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FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3390
TO AMEND THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

APRIL 17, 18, AND 19, 1972



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(II)

CONTENTS

	Page
Statements by:	
Alpern, Robert, SANE, A Citizens' Organization for a Sane World.....	207
Butz, Timothy, Vietnam Veterans Against the War.....	238
Cash, Dr. Richard, The Bangladesh Information Center.....	219
Clark, Hon. Joseph S., chairman, Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy.....	173
Laird, Hon. Melvin R., Secretary of Defense, accompanied by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious II, U.S. Army, Deputy As- sistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for Security Assistance and Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency; Rady A. Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Donald S. Floyd, Special Assistant for Congressional Relations, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Col. Robert M. Lucy, U.S. Marine Corps, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Christian A. Chapman, Director, Office of Military Assistance Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State.....	92
Lowenstein, Allard K., national chairman, Americans for Democratic Action.....	227
Ravenal, Earl C., Federation of American Scientists.....	197
Rogers, Hon. William P., Secretary of State, accompanied by Dr. John A. Hannah, Administrator, Agency for International Devel- opment; George S. Newman, Acting Coordinator of Security As- sistance; and Thomas R. Pickering, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State.....	4
Smith, Rev. John Coventry, General Assembly of the United Pres- byterian Church in the United States.....	247
Yarrow, Clarence Friends Committee on National Legislation.....	181
Insertions for the record:	
Text of S. 3390.....	1
Prepared statement of William P. Rogers, Secretary of State.....	5
Prepared statement of John A. Hannah, Administrator, Agency for International Development.....	8
"Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi Is Down," article in the New York Times, April 14, 1972.....	44
"We Have Always Survived," article by Robert Shaplen, the New Yorker, April 15, 1972.....	53
Prepared statement of Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense.....	98
Prepared statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.....	102
Manner in which DMZ has been respected since 1968.....	111
Hanoi's violations of Geneva Convention.....	129
Costs of Vietnam war.....	139
U.S. military assistance to the South Vietnamese Air Force.....	148
A-1 program for South Vietnam.....	148
"Saigon Making Moves To Curb Bad-News Coverage of the War," arti- cle in the New York Times, April 16, 1972.....	151
"U.S. To End Disclosure of Air Strikes in North," article in the New York Times, April 13, 1972.....	154
"50 GI's in Vietnam Refuse Patrol Duty, Then Agree To Go," article in the New York Times, April 13, 1972.....	156
Military assistance program plans.....	160
Estimated gross national product of Greece.....	171
Prepared statement of Joseph S. Clark, chairman, Coalition on Na- tional Priorities and Military Policy.....	173

Insertions for the record—Continued	Page
Prepared statement of Clarence H. Yarrow, on behalf of Friends Committee on National Relations.....	181
Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Edward F. Snyder, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1972.....	185
"The Prisoners of Buru: Held Without Trial or Hope of Trial, 10,000 Men Wait on an Island in the Moluccas," article by Dom Moraes, the Asia magazine, March 5, 1972.....	186
Prepared statement of Earl C. Ravenal, Federation of American Scientists.....	202
"U.S. Cuts Dacca Relief as No Longer Needed," article from the Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1972.....	212
"U.N. Aid Officials Fear Bangladesh Food Crisis," article from the Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1972.....	213
"Kennedy Critical on Aid to Bengalis," article by Benjamin Welles, the New York Times, March 12, 1972.....	213
South Asia relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance.....	216
U.S. Government commitments for relief and rehabilitation in Bangladesh.....	217
Prepared statement of Dr. Richard Cash, Bangladesh Information Center.....	219
"The Strategy of Failure," editorial in the New York Times, April 19, 1972.....	230
"An Ad Hoc Committee To Keep Tabs on the Military," commentary by Nicholas von Hoffman, the Washington Post, April 19, 1972.....	231
Prepared statement of Rev. John Coventry Smith on behalf of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.....	248
Appendix:	
Statement by Congressman Don Edwards, Democrat, of California, on behalf of the U.S. Committee for Democracy in Greece.....	253
A court martial in Athens, excerpts from the interrogation of Joseph Valyrakis and Ioannis Kyriazis.....	255
"The Case of the Missing Paragraph," article by Maurice J. Goldbloom, the Washington Post, December 5, 1971.....	257
"Ruling Greek Junta Implicated in Italian Terrorist Activity," article by Claire Sterling, Washington Post, April 5, 1972.....	259
"How Much Russian Aid for Hanoi?" article by Henry Keys, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, May 5, 1972.....	261

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

MONDAY, APRIL 17, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Church, Symington, Spong, Aiken, Case, Cooper, Javits, and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

This meeting is called this morning to receive testimony on the administration's foreign aid proposal for fiscal year 1973. Mr. Secretary, the announced and scheduled purpose of this hearing was to receive testimony on the executive branch request for something over \$2 billion for military supplies, guns, tanks, et cetera, and economic assistance particularly for Vietnam and the other allies and dependencies in Asia and elsewhere for fiscal year 1973. I am sure you would agree, however, that it would be an evasion of this committee's responsibility were today's hearings to ignore the events that have occurred over the weekend. Furthermore, we should be quite clear in our own minds that the bill before us today is a bill to authorize a continuation of the war by providing arms to our Asian dependencies and economic aid in particular for South Vietnam.

(The text of S. 3390 follows:)

[S. 3390, 92d Cong., second sess.]

A BILL To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Assistance Act of 1972."

SEC. 2. Chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to international narcotics control, is amended by striking out section 481 and inserting in lieu thereof the following new sections:

"SEC. 481. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL.—It is the sense of the Congress that effective international cooperation is necessary to put an end to the illicit production, smuggling, trafficking in, and abuse of dangerous drugs. In order to promote such cooperation, the President is authorized to conclude agreements with other countries to facilitate control of the production, processing, transportation, and distribution of narcotic analgesics, including opium and its derivatives other narcotic drugs and psychotropics, and other controlled substances as defined in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-513). Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to furnish assistance to any country or international organization, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for the control

of the production of, processing of, smuggling of, and traffic in, narcotic and psychotropic drugs. The President shall suspend economic and military assistance furnished under this or any other Act, and shall suspend sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act and under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, with respect to any country when the President determines that the government of such country has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs and other controlled substances (as defined by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970) produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country, or transported through such country, from being sold illegally within the jurisdiction of such country to United States Government personnel or their dependents, or from entering the United States unlawfully. Such suspension shall continue until the President determines that the government of such country has taken adequate steps to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

"SEC. 482. AUTHORIZATION.—To carry out the purposes of section 481, there is authorized to be appropriated to the President \$42,500,000 for the fiscal year 1973, which amount is authorized to remain available until expended."

SEC. 3. Section 491 of chapter 9 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to refugee relief assistance, is amended by striking out "1972" and inserting in lieu thereof "1973" and striking out the figure "\$250,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$100,000,000".

SEC. 4. Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to military assistance, is amended as follows:

(a) In section 504(a), relating to authorization, strike out "\$500,000,000 for the fiscal year 1972" and insert in lieu thereof "\$780,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973".

(b) In section 506(a), relating to special authority, strike out "1972" each place it appears and insert in lieu thereof "1973".

(c) Section 514 is hereby repealed.

SEC. 5. Section 532 of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, relating to authorization for security supporting assistance, is amended by striking out "for fiscal year 1972 not to exceed \$618,000,000, of which not less than \$50,000,000 shall be available solely for Israel" and inserting in lieu thereof "for the fiscal year 1973 not to exceed \$844,000,000".

SEC. 6. The Foreign Military Sales Act is amended as follows:

(a) In section 23 of chapter 2, relating to credit sales, strike out "ten" and insert in lieu thereof "twenty".

(b) In section 31(a) of chapter 3, relating to authorization, strike out "\$400,000,000 for the fiscal year 1972" and insert in lieu thereof "\$527,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973".

(c) In section 31(b) of chapter 3, relating to aggregate ceiling on foreign military sales credits, strike out "\$550,000,000 for the fiscal year 1972, of which amount not less than \$300,000,000 shall be made available to Israel only" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$629,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973".

(d) In section 33(a) of chapter 3, relating to aggregate regional ceilings, strike out "\$100,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$150,000,000".

(e) Section 33(c) of chapter 3, relating to aggregate regional ceilings, is amended to read as follows:

"(c) The President may waive the limitations of this section if he finds that overriding requirements of the national security of the United States justify such a waiver and promptly reports such finding to the Congress in writing, together with his reasons for such findings. In any case in which the limitations of this section are waived under the preceding sentence, the report required under such sentence shall set forth, in detail, the amounts of assistance, sales, credits, guarantees, and ship loans proposed to be made in excess of the geographical limitation applicable under this section."

SEC. 7. Section 8(b) of the Act of January 12, 1971, entitled "An Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act, and for other purposes" (84 Stat. 2053), is amended by striking out "\$185,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$245,000,000".

6 YEARS OF DISCUSSING VIETNAM WAR

Only a little more than 6 years ago, in hearings on a similar legislative proposal—the authorization of a supplementary request for supporting assistance, most of it for South Vietnam—we began public discussion of the war in Vietnam with your predecessor, Secretary Rusk.

It is ironic and tragic that today—6 years later—after hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost; after much of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been ravaged and destroyed; after the economic and social fabric of our own Nation has been seriously undermined—we are still discussing the war in Vietnam with the members of the Cabinet even though we have a President who came into office in January of 1969 promising to end the war either through negotiations or through Vietnamization. Instead, 3 years after that President took office, we find the largest force of combat aircraft and naval vessels the United States has ever assembled in Southeast Asia, massive bombing of North Vietnam resumed, and the port of Haiphong and the capitol of Hanoi under attack at the risk of grave international complications, at a time when at last there seemed to be some promise of a long overdue fundamental restructuring of our relations with the Soviet Union and, I might add, a movement in our relations with China.

MC GEORGE BUNDY'S MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MAY 1967

Just to refresh your memory, Mr. Secretary, I want to read a very brief excerpt from two memorandas of the past. This one is from McGeorge Bundy's memorandum to President Johnson in May of 1967. I think it refreshed our memory how long we have been on this. This is from the Pentagon papers that have recently been published (New York Times edition, p. 570) :

On the ineffectiveness of the bombing as a means to the end of the war, I think the evidence is plain—though I would defer to expert estimators. Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues simply are not going to change their policy on the basis of losses from the air in North Vietnam. No intelligence estimate that I have seen in the last 2 years has ever claimed that the bombing would have this effect. The President never claimed that it would. The notion that this was its purpose has been limited to one school of thought and has never been the official government position, whatever critics may assert.

* * * Moreover, I think those against extension of the bombings are more passionate on balance than those who favor it. Finally, there is certainly a point at which such bombing does increase the risk of conflict with China or the Soviet Union, and I am sure there is no majority for that. In particular, I think it clear that the case against going after Haiphong Harbor is so strong that a majority would back the Government in rejecting that course.

So I think that with careful explanation there would be more approval than disapproval of an announced policy restricting the bombing closely to activities that support the war in the South.

SECRETARY McNAMARA'S COMMENTS ON BOMBING

Then in the same papers, on page 580, this is then Secretary McNamara, in which he was commenting upon the same subject which has just been renewed this weekend. It says

* * * The answer is that the cost and risk of the actions must be considered.

The primary costs of course,
this is of the bombing,

are U.S. lives: The air campaign against heavily defended areas costs us one pilot in every 40 sorties. In addition, an important but hard to measure cost is domestic and world opinion: There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an

issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States—especially if the damage to North Vietnam is complete enough to be “successful.”

QUESTIONS CONCERNING RECENT MILITARY MEASURES

There is much more, of course, in those papers relating to this subject. The only new thing that I could add with regard to that is that on Saturday as I watched on television the table tennis contests in Michigan University, after which the Chinese and the American players all paraded out holding their hands high and flames in their other hands, this is another change from the time when we had those reports.

I, for one, Mr. Secretary, cannot understand what possible national interest has dictated these military measures. Surely, considerations of prestige would not warrant such drastic steps. Surely, we are no longer under the illusion that a military victory can be achieved by bombing or that a renewal of bombing will improve the chances of negotiating a settlement or recovering our prisoners of war.

I hope that will enlighten us this morning on the reasons for these recent actions. And I would begin by asking these five questions: (1) What is the purpose you seek to achieve by the intensified bombing of North Vietnam? (2) Why was the decision made to bomb Haiphong at this particular time? (3) Why was the Congress and especially this committee not consulted in any fashion whatsoever in advance? (4) Does the policy of Vietnamization include the assumption that the United States will continue indefinitely to provide unlimited air and naval support whenever South Vietnamese ground forces are under military pressure?

Finally, what do you suppose would happen to the United States if we just let them fight it out, win or lose, with no further American interference?

I hope, Mr. Secretary, you will address yourself to these questions. But before we proceed, the details of the bill before us which are quite well known to this committee, having gone over them year after year.

I would like to say, of course, that Secretary of State Rogers is accompanied by Dr. John Hannah, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

Mr. Secretary, would you please proceed?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN A. HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; GEORGE S. NEWMAN, ACTING COORDINATOR OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE; AND THOMAS R. PICKERING, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I have a statement here that I would like to read—

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind—

Secretary ROGERS. Dealing with the subject matter that I was asked to testify on this morning. Then I would be happy to answer any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I much prefer if you would address yourself to the

questions. We are familiar with the program and I have seen your statement. But the questions that are uppermost in our minds certainly relate to the justification for the program submitted in your statement. Do you object to addressing your answers to these questions?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't Mr. Chairman. I would like as I said a moment ago, and I won't insist on it if the Chair feels I shouldn't—I would like to read the statement that I had prepared for this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you read it at the end of the hearing instead of now?

I am very serious about it. Those are typical statements. We have heard them often. We know what is in them. But the substance of it is the questions we have raised, I believe. Then you can read the statement.

Secretary ROGERS. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. We will certainly put it in the record.

Senator PERCY. May I ask how long the statement is?

Secretary ROGERS. About 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you proceed to address the questions, please.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, may I put the statement in the record then?

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

(The prepared statements of Secretary Rogers and Dr. Hannah follow:)

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee: I am here today to seek this Committee's support for the President's fiscal 1973 funding requests for security assistance, the international narcotics control program, and South Asian relief.

Mr. Chairman, for Fiscal 1973, I am asking your support for the authorization of \$780 million for grant military assistance, \$527 million in foreign military sales credits, and \$844 million for security supporting assistance.

This requirement was developed within the Executive Branch and approved by the President prior to final Congressional action on the Administration's fiscal 1972 request. Our fiscal 1973 request does not compensate for the reduced sums authorized and appropriated by the Congress for the current fiscal year. As the President has stated, the funds appropriated for security assistance were inadequate for the purposes which we are seeking to achieve. Many important country programs have had to be cut back drastically. These reductions have impaired the effectiveness of the Nixon Doctrine. Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, during his recent trip to East Asia found that the leaders of many countries now question, not the President's desire to provide adequate assistance in support of their legitimate self-defense needs, but whether his assistance will in fact be forthcoming.

The funds we seek will help to build local defense capabilities. In placing greater reliance on local forces, this approach will mean a correspondingly less potential need for direct U.S. military involvement. And it will bring the time closer when even our security assistance can be reduced.

The progress of the Vietnamization program, despite the renewal of North Vietnamese aggression, has permitted us to withdraw virtually all of our ground combat troops.

Our assistance to Cambodia has helped the Khmer Government develop and support a light infantry force which has resisted the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong invasion, and has diverted and complicated North Vietnamese efforts against South Vietnam.

We have 20,000 fewer troops in Korea than we had two years ago, and the Koreans themselves have assumed primary responsibility for the defense of the entire demilitarized zone.

Our security assistance has helped to maintain the delicate military balance in the Middle East. And although the arms balance may not be a guarantee of peace, it is a deterrent to war.

Our assistance to Greece and Turkey has been an important ingredient in our close cooperation with both countries in the security field and has enhanced their ability to perform their assigned roles in NATO's military defense planning.

While many of the nations we seek to assist still require our material support, the nature of our relationship is changing. Our friends and allies now are determining their own security requirements, are doing more of their own military planning, are assigning priorities in terms of economic and military resources, and are developing plans for their own defense self-sufficiency. They know and we have told them that our basic objective, consistent with our security interests and obligations, is to get out of the grant military assistance business as soon as we can.

Let me turn to our specific fiscal 1973 request.

For Vietnam, we are requesting \$585 million in security supporting assistance earmarked mainly for economic stabilization and war relief activities and for expanded economic development. A significant part of this request is for requirements that previously were met by expenditures from the DOD budget.

Mr. Chairman, as the Committee knows, South Vietnamese forces are now engaged in the courageous battle to defend their country. The North Vietnamese, while cynically calling for meetings at the conference table, prepared and launched a massive invasion of South Viet-Nam. All but one of their thirteen combat divisions is currently operating outside of North Vietnamese territory, and nearly all of these are engaged in attacks against South Vietnam.

In Military Region I, in the north of the country, the North Vietnamese have invaded directly across the Demilitarized Zone, using heavy tanks, artillery, and massed anti-aircraft weapons of the most sophisticated types.

In Military Region II, in the Central Highlands, two more divisions of North Vietnamese troops, attacking from Laotian territory, are pressing hard against the defenders of two provincial capitals.

In Military Region III, not far from Saigon, the North Vietnamese, again using heavy and sophisticated offensive equipment, have invaded from Cambodian soil.

These attacks have dropped the pretense that this war is in any sense a "popular uprising" and have exposed it as a naked aggression of the most flagrant type.

The South Vietnamese have risen to the challenge; they have demonstrated their determination to resist aggression. They deserve, now more than ever, our steadfast help and encouragement.

Our proposed \$50 million program for Laos will be primarily for economic stabilization and refugee relief and resettlement operations.

The bulk of the \$225 million requested for military assistance for Cambodia will continue to finance required ammunition, light combat equipment, and much-needed training. Another \$75 million in supporting assistance will help meet the needs of a war-disrupted economy and help to replace some of the resources denied the Cambodian people by NVA/VC military operations.

The largest single grant military assistance request, \$235 million, is to continue to support the Republic of Korea's five-year modernization program. Given adequate funds we expect the program to be completed in 1975. We then expect Korea to meet the bulk of its defense needs through the Foreign Military Sales program.

In the Middle East, in the absence of a peace settlement, we must continue to provide assistance to Israel and friendly Arab countries. This assistance contributes to the military stability which is an essential condition for progress toward an Arab-Israeli peace.

The armed forces of Greece and Turkey need further modernization to enhance the effectiveness of their contributions to NATO's strength. Neither country is yet able to dispense with our assistance. However, Greece's rapid economic strides have made it possible for us increasingly to substitute credit for grants. With Turkey's economy considerably strengthened, we believe it possible that Turkey will be able over a period of time to make a transition from grant military assistance credits.

We are proposing two amendments directly aimed at accelerating the transition of countries from grant military assistance to sales.

The first amendment which we are proposing extends the repayment period for Foreign Military Sales credits from 10 years to 20. This will allow the sale of military equipment on a more favorable basis and thereby relieve the balance-of-payments pressures which recipients experience. But more importantly, longer repayment periods will allow us to accelerate our program for moving countries from grant Military Assistance programs to Sales programs. The

transfer of a country from grant assistance to sales on military equipment encourages the recipient countries to review priorities and make the hard decisions between military and other requirements within their own budgets.

Second, we are requesting that the Congress increase the ceiling on military grant material and sales programs to Latin America from \$100 million to \$150 million. Latin American nations, with World War II and Korean War vintage equipment, wish to modernize their inventories. If U.S. equipment is not available, Latin American countries will go elsewhere—in recent years they have spent some \$800 million for European arms. Recent Latin American military expenditures average only about two percent of gross national product. We want to be responsive to reasonable requests for force modernization, and we believe that important political and economic advantages will result from an increase in the regional ceiling.

Finally, we are proposing the repeal of Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act. This section imposes a requirement that is contrary to the basic purpose of grant MAP programs, cuts across our desire to encourage recipients to assume a greater share of their defense responsibilities and inhibits their movement from grant programs to credit programs.

With the help of Congress, we have taken an important step to improve the management of our security assistance programs. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 authorized a new position, an "Under Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance Programs." The President has just nominated Curtis W. Tarr for this important position. Under his guidance I am confident that we can improve the integration of our security assistance.

Mr. Chairman, I now turn to the international aspects of the drug abuse problem, which has caused an inordinate amount of human suffering and social dislocation in the United States. To combat it, the President has organized an all-out effort, of which the International Narcotics Control Program, for which we are requesting \$42.5 million for fiscal 1973, is an essential element. This program is supervised by the President's Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control of which I am Chairman. It complements the domestic programs undertaken by Dr. Jaffe's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and by Myles Ambrose's Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement. Nothing less than a comprehensive and coordinated attack on all fronts will be sufficient to overcome this critical problem.

We knew at the outset of our planning that many nations did not regard the drug abuse problem as seriously as we did. The first part of our program involved intense diplomatic efforts to persuade other governments of the need for cooperative action and to mobilize their support. Our top narcotics officials and the President himself have joined with the Department of State in this effort. Our diplomatic posts in over 50 nations which are important producing areas, refining sites, or transiting routes have prepared Narcotics Control Action Plans. These plans will be the basis for bilateral negotiations with each country; our goal is to begin implementing all the plans within six months. In nations where bilateral joint efforts are already underway—for example, France, Laos, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey—we have received excellent cooperation. We will need your support to expand our effort.

I should also like to call your attention to the increasing role of the United Nations in the international drug control effort. With broadened financial support the United States Fund for Drug Abuse Control is becoming increasingly active in organizing control programs in critical areas. The recent Conference to amend the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a singular example of international cooperation on the narcotics issue, adopting by a vote of 71-0 (with 12 abstentions) a reinforcing protocol already signed subject to ratification by 41 nations. Moreover, more than 20 nations are at various stages of ratifying, and three countries have ratified, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances now under consideration by your Committee.

I know that the Congress fully shares our interest in controlling the flow of illicit narcotics and I deeply appreciate your constructive efforts to support and improve the program. Our preliminary indications are that the international and domestic efforts are beginning to have an impact and with your help we expect by the end of the year to have registered even more significant progress.

Mr. Chairman, our final authorization request is for \$100 million as the contribution to the international effort in South Asia. The government of Bangladesh is facing enormous problems of relief and reconstruction. For fiscal 1972, the Congress appropriated \$200 million for South Asian relief. We have already committed over \$71 million of that amount for priority non-food items and we

have also made available nearly \$73 million under PL 480 to meet immediate requirements. We are urgently considering additional assistance to Bangladesh as part of the coordinated effort directed by the United Nations.

The World Bank is completing an assessment of requirements in the area. Hence, it is still too early to determine accurately overall needs, and our \$100 million request reflects only a preliminary assessment of future requirements.

Mr. Chairman, the proposals for which I am asking your support are premised upon a view of the world as it is today—not upon what it was in the past. Our role has changed dramatically, but it is still significant and we must continue to discharge our responsibilities. I urge your Committee's support for these authorization requests.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN A. HANNAN, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here today to support our request for fiscal year 1973 authorizations totalling \$986.5 for three activities administered by A.I.D.—Security Supporting Assistance, South Asia Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance, and International Narcotics Control Assistance. The other programs carried out by A.I.D. have already been authorized by fiscal year 1973 in the foreign aid authorization bill enacted this past February.

First, I would like to mention some of the changes we have made in the Agency for International Development.

All Supporting Assistance programs now are managed by a single bureau. In setting up this new bureau, we sought clearer management responsibilities within A.I.D. and improved coordination with other agencies.

A new bureau for population and humanitarian programs has been established within A.I.D. to give strengthened direction to these priority programs. This bureau includes an improved capability for administering emergency relief programs and coordinating U.S. relief assistance with the UN and other organizations.

In addition to these major organizational changes, central program administration is being strengthened and we are redirecting programs to focus more directly on basic human needs, to expand the role of private organizations engaged in overseas assistance programs and to rely more on the developing countries themselves to manage their development programs.

Now, let us consider the authorizations we are requesting for fiscal year 1973.

SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE (\$844 MILLION)

Security Supporting Assistance is an important part of U.S. foreign policy to strengthen the economies and defense capabilities of friendly countries. This economic assistance helps countries to promote and preserve political stability and to achieve greater self-reliance. When provided in conjunction with U.S. military aid, as in Southeast Asia, Supporting Assistance strengthens the recipient country's capacity to meet its own defense requirements, permitting reduction or termination of dependence on U.S. military forces—a central aim of the Nixon doctrine.

The countries we are helping with Supporting Assistance are demonstrating increasing capability to shoulder a large share of the burden of their defense, but their material resources are often inadequate. They no longer expect American military forces, but they do look to us for the tools—equipment, supplies, and financial resources—to help them do the job.

Supporting Assistance often contributes to the economic development goals of the recipient country, but the fundamental U.S. aim in providing these funds is to strengthen the economic base and help to stabilize the country's economy in the context of a specific security situation. In many cases it helps a country avoid a major and damaging deterioration of the national economy as it seeks to deal with a threat to its national survival.

The bulk of the proposed FY 1973 Supporting Assistance program is for the countries of Southeast Asia which share an immediate common threat to their national security. Eighty-five percent of the FY 1973 Supporting Assistance program—\$743.8 million of the \$874.5 million total—is proposed for Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and East Asia regional programs. This assistance will continue in FY 1973 to help maintain national economies capable of carrying the burden of their security requirements.

Another \$90 million is proposed for security-related purposes in the Middle East. Of this, \$50 million will assist Israel with its heavy fiscal burden arising from the absence of a peace settlement in the Middle East and the flow of immigrants to Israel. The other \$40 million will help Jordan meet the costs of maintaining its security.

The remaining \$40.7 million is requested for security-related purposes in other parts of the world. For example, \$9.5 million represents the U.S. contribution toward the new NATO Alliance agreement with Malta, \$4.8 million is proposed for support of UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, and \$3 million is requested to fund the educational/cultural component of the 1970 U.S.-Spanish defense agreement.

The objectives of the economic program in Vietnam remain essentially the same as last year, except for a shift in emphasis to longer term economic development efforts so that U.S. economic assistance can eventually be phased out. In addition, our economic support will continue to make it possible for the Government of Vietnam to take over the military burden of the war; will be used to maintain, our economic support will continue to make it possible for the Government refugees and war victims; and will provide support for the pacification program.

Progress to date

Much economic progress was made last year in spite of the assumption by the Vietnamese of an increasing share of the military burden of the war.

Outstanding accomplishments included reform of the foreign exchange system, dampening import demand, and increasing domestic savings through a series of economic policy measures which have now set the stage for both economic development and the gradual phasing down of U.S. assistance. These economic measures were achieved while holding price increases to 14 percent, far lower than the 32 percent average of the previous several years. The Government of Vietnam deserves great credit for its progress with economic reforms.

Significant progress was also made in implementing the land reform program. Over one million acres were transferred to 325,000 new tenant owners during the past year.

In agriculture there was an increase in rice production plus the successful introduction of two new high-yield strains. Pork and poultry production have risen to the point where imports for the civilian economy are no longer necessary. Agricultural credit was more widely available with establishment of 16 new rural banks.

In the field of health Vietnamese Government hospitals were expanded sufficiently to accommodate 23,000 additional patients, and the number of Vietnamese doctors and nurses graduating from A.I.D.-assisted medical institutions reached an all-time high of 226 and 717 respectively.

A.I.D. also helped approximately 127,000 refugees who received resettlement benefits during the year. A new voluntary resettlement program was also undertaken to provide permanent homes to families which have been living in refugee status for many years.

We are continuing to reduce the number of A.I.D.-financed American employees stationed in Vietnam. Since FY 1971, the personnel ceiling has been reduced from 1,830 to a planned 1,133 during FY 1972, and will drop further to 822 in FY 1973.

Significantly, assistance to South Vietnam from other countries increased substantially during 1971. Total non-U.S. financial aid to Vietnam was \$78 million compared to \$35 million in 1970. This increased assistance for both humanitarian and development projects also bodes well for greater sharing of the aid burden in the future.

Program request for fiscal year 1973

The FY 1973 request for Vietnam includes funds to continue support for economic stabilization through the Commercial Import Program (\$375 million) and an Economic Support Fund (\$50 million). These funds provide a flow of commodities required by Vietnam's economy, which indirectly replaces productive resources diverted to the war effort. They also serve to keep inflation in check, which could otherwise threaten both the political and economic stability of the country. The request also includes \$70 million for the Project Program for a variety of projects in such fields as agriculture, education, industrial development, public works, rural development, customs control, public safety, public health and refugees. The amount requested is below the FY 1972 level as war-related projects are turned over to the Vietnamese.

The request also initiates a shift in emphasis to development activities by including a \$75 million request for an "Economic Development Fund." The fund will provide financing for private and public investment—with \$50 million of this amount to be used to make loans available to Vietnamese private enterprises for the expansion of plants and equipment so that Vietnam can produce a larger share of the goods which it needs, and \$25 million for projects such as electric power, bridges, and water systems. In the past, the A.I.D. program in Vietnam has provided technical assistance for agriculture, industry, and roads, as well as the financing of capital investment equipment within the Commercial Import Program. However, the new Economic Development Fund will further direct resources toward development, which in turn will hasten the process of Vietnamese economic self-sufficiency.

Our request includes \$15 million as our final contribution to the Land Reform Program. At the time the program started in 1968, we estimated that approximately \$40 million would be required. We contributed \$10 million in FY 1969 and \$15 million in FY 1971. The final \$15 million completes our support for this highly successful program, which will ultimately involve over 2.5 million acres and provide ownership to nearly three-quarters of a million former tenants.

In summary, in FY 1973 we are requesting \$585 million for Vietnam, an increase of \$30 million over the FY 1972 request. This increase is caused by a continuing decline of our military presence in Vietnam, and the consequent reduction in the Department of Defense expenditures there.

We expect that future Supporting Assistance levels can be gradually reduced after FY 1973. The economic policies which the Government of Vietnam has set in motion during the past year have laid a sound basis for future progress. The future reduction in U.S. assistance will be hastened if assistance from other donors continues to increase, as it did last year.

Cambodia

Major economic dislocations have accompanied Cambodia's decision to resist North Vietnamese and Viet Cong aggression. Budget expenditures have been greatly increased in order to expand the army. At the same time, revenues have declined sharply because of decreased domestic and export production and lower domestic tax collections. The increase in money supply resulting from these budget deficits has caused a major price inflation over the past two years.

The \$75 million we are proposing for FY 1973 will provide further foreign exchange financing for imports to help offset declines in Cambodia's domestic production and export earnings. In addition, we will join Japan, Australia, United Kingdom, Thailand, New Zealand and Malaysia in contributing to a multilaterally-financed Exchange Support Fund designed to finance other essential foreign exchange transactions.

The Cambodia program is being implemented with a minimum of direct U.S. involvement, relying heavily on existing Cambodian institutions and encouraging Cambodia to seek advice and assistance from others to the maximum extent possible.

Laos

U.S. economic assistance to Laos has been concentrated primarily on controlling inflationary pressures, which threaten the country's economic and political stability, and helping the Lao Government to provide essential services and facilities in rural areas.

The proposed FY 1973 Supporting Assistance program for Laos totals \$49.8 million—\$18.8 million in support of the multilateral economic stabilization program and \$31 million for project activities.

The United States has joined with Australia, France, Japan and the United Kingdom to support the Lao *Foreign Exchange Operations Fund*, which buys Lao currency on the open market to reduce the money supply. The Lao Government, in turn, has made strong efforts to increase taxes, improve tax collection and exercise stringent budget controls. As a result, relative price stability has been maintained despite mounting military and war-related costs.

The *project program* will continue in FY 1973 to help the Lao Government provide basic services and facilities for which its own financial resources and supply of skilled personnel remain inadequate. The principal thrust of project assistance is to provide relief to an average of almost 300,000 refugees at any given time. The United States furnishes refugees with food, clothing, medical care and supplies; provides air services for emergency relocation of refugees and for delivering supplies to them; and helps refugees resettle and become self-

sufficient. The United States also helps train junior Lao Government officials to perform refugee work at both the national and provincial levels. The provision of refugee assistance is carried out not only through a special refugee relief and resettlement project, but also as an important part of other projects such as air support, public health and rural development.

The remainder of our aid to Laos is designed to strengthen the Lao Government's ability to provide essential services and facilities in rural areas. These include schools and teachers, medical care, public safety, roads, and a variety of development activities, particularly in agriculture.

Thailand

Our past economic assistance programs have helped to relieve the potentially adverse effect of large military programs on Thailand's economic development. The economic growth rate Thailand enjoyed in the mid-60's has decelerated in recent years. The uncertainty of the military situations in both Laos and Cambodia has led the Thai to reduce the rate of increase in budgetary outlays for development while, at the same time, maintaining defense expenditures at a relatively high level. The FY 1973 Supporting Assistance request of \$25.6 million is important to Thailand so that the Thai need not divert additional funds needed for economic development to security purposes.

The United States will continue the basic security-oriented program of previous years, but will also direct increased attention to the building of institutions which will permit the Thai Government to deal on its own with its economic development problems over the long term. Assistance will be provided to help the Thai Government continue to carry out a broad program of rural security and development. The FY 1973 program will increase efforts to support or improve basic Thai institutions which have leading roles in development, including local government finance, national economic policy and agricultural planning.

East Asia regional programs

U.S.-assisted regional programs in East Asia help to improve the prospects for long-range peace and stability in the area. The main project focus is on the exploitation of the Mekong River's hydropower and irrigation potential. Other projects deal with flood control, transportation and communications, fisheries, resettlement, and schistosomiasis control. For FY 1973 we are requesting \$8.4 million of Supporting Assistance funds for East Asia regional programs.

Israel

There is an urgent need to find a way to achieve a lasting Arab-Israeli settlement. In the meantime, the ceasefire between Israel and her neighbors, which began in August 1970 and which has endured for the past eighteen months, must be maintained, so that a climate conducive to continued negotiations may be preserved. However, until a peace settlement is achieved, it is essential that we preserve the arms balance in the area.

Despite the very considerable efforts which Israeli authorities have made in managing the Israeli economy, Israel has experienced increasing difficulties in meeting the mounting military and economic claims from available resources.

To assist Israel in financing its heavy fiscal burden, we plan to provide \$50 million of Supporting Assistance in FY 1972 and propose another \$50 million in FY 1973.

Jordan

As a moderate Arab state, Jordan is a stabilizing influence in an area where important U.S. interests are threatened by radical forces. Despite internal difficulties and pressures from Arab neighbors, Jordan remains interested in a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Jordan still finds itself in serious economic difficulties. These difficulties stem essentially from Jordan's loss of the West Bank, with its relatively good farmland and its world-renowned tourist attractions. The cost of rehabilitating the areas damaged in the September 1970 crisis added another burden to the Jordanian budget. The United States is providing Supporting Assistance to Jordan to enable it to carry out essential government activities, as well as to continue modest development activities. In the course of FY 1972, we have provided Jordan with \$30 million in Supporting Assistance and \$15 million from the Contingency Fund. A \$40 million Supporting Assistance program is proposed for FY 1973.

Other programs

The remaining \$40.7 million is proposed for a number of other security-related programs.

In fiscal year 1973, we propose to contribute \$9.5 of Supporting Assistance funds as the U.S. share toward the recently concluded NATO Alliance defense agreement with Malta. The U.S. contribution toward this agreement for FY 1972—also \$9.5 million—is being provided from the Contingency Fund.

Security assistance to *Spain* is covered by a five-year treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in 1970, which provides grant military aid in exchange for extension of U.S. military base rights. We propose \$3 million of Supporting Assistance in FY 1973 to fund the educational/cultural component of this U.S.-Spanish defense agreement. The Spanish Government attaches importance to the non-military portion of the defense agreement and views it as a significant item in U.S. relations with Spain. Accordingly, Spain looks forward to its continuation as part of our agreement on the use of Spanish bases.

Other Supporting Assistance funds being requested for FY 1973 are \$4.8 million for the *UN Force in Cyprus* and a portion of the costs of A.I.D.'s centrally-administered activities.

SOUTH ASIA RELIEF AND REHABILITATION (\$100 MILLION)

The people and government of Bangladesh face extraordinary difficulties. Large-scale relief is needed to avert human suffering arising from chronic, and now increased, food shortage and from wide-spread destruction of shelter. Related to this is the requirement for help to rehabilitate the economy—rebuilding basic facilities such as roads and bridges, port facilities and schools, and providing commodities such as fertilizer and raw materials to help meet basic production needs.

Bangladesh authorities estimate it will cost \$3 billion—including at least \$1 billion of food and non-food imports—to get the country to where it was prior to 1971.

The United Nations is to be applauded for assuming a lead role, working with Bangladesh, in assessing needs and priorities, and in calling for and coordinating the world response.

The United Nations has already assessed the immediate human relief needs and is now engaged, with the World Bank, in examining urgent reconstruction priorities.

Initially, the UN has focussed on the more immediate relief requirements—particularly food, but also road and river transport and interim logistic support, shelter, fuel, fertilizer and other essential agricultural inputs. The UN preliminary assessments total over \$600 million needed during the balance of this year.

As our initial response to the UN Secretary General's appeal for contributions on February 15, 1972, the U.S. Government donated 450,000 metric tons of wheat and rice valued at approximately \$51 million, including shipping costs, under Title II of PL 480. Fifty thousand metric tons of edible oil valued at approximately \$21 million including shipping was authorized as a further grant to the UN.

In response to a subsequent UN appeal for funds to help meet the priority relief and rehabilitation needs in Bangladesh, we have made an additional grant to the UN of \$35 million. These funds will be used to meet urgent needs for additional vessel and aircraft charters, repair and reconstruction of port facilities, and purchase of relief import requirements such as vehicles, power tillers, irrigation pumps, fuel, fertilizer, roofing and other construction materials. A small portion will also be used to pay administrative costs of the UN operation.

We have also provided \$6.7 million in grants to support voluntary agency relief programs. Our initial grant of \$650,000 is to enable CARE to carry out a 62-village housing project and continue its research on cyclone-resistant shelters. A \$3 million grant has been made to the Catholic Relief Service for housing materials for 200,000 returned refugee and displaced families. To help college students made destitute by the war continue their education, the United States has provided \$1.2 million to the International Rescue Committee education program. These funds will enable 9,000 college students to continue their education for at least one year. In the field of health we have made a grant of \$450,000 to the International Rescue Committee for emergency funding of the Cholera Research Laboratory, which operates two hospitals. Also in the field of health, a grant of \$1.5 million was made to the American National Red Cross, for use by the Inter-

national Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out a program of nutritional and medical assistance for an estimated two million persons, including minorities, who have special needs. A \$1.5 million grant is pending to the Foundation for Airborne Relief to airlift food and supplies within Bangladesh.

As a result of these obligations of \$43.57 million in non-food post-war assistance provided to the UN and voluntary agencies for Bangladesh, plus a total of \$27.7 million incurred before December of last year for refugees in India as well as needs in Bangladesh, less than \$180 million of the \$200 million fiscal year 1972 appropriation for South Asia relief and rehabilitation remains available to meet additional requirements over the next few months.

In making our contributions, we are guided by the Congressional recommendation that the U.S. share should not exceed 40 percent of the total from all sources, if reasonably possible. In view of the significant contributions already made by many nations, including India and Great Britain, we expect that U.S. participation in the amount already provided by the Congress will be within this concept of "fair share." The \$100 million requested for fiscal year 1973 will enable us to continue to provide our fair share of this vital effort of expanding dimensions, which we expect to continue through the middle of next year.

By late this month, when we expect to receive the report of a UN/World Bank survey of needs in Bangladesh, the type and magnitude of rehabilitation requirements will be clearer. After we have examined that report Mr. Chairman, we would be pleased to provide the Committee with a fuller, more detailed account of the requirements these funds will help cover than we, or anyone, can do today.

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL ASSISTANCE (\$42.5 MILLION)

We are requesting a line-item authorization and appropriation of \$42.5 million for fiscal year 1973 to carry out the international narcotics control program for which special authority is now provided in the Foreign Assistance Act.

The President has made the control of drug abuse a high priority. In support of this policy the U.S. Government has launched a major international drive for improved narcotics control. Initial efforts are being directed toward opium and its derivatives, since these drugs are recognized to be the most destructive, both to the individual and to society as a whole.

Largely through U.S. efforts, a conference was held last month in Geneva which approved amendments to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This Convention will require tighter controls on the production of such drugs and will, for this purpose, give greater powers to the International Narcotics Control Board. These amendments will come into force following ratification by 40 nations. Our efforts have also led to the creation a year ago of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to which the United States plans to contribute \$2 million this fiscal year and \$5 million in fiscal year 1973.

We have identified more than 50 countries with which cooperative efforts could result in the diminution of the worldwide problem of drug abuse. Discussions are already under way with many of these countries, particularly those in which the more serious problems of opium production and trafficking exist. As the President has indicated, we stand prepared to assist any nation seeking to fight drug abuse.

The most important development to date has been Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim's announcement that all opium production in Turkey will be banned after the 1972 crop. France and Mexico are also making significant contributions to the effort. We hope the Turkish decision and other efforts which have been undertaken will serve as an example for other countries to move forcefully also.

The funds we are requesting will underwrite our contribution to the effort for the next fiscal year. The program is new and expanding rapidly. Hence, it is not possible at this time to provide detailed proposals for the entire amount of the request. However, discussions are under way with a number of governments which we expect will result in an increasing number of concrete programs in the coming months. It is essential for the United States to be in a position to move quickly into the implementation stage as each proposal is made and evaluated.

Particular emphasis will be placed in the first instance on improving enforcement capabilities and increasing cooperation between national and international enforcement agencies in the exchange of intelligence on drug trafficking. We believe this will make the most immediate impact on the problem, in terms of

preventing both the illicit production and processing of narcotic drugs and their movement throughout the world.

Programs addressing the agricultural and health aspects of drug abuse will also play important roles in the U.S. effort. However, crop substitution programs, by their very nature, must be considered long-term solutions.

Drug abuse is a relatively new problem in many countries around the world. Those which are not now experiencing serious drug abuse are becoming increasingly alarmed that this could become a problem for them in the future. The control of narcotics will require the cooperation of the entire community of nations. We are gratified with the growing awareness of this fact and the increasingly helpful responses we are receiving. We must be prepared with the financial resources needed to take full advantage of the interest of other countries and international bodies in cooperating with the United States in attacking the narcotics problem.

