

Allen W. Dulles, C.I.A. Director From 1953 to 1961, Dies at 75

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 — Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961, died last night in Georgetown University Hospital. He was 75 years old.

Mr. Dulles had suffered from arthritic gout for several years, but doctors attributed his death to influenza complicated by pneumonia. He had been ill a few weeks.

In a statement, President Nixon said "In the nature of his task, his achievements were known to only a few. But—because of him—the world is a safer place today.

"The death of Allen Dulles came at a time when his qualities of deliberation, integrity and intelligence are more than ever those on which free men must rely. He served his country in the great tradition of his family and with unstinting devotion to duty.

"He was a man who brought civility, intelligence and great dedication to everything he did."

Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a statement released through his Gettysburg, Pa., office, said: "I am deeply grieved by the news of Allen Dulles's passing. He was a devoted public servant whose outstanding ability will be greatly missed by the nation."

On the other hand, Tass, the Soviet press agency, denounced Mr. Dulles as a man who "fiercely hated the Soviet Union and was the advocate of unscrupulous ideological and propaganda activity by the United States."

Mr. Dulles is survived by his widow, the former Clover Todd; two daughters, Mrs. Joan Buresch of Zuurich, Switzerland, and Mrs. Jens Jehsen of New York; a son, Allen Macy of Washington; three sisters, Mrs. Eleanor Lansing Dulles of Washington, Mrs. Dean Edwards of Rye, N. Y., and Mrs. James Seymour of New Hartford, N. Y., and six grandchildren.

A funeral service will be held Saturday at 11 A.M. at the Georgetown Presbyterian Church in Washington. Burial, in Baltimore, will be private.



The New York Times

Allen W. Dulles

Led Spy Network

By ALAN S. OSER

To the task of running the nation's intelligence establishment during the height of the cold war in the nineteen-fifties, Allen Welsh Dulles brought an engaging manner, a hearty gregariousness and a professional appearance enhanced by a high forehead, gray hair and full gray mustache, rimless glasses, rumpled tweeds, and, almost perpetually, a pipe. All of which masked the zest for conspiracy stirring within.

Like his older brother, John Foster Dulles, he was a diplomat and a lawyer. But while Foster moved into the policy-making role of Secretary of State under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allen's career branched off into cloak and dagger work in World War II and reached its apex with his appointment as Director of Central Intelligence in 1953.

While Foster moved the policy pieces on the international diplomatic chessboard, Allen commanded the vast clandestine operations and evaluation network of the Central Intelligence Agency in what to both Dulleses was little less than a crusade against a worldwide Communist conspiracy of conquest.

Allen Dulles's apprenticeship for the spy-in-chief post included his work as head of the Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland in World War II. There he directed a complex operation that, over six months, led to the surrender of the German armies in northern Italy on May 2, 1945—six days before the total collapse of the Third Reich. The venture earned him the lasting distrust of the Russians, who feared a separate peace, and brought about a celebrated bitter exchange between Josef Stalin and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which foreshadowed the cold war.

Some Notable Setbacks

In that remorseless struggle for the minds of men and the allegiance of governments, Mr. Dulles's achievements as head of the C. I. A. usually went unheralded. But the setbacks received spectacular treatment.

Among these were the Soviet capture of Francis Gary Powers and his U-2 reconnaissance plane in 1960, an episode that severely embarrassed President Eisenhower and his Government, and the attempted invasion of Cuba in 1961, an incident that seemingly benefited Fidel Castro more than it did the United States. Not long after the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy, who took the blame for it, appointed a new C. I. A. director.

Even then, Mr. Dulles remained philosophical and restrained. "I don't spend my time worrying about things I can't do anything about," he once observed. "If something goes wrong, that's too bad. If it goes right, I just hope we can keep it a secret as long as possible."

The man of affairs was born on April 7, 1893, in Watertown, N. Y., into a family of affairs. Mr. Dulles's father was the Rev. Allen Macy Dulles, a Presbyterian minister and the nephew of John Welsh, Ambassador to Britain during the Rutherford Hayes Administration. His mother, the former Edith Foster, was the daughter of John W. Foster, Secretary of State under President Benjamin Harrison. Mr. Foster's son-in-law, Robert Lansing, became Secretary of State under President Woodrow Wilson.

"My earliest recollections are of the Spanish and Boer wars," Mr. Dulles once wrote. He listened to hot debates between his grandfather and Mr. Lansing on the merits of the Boer and British causes and, at the age of 8, he formed his own opinion.

