices in Korea.

Now the Communists are beginning to see possibilities for guerrilla wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as the best way to expand their empires with the least risk. So the Vietnam war is quite decisive, in the first place, because unless we develop an effective counter there, we may well find ourselves in the same difficulty in some of these other areas. Secondly, this war is decisive in that

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as much political and economic e long-range task is nation-building.”

the steps needed to fight it are the very steps needed for building the new nations of the world into independent, self-sustaining states. Our job in Vietnam is as much political and economic as it is military—the long-range task is nation-building.

What are the steps involved in nation-building?

To become a stable nation, Vietnam needs much more than dams, power stations, steel mills, and other giant foreign aid projects which will have to come sooner or later. This sort of foreign aid is important, of course, but on a longer term basis. In the short term, these people need more simple aid such as communication routes, so that goods and services can flow freely from village to village throughout the country. There must be a way for information about the needs of the people to flow upward, and a way for government services to flow downward to answer these needs. They need health programs, police security, educational systems, economic help, sewer systems—the very things many an American pioneer village needed over 100 years ago.

Strategic Hamlet Program

An important part of this nation-building program is to provide the villagers with the physical security so necessary to peaceful progress. This is what the strategic hamlet program does. We are helping the villagers ring their villages with barbed wire, much as our frontier towns were protected with stockades. Then 20 or 30 in a village of 200 are trained to use weapons such as hand grenades, shotguns, and carbines. And they are given a radio with which they can contact province headquarters for help if they are attacked by a large band of terrorists.

But the strategic hamlet program involves far more than just physical security. It is also a vehicle for getting government services to the people to help enlist popular support for the government. And as the government becomes more popular, and as more villages are secured, the Viet Cong will be isolated more and more from their key sources of supply—the villages of the

back country. No longer will marauding bands of five or six guerrillas be able to walk into villages and either seize or buy rice.

If they can't get into the villages, and if they are occasionally ambushed themselves, will the Viet Cong then start to wither?

That's right. By cutting off this important supply line to the villages and by keeping them on the move, we will begin to make the guerrillas suffer from lack of food, from hunger, and from discomfort. They will begin to dry up.

Of course, we are not at that stage yet in Vietnam. However, we have come a long way and have made much progress recently. During the last half of 1962, outlying villages containing roughly half a million people were made secure by the government, bringing the share of rural population in secured villages to about 51 per cent. The Viet Cong controls about eight per cent.

This still leaves around 40 per cent of the rural population unsecured. It is to this group that the government must extend its services and control in the next phase.

In the mountain regions during the last year we have helped the Vietnamese train over 37,000 Montagnard tribesmen in the use of simple weapons, how to set up village defenses, and how to patrol areas between villages. But one Special Forces team I know of is most proud of a completely non-military kind of project—a village market. They went to the province capital and persuaded a tailor, a tobacco merchant, and a general store operator to move to the Montagnard village where they were stationed. Then they persuaded the villagers in the area to start producing a surplus of what they grow, and to bring the excess to the market where they could sell it and buy thimbles, needles, thread, pots, pans—the instruments for a better life that they could never have before.

This isn't warfare in the usual sense and it isn't killing Viet Cong. But it is the real way to fight the Communist terror. It is a vital step in nation-building, and that is our long-range goal.

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Nation-building in Vietnam involves: (1) guerrilla warfare training, (2) development of strategic hamlets, (3) establishment of village markets.



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“the whole nation-building program has a revolutionary, ‘spiritual’ appeal.”

Secretary Hilsman, it has been said that the Communists are offering a “spiritual” challenge to the people in Asia, telling them, “We need you desperately, whoever you are, whatever you can do. Ours is the revolution of the future. You can be the liberators of mankind.”

In contrast, it has been said that the American appeal offers no such “cause” but merely a slight material gain through our aid and assistance programs. We have been told that there really isn’t an “American side.” Is this theory true, or half-true, or is it completely inaccurate or obsolete?

There is no question in my mind that this theory is completely obsolete. In terms of appeals, the Communists are not doing at all well. The normal Communist ideology does not cut much ice anymore. Where they do make headway, they capitalize on an appeal to nationalism, or they use threats of terror and retaliation.

The theory about American appeals is also obsolete. We have a spiritual appeal that is a truly revolutionary one—a government interested in the wants and needs of the people. In the past, government has usually meant—if anything—an official who collects grain or yams and gives nothing in return. So we have a revolutionary appeal to excite and inspire these people—the simple but very effective concept that government exists to serve and protect them.

In a sense, the whole nation-building program has a revolutionary, “spiritual” appeal, not only in Vietnam but in all the world’s underdeveloped areas. This is really the guts of the Alliance for Progress program, except that in Vietnam nation-building must proceed under the guns of Communist terrorism. The barbed wire and guns of a strategic hamlet program would not be needed in a country not under attack as Vietnam has been, but the civic action certainly would.

But the really important appeal of the West is the respect for the individual which is built into Western Culture. In contrast, the whole Communist Bloc leans toward a monotonous grayness—the Tibetans should act like the Chinese, the Chinese like the Russians, and the Russians like the Poles. There is not the diversity which is found in the Free World.

What can industry here in the United States do to help these countries build their civilizations? For example, Dr. Werner von Braun has said that much of the success of the space program has resulted from the individual contributions and innovations of private industry. He told us that he spends a substantial part of his time “trying not to drown in all the many ideas which come to us.” Do private companies face this same kind of challenge in “nation-building programs” as they have already faced in aerospace and defense?

They most certainly do. There are many areas of science and technology where new ideas can help Vietnam and similar countries to discover new approaches to their problems. Right now scientists in this country are on the brink of some discoveries in genetics which are just as dramatic and exciting as the discovery of the nuclear reaction. Some of them may help to solve many of the tremendous problems in disease, overpopulation, and food shortages.

To help break the illiteracy problem we may be able to use a communications satellite, providing a country with a complete television network which could be picked up on television sets powered by wood-burning generators. We could increase a teacher’s exposure a hundred times.

Chemistry, biology, electronics, physics—every science you can name—may have some answers if we can get researchers to focus on the problems.

How optimistic are you that our nation-building program will succeed in Vietnam? Do you have a time-goal in months or years?

Right now about Vietnam I am optimistic—but cautiously so. It is not a question of winning a battle or defeating an army. It is a question of building a nation, and that takes time. So far things are going rather well, but we have to think in terms of years instead of months. It will be some time before you can go anywhere in Vietnam with a feeling of complete safety and security.

Of course all the new nations like Vietnam need time. No magic of science can transform their way of life overnight. It took seven years to eliminate guerrillas in Malaya. It may take more than this in Vietnam, or it may take less. But I think time is on our side.

