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3 M E E T T H E P R E S S  
4 Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak

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14 SUNDAY, JULY 17, 1966

15 GUEST: Admiral William F. Raborn  
16 Former Director, C.I.A.

17 PANEL: John Steele, Time-Life Magazines  
18 Max Frankel, The New York Times  
19 Robert Goralski, NBC News  
20 Lawrence E. Spivak, Permanent Panel  
21 Member

22 MODERATOR: Neil Boggs

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24 MR. BOGGS: This is Neil Boggs, inviting you to  
25 MEET THE PRESS.

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27 MR. BOGGS: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is Admiral  
28 William F. Raborn, recently retired Director of the Central  
29 Intelligence Agency. Admiral Raborn is widely recognized as  
30 the developer of the Polaris missile system. He succeeded

1 John McCone as head of the CIA in April, 1965. Now we will  
2 have the first question from Lawrence E. Spivak, Permanent  
3 member of the MEET THE PRESS panel.

4 MR. SPIVAK: Admiral Raborn, the Senate is engaged in a  
5 controversy over the question of adding members of the  
6 Foreign Relations Committee to the committee that now  
7 overseas the CIA. Would you say that it makes much difference  
8 to the CIA what Senate committees oversea it?

9 ADMIRAL RABORN: It has been the position of the agency,  
10 and it was my position too, Mr. Spivak, that the oversight  
11 activities of the Congress were distinctly the business of  
12 the Congress.

13 MR. SPIVAK: May I have your opinion. You are out of the  
14 CIA at the present time. What is your personal opinion,  
15 does it make any difference?

16 ADMIRAL RABORN: Well, I stated my opinion. My opinion  
17 is that this is a matter which the Congress itself would want  
18 to resolve and it is not a matter of conjecture by me.

19 MR. SPIVAK: Do you mean to tell me, Admiral, now that  
20 you are a private citizen, you have no opinion on a matter of  
21 that importance that might be of great help to the American  
22 people if you did give an opinion?

23 ADMIRAL RABORN: As a private citizen I would make my  
24 views known to the people who have to do with such matters,  
25 namely the Congress, and I think I must be appropriately

1 reticent about commenting on the responsibilities of responsible  
2 people.

3 MR. SPIVAK: Admiral, it was reported that you refused to  
4 give members of the Foreign Relations Committee any  
5 information on sources and methods. Can you tell us why you  
6 refused?

7 ADMIRAL RABORN: Yes. I am directed by the Congress,  
8 the Congressional Act that set up the Agency, Public Law 80-253  
9 of 1947. It specifically charged the Director of Central Intel-  
10 ligence with safeguarding methods and sources of intelligence  
11 and it has been the practice of all previous Administrations  
12 since then and under the current Administration, that we  
13 would report fully on these activities to the Oversight  
14 Committees set up to oversee the activities of the intelligence  
15 agencies and bodies of the United States government.

16 MR. SPIVAK: Admiral, as you know there has been a good  
17 deal of criticism and even hostility in recent years against  
18 the CIA. Would you say that any of the criticism has been  
19 justified?

20 ADMIRAL RABORN: Oh, I am sure that none of us lead  
21 a blameless life. I think there has only been one Person  
22 I believe in the history of <sup>mankind</sup> / who has lived a blameless  
23 life, but by and / <sup>large I would say that</sup> the criticisms have been largely based on  
24 inaccuracies and are not justified at all.

25 MR. SPIVAK: TWhat is your explanation for the rising tide

1 of criticism against the CIA in recent years?

2 ADMIRAL RABORN: Well, I think that this is in the nature  
3 of the organization. It, of course, has to be secret and  
4 this fact that it has to be secret was recognized even by  
5 General Washington in an original letter that I have in which he  
6 stated that secrecy in intelligence matters was a primary  
7 essence of intelligence.

8 I think that the American people have not had the Central  
9 Intelligence Agency and other intelligence activities of the  
10 United States government properly explained to them and  
11 this is one reason why I gladly accepted your kind invitation  
12 to appear on this program because it is a wonderful  
13 organization, one that is extremely vital to the United States,  
14 the security of the United States, and one which they can not  
15 do without.