He was for the Boers, and he wrote a lengthy tract about it, full of detailed battle accounts and misspellings. The family published it in the

"England ought to be content if she owned the mines where gold is, but no, she wants to have the land too," he wrote. "She is all the time picking on little countries. A little time ago she was trying to make off with Venezuela and now South Africa, and trying to squeeze the life out of the Boers, but she is finding it hard work to do it; all her crack soldiers are being cut up by the Boers."

A close relationship between Allen and his brother Foster, who was 5 years older, began when they were young. It lasted until Foster's death in 1959.

Allen followed his brother to Princeton, where his easy friendliness contrasted with the stiff intellectualism that Foster had displayed on the campus a few years earlier. After graduation, he set out to see the world.

Assignment in Vienna

The year was 1914. He was in Paris when Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated at Sarajevo, setting off the events that led to World War I. But to the young Allen Dulles, who read the news in a sidewalk cafe while sipping an apéritif, it did not seem particularly ominous.

He went on to India, where he taught English at a mission school in Allahabad. Later he visited China and Japan. The year of travel ended back at Princeton, where he won an M.A. degree in international law in 1916 at 23 and joined the diplomatic corps.

First he went to the United States Embassy in Vienna and was given the task of making contact with the dissident forces in Austria that were trying to upset the Austro-Hungarian wartime alliance with Germany.

A year later he was in Bern, Switzerland, gathering information on Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Balkans.

In 1919 Mr. Dulles was at the Paris Peace Conference, reunited again with Foster, who worked on European economic and financial problems while Allen specialized in political affairs. Next came Berlin, where he helped open the first post-war United States mission; then Constantinople (now Istanbul) and finally, in 1922, Washington, as chief of the State Department's Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

A year later President Warren G. Harding died. Mr. Dulles emerged from a late dinner party to hear a newsboy shouting "Extra!" He read the news and rushed to the State Department.

Only a clerk was on duty. Mr. Dulles rounded up the information chief of the State Department, Stanley Hawkes, and rushed to the home of Secretary of State Charles

Evans Hughes and brought him back to the State Department. From there they reached the Vice President, Calvin Coolidge, at his father's house in Plymouth Notch, Vt.

There was no phone there and it took an hour to fetch the phone. Mr. Dulles used the Hamilton Fish review of the council's quarterly Oath in The World Almanac, and Mr. Hughes dictated it over the telephone to Mr. Coolidge's father, a notary public, who administered it to his son.

In Washington Mr. Dulles attended law classes at night at George Washington University, and in 1926 he received an LL.B. degree. Then, when he was reassigned to the post of counselor to the United States Legation in Peking at a salary of \$8,000 a year, the same as his pay as division chief, he quit government service.

His resignation letter, a polite but firm protestation over low salaries in the diplomatic profession, appeared in the press and caused no small stir. In The New York World on Oct. 3, 1926, Mr. Dulles set forth, in a characteristically dry style with close attention to detail, the problems of the diplomat who lacks independent means.

"I have always endeavored to live modestly," he wrote, "but one is compelled to establish contacts, to accept and return entertainment and deport himself generally in a way that will be a credit to himself and his Government.

"This does not mean," he went on, "that Foreign Service officers must be 'pink tea' artists. That is a silly notion. It is a well-known fact, however, that a great deal more can be accomplished over the dinner table or during a social call in the evening than in an office."

From Washington Mr. Dulles went to Wall Street and the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, where Foster was already a partner.

Foster had a reputation for legal brilliance if a rather severe personality, but Allen was to be remembered as a man who "bubbled over with enthusiasm, laughed a lot, had myriad friends, was always talking, always gay."

Mr. Dulles was of that breed of lawyer who shuffles between private practice and Government service. In 1927 he served as legal adviser to the Three-Power Naval Conference. In 1932 and 1933 he was adviser to the United States delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. And in an unsuccessful brush with politics, he was defeated in a primary race for a Congressional seat in 1938.

The channel for his continuing intense interest in international affairs was the Council on Foreign Relations, formed in the late twenties by a group of Americans who had been active at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In collaboration with Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of the council's quarterly Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dulles wrote two books, "Can We Be Neutral?" in 1935 and "Can America Stay Neutral?" in 1938.

The books reflected a turning away from the pre-World War I attitude that there could be such a thing as a "strict" and "impartial" neutrality, and took the more pragmatic position that neutrality was merely a policy that a country at peace adopted toward a country at war.