Mr. Chairman, each of the three authorization requests A.I.D. is making this year is for an assistance program of great importance. I urge the Committee to provide the full amount we are requesting.

Secretary ROGERS. If the chairman insists that when I come to testify on legislation that I am not permitted to read a statement, I, of course, will follow your instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be permitted to read it. It is the timing of it. In order to evaluate the program you are submitting, I think the questions I asked are fundamental.

Secretary ROGERS. Could I have the questions? I will take them one at a time.

PURPOSE OF INTENSIFIED BOMBING

The CHAIRMAN. What is the purpose you seek to achieve by intensified bombing of North Vietnam?

Secretary ROGERS. We have three purposes in mind, Mr. Chairman.

First, we are doing it to protect American troops that are in South Vietnam, protect the lives of those troops while the President's withdrawal program continues.

We are doing it to make certain that the withdrawal program that the President has announced can continue, and we are doing it to give the South Vietnamese a chance to defend themselves against the massive invasions by the North Vietnamese.

Now, the references that the chairman made in his opening statement about conditions that existed many years ago are quite different today. The fact is that the United States has withdrawn 450,000 Americans. We have no Americans in ground combat action today and the President has said on every occasion that he had a chance to, that as the withdrawals continued, that if the enemy attempted to take advantage of those withdrawals, to put American lives in jeopardy, he would take the necessary actions to prevent it. He has taken this action and he intends to continue to take whatever action is necessary to achieve those purposes.

THREAT TO U.S. TROOPS QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. You have properly said that our troops are largely withdrawn. I wasn't under the impression and have seen nothing to indicate that our troops, such as are left, have been under any great threat.

Secretary ROGERS. If the Communists took over the country completely, we have 85,000 men still there.

The CHAIRMAN. And they could be withdrawn very easily; could they not?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, as you said yourself, Mr. Chairman, on "Issues and Answers," you would not favor any such proposal.

The CHAIRMAN. I said—

Secretary ROGERS. You said it would be ridiculous to do that.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, for a long time the North Vietnamese have been able to peddle, to sell a cruel hoax to a segment of the American people that somehow the war in Vietnam was a civil uprising. Now it is quite clear, and I don't believe anyone can deny it, that this is a major invasion of and offensive action by the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. It comes at a time when its purpose is to disrupt the withdrawal program and to endanger American lives, the lives of Americans who are still in South Vietnam. The enemy has committed outside of North Vietnam 12 of its 13 combat divisions. So we think it is essential to conduct the attacks that the President has ordered, to conduct against military targets wherever he decided to make these attacks to protect American lives, to permit the withdrawals to continue, and to give South Vietnamese forces a chance to defend themselves.

It is quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that the South Vietnamese forces have been acting courageously in the defense of their own country. The attacks are occurring in military region I, II, and III and to some extent in military region IV.

The CHAIRMAN. I said we ought to settle it by negotiated settlement. Nobody ever turns tail and runs out.

Secretary ROGERS. You said it would be ridiculous to have an immediate withdrawal.

The CHAIRMAN. It would. I don't think that is in the cards at all.

WHAT IS U.S. INTEREST?

I am trying to understand, in view of all that we have suffered from this war, and the conditions that we know we contend with, is what is the U.S. interest.

Talking about Mr. Thieu's interest or the South Vietnamese Government, that is another matter.

Whether or not it is a civil war—it certainly was at one time, but our coming into it made it an international war. That is true; it is changed in character. But with our withdrawal it was again approaching a civil war between two sections of the same country, which is Vietnam. I am unable to understand what the U.S. interest is. How does this serve our interest in view of the developments with Russia and China?

I think every member of this committee has applauded the President for making moves in China and Russia and I am unable to see how this action promotes those. They are moves in which the interests of the United States are very clear to any of us. I have a great interest, all of my constituents do, in the moves to normalize relations with China and Russia, but I can't see what interest of the United States is served by this continuation of this war. I don't see from what you have said, except the lives of our soldiers. I don't believe that is any longer a significant threat. It is significant that we save them, of course, just as it is the prisoners. But we were in negotiations and according to the press we broke off negotiations.

Would you say is it possible that these bombing raids are intended to force a return to negotiations? You didn't mention that, but is that part of it?

PRESIDENT'S RECORD IN DECISIONMAKING

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to if I may, to address the first part of your question, then I will come to the last part next.

Your comment that you don't understand why we have taken this action in view of the recent decisions that the President made vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Well, as you know, his record is good. I can recall testifying before this committee in the case of decisions he made in Cambodia and the decisions he made in Laos, and we were under severe criticism because it was felt by some members of the committee that that would make it difficult for us to have better relations with the Soviet Union, and it was felt it would make it difficult also for us to have better relations with the People's Republic of China.

As you see, the President's decision was right. We had a very successful visit with the People's Republic of China. We are continuing to plan for the visit to the Soviet Union and I think the President's judgment has been sound.

Now, I think the decisions that we have made recently to bomb military targets in North Vietnam make it clear to the other side that the United States is going to take whatever military action is necessary to achieve the purposes I mentioned.

HOW UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE SUPPORTING SOUTH VIETNAM

I can remember some of the members of this committee in the past criticizing the policy of the United States for not making attacks on military targets in North Vietnam. We are doing everything we can to prevent civilian casualties, but the North Vietnamese have mounted a major invasion of the south, and it is clear for everyone to see now, and it is clear they have been lying through their teeth when they were saying there were no North Vietnam forces in South Vietnam. You have a major military invasion of South Vietnam, and we are going to continue to support the people of South Vietnam and their right to determine their own future and we have no intentions of permitting the Communists to take over South Vietnam by force. We are going to do it with South Vietnamese troops. We are going to do it with the use of American air power. We are not going to reintroduce any American ground combat troops in South Vietnam, but we are going to see this major offensive-attack on South Vietnam does not succeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me move on to the other questions.

You have had 3½ years to withdraw our troops. It is a very long time. If it is as important as you say, they could have been withdrawn.

REASON CONGRESS NOT CONSULTED IN ADVANCE OF REESCALATION

Why was the Congress not consulted in any fashion, and I don't think it was, in advance of this major reescalation of the war?

Secretary ROGERS. I think the reason was, of course, Mr. Chairman, that the secrecy of this type of thing is very important. Now the Congress knew, and the President has told the Congress from time to time, that if the enemy persisted in attempting to take advantage of the withdrawals, if they made attacks against us at the time we were withdrawing, mounted a major offensive, he would take whatever

retaliatory action he thought was necessary, and that is what he has done. To that extent the Congress has been informed. The Congress was not informed precisely of the military actions involved.

TIMING OF DECISION TO BOMB HAIPHONG

The CHAIRMAN. Why was the decision to bomb Haiphong made at this particular time? What about the timing? That was significant.

Secretary ROGERS. Because of the major invasion that has occurred and because of the military targets in Haiphong. I might say that the harbor itself was not bombed. Some of the military targets in the area, of course, were near the harbor, but the harbor itself was not bombed. But it was decided to make these attacks to slow down this major offensive underway in South Vietnam. The attack included petroleum storage dumps, places where heavy equipment is stored, warehouses and other such places of that kind which contribute, of course, to the offensive in the south.

U.S. CONTINUATION OF AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT

The CHAIRMAN. You may have already answered this one. That is, the question of the policy of Vietnamization, including the assumption that the United States will continue indefinitely to provide a limited air and naval support whenever South Vietnam forces are under pressure.

Secretary ROGERS. No, it does not. I think in that connection it should be pointed out, I am not sure there has been enough attention given to it, that the South Vietnamese are supplying a good many of the tactical missions in South Vietnam and they are doing quite well. We have every reason to think they will be able to continue the building up of their air power.

WHAT IF U.S. REMOVED ITS FORCES?

The CHAIRMAN. What is your answer to this question? It interests me very much. What do you think would happen if the United States had removed its forces, as we have been in the process of doing, and let the Vietnamese settle these matters themselves? What is the position of the Administration?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think as you said yourself, on the "Issues and Answers" program, Mr. Chairman, that any immediate withdrawal of American forces would be ridiculous. It probably would result in a blood bath. There are 17 million people in South Vietnam. If the United States did an about-face after all of these years of supporting South Vietnam, if that occurred I think there would be a major blood bath in South Vietnam. What its form and composition and so forth would be I, of course, can't be sure. But there is no doubt in my mind that there would be a terrible massacre.

Secondly, I think it would destabilize the whole area. There are other nations in the area with which we have treaty commitments that have been negotiated and ratified over a period of a great number of years. It is not a partisan matter in any sense of the word. These treaties have received bipartisan support. If we suddenly withdraw not only would we have a major blood bath in South Vietnam

but I think it would be destabilizing in areas like Korea and Japan and the Philippines and other countries in that area. So I think it would be a major disaster. It would be a mistake of major proportions.

WITHDRAWAL ORDER INDEFINITE

The CHAIRMAN. You keep saying suddenly withdraw. Vietnamization was begun in 1969. There is nothing sudden about it. The order is indefinite. It could go on for 10 years if you only withdraw 2 or 3 thousand a month.

Secretary ROGERS. I think, Mr. Chairman, you overlooked the fact we have withdrawn four hundred and fifty thousand and the President is going to make another announcement about more withdrawals, or at least he is going to make an announcement about what he is going to do. We are going to continue the present withdrawals, the withdrawals that have been announced, and he has another announcement he will make before May 1.

Now, it is difficult for me to understand how you can say we haven't withdrawn troops. The American people know we have withdrawn all of the combat troops. We have only about 85,000 troops left and we are going to be down to 69,000 by May 1.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS OR COMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. I am familiar with that. Do I understand then that in the future anytime you feel that secrecy is called for you will not consult the Congress or this committee?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think that has been true throughout our history. In terms of military battles Congress has not been advised in advance about a particular battle. That has been true in most wars. It was true beginning in George Washington's time. In fact this was one of the major controversies he had with the Congress at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

U.S. POLICY ON CONTINUING BOMBING

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, last week the press reported Secretary Laird saying that the bombing of North Vietnam would continue until the North Vietnamese had withdrawn above the DMZ. Is that the policy?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, the policy is that we are not going to engage in useless talks with the North Vietnamese. We think that the talks that we have had over the last several years have provided them with a propaganda forum that has not been useful at all. Negotiations are quite different from talks, as you know. Negotiations require serious purposes on both sides to try to resolve differences. I can say quite frankly that we haven't detected any serious purposes at all on the part of North Vietnam. We believe that their purpose is to use the negotiating forum for propaganda purposes.

In answer to your question specifically, we are not going to engage in negotiating while this major invasion is underway.

As you know, there are offenses now occurring in many parts of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese are committing almost all of their combat troops to this invasion. Therefore, we are not going to do

that. What we would do in the future, depending on the end of the invasion, of course, the President will have to decide.

Senator CHURCH. My question was the War Secretary has said that the bombing would continue until the North Vietnamese had withdrawn above the DMZ. I was wondering if that is American policy?

Secretary ROGERS. As I have just said, we are not going to enter into negotiations unless, first, we think the other side has a serious purpose and, secondly, unless this invasion is repelled or they withdraw.

WHY WILL BOMBING SUCCEED NOW?

Senator CHURCH. Why do you think the resumption of full-scale bombing in the North will now succeed when it failed before?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, before, we had a lot of American ground troops in South Vietnam. The myth persisted at that time that this was a civil war and any attack on the North somehow was unfair. Now, that is wrong, we think. The North is being used to supply the troops in South Vietnam and as long as it is being used for that purpose we think that we will have the right to and will continue to attack to prevent the invasion of South Vietnam from succeeding?

Senator CHURCH. During the Johnson years, there was very extensive bombing of North Vietnam. It was directed toward military targets; it went on for years. I will repeat my question again. Why do you think a resumption of bombing of military targets which you have now undertaken will succeed now when it failed then?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, because the facts are entirely different.

Senator CHURCH. What facts? The bombing of military targets went on for a long time, but it did not result in the North Vietnamese calling off the war or stopping the pressure on the South. Why do you assume that the resumption of bombing now will have that effect when it didn't have that effect before.

Secretary ROGERS. Well as I repeat, the facts are different, and I will tell you what the facts are that I base my answer on.

First, we do not have 535,000 Americans in South Vietnam. Secondly, we have trained and equipped the South Vietnamese to defend their own country, so that a lot of them are well trained and equipped. Third, the enemy has never committed all of its forces outside of its country before. Before, we were fighting a sort of guerrilla war and there were infiltrations and sapper attacks and so forth. Now it is a totally different concept militarily. There is a major invasion and they have committed all of their divisions except one outside of North Vietnam. That is quite a different military situation, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. I say to you most respectfully you are not answering my question.

Secretary ROGERS. I think I am. I think the military situation is quite different.

Senator CHURCH. I am not contending that the situation is the same as it was as far as the number of divisions in the South are concerned or as far as the number of American troops in the South are concerned. My question relates to the effectiveness of the bombing. The bombing in the past, when it was very extensively applied against targets in the North, had not the effect of reducing pressures on the South. I want to know why you think that the resumption of the

bombing will succeed now when it didn't succeed then? That has nothing to do with the military situation.

Secretary ROGERS. Of course it did.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, can you name a war when bombing has ever resulted in the calling off of the fighting, whenever an enemy has been bombed into submission through the use of air power alone?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, Senator, now you are asking another question.

Senator CHURCH. That is the same question.

Secretary ROGERS. Let me answer first the question you asked. You asked why because the facts are different do we expect the result to be different? Isn't that the question you asked?

WHY WILL RESUMPTION OF BOMBING SUCCEED?

Senator CHURCH. No, it is not the question I asked. The question I asked was this. For years under the Johnson administration, we bombed the North in an effort to make them, as Rusk used to say, stop interfering with their neighbor's affairs. It never succeeded. North Vietnam kept up the pressure despite the bombing. The pressure only increased; it never diminished.

The South is again under great pressure. We are resuming the bombing of the North.

My question is: Why do you think the bombing is going to succeed in inducing the North to call off the attacks on the South when in the past bombing never had that effect?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, OK. In the past, the period that you refer to, the war was being fought on a totally different basis. Now, if you have a different kind of a war you have to naturally consider that when you decide what to do.

In this case, the enemy has committed 12 of its divisions, combat divisions, outside of its country and it needs support for those divisions, which is quite different than in the past. We think and I think that history will show the wisdom of attacking the military targets in the North, which are required for their invasion of the South; they need these places for logistical purposes; they need the petroleum. Now before they didn't have the need for petroleum. Now they have very sophisticated military equipment. They have tanks, armored vehicles. They have some sophisticated guns, mobile artillery guns, all of which require petroleum and oil products. They need a lot of oil supplies from the North. They need a lot of equipment coming from the North. They have massive military supply depots north of the DMZ in other areas.

Now it is quite a different war we are fighting—that is the difference—and we think that these attacks will slow down that invasion and we think it will result in a failure of these offenses.

SUCCESSFUL HISTORICAL PRECEDENT REQUESTED

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, when you say you think history will show this, can you point to another war where the use of airpower alone has produced that effect against an enemy? As far as striking the North is concerned, you are not going to use American ground forces

to invade the North, are you? You say you are just bombing. I want to know where in history just bombing has produced the effect you are looking for?

Secretary ROGERS. As I say, this isn't just bombing. You have ground fighting going on in South Vietnam. But unless my memory fails me—I was there—airpower was quite effective in World War II.

Senator CHURCH. Airpower didn't reduce Germany into submission until allied armies conquered Germany and there was nothing left in Berlin but large ash-burning ruins.

Secretary ROGERS. I was talking about the other part of the war I took part in.

Senator CHURCH. Even there, bombing didn't produce that effect until atomic bombs were dropped. We were right at the point of invading, and the Japanese knew we had every intention of invading.

SOUTH VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF WITHOUT U.S. AIRPOWER

Secretary ROGERS. Let me say we have reason to think and I believe that if these offensives on the part of North Vietnam are unsuccessful—and it looks as though they are going to be now. Every indication we have is to that effect. The South Vietnamese have been fighting very well, and you know from the morning papers it looks as if An Loc is going to hold. If these offensives are unsuccessful, I believe the Vietnamization program will work well and I think South Vietnam will be able to defend itself successfully.

Senator CHURCH. If to defend against the present offensive it is necessary to mass such tremendous American airpower, airpower that the South Vietnamese alone will never possess themselves, then how can you conclude that in the future the South Vietnamese will be able to defend themselves without the interposition of American airpower? If the kind of aerial armada we have now assembled is necessary, how can you say that Vietnamization is going to succeed and the South Vietnamese will become self-sufficient?

Secretary ROGERS. If these offensives are unsuccessful and these combat divisions, 12 of the 13 that are outside of North Vietnam are defeated, then the effect of renewed massive invasion by the North Vietnamese in the future is going to be greatly diminished. We think in the meantime the South Vietnamese will build up their airpower.

Now, we have said from the beginning—every time I have testified here I have said as we withdraw our troops from South Vietnam we are going to continue to use airpower, we are going to continue to use the airpower necessary to prevent a takeover by the Communists in South Vietnam. I believe that can be done.

We are not going to make any announcements about what we are not going to do. We think that there has been altogether too much of that in this war.

The only two announcements I will make about what we are not going to do are these. We are not going to reintroduce American ground combat troops in South Vietnam and we are not going to use nuclear weapons in South Vietnam or North Vietnam. But short of that we are not going to make any announcements of what we are going to do or not going to do.

Senator CHURCH. I hope, Mr. Secretary, that the Vietnamese do hold out against this offensive. My disagreement is based upon a 30-

year record that the North will continue to press this war. By now either the South is able to defend itself or it looks to be very dubious they will ever be able to defend themselves. If it takes this kind of American airpower now, I can't see any time in the near future when it won't take that kind of American airpower again and I don't see Vietnamization ending our involvement if that is the way the policy of Vietnamization is defined.

WHY NORTH VIETNAM MASSED MAJOR OFFENSIVE

Secretary ROGERS. If there had been any intention on the part of the other side to negotiate a settlement, why did they mass this major offensive at this time, at a time when we are withdrawing and the whole world knows it and we are trying, as the chairman said, to improve our relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union? Why did they think it was necessary to invade South Vietnam and in a major way so the whole world could see it? Now there is no dispute about it. Everybody finally admits the forces in the south are North Vietnam forces.

Senator CHURCH. They do it because they are determined and have been from the beginning to accomplish two objectives: to drive the foreigner out of the land and to reunite Vietnam under the revolutionary government in Hanoi. That has been their objectives all along. You are unable to negotiate a settlement with these people because you can't agree to their terms and they can't agree to ours. That is plain. And they are not going to stop fighting.

Now either Vietnamization means that the South Vietnamese become self-sufficient, we provide them the tools to defend themselves while we extradite ourselves from further involvement in the war or, as you seem to define it, it means a continuous involvement for the indefinite future because the north isn't going to call this war off.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, let me follow that by saying—

QUESTION OF CIVIL WAR

Senator CHURCH. I want to add one thing further. I disagree with you when you say it is now clear to all of the world this isn't a civil war as though these two countries were distinct and separate countries. For generations, they haven't been. It is much like our civil war no longer being a civil war when the northern government invaded the South. It is a civil war and has been from the beginning, and the North Vietnamese are not going to call it off. If Vietnamization means anything and if it is to be a successful policy, it means and should mean by now that they have acquired the capacity to defend themselves. If they haven't, if it takes this kind of massive American involvement in the air and from contiguous waters, then when will the end come to our participation?

Secretary ROGERS. Let me answer both your comments. First, on the question of civil war. What I had reference to, Senator, is that until recently the North Vietnamese have never admitted they had any troops in South Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. I know that and no one has paid any attention to that.

Secretary ROGERS. Why when the enemy lies and commits a terrible fraud we say, of course they are lying, of course they are fraudulent. The fact of the matter is that the country has been divided at the DMZ. The South Vietnamese want to protect their country. They are fighting courageously. We seem to forget the South Vietnamese are fighting now to protect their country, and they are doing it well and they are under attack by the north.

EFFECTS OF DEFEATING NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVES

Now going to the second point that I made; the future I think, if these offensives can be defeated, will permit the South Vietnamese to defend their own country. They have been fighting well. They fought very courageously. A week ago Sunday in military region I, without any appreciable help on the part of the United States, they fought a very successful battle. They destroyed in the neighborhood of 50 enemy tanks. They were outmanned and they handled it very well. Our military people, General Abrams and other officers, are very complimentary on the kind of fight they put up. We think if the enemy is defeated now in these offensives they will be able to survive as a nation and they will be able to negotiate if the other side wants to negotiate some settlement of their own. Keep in mind, and I am sure you do, we have lost 45,000 American lives there; we have been engaged since 1965. We have all been a part of it and we can't now just turn tail and leave our friend and ally alone. We are going to do what we can to defeat this invasion, to help the South Vietnamese without the use of our ground troops, and if we do that I think the prospect for some kind of settlement on the part of the Vietnamese themselves is fairly good.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I have only two or three questions, Mr. Secretary. I am not going to base those questions on conditions which existed in the war between the States in 1861 to 1865 because I don't recall a few hundred thousand southerners had been butchered in the North previous to the invasion of the South.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S DIRECTIVE TO MOVE REFUGEES IN 1954

So my first question is, President Eisenhower directed many of our ships to move refugees from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in 1954, I believe. Approximately 900,000 people were moved. What was the reason that President Eisenhower took, well, say, advantage of this situation to move all of those people out of North Vietnam? Was there any good reason for it?

Secretary ROGERS. I don't believe I know the answer to that.

Senator AIKEN. The answer to that is the North Vietnamese had already killed 200,000 of these people. They had butchered them. And after that we, the United States, this hardboiled country, used its ships to move about 900,000 more people out of North Vietnam to the south in order to keep from suffering the same fate. I think I am correct on that.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, that is in answer to the question the chairman asked me.

HAS NATURE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE CHANGED SINCE 1954?

Senator AIKEN. You partly answered it in your testimony earlier. Do you think that the nature of the North Vietnamese has been changed since?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I do not.

Senator AIKEN. Since those days when they deliberately slaughtered 200,000—that is the best estimate I can get. Probably some of the State Department people can give a better one.

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I don't think they have changed. I don't think they have any intentions of living up to international law. As you know, they haven't lived up to the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war. There is no indication they have any respect for international law at all. And I think that if we pull out of South Vietnam quickly, as some have suggested, that it would result in a horrible massacre.

Senator AIKEN. And weren't about 750,000 of those refugees taken out because of religious beliefs?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. Between 700,000 and 900,000 in all had to clear the country of North Vietnam to get in to the south.

Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

EFFECT OF ACCEPTING NORTH VIETNAMESE TERMS

Senator AIKEN. Now, as I understand it, there are people in this country who have spoken, people who are quite prominent from time to time, demanding that we accept the North Vietnamese terms for ending the war over there.

Those terms, as I understand it, call on us to repudiate the Government of South Vietnam; is that correct?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. And also to remove the weapons which we have furnished to the South Vietnamese people with which to defend themselves; is that correct?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. And if we did that do you think that would do away with any prospect of bloodshed in South Vietnam after we complied with their demand?

Secretary ROGERS. No; of course it would greatly increase the prospect of bloodshed.

CHARGES THAT VIETNAMIZATION IS NOT WORKING

Senator AIKEN. And also the charges made that Vietnamization is not working anyway. I read a story which appeared in one of the Nation's big newspapers, the New York Times, on April 9 telling how the people who owned their homes and worked their farms up in the north were not giving them up and becoming refugees simply on command of the North Vietnamese, but were fighting back just as the Americans did at Lexington and Concord some 200 years ago. Is that correct? I have never seen that story anywhere else. I found it inadvertently in the middle of this big newspaper. I thought it was a very illuminating story.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct, and I think what is overlooked, at least what the papers don't seem to say much about, is that the Government of South Vietnam has provided weapons for over a million people in South Vietnam, one out of every 17. If there was great opposition to the government it would be difficult for the government to do that. I think these recent weeks show that people are supporting the Government of South Vietnam and are fighting very courageously to protect their own country.

PRESENT ROLE OF VIETCONG

Senator AIKEN. To what extent do the Vietcong enter into the picture now compared with what they used to do.

Secretary ROGERS. Very little now because the whole fighting is being borne by the North Vietnamese.

Senator AIKEN. And isn't it true some of those who were regarded as Vietcong or NLF, or whatever they call it, are now fighting for their own homes?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, that is correct; there have been quite a few defectors now fighting to protect South Vietnam.

NO COMPARISON BETWEEN BOMBING HAIPHONG TODAY AND IN 1966

Senator AIKEN. I think it was a rather hideous story being written from 1961 to 1969. I do recall we had 543,000 men there by 1969, put in there over my objection, and by the way, the question is now being asked, "Why didn't you consult the Congress in advance before attacking Hanoi, bombing Hanoi or Haiphong Harbor?"

This is not a question, but I would like about 1 minute to repeat for myself. I was at the White House in 1966, I believe it was, about February, when several of us, I believe including you, Mr. Chairman, were called down there, not to be consulted, but to be told that bombing of North Vietnam was to begin. It had been decided on. Among those present were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary McNamara, President Johnson, Joint Chiefs of Staff and so on, probably 15 people in all. I recall that I protested that decision to bomb the north as vigorously as I could—that I told those prominent people there I wasn't President, I didn't have authority, I wasn't even Vice President, so I couldn't do anything about that, I wasn't even Secretary of State, but I told them—

Secretary ROGERS. You are getting pretty low.

Senator AIKEN. And I don't want to be now—that that action would prolong the war, it would not reduce the infiltration of either men or arms from the north, and I do recall turning to Secretary McNamara and telling him if he went ahead with that bombing that he would put this country in hell. Well whether it has been hell or not is a matter of opinion. Some people in this world have evidently rejoiced but others agree that it has been a hellish experience that we have had, but there is no comparison between the bombing of Haiphong today and the bombing of Haiphong then when I thought the United States was clearly the aggressor.

Today I feel that by committing its entire military strength into the invasion of a neighboring country that North Vietnam is the

aggressor. I am satisfied they are going to lose. I am satisfied, if any other country put them up to this aggression at this time, that that country is not doing itself much good.

And so I have that off my chest. I have been carrying it now for about 6 or 7 years, at least, and I do believe there is no comparison between the situation in 1966 and now in 1972. I would not want to stand by and see 2 million people butchered in South Vietnam even if two-thirds of them do happen to be of different religious faith than my own. I think we now have an obligation, a humane obligation, to consider their security.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you; I thank you very much. I think the American people have great respect for your statement. I appreciate that statement.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S STATEMENT ON BOMBING LEVEL, OCTOBER 7, 1968

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, on October 7, 1968, when campaigning for the Presidency at a UPI conference in Washington, Mr. Nixon said and I quote:

At the present time 90 percent of the bombing over North Vietnam has been discontinued. The 10 percent that is now being continued is for tactical military purposes to protect the forces in the DMZ zone. I would not raise that level of bombing.

Do you have any comments on that?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't, Senator.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S STATEMENT ON VIETNAM WAR; MARCH 6, 1968

Senator SYMINGTON. Then on March 6, 1968, as reported in the press, he said and I quote:

But, my friends, if in November this war is not over after all of this power has been at their disposal, then I say that the American people will be justified to elect new leadership and I pledge to you that the new leadership will end the war and win the peace in the Pacific, and that is what America wants.

Do you have any comment?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I do not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

IS BOMBING ADMISSION THAT VIETNAMIZATION NOT WORKING?

The day after Vietnamization was announced, based on many visits to Vietnam, I said that in my opinion it would not work. Is not this bombing of North Vietnam admission that Vietnamization is not working?

Secretary ROGERS. I don't get the question, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is not the necessity to now bomb North Vietnam an admission that Vietnamization, as a policy, is not working?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't think so. I think Vietnamization is working and I think the fact that the South Vietnamese are fighting as courageously and as fully as they are indicates that. You can never be sure until the events develop on the battlefield, but we are encouraged by the way they are handling the ground combat activity.

Second, the fact that we are using airpower as we are is because the North Vietnamese have committed all of their forces to the invasion which is quite different than anything that has ever happened in the past in Vietnam.

COULD SOUTH VIETNAMESE SUCCEED WITHOUT U.S. AIRPOWER?

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the South Vietnamese would have been successful in their resistance to the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam without the use of American airpower?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, it is difficult to predict. It certainly would have been a tough problem for them because they are faced with, as you know, very heavy equipment provided by outside sources including heavy tanks, T-54, mobile artillery.

Senator SYMINGTON. What are your thoughts about it, your opinion?

Secretary ROGERS. I can't tell. It certainly would have been more difficult.

Senator SYMINGTON. If they could succeed without the use of American airpower, that would have proved Vietnamization was working; would it not?

Secretary ROGER. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. But if they could have succeeded without American airpower it also means it was needless to sacrifice additional lives of American fliers; does it not?

Secretary ROGERS. Of course that would run the risk of putting American lives in jeopardy. We still, as I said earlier, have 85,000 men there. We would have no intention of taking that kind of a chance at the moment. The President has been totally consistent. Every time he made an announcement about troop withdrawals he pointed out if the enemy attempted to take advantage of us while the withdrawals were occurring he would take the necessary action. He has taken that action.

NORTH VIETNAM'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING

Senator SYMINGTON. We had a witness the other day, back from North Vietnam who said the North Vietnamese told him in Hanoi they would continue to fight even if we captured Hanoi; that they have been fighting for freedom for 25 years and, if necessary, would fight another 25 years. Are we willing to stay out there another 25 years?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, the South Vietnamese are also prepared to defend their country. They haven't given any indication they are going to quit. We in the United States always emphasize what the North Vietnamese say. I would like to emphasize what the South Vietnamese say. They say they too are going to defend their country against an attack. We have indicated that we are withdrawing our troops, but we are going to continue to give them support. We are hopefully going to give them economic assistance, if the Congress supports us, and I think Congress will. Yes, we think that the South Vietnamese can manage.

CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM
AND THIEU GOVERNMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. We intend to support the South Vietnamese as long as it is necessary to support the Thieu Government; correct?

Secretary ROGERS. We are supporting South Vietnam.

Senator SYMINGTON. We could not support any other Vietnam government because he is the only person who ran for President.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, as I have said, we have said many times, that is up to the people of South Vietnam, but we are going to continue to support South Vietnam. We are going to continue to withdraw our forces. We are going to continue to use airpower. And we hope that as time goes on it won't be necessary, for the South Vietnamese will be able to take over most of that function as they have done in the case of ground combat. I wouldn't want to make any predictions about when that is going to happen. I think it is too difficult to predict.

U.S. PRESENCE IN THAILAND

Senator SYMINGTON. I thought you were somewhat firm in your answer to Senator Church about the North Vietnamese not admitting they were in South Vietnam. For years you could go to Bangkok and see thousands of American soldiers walking the streets; but we would never admit over here that we had troops in Thailand.

Speaking of Thailand, we have built a great air bastion in that country. We have first-class tactical airbases where planes can take off also for strategic purposes; and south of Bangkok we have perhaps the greatest strategic base for B-52 heavy bombers in the Far East.

When we talk about getting out of Vietnam after Vietnamization, does that mean we also plan to get out of Thailand?

Secretary ROGERS. We haven't made any prophecies on that subject. We have no intentions at the moment of getting out. As you know, we have a treaty commitment with Thailand and I think our decision on that subject will depend on events.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nevertheless, if the Paris peace talks are successful and we stop the war in Indochina, which would include Laos and Cambodia as well as South Vietnam, and get out in return for our prisoners of war, it would not extend necessarily to getting out of Thailand; correct?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, we won't necessarily stay in Thailand. We won't make that decision at the moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is not part of the quid pro quo being offered the North Vietnamese?

Secretary ROGERS. We have never gotten to the stage of what that is so I would not want to answer that.

Senator, let me say in this connection if the world is fortunate enough to have this conflict resolved by negotiation, and it is clear that the tensions in the area are reduced, we have every intention of following the Nixon doctrine, and that is to reduce our presence in that area. We have told the world that we have no intention of staying in the Pacific, to control any territory, to present any threat, and it has been a bipartisan policy because we firmly believe that it contributes to the stability of the area.

Now, if it is not necessary, that is another matter and we will have to make those decisions when that times comes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't want to belabor it. We have built this tremendous military position in Asia, on the mainland. Militarily, there has been a lot of criticism as to whether that is wise for us to do. We hear much talk about what we will do, the Nixon doctrine, Vietnamization, letting these people solve their own problems. If a decision is made, an agreement about Indochina—does that include our getting out of Thailand from a military standpoint?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, at this point it neither includes or excludes that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that we have pretty thoroughly thrashed this straw. And yet, I should like, briefly, to restate my own position.

ADMINISTRATION'S REDUCTION IN U.S. INVOLVEMENT

I don't see how any fairminded person can do other than applaud and be thankful for the reduction in the American involvement in the war that has come under this administration. Perhaps it would have come under another administration, but it did come under this one. I think everyone has to agree that, as matters had been going, the South Vietnamese would never have been able to take over anything themselves because they weren't being given enough kind of training or support in the development of their own strength until this administration came into being. This was the great failure of the past administration and of our military under the past administration. We tried to do it by ourselves and this was impossible. This is what destroyed President Johnson, because the American people understand when things are hopeless and this was hopeless. There is a difference, a great difference, under the present administration.

FIXING DEFINITE DATE FOR TERMINATING U.S. INVOLVEMENT ADVOCATED

Now, I have my difference with this administration as to how the war can finally be terminated. It seems to me clear that the lessons that we learned, the American people learned, under the previous administration in respect of the ground forces of South Vietnam, apply equally to their whole military capability. So long as we were willing to supply the ground forces the South Vietnamese would not build up their ground forces. And this is just a plain fact. Who wouldn't let Americans do the fighting if Americans are willing to? Certainly the people in that part of the world, who have long been accustomed to living by their wits, would do this and they did, and the prospect was a hopeless one for endless war, under President Johnson.

Now it seems to me that we have let ourselves, as far as a final termination of American involvement goes, get into something of the same dilemma. So long as we proclaim that we are going to provide air support to South Vietnam whenever she is in a tight spot, we are going to be allowed to do it. I believe that the only way that we can end the bombing and the other horrors of this war, is to end our involvement completely. We should fix a reasonable time for this, so, if they ever can, the South Vietnamese will be able to shape up in this area too. I am not one who wants the North Vietnamese to win. I have

no belief that Ho Chi Minh was the heaven-sent father of his country or that he and his successors represent the pure spirit of nationalism in Southeast Asia or anything else. I think that these people have to solve their own problems and insofar as we have been responsible for getting them into the mess we ought to try to help them get out. I want Vietnamization to win, to succeed, because I think it is the only way that the thing can be ended without blood baths.

As things have gone up to now, and as they are still going, there has been, and there still is, no chance of a reasonable negotiated settlement with North Vietnam. This has not been due to any failure on our part to offer North Vietnam reasonable terms. They have been, and they still are, willing only to accept what amounts, in effect, to a complete surrender. They have felt, and they still feel, that, if they hold out, the United States finally will tire of carrying on a hopeless war and will withdraw and that when that time comes South Vietnam will still be unable to defend itself.

For some time now I have been convinced that the only way out of this dilemma, as far as the United States is concerned, is to fix a definite time after which we will no longer carry the burden of the war ourselves. If we do this and the South Vietnamese know they are faced with a definite time limit, they will know also that they have to shape up and will do so if, indeed, it is possible. In any event, we will have done all we can or should do.

I repeat again that I have great admiration for the job that has been done by this administration in turning down American involvement. And now, I hope very much that Congress and the President can be persuaded of the wisdom of setting a date for the final termination of our involvement in the war.

I don't ask you to comment at all, but I couldn't let the discussion on this matter go without attempting once more to make clear my very strong feeling on this.

Thank you.

Secretary ROGERS. May I comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. If you wish.

PRESIDENT NIXON CHANGED MAJOR THRUST OF WAR

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I would like to begin by saying that I appreciate your comments very much and I think it does highlight three things that deserve comments.

First, you commended the President, I think very rightly, for changing the major thrust of the war by withdrawing our ground troops, and he had it under very difficult circumstances.

As you remember, there was great opposition to the decision he made on Cambodia and Laos. But I think that in retrospect we will agree now that these were right decisions, wise decisions, and necessary to permit the withdrawals to continue at the pace he had outlined.

NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD NO INTENTIONS OF NEGOTIATING

Second—and I appreciate this particularly—you pointed out that you are convinced as we have been for some time that the North Vietnamese had no intentions of negotiating. They never made any serious attempt to negotiate. Their discussions were used as a propaganda

forum and nothing else, and I think there is agreement here this morning, and it is a very healthy thing, that we do agree that they have no intentions of negotiating.

QUESTION OF HOW FAST WE VIETNAMIZE REST OF WAR

The question that you raise now is how fast do we Vietnamize the rest of the war?

Here again I would like to urge the Senate and Congress and the American people to support the President. He has made the decisions; he has made them well. He has a good track record and I would hope that the American people and the Congress would support him.

I think it should be noted that the South Vietnamese have taken over a larger share of the air combat role. About half of the tactical missions in South Vietnam are flown by the South Vietnamese. But we can't at this stage when there is a major invasion, and everybody agrees to that, now permit the Communists to overrun that country, in view of what has transpired since 1963. We are all a part of it. No one can escape responsibility and we are part of it and we are going to see it through. We are going to see this major invasion is not successful, and the President has to make these decisions. They are tough decisions and it is easy for people to sit on the sidelines and complain about them.

I had a group of top people around the other night and we asked what they would do if they were the President? And by pinning everybody down and making everyone answer that question, almost everyone came to the conclusion that what the President is now doing is probably the best possible course to follow.

So I would say that in view of the President's track record that he ought to have the support of Congress and the American people. We ought to continue to defeat this invasion and I think if that happens he will succeed in bringing peace to this area.

PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT IF OFFENSIVE DEFEATED

Now we can't be sure, but I think if this major offensive on the part of the enemy, in which they have committed almost all of their ground combat troops, is defeated, the prospects for reasonable settlement are greatly increased.

Senator CASE. We all hope this will happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Spong.

Senator SPONG. Mr. Chairman.

DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES OF BOMBING

Mr. Secretary, in this morning's New York Times a Pentagon official is quoted as follows: "There is a heavy dose of diplomacy involved in the Hanoi-Haiphong strikes."

Your response to Senator Fulbright's first question gave what I would call the military reasons for the intensified bombing. You gave three military reasons, I believe.

Could you tell me what your diplomatic objectives are? Perhaps you touched on one of them in your last statement to Senator Case.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, I had, Senator. I didn't mean to put all of the stress on the military aspect of it. I think that was done as a result of the question itself.

Certainly there are diplomatic aspects to this, principally they are these: That if it is clear that the United States is not going to abandon its ally under these conditions and if it is going to take whatever military steps are necessary and reasonable to see that the invasion is not successful, then not only North Vietnam but possibly those allied with North Vietnam will come to the conclusion it is not worth attempting to continue this indefinitely. Nevertheless, we have, I think, adopted the view here that the other side does have its problems. The other side has taken tremendous losses in this invasion and they have been fighting for a long time, too. So we have reason to think that if these offensives are unsuccessful that the prospects diplomatically are improved.

CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION OF PEACE TALKS

Senator SPONG. You touched on this next question in one reply to Senator Church, but a radio news report this morning indicated that the North Vietnamese were willing to resume secret meetings at the Paris Peace Talks pending certain conditions.

What are these conditions?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, the condition is we stop the bombing, which, of course, is a totally unacceptable precondition. I think it is unrealistic at the moment to engage in negotiation while these offensives are occurring.

Senator SPONG. If I understood your reply to Senator Church, we are not prepared to resume the talks unless the troops are withdrawn from the South; is that correct?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, we are not prepared to resume negotiations while this major invasion is occurring in South Vietnam. If they are defeated or if they withdraw, certainly we would consider negotiations, but there is no point to it now.

I don't think the other side has any intentions of negotiating a settlement now and I think Senator Church was correct when he said he didn't think so either.

EFFECT OF BOMBING ON RETURN OF POWS

Senator SPONG. One of the major concerns of recent years has been the return of the prisoners of war. Do you believe the increase in bombing can in any way contribute to that goal?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, it can if these offensives are defeated because that would then be about the only arrow they have in their quiver. They have nothing left. They are using the prisoners as pawns in this war and they intend to use them for blackmail purposes. But if the hope of military success diminishes then I think the chances are that they would be more inclined to try to negotiate on the return of the prisoners of war.

The President, as you know, has done everything he can to try to take into consideration the terrible plight of the prisoners of war. The fact that the enemy doesn't have intentions of living up to the Geneva Convention is itself sickening conduct on their part.

U.S. LOSSES IN BOMBING RAIDS

Senator SPONG. I am very much concerned that there may be many more prisoners. The reports on the bombing raids are conflicting. Hanoi is claiming several planes shot down. We say we are not losing any. I suspect the truth is somewhere in between.

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, the truth is that on those raids, Hai-phong and in the vicinity of Hanoi, we lost two planes. We lost an A-7, and the pilot was recovered at sea, and we lost an F-105, an Air Force F-105. In that case two members of the crew were not recovered. Those are the only losses we suffered in those raids.

Senator SPONG. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator COOPER. Mr. Secretary, I think you have been very forthright and explicit in your answers. I think your testimony has helped us get a better understanding of the situation. I also think that the questions that have been raised have tended to bring into focus many of the problems that face us.

PROTECTION OF U.S. TROOPS

I would like if I could to explain two courses of action. One is the course of action dealing with the protection of our troops.

As you stated correctly, our forces have been reduced from 543,000 to what will be 69,000 on May 1.

Secretary ROGERS. It is in the 80,000 area today—80,000 and some odd.

Senator COOPER. I think it is reasonable to say that we haven't the capability to protect our own forces against an attack of the magnitude as is occurring now with 80,000 or 100,000 men equipped with sophisticated equipment.

Secretary ROGERS. Our troops are not combat troops, they are support troops.

Senator COOPER. And my own thinking is that the President has the constitutional right and obligation to do what is necessary——

I will come back to the word necessary in a moment—to protect these forces.

You remember the Battle of the Bulge of World War II. I was then in the 3d Army, and I remember the fear, the concern when that battle was in progress. I believe that if these North Vietnamese forces had broken through, not been stopped, and with our remaining forces there, and very few of them combat forces, we could have been forced to evacuate under very difficult circumstances—circumstances which could have resulted in the destruction of many of our soldiers.

Do you think that is correct?

Secretary ROGERS. I do.