16 MR. SPIVAK: Now may I give you an opportunity to make an  
17 explanation on one matter of great importance: Senator  
18 Stephen Young of Ohio was recently reported as charging that  
19 the CIA has become an invisible government answerable  
20 only to itself. Now how would you answer that charge?

21 ADMIRAL RABORN: I would say that this is a complete  
22 fallacy.

23 MR. SPIVAK: What about his charge that the CIA was  
24 employing a small army in Vietnam?

25 ADMIRAL RABORN: I would say also this is a complete

1 fallacy.

2 MR. SPIVAK: You are not hiding behind CIA secrecy when  
3 you make these general refutations, are you, Admiral?

4 ADMIRAL RABORN: No, I am just answering them directly.  
5 Trying to.

6 MR. SPIVAK: The CIA has been charged also with stirring  
7 up insurrections and sometimes running little wars. Would  
8 you say that that too is a false charge?

9 ADMIRAL RABORN: I would say that the activities of the  
10 Central Intelligence Agency, the clandestine activities, are  
11 relatively small by comparison to the major weight of  
12 their activities in other fields and that any activities of  
13 this sort is in conformance with the approval of the National  
14 Security Council and in furtherance of United States policy.

15 \* \* \* \* \*

16 MR. FRANKEL: Admiral, since so relatively small part  
17 of the Agency's work is, as you say, clandestine, since much  
18 of it is analytical, scientific, collecting well-known  
19 information, do you think that part of the trouble and  
20 misunderstanding of your critics is due to the fact that there  
21 is too much secrecy surrounding the Agency?

22 ADMIRAL RABORN: This could be so, but I rather doubt  
23 it. As a matter of fact, I doubt it sincerely. The nature  
24 of our work is that we of course make these reports, as you  
25 say, to the Administration authorities and to the Congress,

that we make it on a "need to know" basis, give it to the people who have a need for it.

Obviously it would be unwise to make this general knowledge because of the delicacy of the matters.

MR. FRANKEL: For instance, the total budget you operate under, the total number of employees that you have. You have been in secret projects before, Polaris -- the Pentagon has many secrets. Yet the overall activities, the extent of them are known. And I know that law forbids you now to talk about the budget and the number of employees, but is this really necessary, is so much mystery necessary?

ADMIRAL RABORN: Yes indeed it is. If we knew, for instance the exact -- I am not saying we don't -- the exact numbers that the KGB, we will say, employs, and their budget, it is quite possible for one intelligence service to determine the effectiveness of the other and their capabilities, if you know these salient factors. You can work it out, piece it together, little by little. So this is a very tightly-held secret.

MR. FRANKEL: Let me ask you about another aspect of the secrecy: When we tried to determine from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and other universities who have done, I understand, very good work for the agency, they told us that you insist that they not tell us the size of the subsidy they get from the Agency, that often they can publish material,

1 but they can't identify government money behind it. Why does  
2 that have to be so?

3 ADMIRAL RABORN: Well, I think this is not necessarily  
4 restricted to the CIA. This is common practice in many  
5 classified projects from all departments of the government. It  
6 is just information that we don't want loosed to the hands of  
7 foreign intelligence services.

8 MR. FRANKEL: In connection with that there has been  
9 another controversy recently. The United States Information  
10 Agency, for instance, is forbidden by law to propagandize within  
11 our country. Yet some people have suggested that you have  
12 allowed your men to write in American magazines, that you  
13 have supported books that are published in the United States,  
14 magazines that circulate in the United States, without ever  
15 telling the reader that they are getting government material,  
16 that they are getting official points of view.

17 Do you think that is right for the CIA when, say, the  
18 USIA is not allowed to do it?

19 ADMIRAL RABORN: Well, let's put it this way: The Agency  
20 is accused of many things and quite a bit of it is most  
21 inaccurate. Specifically, now, as to permitting the  
22 scholars who are a large part of the Central Intelligence  
23 Agency, they feel a need to publish objectively information  
24 on situations existent around the world. To the extent that  
25 they can be cleared from a security point of view, they add to



1 the general understanding of the public, and this goes back  
2 to your problem of secrecy, now, a general understanding  
3 of the public of the actual facts in a matter under scrutiny,  
4 and it is a public service. Whether or not a writer  
5 should be identified as a member of a government agency I think  
6 that is a matter for the Department concerned to make up their  
7 minds upon. It has been the past policies of the Central Intel-  
8 ligence Agency not to trade on a name but to let the work  
9 stand on its own merit, which is the way scholars like to have  
10 their work considered.