But as World War II neared, Mr. Dulles grew increasingly skeptical of the chances that war could be avoided or that the United States could stay out once it came. In May, 1941, in fact, he urged the United States to enter the war for reasons of "enlightened selfishness."

"England and the United States together can survive," he observed to a Republican committee. "It might not be possible for them to survive separately."

At Sullivan & Cromwell Mr. Dulles drew upon and expanded his wide acquaintanceship in Europe, traveling there frequently. He became a director of the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation of New York, the American branch of an old British banking house of German origin. And he was involved in his firm's work for such German clients as Vereinigte Stahlwerke (the Fritz Thyssen steel trust) and I. G. Farbenindustrie, the chemical trust.

Joining the O.S.S.

Colonel (later Maj. Gen.) William J. Donovan was looking for men with just such broad European connections when he was building the staff of the wartime intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services, after Pearl Harbor. Mr. Dulles, an acquaintance from both Washington and New York days, was one to whom he turned.

Mr. Dulles was assigned to Bern with orders to gather information on the enemy and assist the anti-Hitler underground. But in November, 1942, half the fun was getting there.

At his train's last stop in occupied France before the Swiss border, Mr. Dulles's passport was examined by an apparent Gestapo agent. Soon a French gendarme told him he would have to be detained.

The movement that began even before World War II. In another book, "The Secret Surrender," he described the clandestine operation that led to the surrender of Germany's armies in Italy on May 2, 1945.

The central figure in that operation, known to the Americans as Operation Sunrise, was the commander of all SS (Elite Guard) forces in Italy, Gen. Karl Wolff. Mr. Dulles met him secretly and then set up the first meeting between high-ranking Allied officers—then Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer and a Briton, Maj. Gen. Terence S. Airey—with a German general, Wolff, to discuss a German surrender. The meeting was held in Ascona, Switzerland, at the villa of Gero von S. Gaevernitz.

Hesitation by German generals and political complications in Washington set the operation back, and when the Russians got wind of it they were furious. In March, 1945, they angrily protested to Washington that the Americans were negotiating with the Germans behind their back, and in April Stalin wrote an accusatory letter to President Roosevelt, who replied, "I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates."

Admiral of the Fleet William D. Leahy called the episode "our first acrimonious altercation with the Russians since they joined the Allied cause."

For his part, Mr. Dulles justified the operation on the ground that perhaps thousands of lives could be saved, and Italian industry in northern Italy saved from destruction at the hands of the retreating Nazis, if the war could be ended there sooner. He also suspected that the real cause of the Russians' anger was their fear that an early settlement in Italy might allow Allied forces to drive on to Trieste and Venezia Giulia before the Soviet Army could get there.

Later, some critics contended that the operation helped to destroy hopes of postwar cooperation with the Russians and strengthen the impression that Mr. Dulles was as much an architect as a prosecutor of the cold war.

The spy network that Mr. Dulles established also succeeded in obtaining information about the Nazi V-weapon program. This led to the bombing of the research center at Peenemunde, which was said to have set back the Nazi rocket-development program by at least six critical months.

After the war Mr. Dulles returned to New York to practice law. Before long he was helping to draft the legislation

Caution did not eliminate blunder. In a dimly lighted hotel corridor one night a stranger approached Mr. Dulles and asked him, "I beg of you, where is 110?" That happened to be his secret intelligence agent's number and Mr. Dulles blurted out, "You are talking to him. I'm 110." Too late he realized that the stranger was merely looking for his room.

Nazi Documents Obtained

In Bern Mr. Dulles made contact with a man known only as George Wood, an employe in the German Foreign Office in Berlin. Over a two-year period "George" directed more than 2,000 Nazi documents across the border, making microfilms of them in an operating room at Charité Hospital in the German capital.

Through this contact Mr. Dulles reported the presence of a clandestine radio transmitter in the German Embassy in Dublin that was used to direct submarines for raids on Allied shipping. Plans to trap an American troop convoy were uncovered in time to reroute the ships.

Another tip from "George" exposed the valet of the British Ambassador in Ankara as a spy.

Mr. Dulles also made contact with Hans Bernd Gisevius, a German diplomat who was one of the group of conspirators who attempted to assassinate Hitler with a bomb on July 20, 1944. Through Gisevius Mr. Dulles kept the Government informed of the plotters' activities.