Senator COOPER. We in the Senate have been pleading for our forces to move out of Vietnam, and they are moving out. Don't you think then that a similar plea to protect them while they are moving out should also apply?

Secretary ROGERS. No doubt about it.

Senator COOPER. I hope that is understood. That is my position. So I want to say that I agree wholeheartedly that we have to protect our forces. There is a great outcry about death in North Vietnam. People are dying in South Vietnam too. Beyond all of that my first interest is in our forces, our people.

DOES BOMBING ADVERSELY AFFECT OTHER SITUATIONS?

The bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi—and I come back to the word “necessity”—unless it is necessary to protect our forces, and it seems to me we run into another problem and that is whether this bombing adversely affects other situations or would cause other dangers which would be much larger than the immediate danger, either with the possibility of Chinese intervention or with the important negotiations to limit nuclear weapons we have with the Soviet Union.

I only hope that the administration has taken into account those two sets of problems, whatever it does about Hanoi and Haiphong and the bombing in the far north.

NOT CLOSING AVENUES TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS RECOMMENDED

As to the negotiations, I think I can understand there is not much possibility of negotiations while this offensive is underway, but I hope also that the administration would not close its avenues toward negotiations if this offensive can be halted.

Is it correct that in the private talk Dr. Kissinger had with Le Duc Tho he presented to Le Duc Tho on behalf of this Government a proposal to form a government under an international commission, an interim government, to see what can be worked out between the two countries—something of that nature?

Secretary ROGERS. I think the position of the United States is best set forth in the President's eight point program which provides, as you know, for resignation of the South Vietnamese president prior to elections, and a commission consisting of various representative elements to supervise the election and to provide the police power during the election period. But I want to say on that score, Senator, that President Nixon has done everything that a reasonable person could do to try to get the negotiations started in a business like way. And, as you remember, the majority leader himself said after the President's last announcement that he thought the President had done everything that a reasonable man could do. It seems to me that is the impression that the other side must have and certainly that is the conclusion the American people have reached—that this Government is taking every possible action to try to negotiate a settlement that is fair to everybody.

We have no desire to stay there indefinitely. We would like to have the people in the area decide their own future and we think it could be done if the other side had any interest in it. But, as Senator Church said himself, they don't have any interest in it, they want a Communist takeover, they want us to get out. If they did take over, we are quite convinced and certainly the President is convinced there would be a blood bath. We have gone through the experiences we have gone through since 1965 and we can't permit that to happen. As you said

in your opening statement, which I very much appreciate, you hope the President has considered the factors that you outlined. I can assure you he has considered those factors. He has all of the factors that any person would consider if they were in his position.

Senator COOPER. I think what you have said is correct. There is an impression around this country that the United States has refused to negotiate. I can only repeat what American Ambassador Harriman, American Ambassador Vance, American Ambassador Lodge, and American Ambassador Bruce all have told me; they all said the whole process had been useless. I asked what about these people who go over to Paris and come back with reports of negotiations, many in our body, many in the other body, many private persons. They all said it was a tactic of the North Vietnamese; they would have these meetings with the people and come back from negotiations absolutely adamant about negotiations, is that correct?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Senator COOPER. Now I turn to legislative proposals. In the past I have sponsored a number of proposals. I am not going to say I won't do so again. But these proposals are for us to get out now. It is my view that during the height of this offensive, and I am not going to make that an indefinite period of time, but while that attack by North Vietnam is on, an attack which would endanger the lives of these men we have sent there—

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, any action such as that would be disastrous, in my opinion, not only to the situation that prevails in Indochina but to our whole foreign policy. I don't think it is anything that we should consider.

The President's program is working. We have got the American ground forces out of there. What we need now is support. We don't need any immediate criticism. There is going to be plenty of time to criticize if it doesn't work.

I think the decisions the President has made are wise decisions and will be successful. I would hope the Congress and the American people support them.

MILITARY ACTIONS FOR PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES UNDERSTOOD

Senator COOPER. Well, I thank you. I do hope that all of the military actions that are taken will be only for the protection of our own forces. The American people understand that.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. I think without exception a few—I think with the exception of a few, they do understand that.

Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I shall not go over the same ground, especially that Senators Case and Cooper went over, because I find myself in many respects in agreement with them, and I, too would like to add my feeling that we are moving out, not moving in as in the previous administration; so there is a marked change.

U.S. POLICY ON WITHDRAWING GROUND TROOPS

You say we can't pull out our remaining forces now. Is there any change in the policy of the United States to completely withdraw ground troops from Vietnam except for the so-called residual force which is considerably smaller than those who are still there?

Secretary ROGERS. No, there is not, Senator. I would not want to suggest by my answer that the President has decided on any particular announcement when he makes the next announcement. But I can say that the policy remains the same. We are going to continue the troop withdrawals that have already been announced, so by May 1 we will have only 69,000 Americans in South Vietnam. Before May 1 he will make another announcement. That announcement and what it consists of will depend on the events that occur between now and then.

PURPOSE OF BOMBING THE NORTH

Senator JAVITS. Is the bombing of the North entirely attributable to the security of our remaining troops, or does it have some other purpose, and if so, what is it?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, as I stated in my answer to the first question of the chairman, there are three considerations that we took into account in making the decision. First is the protection of American lives. That is the most important.

We still have 80,000-some troops there and, as Senator Cooper said, if there was a military takeover by the North Vietnamese their lives would be in danger.

Second, we want to continue the withdrawals on schedule so as to permit the continuation of the withdrawal program as scheduled. And, three, we want to help our ally, South Vietnam, defend against these massive attacks by the very major segment of the North Vietnamese Army.

They now have 12 of their divisions, 12 out of 13 of their divisions outside North Vietnam in an attempt to invade South Vietnam. We are going to use air power to assist our friend and ally to protect itself against this attack, and the President will use whatever air power is necessary against military targets, only military targets, to achieve those purposes.

HAS UNITED STATES UNDERWRITTEN GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT THIEU?

Senator JAVITS. It is said we have underwritten the government of President Thieu. Will you tell us whether we have or have not, and give us any specifics that you can on that score? Because the previous answer would lead one to that conclusion.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I don't believe my previous answer did. I said we support the people of South Vietnam and we support its present government, but we have never said that we support any particular government in perpetuity.

Senator JAVITS. In other words, we are ready to support any government that we believe is democratically designated to be the government of South Vietnam?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct, and that is why we offered to have elections, and that is why President Thieu offered to resign prior to the election.

OFFENSIVE'S EFFECT ON POLICY TOWARD MAINLAND CHINA, SOVIET UNION

Senator JAVITS. Finally, does this offensive change our policy in any way with respect to either Mainland China or the Soviet Union?
Secretary ROGERS. No.

EFFECT OF ERUPTION IN VIETNAM ON U.S. ECONOMIC PROBLEM

Senator JAVITS. Is this going to make our deficit position worse, this eruption in Vietnam? Our deficit position is already very serious with a \$38.8-billion deficit and a razor thin full-employment surplus or \$100 million.

I notice you are asking for \$580 million here for military assistance to South Vietnam.

Do you have any estimate of what this whole operation is going to cost us now and how badly it is going to complicate our problem economically?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, there are two parts to your question.

As far as the request that I am making this morning, I made by introduction of my statement in the record—

Senator JAVITS. A long time ago . . .

Secretary ROGERS. It, of course, doesn't include the type of expenditure that you are talking about.

Secretary Laird is going to be here tomorrow, and I think it would be better to ask him on the figures of the Defense Department budget. I do not think it will have any appreciable effect, really, on the matters that you mention.

Senator JAVITS. You don't believe it will have a materially adverse effect on the budget?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

ADMINISTRATION'S OPPOSITION TO FIXING WITHDRAWAL DATE

Senator JAVITS. Is the administration still against fixing a date for the complete withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. And what is the reason for that, under the present circumstances?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, first, because we do not see any point to it. Second, we are withdrawing our troops.

Third, we are going to retain the residual force there until we work out some arrangement on the prisoners of war. So we don't see any purpose served by announcing it.

COMPARISON OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Senator JAVITS. The last thing I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, is this: I have been there, and I was impressed with what was done militarily and with what has been properly attributed to the President, the winding down of our engagement on the ground and the buildup of the South Vietnamese armed forces. I was especially interested in the fact that arms had been widely distributed in the countryside which was an indication of confidence by the Government in the adherence of the local people.

What puzzles many of us is this: Here you have a million South Vietnamese under arms. They have just as sophisticated equipment as the enemy, indeed probably more so, and you said there are 100,000 invaders. That is a 10-to-1 advantage.

Do the South Vietnamese really want an independent country, in your opinion? Is their morale equal to that of the North Vietnamese? If it is, tell us so; if it isn't, why isn't it?

Secretary Rogers. Well, I think this is a natural question to ask, and I have asked it myself several times.

Of course, when you talk about the million men you have to keep in mind we are talking about provincial and regional forces which in a measure are there to provide stability in the areas concerned against infiltration and subversion.

Actually, in terms of combat units, the two are about even—South Vietnam and North Vietnam. They each have about 450,000 in their regular forces.

I am sure that in the case of North Vietnam it has equivalent forces to provide protection in localities; but essentially I think the answer is that the forces are about the same in terms of combat forces, about 450,000.

Second, you have to keep in mind that the North Vietnamese have the element of surprise available to them. If the South Vietnamese were attacking North Vietnam, as someone said here earlier, it would be a different matter. But the South Vietnamese have never invaded North Vietnam; they have been sitting there defending a fairly large country and they have to defend all of it against attack.

So as this offensive built up, they had to prepare themselves to defend against the attacks across the DMZ because they could see the enemy was building three roads across the DMZ in total violation of the Geneva Accords. They built three main roads across the DMZ. They had to protect against the buildup west of Hue because that was a vulnerable area, based on past experience. They had to defend against the forces building up opposite the Central Highlands in Laos.

The North Vietnamese had forces in Laos that were moving in. They had to defend against the forces in Cambodia threatening An Loc, and they had to provide for possible attacks in the south of Cambodia against military region IV.

So it presents a very difficult defensive problem for the South Vietnamese, while the North Vietnamese don't have to worry about the attacks on the ground against their country.

WILL OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Now, you asked do we think the South Vietnamese have the will to fight, the necessary will to maintain—

Senator JAVITS. A country.

Secretary ROGERS. Their country, in the future. Of course, you never know for sure until they try it. But we are, Senator, now very much encouraged and I think that Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams are of the same view. They so reported to us they are very encouraged by the success of the South Vietnamese in some very tough battles.

As you know, over a million South Vietnamese have arms, and so the answer is yes, we think the South Vietnamese do have the will to protect their country. I think it is interesting to note that when the

refugees leave, they don't go to North Vietnam. If the North Vietnamese represent the will of the people, why do the refugees go south? There are no refugees going to the North.

We are convinced that the South Vietnamese people want their country to be successful. They want an independent country. They are prepared to negotiate a settlement with the North Vietnamese, if North Vietnam has any interest in it, but they have the will now, and they are proving it on the battlefield. I think An Loc is a good indication of that success. And they have been also very successful, as I indicated before you came in, a week ago Sunday in military region I. Without any appreciable help from our Air Force they destroyed almost 50 of the enemy tanks.

One of the reasons the attack up there slowed down is because of the South Vietnamese force. We think they have the will to resist this invasion.

Senator JAVITS. You will understand how many of us feel, having heard such rosy predictions over the years, and always having them dashed by events.

I appreciate your answer very much. Thank you.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you, Senator. I don't hold out any particular expertise. Obviously, things can go wrong. But based on what has happened since this invasion started, and the reports that we get, we are encouraged by the fighting spirit of the South Vietnamese.

That is all I can say. We will have to wait and see. I don't think it does any good to make prophesies. We will know before long.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, if I could turn for a moment to the AID testimony that has been submitted: I would ask that Dr. Hannah's excellent statement be incorporated in the record following Secretary Rogers. (See p. 8.)

AID PROGRAM UNDER DR. HANNAH'S DIRECTION

Senator PERCY. I would like to say it is my general impression that the AID program, under Dr. Hannah's direction, has sharpened management procedures and has clarified and coordinated its activities with other agencies in carrying on a fine job under difficult circumstances.

I am particularly pleased in Dr. Hannah's testimony to have him point out the new Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Programs which I think is exceptionally important. These kinds of programs will have an impact that will be far more in the long run than many of the other things we have talked about.

And the international narcotics control program will have a tremendous impact in this country where we already have 560,000 heroin addicts.

FULL FUNDING OF AUTHORIZATION REQUEST

I would like to ask this one question: How strongly, Mr. Secretary, do you feel about full funding of the \$986.5 million requested in this authorization we are now discussing before this committee?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I strongly support it, Senator. I think it is very important to have this funding and that we make a very strong request.

CRUCIAL QUESTION IN PEOPLE'S MINDS

Senator PERCY. I think your appearance this morning is very fortuitous and we would be negligent if we had not concentrated on the thing uppermost in the American public's mind.

I just came back from 48 intensive hours in the Midwest, deluged with questions, and Secretary Abshire has been very helpful to me on the telephone filling me in hour by hour as to what was transpiring in Vietnam.

I think the crucial question in people's minds was the relationship between U.S. military activity and the protection of American forces, and whether now for the first time North Vietnamese forces are massed where they can be gotten at, and whether by hitting them hard the North Vietnamese program might be set back 3 or 4 years, and enable a total and complete withdrawal of American forces without any residual force.

Is there any expectation that if this action of ours is successful now that that would be possible?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think that the answer to the first part of your question is that if we are successful, if the South Vietnamese are successful in defending their own country, and as a result of air power we help them in the defeat of the invaders, that it will set the enemy back several years. We can't be sure but it would be a very serious setback for them. I think it could possibly lead to a serious desire on the part of the enemy to negotiate. We don't know. But, if they realize that we are serious about this, and that the South Vietnamese are going to defend their country, and we are going to assist them, and that we are not going to just turn our backs and leave our friend and ally after all of these years. The South Vietnamese are determined to defend their country, and we are going to assist, not with ground forces, but with air power, only when needed, then the hope for successful negotiations, I think, are increased.

I don't want to make any comment about residual forces because the President has said we have no desire of staying there permanently. We are going to keep our residual forces there until we work out something on the prisoners of war.

Obviously, if the enemy suffers a serious military defeat, it will help, I think, the general climate in the area. If that occurs, then I think the possibility of a reduction in tension and all the things that go with it, is brighter.

RESIDUAL FORCE POLICY

Senator PERCY. But the sharpest difference of opinion between the many Members of Congress and the administration is the residual force. If it is policy that the residual forces stay there until the prisoners of war are returned, there is also a strong body of feeling that you are never going to get the prisoners of war back as long as there is a residual force.

What other set of conditions can cause us to come together in accord on this and get our residual force removed, other than conditions that have been laid down that appear to be totally unrealistic?

Secretary ROGERS. I think I said this before—I am sort of repeating myself but I hope you don't mind—we think the steps that President Nixon has taken today are successful and indicate that his judgment is good.

Now, we don't see any necessity now for saying what we are going to do some other time. We are doing what we have said we are going to do, and everything the President has promised this committee and the Congress and the American people, he has done.

After Cambodia he said we were going to move our troops from Cambodia and not send them back. He said in Laos, we are not going to use ground combat troops, and we didn't. He said we are going to do everything we can to get negotiations started, and we will make any reasonable proposal. Now we have discussed this with them privately and publicly, and everyone agrees the enemy had no interest in negotiations anyway. We have done everything that a Nation could do.

Now, the President is going to make another announcement before May 1st. My suggestion is: Let's wait and see how events develop, how they transpire, and we can talk about residual force later. But for the present we are going to keep that residual force in there until there is some indication that we are going to work out some arrangement on our prisoners of war.

EFFECT OF U.S. BOMBING OFFENSIVE ON POW ISSUE

Senator PERCY. One of the most frequent questions I have had this weekend has been the effect of this bombing offensive on our part on the prisoners of war issue. Won't this just harden the lines and make it more difficult?

Could you give us your own reaction—how would you answer that question?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think that it will, if we are successful, it will increase the possibilities of return of our prisoners of war. The enemy has kept the prisoners of war for blackmail purposes and they thought that by keeping the prisoners of war they could develop a great deal of domestic opposition to the President.

They had in mind starting this offensive at the time they thought would be most damaging to the country, and they thought if it succeeded it would be a very serious setback for the United States and for our foreign policy.

Now, if they are not successful, and they realize that the South Vietnamese have the determination, too, and they are going to resist this invasion successfully, then I think there is a better likelihood that the North Vietnamese would be willing to negotiate a settlement for the release of the prisoners of war.

HANOI'S DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET UNION

Senator PERCY. There is a body of thought that supports the theory that the latest offensive of the North Vietnamese and their dependence upon the Soviet Union is a response of the Soviet Union to the President's visit to China; it simply wants to get Hanoi more dependent upon the Soviet Union than on the People's Republic of China.

Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary ROGERS. No, Senator, I don't think I would want to comment on that. We don't know for sure, of course.

Senator PERCY. Could you tell us on whom, either China or the Soviet Union, Hanoi is more dependent today to support this offensive?

Secretary ROGERS. On the Soviet Union. We estimate 75-80 percent of their military equipment is from the Soviet Union.

LETTER OF PROTEST FROM SOVIET UNION

Senator PERCY. Has the content of the letter from the Soviet Union delivered to our Ambassador, a protest, been released?

Secretary ROGERS. No, it has not.

Senator PERCY. Is there any intention to release it?

Secretary ROGERS. We haven't decided. It really depends on the Soviet Union's understanding. We are in the process of replying now. The reply is on its way. We haven't decided whether the contents will be released.

EFFECT ON PRESIDENT'S MOSCOW TRIP AND SALT

Senator PERCY. What effect will our response to the offensive in North Vietnam have upon the President's trip to Moscow? Will it put a chilly atmosphere on it? Is there any danger that the summit could be—any indications that the summit could be—cancelled, as President's Eisenhower's summit was, after the U-2 incident?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, at the present time we are proceeding with the plans as scheduled.

Senator PERCY. And you have no evidence at all that the trip, itself, is in danger?

Secretary ROGERS. No; we have no evidence to that effect.

Senator PERCY. Or that the results we hope to achieve from an agreement on the SALT talks, and so forth, would be endangered by this action on our part, because these are issues that are of paramount importance to our Government, and certainly theirs, too.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I want to be sure I answer the question precisely.

The answer is that we have no evidence to that effect now. I don't want my answer to be taken as a prediction because I have no way of predicting. All I can say at the moment—we have no evidence to that effect.

PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS

Senator PERCY. You indicated—I think I put your comments down correctly—we will not engage in negotiations while the present offensive is underway and that they would have to stop the offensive or withdraw their forces. You have indicated the conditions under which we would resume negotiations. They have indicated their conditions.

Are we in effect saying negotiations in Paris are over?

Secretary ROGERS. No; I don't think so. We are saying that as a practical matter there is no prospect for negotiations immediately. That can change upon conditions. But right at the moment the prospects for negotiation are not good. As I said, if conditions change, then the prospects might change. But we are going to continue to keep

our Ambassador in Paris, and as far as I know, they are going to continue their presence in Paris. If it looks as if there is any prospect for negotiations to succeed after the enemy has been defeated in this invasion that they have made into South Vietnam, or if they withdraw, we certainly want to consider it.

Senator PERCY. Are we insisting upon President Nixon's proposals being the basis for negotiations or would we consider undertaking negotiations based also on Madam Binh's proposals?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, we have believed that the President's eight-point proposal are sound bases for negotiations. We would like to proceed on that basis. We have said that we are not inflexible, and that means just what it says, but we think that the President's eight-point proposal is a good one. We think, as Senator Mansfield, it is as far as any reasonable person can go, and we think if the enemy had any interest in negotiating a settlement, they would be willing to talk to us about it.

CHANGE IN FORMAT, LOCATION OF TALKS

Senator PERCY. Do you feel there is any advantage in considering resuming talks in some other format, some other location? The Paris talks have a long history now of charges, countercharges, and failure. Sometimes if you just change the atmosphere——

Secretary ROGERS. No; I don't think the forum——

Senator PERCY. Move them to Burma?

Secretary ROGERS. No; I don't think the forum makes any difference. It is a matter of intent, and we see no indication of serious intent on the part of the other side.

DAMAGE TO SHIPS IN PORT OF HAIPHONG

Senator PERCY. The last question: You indicated that the Port of Haiphong was not bombed. What was the extent of the reported hit on a Soviet ship? Were any East German ships hit, to your knowledge, and did U.S. intelligence know where such ships were located in the port, and did the U.S. planes try to avoid them?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir, Senator; I said that the port and port facilities were not a target of the raids. I did say that there were petroleum facilities that were bombed in that area but not in the port. We did everything we could to avoid damage to the ships in the harbor. We have no way of knowing yet whether there was damage to those ships.

CHANCES OF WAR POWERS LEGISLATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Senator PERCY. I did want to ask one other question, if I have a moment, Mr. Chairman. We have just adopted an act that I consider very significant to reassert our responsibility and share responsibility for making war, engaging our forces in hostilities.

As this goes to the House now, what atmosphere do you see in the House and do you feel that this latest offensive has improved the chances that the House will look more favorably upon this well-guided and finally devised procedure or act that we have sent over to them?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, Senator, I would prefer not to make a prediction about what the House will do. I think you are in a better position to judge that than I am.

Senator PERCY. We would be the last to know.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, just one or two items.

ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM BY RUSSIANS

You were talking about assistance to North Vietnam by the Russians. There is an article in the Times on the 14th of April, date-line April 12, and it says:

Yesterday United States Government sources not allowing use of their agency name, made available figures that had been prepared within the intelligence community before Hanoi opened its offensive at the end of March.

The Russians shipped \$505 million in arms to North Vietnam in 1967, \$70 million in 1970, and \$100 million in 1971.

Then it gives a lot of other figures which I won't quote.

The end of the article says:

United States spending on the Vietnam conflict is placed at about \$9 billion this year.

Mr. Reporter, I will put the entire article in the record.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Apr. 14, 1972]

SOVIET ARMS AID TO HANOI IS DOWN

U.S. FIGURES SHOW A SHARP DROP SINCE '67 DESPITE THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE

WASHINGTON, April 12 (AP)—While Washington contends that Moscow is a major contributor to Hanoi's new offensive because of its shipments of heavy arms, a reading of United States intelligence estimates indicates that Soviet weapons assistance to North Vietnam is actually far smaller now than earlier in the war.

Because figures can be read different ways, it is difficult to pinpoint a contradiction. But since the Kremlin's aid flow has been going on for years, the Administration's stress on it now is clearly a matter of choice.

In his State of the World Message in February, President Nixon spoke of Hanoi's getting "nearly \$1-billion" a year in aid from its allies.

Last week Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, mentioning a \$600-million figure, pointed to the Soviet Union as "the major supplier of the military arms and the munitions which are being used in North Vietnam." Therefore, Mr. Laird concluded, the Soviet Union is "a major contributor to the continuing conflict that exists in southeast Asia."

AID FIGURES PROVIDED

Yesterday United States Government sources, not allowing use of their agency name, made available figures that had been prepared within the intelligence community before Hanoi opened its offensive at the end of March.

The figures indicate that total aid to North Vietnam in 1971 from Communist countries was about the same as the year before, as was the flow from Moscow, and that both were well below the peak reported before the United States halted its bombing of the North in 1968.

The United States intelligence estimates included these:

¶ Combined Soviet, Chinese and East European military and economic assistance to North Vietnam totaled \$1.02-billion in 1967, \$765-million in 1970, \$775-million in 1971.

¶ The Russians shipped \$505-million in arms to North Vietnam in 1967, \$70-million in 1970 and \$100-million in 1971. Soviet economic assistance amounted to \$200-million in 1967, \$345-million in 1970 and \$315-million in 1971.

¶Total Soviet military-economic aid was \$705-million in 1967, \$415-million in 1970, and \$415-million again in 1971. The United States Government sources tied the "military" and "economic" categories together in saying that Soviet economic assistance consisted of items supporting Hanoi's defense effort.

¶Military assistance from China was \$145-million in 1967, \$85-million in 1970 and \$75-million in 1971, while Chinese economic help in these years was \$80-million, \$60-million and \$100-million, respectively.

SOVIET AID IS STRESSED

Economic assistance from East European countries came to \$90-million in 1967, \$205-million in 1970 and \$185-million in 1971.

Administration spokesmen have stressed Soviet aid to North Vietnam because, they say, it is the largest outside support for Hanoi's drive and because it includes advanced weapons used in the military assault. Moscow has been supplying such items as surface-to-air missiles, tanks, heavy artillery and oil. Peking has provided small arms and ammunition.

Administration officials say Washington has made no diplomatic attempt to ask Moscow to curb the arms flow. They say the issue is one that President Nixon is likely to bring up in Moscow next month as part of an effort to urge big-power restraint in troubled areas.

The Russians have rebuffed past United States attempts to limit the supply of arms for countries in the Middle East.

United States spending on the Vietnam conflict is placed at about \$9-billion this year.

I think it bears upon your idea of the devotion and spirit of the South Vietnamese. We obviously are giving them far more arms, to say nothing of our troops, and the running of our airplanes, than the North Vietnamese receive from the Russians and the Chinese combined, according to those figures.

PURPOSE OF BOMBING HAIPHONG

Mr. Secretary, is the purpose of bombing Haiphong to tell the Russians to stop supplies to the North Vietnamese? Is that one of the reasons?

Secretary ROGERS. The reasons are the ones I have given. We would hope that when it is clear that the United States is determined to assist South Vietnamese forces resisting this massive invasion of its country, that other countries will counsel restraint.

U.S. INTEREST IN VIETNAM CONFLICT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I hate to harp upon this subject, but I may be very dull. It is the interest of this country in this conflict that interests me most. We are all very concerned about cruelty and inhumanity of man to man, wherever it may occur, whether it is South Vietnam, or Bangladesh, or the Middle East, or anywhere else. It is why we have become so devoted to this particular instance of warfare. We have heard some very dire predictions of massacres. We have just witnessed a massacre in Bangladesh by one of our allies, which I expect goes far beyond what one can expect of Vietnam, but we didn't mount a full-scale operation to rescue them or deter them. In fact we tilted our policy in favor of that particular government at the time.

What bothers me is this: Another aspect of it is that the Communists took power in China by force in 1949 and in Russia by force in 1917, and this administration is doing its best to live in peace with these two countries.

What is the difference about Vietnam? What is the difference about the North Vietnamese seeking to do the same thing that so compels us to undermine our own country, to spend these vast sums of money, to say nothing of the enormous loss of lives?

You said a moment ago there were 45,000 Americans dead. That is only in action. Actually there are over 55,000 dead. The others died in accidents which accompanied the fighting. It is well over 55,000 now and, I think 300,000 casualties, many of whom are terribly mutilated.

I have never been able to understand why we take Vietnam as this very special responsibility. It wasn't our colony; it belonged to the French. We never had any previous connections.

Obviously China or Russia is a great threat. Why didn't we mount a comparable effort against China and Russia? We didn't. And temporarily, we are now—and I approve of it—making efforts to resume relations.

I am still extremely puzzled about why you think it is so important that the form of the political organization of a very small part of this world is so important that you are willing to threaten the continued deterioration of that country and the spirit of unity of our country?

Why the priority to Vietnam? Obviously our own country is undergoing very serious strains both economically and, above all, politically and socially. That is, the sense of unity that has broken down over this conflict, and one of the reasons is, I think, that other people share my puzzlement as to why it is justified.

U.S. POSITION OF NO CHOICE BUT DEFEAT OR ESCALATION

When you reduce it to our troops being there, of course, everyone wishes to protect our troops. You stress what we ought to do now. Do we have to bomb to protect our forces? The real question, it seems to me, is how we got into the position of having no choice but to escalate the war or accept defeat and humiliation. The offensive that we are talking about now was foreseen years ago. Former Pentagon officials foresaw it and common sense indicated that the North Vietnamese would test this Vietnamization concept when the American levels were low. I don't understand why you allowed us to get into this position of having this Hobson's choice—choice of defeat or escalation. I must say I don't see how this vindicates Mr. Nixon's 1968 promise to end the war and win the peace.

This still puzzles me, even after all that you said, and certainly much of it is about the immediate thing. We find ourselves after nearly 3½ years in a situation where you have to take this action, the very kind of action that caused President Johnson to retire.

WHY IS VIETNAM SO MUCH IN U.S. INTEREST?

I am not enlightened about it. I can't understand it. Why is this particular piece of real estate, these particular people, so much in our interest that we are willing to jeopardize the security of our country, spending enormous sums more than the Russians and Chinese?

Goodness knows. I can understand that the Chinese are rather relaxed about our war because they can see the United States commit-

ting suicide. They may protest a bit, but after all, if this is a contest between the concept of communism as a way to organize society and the concept of democracy, who is winning? They have no troops at all. As far as I know, not one Russian life has been lost in this war—if it was, it was an accident or by one of our bombings.

Also, as far as I know, there are no Chinese combat troops in North Vietnam. There are very few Chinese troops in Laos and very little Chinese aid to the Pathet Lao.

So on balance, during these past 6 years, can you honestly say the United States is stronger, relative to the Communist world, or vice versa? This puzzles me, I just can't understand it, and I think the American people, as well as I, as chairman of this committee, deserve a little better explanation of why this particular conflict is so awfully important that it justifies the resumption of the war at this level.

[Applause.]

Please be quiet. This is a serious question I am asking.

I simply have never, for years now, been able to understand it and I would like as serious an answer as you can possibly give.

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I am sure that, based on the history of the problems in Vietnam and the attitude of the chairman of this committee over the years, that I cannot answer all of the questions and I am sure that you will continue to have puzzlement.

I don't think the analogies that you suggest are apt and I don't like to keep referring to these things because I don't convince you, I just irritate you.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't irritate me; you puzzle me. I want to understand it and see what I can do. I would like to do anything I can to bring the war to an end.

Secretary ROGERS. Let me finish, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. I just don't want you to say you irritate me.

Secretary ROGERS. I think I do.

The CHAIRMAN. No, you don't; and neither did Rusk irritate me.

I simply feel it is necessary. Maybe I shouldn't use the expression I do. I may be inept in the way I express it, but this is a genuine concern.

My own constituents, people come to me all the time, they cannot understand their own difficulties here at home, which don't relate to the war, and I think it is my duty to relate all of these activities to one another and see what the final mix is. This is all I am trying to understand.

I will put it another way—I guess maybe you think I irritate you. I am merely trying to use what persuasion I have to point out to you and the administration that it is not in our interest to continue. This is what I obviously have been trying to do.

Secretary ROGERS. You don't irritate me. Now we know we don't irritate each other. And you don't, Senator, because you are performing your functions, and I am mine.

Now, the reason I said what I said to begin with is, that from the beginning of this administration we have pointed out that we inherited the war.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't have to point it out. Goodness knows, we all knew that.

Secretary ROGERS. The analogies that you use are quite inappropriate.

We at that time had 535,000 Americans in there and we were spending \$21 billion a year. We had nothing to do with that. President Nixon wasn't involved in that.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree.

Secretary ROGERS. Congress wasn't involved in it.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you.

Secretary ROGERS. Congress passed the resolution that supported it, Congress appropriated the money, and we had a lot of casualties at that time.

POLICY PURSUED BY NIXON ADMINISTRATION

So we were faced with what we should do under those circumstances. What we have tried to do is pursue a policy that would get us out of Vietnam at the earliest possible date without jeopardizing our whole foreign policy, without totally disavowing and turning our backs on our friend and ally, South Vietnam, and without destabilizing that area of the world.

We have treaty commitments with many countries in Asia, supported by a bipartisan foreign policy. We think we have done a good job and we think we are going to continue to do a good job.

I am sure it is easy to be critical, and every time there is an action taken, such as the one that the President recently took, it is natural for the Congress to question us. That is the function that you are supposed to perform. We understand that. We are not critical of it, but we think the American people support the President.

We think we have done a good job. In the meantime the President has done exactly what you and the members of the committee wanted him to do, and that is we have opened channels of communication with the People's Republic of China.

We have a visit scheduled to the Soviet Union. Our relations with other countries in the area are good.

We think that if the President gets the support of the Congress and the American people, and I think he will, that he will continue to succeed in his programs.

We think if we just turned our back and just quit now, or if we had done it a year ago, it would have been a very serious mistake in judgment, and the American people would have regretted it for many years to come. So we had to decide against that option of quitting. We decided we would not quit.

Now, what was left? We were not going to stay. We announced a policy of getting out of Vietnam and doing it in a way that was not destabilizing, an orderly way, and a way that was consistent with what we thought we had to do, based on the resources and the lives of American men that we lost there. I think it is a good program.

Now, I really know how you feel about it and I respect your judgment and I hope you respect the judgment of the President and myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do. I realize you have a much more influential position than any member of the Senate; all we can do is try to persuade.

I can only say I don't think your answers are very responsive, but maybe the question is not well put.

PRESIDENT NIXON HAS NOT STOPPED WAR

You said a moment ago the President has done everything that he said he would do. The one thing he hasn't done is stop the war. He has done all of the other things, the intermediate things you mentioned, such as getting troops out of Cambodia.

But the reescalation, you see, touches a very sensitive point. We have been led to believe, even though many had reservations, that possibly your Vietnamization would work. But the last 10 days, what has happened recently, puts a very different color on this whole thing.

As Senator Javits and others recalled, we have heard these things before. I remember Admiral McCain, who was then, I think, head of the Pacific Fleet—I forget his particular title, but he was a very prominent leader in the Navy. In 1966, I think it was, in the Reader's Digest, he had a most remarkable interview that the war was won, that the enemy was defeated, and there was nothing to do but to wind it up. Every year we have had these extremely optimistic statements going back to McNamara's time, "the light at the end of the tunnel," way back in 1965, and "we are going to get the troops home, I think, by Christmas."

Every year, you see, this has been going on and maybe this is why we are more sensitive than otherwise. If it were the first time we were confronted with statements of this kind, it would be a different thing. Perhaps that expresses some of it.

But coming back to the fundamentals, I agree that we are interested in American lives, but the way you and other spokesmen put it, the first priority is protection of American lives, leaving the implication we don't care how many other people we kill or by what means.

Really, I don't think the American people want to take this position—I don't believe it.

Secretary ROGERS. No; I certainly didn't intend that we would not like to have a peaceful settlement worked out, Senator—I said, Senator, earlier, I thought if we just turned tail and got out—

WAY TO SETTLE STALEMATED WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I have said a hundred times, and others have, that the traditional, classic way to settle a war that is in the nature of a stalemate is the procedure followed by the French in Geneva in 1954. It is the traditional, classic way, when you get a stalemate.

There have been many wars where there was no unconditional surrender, as we insisted upon in World War II. They were settled by such process. Many of the medieval wars they got together and settled. The procedure is not a mystery.

U.S. POSITION ON FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

Of course, the terms continue to be that we insist upon having a form of government, as you said a moment ago, a form which in our view is democratic. In other words, having our government there, and this is unacceptable to the North.

I come back to my first thing, why is it—

Secretary ROGERS. That is not our position.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what was said in the record a moment ago in answer to one of the questions. I will rely on the record.

You were asked by, I forget whether it was Senator Javits—and you said yes, this is it and it has been implicit, I think, all along. That isn't free choice, according to the other people; it is free choice so long as it is our choice. If it deviates from our choice—

Secretary ROGERS. That is a disservice, Senator. We never said that and I think it is a disservice to say it. We have always said any kind of proposal providing for the method of permitting the South Vietnamese to make their own decision is acceptable to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment ago, I am almost certain, you said in response to a question I think the Senator from New York said, a government which in our view is a democratic government.

Secretary ROGERS. If I said that—I don't believe I said it—but in any event, I said—

The CHAIRMAN. It was a slip; I am sure you didn't intend it, but that is what actually took place.

Secretary ROGERS. Let's go back and see if we find it. I don't think I ever said anything like that.

The CHAIRMAN. You said yes in response to the question.

Secretary ROGERS. Whose question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits'. We will look at it in a moment. Let me finish this before I get completely off the track.

WHY IS GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM SO IMPORTANT?

It comes back again to the original question—whether you said that or whether you didn't—my point is: In view of the fact that the war continues to be the principal obstacle to our country proceeding to do a great many things internationally and domestically that are now being held up, this war is the obstacle in weighing what is of greatest importance to our people.

You can come down on the side that the kind of government they have in South Vietnam, a country of 15 or 16 million people, is more important than all of the rest, when you have accepted a similar government in China and in Russia. We are great friends with Yugoslavia; we recently had Tito here, welcomed him here with open hands at the committee, and everybody paid him compliments. The Chinese are here now; we walk out hand in hand. It is just a mystery to me why it is so important to us that we can jeopardize our country to see that the government of South Vietnam is one that meets with our approval. I can't quite see it at all. I am awfully dumb, I guess—

Secretary ROGERS. Could I say—

The CHAIRMAN. This is exactly the point—why is it so important that that government has to be one that is not similar to North Vietnam or China or Russia or Yugoslavia?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, let me speak for a few minutes to that point.

You misrepresent the viewpoint of the United States. We have never said that. Our position is as follows:

We are prepared to have the people in South Vietnam negotiate with the North Vietnamese in any way they want to so that the gov-

ernment that they work out, or the future of that area, can be devised by them. We have said whatever they work out is all right with us.

Second, we have said that, assuming they can work out something between the South and North, we are prepared to agree to an election because the only way we know of for the people to express their point of view is by an election. Maybe there is some way, but in any event, we have said, try to work out an elective procedure. We are perfectly satisfied to accept that.

Let me finish.

The CHAIRMAN. Most people of the world don't follow the election system. That is a minority position.

Secretary ROGERS. The only way we know of is either by agreement between the people of South Vietnam and the others in the area or by giving the people a chance to express their views.

We will not accept, and your question suggests we should accept, a Communist takeover of the Government of South Vietnam against their wishes, as a result of a military victory. That we cannot accept, in view of the history of this conflict.

Now, if you disregard the history of the conflict, if you forgot about all of the facts that happened in 1965 and 1966 and 1967 and 1968, it would be another matter. You can't do that. So now we said, yes, the people in Vietnam can themselves decide if they can agree on how they will govern themselves, separately, together, or however.

Second, we are prepared to have the people express their will in any fair way that can be worked out, and with the use of an international commission and of observers and anything else that is necessary to provide that it be done fairly. We are perfectly prepared to accept that result.

The only thing we are not prepared to do is, and if I get your comments correctly, you are suggesting that the United States say now, in view of everything that has happened, notwithstanding that we are prepared to leave, let the Communists take over the country militarily and impose a communistic rule on the people of South Vietnam, that is unacceptable.

Senator JAVITS. Would you yield at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. I yield.

Senator JAVITS. I think that this discussion has produced a very interesting development of views, Mr. Chairman. I wouldn't interrupt unless I hoped to contribute to it.

QUESTION IS WHETHER WE ARE THROUGH WITH WAR

I would like to put the chairman's position in a different light. I think the chairman understands what I mean.

What many of us say, and I say, Mr. Secretary, is having been in there since 1964-65, having fought for this opportunity that they have, having armed them to the hilt, having organized them with a million men, they are now on their own. I don't know how they will come out. I don't know whether it will be settled by election; I don't know whether they will be taken over; I don't know whether they will turn the tables and invade North Vietnam. But we should be through with it. That is the question, as I see it—are we through with it, or are we going to continue to guarantee that they are going to have some kind of expression of view by the people? Or, are we going to under-

write the legitimacy of the Thieu government and the election which kept it in office?

That is what I thought the President's policy was, but he doesn't want to set a date. We think he should. We have done all we can, from now on the balance is the other way. We lost; we lost in the division of and damage to our country. We lost in the diversion from our more important responsibilities elsewhere.

We lost in our economy, and so on. That is the question. The way the chair puts it, I agree. I get an implication that surely the Communists are going to take over. That is unfortunate. I feel very deeply—and I think many of our colleagues share it—after so many years of suffering and so many casualties, we have now armed them, and will even give them money, maybe we owe them that—a couple billion dollars a year—but we are through. And what worries us all, from what you say, is the United States is not through. We are underwriting something more. We don't want to underwrite anything. That is the problem between us.

The CHAIRMAN. I am bound to say he demonstrates a great capacity as one of the leading minds in our Senate and he expresses it very well.

In a slightly different context he says what I am trying to say.

U.S. POSITION ON ELECTIONS IN VIETNAM

You talk about elections. Most of the people of this world don't have elections; they settle their government without elections, most of our allies, all the way from Greece to Brazil.

Secretary ROGERS. It is unfair—

The CHAIRMAN. Why do we have to have an election there?

This committee has recently been told by various reputable people that the North Vietnamese position is not that they are against an election, but they are against an election controlled by Mr. Thieu. Within a month we had three men go to Hanoi, reputable leaders in a certain movement of the labor union, very experienced people, and they said in no uncertain terms nothing new; they only confirmed what a number of Members of the Senate and others have brought back. The essence of the question of determination is that you do have to get rid of Thieu who is the symbol of the repression in that country that goes back to Diem. North Vietnam is perfectly willing to use as a preparatory period what they call a government of national concord made up of the three major areas: the NLF, the Hanoi government itself, and of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, other than Thieu. And I don't want to get bogged down in saying they have this or that or on the election. You didn't insist they have an election in China. You don't insist they have an election in Russia. You didn't insist they have an election in Pakistan. You don't insist they have an election in Greece.

Secretary ROGERS. And I haven't insisted on it here.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying the one thing we won't take is that they continue there without an election.

Secretary ROGERS. I did not say that.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand it any other way.

Secretary ROGERS. Read back my answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know if he can find it within a reasonable time. I don't want to emphasize that too much. Maybe you misunderstood the Senator's question. I know I heard it. But, anyway, there is what we are doing to the Vietnamese.