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1 MR. FRANKEL: Don't you think it is important that we  
2 the readers know that when a scholar comes with material  
3 that this is really material that has been cleared  
4 as officially acceptable at least by an agency of government?

5 ADMIRAL RABORN: "Acceptable" connotes something that I can't  
6 buy. Let's say that they represent facts or objective. If they  
7 are objective and factual that is the thing that should be  
8 brought out. The Central Intelligence Agency does not write  
9 articles in support of administration policies or anything  
10 of that kind, so I don't like to get that connotation in  
11 there.

12 I think it is an open question whether or not scholars in  
13 the future should identify themselves. As a matter of fact, I  
14 rather perhaps think they should. I like to think that the  
15 Central Intelligence Agency can be more widely accepted as a  
16 good, worthwhile member, church-going member of the family of  
17 departments that make up our fine government.

18 MR. STEELE: Admiral Raborn, you told Mr. Spivak a minute  
19 or two ago that a lot of the criticism of CIA stemmed from  
20 inaccuracies. I want to ask you if perhaps there isn't a  
21 different kind of criticism that is stimulated, one perhaps  
22 stemming from our enemies on the other side of the so-called  
23 Iron Curtain. Are you conscious of any attempt to undermine  
24 the CIA, to question its validity from not-sympathetic sources?

25 ADMIRAL RABORN: Yes, indeed, Mr. Steele.

1           The Communist intelligence services are working night and  
2           day, twenty-four hours every day around the world, to under-  
3           mine the effectiveness of the Central Intelligence Agency and  
4           of democratic processes and institutions around the world.  
5           We know that, for instance, there is a "Department-D"  
6           known as the "Department of Disinformation." And the KGB,  
7           Lt. General Yagayansi, I believe, is the head of it -- this  
8           is no secret -- who spends their time in trying to under-  
9           cut truly democratic institutions and agencies.

10           MR. STEELE: What does this Department D do about the CIA?  
11           What activities are you aware of?

12           ADMIRAL RABORN: They float stories around the world and  
13           then the Communist press picks it up immediately and puts it  
14           on the air and prints it in the newspapers. Generally these  
15           stories are completely false and they have just enough  
16           truth in them to be twisted all out of shape.

17           MR. STEELE: Has this activity of this Soviet department  
18           made things more difficult or is it really more of a joking  
19           matter around the world?

20           ADMIRAL RABORN: I don't mean to just single out the KGB.  
21           All foreign intelligence services that are opposed to the  
22           democratic way of life and the true democracy such as the  
23           United States represents, engage in these activities and it  
24           is part and parcel of their work and they, of course, are  
25           out to discredit anything that tends to thwart their nefar-

1 ious activities.

2 MR. STEELE: Well, it has been said quite often by out-  
3 siders that the CIA really is locked in a deadly battle  
4 with this Department-D and the KGB. Do you feel that is  
5 going too far or is the competition such that it really  
6 does amount to a serious battle?

7 ADMIRAL RABORN: I think that the Central Intelligence  
8 Agency is but a small part of the national effort to per-  
9 petuate truly democratic ideals and freedoms around the  
10 world. We do have a significant part to play but I think  
11 we shouldn't overdo it.

12 MR. GORALSKI: Admiral, aren't you unwittingly helping  
13 the KGB by not denying some of the stories that they are  
14 circulating? Every time we call the CIA, we, as newsmen,  
15 we always get nothing but a "No comment."

16 ADMIRAL RABORN: Well, sir, this is the policy, which is  
17 long established and it has generally been recognized over  
18 the years that you deny no stories, good or bad, you accept  
19 no praise and you try to ignore criticisms. Because they  
20 are largely uninformed, in both cases, and you never know  
21 when to stop once you get into the practice.

22 There are those in the United States government that from  
23 time to time -- such as the Secretary of State, such as the  
24 Congressional oversight committees, knowing the facts, get  
25 up and do, for the record, straighten things out. Unfortunately  
they don't get quite as much publicity in the news media around

the world as some of the accusations do.

