(Monday, March 30, 1959)

RUSSIA AND BERLIN

(by Richard Spong)

The foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization meet in Washington on Thursday (April 2).

SEE DAILY SERVICE OF MARCH 27, 1959: 1 "NATO DECEN-

· MARCH 4, 1959

"IF THE WEST is resolute, then I believe that the Soviet Union -- by hook or crook -- will be the one to back down." This estimate, made by the deputy director of intelligence for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in a little publicized speech of March 3, appears to be the most authoritative intelligence analysis made public as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies meet to discuss German reunification and the Russian threat to Berlin.

The speech, made from notes and not carried by the press association wires, was reported in the Columbia, S.C., <u>The State</u>.* Robert Amory, Jr., assistant to C.I.A. Director Allen W. Dulles, told a University of South carolina study group that the Soviet Union is not ready to risk a major nuclear war over Berlin, but that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev "expects to force us to chicken out."

THE NEWSPAPER account of the talk has been confirmed for accuracy by Amory. He said that the Russians "haven't got what it takes rationally to challenge us this spring." The future remains in doubt, but, says Amory, in the next 15 years the West faces "a race for leadership in the world against militant Communists with fervent faith."

The report of Amory's speech lends additional significance to the statement made by President Eisenhower about the same time. In his press conference, March 11, the President said with great firmness: "We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe."

Against the import of the Amory speech, the President's statement must be interpreted as indicating that the Western allies will not back down on Berlin in the face of a Russian threat of nuclear war. The reasoning is that any such threat would be essentially, as Amory has indicated, a bluff. Nonetheless, in Amory's view, the Russians are negotiating from confidence. "The goal," he said, "is to take over Berlin (identified as a "needle" to the Reds because of its high pro-Western living standards) and consolidate East Germany. They think they hold the trumps because their action is peaceful. It's a case of 'here we go, here they come'."

THE OUTLOOK for the long-range future is challenge. The Russians, says the U.S. intelligence expert, "think in large gobs of time."

Their aims in the 30-year period between 1945 and 1975 -- goals viewed by them with confidence -- are a yearly gross national product of \$500 billion consumer standards comparative to those of Western Europe, and \$100 billion annually to spend on armaments or on "external investments" -- such as their "no strings" foreign aid policy toward nations not actually allies or invited to become allies.

Since Stalin's death, Amory reports, the Russians have made "an aboutface rivaling anything in history without compulsion from outside." It would follow that the race now is not necessarily to the swift or to the strong but to the most determined, bearing always in mind, as Amory advises: "We must never tempt them into a major military path while letting down our strength."

RUSSIA AND BERLIN

SEE REPORT OF JUNE 26, 1957:

Monday, March 30, 1959

Approved For Release 2000/06/13 : CIA-RDP75-00001R000100190022-3

EDITORIAL PESTARCH REPORTS