DESTRUCTION BROUGHT ON SOUTH VIETNAM

There is an article by Robert Shaplen, and maybe you don't agree, but he has been writing about this for years and years. He has written books. I think it is generally conceded that he is an astute observer of the Vietnamese scene as anyone since Bernard Fall died. He describes the horrible destruction we have brought on South Vietnam. I am not going to read it all. I am going to ask that the article by Robert Shaplen from this current issue of *The New Yorker*, April the 15th I believe is the date, be inserted in the record because I think it is appropriate. I want to read one paragraph. It says:

Once a gracious city of quiet streets lined with tamarind and flame trees, with plentiful gardens and play areas, Saigon has become a monstrous urban sprawl, full of ugly, squalid slums, in which crime abounds. Most of Saigon's decline and degradation, of course, can be blamed on the war, and much of it has occurred since 1965, when the Americans began arriving in strength.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the *New Yorker*, Apr. 15, 1972]

WE HAVE ALWAYS SURVIVED

(By Robert Shaplen)

Outside the restaurant in Cholon, the Chinese section of Saigon, where a group of us were having dinner a couple of months ago, there was a sudden howl of sirens. After years in this city, I had become used to sirens, whose throbbing *wow-wow-wow* is heard constantly, and at first we paid no attention and went on enjoying our fried crab. Within a few minutes, however, it became apparent that some emergency vehicles had come to a stop directly in front of the restaurant. I went out, to find the block cordoned off, while American and Vietnamese military police carried out a house-to-house search in the glow of rotating red-and-white searchlights flashing from the tops of jeeps. Getting out my press credentials, I approached a young American M.P. who was waving his M-16 rifle like a fishing rod. He couldn't have been more than nineteen years old, and he looked as if he might have arrived in Vietnam the day before. When I asked him what was going on, he replied only, "Sir, you'll have to go back into that restaurant." A Vietnamese M.P.—an older man—muttered something in broken English about "students" and "more riot." The Saigon University residential compound, Minh Mang, was only a block away, and for the past week the students had been, as they often are, demonstrating—this time against some new rules designed to prevent just such activity. Pointing to the roof of one of the buildings across the street, the Vietnamese policeman said something about "terrorists." I again tried the young American, who was now ducking in and out of doorways and pointing his gun at anyone still on the street. He was so jittery that I was afraid the weapon could go off at any moment, and it was obvious that he was in no mood to listen to further questions from me. "Sir," he finally spluttered, "have you got a disaster pass?"

I had never heard of a disaster pass—nor, as I subsequently found out, was there such a thing (the young M. P. was probably referring to a special pass entitling a small number of officials to go anywhere at any time)—but the phrase has stayed with me, and I have since reflected that, in a manner of speaking, I have had a disaster pass for Saigon for a quarter of century. Between the date of my first arrival, in June, 1946, and the present highly uncertain time, I have seen the city undergo myriad changes, almost all of them for the worse—particularly over the past decade, during which I have spent approximately half

my time in Vietnam. From a 1946 estimate of four hundred thousand, not counting French colonial troops, the population has grown to almost three million, and that of what is called the Saigon metropolitan area, embracing parts of Gia Dinh Province, which surrounds the city, is more than four million. Official projections—including one made by C. A. Doxiadis, the famous Greek city planner, whose firm did a study of Saigon in 1965—range as high as nine million two hundred thousand for the metropolitan area by the year 2000. Once a gracious city of quiet streets lined with tamarind and flame trees, with plentiful gardens and play areas. Saigon has become a monstrous urban sprawl, full of ugly, squalid slums, in which crime abounds. Most of Saigon's decline and degradation, of course, can be blamed on the war, and much of it has occurred since 1965, when the Americans began arriving in strength. The first Indo-China war, between the Vietminh and the French, from the end of 1946 until the middle of 1954, affected Saigon, but not nearly as much, because the major impact was felt in North Vietnam and in the northern parts of South Vietnam. Moreover, the French, having ruled Indo-China for a hundred years, blended into the scene; they and the Vietnamese had developed their own peculiar love-hate relationship and were used to each other. The Americans, though, were, as in so many other parts of the world, out of place and ill at ease in Vietnam—something that is even more apparent today, when they are leaving.

In the time of the French war, long before the booming blasts of rockets, mortars, and artillery were regularly heard and orange flares filled the sky at night, Saigon was at least as dangerous as it has been since. This was chiefly because there was much more random terrorism. One sat in one or another of the cafes on the main thoroughfare, the Rue Catinat (which was named after one of the first French vessels to come to the area and has now been renamed Tu Do, or Freedom Street), and several times a week, usually around eleven in the morning or five in the afternoon, young men hired by the Vietminh would hurl grenades at the cafes from bicycles. Sometimes they missed or the grenades proved to be duds, but more often than not they killed or wounded members of the motley French Army—including blacks from Africa and Foreign Legionnaires—or civilians who were foolish enough to sit outside. After a time, most of the cafes put up protective metal screens. There were, in the beginning, none of the modern plastic explosive devices, which can rip apart whole buildings, but over the months the grenades took their steady toll. Even so, the war never had much visible effect on the easy way of life centering around the cafes and the two main clubs, the Cercle Sportif and the Cercle Hippique. The official American representatives in those days, whose number grew from about a score when I first arrived to several hundred by the time of Dien Bien Phu and the French surrender, shared the pleasant life of Saigon, whose charm was enhanced by the lovely, lithe Vietnamese women, in their native go dais—the traditional long-sleeved dresses with their long skirts slit in two panels to show wide trousers underneath—and by lovely Frenchwomen, too. There was, moreover, a constant feeling of excitement, a genuine sense of adventure. One could arrange clandestine meetings with Vietminh agents in teahouses on the outskirts of town, to which one travelled by cyclo—pedicab—and where one sat and sipped tea and discussed the theory and practice of revolution. In Saigon in those days, which now seem impossibly far off, there was none of the tawdriness and none of the dementia that the city reveals today.

General D. used to be one of South Vietnam's leading generals. He was in charge of IV Corps, in the Mekong Delta; he took part in several of the coups after the one that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem in November, 1963; and he once tried to mount one of his own, which petered out before it reached Saigon. Eventually, he lost his commission and sank into the limbo that has swallowed up so many Vietnamese leaders in recent years. Nowadays, dressed in stained trousers and a shirt, D. can regularly be seen on Tu Do, gesticulating and shouting wild imprecations. He occasionally comes onto the veranda or into the lobby of the Hotel Continental—a rambling, high-ceilinged, musty, comfortable remnant of French colonialism, at which I have always stayed while in Saigon. Once, he went behind the room clerk's counter and started handing out room keys to everyone who walked in. The manager—a good-natured man named Philippe Franchini, who is part French and part Vietnamese, and who inherited the hotel from his French father—let him alone, and in time D. grew tired of his game and went off, still shouting. He is a victim of paresis.

There are demented people all over Saigon—most of them simply victims of war. One crazy woman who usually wanders around Tu Do wears an American Indian headdress and is always giggling. No one knows who she is, but she has

become a daily feature of the landscape. There are deranged war widows who rant and rave like General D., but they tend to be more bitter, and they deliberately squat to relieve themselves in front of hotels where Americans stay. Then there is a woman who directs a group of deaf-and-dumb prostitutes—most of them fourteen and fifteen years old, some even younger. They cluster nightly at the corner of Tu Do nearest the Continental, usually just before the curfew hour, which is 1 a.m. At this time of night, there are prostitutes—among them some whom I have watched grow old and tight-faced in the last ten years—standing at street corners all over town, hoping to be picked up by late-cruising customers. At this hour, too, pimps haul their girls around on the backs of motorcycles and offer them at bargain prices. They are scarcely bargains, though; the venereal-disease rate among prostitutes in Saigon is now estimated to be sixty-five percent.

More tragic than the prostitutes, to my mind, are the street boys of Saigon—wild, tough youngsters, many of them as young as nine or ten, and many of them orphans who have no homes other than the doorways they sleep in at night. Some who work part time as shoeshine boys are as pestiferous as flies and, if finally given in to, curse their customers unless they get what they consider enough piastres. Some sell newspapers, peanuts, pencils, or postcards, or do any monetary job offered them. Most of the time, though, there is nothing for them to do, and increasingly often they steal—from black-market sidewalk stalls, from the open-air stores, from the pockets of careless pedestrians. They spend much of their time smoking cigarettes—marijuana if they can get it—and playing cards for money in the alleyways. Many seem beyond redemption; some actually want to be arrested and to live in prison, even under the worst of conditions. An American friend of mine carried out an experiment last year. For several months, he had watched one particular boy, who was about nine, and whose life on the streets had not yet totally obliterated a look that was almost angelic. Each afternoon, the boy was to be seen around Tu Do, wearing the same tattered shirt and short pants, doing occasional begging or sometimes selling newspapers. My friend took him home, gave him a bath, fed him, and dressed him in some new clothes. The boy thanked him and then asked if he might leave. An hour later, he was back at his station on Tu Do, wearing the old, dirty clothes.

Beggars are all over Saigon, and they range in age from three to three score and ten. Some are the children of refugees, and wander about with infant sisters or brothers strapped to their backs, and some are native Saigonese who have made a profession of begging during all the years of the war. Many of them are crippled, either born so or maimed in battle, and they sit on street corners where Americans are most likely to pass by, holding out their hats or cups, smiling and bobbing their heads. They are profuse in their thanks if someone gives them ten or twenty piastres (from three to five cents), but if they are ignored, they, like the shoeshine boys, will hurl curses—which they can be pretty sure the Americans won't understand. Saigonese beggary has become more than an expression of poverty and despair. There is a special quality of self-degradation to it—of self-hatred and hatred of the foreigner who has reduced the whole society to shame and dependence. There is occasionally, of course, actual self-immolation, carried out by young Buddhist monks and nuns who burn themselves to death by soaking their robes in gasoline and then igniting them. The beggars, too, sometimes perform horribly self-destructive acts. One day, while I was walking along Tu Do with a friend, I saw a middle-aged man who had just cut his arms and legs with a knife and lay bleeding on the sidewalk, still holding out his hat. I said, "Oh, my God—only in Vietnam!" My companion, an American who had been in and out of the country for as many years as I have and is married to a Vietnamese woman, rebuked me, "Have you ever seen a big American city late at night, with all its brutality and ugliness and violence?" he asked. He paused, and then added, "It's true, though, that both we and the Vietnamese have a strong feeling of having sinned—against each other and against ourselves. Poor Vietnam is the whore, America the pimp."

Now that the Americans are withdrawing, a sense of impending change is everywhere. My Vietnamese friends—even those who have been closest to us—are bewildered and worried. Most of them have been making good money, but they have not let themselves become part of what I call the American-privileged Vietnamese class, which has grown up over the past five or six years, and which differs noticeably from the privileged Vietnamese class that the French created. My friends have not been motivated primarily by the urge for profit, as have the contractors who have built apartment houses and villas and rented them

to Americans at exorbitant prices, or as have those Vietnamese who have taken jobs at high salaries with American construction companies or the American bureaucracy—to say nothing of the thousands of prostitutes, taxi-drivers, and café operators, or the countless black marketeers selling goods pilfered from the docks or stolen from the post exchanges. My friends are people who have simply made the most of the opportunity given them by the huge American presence to earn five, ten, or twenty times as much as they had ever earned before or will ever earn again. Some of those I am speaking of, many of whom are journalists, have remained ardent nationalists; some are strict neutralists; and some accept, with a sense of transcendent fate, the prospect of a Communist victory—mainly because they are so disillusioned by the ineptitude of successive local governments. Disillusion, in the case of the Thieu government, has become contempt; they consider it “Diemist” without Diem’s redeeming attributes, which were, in the beginning at least, those of a true nationalist and patriot. There is today a universal distrust of the Army, which runs the country—of the corruption it promotes and countenances, and, in particular, of the money that the wives of generals and other high officers are making from such activities as the disposal of scrap bullet and bomb casings and of Army steel and cement. Such business, of course, has always existed as an adjunct to war, but there is something especially sleazy about the way it is carried on here now, and about the naïve, even bland, acceptance of it by the Americans. A conservative estimate is that fifteen thousand Americans in uniform or out, have been involved in this process of corruption. These Americans have encouraged the black-marketing of all sorts of goods, have encouraged pilferage for payoffs, have raked in huge profits from the smuggling of drugs and other goods, from the illicit trade in dollars, from the operation of night clubs, from the importation of American call girls, and so on. The prevalence of corruption has its comic as well as its depressing aspects. A few months ago, a group of fifty angry women marched to the National Assembly building and staged a brief, shrieking demonstration to protest the demolition of their black-market street stalls by the police. The police take such action sporadically—and the stalls always reappear as soon as the police disappear. Many of the women who run the stalls are the wives of Army officers, and although they have the protection of their husbands they do not necessarily have that of the police, who obey their own instructions or their own instincts. However, the anger of the women on the march to the Assembly was directed not at the police so much as at the Americans and, indirectly, at the American post exchanges. As long as the Americans permitted various goods to be sold, or stolen—so ran the argument of the women—why blame them for selling those same goods?

The cynicism that dominates Saigon today is notably exemplified by the role that the Vietnamese and American draft-dodgers and deserters play there. Most Vietnamese Army deserters return eventually to their own units or to other units, but some flee to the cities—most often to Saigon—where they hide in the slums or, in some cases, obtain work under assumed names and at unusually low wages in Vietnamese or American companies. Occasional roundups are conducted, but since the ranks of the police are filled with men who are also seeking to avoid military service, the deserters and draft-dodgers are not too assiduously pursued. In addition to the thousands of Vietnamese deserters, there have been hundreds of American deserters in and around Saigon; now, of course, their number has dwindled. Most of the American deserters hide out in the slums, including an infamous area known as Hundred-P. Alley (the “P.” stands for “piastre”), which is near Tan Son Nhut Airport and derives its name from the ease with which one may procure anything there—a girl, opium, heroin—for a relatively small fee. The American and Vietnamese police conduct sporadic raids on the place, and seize guns, dope of various kinds, forged leave passes, blank flight authorizations to leave the country, and so forth, all stolen from American bases. It is a world unto itself, one of many such enclaves that survive no matter what action the police take.

There are other spots where, in the receding tide of the American presence, total permissiveness has set in. Among them are night clubs and bars on Plantation Road, near Tan Son Nhut. Late last year, one of the underground G.I. newspapers in Vietnam, *Grunt Free Press*, printed a story about life on Plantation Road headed “Happiness Is Acid Rock.” It dealt mostly with one of the more popular rock-and-roll places where young Vietnamese and Americans


gather nightly, noting, "There is an empathy between them found nowhere else in Vietnam." The story continued:

The vibrations are there in the flashing lights and the cool music and the hot air and smoke and crowding. It's a warm scene, as warm as any found in Haight-Ashbury, Greenwich Village, Santa Monica, Des Moines, London, Paris, Berlin, Tokyo, and anywhere else where under-thirties groove together "You know, it's like this [one American soldier said]. Some G.I.s bitch and moan about Vietnam, but, man, it ain't so bad as all that. Gimme a place like this and it don't matter if I'm in Saigon or Sioux City. There's some good thing going for us here, man, but you got to know where it's at It's the vibrations. I dig the vibrations here. There's something mellow about these people when I come in here. And I don't get it anywhere else."

Nearby, in a restaurant on the upper floor of a run-down tenement, other G.I.s sit and smoke opium or hashish or marijuana while stereo tapes blare out the latest pop tunes. Marijuana can be bought virtually anywhere, in phony cigarette packs. A popular brand just now is Park Lane; the names tend to change as crackdowns increase. Another underground G.I. paper, *Rolling Stone* (no relation to the domestic sheet of the same name), last fall quoted a G.I. as saying, "They couldn't pay me to leave here before my enlistment's up. This place is a gold mine. Hell, scoring grass here is easier than buying a loaf of bread."

Advertisements like these still appear every day in the Saigon *Post* or the *Vietnam Guardian*, the two main English-language papers:

THE PIONEERS
OF PROGRESS:



**What You Need,
We've Got It!**

Promptest completion at most competitive fee: Passport, Visa, Extension, Work Permit, Sponsorship, Cohabitation, Marriage Cert. & any other paper procedures. . .

71 Ngo Tung Chau
Sg. Tel. 21922
★

Top price purchase of non-used properties & various usable items, from vehicles to kitchen sinks! . . .

(Cohabitation papers allow a Vietnamese girl to live legally with a man—usually an American—though they are unmarried.)

Welcome To Happy Room

413—415 Phan-Thanh-Gian St.
Saigon Tel.: 90305

Air Conditioned ★ New Decoration

TURKISH BATH:	NIGHT CLUB:
★ Excellent Service	★ State side Music
★ Pretty Girl Massager	★ Magicial & Sexy Show
★ Private Steam Tubs	★ Experienced Band & Beautiful Singer

Here reserved the foreigner only.
Open every day from 09.00 AM To 24.00 PM.

One of the first victims of Vietnamization may be said to be Miss Lee. Until early in 1970, the main part of her business consisted in finding suitable girl partners for American servicemen and other foreigners in town. She kept files on about fifty women, including young widows, "companions," and middle-aged women. Her advertisements promised "beautiful ladies of charm and class, for company, conversation, or . . ." For five hundred piastres—about two and a half dollars—a customer had the right to look through her album of photographs. Another five hundred entitled him to meet a girl and look her over at the office of the agency. For fifteen hundred, a date would be arranged. If a marriage ensued, Miss Lee took a further cut of twenty-five hundred piastres. The following advertisement shows what Miss Lee is reduced to today in the way of offering services:

MISS LEE:

- Needs to buy AIR-CONDITIONERS & CARS Top prices paid.
- Has **CAR FOR RENT**
monthly, weekly,
daily with insurance:
TOYOTA, MAZDA,
DATSUN, VOLKSWAGEN, JEEP, MICROBUS
Sedan, Pick-up, microbus—GOOD CONDITION, SEASONABLE PRICES.
- SERVANTS, COOKS, DRIVER LICENCE
- VILLAS APARTMENTS, HOUSES FOR RENT

Please Ask for:
MISS LEE
12-Bis Chi-Lang
GIA-DINH
PTT: 23.637
Daily: 08.00 2.000
including Sundays
and Holidays

Inevitably, the departure of the Americans has also meant the closing down of many bars, hotels, night clubs, and restaurants in the main sections of Saigon that have thrived on G.I. patronage. Some of these places, hoping to attract the Americans' young Vietnamese hangers-on, have changed their names from such things as Tennessee Bar, Texas, or G.I. Dolly to Vietnamese ones—street names or the names of local movie heroes or heroines. One straitlaced Vietnamese I know, who regards the presence of the G.I.s as a necessary evil but the self-degradation of his young countrymen as an unnecessary one, said of this transformation, "The rats have taken over."

There is also literal truth in this statement. The rat population has increased tremendously in the last two years, despite improvements in the garbage-collection system. One sees rats by the hundreds, especially at night, even around the best restaurants and homes, scurrying across streets, chasing and jumping over each other. Owing to a said lack of medical facilities—there are approximately five hundred registered M.D.s in Saigon, along with hundreds of Chinese practitioners—illnesses caused by filth and rats are a mounting problem. In 1968, the infant-mortality rate was one in twenty; today, of twenty thousand recorded deaths each month more than half are those of children under five. A large number of deaths, particularly those of infants, go unrecorded. (It recently was revealed, incidentally, that some Saigon surgeons, who had earlier been sent to the United States for training as Army doctors, were devoting much of their talent and time to cosmetic surgery on local women who wanted to look more Occidental.)

Despite all this, and beneath the unrest that one feels today in Saigon—only a fraction of which takes the form of overt demonstrations by students, veterans, and others—one senses something else: an intense determination to endure. Again and again, the Vietnamese reveal a capacity for surviving almost anything: poverty, disease, bombed-out homes, loss of members of the family. Everywhere, Americans bemoan our failures and condemn both the Vietnamese and themselves either for becoming so deeply involved in the war to begin with or for not having fought “the right kind of war.” There is a constantly growing awareness among the Americans in Saigon of the policies that have led us to disaster—and the publication of the Pentagon Papers, of course, added to this. But the Vietnamese think differently; among the Vietnamese in Saigon, the Pentagon Papers scarcely caused a ripple. They tended to shrug the revelations off with typical fatalism and cynicism. Whatever they now think of us, their attitude is expressed over and over again in the words “We will survive. We have always survived.”

Saigon may be the most heavily polluted city in the world, not excluding New York or Los Angeles. There are approximately a million registered vehicles in the area, and probably at least as many more come and go. In addition to private cars, small Renault taxis, and buses, there are several thousand three-wheeled motor scooters and many thousand three-wheeled *poussepousses*—motorized versions of pedicabs. All these smaller motor vehicles, as well as many of the larger ones, use kerosene or low-grade gasoline for fuel, so the Saigon air is constantly full of smoke and fumes, and a haze never leaves the sky. To make matters worse, there are now thousands of motorcycles, almost all Japanese-made, which swarm like locusts and make life more hazardous than ever for pedestrians. A wild Jet Set of Honda-riding youths races down Tu Do each night, or along the Bien Hoa Highway, outside town, and then the young men pile their motorcycles on the sidewalks while they go to cafés or movies. The city now has a considerable number of traffic lights, but in many places streams of vehicles still seem to come from all directions at once, and the ability to maneuver across a busy street at the height of the morning, noon, or evening rush hour is the mark of a veteran resident.

From my window at the Continental, I am mesmerized by the noise and variety of the traffic flow and pedestrian dash. Roaring convoys of American-made trucks, driven either by G.I.s or by Vietnamese, are like to be followed by screaming police cars escorting some high government official or rushing to some new disaster. Amid all this, small blue taxis scuttle about like water bugs, and motorcycles dart in and out. Vietnamese women seem to handle motorcycles more skillfully than men—or, at least, less dangerously. They sit straight and prim in the saddle, often wearing colorful little hats, and their natural grace is even enhanced by their adept control of the sputtering machines. The motorcycles serve as family jitneys, taking children to school and parents to work. Partly owing to the kerosene fumes—and to the fact that some of the kerosene containers were once used for defoliants—Saigon has lost many of its lovely old trees; others have been cut down to widen the streets. The fumes have also affected the normal bird population. A friend of mine bounced into my room one afternoon recently, exclaiming, “Guess what! I just saw a pigeon.”

In the past few years, Saigon has acquired an elaborate hippie culture and language. The hippies are categorized by age groups. A *hippie chôi chôi* (“chôi” means “play”) is a very young hippie, a teenybopper; a *hippie wôm wôm* is a twenty-year-old boy or girl; and a *hippie lau lau* is an old-time hippie, in his or

her late twenties. "*Bui doi*," which literally means "dust of life," denotes a general hippie attitude, and also is used to describe street youngsters. "*Quan voi*" means "elephant pants"—bell-bottoms. "*Trong cay si*," literally "to plant love trees," means that one is madly in love. "*Xan tien nhicu my*" means "to spend money like the Americans," to live lavishly, and is used to describe not only the American way of life in Saigon but the American conduct of the war—the indiscriminate use of artillery and planes to achieve a non-achievable objective. "*Bay buom*" means "to fly like a butterfly," as from girl to girl. "*Cao boi*," the most common term, is a Vietnamese phoneticism of "cowboy," meaning a young hoodlum or tough. In the past two years, *cao boi*s have become increasingly numerous, wandering the streets in gangs. They have encouraged much of the increasingly overt anti-Americanism, sometimes jumping American soldiers or civilians on the street and beating them up, for no apparent reason or because they have been hired by somebody holding a grudge against the victim. They are also responsible for other growing street crime, including robberies; many are good at deftly snatching watches off the wrists of pedestrians. Most of the hippies, however, are harmless. They meet in cafés and sit and talk and drink Coca-Cola or beer, complaining about the futility of life or bragging about how they can stay in school and out of the Army for two more years because their parents have lied about their age. Like hippies the world over they favor long hair, and the boys have a special fetish—expensive shoes. These may cost as much as fifteen dollars a pair—a very high price in Saigon. Last fall, during an anticrime campaign that lasted three months, the police arrested more than two thousand hippies, along with four hundred young men described as *cao boi*s and hooligans, but the hippies—arrested ostensibly because they refused to cut their hair—were quickly released. During that campaign, almost a quarter of a million people were apprehended, about half of them for alleged traffic violations. In Saigon nowadays, when one is driving a car it is commonplace to be stopped by the police for failing to obey some sort of traffic sign in Vietnamese. Almost always, a five-hundred-piastre note—worth a bit more than a dollar at the new official rate—will spare you a trip to the police station. This, of course, is one way the vastly underpaid policemen make ends meet. In last year's crackdown, the second-largest group of those apprehended consisted of polluters and litterers. Then came illegal residents, "military troublemakers" (for the most part, veterans who had engaged in anti-government demonstrations), draftdodgers, people with false identification papers, gamblers, and deserters. The campaign was launched as a result of a decree, issued late in 1970, that gave Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Minh, the head of the Capital Military District, the right to do almost anything to maintain order in the city, but since most of those arrested or questioned were released, nothing much came of it all. It was like the sporadic anti-corruption campaigns in Saigon. Every now and then, there is a hue and cry about corruption, and a scapegoat—a Chinese merchant, a Vietnamese found stealing at the docks, or someone caught at the airport in the act of smuggling heroin or black-market dollars in or out of the country—is arrested and tried. Then the hullabaloo is over, and everything continues as before.

Whether they are hippies or not, virtually all of Saigon's young people are deeply embittered by what the war has done to them and their country, but, except for a relatively small element of revolutionary activists, they hold their bitterness tightly to themselves. Among the activists, some have covertly established direct liaison with the Communists, and other have made indirect contacts. In the past year, the Communists have stressed the importance of trying to build up the youth movement in the city. Since there are plenty of urgent political, social, and economic issues to be concerned about, a considerable number of high-school and college students have been aroused by the activists. This has been particularly true at times when the government has moved high-handedly, as it often has, to arrest student leaders and subject them to imprisonment and torture. Largely because of their contempt for the Saigon government, a good number of young people still feel admiration for the late Ho Chi Minh, whom most of them respect as a nationalist who led the Vietnamese to victory over the French, rather than as a Communist.

Recently, I talked with a student at the Buddhist Van Hanh University who expressed such admiration. The youth, whom I will call Thanh, was a senior, studying politics. At first, he said that the only people he admired were his parents; his father was a contractor, he told me, and his mother was "in the trading business." Then he observed that the only "world personage" he admired was Ho. When asked why, he replied, "Ho Chi Minh spent his life for Vietnam. He freed Vietnam from world domination. History will judge his actions. But as a very

young man, with empty hands, he went to France, worked so hard to get what he got. I admire him on this point. That is what today's youth should learn from him." Like many other young men, Thanh said he liked the Americans as a people but felt they had done his country more harm than good.

The most activist, or most curious, of the Saigon youths go out into the countryside during their summer vacations and during Tet (the New Year period) and join the Vietcong. Whether or not they become Communist operatives, their action is, as much as anything, an expression of their disgust at the degraded, profiteering way of life in Saigon—and, in many cases, at their own parents' participation in it. Similarly, some girls from good middle-class or lower-middle-class families whose incomes are inadequate because of inflation are sent to work in bars and restaurants, and they occasionally sleep with Americans they like while retaining their ties with their families and their Vietnamese boyfriends. Young men from good families, while deprecating their parents' profiteering, are glad to have those parents pay brides to keep them out of the Army, and they make a point of adeptly juggling the amounts of time they devote to leisure and to attending overcrowded classes so they can avoid military service.

These youths are not to be confused with the rich hippies whose parents keep them out of the service through sheer pull, or with a minority of serious and deeply troubled young men who object to the war. On a number of occasions over the past two years, I have had dinner with a group of six or seven of these serious young people. All are college graduates in their late twenties, and most have done graduate work in law, engineering, education, or administration. One of them works in the Presidential Palace, for one of Thieu's aides. "I have long legs," he says, with a sad smile, implying that he is used primarily as a messenger boy. Another is a lieutenant commander in the Navy, holding down a dull desk job. None of them are doing anything like the work for which they are qualified by their education and ability, and this is part of the tragedy of Vietnam today. The bureaucracy is still French-oriented, immobilized, so although some younger people have been elected to the House of Representatives or to provincial and village councils, the appointive jobs are mostly held by older men. Thus, most of the considerable younger talent that exists is being wasted. "The generation gap is very bad," one of my young friends said. "We are the transitional ones. Those younger don't care or aren't ready for anything. Most of them feel abandoned, and that's why, though they are really disillusioned, they pretend to be full of bravado, like the hippies and *cao bois*. The older intellectuals are lying low or have given up. We have nowhere to turn except to politics, which remains corrupt. The French created their privileged Vietnamese class—the *doc phu su*, or mandarin element—but they left the peasants and the middle class untouched. And they used the civil servants they created as just that—servants. When I was twenty-one, I had a sense of direction—of behavior and morality. Now anything goes. There is a loss of faith in Vietnamese historical traditions. We know what's wrong here, but there's nothing we can do about it. No one lets us. At least, the French allowed the Vietnamese culture to exist, in its own way, but you Americans have made us a nation of operators. We're in a void. We're empty."

I reflected afterward that although there has been plenty of repression of political prisoners and censorship of the press in Saigon over the past few years, there has also been a greater degree of freedom of expression—certainly more than there was in the days of Diem. In the early sixties, before Diem's overthrow, the sort of discussion I easily had on my own with this group of young men was occasionally possible but had to be arranged with the utmost care to safeguard the participants. Nowadays, though newspapers are regularly banned, they usually reappear after several days or a week, and continue their criticism of the Thieu government until they are banned again, and the process repeats itself. It is a kind of endless anarchy—neither freedom nor total repression. Much of the published dissent is dissent for dissent's sake—what is called in Saigon *nham nho*, a phrase translated for me by one Vietnamese as "bold and brazen talk that's out of place." This is not to say that some important issues have not been raised in the press. Considerable attention was given two years ago to the arrest, trial, and sentencing of the opposition deputy Tran Ngoc Chau, for example, and to the more recent arrest of his fellow-deputy Ngo Cong Duc. Duc is the owner of the most popular opposition paper, *Tin Sang*, which has achieved the distinction of having been banned most often. (Duc was defeated for reelection in August, but he continues his broadsides against Thieu.) "*Nham nho*" is also widely used to describe the so-called new culture, which consists largely of cheap novels and an increasing amount of pornography. This, like everything

else meretricious, is blamed on the influence of the Americans—and with similar justification.

Lately, however, there has been an awakening of something new, perhaps best defined as an awareness of anger. This was apparent a few months ago in an exhibition of paintings, drawings, poems, scrolls, and pamphlets by students at the College of Arts and Letters of Saigon University. Most of the paintings and sketches were naturally concerned with the war, and many of them had a harsh, "Guernica"-like quality. One large panel depicted Americans as eagles, hawks, and wolves devouring the countryside. There were many paintings or drawings of cemeteries and skulls, of bare bones in fields, of people on the run. One poignant painting, called "Going Back," showed a group of boys returning to an empty village in the war-ravaged wilderness. Another, which showed shackled prisoners, was entitled "Victory of the U. S. Over Prisoners of War," and a slogan in Vietnamese read "Hate calls for hate, blood for blood, skull for skull." A Vietnamese friend I went to the exhibition with remarked that it was a display of "the weapons of the weak." Without guidance, sense of direction, or much talent, the young artists and poets were venting their wrath against the Americans because, as my friend said, "they have no other way to say anything—they can't attack the government, but the government lets them attack the United States." There have been more and more anti-American cartoons in the newspapers recently. Still, it is surprising to me that the anti-American sentiment has risen so slowly. In Saigon, the slowness can be explained partly by the fact that, with rare exceptions (such as an American jeep leaving the scene of an accident, or a few G.I. getting into fights with Vietnamese in bars), the American troops have behaved well, and that over the past two years fewer and fewer G.I.s have been allowed to come to the capital. (Several other big cities have been declared off limits entirely.) The worst instances of American brutality, epitomized by My Lai, have occurred in the countryside; the number of smaller but similar incidents will never be known but must run into the thousands. On the other hand, one must say that the average American who has served in Vietnam for a year or eighteen months, though he may have failed to understand the Vietnamese, has generally left them alone. In the earlier days of the war, some friendships were established between American and Vietnamese, but they were nearly always surface relationships. The Vietnamese are not easy to know, and they like to emphasize their inscrutability to the Americans, who shuttle in and out of their lives to quickly. After my twenty-five years of contact with the country, I have perhaps a score of close Vietnamese friends, all of them in Saigon.

One reason that the Vietnamese are not easy to know is that there has been a deplorable slowness in instituting systematic Vietnamese-language training for our people here. Vietnamese is extremely hard to learn, because of its many tones—some words can be pronounced five or six different ways, tonally, and have five or six altogether different meanings. Matters could have been improved quite easily, however, if we had subsidized the widespread teaching of English to the Vietnamese instead of letting them acquire it in local, often rather expensive, fly-by-night schools. For those under forty, English, rather than French, is the second language in Saigon, but it is not spoken as well as French was, and still is. Indeed, one of our greatest failures in Vietnam has been in the field of education in general. We have built schools all over the country, yet there are not enough teachers, books, or equipment. Though the Vietnamese, like the Chinese, are hungry for education, attendance in four of eleven Saigon school districts is less than fifty per cent of those eligible. This is because the city now has slightly more than a thousand classrooms in public and private elementary schools, with an enrollment of two hundred and fifty-seven thousand. A third to a half of the classroom space is operated on three shifts a day, which means that many of the children who are able to attend school at all are there for only three hours. There are twenty-five hundred teachers, or one teacher for more than a hundred pupils. Not surprisingly, then, only fifty-per cent of the children who enter school finish even the elementary grades.

The situation in the universities is in some ways even worse. Saigon University—one of eight universities and colleges in the country—has about thirty-five thousand students and three hundred and fifty teachers, or one teacher for about seventy-seven students. Many, if not most, of the professors and instructors devote only three hours a week to their Saigon classes, because they have to travel the length and breadth of the country to teach at other universities scattered from Hué, in the north, to Can Tho, in the south. Lectures are ordinarily handed out in mimeographed form, and there is virtually no classroom discussion. Moreover,

there is so little scientific equipment that twenty-two thousand of Saigon University's thirty-five thousand students are enrolled in either its College of Arts and Letters or its law school—this in a country that, if it is to survive at all, needs many more engineers and scientifically trained graduates than lawyers or students of literature. One consequence of the university's inadequacy is that sons and daughters of the wealthy go abroad to study, and stay away. My friend Ton That Thien, who is a social historian and is the dean of Van Hanh University, a private Buddhist institution with thirty-six hundred students, sympathizes with those who can afford to go abroad, even while he bemoans the effects of their absence on Vietnam. "Who wants to come back to a huge prison and get killed?" he asks.

One of the idols of the younger generation is a slim, bespectacled young man, born in Hué, named Trinh Cong Son, who, at thirty-two, is the composer of some haunting anti-war songs, which, though banned in 1968 and 1969, are still played in a few night clubs and distributed on pirated cassettes. A twenty-three-year-old North Vietnamese refugee girl named Khanh Ly, whose deep, melodious voice is as haunting as the songs themselves, has helped make them famous. Perhaps the most famous of the songs is "The Love Song of a Madwoman," which contains the names of memorable battles in the long war:

I had a lover who died in combat at Pleime.

I had a lover from Zone D who died in combat at Dong Xoai.

I had a lover who died at Hanoi.

I had a lover who died in a hurry somewhere along the borders.

I had a lover who was killed in the Battle of Chuprong.

I had a lover whose cadaver was floating down a river. . . .

Another of Son's songs is called "A Lullaby of Sounds of Cannon Fire in the Middle of the Night." The first part goes:

Every night the sounds of cannon fire reverberate through the city.

A city sweeper stands still in the street, a broom in his hands.

The sound of cannon fire wake a mother from her sleep,

Fill the heart of a baby with poignant sadness. . . .

Shelters are being destroyed, laid in lifeless ruins,

Yellow skin, yellow flesh, what a tragedy being blown to pieces.

Trinh Cong Son, who sometimes sits in night clubs to hear Khanh Ly sing his songs, has gained fame but little money from them, for he has no control over the casset distribution. What money he does make comes from sheet-music sales of love ballads he has written. The government has more or less left him alone, because of his popularity, but he has little faith or trust in politicians and little interest in politics. A year or so ago, some friends in the Vietnamese Air Force offered him a safe assignment as an enlisted man, but he turned it down. His songs are extremely popular with members of the armed forces, who go to the club on Tu Do where Khanh Ly sings them and sit and applaud her wildly. Sometimes, one veteran who has lost an arm, a leg, or an eye in battle, gets up and sings the songs in a husky voice, with the spotlight playing on him, creating a grotesque shadow play.

I spent an afternoon talking with Trinh Cong Son and listening a few of his latest songs, which are somewhat in the nostalgic vein of the revolutionary ballads of the Spanish Civil War. Among the titles are "We Are Determined to Live," "We Can Count Only on Ourselves," and "Vietnam, Rise Up." Hearing them, I thought of the words of a Vietnamese Communist marching-and-indoctrination song I had recently read. It was taken from the body of a North Vietnamese soldier, and had none of the sadness of Trinh Cong Son's songs. In contrast with it, even his latest ones sound anachronistic and sentimental. Here is one verse:

To feel a resentment when our hatred boils,

Living is to endure misery and pain,

To be haughty, to subdue the enemy,

To roar when our people are suffering,

To be ashamed when we are defeated.

Living is to snarl in fury,

To feel a hatred when our people are in misery,

To keep away vile and shameless people.

To be proud is moving forward in combat.

Living is to put the enemy to death.

While Hanoi has always been a city with a strong identity, both political and intellectual, Saigon has never had such a well-defined role or character. A friend of mine says, "You hear people say, 'I'm a New Yorker,' or '*Ich bin ein*

Berliner, but you never hear anyone say, 'I'm a Saigonese.' Even the history of the city is ill-defined. There are a number of theories about its beginnings. The land on which it stands was once a watery waste of marshes and swamps, with a few clusters of trees and tall reeds among countless small streams. Tigers, leopards, monkeys, snakes, and crocodiles were the only inhabitants. The first human beings known to have lived there were called Phu Nam, which may mean "people from the swamps of the south," and their origin is obscure, but in recent decades archeologists have uncovered earthenware and jewelry that are believed to have been fashioned by Phu Nam. In the first century A.D., according to Vietnamese historians, ships sailing from Rome to China by way of India touched at South Vietnam, but whether any of the sailors ventured as far inland as Saigon is doubtful. The name Sai Gon was first heard by Europeans in 1675, as reported by both a British travel writer and a French travel writer of the period. An early account speaks of Tay Cong—"tay" from the Chinese word meaning "west" and "cong" meaning "tribute." The suggestion is that what is now Saigon was a small outpost paying tribute to various kings or warrior leaders, probably including Chinese, Vietnamese, Siamese, and Cambodians, since these peoples fought back and forth over the lower part of Indo-China until the French began to dominate the peninsula, in the nineteenth century. Whatever its history, Saigon was never considered a capital by the rival Vietnamese emperors based at Hanoi, the capital of Tonkin, and Hué, the capital of Annam, who fought each other for control of all of Vietnam between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Instead, Saigon recurrently served as a place of refuge—a temporary haven for an exiled or defeated ruler—or a place the ruling emperor could put in the charge of an underling.

It was not until the French formally took over the entire country, around 1880, that Saigon, as the principal city of what European explorers had christened, from an earlier Chinese name Cochin China, gradually became one of two Indo-Chinese capitals, Hanoi being the other. Thereafter, the French governor-general divided his time between the two. Over the years, though, Saigon remained more of a commercial center than a capital city. It was a place where people went to make money. As Ton That Thien says, "People come to Saigon at the dictates of their heads, not their hearts, and they come to take, not to give." This was probably true of the first Yankee traders to complete transactions in the area—Salem sea captains named John Brown and John White, aboard the ships *Marmion* and *Franklin*, who in 1819, after considerable negotiation, sailed home with cargoes of sugar. (The Vietnamese name for Americans, Hoa Ky, stems from this visit, when the Stars and Stripes was interpreted by the local people as the "flower [*hoa*] flag [*ky*].") In 1823, White published a book on the voyage. In a passage that calls to mind today's Saigon, he describes the amount of bribery and finangling he and Brown had to use to get the sugar they wanted, through local officials and merchants. Conversely, he reminds us of anything but modern Saigon when he tells how zealously some of the womenfolk were guarded.

When the French took over the South—in 1862, twenty-three years before they gained control of the North with the ostensible purpose of using it as a springboard for the development of the China trade—Saigon and Cholon were just two scattered collections of small settlements built up along the mudbanks of small canals and the Saigon River. The settlements were connected by dirt roads and paths that ran along the canals. In the following decades, particularly after 1900, the French built their familiar stucco structures with red tile roofs that still dominate the city. Official buildings and private homes were all in the same style, with open verandas and large gardens, and they stood on wide boulevards and streets that the French planted with hundreds of trees. One thing to be said for the French colonialists is that they knew how to plan and create cities, and Saigon was probably their gem. As the capital of Cochin China—which was a colony, whereas Annam and Tonkin were protectorates—Saigon from the outset was primarily a commercial center.

Even before the First World War, the French met with a good deal of political resistance from Vietnamese nationalists, and crushed them ruthlessly, driving them from the cities into the countryside and then conducting campaigns in which whole villages were often wiped out for harboring a cell of resistance leaders. In furthering their economic objectives, the French dealt largely not with the Vietnamese but with the local Chinese, and Saigon was essentially a French-Chinese city rather than a Vietnamese one. The Chinese traders formed a comprador class much like that employed by Europeans in China, and they were also used in administrative roles, subordinate to the French *fonctionnaire* class.

However, the French did start a number of primary and secondary schools to train Vietnamese as interpreters and petty *fonctionnaires*. Largely because of the University of Hanoi, which was opened in 1917 as a branch of the University of Paris, Hanoi became the cultural and political center of Indo-China. (Saigon University was set up some thirty years later, as a branch of Hanoi University.) Saigon, for its part, was dominated by Chinese rice mills in Cholon and by a handful of powerful French trading and shipping companies, which had some Vietnamese employees. Most of the interpreters originally used by the French were Vietnamese students from the French Catholic schools, who also had some knowledge of the Latin alphabet and the Chinese characters. What Vietnamese intellectuals there were sought haven in the countryside among the local Vietnamese landowners, who led a precarious existence, because they hesitated to claim their ancestral holdings under French sponsorship for fear the French would one day be thrown out by the Vietnamese nationalists, whereupon a restored royal government would take reprisals against them as collaborators. A lot of land in the Delta thus being officially unclaimed, the French claimed it for themselves; some of it went to the local, French-run Catholic Church. The *doc phu su* mandarin element were allowed to have some land, too.