1           MR. GORALSKI: In the light of this criticism of the  
2 CIA of late, are you having trouble recruiting Americans to  
3 work for the Agency?

4           ADMIRAL RABORN: No. Let me say this. This is one of  
5 the real wholesome things that I can say. The fine, patriotic,  
6 really outstanding men and women who apply for lifetime  
7 employment with the Agency every year. The people of the  
8 Agency come from more than 600 universities. Seventy-seven  
9 percent of them have college degrees and about 20 percent  
10 have a Masters or a Doctorate.

11           MR. GORALSKI: I wonder if I could ask you a question on  
12 Vietnam. One of our concerns is that we don't really have  
13 enough information on what Hanoi is thinking or for that  
14 matter Peking as well. Do you feel we know enough about  
15 their own attitudes right now or could we get a better  
16 insight?

17           ADMIRAL RABORN: I would say, Mr. Goralski, no intelligence  
18 service is ever satisfied with the amount of information that  
19 they have and in a closed society where the efforts of a  
20 nation are closely controlled in the hands of ten to 12 hard-  
21 lined, close-mouthed men, it is quite difficult to get into the  
22 minds of those men. You have to read their actions in order to  
23 get their line.

24           MR. SPIVAK: Admiral, one of the grave concerns in this  
25 country is that Communist China might enter the war in

2 1 Vietnam if the U.S. furthers its escalation. Can you give  
2 us an opinion on that, your own opinion?

3 ADMIRAL RABORN: I guess this would be a very difficult  
4 thing to do because the spectrum of things that could trigger  
5 off such an action is very wide and I perhaps should not try  
6 to conjecture on it. I do have my own personal views, but  
7 these are matters which I think are best left to the policy  
8 makers.

9 MR. SPIVAK: Admiral, in a speech you made when you were  
10 head of the CIA, you said this, and I quote: "I can assure  
11 you that we deserve the confidence and support of the public."

12 Now can you tell us just why?

13 ADMIRAL RABORN: Well, I certainly can. Going back to  
14 President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy  
15 and President Johnson, all have expressed their thoughts on  
16 the Central Intelligence Agency as an extremely essential  
17 part of the United States government. Now having been at  
18 the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and as Director  
19 of Central Intelligence, which includes responsibility for  
20 the coordination of the rest of the intelligence activities  
21 of the United States government, I can say proudly -- and I  
22 am not a Johnny-Come-Lately around Washington -- that the  
23 Agency deserves the unbounded admiration, the respect and  
24 support of the United States citizens everywhere and of  
25 the Free World everywhere. I have greatest admiration for

1 them. The breadth and depth of competence, the integrity,  
2 the loyalty, the willingness to serve the government under  
3 adverse conditions sometimes and under criticism is something  
4 that I thought perhaps was the sole property of the military.

5 MR. SPIVAK: Well, Admiral, we did pretty well in this  
6 country without a CIA, which was set up in 1947. What do you  
7 think would happen if the CIA were abolished?

8 ADMIRAL RABORN: May I suggest, sir, that your statement  
9 is not correct. Before Pearl Harbor there was no CIA. We  
10 had a Pearl Harbor. And I think if there is a motto of  
11 CIA, it is "There will never be another Pearl Harbor," and  
12 Pearl Harbor caused this country to go to a Central Intelligence  
13 Agency type of intelligence work.

14 MR. SPIVAK: You think with a half hour warning time that  
15 we have the CIA is sufficiently informed on countries that have  
16 missiles so that there can not be a surprise attack against  
17 this country again?

18 ADMIRAL RABORN: I would say you are far better off with  
19 it than without it.

20 MR. FRANKEL: I would like to touch on the clandestine part  
21 of your activity -- I think I am not going to get very far  
22 if I ask you to discuss it in detail, but CIA activities in  
23 this area over the years have raised some questions almost of  
24 a philosophical nature and I think from what little I know  
25 about the Agency it isn't always necessarily the Agency that

1 has to answer, it is the President of the United States himself  
2 who does. But being a part of that machinery, what are your  
3 thoughts on just how far we Americans really ought to go in  
4 this world in terms of meddling in other people's business?  
5 In terms of throwing money into elections, into helping the  
6 people we like and resisting the people we don't like,  
7 some of which at least crudely stated might resemble some  
8 of the activities of our Communist opponents. But we of  
9 course think we are doing it for better purposes. But how  
10 far do you think we ought to go?

