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Pittsburgh Naval Reserve Intelligence Division

20 May 1967

I. Introduction

- A. Preliminaries
- B. Preview
 - 1. Talk about 30 minutes; then questions
 - 2. Coverage
 - a. Development of the basic concepts
 - b. Development of CIA
 - c. The policy problem
 - d. The accountability problem


II. Development of the Basic Concepts

- A. The Pearl Harbor lesson -- central coordination
 - 1. Usual oversimplification
 - a. Pearl Harbor an intelligence failure
 - b. CIA created to prevent a repeat
 - 2. Pearl Harbor proved need for central coordination
 - a. Nature of military intelligence units
 - b. Concept not new -- Donovan in July 1941
- B. The World War II lesson -- total coverage
 - 1. Limitations of pre-WWII intelligence
 - a. Military -- G-2 and ONI -- two voices
 - b. Political -- State -- a third voice
 - 2. Not coordinated and not enough
 - a. The hindsight books
 - b. Examples -- Schweinfurt raids; Pacific area
- C. Concepts embodied in present Intelligence Community
 - 1. Central coordination -- one voice
 - 2. Total (National) Intelligence coverage

III. Development of CIA and Functions

- A. Military antecedents
 - 1. ONI -- 1882 -- under Bureau of Navigation
 - 2. CIP -- 1917 -- later became CIC
 - 3. MID -- 1918 -- later G-2 (ACSI, AFNIN)
- B. World War II and later
 - 1. Office of Coordinator of Information -- July 1941
 - a. Donovan reported to President
 - b. Structure and progress

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2. Office of Strategic Services -- June 1942
3. National Intelligence Authority -- January 1946
4. National Defense Act -- 26 July 1947
 - a. The three-hat position of the DCI
 - b. The missions of CIA -- policy is not one of them

IV. Agency Relation to Policy

- A. The recent controversy -- Fulbright, et. al (89th Congress)
 1. Settlement -- The Dean Rusk statement, etc.
 2. Popularized the problem
- B. The non-policy concept
 1. Intelligence only one factor in policy
 2. The major policy-background instrument
 - a. The National Intelligence Estimate
 - b. Product of entire intelligence community
- C. The policy implication situation
 1. The estimate of a consequence -- Cuba, 1962
 2. Alternative courses of action
- D. The Agency as an instrument of policy
 1. The act of 1947 -- "other activities as directed"
 2. Covert action -- as directed

V. Accountability (The Invisible Government)

- A. Executive
 1. The President and the National Security Council
 2. The 303 Committee (Vance, Kohler, Rostow, DCI)
 3. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
- B. Legislative
 1. The Senate subcommittees
 - a. Armed Services -- Russell of Georgia (5 members)
 - b. Appropriations -- Mahon of Texas (4 members)
 2. The House subcommittees
 - a. Armed Services -- Rivers of South Carolina (11 members)
 - b. Appropriations -- Hayden of Arizona (4 members)
- C. Fiscal -- Burial of funds and DCI's spending authority
 1. The Bureau of the Budget
 2. Internal audit procedures

VI. Conclusion

- A. Evaluation of Intelligence
 1. What happens is not valid standard
 2. Defense or justification dangerous
 3. Internal self-evaluation
- B. New concept
 1. Weapons system -- a deterrent force
 2. Ultimately a preventive -- Chinese War Lords