During the twenties and thirties, Saigon grew and became more cohesive. Physically and politically, it was still quite distinct from Cholon, but streetcar lines now connected the two (they lasted until the mid-fifties, when they were replaced by bus lines). The two cities were not joined politically under a common administration until after the French departed, but there was commingling of commerce through the conduits of the French and Chinese comprador system. Also, in 1936 the French completed the Trans-IndoChina Railway, which ran between Hanoi and Saigon (the trip took forty hours, and a fourth-class ticket cost only a few dollars), and this helped promote commerce and trade throughout the country. By the late thirties, the *doc phu su* had become chiefs of districts or, in Saigon, subordinate officers in the French municipal bureaucracy. During the thirties, some sons of *doc phu su* went to France to study, as did the sons of rich peasants, and even a few sons of workers. Most of these foreign students returned to become teachers, lawyers, doctors, or pharmacists, but others became members of a burgeoning revolutionary element.

In the twenties and thirties, too, the French were building up rubber, coffee, and tea plantations in the south and central parts of the country, and many of them maintained luxurious villas both on their plantations and in Saigon. In town, a Frenchman, dressed in white shorts and shirt, would work a few hours a day and then retire to his home and, after a siesta, go to a café for an *apéritif*, after which it would be time for dinner and a visit to his club. And after rice-harvest time there could also be seen in Saigon some of the few wealthy Vietnamese land-owners, dressed in rich silk robes, who were in town for a couple weeks to shop for French luxuries and Chinese delicacies. There was also a new element arriving—the Corsicans. Some had come as servicemen and Legionnaires, others as employees of the police or customs services; in time, tougher, Mafia-type Corsicans, with international smuggling and racketeering connections, showed up. A number of Corsicans opened restaurants or ran them for French bosses, and these places, which, unlike the earlier French restaurants, served not only French food but Chinese, gave Saigon the reputation of combining the two best cuisines in the world. In general, life in Saigon and in all of Cochin China was soft and easy, even for the peasants—in contrast to life in the north, where the climate was more rigorous and the soil less fertile. The peasant in what is now North Vietnam spent many hours a day tilling his fields or fishing, but the southerner could turn his soil over in a couple of hours, throw in his seeds, and just let the rice grow; when he went fishing in his sampan, at dawn or at dusk, he would take along a lantern and two pieces of wood, which, when he clapped them together, attracted fish. In half an hour, he would have all the fish he could use, and, like his new French master, he could go home and relax. As always, the people who worked hardest were the Chinese. Cholon was already a close-knit society of clans and family branches. One of the earliest heads of the Chinese community was a rich merchant, Ong Tich, who owned a fleet of boats that brought rice from the Delta to the city along the rivers and canals. It was his chief assistant, Ma Tuyen, who in 1963 hid the fugitive dictator Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu before they were found by Vietnamese officers and murdered.

Though the French took Vietnamese or Chinese mistresses, there was very little intermarriage. The good Vietnamese families disapproved of such marriages,

for the most part, and a girl who became the wife of a Frenchman was looked down upon and often ostracized from her own circle. There were more marriages between Chinese and Vietnamese. A Chinese man who came to Cholon from southern China to make money frequently left a wife behind him but took a Vietnamese wife, too, and raised a family there, perhaps returning to China after ten or twenty years, leaving his Vietnamese wife behind. Some of the Chinese who came remained, though they might revisit China every few years—and, like all good overseas Chinese, they regularly sent remittances to their families back home. A Vietnamese song of the time indicates how the Vietnamese felt toward the French and toward the Chinese. It tells of a French boss who is returning to France and advises his Vietnamese *co-ba*, or mistress, to marry his Vietnamese interpreter. The Vietnamese interpreters, however, were then regarded as having prostituted themselves to the French and were held in contempt. The song goes on, "They are not good for each other, the girl and the interpreter, even if they both have tens of hundreds of piastres." The song concludes with the words "It is better for the girl to marry a humble Chinese who has a pole and two baskets to feed his pigs."

Between the two world wars, the French prided themselves on having defeated the national resistance movements in Vietnam—a pride that went before one of history's biggest falls. During the mid-thirties, resistance cells managed to stay alive in the South, though the jails were full of political prisoners, and by the late thirties the revolutionaries had become openly active again in the Saigon area. In 1940, what was known as the Insurrection of Cochin China took place. The leading Southern revolutionary at the time was Le Hong Phong, the head of the Cochin China Committee of the Indo-China Communist Party, which Ho Chi Minh had by then welded together (although the Party had been outlawed in 1939 and about two hundred members arrested). Just after the defeat of France in Europe, the Insurrection was savagely suppressed, and Phong and his wife were caught and executed. By the time the Japanese invaded Indo-China, a short while afterward, the rebellion was over. The French, under an admiral named Jean Decoux, were permitted by the Japanese to maintain control of the country's administrative apparatus, but the Japanese actually took control. They kept most of the Vietnamese Communists in jail but sent a few nationalists to Japan, as part of a long-range plan for indoctrinating local leaders to help Japan build its "Great East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere."

Under combined Japanese and French control, Saigon became a city in a cocoon. Though the Japanese were clearly the masters, life generally continued for a time at its easy pace. Gradually, however, this gave way to a harsher discipline. With their shaved heads and samurai swords and boots, the Japanese were privately mocked by the Vietnamese and French alike—except for a small number of collaborators—but, by and large, the Japanese were accepted with Oriental fatalism by most Saigonese. There was no coal coming into Saigon from the North, because the Japanese were using it for war purposes, so rice had to be burned as fuel, and by 1944 there was an acute rice shortage all over Vietnam. More than a million people in the North were starving. In Saigon and the rest of the South, the Vietnamese were not as badly off, but they suffered, too, and the suffering increased as time went on, for the Japanese reduced the amount of rice grown, by forcing the people in the countryside to raise pigs and hemp, which the Japanese needed for food and fibre. The upper-class French, though cut off from France, were able to make do, and the Chinese, too, managed to survive fairly well, but the Vietnamese poor suffered more and more as the war dragged on. In Indo-China, the Japanese committed few atrocities compared to what they were responsible for in other parts of Southeast Asia, but as the war continued, a Vietnamese underground was formed to pass military information to the Allies, and those of its members who were caught were summarily executed. By 1944, the news that the Japanese were losing the war had become pretty well known in Saigon. Vietnamese who worked for Japan's Domei News Agency and members of the French Secret Service, including some double agents, had spread the word. (There was also a small group of Gaulists, and they helped.) By this time, American B-29 bombers, called "black tunas" because they came in from the sea, had begun bombing that docks of Saigon and the railroad station, and air-raid sirens were regularly heard in the city. The Japanese became aware of a growing lack of cooperation among the French and also of a growing Vietnamese resistance movement, led by Ho Chi Minh as head of the Vietminh, and Tokyo decided to take the administration out of French hands almost entirely. This was done on March 9, 1945, and the five months before the war ended constituted a twilight period. Five thousand French troops were in-

terned by the Japanese in Saigon, but a few *fonctionnaires* were allowed to remain free to keep things running. The Vietnamese and the Chinese mostly stayed in their homes, awaiting the war's outcome.

Of the many changes that Saigon has undergone in the course of its history, probably none was as great as that which occurred in August and September of 1945. The first British occupation troops—mostly Indians—arrived early in September, and were warmly welcomed by the Vietnamese, who, moving swiftly, had already taken control of the city. For the most part, the welcomers were members of the Vietminh People's Committee, directed by General Nguyen Binh. Ho Chi Minh had sent Binh south in 1945 to take over command of the underground from Tran Van Giau, who, in Ho's estimation, had failed to put up an effective resistance to the French and the Japanese. Binh had quickly set up separate and distinct zones for revolutionary operations and started a training center, and he had placed his men not only in Saigon but in many hamlets in the Delta and in the region north of Saigon. The British refused to deal with the Vietminh, even though the Vietminh offered to cooperate in disarming some seventy thousand Japanese who remained in the South. Instead, the British commander, Major General Douglas Gracey, declared martial law, armed the five thousand French soldiers who had earlier been interned, and ordered the disarmament of the Vietminh and the Vietnamese police. Some Japanese troops were even used to suppress the Vietnamese nationalist movement, and hundreds of ordinary Vietnamese citizens suspected of revolutionary activity were rounded up and imprisoned by the French. The Vietnamese retaliated by calling a general strike, which virtually crippled Saigon. Guerrilla fighting had already broken out in the suburbs and the surrounding countryside. Each night, there were assassinations, and the sky above Saigon was red with the flames of exploding ammunition or fuel dumps or of the homes of suspected collaborators. Toward the end of September, the French mounted a coup against the remaining Vietminh in the city, attacking their last sanctuaries—the Hotel de Ville, the Post Office, and Sûreté headquarters. Scores of additional Vietnamese were seized and jailed; others fled to the countryside to hide and wait. The campaign of terror continued into 1946, as General Binh reorganized his forces, and in December, 1946, when the war against the French broke out in earnest, Binh had control of sizable parts of the Delta. Meanwhile, the terrorist attacks in Saigon increased month by month.

These attacks had become really serious by 1950, the year in which the American made their fateful decision to support the French economically and with large amounts of materiel—a decision based to a considerable extent on the fact that in Europe we were trying, through the Marshall Plan, to put France back on its feet after the ravages of the Second World War. Of course, the drain on France would have been more easily alleviated if the French had granted the Vietnamese a real measure of autonomy and thus eased the colonial conflict. Their only step in this direction was to set up the Annamite Emperor Bao Dai as Chief of State. Bao Dai, whom I met several times, was far less of a playboy than he was reputed to be, but his efforts to gain real concessions from the French were frustrated, and the resistance intensified. As for the Americans, during this critical period our officials, except for a handful, thought we should stand behind the French, while gently prodding them to give the Vietnamese a few more independent functions. This was the real beginning of the tragic United States involvement.

Despite the atmosphere of tension, Saigon in the late forties and early fifties retained many aspects of a typical French provincial city. Except for the hours spent around the pool at the Cercle Sportif by day and at the restaurants, gambling parlors, and brothels at night, money-making was a pastime that absorbed everyone. Paris was the nerve center of the game, and vast fortunes were made by the French and their friends among the Vietnamese and Chinese on the basis of a totally unrealistic rate of exchange between the franc and the piastre. The trick was to wheel and deal in Saigon and then transfer your ill-gotten piastres to Paris by telegraph, but one had to have permits for the transfers, and huge bribes were paid to get them.

In 1954, the United States Legation became an Embassy, which brought in more Americans. Though they mingled with the French at the Cercle Sportif, they otherwise kept to themselves, leading the compound-ridden lives that official Americans—and many business people as well—lead abroad, going to their places of work by day and retiring at night into barbed-wire-protected apartment houses and villas. Long before the major war began, this barbed wire had become a common sight in Saigon, and I well remember the first enclosures behind which the Americans shielded themselves.

The stream of Saigonese life continued to flow along Rue Catinat. Day after day, one could see the whole swarm of colonial and Vietnamese society on the broad avenue, lined with cafes and elegant shops filled with the best French goods. Nearby, some thirty thousand French civilians—the chief money-makers—lived in sumptuous villas. Catinat was their meeting place, and the delicate social nuances of Saigon could be detected in the manner in which people greeted each other—in the nature of a handshake and in the quick flick of a smile, or the lack of one. French and Vietnamese women flowed by like shoals of multicolored tropical fish. Then, there were Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Senegalese from the French Colonial Army. And there were the Indians, who flocked to Saigon after the war and became merchants and moneylenders. Today, the Indians are the main money-changers—the black market is sometimes called the Bank of India—but a recent crackdown on illegal financial dealings and a revised exchange rate have somewhat diminished the trade in black-market dollars.

While the area around Catinat remained the social and commercial hub of Saigon, the spokes of the city's wheel, now stretching out for miles, made up the real Saigon. The city's population quadrupled between 1940 and 1950, and the ever-increasing swarm of people for the most part lived precariously, on the edge of poverty. On the fringes of the city were the shantytowns, huts made of straw and mud and pieces of tin, that were haunts of the poor and the displaced, the coolies and all those others who managed in some way to earn a few piastres a day. In the somewhat better areas, closer to the center of the city, there were whole blocks of what were called *compartiments*, which were narrow one-story, or occasionally two-story, structures of wood or into about twenty feet deep; they usually contained a store of some sort in front and living quarters in back. This was lower-middle-class Saigon. Among these structures and behind them, in dank corners in an intricate maze of alleyways, were cubicles used for prostitution and abortion, or for smoking opium. There were holes leading from one *compartiment* and one alleyway to another, and these not only afforded escape routes for criminals but served as a spawning ground for Vietminh cells. It was here that General Binh's terrorists met to get their grenades and here that they hid after using them.

The main business of this labyrinthine part of Saigon—including sections of Cholon—was gambling. The poor gambled at least as much as the rich, and were victimized by racketeers, who ran the gambling syndicates, as they ran everything else, including the brothels. The most famous of the houses in the early fifties was the House of the Four Hundred, which the French built and protected primarily for the use of their own military, though Vietnamese, too, were eventually allowed in. Customers could buy tickets and then choose any one of approximately four hundred girls (who were medically inspected every week). According to a friend of mine, "It was more like a slaughterhouse than a bordello, and the noise was enough to drive a man crazy." The plushest gambling casino was the Grand Monde, which was situated on the border of Saigon and Cholon. Initially, the major gambling houses were controlled by Chinese or Macanese, but then the Binh Xuyên, a local gangster organization run by a Vietnamese named Bay Vien, moved in and took over almost all the casinos, including the Grand Monde. With the approval of Bao Dai, he also won control of the police, and in effect, with a further nod from the French, became the "boss" of Saigon. He moved around town with an entourage of fancily clad armed bodyguards, and at night at the Grand Monde he dispensed purple chips worth five thousand piastres to his friends and snubbed anyone he didn't trust or who was of no use to him. At his headquarters, he had a private zoo, including tigers and poisonous snakes, and beneath it was a tunnel where he kept a large cache of guns and opium. Bay Vien's power did not wane until after the French defeat in 1954 and the assumption of power by Ngo Dinh Diem, who was appointed Premier by Bao Dai. After a number of bitter battles in the streets and in the marshes around the city, where the Binh Xuyên had hideouts, the organization was finally destroyed in 1955, and Bay Vien fled to France (where Bao Dai, deposed as Emperor by Diem, also settled in comfortable exile). I saw Bay Vien in Paris three years ago. He was acting the role of a benign old man, but the earlier soul of the gangster chief was still betrayed in his sharp, flickering smile and his small, darting eyes.

After the French defeat in 1954 and Ho Chi Minh's full takeover in North Vietnam, there was a vast exodus of nearly a million people from North to South. The influence of these Northerners, many of them Catholics, on the Saigonese and the other Southerners has been a lasting one. Initially, Diem's idea was to place the majority of the refugees in a sort of *cordon sanitaire*

around Saigon, in the hope that they would serve as a protective screen against the Vietminh, but most of the newcomers wanted to be in Saigon. They had come South with very little in the way of money and possessions, so they had to scramble to make a living, and the best place to scramble was in the city. Many of them were uprooted intellectuals and professional people who felt out of place in the commercial-minded Southern city, and their sense of isolation was enhanced first by the unrest and violence during Diem's early struggle to gain control and later by the fact that Diem himself, who came from central Vietnam, tended to rely strongly on his own small group of intimates and on Southerners he felt he could trust. Also, against the background of political intrigue in the South, the Northerners seemed more rational and tough-minded, whereas the Southerners were less sure of themselves, more given to subterfuge, and less sophisticated. Ultimately, however, the two groups began to mingle, and the process, which continues, was both a subtle and a useful one. In many respects, it was the Southerners who succumbed to the influence of the Northerners, or, to put it differently, the Southern way of life was absorbed into the Northern framework. Many, if not most, of Saigon's newspapers, for example, were taken over by Northerners, who made them more politically aggressive and also more comprehensive. The Northerners, who as a rule were better educated, had an enlivening influence on writing and poetry—to which, in time, the Southerners responded both by adapting to the cultural change and by mass-producing lower-quality material. Novels of romance and adventure began running in the papers as serials and appearing in bookstores and on sidewalk stands; once again making money counted for more than the quality of what was sold.

As for business in general, with the French influence diminished (though by no means eliminated, since the French kept rubber plantations and shipping and trading interests) the Southern and Northern Vietnamese competed to take over what had been dominated by French and Chinese. Because the Northerners were better competitors, they often won out, but the competition was healthy and served to heighten the spirit and temper of the city. The Northerners also led the Southerners to adopt more elaborate dress and more careful and precise manners, adding further variety and zest to the city's life. And yet, despite the slow and useful interplay, the two cultures remained basically separate. As time went on, the Diem regime, especially as it came to be dominated by Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and Mme. Nhu, became more and more authoritarian. Life in Saigon became increasingly tense. The Southerners withdrew more into themselves, while the Northerners, alerted themselves more. By the time I returned to the city early in 1962, after an absence of a number of years, the mounting resistance to the Diem regime could be felt in the atmosphere, and it was apparent that it was only a matter of time before there would be an explosion. It was not too difficult to arrange clandestine meetings with those opposed to Diem, in the back rooms of private homes or tiny restaurants. Finally, when the explosion came, in November, 1963, and Diem and Nhu were overthrown with American help, Saigon seemed to breathe one vast sigh of relief.

Saigon is now officially one of eleven autonomous cities in the country—that is, cities independent of provincial authorities—but its mayor, Do Kien Nhieu, is responsible militarily to General Nguyen Van Minh, for he is chief not only of the Capital Military District but also of the III Corps area, which surrounds Saigon and stretches away to the north, northeast, and northwest. Ultimately, though, President Nguyen Van Thieu is the man who runs Saigon, by means of a tightly organized palace entourage, which controls the security forces throughout the city and determines all policy matters, such as how much freedom of speech and assembly the Buddhists and the students may be allowed at any given time. Whenever there is a crackdown on demonstrations, or a roundup of students or other dissident elements, or the arrest of an opposition political leader, one can be sure that the order for it came directly from the palace.

All the complex problems and violent conflicts besetting the city are compounded by tremendous overcrowding. By 1963, the population of the Saigon metropolitan area had reached two million two hundred thousand, and it has leaped upward each year since, owing to the influx of refugees from the countryside. Since 1965, three and a half million people are estimated to have become refugees, and of these two million have moved into the cities. The population of South Vietnam, approaching nineteen million, is now almost half urbanized, whereas before the war it was eighty per cent rural. Estimates are that perhaps a third of the present urban population will move back to the countryside after the war; the rest, however difficult life is in the city, will want to stay there,

because of job opportunities and the sheer excitement of cosmopolitan as compared to rural life. Saigon's population density averages about seventy-five thousand per square mile, but there are some blocks where nearly two thousand people are crowded into three or four acres. An American official who has acted as an adviser to the Vietnamese on municipal problems for several years has estimated that ten per cent of the city's population live in splendor and comfort, forty per cent live a lower-middle-class life of survival, and fifty percent live in abject squalor. Compared to Calcutta and some other cities in India, Saigon may not be so badly off, but there is no doubt that the war has created a grave situation and that very little is being done to correct it. On a number of occasions, I have flown back and forth across the city in a helicopter at just above housetop level and observed the growing patches of slums in most of the districts. From the air, too, one can see the pattern of destruction wrought by the war—mostly by the 1968 Tet offensive. Several thousand large resettlement blocks have been erected, the majority of them on the fringes of the city, but they are not nearly enough to meet the demands for veterans' housing, let alone low-cost housing for civil servants and the general displaced public. As the city has expanded, the number of districts has grown in the past twenty years from five to sixteen, incorporating large parts of neighboring Gia Dinh Province. Saigon, in its municipal housing program, has not yet discovered, as Singapore has, for example, the uses of high-rise housing—"high" here meaning four or five stories. There are, of course, a few Saigon hotels that rise to ten or eleven stories, and some office buildings that have as many as eight floors. But by and large the city is still flat and clotted—a mass of one- or two-story structures filling every available inch of space. Two-thirds of the population still occupy dwellings that lack the basic utilities, including water, which is drawn from neighborhood wells. Such dwellings—huts or shacks, usually made of a combination of mud, thatch, flattened-out beer cans, and American-donated sheets of tin—are classified by the government as unauthorized housing, and during the student and veteran demonstrations of the past two years some have been torn down by the police. In general, though, because there is no cohesive building program and no established procedure for assisting masses of the impoverished, the police and other officials turn their backs on the slum conditions—when they don't make money out of them through extortion. The city has a total of eleven public hospitals, with fewer than five thousand beds, and thirty-nine public dispensaries, and there were cholera epidemics in 1964 and 1966; it is thanks only to a mass inoculation program, mostly against cholera, that health conditions are not worse than they are, but both cholera and plague remain real threats. To collect eighty-five thousand tons of garbage and other refuse a month, the city has only a hundred and thirty modern trucks. While these have improved the sanitary situation, particularly in middle-class sections, it is still bad in the poorer areas, where there is no room for the vehicles to operate.

Facing the street on a typical slum block, or combination of blocks, in Saigon there are likely to be *compartment*-type dwelling-work shops of a story or two, which look relatively clean and neat. In most of these, a narrow lane may lead from the street partway into the block, but it will soon dwindle into a series of narrower passageways—so narrow that it is difficult for even one person to walk through them. Packed tightly around these passageways are scores of ill-made huts, most often consisting of just one room, in which a whole family of six or seven—the average number—lives. Water is drawn from a community well, which may be several passageways distant from a family's hut, though sometimes rusty pipes carry water to communal faucets. Most likely, there will be no electricity at all, and cooking will be done over charcoal stoves. For toilets, there are nearby canals or a ditch in back of the huts. During the day and in the early evening, wandering salesmen, including vendors of noodle soup, hot food, raw fish, and fruit, move in and out of this maze. Everything is crowded so close together that, except for a few square yards of open space here and there, no light enters from above, and the whole scene has an underground appearance. Children and grownups scurry about like moles.

A Vietnamese friend of mine, Nguyen Hung Vuong, who has been my assistant in Vietnam for the past decade, has lived during this time in a more middle-class lane complex, and he has given me some understanding of what life there is like and how it has changed. His house, a small one, faces a crowded lane about fifty yards long in the Third District, in the central part of Saigon. Vuong's immediate area is called Ban Co, which means "chessboard," after the manner in which the lanes are laid out. When Vuong first rented the house, in 1961—

for a thousand piastres a month, plus a three-thousand-piastre down payment and another thousand to the person who arranged the deal—his lane was about six yards wide. It is less than half that now, because so many houses have been built there since, and because illegal extensions have been built on older ones. In contrast with the poorer sections of the city, Ban Co has electricity and running water, and some of the lanes, including Vuong's, have been covered with asphalt, so they seldom get flooded in heavy rains—something that happens routinely elsewhere—but to reach his home by car he has to weave his way in and out of an increasingly complex system of large and small lanes. The Vietnamese have a saying, "*Gan nha, xa ngo*," which means, roughly, "My house is close to your house, but my lane is far from your lane."

All residents of Saigon except foreigners have to go through an elaborate identification procedure when they move into a new dwelling, and they are subject to constant checks and rechecks by the police. Each family must have a census certificate, approved by the chief of the *liem gia*, or group of families. The paper must then be certified by the head of the *khom*—that is, a series of lanes or blocks, making up something like a ward. Then the chief of the *phuong*, or sub-district boss, has to give his approval. The *liem gia* system in Saigon was adopted by the government in the mid-fifties. (The Vietminh had used it before that, but its real origins date back two thousand years to imperial China; it is said to have been invented by a prime minister at the court of one of the Eastern Chu emperors. When the minister fell out of favor and tried to go into hiding, he was quickly discovered through his own system and beheaded.) There are sixteen families in Vuong's lane, and they make up one *liem gia*—an unusually large one, the average being five or six families. Though the head of a *liem gia* gets no salary, his position can make him rich through the favors he is able to hand out. In Vuong's area, an illiterate petty tradesman took the job a number of years ago; bit by bit, he got rich, and moved from a house without beds to one of the best houses in Ban Co, where he serves fine meals and drinks. Vuong's guess is that he has been involved, like so many other minor officials, in such activities as smuggling, prostitution, handling stolen goods, or the lottery racket.

In the ten years that Vuong has been living in Ban Co, it has increased in more than just population and size. There are now several four- and five-story buildings in the area, and a house near Vuong's that cost eighty thousand piastres in 1961 is now worth two million, while some multi-story ones are selling for fifteen and twenty million. Pharmacies, which have always been abundant in Saigon, are multiplying in Ban Co, as elsewhere, at such a rate that registered pharmacists now rent or sell the use of their degree to fake pharmacists, who sell only packaged medicines—or, sometimes, dope. New restaurants, snack bars, and ordinary bars have proliferated, too, despite the diminishing number of Americans. With the advent of new-style Western clothing, especially miniskirts, tailors and dressmakers have been doing good business in the lanes and streets of Ban Co. Barbershops are thriving, as always, for they are centers of rumor and gossip, and some of them are used by the police and by gangsters for gathering or passing information, or are used as rendezvous points by the Vietcong. The barbershops also pass out newspapers; most people in Vuong's lane and others like it don't buy papers or magazines but rent them from the barbershops or from the stands for an hour or so. Vuong's lane is fortunate in having a school, a hospital, and a police station nearby—though the last is something of a mixed blessing, for police stations are prime targets of Vietcong terrorists. When Secretary of State William Rogers was here in the spring of 1969, a band of terrorists was discovered in the school building, preparing to launch some 60-mm. mortar shells on sites in downtown Saigon and then to attack the police station with grenades. The year before, during the Tet offensive, there was fighting within several hundred yards of Vuong's lane, and a number of his neighbors fled. One of the more noteworthy manifestations of Saigon life is the camaraderie that exists among the people of a lane. After a death, for instance, even neighbors who have not been particularly friendly contribute money to the bereaved family and gather to mourn and to discuss the life of the lane and of the whole city beyond, which is so much a part of their daily existence and yet is in many ways so far removed.

A middle-class lane such as Vuong's is also fortunate in that it has fewer deserters, pimps, *cao bois*, petty gangsters, and other troublemakers than the poorer lanes have. Vietnamese are cliquish and clannish by nature, and sometimes snobbish, too; snobbery is ingrained in them, and, especially in the South, it was encouraged by the French. The Vietnamese also tend to be xenophobic.

For example, Vuong, a well-educated man and an intellectual, remarked to me once, "Luckily, though we are overcrowded where I live, there are almost no foreigners—I mean Americans, Koreans, Filipinos, Thais, and so on. The Chinese are all right. They have adapted themselves to the Vietnamese way of life. But for us Vietnamese the foreigners are quite a nuisance—especially the Koreans, Filipinos, and Thais, because they are concerned only with their own security and with making money. It is the Americans who are responsible for bringing them here. The African soldiers that the French brought caused us less trouble."

Despite Vuong's desire not to be bothered by foreigners, Saigon will probably never again be a city of separate national identities, as it was under the French. With the coming of the Americans, there are few areas that have not suffered in social and demographic as well as psychological ways. The effects of the many changes wrought by the war are bound to be lasting, no matter what happens politically, and even if the Communists take over. A Franco-Vietnamese professor of urban affairs at Saigon University remarked to me recently, "Inevitably, there will be a flattening out of classes, and the Occidental influence will remain. There is a new and probably lasting amalgamation of elements—an in-touchness that, for better or worse, will be permanent. It's a matter not only of foreign influences but of what has happened to the Vietnamese themselves. There has been a complete breakdown of traditional images. Civil servants now live in close proximity to *cyclo*- and taxi-drivers who make three or four times what they make. There may be no real contact between them now, but in time it will become unavoidable. A rich undertaker—undertakers have become rich during this terrible war—may build a five-story house on top of the one-story hut he once lived in. For the moment, he may not have any association with the poor people in the lane alongside him, but sooner or later he will. But the rich will still be rich, the poor poor, though they will be living side by side, and the taller houses will overshadow the huts and shacks. We don't know how many will stay rich, or what the impact will be of, for instance, the newly arriving Japanese businessmen, who, although they are Orientals themselves, in many respects lead a Western life. There may emerge a whole new middle class, or there may be no middle class—just well-off people and poor people."

The comments seem especially pertinent as applied in Gia Dinh Province, part of which already blends into Saigon. It has a population of roughly a million and a third, consisting primarily of people who have had to leave Saigon for economic or other reasons and refugees who have come in from farther out and have settled there instead of in the city proper, though they may work in Saigon. A Vietnamese friend recently told me, "The outskirts in Gia Dinh are like boils on Saigon's skin. In the parts of the province that are closest to the city, you have a whole new classless society. It includes small shopkeepers and a large floating element, among them many criminals and hoodlums. The Communists try to infiltrate these floating groups, because deserters, gamblers, and gangsters are hard for the government to control. Farther out of town, in the areas that are somewhat more secure, well-off people have built new brick houses with high surrounding walls. They hire guards or else pay protection to both the government police and the Communists. There is no census, no way of knowing who is moving where or what effect the bombing of the countryside has had on driving people to the suburbs or the cities. No such thing as social mobility, in the traditional sense, any longer obtains."

If there is another large-scale Communist attack on Saigon, like the one in 1968, it will undoubtedly have its genesis in Gia Dinh, throughout which the Communists are establishing new cells. Much of the drug traffic and a good many other illicit activities have shifted from the city to the suburbs as police pressure has increased in Saigon, and this move will help the Communists. Partly for those reasons, Saigon and national officials want to bring large chunks of Gia Dinh under the direct control of Saigon municipal authorities. If the plan is followed, it will mean that some thirty-four hundred hamlets of Gia Dinh will be given over to Saigon, while the remainder of the province will either survive separately or be incorporated into adjacent provinces.

The one part of Saigon that has retained its identity in Cholon, for not even the long, abysmal war has had much of an effect there. The community demonstrates once again the Chinese capacity for remaining Chinese no matter where and no matter who rules China, and the fact that the Chinese in Vietnam have survived all but intact under the French, under the Vietnamese, and throughout the American invasion merely emphasizes the point. In the case of the million and a quarter or more Chinese in Vietnam—the largest group of them in Cholon—this "Chineseness" is doubly significant because in the early days of the Diem

regime they were forced to become Vietnamese citizens. Moreover, their young men have been drafted to fight for a cause that most of them do not believe in, though this is not to say that they are pro-Communist. They were further humiliated, in 1967, by a government requirement that all Chinese establishments—shops, hotels, and so on—identify themselves with Vietnamese names painted above their Chinese names in Chinese characters.

A walk through Cholon, whether by night or by day, is vastly different from a walk through Vietnamese Saigon. For one thing, one sees fewer Americans or other white-skinned foreigners, if one sees any at all. There are fewer vestiges of colonialism, in the form of the stucco buildings that the French built elsewhere in the city. Instead, there are rows upon rows of neat, spick-and-span shops, stacked high with Chinese and Western goods, including many one can't find anywhere in the rest of Saigon. Indoor and outdoor restaurants abound, serving an infinite and marvellous variety of Chinese food. The predominant smell is one of soy sauce, whereas among the outdoor food stands of Vietnamese Saigon the usual smell is that of *nuoc mam*, a strong fermented fish sauce that the Vietnamese like. There are many more Buddhist temples than there are in Saigon proper, and there is a playground next to each. (In the Vietnamese city, there is scarcely any room left for children to play.) Chinese music fills the air—lulling, high-toned instrumental variations on a few similar themes—whereas elsewhere in Saigon nowadays one seldom hears Vietnamese music, which is more melodic and sentimental than its Chinese counterpart; instead, there is only the blare of rock and roll. The one big change in Cholon over the years has been that the younger generation has adopted Western clothes—for girls, skirts and blouses instead of the long gowns called *cheongsams*, and, for boys, tight trousers and shirts. Some of the older people—the old men, especially—still wear long Chinese robes.

It is said that the Chinese control three-quarters of the economy of Vietnamese Saigon, and it is probably true. Even the wealthy Vietnamese are tied into the Chinese financial community one way or another. The Chinese dominate the rice trade, they pull the strings of the money markets, and they set prices for basic commodities like fish, vegetables, pork, cement, and textiles. The illicit traffic in gold and opium is under Chinese control, though the Vietnamese take part in it. Most of the Chinese look down on the Vietnamese, and have either opposed or contemned the whole series of government that has followed the regime of Diem—whom, though he cracked down on the Chinese, they respected, because his birth and education gave him mandarin credentials.

A significant aspect of life in Cholon is a generation gap that is in many cases much deeper culturally than the similar manifestation among the Vietnamese. The younger generation of Chinese, who are better educated than Vietnamese youngsters, because the Chinese schools are better run and there are more of them, fall into three basic groups: the Maoists; the fence-sitters, who are fuzzily pro-Kuomintang; and the so-called "Western trippers," who increasingly prefer American and European movies, for instance, to Chinese ones depicting ancient swordsmen killing scores of enemies with a single stroke. The number of Maoists is small—probably no more than five thousand—but they are hard-core believers in the new China, and they have organized themselves into Red Guard units. During the Tet offensive in 1968, these groups harbored the Vietcong terrorists and sapper squads, and their members took part in street demonstrations in Cholon when, for periods of hours, and even days, the Communists controlled certain blocks in the area and hoisted the Vietcong flag.

Since the overseas Chinese are great accommodators, and since they have even less faith in the future of the present Saigon government than the Vietnamese have, it is probable that if a poll could be taken many people in Cholon would be found to favor Hanoi, chiefly because they feel that under its government contact with the homeland would be easier. This pro-Hanoi sentiment is also in part a product of what is, perhaps unfairly and inaccurately, called "Chinese chauvinism," and it may prove unrealistic, for it is highly unlikely that if Hanoi eventually establishes its own rule over Saigon the Chinese will be allowed to continue playing the economic role they have played for so many years.

As for attitudes toward China among the Vietnamese, all of them, North and South, fear the Chinese and would prefer to remain independent of them. After all, most of Vietnam was occupied by the Chinese for more than a thousand years, and its people are proud that their ancestors finally drove off the northern conquerors and established their independence. Moreover, the most recent Chinese "occupation" of Vietnam—in 1945 and 1946, when some of Chiang Kai-shek's Koumintang troops were sent in by the British-American Southeast Asia Com-

mand to occupy the northern part of the country temporarily while the British occupied the south—has not been forgotten; the occupying troops plundered the area and made fortunes from opium and other illegal traffic. (Indeed, remnants of these troops are still engaged in such activities in the wild border areas of Laos and Burma.) Although the Chinese Communists are regarded as friends by Hanoi, there is little doubt that the North Vietnamese want to maintain their tenuous balance between Moscow and Peking, which Ho Chi Minh managed so well for so long. It is likely that the Cholon Chinese similarly hope to go on hedging their bets.

When it comes to movies, more of the young in Vietnamese Saigon have broken sharply with tradition than have done so in Cholon. Late last year, a Vietnamese film entitled "Chan Troi Tim," or Purple Horizon, for the first time showed a Vietnamese hero and heroine kissing each other on the lips. While essentially innocuous compared to many contemporary productions from the West, the film nevertheless contained what for the Vietnamese were touches of neo-realism, including a scene that displayed a bare bosom. There were also scenes of bar girls, deserters, and other byproducts of the war, and scenes of napalming and bombing by Vietnamese pilots in American planes. The film received a lot of favorable comment from the younger generation but some severe criticism from older Vietnamese. It was a box-office success.

The Vietnamese have taken to television avidly; even some of the poorest families have sets. There are two channels, one run by the United States Army and the other run by the Saigon government, and the American one is by far the more popular among the Vietnamese, who, even if they don't understand the dialogue, enjoy the action of such shows as "Mission: Impossible," "Wild, Wild West," and "Batman." The favorite Vietnamese TV show, "Cai Luong," is a dramatic series told in classical opera form, though the story line is modern; one episode dealt with a young woman who was forced to leave home and go to work as a bar girl. The Americans show a considerable number of propaganda films but, on or off TV, have made scant effort to improve Saigon's cultural life. One exception was the presentation last year, with the financial backing of about half the sixty members of the American Chamber of Commerce, of the German opera "Hansel and Gretel," of all things. It cost seven thousand dollars to put on five performances, and considerable criticism was voiced in the American community about the amount of money spent on something so seemingly irrelevant when the same sum could far better have been used to help refugees or orphans.

With some exceptions, the only regular contact between Americans and Vietnamese is at the G.I. level, where the motivation is for the most part sexual, would-be sexual, or at best superficial. There have, however, been several thousand marriages between Vietnamese girls and American soldiers, despite the fact that they are difficult to arrange—having been purposely made so by both sides. Many of the marriages have broken up once the couple has gone off to America, where the girl has very often found herself the only Oriental in a small American community. Some Americans have also adopted Vietnamese war orphans, with the help of a number of private and public organizations sponsored by Americans and Europeans, but the number of adoptions is infinitesimal in relation to the thousands of orphans who either will have to be reared in government institutions or will remain homeless and destitute.

Something that has not altered through the long years of the war is the importance in Saigon of fortune-telling. Virtually all Vietnamese, no matter how well educated, are firm believers in soothsayers of one kind or another, and depend on them for guidance in all sorts of decisions. President Thieu, former Vice-President Ky, and all the other people I know in the hierarchy of power have made many decisions only after seeking the advice of a favorite seer—and this may be one reason American advice hasn't been taken as often as many people at home think it has. Even the most Western-minded Vietnamese, who pretend to laugh at the way some of their friends depend on fortune-tellers, secretly go to fortune-tellers themselves and cling to traditional beliefs, such as the significance of who enters their houses in the first moments of the new year. I know a number of Americans who have visited Vietnamese friends on the eve of the new year and have politely been asked to leave at the last moment of the old year, because "a good Vietnamese friend of mine is coming in a few moments and it would be unlucky if you were here." The most popular forms of fortune-telling are astrology, phrenology, palmistry, the reading of playing cards, and scrying in crystal balls. Over the past few years, in which one disastrous series

of events has followed another, the timing of coups and attempted coups has invariably been determined by what fortune-tellers told the generals involved. My friends—journalists, businessmen and others—have regularly told me whether their luck at a given time would be good or bad, and, oddly, they have been right more often than not.

Numerology plays a vital part in these predictions, with emphasis on the basic numbers three and five. Three is lucky, and five is unlucky; the fifth, the fourteenth, and the twenty-third days of the lunar month are always considered unlucky. (In the second and third of these dates, the digits—one and four, two and three—add up to five, accounting for the presumed ill omens.) Finally, and most important, there is the twelve-year Vietnamese calendar cycle, similar to the Chinese cycle, with each of twelve successive years identified by a spirit in the form of an animal figure, and each of these being considered lucky or unlucky for each man in certain years. The year 1971 was the Year of the Hog, and in February, 1972, the whole cycle began again, with the Year of the Mouse, or Rat. Each year, at the start of Tet, the family home is brightly lighted to welcome not only the first visitor but the new spirit. Tables are laden with food, flowers are placed everywhere, and at dawn the family honors its ancestors by sitting down to the first banquet of the Tet period, which lasts between seven and ten days. When the meal is over, each member of the family dresses in his best clothes to greet relatives, especially grandparents. Each child receives a small sum of money in a traditional red envelope, and foreign as well as Vietnamese employers are expected to give the Vietnamese who work for them, and even hotel managers and hotel servants, Tet gifts—if not a month's salary, then a few hundred or a few thousand piastres, depending on the importance of the relationship.

Some years ago, an American friend of mine undertook a study of the significance of fortune-telling and other forms of soothsaying, and came up with some interesting results. The sites of all buildings, including the Presidential Palace (currently considered to be in a bad spot), are thought to be lucky or unlucky according to their access to light, water, and space. The fortunes of the American Embassy in Saigon definitely seemed to change from good to poor when it was moved from its site downtown, to its present site, on Thong Nhut Boulevard. A prominent geomancer has pointed out that President Thieu was born in the Year of the Mouse, and this means that 1972 doesn't look good for him. No one knows how much faith the Communists in North Vietnam place in all this, but certainly those of my Saigon friends who are from the North believe in the whole system implicitly.

Despite Saigon's wartime transfigurations, the Vietnamese remain a ritualistic people, and one of their fundamental rituals remains the transmission, after careful evaluation, of rumor and gossip. Ever since 1960, when the first coup against Diem occurred, the chief rumor-and-gossip mill has been called Radio Catinat, and the old name has stuck. Around 1962, its headquarters were at a restaurant called La Pagode, toward the upper end of the Rue Catinat. After the fall of Diem, the veranda of the Hotel Continental and, subsequently, the bar of the Caravelle Hotel were part of the network, but its true center since Diem's overthrow has been a small restaurant and pastry shop called Givral, across the street from the Continental. (La Pagode, a block away, is now frequented by "phantom troops"—officers and noncoms whose families are rich enough to keep them in Saigon.) Much of the talk one hears at Givral is of questionable value, for people who frequent the restaurant often plant information on each other for a purpose. Among the clientele are Nationale Assemblymen (the Assembly building is only fifty yards away), public officials, secret police, journalists, and businessmen. It is not uncommon to see an opposition deputy and a secret-police agent sitting together and fencing verbally. Everyone who comes to Givral does so not only to exchange information but to play the stultic conversational games the Vietnamese play so much better than Americans can—testing each other, putting each other on, trying to humor somebody and to denigrate somebody else. Cabinet ministers drop by from time to time, as do other high civilian and military officials; President Thieu used to, when he was still an Army officer. Businessmen not only listen to journalists and others here but use the place to test their own agents, one against another, for veracity or the ability to plant false rumors. There are three daily "broadcast times" at Givral—one around ten in the morning, one in midafternoon, and one between five and seven, after the daily press briefings are held at the National Press Center, across the way. The morning period is concerned mostly with business

rumors and reports, and the two afternoon sessions with political and military matters.