11 ADMIRAL RABORN: Mr. Frankel, I think it is the thrust  
12 of the entire United States government, through its diplomacy  
13 and through its U. S. aid programs and the security apparatuses  
14 to safeguard first the security of the United States and assist  
15 in the safeguarding of the Free World, and to promote our way  
16 of life, vis-a-vis the active ~~efforts~~ of the Communist movement  
17 to undermine the free institutions. I think we should go  
18 far enough to win, and this includes military action, and  
19 unfortunately sometimes it comes. You have to say, do we let  
20 them rule the world or are we going to stand up for what  
21 we know is a better way of life?

22 MR. FRANKEL: It is usually that question: Is a Communist  
23 going to profit from this fellow winning an election or this  
24 government coming to power or this government falling? That should  
25 be the decisive point?



1 ADMIRAL RABORN: I wouldn't like to get too specific, but  
2 I think the main thrust of the philosophy of the United  
3 States government is what I was trying to speak to and  
4 the CIA is just a part of that.

5 MR. STEELE: Admiral, it has been said that a very small  
6 percentage of your activity and energy is devoted to so-called  
7 clandestine or covert activity, is that correct?

8 ADMIRAL RABORN: Only a very small fraction of the entire  
9 effort of the Central Intelligence Agency has to do with  
10 clandestine activities, Mr. Steele.

11 MR. STEELE: Admiral, many people don't understand what  
12 a national intelligence estimate is. Can you tell us in a  
13 very few words what it is and how it is made?

14 ADMIRAL RABORN: Yes, sir, I will try. The national  
15 intelligence estimate is the general views of the entire  
16 intelligence apparatus of the United States which includes of  
17 course the Central Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence  
18 Department of the Department of State, the National Security  
19 Agency, ~~the Defense Intelligence Agency,~~ the FBI, and the Atomic Energy Commission. They are  
20 formulated in weekly meetings in which these are put out in  
21 formal pamphlets and signed by the Director of Central  
22 Intelligence. Exceptions from what is printed in there are  
23 also freely entered so that the reader can have the benefit  
24 of both points of view on a particular point.

25 MR. STEELE: Is it for the President of the United States?

1 ADMIRAL RABORN: It is for the President and for the  
2 members of the Administration who have need for them.

3 MR. STEELE: And as such that is used in the making of  
4 foreign policy?

5 ADMIRAL RABORN: As such they are part of the information  
6 that goes into whatever actions are taken.

7 MR. GORALSKI: Can you tell us if any changes were imple-  
8 mented at CIA as a result of the Special Committee that  
9 was appointed by President Kennedy?

10 ADMIRAL RABORN: Yes, I think so. It has been an extremely  
11 efficient and effective Committee, Mr. Goralski. In my view  
12 it has been most helpful. They give us an objective point  
13 of view from really a distinguished panel.

14 MR. GORALSKI: But there were obvious changes that did take  
15 place within the organization as a result?

16 ADMIRAL RABORN: And continually so. We are trying to  
17 improve always.

18 MR. GORALSKI: You couldn't tell us what some of those  
19 areas are?

20 ADMIRAL RABORN: No, not without getting into security  
21 matters.

22 MR. SPIVAK: Admiral, it was reported that you refused  
23 to tell the Foreign Relations Committee whether the CIA ever  
24 used the Fulbright Scholarship Program as a cover for your  
25 agents. Why did you hesitate to say you didn't, if you didn't?

1           ADMIRAL RABORN: Well, this came at the end of a series  
2 of questions which had to do with sources and methods which,  
3 of course, were quite private, and I did answer it, although  
4 I understand it didn't get into the -- this is one exception  
5 I made because of the distinguished Chairman of the Senate  
6 Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Fulbright. I did answer  
7 it, but there were four or five other people talking at the  
8 same time and I understand it didn't get into the record.  
9 I said categorically No.

10           MR. BOGGS: Thank you, Admiral Raborn, for being with  
11 us today on MEET THE PRESS.

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