He urged Washington to encourage and assist the German underground, but here as in other activities Mr. Dulles ran up against skepticism in Washington and also the insistence on unconditional surrender, a slogan that he said the Nazis were able to use to "prolong a totally hopeless war for many months." The unconditional-surrender policy made it impossible to promise German dissidents less rigid terms for peace if Hitler were overthrown.

In the book "Germany's Underground," published in 1947, Mr. Dulles wrote the history of the last three months of the war.

to set up the Central Intelligence Agency, and a year later he headed a committee to report on the effectiveness of the agency as it was organized under the law.

In 1950 the C.I.A.'s director, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, invited Mr. Dulles to Washington to "discuss the report" with him. Mr. Dulles stayed for 11 years, first as deputy director, then as director.

"More than any other individual, Allen Dulles is responsible for the C.I.A. as it is today," Russell Baker of The New York Times wrote in 1958. "In one way or another, he has been involved with the creation of the agency almost from its inception and over the last five years has put his personal stamp on it."

Interested in Details

The Dulles C.I.A. was considered a "happy ship," at least until the Bay of Pigs failure. The agents looked upon the director as a colleague, and the director bore down on operational activities and national estimating processes, leaving administrative details to others. To his subordinates he was the "great white case officer" because of his interest in the details of operations. "He always got into the juicy ones," one associate remarked.

There were many juicy ones. Was there a 20 per cent chance to overthrow a "leftist" regime in Guatemala? Mr. Dulles thought so, and President Eisenhower took the chance. And on June 30, 1954, the Government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was overthrown after a 12-day civil war engineered by the C.I.A.

Was there a chance to tap Soviet communications lines through a tunnel between East and West Berlin? There was, and the project was successful until the Russians accidentally dug into the tunnel when they were trying to repair a leak in their own cable tunnel.

Was there a chance, in 1953, to overthrow Mohammed Mosaddegh as Premier of Iran and restore to power Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, a friend of the United States? The C.I.A. thought so. A crowd chanting pro-Shah slogans and an attack by pro-Shah troops on the Premier's residence came with well-planned precision one night in August, and soon the Shah was flying home from Rome to set up a pro-Western regime.

Mr. Dulles loved these adventures, and in carrying them out he placed supreme confidence in his personal judgments. Colleagues recalled that he would cut off debate about the intentions of a foreign head of state with the remark, "Oh, I know him personally. He would never do a thing like that."

was a fine politician, too, and that this was no small matter for the head of an agency under suspicion if only because of the secret nature of its task.

His strong position helped him withstand the challenge of McCarthyism. When Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin was weakening Washington agencies and destroying careers with sensational charges of Communist infiltration, Mr. Dulles successfully fought him off. The Senator got nowhere with attacks on William P. Bundy, a high C.I.A. aide and later an Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. Dulles resolutely refused to release Mr. Bundy, denouncing charges by the Senator as false.

That political skill was helpful in beating down continuing efforts by some in Congress to establish a joint Congressional committee to watch over the activities of the C.I.A. His argument that agency secrets would be susceptible to "leaks" through such a committee overcame the concern about the fact that the C.I.A. was immune from the ordinary forms of Congressional checks.

In 1956 the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, made a celebrated speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist party denigrating Stalin. The speech marked an important turn in Soviet life, the end of the Stalin personality cult and the start of a broad program that came to be known as de-Stalinization, but the speech was not made public. Mr. Dulles always considered it one of the coups of his career that the C.I.A. was able to obtain a copy of the speech and publicize it to devastating propaganda effect.

Not for this reason alone did Mr. Khrushchev have reason to know the Dulles name, and when the Premier came to the United States in 1959 he was beyond the conspiratorial. He interested in meeting the intelligence chief at a White House dinner.

"You know Mr. Dulles, don't you?" Vice President Richard M. Nixon said to the Premier over cigars after the dinner.

"Oh, yes, I read your report," Mr. Khrushchev said to Mr. Dulles.

"I hope you get them legally," Mr. Dulles said.

"Oh, yes," the Premier rejoined. "We get these reports from the same sources and the same agents. It's a pity that we don't get together and pay these agents only once and save money."

"Well, this would be a kind of sharing-the-wealth program," Mr. Dulles suggested.

But the banter did not reach which Mr. Dulles always took the Communist threat. "I think

face is the Communist peril," he once said. "That is the only peril to our freedoms, to our institutions, to everything we hold dear."