If Radio Catinat is the most central and most public place for the dissemination of information, true and false, there are other places, not far off, which are also important, each in its own way. For several mornings, I accompanied a friend of mine, Pham Xuan An, who is employed by an American news magazine and is probably the hardest-working and most highly respected Vietnamese journalist in town, on his rounds of these spots. An, who loves animals and birds—he has eight birds, four dogs, and one fish—took me first to the Ham Nghi animal-and-bird market, near the old American Embassy building. The market, which stretches for about half a block, sells monkeys, civets, ocelots, rabbits, guinea pigs, and all sorts of dogs, cats, fish, and birds—among the last being cuckoos from Africa, pigeons from France and Mozambique, owls, myna birds, parrots, skylarks, pheasants, and canaries. For those who favor ancient folk remedies, bats are available; a well-regarded cure for tuberculosis involves cutting the throat of a bat and drinking its blood mixed with rice wine. Adjacent to Ham Nghi is a street called Nguyen Cong Tru, where each morning at about ten o'clock Chinese businessmen or their Vietnamese agents meet in two or three cafés to determine collectively what the day's black-market piastre rate will be and also to set the prices of rice, pork, and other basic commodities. Within half an hour after their decisions are made, the word goes out to the two main commodity markets in Saigon and Cholon and to the dollar black market. This Chinese-dominated strip dates back to the days of the French, who operated out of the same places through their Chinese compradors. In the same block, and extending along part of Ham Nghi, is the center of the sidewalk black-market traffic in American goods. Here, despite occasional crackdowns by the police, one can buy anything available at the American post exchanges and a wide range of other foreign products as well, including Japanese cameras and hi-fi sets. Because police roundups have been more frequent in the past year or so, the more expensive items are no longer displayed, but they can be bought on a C.O.D. basis; that is, a Vietnamese woman running a stall will ask a customer whether he wants such-and-such a camera, and if he is interested he will give her his address and she will come around the next morning, camera in hand, and bargain. Almost all the goods are perfectly genuine—except the whiskey, which is usually diluted with rice wine. The markup on black-market goods ranges from forty to five hundred percent, but some things remain cheaper at the black-market-dollar rate (now about four hundred and fifty piastres to the dollar) than they are at the post exchanges. It all depends on the subtle process of supply and demand, and on one's ability to bargain. Some of what is sold has been pilfered from the docks on its way to the post exchanges, and then the price is ordinarily kept low, but usually something like a case of beer, which sells for three dollars at the PX, will cost six or eight dollars on the black market. A carton of American cigarettes, which costs a dollar-seventy at the PX, will cost four dollars on the black market.

In the same vicinity are a number of restaurants, each catering to a different clientele, and to these An took me in his search for tidbits of information. The Victory, a spacious place on Ham Nghi specializing in Chinese food, has much the same atmosphere in the morning that Givral has in the afternoon, but is not so crowded. Politicians, journalists, and important businessmen exchange information there every morning over tea or Chinese soup. The nearby Do Thanh is more of a middle-class place, for officials of sub-Cabinet rank, field-grade officers, and the second-rung diplomatic set. An, being a journalist who, though he works for the Americans, is also trusted by the Vietnamese, makes a point of visiting at least five such places each morning before he heads for Givral; then, after lunch, he goes to the official American and Vietnamese briefings and back to Givral. "It takes a long time to build up your sources," he says. "You have to be frank and sincere, and you have to protect your sources. You must also do them favors—tell them things they want to know, buy them lunches and dinners, give them Tet gifts. Saigon operates in this pattern of social circles. If you're not qualified for one particular circle, you won't be accepted in its restaurant. The people there will just ignore you. Journalists—the good ones—are the most useful informants, because they are in a position to hear things from so many different sources. The whole thing is like a school. You can graduate from one circle to another, just as you would from one class to another, once you've passed your tests."

If rumors remain a large part of the daily life in Saigon, hard facts are what the police deal with. Whether or not their efforts are appreciated by the populace, the police have undoubtedly become more efficient in the past two years. This is chiefly thanks to the efforts of Trang Si Tan, who was appointed police chief in

January, 1971. Tan, a former prosecutor, magistrate, and president judge of the Saigon Municipal Court, is in charge of about twenty thousand men, including the uniformed police, who handle traffic, administrative work, and other routine functions; the Maritime Police; the Field Force Police, who are engaged primarily in keeping order and quelling disturbances; and, finally, the Special Police, who are in charge of security. There is considerable rivalry and jealousy among the police, the Military Security Service, the Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization, and Vietnamese Army Intelligence, just as there is among their American equivalents, yet Tan—who reports, through the National Police Chief, Colonel Nguyen Khac Binh, to Prime Minister Tran Thien Kiem (who is also Minister of the Interior)—is widely respected by all his colleagues. A quiet, soft-spoken man with the mien of a judge, he is a tough administrator, and he operates his force with more discipline and order than it has had for a long time. A while ago, I took two trips around Saigon with him and watched him in action.

Tan's Special Police are in charge of what is called "population control and classification." The population is divided into four categories—A, B, C, and D—and each household is given a rating that supposedly reflects its loyalty to the government. Tan and I visited one of five police stations, for example, in District Six, which embraces part of Cholon and is considered one of the least secure districts in the city, and I discovered that the almost twenty-five thousand households in the substation area were rated as follows: 16,007 were A, or pro-government; 7,944 were B, or uncommitted; none were C, or openly anti-government but non-Communist nationalist; and 277 were D, or pro-Vietcong (or suspected of being so). A file is kept on each member of each household, and each must have an identity card. The A houses in District Six are mostly those of government civil servants, members of the armed forces, or the People's Self-Defense Forces—the locally recruited "home guards." The uncommitted households, which are the majority in many areas, are most difficult for the police to identify. These households consist of people who maintain that their sole interest is in earning a living, and that they are neither for nor against the government—simply not interested in politics. While Tan's Special Police and their penetration agents—that is, men out of uniform who have penetrated pro-Communist or suspected pro-Communist groups and neighborhoods—keep a constant check on these houses, no one can tell for certain that the Communists have not planted some of their workers among them. Another thing the police are anxious to know is whether members of these households would, if they were given the chance, vote for a neutralist or a Communist candidate in an open election contest. The reason there were no C households in the area we visited—and there are very few anywhere—is, of course, that hardly anyone wants to be identified as being against the government.

When I asked Tan whether all this didn't really amount to total police control, he replied that it was not unlike what the Communists had always done, and that since the 1968 Tet attack it had become the only way to determine what the Communist were up to. Tan and his American advisers readily admit that in the most sensitive areas—particularly in Cholon and some of the newer districts of the city—the system is far from fully effective. Even so, incidents of terrorism, sabotage, and other forms of Communist activity have diminished considerably since it was put into effect. Throughout the city in 1969, according to police statistics, there were a total of three hundred and seven incidents of all kinds—bombings, mortar barrages, killings of policemen, and so on. In 1971, the total number of incidents was only about sixty-five. Tan says he believes there are now probably between two hundred and five hundred Communist Party members in the city, and perhaps fifteen thousand active sympathizers. It is undoubtedly much harder for them to move about than it used to be; they do maintain a courier system, though, and they are believed to have five secret mobile radio stations in Saigon. As a result of a tighter system of checkpoints that Tan's men have established on the outskirts of Saigon, he says, it is also harder for the Communists to move people into the city.

We visited one of these checkpoints, where all vehicles were stopped and searched by both uniformed police and plainclothesmen. Former Vietcong members who were regarded as trusted returnees acted as spotters. At this particular checkpoint, Tan told me, twenty-five thousand people passed back and forth each day, and out of every five hundred perhaps ten were held for questioning. Though Tan said he did not believe that the Communists could conduct a large-scale assault on the city, he admitted that they could still conduct propaganda campaigns and carry on political activity almost anywhere, and that they were

undergoing a thorough reorganization to improve their apparatus for another major attack. "As always, they will exploit the democratic process," Tan says, "and when that process is weakened by lack of authority, by lack of decent living standards, by lack of any useful long-range plans for making the city livable, the danger will remain, no matter how many checkpoints we set up or how much population control we maintain."

Although ten city plans have been drawn up for Saigon in the past ten years, almost nothing has been done to carry any of them out. After the Tet offensive of 1968, there was a brief period when the Americans and the Vietnamese got together on projects for repairing the worst damage—caused mostly by American planes bombing entrenched Communist attackers—but there has been little coordinated or long-range action since then to alleviate the overcrowding or to improve the dire condition of the slums, and the administrative organizations that were formed at the time have been allowed to die, mostly for lack of funds (though, according to Frank R. Pavich, who is one of a handful of American urban experts here, there are few Vietnamese with any real background in urban planning). A survey has been made of each block in Saigon to determine how the land is being used—for residential, commercial, or other purposes—but nothing has been done to identify the worst slum areas, to get fundamental economic-aid programs started, or to plan the construction of higher buildings as at least a temporary solution. What has happened is a considerable amount of indiscriminate, haphazard new building in various parts of the city, indicating, if nothing else, some degree of hope for the future of a non-Communist Saigon. However, there are few signs of any long-range outlook on the part of the central or municipal government. Pavich and others believe that the earlier plans, made by such experts as the Doxiadis group, to expand the city northward toward Bien Hoa, where the Americans have had their biggest airbase, are still valid, but that putting them into effect would require further detailed and constructive planning, and a lot more money. James P. Bogle, another American expert, who made a study of Saigon's growth problems a few years ago, concluded that, where urbanization was concerned, the government was facing problems familiar to all less developed countries, and that it was "extremely questionable" whether it would be able to cope with them. Unlike the North Vietnamese, who have continued to rebuild as the war has gone on, the South Vietnamese, except for the short period after the Tet offensive, have done very little to improve any of their cities.

Important as the rebuilding process is, social reconstruction and moral regeneration are more important. "We have fostered a whole new generation of drifters, who have lost all their Confucian values," one older Vietnamese in Saigon told me. "All they think of is dodging the draft, having fun, riding their Hondas." There is no doubt that the Americans have altered the entire fabric of Saigon life, and one feels that a new breakdown is inevitable unless something drastic is done. What we have done is to create a social spectrum with a *nouveau riche* class at one end, a new class of poor people, largely refugees, at the other, and in the middle a classless majority, who have lived off the American presence.

Another Vietnamese friend told me, "You Americans think you have given the Vietnamese a better material life, but it's not true. Most of the equipment you poured in here will end up as scrap. Perhaps the situation will have to disintegrate still further before something new can be built. The only hope is that a new younger group, with ideas of its own, will emerge, and that these young people will understand that both the old prewar society and the American superimposed one are finished. If we don't go Communist, it may take twenty years, or even longer, to bring about a new synthesis, but it will happen. First, though, we must undo the damage you have done. The Vietnamese like to raise monkeys. You have seen them in the animal market, in homes, in the parks. What you have done here in Saigon is create a monkey climate. The only Vietnamese you really know—the ones you have dealt with—are monkeys. Why don't you at least help us get rid of the monkeys before you go?"

—ROBERT STAPLEN

The CHAIRMAN. I cite this quotation not simply to reflect upon the merit of our involvement but as a description of what is happening there. If you are interested in the South Vietnamese, the greatest thing you can do to them is to relieve them of the war itself.

WHY IS ADMINISTRATION BOUND BY HISTORY OF WAR?

You made much of the history of this war. You have distinguished this from China and Russia because of what happened in 1966, 1967, and 1968, but I thought you started out with a view that this wasn't your responsibility, it was President Johnson's.

Why do you feel so completely bound by his sins? I mean you came in, the country elected you on the assumption you weren't going to follow or be bound by Mr. Johnson's obligations, whatever they might be. I think is a very questionable reason to give for distinguishing this war from the other instances.

I don't quite know what you meant by that. You said in view of what happened. I hope I don't misquote you. But I think I was listening carefully.

In view of what happened in 1966 and 1967 in this war, we just can't accept anything short of this. Why do you say that? What happened in 1966 and 1967 that makes you feel a special responsibility to see that we have an election in accordance with our views in South Vietnam or somebody else's views?

What is it that happened that makes you feel that way?

DETERMINING WHAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE WANT

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I would like to first say, what I have consistently and repeatedly said on other occasions, that our position is that we are prepared to have any government in South Vietnam that the people of South Vietnam want. We are prepared to work out any reasonable machinery to determine what the people of South Vietnam want.

Now, I have never said that we insisted on an election. It is unfair for you to say that. I have never said that. The Government of the United States has never said that.

We have said that one of the ways of determining what the people want is by the elective process. If there is another way, fine, let's talk about it. The fact is we are convinced now, especially now, for reasons that Senator Javits mentioned earlier, that the people in South Vietnam are supporting the Government. The people as a matter of fact have a lot of arms which could be turned against the Government if they were opposed to the Government. We are convinced that the people of South Vietnam want to remain a free and independent country. I have said that in view of the history of this war, we are not going to do an about-face and abandon South Vietnam. It is as simple as that. We are not going to do it.

OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The reason I mentioned that is because many of the people who are the most critical now of it, are the ones that got us into this war.

As I say, one of the reasons I am sure that when I say these things you don't like is because you, yourself, were very active in that you supported the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and the Congress of the United States has appropriated the money all these years for this.

Now, we as a nation, and I am not talking about the administration, I don't think it should be done that way, our judgment is as a nation that the policy the President is following is a sound policy.

We respect your views. We understand that you are opposed to what we are doing. We would hope that you would respect our views.

We think that the President's policy is a sound one and in discussing this matter with other nations in the area, with almost without exception they think it is a sound policy, too. We think this conduct of foreign affairs under President Nixon's leadership has been outstanding, and I think it is supported by the American people.

Now, I understand that you have had a history of long opposition, and I am sure that your comments reflect that opposition. As I say, we respect it, but I don't think it is fair to suggest that we have been adamant in insisting on anything.

One thing we are not going to do, and we are not prepared to do, is let the enemy overrun South Vietnam and take over that country by military might.

Now, in view of the fact that the situation is clear and that they have committed all but one of their divisions to this objective, we are going to do what we can to see that they are not successful. We think if they were successful it would be very damaging to our foreign policy.

UNDERMINING ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND SOCIAL FABRIC OF THE UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. And you are apparently prepared to continue to undermine this country's economic and military and social fabric for that purpose?

Secretary ROGERS. We don't think we are undermining.

The CHAIRMAN. A lot of people think you are undermining and the evidence in is that in many areas it contributes to this.

GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION

You mentioned the Gulf of Tonkin. I think you should have heard the Gulf of Tonkin was repealed by both Houses of Congress a long time ago, and many of us believe the Gulf of Tonkin was procured by misrepresentation and fraudulent and untrue statements to the Congress.

Secretary ROGERS. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been books written on the Gulf of Tonkin that I think sustain that.

I don't think you ought to follow Mr. Johnson's precedent of citing that resolution as a justification for support of the war.

SUPPORT OF WAR BY APPROPRIATIONS

You mentioned the support of the war by appropriations. That is the nearest to the truth you have it. You raised the very important question that anybody who votes for this bill, which you have presented and which is before us, is going to be in the position of supporting this war. I, for one, feel if that is going to be the interpretation, I will find it very difficult to support this bill either all or in part—if

it is going to be interpreted in this way. If it was to liquidate the war and to stop it, that is another matter, but to put it on the ground that we are going to support the war is going to make it very difficult and—

Secretary ROGERS. I didn't put it on that ground when we are winding down our forces in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. You referred to other appropriations.

Secretary ROGERS. I was referring to the time when we were sending into Vietnam, not taking them out.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rusk used to do that, and in desperation he cited the appropriations bill as the endorsement for the war.

SUPPORT OF PEOPLE FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT QUESTIONED

I wasn't going to read any more, but in his article Mr. Shaplen raises very serious questions about the people of Vietnam and this particular government. After all, it is a military government. I hope you are not trying to kid us this is a freely elected democratic government. It is not any such thing. There was only one candidate. It is a military dictatorship. Mr. Shaplen says:

Disillusion, in the case of the Thieu government, has become a contempt; they consider it "Diemist" without Diem's redeeming attributes, which were, in the beginning at least, those of a true nationalist and patriot. There is today a universal distrust of the Army, which runs the country—of the corruption it promotes and countenances, and, in particular, of the money that the wives of generals and high officers are making from such activities as the disposal of scrap bullets and bomb casings and of Army steel and cement. Such business, of course, has always existed as an adjunct to war, but there is something especially sleazy about the way it is carried on here now, and about the naive, even bland, acceptance of it by the Americans.

I didn't intend to read all of that, but it raises very serious questions concerning the official government interpretation of the widespread support of the people of Vietnam for this government. It is true we have difficulty in obtaining our independent information, but these statistics you cited—why do we have to give nearly 10 times as much in material to the South Vietnamese, to say nothing of our troops, for them to maintain their independence, as the Russians and Chinese give to the North Vietnamese?

How can that be accounted for, other than by the difference in morale? And that would seem to be to belie your idea that you are supporting here a government which is accepted by the people of the country as their savior and salvation?

CONDEMNATION OF ENEMY

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I have made a reference to that question earlier. I would like to ask the Chairman a question.

Until this offensive started, the withdrawal program was going well, the fighting had deescalated, we were having discussions, negotiations, in Paris, and at that time the enemy carefully prepared and implemented a plan of major invasion of South Vietnam.

Now, isn't it time that, at least to that extent, you recognize that fact? Shouldn't some effort be made to condemn the enemy?

They have made this attack on South Vietnam. They are shelling cities with no precaution at all. They are sending rockets and mortars into Danang. No effort is made to protect the civilian population. I think it is time that we point out what the enemy is doing, criticize them for some of the things that have been happening.

The United States, I think, is pursuing a very honorable policy in Vietnam and there it would be successful and the people in South Vietnam and the whole Indochina area could live successfully in the future. There is no condemnation of the enemy. Look at what they have done. They have launched a major invasion in violation of all of their agreements, in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the later Geneva Accords, the understanding that they had with President Johnson. They are attacking major population centers.

They have made major attacks in all of the military regions of South Vietnam. I haven't heard a word of criticism about that this morning and I think we should point that out.

Senator COOPER. You heard it from me.

Secretary ROGERS. I heard it from Senator Cooper. I apologize. That is right.

I heard no criticism of their negotiating position. They haven't offered a proposal of any kind except that the United States get out and let us take over.

Senator CASE. You heard criticism from me on that. I have made it clear that I had no illusions about the purity of the moral position of North Vietnam.

Secretary ROGERS. I apologize. I think we ought to highlight that. When we take a military action which the President believes is in the best interest of our country, we come before Congress and there is no criticism of the enemy.

Now, this has been a very difficult war for the United States. The President is trying to make decisions that will serve the national interests and, as I say, they are difficult decisions.

The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to help him make decisions that will serve the Nation.

Secretary ROGERS. Good. Let me point out some of the things this enemy is doing.

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES SUPPORTED BY U.S. PEOPLE

Senator PERCY. I think also I would like to join the others in saying how I feel about the offensive actions that they have taken many times, one of which I personally experienced while over there; but I do feel that we would be negligent in not saying to you when you precede your comments by saying that the program has had the support of the American people, that the program President Nixon has carried out has had support because it has as its central core the withdrawal of American forces.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator PERCY. This withdrawal is an action that we urged beginning in January, 1969, and face-to-face across the table, in night sessions with administration officials, saying that was the only way we could win such support. But I feel that today there is going to be

a big change, because today I feel the American people want to get out lock, stock, and barrel, and they want to get out by a definite date.

They want to see complete U.S. withdrawal ahead and they really feel that if the South Vietnamese are going to hack it alone over there, this is the time they have to do it.

We have done enough. We have done all anyone reasonably can be expected to do in an area that is not at all vital to our national security or national interests.

I think we are expressing the feeling of the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the statement of the Senator from Illinois. I think he has reflected what I believe to be the attitude of the American people.

ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY WILL CONTINUE

Secretary ROGERS. I would like to say that obviously the President is going to continue the program of getting out. What I said here this morning does not change that at all. I think in answer to Senator Case or Senator Cooper, I said that he is going to continue the policy that he has followed, and I think the policy has been a successful one.

I think any attempt now, while this invasion is occurring, to force the President's hand would be very unwise. My comment about the invasion was made because it seems to me in all of these discussions we have to point out what the President is faced with. He is faced now with a massive invasion by the enemy at a time when we are withdrawing. He said that if that happened he would take action. He has taken that action. It doesn't change our policy. Our policy still is to Vietnamize the war, to get out, and we are going to do that. But we are certainly not going to do it as a surrender. We are not going to do it to abandon our allies. We are going to continue to support South Vietnam, and we think the American people will support the President.

I think his program is going to succeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper says he would like to ask one more before he leaves.

CAUTION SUGGESTED REGARDING BOMBING OF HAIPHONG AND HANOI

Senator COOPER. I would like to come back to the question we started with.

These questions we have been debating and I am sure we are going to continue to argue them, will be seen in amendments upon which we will vote, but it may be rather difficult to do anything while this dangerous situation affecting our troops continues.

I said that I believe that the President has the right and obligation to protect our troops, and I know that is being done. But I do, again, give my caution as one member, as to the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi, which actions bring into question and might cause the loss of other important interests we have, very important interests, such as at SALT and our other difficult problems with the Soviet Union.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Senator CASE. The Senator has a special right to make that point because of his interest in this over many years.

IDEA WE DON'T TALK ABOUT NORTH VIETNAMESE

The CHAIRMAN. I just have a comment about the idea we don't talk about the North Vietnamese. I remember at the time of the San Antonio formula as President Johnson called it, I thought then the North Vietnamese were very foolish not to make a motion to accept it. I think they would have proceeded and gotten the war over, but I also have to remember that they live there. It is their country; it is not our country.

You insist it is not a civil war, but these are Vietnamese people. They have a long history of colonial subservience to France. All of that has to be taken into consideration as to why they acted, in my opinion, against their own interests. That is a long story, but we don't talk about it primarily in a hearing like this because we don't control their policy. We can't advise General Giap or anyone else, but it is our responsibility to advise our own President. That is why we are talking about our policy. It isn't because we think they are spotless and all angels. That isn't the question, at all. It would be rather futile for us to be spending the time saying what we think General Giap should do.

You talk about why they did what they did now. Again I think you really expect us not to be aware, apparently, that secret talks were proceeding and there have been two or three recent discussions of this, as to why they were broken off and what happened. It is a detailed matter.

I think it is fair to say that we broke them off. Whether or not there was a good reason, or whether or not a misunderstanding, we did break them off on November 23, I believe.

And then I think what was more offensive and caused them to believe it was hopeless was the public announcement of it. The Administration made a public announcement that Mr. Kissinger had been going over there many times. It was a well kept secret as far as this committee was concerned, and I think the public too.

I think what happened is that they had decided that any negotiations were hopeless, and I expect what they are doing is saying that if negotiations cannot be resumed, if that is the way we are going, they are not accepting Vietnamization, which they believe to be the equivalent of their defeat.

I throw that out as reasons. I don't think this could have or should have come as a surprise to you in view of the war and of the developments.

You speak of the Geneva Accords, about their breaching them. Of course they have. So did we. The then Secretary of State went practically directly from Geneva to create SEATO, to destroy the Geneva Accords. Surely you don't come with clean hands to accuse them of violating them. Of course they have. So have we. We didn't even accept the Geneva Accords in the beginning. The Secretary of State left Geneva, as you know, and left Mr. Bedell Smith there, and all he did was say we wouldn't use force to upset them.

As a matter of fact, we did organize SEATO for this specific purpose, among others, to upset them. But I don't like to go into all of this.

U.S. PROBLEMS ARE MAIN CONCERN

But what I come back to, and I will stop with this, is a reiteration in spite of all that has gone on, this country is suffering from serious dislocation within this country, within our borders, aside from internationally. We have it in the big cities, and I won't recount them. It is recounted every day in the press and on the floor.

There certainly is no question we have very serious problems, and that is our main concern; that is why we talk about it, why we talk about our policies. We think that maybe with a discussion and exchange of views that possibly you could cause the executive to consider more carefully its policies and avoid continuing mistakes or even follow a more fruitful and positive policy.

That is the only purpose of these discussions. It is not for recrimination and none of us accuse you of having started the war. None of us feel it is all your responsibility.

HOW DO HAPPENINGS OF 1966-67 COMMIT UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE?

But I must say it disturbs me for you to say what happened in 1966 and 1967 is in some mysterious way—has in some mysterious way committed us to continue this war regardless of whether our present interest is served by it, or not. That is a startling thought and a discouraging one because you are not responsible for what happened in those years, and I don't know why you should be bound by them.

I don't see anything in those years that would cause us to continue to do the same foolish thing, unless it is some mysterious concept of prestige, unless there is involved in this some psychological phenomena about which I am unaware—a great nation because it is rich and powerful can never admit a mistake; can never accept even a compromise, much less a defeat.

This puzzles me. I don't understand it. That is the only thing I can conclude from what you said about what happened in 1966 and 1967.

Do you have any further explanation? I will desist.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to close on a more positive note, if I may.

ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO WORK OUT PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS

We are engaged in an effort to work out peaceful solutions to problems and we think we have done well.

In the Middle East we still have a ceasefire. Since we took office, and we repeat it, it is an old hat, but the fact is that we have withdrawn from Vietnam almost 500,000, 450,000 men, and we are withdrawing more, and that has changed the whole situation.

There is no doubt that the casualties were about 300 a week and recently they have been down, as you know, to 10 and lower than that.

We have initiated a whole new policy toward the People's Republic of China that has been acclaimed throughout the world. The President

did it on his own initiative; it has worked out rather successfully; and we think it holds promise in the future.

The cost of the war has been greatly reduced from \$21 billion a year to roughly \$7 billion. It is going to be reduced further.

We are now planning a visit to the Soviet Union, for the same reason, to try to work out peaceful solutions to problems of the world.

U.S. WILL NOT ABANDON SOUTH VIETNAM

Now, this latest offensive, the invasion, is a problem, it seems to us, as if it was carefully planned and calculated, to see whether we could be forced to turn tail and get out. We are not going to do that. We are not going to abandon South Vietnam.

Nothing that I said was intended to sound belligerent. We still hope we can negotiate a peaceful solution.

We have promised to provide economic assistance to the whole area, including North Vietnam, if we can work out a peaceful settlement. We are prepared to leave and we are prepared to accept whatever kind of government the people in the area want for themselves.

We do not insist on an election, but we think election is one of the best ways of finding out what people want. But if there is some other way a negotiated settlement could be worked out, we would be happy with that.

COMMITTEE'S VIEWS WILL BE CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT

So I think we are going through one of those phases that occurs in this conflict, which causes difficulty for us all. I think the committee is performing a function that is obviously a proper function. We respect the views that have been expressed here this morning. I will convey them to the President. I am sure that he will consider them very carefully.

I know I am involved in the discussion of the various factors that have been raised here. So I just want to leave the committee with that thought—that we are continuing to work for a peaceful solution. We appreciate this hearing this morning and I respect the views of all of the Senators.

REASSURANCE OF NO MAJOR SHIFT IN PRIORITIES

Senator PERCY. As I said, I think your appearance this morning was absolutely vital because I think the concern of the American people in the series of things that have occurred is that there may be a basic shift in policy, and I realize it was based strictly on the invasion by the North Vietnamese across the DMZ. But the combination of circumstances, the calling off of negotiations, the bombing that we have undertaken now in a whole new area, and then the comment to me over the weekend referring me to the Defense Department—that it is their problem—there suddenly developed a feeling maybe that the first priority which the administration has always said would be a peaceful negotiated settlement had shifted, and somehow we were now seeking what we believed President Johnson sought before—and President Kennedy—a military solution through American money and force, if not all of our manpower. I think your reassurance that there has been no major shift in

priorities is vital to get the support of the country behind a unified program to end this war.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you very much, Senator.

U.S. PROGRAM TO RECONSTRUCT VIETNAM

Senator PERCY. I wonder if I could ask one further question about the AID program.

The comment was made by the President that postwar we would undertake a multi-billion-dollar program to reconstruct Vietnam as a whole, North and South.

Has there been any change, or would there be a clarification that you would care to make, on that policy statement which has not been amplified very much? What can we look forward to in the way of a request if the war is brought to an end?

Secretary ROGERS. I don't think I could add anything to what the President said. We are prepared to help rehabilitate the whole area, including North Vietnam. In terms of order of magnitude, it is too difficult to predict, but I think it is an indication and a clear manifestation of good intentions. We have no desire to take over any territory or to occupy any territory.

We would like to have the war end by negotiations and we are prepared to contribute our resources to the rehabilitation of the whole area.

OPTIONS AVAILABLE ON WITHDRAWAL

Senator PERCY. This is April 17, as every taxpayer knows, and you said that before May 1 the President would announce our next decision on withdrawal.

Could you define what options are available to us? Would it be conceivable that he would say we are not going to withdraw any more men because of this latest offensive of the North Vietnamese, or is it just a matter of degree, now, of a continued withdrawal program that the President has under consideration with his advisers?

Secretary ROGERS. I would not care to comment on that, Senator.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, of course your statement is in the record.

We will have Secretary Laird tomorrow and there are no mysteries in the nature of their program. It is an old program, an ongoing program.

Secretary ROGERS. Okay; thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(Thereupon at 12:55 p.m. the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Pell, Aiken, Case, Cooper, Javits, and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

We are very pleased to have this morning the Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, accompanied by Admiral Moorer and other members of his staff, to testify on our bill for the foreign military sales and aid.

PROMISED END TO WAR NOT IN SIGHT

Mr. Secretary, the reescalation of American combat involvement in Vietnam since the first of this month and the attack on Hanoi and Haiphong by B-52 bombers over the weekend have shattered the carefully created illusion that the United States direct role in Indochina is nearing an end. The administration's massive military response to the North Vietnamese offensive indicates two things to me: first, the administration's own lack of confidence in South Vietnam's ability to defend itself, and second, the administration's continued willingness to expend additional American lives and resources in an effort to control the outcome of the war among the Vietnamese people. Thus with the Paris talks broken off and Vietnamization is a broken myth, it is clear once again that the end to the war which we have been promised is not in sight. In the words of one of your predecessors, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

MAGNITUDE OF REQUEST BEFORE COMMITTEE

The magnitude of the request before this committee today—a request prepared before the recent upsurge in fighting revealed the precarious nature of the situation in Vietnam—provides yet another indication of the enormous expenditure the administration is willing to make in the pursuit of a policy which we thought it had disavowed. In this bill alone more than \$1 billion—over half of the entire request—is for Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Approval of this bill thus would in effect constitute not only authorization but

approval by the Congress of the continuation of the war in Indochina. This was made very clear in the testimony yesterday.

There is little that is new or different in this bill except that it represents an increase of 110 percent in the amount authorized in corresponding legislation 2 years ago and 40 percent more than was authorized last year. It would appear that the more success we achieve for the Nixon doctrine the more it costs.

ADDITIONAL FINANCING SOUGHT

In addition to the more than \$1 billion requested in this bill for Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, the administration in other legislation before a different committee is seeking another \$2 billion to finance the military operations of the Vietnamese, Lao, and Koreans in Indochina. Adding the \$3 billion in these two bills to the estimated cost of U.S. military operations—even at levels that existed prior to the recent escalation—the measurable cost to the U.S. taxpayer of the war in Vietnam will exceed \$8 billion in the coming fiscal year. Such expenses surely are not required just to protect the lives of less than 100,000 troops there, and it is an excessively heavy burden for the people of this country to have to pay \$8 billion in order to defend the very special government of President Thieu. Clearly the Soviet Union and China are getting a much better bargain since the value of their aid to North Vietnam last year was recently estimated at only \$775 million and the value of the Soviet military supplies in North Vietnam—the supposed objective of the B-52 raids on Haiphong—was only \$170 million last year.

PAST AND CONTINUING COST OF WAR

The millions of American taxpayers who filed their individual tax returns yesterday should consider how much this war has already cost them and how much it will continue to cost them in future generations of Americans.

In June of 1971, the Library of Congress stated that the full budgetary cost of the war from fiscal year 1965 only through fiscal 1970 amounted to \$104.4 billion. Since that time at least \$20 billion in direct costs have been added. Not included in these figures, however, are the vast additional and continuing costs to the United States of borrowing the money with which to finance the Vietnam war debt or the cost of benefits to the millions of American servicemen who will have served in Indochina. We will be paying these costs far beyond the lifetime of anyone in this room. Indeed, one economist who has studied the question of the ultimate cost of the war estimates that the budgeted military cost of the Vietnam war will be doubled as these benefits are paid out over the next century. Taking all of these factors into consideration, I do not think it is at all unreasonable to assume that the cost of the war today already approaches \$200 billion and will eventually exceed \$500 billion.

SEEKING BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ADMINISTRATION'S OVERALL
INTENTIONS

Although there is little new in the proposals before us they come at a time when our understanding of the administration's policy has been drastically altered by the massive B-52 bombing campaign against North Vietnam. In order for us to give informed consideration to the present bill, I believe the committee's first order of business should be to seek from you a better understanding of the administration's overall intentions in Vietnam.

Secretary Rogers sought to assure us that these recent raids do not reflect a change in the administration's policy. Perhaps they do not. Perhaps we should have known all along that the President's underlying objectives in Vietnam were identical to those of his predecessors and it was only his tactics which would be different. Apparently President Nixon believes that we can accomplish with air power alone what President Johnson failed to do with air power plus more than 500,000 American soldiers.

Because the rationale behind this bombing is so difficult for me to comprehend, and because we should be able to look to you, the Secretary of Defense, to explain such questions, I would like very much to ask you to explain the purposes of the escalation in the air war as set forth yesterday by the Secretary of State. These were his reasons for the bombing—

- (1) To protect American lives,
- (2) To permit the withdrawal to proceed as scheduled, and,
- (3) To assist the South Vietnamese in defending themselves.

Before getting to your statement, Mr. Secretary, if you would be so kind I would like to ask these questions.

(1) Given the fact that several months are supposed to be required for the shipment of supplies from Haiphong to the battlefields of South Vietnam, what direct relationship is there between the attacks on supplies at Haiphong and Hanoi and the current battlefield situation in Vietnam in which the lives of American troops are alleged to be in danger?

(2) What is the logic in the statement that these attacks are necessary in order to keep the North Vietnamese from preventing our withdrawal? All of the evidence that I have seen and common sense would indicate to me they are quite willing, in fact they are enthusiastic to see us withdraw, and,

(3) What authority does the President rely upon in ordering offensive actions by U.S. forces in order to assist the South Vietnamese in defending themselves? In the latter connection I would enforce and commend to you the view expressed by Senator Cooper at the time the Senate was considering the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. If the Tonkin Gulf resolution is repealed, he said, the President's "authority will reside only in his constitutional power to defend our Armed Forces."

Mr. Secretary, I would be very pleased if you could comment briefly on those questions before we attack the details of the bill which is before us and which, as I have said, is quite familiar to us from past experience.

You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; LT. GEN. GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS II, U.S. ARMY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY; RAY A. JOHNSON, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; DONALD S. FLOYD, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; COL. ROBERT M. LUCY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND CHRISTIAN A. CHAPMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE SALES, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, Admiral Moorer, and General Seignious, who is the Director of our Defense Security Assistance Agency in the Department of Defense, are indeed pleased to have this opportunity to appear before this committee and address the administration's proposed security assistance programs for fiscal year 1973.

In the statement which I have made available to the committee I discuss the fiscal year 1973 request for grant military assistance and also for the foreign military credit sales program.

As the members of this committee know full well from the statement made by the chairman, this particular military assistance and foreign military sales program does apply to some areas in Southeast Asia. It also applies in the military assistance area and in the military sales area to Israel, to Jordan, to Turkey, to Greece, to the Republic of China, and a number of other countries. In my statement I go into the specifics of this particular program not only from the standpoint of military sales but also from the standpoint of grant military assistance and the effect of this program upon the future security needs of the United States.

Security assistance, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, is the only way for the United States to stop being the cop on every beat without copping out on the world. It is the best way to meet our treaty commitments which have been ratified by the Senate under our constitutional process. And, Mr. Chairman, before I get into the details of my statement I would like to address specifically several of the issues which you have raised this morning. I believe that they are quite legitimate issues to be discussed with this committee and with Members of the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.

VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM

The Vietnamization program was devised and implemented in early 1969. This was a program to give the United States a dual track toward terminating American involvement in Southeast Asia. Prior to the time President Nixon took office, the only manner in which the U.S.

presence in South Vietnam and in Southeast Asia could have been terminated, as it relates to the Vietnam conflict, was, of course, through negotiations. It was necessary to have a program that would complement negotiations but could act as an alternative to negotiations should negotiations fail.

CHANGE IN CONDITIONS SINCE 1969

I have not gone back and dwelled upon the 1968 understandings. Those understandings were arrived at prior to the time that this administration had the responsibility for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, national security planning, and defense planning for our country. But there has been a tremendous change since early 1969 and the conditions that exist now in South Vietnam show that. We have made a substantial reduction in the American presence. We have reduced the American military presence in Vietnam from a total authorized strength of some 549,500, which was our troop ceiling, to a troop ceiling of 69,000 on May 1st as announced by the President of the United States.

We have reduced our presence in Thailand from a ceiling of 48,000 until today we have approximately 32,000 in Thailand. We have made a substantial reduction in the American presence there.

In addition we have made reductions in the American presence in Korea, in Japan, in the Philippines, and throughout Asia. This has been made possible by the implementation of the Guam doctrine, which has come to be referred to by everyone in the Congress and throughout the world as the Nixon doctrine. We have implemented our security assistance programs in the Department of Defense to bring about the full implementation of the President's program of maintaining partnership and military strength, but at the same time showing a willingness, along with our friends, to negotiate with our adversaries.

NORTH VIETNAMESE DECISION TO INVADE ACROSS DMZ

I cannot explain to you, Mr. Chairman, the reason why the North Vietnamese decided to invade across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Since 1968, up until this particular time, the 1968 understanding, which was arrived at in Paris, had to a great degree, with a few minor violations of the DMZ area, been lived up to by the enemy.

We have talked about the capabilities of the North Vietnamese along the DMZ. We have talked about the roadbuilding that has gone on in the DMZ area. We have talked about the capabilities of the enemy opposite Military Regions 1, 2, and 3 in Laos and Cambodia. But we have avoided giving a statement of their intentions. We have talked about their capabilities and we knew of these capabilities, but we have not made forecasts or projections concerning their intentions.

Their decisions to violate the 1968 understandings, to move main force units across the DMZ—to move them against the 3d South Vietnamese Division, the newest division in the South Vietnamese Army—was something that I cannot explain. I will not try to give a reason before this committee for this flagrant violation of those 1968 understandings. That is something that Hanoi must explain; that is something that the enemy has the responsibility to explain to this

world. It is not something that I as Secretary of Defense should be required to interpret. I believe that they should be called upon to explain this massive, flagrant violation of the 1968 understanding.

PRESIDENT'S RESERVATION CONCERNING POW'S AND MIA'S

Now we have withdrawn American forces from Vietnam as we have implemented the Vietnamization program to terminate American involvement in Vietnam. There is one reservation that the President has always expressed on the termination of American involvement in Vietnam, and that is the reservation that there will be an American presence in Vietnam until the POW problem has been resolved and those men missing in action have been accounted for. But the North Vietnamese continue to violate the 1949 Geneva Conventions, just as they are now violating the 1968 understandings.

The CHAIRMAN. What convention—1949?

Secretary LAIRD. I am talking about the Geneva Convention on the treatment of—

The CHAIRMAN. Prisoners.

Secretary LAIRD. Prisoners of war and missing in action.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. While they violate the Geneva Convention and the 1968 understandings, it does not seem to me that the United States should at any time jeopardize the American forces that are remaining in Vietnam. We should not be in a position where we do not take out that extra needed insurance so that these forces are protected as we continue our withdrawals.

PHASE I OF VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM

Phase I of the Vietnamization program, as I outlined to this committee in late 1969, provided for the turning over of the ground combat responsibility to the forces of South Vietnam. That program has been fully implemented and the ground combat responsibility has been turned over to the forces of the South Vietnamese. Those forces—regular forces, popular forces, and regional forces—at the present time total approximately 1,100,000, and I will get back to that and discuss the manner in which these forces are currently operating in the country at this time.

PHASE II OF VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM

Phase II of the Vietnamization program as I outlined it to you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, had to do with turning over the air, logistics, artillery, and other support responsibilities to the forces of the South Vietnamese. That has been running concurrently with phase I of the Vietnamization program, but it takes somewhat longer because of the training requirements.

I might just add here parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, that when I appeared before you in 1969 outlining this program to terminate American involvement in Vietnam, I indicated at that time that the training of pilots, mechanics, and other skilled personnel did take a little longer than the training of the ground forces. When this program was initiated, the South Vietnamese had more than 200 combat aircraft. To-

day as a result of this phase II program, the South Vietnamese have over 1,000 combat aircraft, and they are using these forces effectively. One need only look at the airlift which was made at An Loc for the regular forces of the South Vietnamese Army, which was taken in there completely by the helicopter force—and the South Vietnamese currently have a helicopter force which totals over 500. That air operation to bring in those reinforcements at An Loc was conducted totally and entirely by the South Vietnamese. If one questions whether phase II of the Vietnamization program is working, all we have to do is to point to the sorties which are currently being flown by the South Vietnamese Air Force at the present time.

This past Sunday, over 200 attack sorties in support of the South Vietnamese ground troops were flown by the South Vietnamese Air Force. Yesterday, well over 200 sorties were flown by the South Vietnamese Air Force in support of the South Vietnamese ground forces. So we can see that progress, progress in the phase II of the Vietnamization program, is also being made at this time.

PHASE III OF VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM

And phase III, as you know, Mr. Chairman, and as I have outlined on many occasions, is the reduction of our presence to a military advisory mission.

Phase III has already begun as we are reducing the number of advisers during this particular period of time. That program, which is running concurrently with phase II, is continuing at a very satisfactory rate.

REDUCTIONS IN U.S. CASUALTY RATE AND COST

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the situation that exists in Vietnam as I testify before this committee today is much different than the situation that existed in 1969. You are familiar with the fact, Mr. Chairman, that in the Tet offensive of 1968 the casualties to U.S. military personnel were running from over 300 a week to 500 a week. I will not be satisfied, and neither will the President of the United States, until those casualties are down to zero, but the current casualty rate for U.S. forces has been reduced from a figure of something over 300 a week in 1968 to from 4 to 12 in 1972.

I would also like to discuss, Mr. Chairman, the cost which you alluded to in your opening statement. In fiscal 1969, the incremental cost of the war to the United States was over \$21 billion. We have consistently reduced those costs until we have reached the point today where we are spending about \$7 billion in this fiscal year. This is a tremendous reduction in the application of the resources of our Government to Southeast Asia and to Vietnam.

USE OF U.S. AIR AND NAVAL POWER

Mr. Chairman, in your statement you asked me to discuss the question of airpower and the supplementary use of American air and naval power in the current attack of the North Vietnamese across the DMZ in violation of the 1968 understanding. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that you concur with me that this is definitely an outright violation of that understanding.

In 1968, the United States was flying over 30,000 attack sorties per month. We reduced that to about 11,000 in 1971 and in the first quarter of 1972. VNAF has gone from an attack sortie rate below 2,000 to a sortie rate that is over 3,000.

As far as the B-52's are concerned, in 1968 the B-52 raids were averaging 1,800 sorties a month and each of the last 3 years that sortie rate has been reduced. As phase II of the Vietnamization program has gone forward, as the South Vietnamese have acquired this increased capability, we have been able to reduce the American air and naval presence.

When I became Secretary of Defense there were some 35,000 naval personnel operating in ships in that particular area. That particular figure now is about 34,000. We will have certain augmentations going forward with our fleet there, because I believe our Navy should be present in the areas where there is this kind of action. They should be present in order to protect the remaining forces of the United States as General Abrams continues the withdrawal program and goes ahead to meet or beat that goal established by the President of reducing our presence to 69,000 military personnel on May 1.

The augmentations which I refer to, of course, are certain ships that will be dispatched to that area within the next 2 or 3 weeks. That augmentation will continue because I believe it is absolutely essential and prudent to have an insurance reserve in that area, and that is what naval power and naval assets are all about.

Now, as far as the airpower is concerned. We are at this time flying tactical air sorties, including B-52 sorties, in South Vietnam, below the DMZ, in the DMZ, and north of the DMZ. The authority is there for commanders to use as the tactical situation develops.

We are also using American airpower in Cambodia and in Laos at this very time.

This use of airpower is part of our program to protect the withdrawal programs at a time when the enemy is doing everything in its power to impede the program of Vietnamization and our effort to turn over this responsibility to the South Vietnamese themselves.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that this is a record of progress, a record of change—a record of progress in turning over this responsibility to the people of South Vietnam. I can assure you that this progress and the actions of the past 2 weeks by the South Vietnamese prove the success of this program.

MANNER IN WHICH SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE OPERATING PRESENTLY

Let me give you a few examples of the manner in which the South Vietnamese are operating presently. They have the ground responsibility. They are not going to win every battle, but they will win the majority of battles. Their newest division, the 3d division, was put along the DMZ. It was put up there with the understanding that that particular area on the eastern side of the DMZ would be the most unlikely area for the North Vietnamese to attack because of the 1968 understanding and the pressure of world opinion against moving regular units down across the DMZ. The South Vietnamese themselves

made the judgment that they would place their newest division along the DMZ, a division that was just formed 5 or 6 months ago as Americans withdraw. It was the newest division to be placed in position there.

When the North Vietnamese moved across the DMZ this division fell back to certain positions and as a matter of fact adopted a strategy of falling back to the Cua Viet River to establish their defensive positions along that river. There were many people who seemed to write off the 3d division in the first few days of the invasion across the DMZ, but that 3d division has held on the Cua Viet River and is now on the initiative and on the attack in that area. A total of from 130 to 160 tanks were used against that force, that new division of the South Vietnamese, and according to our most recent battlefield reports they have already destroyed well over 100 of those tanks. They have destroyed them with ground fire. They have destroyed them at a time when the only aircraft that were able to operate in the area were the South Vietnamese operating the slower moving A-1's and other aircraft. But the South Vietnamese Air Force moved in on the attack and the 3d division has held its positions. The South Vietnamese may bend from time to time, but I am confident they will not break and they have not broken up to this point.

Moving on down in Military Region 1, we come into the area opposite Hue where the 1st division, one of the finest divisions in the South Vietnamese force, has the ground combat responsibility. And this division has acquitted itself very well and very capably. In all of its contact thus far the 1st division has gotten much the better of the enemy and it continues to do well.

In Military Region 2 the South Vietnamese forces there have not had major contact, but they face a formidable foe that has a great capability residing in the so-called B-3 front. The B-3 front is the term that the North Vietnamese use for that area immediately opposite Military Region 2 and adjoining Military Region 1. There are approximately 35,000 to 40,000 North Vietnamese troops in that area. They have a capability to attack in that area, but the South Vietnamese forces have thus far done an extraordinary job in keeping them off balance and there has not been a major attack from that force of regular North Vietnamese units.

In Military Region 3 where the border of Cambodia comes very close to Saigon, there has been a major battle between the main force units of the North Vietnamese and the 5th Division of the South Vietnamese Army. The 5th Division of the South Vietnamese Army was looked at by some as not a very good division in 1969, and I mean to be rather modest in the appraisal of the 5th Division. But the 5th Division has improved to a very great extent and has fought well. At the present time it is in control of the situation at An Loc. The 21st Division units have moved within 7 kilometers of An Loc. They have not moved into the city but are continuing probing activities around that particular area and if they are needed, of course, they are available to move toward the city itself. But they are in contact with the enemy at this point and those contacts continue to be vigorous. The South Vietnamese have done very well.

USE OF RUSSIAN T-54 TANK

There, Mr. Chairman, is an example. For the first time the Russian T-54 tank, the large Russian tank, has been used in Military Region 3. We estimate there are between 30 and 50 of those particular tanks, the large tanks supplied by the Soviet Union, that have been involved and are in that particular area. Those particular tanks have had a rather difficult time in their combat with the South Vietnamese forces and a considerable number of those tanks have been destroyed by the South Vietnamese forces.

RESTRAINT ANSWERED BY INVASION

Mr. Chairman, we have been very restrained during this period of time, but our restraint has been answered by invasion. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that this invasion across the DMZ in violation of the 1968 understanding must be treated as a very serious matter as far as the U.S. Government is concerned and as far as our people are concerned at this time.

(Secretary Laird, and Admiral Moorer's prepared statements follow:)

STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is again my pleasure to appear before you to discuss two essential elements of our Fiscal Year 1973 Security Assistance Program—grant military assistance and foreign military credit sales.

I am happy to have with me today Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lieutenant General George M. Seignious, the first Director of the new Defense Security Assistance Agency, General Seignious before you to discuss two essential elements of our Fiscal Year 1973 Security Affairs (Security Assistance).

Later today, Admiral Moorer will present a military assessment of the importance of the Security Assistance Program in the implementation of the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.

Two months ago when I presented my Defense Report to the Congress, I stated that for the first time, security assistance had been incorporated into the defense planning process as an integral part of our program and budget deliberations. Today I will not repeat items contained in my Defense Report, other than to summarize a few key points.

First, in my Defense Report I noted that 1971 had been a year of continuing transition in which international and domestic factors had considerable impact upon our security assistance programs. The changing world situation, and the conflicting views and strong sentiments associated with our assistance programs are conspicuous realities that we must face in maintaining and enhancing an effective Free World Realistic Deterrent.

As you know, this Administration has established a new Foreign Policy and Strategy for Peace based on three pillars of strength, partnership and a willingness to negotiate. The third, the negotiation pillar, is made possible only by our determination to ensure maintenance of adequate Free World strength.

For example, President Nixon has repeatedly emphasized his hope of bringing about a basic change in our relations with the USSR—a change from confrontation to negotiation. There are profound differences and disagreements between us and the Soviet Union. They are rooted in different conceptions of the rights and responsibilities of men and of governments, and in different approaches in dealing with other nations. They manifest themselves in conflicting interests in different regions of the world. They cannot be eliminated overnight. But if we are to realize a generation of peace, nothing is more important than the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We are now, and will remain for some time, if not adversaries, than at least political-military opponents with different global policies. Unless we accept these strategic and political realities and make this recognition the starting point for

our efforts toward peace, we increase the risks to our own basic interests, and diminish chances to achieve peace.

We must recognize that in areas like Southeast Asia the prospects for ultimate peace rest, to a major degree, with the Soviet Union. We must also recognize the need for maintaining military power—ours and our Allies'. For a stable military balance between us and the Soviets is and will continue to be a necessary condition for the foreseeable future. It is necessary not only for protecting our interests, but also for achieving the more stable and positive relationship with the Soviet Union that is so important to our hopes for a generation of peace.

I believe great nations today can be peaceful adversaries without being belligerent antagonists.

The Nixon Doctrine and its supporting National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence strike a balance between what America should do and what our friends can do. This policy allows us to do enough, without doing or attempting to do too much. It pledges that we will keep our treaty commitments; provide a nuclear shield; and assist our friends in safeguarding world stability—without doing everything ourselves.

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is designed to carry out what the Nixon Doctrine promises. It is the mechanism the Department of Defense developed to carry out and implement the Nixon Doctrine and the Strength and Partnership pillars of the President's Strategy for Peace. For it is only through continued strength and strong partnership that the third pillar of the President's Strategy for Peace can stand. Strength and partnership form the indispensable foundation for meaningful and successful negotiations.

Some want us to negotiate by unilaterally disarming and walking away from our world leadership role. I strongly believe that such a course of action would be counter-productive and dangerous to the security of our country and the safety of our people. I do not believe the American people regard responsibilities and challenges as something to walk away from; rather, they accept responsibilities, meet challenges and realize problems are there to be solved.

Under the National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence we do not build military power to threaten anyone. We build and maintain military power to convince others that there is no profit in threatening or using force in an attempt to impose their political will on us, or to advance their interests at the expense of ours. Security assistance plays a key role in maintaining Free World military power, and we have placed new emphasis on this program.

I would emphasize that our provision of Security Assistance to friends and allies is not to foster conflict, or to encourage and support military activity outside the borders of the recipients, as Communist assistance to North Vietnam is being used today. Rather, it is to enhance defensive capabilities of these recipient nations, to help them resist such aggression.

In our new approach to security assistance we have adjusted, and in some areas eliminated, practices which do not reflect the realities inherent in the Nixon Doctrine and our National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. We have sharpened our managerial procedures to assure better allocation of our scarce resources, and have included specific guidelines for the integration of security assistance into overall force planning under the Total Force Concept. And most importantly, we are moving forward with our allies on programs which do improve their self-sufficiency and increase their contributions to our mutual security.

For evidence of improved capabilities one needs to look no further than the increased contributions we can expect from our NATO allies or the significant improvements in Korea self-sufficiency that will stem from that country's efforts—assuming, of course, that we can gain the necessary support from Congress for the assistance levels needed to continue and complete an effective modernization program. In essence, the nature of our security assistance programs has changed in two aspects—from the procedural or managerial standpoint and from the standpoint of achieving a measure of success in self-sufficiency.

However, that measure of success in self-sufficiency will become a promise unfulfilled if we fail to gain the necessary support from Congress for our security assistance programs. Let me be blunt: for the facts demand blunt, honest talk. We face varied and severe hardships in attaining our near-term objectives. The reduction in the funding of grant military assistance from \$705 million to \$500 million for Fiscal Year 1972 had a severe impact. For example, it caused close to a 40% reduction in planned funding for the Republic of Korea (ROK) modernization program, from \$239 million to \$150 million, and required a complete restructuring of the worldwide military assistance program. This reduc-

tion impacted not only on the success of particular security assistance programs, but also upon the attainment of overall U.S. national security objectives.

If we are going to move forward with successful implementation of Total Force Planning, a process which integrates the capabilities of our allies into our military planning and fosters a higher degree of dependence upon their capabilities, we must provide effective funding for these assistance programs. If we are going to reduce the burdens on the United States for Free World defense while maintaining our treaty commitments in a period of diverse and increasing threats, it can only come from a willingness to support a strong security assistance program. Last year Congress did not provide sufficient support. Continuation of such a trend away from effective partnership is in my view a serious drawback to the achievement of overall Free World security and is certainly a drawback to effective program management.

The benefits and aims of security assistance programs correlate directly with the objectives of Total Force Planning as an instrumental feature of our Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. It is in this context—that is, the willingness of our allies to continue improvements in their active and reserve forces, coupled with our efforts to take advantage of our own total force capabilities—that we should view the merits of our proposed security assistance programs. We are going forward in each of our military services with the implementation of new initiatives which support the Total Force Concept—our forces are being modernized and formed to reflect the type of combat potential that we judge to be essential to our future security. Our National Guard and Reserve forces are being called upon to assume a greater share of our defense responsibilities. And, directly related to today's discussion, we have initiated a variety of programs which will enhance the ability of our allies to broaden their technological base, increase their productivity, and assume a larger share of the economic burden which stems from our joint security needs.

In this regard, it must be remembered that our approach to the deterrence of subtheater or localized conflict emphasizes our reliance upon the country being threatened to bear the primary burden for its own defense, particularly the manpower burden. Although security assistance is not limited to allies threatened by this type of conflict, the majority of our assistance programs are established with countries susceptible to that type of aggression. Furthermore, to be a fully effective element of our strategy of deterrence, these assistance programs must allow our allies sufficient time to equip, train and deploy adequate deterrent forces. Given sufficient time, our allies can reduce uncertainties as to their capabilities and simultaneously influence the perception of potential aggressors as to their resolve to use those capabilities. In essence, to deter such conflicts the threatened country must have credible capabilities, well-established in advance of potential hostilities. Our security assistance programs are designed to help these countries establish these capabilities, to reduce this degree of uncertainty and thereby enhance prospects for a more stable international environment. The end result of this stabilized international environment is both its contribution to the protection of our own vital national interests, and its contribution to world peace.

At this point I would like to emphasize that security assistance, particularly Foreign Military Sales to Latin American countries, has been severely restricted by an unrealistically low regional ceiling imposed on us by Congress since 1966. Elimination of this ceiling is most important in my view to the strengthening of our mutual security interests.

With respect to the proposed legislation, I urge continuation of the special authority which authorizes the President to order defense articles from stocks of the Department of Defense. This procedure is essential, to meet effectively contingencies that arise from time to time and threaten the security of the United States and its friends and allies. It provides flexibility in using the total resources of the Free World to counter the pressures that can be brought to bear against our friends and allies.

We urge elimination of the ten percent foreign currency deposit required of countries receiving grant security assistance, because it is inconsistent with the basic concept of our grant security assistance program. As you know, these security assistance programs are intended to provide for the legitimate defense needs of countries with severely restricted economies and scarce resources, who cannot afford to purchase their needs or divert resources from their own defense efforts. Frankly, some countries are unable to meet the ten percent requirement and will either seek assistance elsewhere or be forced to accept lower levels of aid. With countries that can afford the ten percent deposit, its imposition tends

to impede the achievement of self-sufficiency and could increase the reliance on external assistance.

To speed up the transition from grant assistance to programs which emphasize credit and cash sales, I also urge extension of the maximum maturity period for credits from ten to twenty years. This extension will permit the United States to assist Israel and lesser developed countries such as Greece, Turkey, Korea, and the Republic of China to meet their defense needs while furthering their transition toward self-reliance. Moreover, to the extent that this change will enable transition to credit and cash sales rather than grant assistance, the United States reduces expenditures and offers terms more competitive with the terms offered by other Free World nations.

The distribution of defense material declared excess to the needs of U.S. forces is an important adjunct to our grant military assistance program. The use of these articles is not reflected in our funded program, yet in some cases this equipment meets the military requirements of our allies. When we are able to fill a nation's needs with excess equipment, we are also able to minimize our MAP appropriations. For this year's program we are requesting that the ceiling on excess defense stocks be raised from \$185 million to \$245 million.

As you know, last year our Commander in Chief, President Nixon, proposed a new program to reshape our foreign assistance efforts. His objective was to clearly define program responsibility for each foreign assistance element, and to that end he directed that all security assistance-related planning be integrated. As I noted earlier, we have incorporated this objective into our planning this year.

In consonance with these changes in the institutional arrangements for the management of our foreign assistance efforts, I have made several changes within the Department of Defense to improve management and program effectiveness. First, I have established the Defense Security Assistance Council to advise me on matters relating to security assistance and to provide DoD coordination of this assistance. The membership of this Council is designed to assure that security assistance meets the requirements of those who would receive the assistance and is still consistent with overall DoD plans, programs and capabilities.

As a second step, I have established a Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). The DSAA is the central organization in the Department of Defense responsible for directing and supervising the execution and administration of approved security assistance programs. With the DSAA we are now able to get complete reports on the status of security assistance programs, either by country or by region. The Director of DSAA operates under the policy guidance of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Defense Security Assistance Council, and, of course, the Secretary of Defense.

These improvements in the management of our security assistance programs and our emphasis upon Total Force Planning to exploit the potential of combined U.S. and allied capabilities will contribute significantly to our ability to establish and maintain a viable foreign assistance effort. Yet, these improvements and these efforts will not yield the dollars essential to the effective implementation of these programs. Only this Committee, through its recommendations, and the Congress, through positive action, can take that essential step. We in the Executive Branch have gone far in making progress. We have streamlined the management of these programs—we have interrelated our foreign assistance efforts with our own capabilities to insure that our national interests are not jeopardized—we have moved forward in getting our allies to share a greater portion of the economic and military burden of our joint defense efforts—we have instigated a variety of programs with our allies which should lead to continued improvements in their ability to help themselves. In essence, we have come a long way since these programs were initiated some 25 years ago. But, as President Nixon noted in an address last November, "... the United States is only one of the free nations that has the strength or the potential strength to carry the responsibilities of freedom. If we do not carry those responsibilities, the possibilities of keeping peace in the world will be greatly diminished."¹

President Nixon made some other observations pertinent to the security assistance program in his address last November and I would like to elaborate upon

¹ Remarks made by President Nixon before a Salute to the President dinner at New York, N.Y., on 9 November 1971.

bis comments in terms of my experience in the United States Congress. I use my experience because I know how easy it is to find some means of rationalizing a vote against mutual assistance programs for countries abroad. I fully realize that they are no precisely defined constituencies for foreign aid. But we should all recognize that there are only three basic alternatives relative to the implementation of our national security strategy and the honoring of our treaty commitments.

First, the Congress can approve adequate funding levels for security assistance as we move to implement Free World Total Force Planning. In FY 1973, for example, our total funding request is for \$1,307 million for Military Assistance and for Foreign Military Credit Sales. By this action, the Executive could continue to emphasize the features of Total Force Planning which will allow reduced U.S. presence abroad and at the same time assure the protection of our vital national interests.

A second alternative would be funding by the Congress at a level less than that essential to the effective implementations of these security assistance programs. For example, for fiscal 1972 the new obligational authority made available for Military Assistance totaled \$500 million—\$205 million less than the regular program request. For Foreign Military Credit Sales the obligational authority made available was \$400 million—\$110 million less than the program request. In my view, the FY 1972 reductions in our minimum request by the Congress represented inadequate levels to accomplish our national security objectives. In any event—if Congress continues to fund security assistance at inadequate levels—protection of our national interests could be accomplished only by the expanded use of our own military resources and the reversal of the trend toward a reduced U.S. presence abroad: in other words, a return toward the role of "world's policeman" for the United States.

The third alternative—also not an attractive option from my viewpoint—is one stemming from reduced funding for security assistance and a reluctance to absorb the slack with U.S. resources. Given continued existence of our treaty commitments established by our constitutional processes—and I have seen no bills introduced in the U.S. Senate to repeal these commitments—the obvious result of such a course would be a gap in Free World security and a possible return to those conditions which preceded World War II: an unstable situation in some regions of the world and an insufficient U.S. and Free World deterrent capability to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.

The decision as to which alternative route we take is, of course, in the hands of the Congress—a co-equal branch of the Government. For my part, the most realistic and effective approach is to proceed with full implementation of our National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence which calls for a more effective and equitable burden sharing among our friends and allies. But it cannot succeed without a new, strong, vigorous and Congressionally-supported emphasis on security assistance.

In viewing, therefore, the only prudent approach is to continue our security assistance programs in a manner which capitalize on our intentions to integrate the expanding capabilities of our allies with our own existing and planned capabilities—with the ultimate objective of a more effective Free World partnership and a full generation of peace.

STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to address this committee again. I appreciate the opportunity to present a military assessment of the FY 1973 Security Assistance Program.

I consider this assessment as a continuation of the Military Posture Statement which I presented to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in February. A few of the points I made in that statement should be reiterated. At that time I identified the foremost military question now before us as one of how best to maintain the security of the United States and its allies in the face of the significant increase in Soviet military capabilities. I also addressed the growth of military power in the Peoples Republic of China.

The United States is a very powerful nation. However, I feel that our relative military power throughout the world has peaked and is now declining. We no longer possess that substantial strategic superiority which in the past provided us with such a significant margin of overall military power that we

could, with confidence, protect our interests worldwide. Henceforth, we will have to chart our course with much greater precision and calculate our risks much more cautiously. Our overall posture must be considered, not only with regard to the strength of our own military forces, Active and Reserve, but also with regard to the strength of our allies in an examination of the relationship of Security Assistance to our own national security. This examination has to be approached with full recognition of the military capabilities of our adversaries, as I have outlined in detail in my Posture Statement.

As the realities of the world military power balance are inevitably reflected in the political realignment of nations, it behooves us to insure that the global realignments do not threaten the continued free existence of our nation. We have global interests which are vital to our continued economic and political survival. Strong and willing allies play an essential role in helping us achieve our goal of protecting these vital interests.

It appears to me that a judicious and viable Security Assistance Program provides the opportunity to mutually act with our allies in those areas where important US security interests are involved. At the same time, it should reduce the risk of unwanted involvement in internal and local rivalries where our interests are not directly challenged by insuring that these nations are strong enough to cope with such strife without our involvement.

Our collective defense treaties with our allies have been approved by the Congress and are integral elements of the national security posture of the United States. As Secretary Laird has already said, our total force concept requires that consideration be given to the potential of all available resources and assets, including Active and Reserve forces, military and non-military, both U.S. and Free World. Thus, our planning must reflect the military capabilities of our allies in concert with those of our own military forces.

Our collective security arrangements seek to obtain the cooperation, assistance, and increased contributions of our allies in mutual assistance programs designed to counter armed aggression against our vital interests in the Free World and to eliminate internal weaknesses and instability of our allies. Further, the goal is to develop effective regional efforts toward self-help. I might add that we are making a very determined effort to encourage increased economic and military assistance by other Free World nations capable of providing such assistance.

If the total force concept is to be meaningful, and the deterrent credible, those nations with whom we have mutual security interests must possess an adequate military base and force structure to meet their obligations. Any reliance upon our allies demands that their forces be manned, trained, equipped, and capable to perform their assigned role; otherwise, such reliance is unrealistic and thereby potentially dangerous to our own security.

The basic framework upon which our Security Assistance Programs are planned, programmed, and budgeted is the foreign policy of the United States, both in concept and in practice. In fact, in his foreign policy report to the Congress on 9 February 1972, the President stated, "Security assistance is a cornerstone of our foreign policy and of Free World security, as it has been ever since the early days of the Second World War. Our programs have adapted to changing circumstances, but our purpose has remained steadfast—to assist those willing to work for peace and progress." The President further stated, "The essence of this approach is that the United States will fulfill its commitments, while looking to its friends and allies to play a greater role in providing for their own defense."

The Nixon Doctrine looks to the ally directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility in providing the manpower for its own defense. Until that country reaches a level of self-sufficiency, however, we must assist them with the means and materiel to mount that defense.

These means and materiel are supplied through the Military Assistance Program, Foreign Military Sales, and Supporting Assistance programs. Over the past twenty-odd years, we have made a tremendous contribution to world peace through our Military Assistance Program by strengthening threatened nations to counter the external forces seeking to absorb and destroy them. The post-World War II Free World alliance systems, with the help of military assistance, have been effective in countering Communist aggressive thrusts and are responsible, in large part, for Western strength and prosperity today. Countries such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, where we concentrated such efforts, are classic examples of proven results. We are now seeking to reach a similar self-dependence in other nations whose survival is important to our own vital interests.

I will discuss a few selected countries to illustrate what we are trying to do in a military sense with the Security Assistance Program. In considering these

countries, it will be necessary to consider the FY 1973 program in light of the approved FY 1972 program. The program for FY 1973 was developed in the main, as a progression of the FY 72 MAP request. It does not compensate for the reductions brought about by the actual funding of the FY 72 program.

EUROPE

Before addressing specific countries in Europe, I would like to take a brief regional look at the area. The fate of Western Europe is of crucial importance to the security of the United States. Should the USSR or any other nation with interests antagonistic to ours ever gain control of Western Europe, the balance of world power could be heavily turned against us. Any reasonable, objective examination of the economic, technological, and military power potential residing in that area leads inescapably to this conclusion.

Our ties with Western Europe are the foundation of our efforts to build a structure of peace and security based upon the collaboration of many nations. Wars on the continent have engulfed the United States twice in this century. The concentration of industrial might in Europe is crucial to the balance of power. Furthermore, NATO Europe is central because it is rich in tradition and experience, economically strong, and vigorously involved in diplomacy and world affairs. These nations are in a position to play a major role in building a world of security and peace.

Increasingly, the majority of the European nations are shouldering a greater portion of the burden within the NATO alliance. Thus, the trend between FY 63 and FY 72 has been one of declining grant aid programs and an offsetting increase in FMS programs. However, grant aid in materiel and training is required to develop further the forces necessary to protect the southern flank of NATO and to counter growing Soviet influence in that area.

TURKEY

Within this broad regional context, the first country I would like to discuss is Turkey, for this country is and has been a major recipient of Security Assistance over the years. I feel certain that you are all aware of the great strategic importance of Turkey, sitting as it does as a land bridge between Europe and the Middle East and Africa. Turkish control of its territory has become even more significant over the past few years with the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean area as well as the continuously tense situation in the Middle East. Turkey, a key participant in the NATO Alliance, provides the first line of defense in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has some of the best fighting men in the world as well as excellent harbors, docks, modern airfields, and other military facilities. All of these attributes—if they are supported—will assure Turkey's contribution to our strategy of realistic deterrence.

As stated above, Turkey has competent and dedicated armed forces; their contribution to the Korean War attests to their fighting potential. Dedication and desire, however, are not sufficient. Modern weapons, equipment, and materiel must also be available. The limited economic capabilities of Turkey pose real problems as to their immediate realization of self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, this is an eventual goal of our Military Assistance Program. In the interim, however, it will be necessary to continue to supply materiel and services to cover the gaps that the Turkish economy simply cannot afford to fill.

Thus, our FY 72 program, as originally submitted, would have provided for materiel and equipment that offer both a step toward self-sufficiency and a modernization program to increase their effectiveness in NATO. Included was a program to improve Turkish shipyards, enabling them to do their own overhaul with substantial savings in MAP funds. The FY 72 program also included in-country production of naval gun ammunition and weapons, and the up-grading of ship communications to meet NATO requirements. The Turkish Air Force was programmed for aircraft spares, aircraft safety modification kits, shop equipment, and tools for jet engine overhauls and up-grading of communications equipment and early warning facilities. For several years we have been assisting in the mechanization of the Turkish Army. The FY 72 program planned to make available armored personnel carriers, mortars, and bridging equipment. Helicopters, aircraft armament packages, and rockets were also included in the Army Aviation Modernization Program. In addition, modernization of Army avionics, tactical communications equipment and tank communications were also planned.

The reduced FY 72 program either cancels or seriously affects all of these plans. Not only does the cancellation directly affect Turkish combat-readiness,

but it also further compounds the degradation of aging, obsolete, and inoperable equipment.

The FY 1973 MAP for Turkey provides for Army helicopters, communications equipment, tactical wheeled vehicles and an in-country tank rebuild program. It also provides for the transfer of several naval vessels as well as the addition of Century series aircraft to their inventory and funding to complete jet engine overhaul capability.

I can assure you from my personal contacts with the military leadership of Turkey of their firm friendship for the United States and their determination to continue as a key participant in the Free World partnership. Shortcomings are recognized and capabilities and limitation in meeting them are considered. There is a genuine need for us to continue in the spirit of cooperation to provide the requisite assistance to permit Turkey to willingly meet its share of the Free World obligation. However, there is reason for serious concern. Aside from the equipment shortfalls that I have described, there is the possibility of the Turkish Government's reevaluation of their political and military relationships with the United States as they view what would appear to them to be a sudden lessening of U.S. interests in their area. A U.S. failure to adequately fund the MAP requirements of Turkey would almost certainly make cooperation within NATO less effective, and increase the risks to our vital interests.

GREECE

Greece also is an active member of NATO in a strategically important position on the Southeastern flank of the Alliance. Its central location in regard to the strategic area of the Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Sicily and the Otranto Strait provides a defense in depth of the Turkish Straits exit. It maintains well-trained and well-led military forces which are a valuable contribution to NATO. Thus, Greece plays a vital role in "realistic deterrence."

The Hellenic armed forces are efficient, proud, and well disciplined. Grant assistance has been reduced from approximately \$76 million in FY 66 to \$20 million in FY 71. This progress in achieving self reliance is reflected in the fact that Greece purchased over \$40 million of its FY 71 requirements through the Foreign Military Sales program. However, to fulfill their mission in NATO effectively, equipment and material shortfalls must be remedied.

The thrust of the FY 72 Military Assistance Program for Greece was primarily to improve tactical communications, and to achieve army self-sufficiency by modernizing industrial equipment. The withdrawal of the unfunded balance of the FY 72 program cancels these efforts.

For FY 73, the program for Greece contains Army helicopters, and maintenance parts and training for the Navy and Air Force. \$61 million dollars is anticipated in cash FMS and \$55 million is requested in FMS credit to assist Greece in acquiring additional jet aircraft and other improvement items. U.S. assistance and a rapidly expanding economy should enable Greece increasingly to provide for its own defense needs. A failure to continue our assistance could weaken a vital link in our defense structure.

ASIA

Turning now to the Western Pacific, it is our firm desire that during the next few years relations with the Peoples Republic of China and North Korea will significantly improve. Nevertheless, our interests in Asia continue and require that we provide levels of military assistance best structured to train and equip indigenous forces to assume a progressively greater share of the burden of their own defense. The Asian area presents perhaps the most critical challenge to the success of the Nixon Doctrine, seeking as it does to establish a better and more realistic basis to continue a responsible US role in Asia in the continued development of our natural interests in the area. The potential for conflict is amply demonstrated by the events of the past thirty years.

SOUTH KOREA

Turning now to specific countries in the area, South Korea, as an independent nation and a Free World forward defense position, is a buffer between Communist Asia and islands to the east and south beginning with Japan. Its strategic importance to us is obvious because of its proximity to the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and Japan.

The Korean people, democratic and freedom-loving, have determinedly resisted continuing Communist infiltration and have made great strides toward carrying their share of the defense effort. Korea's prospering economy, bolstered by our economic and security aid, has already resulted in increased national strength thereby permitting a reduction in US security forces stationed there. This movement toward self-sufficiency should eventually permit the phasing-out of US military grant aid.

Faced with an imposing, aggressive potential in North Korean military forces, with the possibility of additional reinforcement from the PRC, Korea with our help has built a well-trained, capable, and loyal military force. Perhaps the best example of the military effectiveness of the Korean military is their large contribution to the effort in Southeast Asia where their forces have played a key role in assisting South Viet Nam. The main problems remaining are those of replacing obsolete equipment and establishing an adequate logistic system. Our Military Assistance Program is designed to overcome these shortcomings by a 5-year modernization program; a program, incidentally, which has permitted us to withdraw 20,000 US troops since 1970 as a result of increasing reliance on South Korea's capabilities.

The requested FY 72 program for Korea provided for the second increment of force improvement items based on the 5-year program. It included fighter and trainer aircraft, helicopters and observation aircraft, a destroyer, artillery, trucks, machine guns, construction equipment, communications equipment, training, spares, and operating and maintenance (O&M) funds. The reduction in the FY 72 Korean MAP has resulted in a program of limited support of forces in-being and, thus, only maintaining current defense capabilities. It cancelled aircraft, communications equipment, construction equipment, helicopters, shipyard and airfield improvement and equipment, trucks, and training support. To provide the agreed-upon modernization program, procurement of some weapons systems must be extended over several more years due to annual dollar limitations and required delivery schedules. These multi-year programs required continued relatively high initial expenditures in FY's 71, 72, and 73 in order to provide prompt and orderly modernization. Implicit in a modernization program is the orderly phase-in of weapons systems embodying the entire planning, funding, purchasing, training, shipment, and replacement cycle. These programs have been severely disrupted. The overall military effect is even more serious when the priority efforts of North Korea to modernize its forces are considered.

Furthermore, the major reduction in FY 72 grant aid funds could be interpreted by the Republic of Korea as a breach of faith on the part of the United States in light of already executed US troop withdrawals. Not only will the reduction in grant aid funds jeopardize and delay the modernization program, it could adversely affect the Korean economic situation as the ROK attempts to secure its essential defense needs unavoidably at the expense of its economic growth.

For FY 73, the MAP for South Korea places emphasis on increased self-sufficiency and continuation of the 5-year improvement program. It includes O&M funding, additional construction equipment, tools, trainer, fighter and observation aircraft, helicopters, miscellaneous naval craft, trucks, trailers, ammunition, communications equipment, and training.

This program is considered to be the minimum required to continue the 5-year modernization plan but it does not compensate for the reductions in the FY 72 program. The armed forces of the Republic of Korea, adequately trained and equipped, constitute an effective deterrent to renewal of North Korean attacks against the United Nations Command.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Republic of China, an important link in the defense of the Free World in the Western Pacific, provides the United States with military basing and staging areas. As you know, our relationship with the Republic of China is formally manifested in our Mutual Defense Treaty.

The Military Assistance Program for the Republic of China has built a capable defensive force that is well organized, trained, and combat-ready. Its major weakness lies in lack of modern equipment, as it continues to rely on obsolete World War II and Korean War equipment. As grant military aid has declined, the Republic of China has increased its capability for self-reliance by building modest arsenals, new military vehicle plants, and aircraft and ship

overhaul facilities. It has reached the point where it now finances 97 percent of its defense costs from its own resources. I might add that the Republic of China is an outstanding example of a country properly utilizing Security Assistance. Nevertheless, the funds available for modernization and replacement of obsolete equipment is only part of the resources needed for these purposes.

The relatively modest FY 72 Military Assistance Program submission for the Republic of China provided for acquisition of air defense ammunition, technical assistance for air defense weapons systems, operational and safety aircraft modifications, and aircraft and communications spares for the Chinese Air Force. Reductions necessary to accommodate the authorized FY 72 MAP levels have not only resulted in cancellation or curtailment of these efforts, but also have affected seriously the Navy's shipyard modernization programs and the fleet air defense/early warning capability. Furthermore, the investment equipment programmed for the Army's indigenous ammunition component and weapon parts production, as well as tactical communications equipment replacement, have been precluded by the MAP funding level. Overall, the interruption of grant assistance and limitation of available credit seriously threaten the Republic of China's attainment of self-sufficiency, which is a principal goal of security assistance.

For FY 73, the program for the Republic of China is designed to ease the transition from Grant Aid to FMS Cash and Credit Support and to assist in high priority areas of modernization. It contains communications equipment, essential operations and maintenance items and training. This program is necessary in order to insure that the great progress in the development of the Republic of China's military strength and readiness is not reversed. Any such reversal could place a greater reliance upon US forces in the Western Pacific.

THAILAND

Because it provides bases from which to conduct operations in support of Vietnamization and the remaining US forces in Vietnam, Thailand is highly important to the US military position in Southeast Asia. Further, our adherence to SEATO's collective defense treaty, in the event of armed Communist aggression, and Thailand's leading position among the Southeast Asian nations combine to increase Thailand's importance. Thailand is a key participant in our efforts to build regional security to a point where we can reduce our involvement in Southeast Asia without abandonment of our interests in that area. Our security assistance also helps prevent the rising costs of Thailand's military efforts from adversely affecting the economic programs that are so essential for national development.

With modest Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Forces in-being, our military assistance program is planned to improve the ability of the Thai Armed Forces to combat insurgency, and at the same time, increase their capability to combat the external threat. The FY 1973 program, designed to provide selective support for defense production, rehabilitation and logistic facilities for ammunition, vehicles, aircraft and ship repair to promote country self-sufficiency, includes trainer aircraft, helicopters, patrol and landing craft, trucks, rifles, machine guns, ammunition, communications equipment, and training.

CAMBODIA

An independent Cambodia acts as a barrier to the expansion of North Vietnam and contributes to the ability of the Republic of Vietnam to oppose North Vietnam's aggression and Viet Cong insurgency. Because of this, Cambodia's continued independence is very important to the success of the Vietnamization program.

The people of Cambodia have rallied to resist the occupation of their homeland by a determined and stronger enemy. Assisted with US equipment, the Cambodian Army has grown from 30,000 to approximately 200,000 in less than two years. These expanded forces have greatly complicated the enemy's efforts to supply their forces operating against South Vietnam; and Cambodia has strengthened its cooperation with its neighbors to meet the common enemy. Any significant reduction in US assistance to this country could well force the government to seek an accommodation with the enemy to include limitations on the aerial interdiction of the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" with deleterious effects on Vietnamization.

In recognition of the importance of our effort in Cambodia, we took only minimum reductions in the FY 1972 program. The FY 1973 MAP for Cambodia emphasizes the development of the country's light infantry and aims at developing self-sufficiency in training. It includes trainer aircraft, helicopters, utility aircraft, landing and patrol craft, trucks, trailers, rifles, mortars, ammunition, communications equipment, tools, and training.

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America is a region in which we have had continuing interest as well as a longstanding, friendly, and unique relationship. As the President has said, "The destiny of every nation within our inter-American system remains of foremost concern to the United States."

The threat of direct external attack from outside the hemisphere or Cuba is remote. However, Cuba continues to provide selective support to local terrorists in the form of propaganda, training, and funds. Soviet military, diplomatic, and economic presence in the area is increasing and, potentially, could increase the threat. The United States encourages Latin American countries to develop only those military forces that are necessary for valid security needs and to avoid expenditures which might interfere with socioeconomic progress.

We rely primarily on our sister republics to prevent the establishment within the hemisphere of additional military power bases hostile to the United States. This, we seek to accomplish with minimal levels of military grant aid as these nations move closer to self-sufficiency. The Security Assistance Program has resulted in a marked improvement in the ability of Latin American armed forces to maintain the peace. Our Security Assistance emphasis in Latin America is on FMS. The training program, however, continues to improve the technical and professional skills of the Latin American military and to develop a better understanding of the United States and its goals.

SUMMARY

In summary, our Security Assistance Programs are an integral part of our total force planning. The Security Assistance Program provides the resources to meet the defensive requirements of Free World security. We are already committed to reducing our overseas forces. In order to implement this commitment without increasing the risks to our national security, as well as to our overall interests, we must continue our programs of promoting the self-sufficiency of our allies. We should not permit a reduction in this Security Assistance Program unless we are prepared to significantly expand the use of our own resources for defense needs. Our allies must shoulder a larger share of the common efforts in deterrence and defense. Enlightened self-interest requires that we assist them in doing so. If we are to achieve the ultimate goal of orderly transition to allied self-reliance, while realizing a common objective of partnership, strength, cooperation, and national security, this program is essential. I urge that you approve the Security Assistance Program as requested for FY 1973.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

INTEREST IN PURSUING NEGOTIATIONS QUESTIONED

Your enthusiasm for the battle and the winning of the war is infectious. All of us like to win, whether it is a war or a ping pong match. It is a very popular point of view. I would like to win. I wish we had won long ago. I had thought that the conclusion of all these years of the people of this country was that this war was not winnable at any reasonable cost and that the policy was to settle it by negotiations. From your testimony it strikes me you have little if any hope of or interest in pursuing negotiations and that now the policy is clearly to achieve a military victory.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would stand by my statements before this committee in 1969. I realize that the fastest way to terminate American involvement and to end the war is, of course,

through the negotiation track and I believe in that. I stated it in 1969 and I believe it today. The difficulty is that there has to be some other way to terminate American involvement should negotiation fail.

It is difficult to negotiate with an enemy that refuses to abide by the accords, the conventions, the understandings—understandings as recent as 1968.

As far as the international community is concerned, when you have a nation that will not abide by those conventions, those treaties, those accords, those understandings, it is very hard to negotiate any other kind of agreements with that nation.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I stated last week and I repeat again, that if the enemy will withdraw the forces that invaded across the DMZ in violation of the understandings of 1968—if those forces that had invaded in violation of those understandings are removed north of the DMZ—then the suggestion on negotiations, working out other understandings or treaties, would be a viable opportunity for this country. But as long as the violation continues—and the violation is continuing at this very minute as North Vietnamese forces proceed across the DMZ—this is not the time, Mr. Chairman, while that most recent understanding that was arrived at through negotiations between the North Vietnamese and the United States is being violated, to talk about further understandings, treaties, or negotiations. It seems to me that that would be the height of irresponsibility as far as our Government is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I understand your point of view that there is no intention of negotiations under present conditions.

Secretary LAIRD. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you would agree with me on that point.

BREAKING OFF AND LACK OF PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I can only point out one or two observations, if you will allow me. One is that the negotiations were broken off long before this invasion and there was no serious progress made at that time. So that the administration had the same attitude before the invasion that it does now.

I suggest that one of the probable reasons why the North Vietnamese invaded was the fact that they had believed that there was no reasonable opportunity for a negotiated settlement in view of what happened as long ago as last November.

CONCEPT OF RESTRAINT AND BREACHING OF AGREEMENTS

There are many questions you raise, all of which we have gone over in one form or another for the past 7 or 8 years. We have even had this business of restraint. I remember the first use of that concept was by Mr. Johnson, how very restrained we were in the beginning. He was always very proud that he was restrained and had not bombed Hanoi and the North into the stone ages, as was suggested. I think most of the people approved of that. But I am trying to get back to the real question. In view of this long and very tragic war, I had thought that the people of this country and the Congress felt it was time to settle it and that it is not in the interest of the United States to pursue it.

All this business about breaching of agreements. I don't suggest that they have not breached them. I can only add we breached them too.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman—

BOMBING OF THE NORTH AND UNDERSTANDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. If I could say one word or two before you interfere. You authorized bombing of the North in a very extensive way. You changed its name and called it something else, but it was still bombing of the North. You called them protective reaction strikes. I have never been able to distinguish between them. Those understandings, as I understand it, were unilateral in a sense there was no written understanding. We laid down some rules that we said we would abide by and according to the press and others they listened and didn't say yes and didn't say no. It is alleged that they never understood they accepted the idea of our overflight of their country indefinitely and certainly not protective reaction strikes. Those are details.

Secretary LAIRD. Those are not details.

The CHAIRMAN. They are details. If you would allow me to say one or two words. This is supposed to be a hearing not a monolog.

Secretary LAIRD. I would like to testify as to those points.

QUESTION IS U.S. INTEREST IN CONTINUING WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to make an observation. Going into the details of the success of Vietnamization on the ground or the training of the troops is not the point in which I want to be interested. The question is the interest of this country in continuing the war. I don't think it is in our interest for many reasons, not only the costs, which I have already stated, but what it is doing to our country internally, and it had long before you came into power. I mean it had under the preceding administration to the point where a President almost under conditions without precedent saw fit to resign or at least not to run for reelection. This is all ancient history.

We developed yesterday, and I don't want to repeat too much, that it is in the interest of the United States today, because of our disunity at home, the economic, social and political problems that effect everything from the great cities to our schools and everything else, to bring this war to a close and everyone agrees negotiations are the only way. I don't disagree with you about what has happened and that the North Vietnamese have responded by invading with greater force. They have always been in there. It is a matter of degree. They have come in greater force. But there is nobody who denies nor do you that they have had substantial forces in South Vietnam for years.