The alarms he often sounded were not only in the ideological area. The Government turned to the C.I.A. for national estimates, and in 1959 Mr. Dulles estimated that the Soviet growth rate was sufficient to double industrial output in well under a decade. He sternly warned against falling victim to any "false tranquilizer" about Soviet growth.

Ironically, one of the great intelligence achievements of the period ended as an international political setback. This was the U-2 incident in 1960. An American plane capable of taking detailed pictures from a height of more than 70,000 feet was shot down over the Soviet Union.

The U-2 flights had been providing the United States with vital information about the Soviet missile development program, among other things. But when the plane was brought down an angry Premier Khrushchev called off a summit conference that had been scheduled for Paris in the hope of easing world tensions.

Mr. Dulles always insisted that Premier Khrushchev had merely seized upon the U-2 incident as a pretext to scuttle a conference he had no wish to attend. But skeptics continued to feel that the episode had served to exacerbate tensions at a time when they might have been eased.

The biggest blow to the C.I.A.'s stature, however, was the calamitous attempt to invade Cuba just after John F. Kennedy took office. There, all the worst fears of critics that the agency might come to mix advocacy with execution in a given intelligence operation seemed to be realized.

The landing by about 1,500 anti-Castro Cuban "freedom fighters" took place at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961. From the start the invaders suffered from insufficient ammunition and inadequate air support, and within a few days the Castro forces scored a crushing victory, taking the surviving invaders as prisoners.

The political repercussions were at least as formidable as the military defeat. The country's allies seemed no less shocked than the nonaligned states over United States participation in such an undertaking, and President Kennedy's prestige was sharply undercut after only three months in office.

Publicly Mr. Kennedy spared Mr. Dulles the wrath he was known to feel toward the C.I.A., for he placed the blame on himself according to the mission plan. But he quickly acted

the procedures and personnel of the agency, and in September he appointed John A. McCone to succeed Mr. Dulles.

His View of Invasion

Mr. Dulles himself spoke little in public about the Cuban affair, but when he did do so it was not to acknowledge that the plan might have been misconceived. Once, when he was asked whether the invasion attempt was not both immoral and illegal, he replied that the question was whether the United States should have told the young men of the anti-Castro brigade, "who asked nothing more than the opportunity to restore a free government in their country" and were ready to risk their lives to do so, that they could expect no sympathy or support from the United States.

The Bay of Pigs affair was generally considered a watershed in the history of the C.I.A. The era when Mr. Dulles ran the agency pretty much as he saw fit, and when through his publicly prominent personality it stayed very much in the public eye, came to an abrupt halt. Its operations came under far more rigorous surveillance, and its directors tended to stay discreetly in the background.


Six years after his retirement, the curtain was lifted on another of Mr. Dulles's C.I.A. policies, the secret subvention of the National Student Association. "We obtained what we wanted," he said in justification of the subsidies. "If we turned back the Communists and made them milder and easier to live with, it was because we stopped them in certain areas and the student area was one of them."

Mr. Dulles was called out of retirement for a year to serve on the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, which was headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Otherwise, he lived quietly at Highlands, his home on Wisconsin Avenue in Washington. There he wrote "The Craft of Intelligence" in 1963 and "The Secret Surrender" in 1966.


Last year he edited "Great True Spy Stories," an anthology of modern espionage capers. A New York Times review likened it to "a special museum exhibit."

"We linger where we please," the notice said. "We come back when we're in the mood. With such a guide [as Mr. Dulles] and such a book, both average reader and connoisseur will find rich rewards."




Cornell Cana—Life Magazine

Mr. Dulles at work with a constant companion—his pipe



The New York Times

Allen W. Dulles, seeking Republican nomination for Congress in 1938, voting in the New York primary. He lost.



The New York Times

Mr. Dulles, in 1948, meeting his brother, John Foster Dulles, when the future Secretary of State was on his way from a U.N. meeting in Paris to confer with Thomas E. Dewey, G.O.P. Presidential candidate, to whom he was an adviser.




The New York Times

Mr. Dulles with reporters during a Senate inquiry after a U-2 plane able to fly at 70,000 feet was downed by Russians



From "The Secret Surrender"

Mr. Dulles with Gero von S. Gaevernitz, at whose villa he set up a secret meeting of Allied and German officers during World War II to discuss a German surrender.



United Press International

President John F. Kennedy presenting National Security Medal in 1961 to Mr. Dulles, outgoing C.I.A. director.