Secretary LAIRD. But the movement of their forces had not been across the DMZ.

Mr. Chairman, If I could put in the record at this point the manner in which the DMZ has been respected by large major units since the understanding of 1968 between the United States and the North Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. You can put all of that in.
(The information referred to follows:)

MANNER IN WHICH DMZ HAS BEEN RESPECTED SINCE 1968

(Supplied by Department of Defense)

Since the understanding of 1968 was reached, the North Vietnamese have occasionally moved units of regimental size through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); but NVA units of larger size have not to our knowledge transgressed the DMZ. Moreover, since the understandings the North Vietnamese have not transported heavy military equipment across the DMZ. This situation has changed drastically, however, since March 30. Since that time the North Vietnamese have moved thousands of their troops and significant amounts of heavy military equipment across the DMZ. By contrast, the South Vietnamese have limited their activities to the conduct of small unit patrols to detect infiltrators along the southern edge of the DMZ.

Secretary LAIRD. As you know, those understandings were——

PRESENT OBJECTIVE OF ADMINISTRATION

The CHAIRMAN. You can put all of that in the record. What I am trying to develop is the objective of this administration now. It strikes me from not only what you say but the spirit and the eagerness with which you say it that we must have a military victory and that there is really no serious hope any longer of a negotiated settlement until their capacity for making war has been completely destroyed.

Secretary LAIRD. That is not the case, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the traditional way, of course, to end wars, but whenever a stalemate has occurred usually you have a negotiated settlement.

I can't help but believe that the reaction, as strong as it is, is that we do not have any hope for negotiation and I find some inconsistency. You praise extremely effectively the efficiency of your training program and the enormous effort that has gone into supplying the South with planes and tanks and all the equipment of war. Yet at the same time one of the reasons given is that our troops are exposed to danger. That was one of the first and, of course, most appealing reasons given. I don't think anything you have said fortifies the idea or strengthens the idea that our troops are in danger from this invasion. In fact your testimony is that ARVN was doing so well that there was no danger at all to our troop withdrawals. What I would like to come to grips with is really what is the interest of the United States in pursuing this war indefinitely, because I can see no prospect of this bringing an end to the war, if you succeed, which you probably will, in driving back the North Vietnamese. That doesn't mean an end to the war, it strikes me. It hasn't before. You don't give me much hope that there is going to be a movement toward a settlement of the war by negotiations, which is the only way I think most people believe that it can come to an end in the foreseeable future.

What it leads to, and I will go on and let the other members express their own views about it, is a prolongation of the war and that we are determined to support the government of President Thieu come what may and that that is the main objective, not ending the war which I believe to be in the interest of this country. This is what I think developed from yesterday's hearing, in that you react by saying

we retaliate. It is retaliation. These are all very normal things under normal circumstances in ending a war.

U.S. INTEREST IN ENDING WAR BY NEGOTIATION

For a long time at least, it has been realized by many people that this is not the kind of war that we can win. This is why there has been and still is so much dissension and difference of view between Members of the House and the Senate, among any groups. I thought we had come to the conclusion that it is time to end the war and end it very much like the French ended it—by negotiated settlement.

You are familiar with the procedure followed there. We can argue about all the details of violation of this or that agreement. We have in the past endlessly, but the national interest requires an end to the war, it seems to me, and it is not nearly as vital to us whether or not Mr. Thieu survives. It is desirable. We all would have our views about what is desirable. But our condition is so critical that our interest is overwhelmingly in favor of ending the war by negotiation. I don't think it is beyond your capacity to do it. If the French could do it, we can do it. The French had no great loss of prestige or anything else. They simply recognized a fact of life. In their case colonial powers were on the wane and they were no longer acceptable by the civilized world and they recognized it, both there and Algeria. Now for us to step into their shoes and to think we can create by proxy a government there that would be our friend and our client is not realistic any longer. I keep coming back. What is the purpose of this? What is the objective? It seems to me from your testimony that it is clearly a military victory and nearly everything you have said has fortified that.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. If I could make a few brief comments I would appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope I have given you free opportunity to express yourself.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I think you make a very good witness.

The CHAIRMAN. We are always interested.

Secretary LAIRD. You are excellent as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not as professional as you are. You have been at this longer than I have.

OBJECTIVES OF VIETNAMIZATION

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, you are not a witness for Vietnamization. Vietnamization does not have the objectives that you state. The Vietnamization program that I outlined to you in 1969, which has gone forward since 1969, has as its objective giving to the South Vietnamese the capability of defending themselves and providing for their own in-country security.

This program has been very carefully planned. This program provides the capability to this country to provide for its own security. There is a difference between the program that the Soviet Union is carrying on in North Vietnam and the program that the United States is carrying on in the south. That difference is—

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you.

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). That we provide for a security capability in-country and we have been very careful in our planning to provide the South Vietnamese forces the capability to protect their own country.

The North Vietnamese under the sponsorship of the Soviet Union military assistance program have a different capability and there are no restraints on the equipment that is being supplied. They have at the present time 12 divisions operating outside their country with this Russian-supplied equipment, marauding all over the countryside of Southeast Asia. Our Vietnamization program was planned to take the place of negotiations only if negotiations failed, but it was designed to give the South Vietnamese an in-country security capability. That is what we have done and that is what we are doing with this program and we are continuing to carry out that program.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am proud of the program that has gone forward in Vietnam under the leadership of General Abrams. Here is a military commander having the responsibility not only for reducing American forces, but also for training and for the overall military assistance program for the South Vietnamese and at the same time providing the security that is needed and necessary to protect those remaining U.S. forces as we withdraw. This is not an easy task for a military commander, but it is one that has moved forward and I can assure you that the Vietnamization program has succeeded.

You can talk about military victory or use whatever characterizations you want to for the Vietnamization program. Those are your characterizations, not those of the program as I outlined it to you in 1969. Our objective is an objective that I felt was needed and necessary when I came into this office as Secretary of Defense. There was no approved program to turn this responsibility over to the South Vietnamese. Now I don't say that with the Vietnamization program succeeding, with the conclusion of phase 2, when that is concluded, with the conclusion of phase 3, that that will necessarily end the war, a war that has been going on for 30 years. But it will terminate American presence in Vietnam, and there is only the one reservation—concerning the POW's and missing in action—which I outlined earlier.

PRIORITY OF INTERNAL U.S. NEEDS

The CHAIRMAN. I will conclude by saying it seems to me we have to balance off which is the most important for use to pay for; the internal security of the South Vietnamese as symbolized by Mr. Thieu and his government or the internal security of the United States. After all these years I am proud to come down on the side that I have to put as first priority the needs and requirements of this country internally, particularly internally.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I think—

The CHAIRMAN. They are being sacrificed, I think, to this illusion that you can create a system in Vietnam that is to our liking. As I said, desirable. This is all very desirable, but I think the cost is outrageously out of proportion to its importance. I do not believe it is vital to the security of this country to preserve the particular form of government of Mr. Thieu. It isn't a question of we wished them to be

this or that that happen to them. I simply think in balancing what is important to me and to the people of this country it is to end this war and to go about the business of reconstructing a united and strong United States of America. This is as simply as I can put it.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, you want to go back and make a judgment on the decisions of the past. I think you have to consider where we are at the present time and what is in the best interests—

The CHAIRMAN. I have considered it.

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). What is in the best interests of our country. And our objective in the Vietnamization program is to give the South Vietnamese the capability to provide for their own in-country security and to make this decision as to who is elected. The only thing that we are trying to accomplish with our program is to see that they have this in-country security capability so that outside influences will not determine who their elected representatives are.

CONTINUING WAR NOT IN U.S. INTEREST

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you have always been and you are now a very effective and very aggressive man in your arguments and your intellectual activities. I think you have allowed your enthusiasm for winning this challenge that has been put to you to carry you away. It is interesting. We would all like to win it, but we have a very serious price that is being exacted from us. I am reminded of General Ridgeway's comments to Eisenhower:

Yes, we could bomb China: we could put them out of business, but it just is not in our interest to do it. The cost to us is much too great. It is out of proportion to achieve that victory.

I think it comes down to that. You have sold us all and I am sure you have sold everybody here on the idea that you are making progress in Vietnamization, but you haven't sold me that that is worth what it is costing the United States. The cost comes out in many complex ways. It is difficult to relate them to this, but every day you pick up the paper, whether it is on the financial page, the agricultural page or the urban page, there are great problems here. I am strongly of the view that, granted everything you have said, it is a wrong policy and is not in the interest of the United States to continue this war. Nearly everything you say reminds me of something that Secretary McNamara or Secretary Rusk said. These same things have been said to us in a little different context. They used to talk about the body counts and now it is the tank kills. It is just a little different application. But it all comes out the same place and I am proud to say I think the war must be ended in the interest of the United States and I don't think there is any great mystery about what it takes to end it.

We have had much testimony about what the conditions are that are required to end this war. With that I will have to desist. I am sorry. I only want to say to my colleagues that if you will look at the record I didn't take up all of this time. I took up a very small part of it.

The Senator from Missouri.

RATIONALE FOR HANOI-HAIPHONG RAIDS

SENATOR SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, I ask you a question I asked you earlier at the executive hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee this morning. There is no one who believes more in the effectiveness of proper use of airpower than I. Anyone who reads Speer's autobiography, the man who ran Hitler's economy, realizes how wrong were those who criticized the effectiveness of our World War II strategic bombing.

An editorial from the Wall Street Journal of this morning expresses a lot of what is on my mind. It says:

We do have trouble, though, understanding the Hanoi-Haiphong raids in terms of Secretary Roger's rationale. It is not obvious, at least to us, that these raids will have any military effects on the outcome of the current fighting. As we understand the matter, the supplies now in Haiphong will not make it into the battle areas for two months or more, and by then the battle should be decided. These understandings may be wrong, of course, but the Administration has done little to establish alternative ones.

Thus we are moved to speculate about the real reasons for the raids. We can guess that the President wants to warn Hanoi that he still has considerable freedom of action, and that it must consider the costs he can inflict when it plans future exploits. We can also guess that he wants to make clear to Moscow that he is not willing to sell out any of his purposes for the sake of smooth relations at the planned summit meeting.

* * * * *

The very existence of awesome American air power is a prod toward its use; it's hard to believe such tremendous power cannot be decisive in one way or another. Thus a President may find himself unwilling to forgo its use, and understandably no less unwilling to accept military advice to use it in overwhelming fashion—to bomb North Vietnam back to the stone age or at least to close Haiphong entirely. Trying something in-between, under the cloak of vague psychological purposes, is a recipe, as President Johnson found, for an air campaign of a hugeness matched only by its futility.

We can never be sure the Nixon administration is not repeating this mistake until it makes its own rationale far clearer than it has so far. It has been unusually reticent throughout the recent offensive, in fact. This is an understandable reaction to some of its experience; its oversimplified explanation of the Cambodian attacks did its cause no good, and its sophisticated explanations of its Indian-Pakistan policy were turned against it in the press.

There comes a point, though, when it is no longer in the administration's own interest to leave its purposes murky. The Hanoi-Haiphong raids seem to us to call for further explanation—for some assurance that whatever the temporary flare-ups, the nation's general course remains not toward deeper American involvement, but toward the point where the U.S. will furnish supplies but otherwise Saigon must stand or fall on its own.

That editorial of this morning was headed "A Question of Purpose." With that premise, I will repeat my question: If Vietnamization is being successful, why was it necessary for us to put B-5's over the Hanoi-Haiphong area?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Symington, I got into some detail in the executive session of the Senate Armed Services Committee in regard to the use of the air strikes and the use of airpower in North Vietnam. As I said earlier in this hearing, we are presently using American air south of the DMZ, in the DMZ and north of the DMZ. The targets to which you refer in the Haiphong and Hanoi

area are related to the massive invasion across the DMZ and the continuing use of the DMZ. They were carefully selected so that they would be related to the continuing use of those roads within the DMZ. The POL petroleum products in the storage area, which is the major storage area, is not only transported by pipe immediately from that storage area, it is also then taken by truck down Route 1 and is used at a very rapid pace to supply the tanks that are using the DMZ, have used the DMZ and have been in contact with the 3d Division. The truck parks that were involved are also involved with the supply of this invasion force across the DMZ. The targets selected were related to this massive violation of the understanding and the crossing of the DMZ. They were selected for that particular purpose and they are related to this invasion.

THE 1968 UNDERSTANDINGS QUESTIONED

Senator SYMINGTON. My next question has to do with an agreement. Yesterday Secretary Rogers talked about an agreement made in 1968. This morning you did. The word you used is understanding.

Secretary LAIRD. I have always referred to it as understanding.

Senator SYMINGTON. I read Gen. Maxwell Taylor's recent book. Unless he is clearly in error, there was no agreement, no understanding. To be sure I was right in his position I checked with people closer to the negotiations. They agreed with the general. They assured me there was no agreement, no understanding.

Secretary LAIRD. My understanding is that you have in your classified files excerpts from the minutes of the meetings that went on in Paris during October and November and if you will review those minutes once again I am sure that you will see what the understanding was in regard to the United States halting the bombing of the North. The understanding that the DRV, the North Vietnamese, would negotiate with the GVN, they would stop the shelling of major population centers, they would stop using the DMZ for military purposes, and the understanding, as Cy Vance expressed it and is outlined in those minutes, was that we would fly reconnaissance missions and we would protect those reconnaissance missions to see that the understandings were not violated. I have with me today—and I am not asking him to testify on this question—a man who was at the Paris meetings, who is now our Director of Military Assistance, and I am sure he was quite familiar and I have had an opportunity not only to read those minutes, but excerpts from those minutes have also been supplied to this committee, and there can be no question that the North Vietnamese and the United States understood what they were talking about.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I will read what the general said, page 394 of General Taylor's book, "Swords and Plowshares":

The main point argued in Paris during the summer and early fall was the cessation of all bombing in exchange for some assurance of moderated behavior by Hanoi. For our part, if we were to cease the bombing, we wanted to know what they would do about such things as refraining from further attacks on South Vietnamese cities, respecting the DMZ, accepting the participation of the South Vietnamese government in the negotiations, and admitting the National Liberation Front to participation without recognizing it as a diplomatic coequal of South Vietnam. Harriman and Vance worked diligently and patiently to move the other side to reasonable discussion but were frustrated by Hanoi's absolute

rejection of the concept of reciprocal concessions. The only commitment which they ever got was an affirmation of readiness to move to substantive negotiations immediately following a full cessation of bombing.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Symington, I would like to—

Senator SYMINGTON. Please let me finish the quote. On page 396 he also has these two sentences: "It was soon clear that the 'understandings' were a hoax, largely self-perpetrated I must admit. The Communists never admitted that they existed, and we had nothing in writing to gainsay them."

That comes from the chief military consultant to the President. Regardless of what someone may have written in notes, they never agreed to anything.

Secretary LAIRD. Those discussions between us and the North Vietnamese did go on and it is not up to me to defend the understandings of 1968. I merely have the record to look at and I can assure you that we have followed those understandings. I can also assure you that in 1968 the language of the understandings was negotiated by the United States and the North Vietnamese. I can also assure you that the two chief negotiators on the part of the United States, American Ambassador Averill Harriman and Ambassador Vance, indicated in writing that should the DMZ be violated with an invasion, they would advocate the immediate use of airpower in the North.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AGREEMENT TO UNDERSTANDING QUESTIONED

Senator SYMINGTON. But that is not either an agreement or an understanding, whatever our side advocates.

Secretary LAIRD. The understandings are the understandings that I have outlined.

I have not gone beyond those, but we agreed not to bomb the North. That was the agreement that was made by the Johnson administration.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not with the North Vietnamese.

Secretary LAIRD. With the North Vietnamese.

Senator SYMINGTON. But they say no, and the record so proves it.

Secretary LAIRD. I can assure you I will take the notes of our negotiators rather than the words of the North Vietnamese.

Senator SYMINGTON. My position is based on the statement made by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary LAIRD. He was not present during these negotiations and I hope he has had access to these notes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have also checked with other people at least as close to the President. They assure that at no time did the North Vietnamese agree to anything, any understanding. This is very important because in recent months—

Secretary LAIRD. I am not going to apologize for—

Senator SYMINGTON. Please let me finish my statement.

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). For the North Vietnamese invasion.

Senator SYMINGTON. For months we have defended protective reaction, difficult to understand exactly what it was, in any case; but we have defended it on the grounds the North Vietnamese were breaking some agreement. But when the chief military consultant to the President, and others in important office, say there never was any such an agreement, I don't see why we stay on this sticky wicket as a way to justify what we are doing now in Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Mr. Chairman and Senator Symington, I am not here to defend the action of the Johnson administration or reply to your criticism of our not receiving enough or strong enough assurances in 1968 or not having a written agreement rather than these understandings.

This is not a criticism that I feel I should defend, but I can assure you that they were outlined to me; they have been outlined to our committee. I have read those minutes. I have gone over them very carefully and very thoroughly, and I am convinced that the North Vietnamese understood what it was all about, the fact that we would not bomb north—that the United States would not bomb the North—and that they would not do these three things.

Senator SYMINGTON. They understood our position, but never agreed to it. The best way to handle this would be to get the people involved before this committee.

Secretary LAIRD. To follow your suggestion, Senator Symington, you would seem to be advocating that we should not have abided by the understandings of 1968?

Senator SYMINGTON. I say there never was any understanding unless General Taylor is making a misstatement of fact in the book he has just written.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I have read many of his books. I disagreed with certain points.

Senator SYMINGTON. So did I.

Secretary LAIRD. I have not had a chance to read the full text of his book, but I admire General Taylor.

Senator SYMINGTON. So do I.

Secretary LAIRD. I don't think he has had access to some of the information I have had access to in this job. I assure you the minutes of the meetings, not only the minutes of the meetings in Paris but also the actions that were taken by the President of the United States, President Johnson, at that time, were based upon these understandings.

DO WE PLAN TO GET OUT OF THAILAND?

Senator SYMINGTON. Two other series of questions. We have built up a great air position in Thailand. Thailand is not part of Indochina. If we settle the Vietnamese war, we say we are going to get out. Does that mean we will get off the mainland of Asia, except for Korea? Do we also plan to get out of Thailand?

Secretary LAIRD. There is no plan to completely withdraw from Thailand. We have a commitment there as far as the SEATO treaty is concerned and I would assume that we would maintain a presence in Thailand just as we would maintain a naval presence in Asia. We also have a treaty, as you know, Senator, with Korea. We have a treaty with Japan. These treaty commitments have been approved under constitutional provisions by the U.S. Senate. They have not been set aside by any action of the U.S. Senate and I would assume that we would live up to those treaty obligations.

Senator SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as most of the air attacks against North Vietnam have come from Thailand, would not the North Vietnamese also expect some arrangement with respect to our airpower in Thailand as well as in South Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I cannot speak for the North Vietnamese.
Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE SECRECY

My last question has to do with this problem of excessive secrecy. In general, we have less of a problem with the Defense Department than with State. But we passed a law not to use mercenaries in Laos. Our staff later went out to the Far East. They believe that in this connection the law is being broken. We have the testimony, but we can't get it declassified. To another matter, an able representative of the news media stated we allowed some Arab countries to ship American-given planes into Pakistan when we were "tilting" toward Pakistan in their trouble with India. We have some pertinent testimony on this also, but can't get it declassified.

Another point. For some 7 weeks we have been trying to release the number of sorties of the South Vietnamese Air Force in South Vietnam but the administration has been adamant about releasing that information, so I am glad you released it this morning in this public hearing. It seems there ought to be some way we can get more of such information about spending the taxpayers' money declassified and released to the public. I would hope you would give that request consideration.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I don't believe I can take up much time. I didn't bring any reading material with me. I have already forgotten my monolog and I have to confess I don't believe everything I read, see, and hear these days.

I do agree wholeheartedly with my chairman that in the showdown the United States must come first.

NORTH VIETNAMESE TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

There are a couple of things I would like to have clarified. There has been some discussion this morning whether it takes 2 months or several months to transport material from Haiphong Harbor to the DMZ, we will say. Do the North Vietnamese not have any access at all to planes or helicopters which could carry cargo between Haiphong Harbor and assembly points inside the country? Do they have any access at all or don't they have any?

Secretary LAIRD. They have very little of that capability, but they do have transportation capability for POL, petroleum products, and that was one of the major targeted areas, the fuel and the supplies for energy. That can move by pipeline or by rail and it can move very rapidly down the eastern coast of North Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. Has there been any change in the transportation facilities in the last 6 years?

Secretary LAIRD. There has been quite a change, Senator Aiken. Since 1968 they have been able to go forward and build up their transportation facilities and improve Route 1. From 1966 to 1968 Route 1 and that pipeline area had been almost bombed on a daily basis and that facility for rapid movement of POL has been improved considerably.

U.S. NAVAL PERSONNEL IN OPERATION AREA

Senator AIKEN. Another question which possibly Admiral Moorer could answer better is what is the number of naval personnel at this time. I think it was reported to us a few weeks ago.

Secretary LAIRD. I just gave that figure, Senator Aiken. The current level is approximately 34,000. You see, when you put a carrier on station—

Senator AIKEN. Not the entire Navy.

Secretary LAIRD. The Navy Forces in the operation area.

Senator AIKEN. Operating in Indochina?

Secretary LAIRD. Aboard ships operating off the coast of Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. I was wondering what the total personnel of our Navy—

Secretary LAIRD. The total, we can give you the total as of February, the end of February. We have that here.

Senator AIKEN. It is 34,000, you say, in that general area?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, and the total varies from time to time depending on the number of ships on station. If you put another carrier in there—a carrier has about 5,000 personnel—so that figure does move up and down depending upon the number of ships that are deploy—

DECREASE IN U.S. ARMED FORCES IN AREA

Senator AIKEN. How much has the personnel of the Navy increased in the last 3 or 4 years?

Secretary LAIRD. The number of military personnel in the Navy and the Department overall has decreased during the last 3 or 4 years. We have decreased our overall military personnel by around 1,100,000 since the end of fiscal 1968. We have decreased Navy personnel by approximately 160,000 in that period.

Senator AIKEN. I thought this might be a matter to go into the record.

Secretary LAIRD. Pardon?

Senator AIKEN. I thought it might be good to insert in the record that we have decreased our naval personnel and the Armed Forces personnel, generally by approximately 1 million men, from about three and a half million down to two and a half.

Secretary LAIRD. We will have less than 2.4 million at the end of this fiscal year. It is a very large decrease in a short period of time.

PERSONNEL WITHDRAWN FROM EAST ASIAN AREA

Senator AIKEN. And we have withdrawn approximately 500,000 personnel from the East Asian area?

Secretary LAIRD. We have withdrawn the 500,000 military personnel from the area. That includes Korea, Philippines, Japan, Thailand, and Vietnam.

COST OF WAR

Senator AIKEN. I noted in the chairman's statement he said, "I do not think it is at all unreasonable to assume that the cost of the war to date already approaches \$2200 billion"—there is no dispute over that—"and will eventually exceed \$500 billion."

How much longer could you run the war at the present rate for \$300 billion? I know it takes a lot of mental arithmetic. Being raised on the farm you should be able to use mental arithmetic. It could run a long time, another 20 or 30 years maybe?

Secretary LAIRD. The important point I think is that in fiscal year 1971 we cut the incremental costs by about 33 percent and then in 1972 we cut those costs by almost another 40 percent. We have gone from an expenditure, an incremental expenditure, of \$20 billion plus, about \$21 billion plus down to about \$7 billion in this fiscal year.

Senator AIKEN. You say that the \$20 billion cost was when you took over the office you now hold?

Secretary LAIRD. That was the incremental cost of the Southeast Asia conflict to the Department of Defense when I became Secretary.

Senator AIKEN. If my memory serves me correctly, in 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968, it was running in the vicinity of \$30 billion a year?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Aiken, the figure of almost \$30 billion represents the total costs of the war and includes the cost of maintaining baseline forces that would be retained in our deterrent force and in our peacetime force normally. Although the total cost when you include the Air Force, Navy and Army units that are part of our baseline force—if you attribute them to Vietnam you can get that figure up to almost \$30 billion. I think the incremental costs are a better measure. The incremental cost was over \$20 billion and we have reduced that to a spending rate of approximately \$7 billion this fiscal year.

Senator AIKEN. It would have cost something to put the Navy over in that area anyway.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct, and that is why I have tried to use the incremental costs figures.

Senator AIKEN. Of course, it would probably be cheaper to put them all in one spot, whether the Atlantic or Pacific or Indian Ocean or maybe in the Antarctic, and let them sit there, but I don't think that would serve the purpose for which they were originally organized.

POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING PRACTICALLY ALL GROUND TROOPS

I have one last question. I don't suppose you want to answer it. Do you think it is possible that sometime between the first of July and the middle of August we might have all our ground troops practically withdrawn from Indo-China from the Vietnam area? Is it possible?

Secretary LAIRD. As far as our ground troops are concerned, Senator Aiken, we have now turned over the ground combat responsibility in-country to the forces of the South Vietnamese. The only American ground combat responsibility is in the area of some advisers and we have some security forces around some of our bases that do have a combat role only in connection with the security of that particular base. The other Americans involved are the American press and they are operating on the ground. Their responsibility, however, is not a combat responsibility. Their responsibility is to report in a free and open fashion what is going on in South Vietnam. They have that responsibility. With the other side there is no free and open press reporting on a daily basis.

POSSIBILITY OF VIRTUALLY COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL BEFORE SEPTEMBER

Senator AIKEN. But assuming that this major all-out offensive on the part of North Vietnam fails and that they have to recede, do you think it would be possible that we might effect virtually complete withdrawal, say, before the first of September?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Aiken, the Vietnamization program provides for the termination of the American presence in Vietnam. We have made periodic announcements. The President has stated that he will make another announcement by the end of April as to the progress of the Vietnamization program and that will be addressed at that time. I have tried to avoid making forecasts or predictions as to a given troop level until the President of the United States makes the announcement. Such an announcement will be made the latter part of April.

BEST TERMINAL DATE

Senator AIKEN. What I was trying to get at, Mr. Secretary, is if circumstances permit would it be better to get out in July or August or should we stretch the thing out until December 31, as the terminal date, for instance?

Secretary LAIRD. We will be making an announcement in April and I am not going to make a forecast or projection. The same question was asked me in 1969 before this committee, Senator Aiken, and at that time I informed the committee that I was not going to make forecasts or projections as to the future troop ceilings because I felt that could very easily destroy the credibility of the Department of Defense.

I can tell you that we are achieving fine successes in the Vietnamization program, but I am not going to give any new troop ceilings that will be announced by the President of the United States.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I am not getting very much farther than you did with my questioning; so I am going to simply say that if circumstances permit, and I hope they do, I think it would be a heck of a lot better to get out in July completely than to put it off until December, for obvious reasons.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, the President, including the announcement of the May 1 troop ceiling of 69,000, has gone forward with nine separate announcements. We, in the Department of Defense, and General Abrams in South Vietnam, have been in a position where he has met each of these announcements. He has beaten them by several thousand, and we will meet or beat the 69,000.

As for future projections, that will be handled in the announcement which is to be made in the latter part of this month.

I can only state that our program is moving along satisfactorily, and we have brought out 87 percent of the Americans in Vietnam.

WHEN WERE NEGOTIATIONS SERIOUS?

Senator AIKEN. I will have one other very short question.

The charge has been made that we have broken off serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese. When do you consider that serious negotiations started? We broke them off. When were they ever serious?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Aiken, I do not believe that the enemy has carried on serious negotiations at any time in Paris.

Senator AIKEN. The Paris conference has been merely a stage for them to put on a show to impress the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONSTANCY OF LEVEL OF KILLINGS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. Secretary, you know the personal regard I, and many of us, have for you and also the fact that your administration has done a better job than my own did earlier in reducing the number of troops in Southeast Asia and the quantity of Americans being killed. The thing that bothered me a great deal was brought out by the Cornell University report with which I am sure you or your staff are familiar, showing that the level of killings in Southeast Asia has remained pretty constant on a quarterly basis over the years. The only difference is that those being killed are no longer Americans, thank God, but the number has remained constant. Instead of Americans, they have been Cambodians and Laotians and Vietnamese, old and young, women and children, and these killings have gone on on a fairly regular basis.

The American public is not being concerned, their attitude being "ho-hum" because these are not Americans. With the human lives that are being taken, they should be as much concerned as before, when they were American lives. It has bothered some of us, and it is one of the things that should be consciously at our innards during these years.

We know we are doing the killing. We do it from airplanes high up where we don't see the people being killed. That is somehow OK. If we do it with a rifle on the ground, it is not all right.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not agree with you on that premise, at all.

Senator PELL. Why not?

Secretary LAIRD. Because we are interested in stopping the killing. The North Vietnamese are the marauders; the North Vietnamese are the invaders; the North Vietnamese are the people that are operating outside of their country. If they will stop their invasion, if they will stop their killing, then we can have peace in that area.

But it is absolutely essential, it seems to me, that the great powers in this world, particularly the Soviet Union, go forward to exercise the kind of restraint that I think is needed and necessary, so that the killing can be brought to zero. That is what we are interested in here in the United States, and I do not believe that we should be in a position where our overall attitude on this question is misinterpreted by anyone.

Senator PELL. Right. But the fact remains the killings have remained constant. I would like to follow this up with a couple—

Secretary LAIRD. It is the responsibility of the North Vietnamese, the Communist enemy.

Senator PELL. But the Cambodians and the Laotians who are being killed have been innocent bystanders. Refugees have been created in South Vietnam and have been innocent bystanders. It is interesting to note those refugees that are being created by the current invasion across the DMZ, by the North Vietnamese, are not welcoming these invaders. They are not moving to the north; they are moving to the

south for protection of the South Vietnamese forces and of the South Vietnamese Government.

I would like to follow this thought up with two specific questions before moving on.

ESTIMATES OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OF U.S. BOMBING

One, have there been any estimates out of Hanoi as to the estimate of civilian casualties as a result of our bombings? I am not talking about Radio Hanoi, but the French or Swiss who are there, the Red Cross. Have any statements been given?

Secretary LAIRD. There are estimates. Most of the estimates, though, deal with combat deaths in the invasion in the south and in Laos and in Cambodia. That is where the North Vietnamese have had their greatest casualties as they have attacked outside their own country.

EFFECT OF AUTHORIZATION EQUAL TO RUSSIAN AND CHINESE SUPPORT

Senator PELL. Following up your question with regard to the Russians and their irresponsibility in supporting this invasion, let's say we gave the South Vietnamese the same support the Russians and Chinese gave the North Vietnamese, or about one-tenth from the financial point of view of what we are doing. What would be the effect if, instead of an appropriation or authorization of the scope which you are asking, we gave you an authorization equal to what the Russians and Chinese spend together. What would be the result in the war in that part of the world?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, of course, it is very difficult to make that kind of comparison. For one thing, when you change the rubles to dollars and then you change the amount of labor costs in a particular tank or a particular weapons system, and you make those conversions, it is rather difficult.

As you know, Senator Pell, the Soviet Union includes the trucks as economic assistance.

The American pilots and the South Vietnamese pilots and the South Vietnamese ground forces that are being shot at by the invading forces consider those trucks pretty much military aid, although the Soviet Union considers them as economic assistance. That is also true of the fuel and it is true of the rice and it is true of other commodities that are shipped to the north.

So it is difficult to make that kind of comparison and then convert it into dollars. When you look at the effort that is being made by the Soviet Union and the fact that they exercise absolutely no restraint on the North Vietnamese on the use of that equipment, I believe that the Soviet Union has a responsibility in this area just as it has a responsibility in the Middle East. On the whole question of military assistance which I am testifying to today, and this program that has been submitted to you covering all of these areas of the world, it is absolutely essential that the Soviet Union exercise the same degree of restraint that the United States does in these programs, whether it be in Southeast Asia or in the Middle East.

COMPARATIVE U.S. AND RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE

Senator PELL. Would you agree with me that the extent of our assistance, the net effect, whatever it would be, the weaponry, would probably be roughly eight or 10 times as much as the Russians have given in that part of the world?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, our program, as far as military equipment is concerned, is funded through the service budgets this fiscal year, and I would say the total amount of military equipment during that particular period would probably be less than a billion and a half dollars.

Senator PELL. By the same token, the Russian, strictly military, including the trucks, would be less than the total that is going in there?

Secretary LAIRD. I am including all of ours as far as our program is concerned, and I would include the military trucks as assistance as far as the Soviets are concerned.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you on that. What I am leading into here—

Secretary LAIRD. You know, Senator—

Senator PELL. How many more times is the Soviet assistance than ours, or ours than the Soviet assistance?

Secretary LAIRD. I think they are probably somewhere near one another, but not as much as the dollar conversions would show.

Now, the point here is that it is difficult to pin down exact figures as far as conversions to dollars. That is the point I am trying to make. The point I am trying to make, and evidently I am not making it very well, is that the Soviet Union in their military assistance program, whether it is in the economic area of trucks, or anything else, should use the same kind of restraint that the United States does, whether it is in Southeast Asia or whether it is in the Middle East. That is the important point.

Senator PELL. I see your point. But will you agree with me that the aid that is given by us vastly outguns and is substantially larger than what the Russians and the Chinese give to the North?

I think there could be a little argument that it is conservatively eight times as much. Would you agree?

Secretary LAIRD. I would agree it is more, but I would also state that we are exercising the restraint that I think is needed and necessary to have a responsible military assistance program that places its major emphasis on the security of the country to which we give the aid.

EVENING OUT AID SUGGESTED

Senator PELL. Here we come to a philosophical point of difference, I think. Men like myself feel that that is a war between two half countries, a civil war, and you feel it is a war between two nations. If the aid that we give is substantially more than that of the opposition, why is there any question about the outcome? Why can't we even it out and let events take their course?

Secretary LAIRD. I don't believe there will be any problem as far as the outcome is concerned. I believe the Vietnamization program is a soundly planned program. I believe that the South Vietnamese will

be able to handle their own country's security. I do feel, however, as far as the stability of that whole area of the world is concerned, that the Soviet Union does have a responsibility. I believe that any country supplying military assistance to another country should follow the mandates that we have established here through the Congress and in the executive branch, on the use of that military equipment.

The Congress, quite wisely, as you know, Senator Pell, has provided in our military assistance program that a country that receives our military assistance cannot even transfer that equipment without the approval of the U.S. Government. We have established very strict rules on the assistance that we grant, and I believe that those rules are essential.

WILL U.S. NAVAL AND AIR UMBRELLA BE PERPETUAL?

Senator PELL. In the program of Vietnamization, does this assume, as time goes on, that when it falters, or if it is in danger, there will be this perpetual umbrella of American naval and air force to make it work. We know now if we had not resumed, presumably it would have faltered.

Secretary LAIRD. I will only state to you that the United States will maintain an air and naval presence in the Pacific region under the defense planning that is outlined in great detail in my defense report to this Congress and we, of course, hope that we will have a sufficient deterrent, a realistic deterrent in that area of the world so that we can do our part in restoring and maintaining peace.

U.S. AID SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER SUGGESTED

Senator PELL. For the record, I think again we must disagree. Our understanding of the figures that have been made available to us is that the aid that we have furnished has been substantially greater, in the order of eight or 10 times; but at least we agree it is greater.

Two points you mentioned: One you said—

Secretary LAIRD. I don't want to get into a discussion on figures because these are all estimates, and the estimates vary. The figures that I used before the Defense Appropriations Committee of the House are the figures that were used by and I think carried in some Associated Press or UPI story recently. Those were estimates. They were the best estimates I could get at the time.

But in my testimony before the committee, at the time those figures were made available—and this was based upon the best information I could get from the CIA and the DIA at the time—I made it clear to the members of that committee at the time I gave those figures to them that they were estimates and that the economic assistance estimate included certain things, such as trucks and so forth, that our program included under the military assistance program.

Senator PELL. To leave this point, if I may, with the thought, which I believe to be objective, that those who have seen the figures, some of which are classified—

Secretary LAIRD. We gave your staff the figures.

Senator PELL. This is where they are coming from.

Secretary LAIRD. And the figures were developed at my request; so there is no question about that.

Senator PELL. I don't want to embarrass you by quoting your own figures to you.

Secretary LAIRD. I have no problem at all with it, but I do think you should use the reservation which I outlined before the Appropriations Committee at the time I gave them those figures.

Senator PELL. Then using your figures, the figure order is eight to ten times greater. I think we should recognize that there must be something wrong when we keep talking about the Soviet assistance. We exceeded it in the order of 1,000 percent or so and then we do not still seem to be able to bring this war to a conclusion.

Secretary LAIRD. That figure is incorrect. That figure is incorrect as far as the military assistance program is concerned.

I think what you are doing there, you are putting in figures that had to do when the program was completely an Americanized program and the operation in Vietnam was an American operation. We have transferred certain equipment over to the forces of the South Vietnamese that was there as American equipment, and you have placed the figures in there, the original cost figures of the equipment to the United States.

Now the situation is such that that particular application of the equipment priced at that figure, I do not believe is a fair appraisal because the Soviet Union, in the figures that they are using and that are used in this study, was putting in some equipment that has been moving out of their inventory, and their pricing figure is somewhat different than ours, and that is why you have a little difficulty on that, and that is one of the reasons that in my testimony, when I first used those figures, I outlined all of these reservations very clearly and precisely, and the chart which was used had those reservations with it.

COMPARATIVE SOVIET AND CHINESE AND U.S. AID TO VIETNAM

Senator PELL. I think we disagree on this, but I think perhaps for the record on an unclassified basis maybe you could furnish us your best estimate possible on Soviet and Chinese military assistance to North Vietnam compared to U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam during the past fiscal year.

(The information referred to follows:)

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Pell, what I have tried to do—I will be glad to do that for the record at all times is to make the point that it is the restraint and the provisions of the program that are so vital. I believe that people supplying military equipment to these various nations should do it with a certain amount of restraint and also provide that it be used in a defensive capability rather than an aggressive or offensive capability outside the country to which the equipment is provided.

Senator PELL. And this is why, for instance, we are flying the B-52's over North Vietnam and the North Vietnamese—

Secretary LAIRD. We have not given the South Vietnamese a capability to carry out extensive air operations over North Vietnam.

PRESS REPORTS OF PLANES SENT TO PAKISTAN

Senator PELL. Incidentally, in connection with giving aid to another country, there have been exceptions. I think in the Pakistani war there were press reports, I don't think denied by the Defense Department, to the effect that Jordan did send some planes in there.

Secretary LAIRD. I can assure you that any action such as that would be immediately acted upon by our director of security assistance.

In the case of Pakistan and, of course, of India, an embargo was placed on the military assistance.

NEUTRAL COUNTRIES' VIEW OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Senator PELL. On a somewhat lighter note, you talk about military assistance programs and what they mean. I remember sitting next to the sovereign of a little country in the underdeveloped part of the world, and at the end of the meal a request was made to us. Please make sure, Mr. Senator, we do not get an aid program. I think those who are truly neutral have this view.

WEATHER MODIFICATION

I have asked the Defense Department previously what we have been doing, if anything, in the way of weather modification. I have introduced a draft treaty in that regard, saying that weather modification should not be used for military reasons.

There have been allegations and press reports that we have engaged in those activities in Southeast Asia. Are you able to comment in any way on this subject?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, I would be pleased to comment.

First, on the question of the techniques used in weather, we have used certain techniques in Asia. We have used them in Texas. I can particularly refer to the use of it in the Philippines. This was done at the request of the Philippine Government.

We have also done some weather work on last year's drought in the Texas area. This is a program which we believe that the Congress is fully aware of.

We have used some rainmaking devices in the Caribbean area. I am not sure that this necessarily works. We have not perfected it to the extent that some of our friends in Texas would like.

Senator PELL. Excuse me, I know my colleagues are waiting to question you, too. Have we engaged in these activities for military reasons in Southeast Asia?

Secretary LAIRD. I can't discuss the operating authority that we go forward with in Southeast Asia specifically, but I would be glad to discuss with you the techniques that have been used outside of the battle zone. But I cannot discuss any of the operating authorities within the battle area.

POW RELEASE PRIOR TO SETTLEMENT OF WAR QUESTIONED

Senator PELL. Finally, the subject of the prisoners of war, as you know, has interested me. I spoke on it at the United Nations, and I have made a couple of private trips to the North Vietnamese in Paris on it.

Why do we believe there is any possibility of prisoners of war being released prior to settlement of the war?

I asked the Library of Congress to run a check on this, and there hasn't been a war in history where POW's have been released before there has been a settlement of the basic questions.

Why do we continue to delude the American people, the poor wives and mothers, to the effect there is a chance of their men coming back prior to settlement of the war? What is the rationale here?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Pell, I have been doing as much as I can to call this problem to the attention of the world, and this has had the full support of our commander in chief and the President of the United States. I think I have special responsibilities in this field, too, because they are military men, and I am in constant touch with their wives and their families.

I have emphasized the humanitarian problems that are involved in the failure of the Communists to abide by the 1949 Geneva Convention, and I will continue to emphasize this inhumane treatment of our prisoners of war. I have placed the emphasis on the Geneva Convention, and in my defense report I have outlined 9 violations that are currently going on. I would like to put them in the record at this point.

(The information referred to follows:)

HANOI'S VIOLATIONS OF GENEVA CONVENTION

The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners be humanely treated and protected. This provision has been consistently violated.

The Geneva Convention requires that neutral inspection of prisoner camps be permitted, including interviews of the prisoners without witnesses in attendance. The enemy has never permitted such inspection or such interviews.

The Geneva Convention requires that the names of all prisoners be released promptly. Such names as the enemy has released have not been released promptly nor through regular channels.

The Geneva Convention requires notification of deaths in captivity and full information on the circumstances and place of burial. The enemy has not furnished any information about circumstances of death and place of burial.

The Geneva Convention requires that prisoner of war camps be marked clearly and their location be made public. The enemy has not marked its camps nor divulged their location.

The Geneva Convention requires that the seriously sick and wounded be repatriated or interned in a neutral country. The enemy has refused to comply with this provision.

The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners be permitted to send at least two letters and four cards a month. The average has been two or three letters a year and none at all from some prisoners.

The Geneva Convention requires that sufficient food must be given to prisoners. Yet, all of the released prisoners have been found to be underweight and suffering from malnutrition.

The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners not be held in close confinement. Yet, the enemy has held some men in solitary confinement for years.

Secretary LAIRD. I believe that any nation that is involved and wants to be involved in the international community must show through its actions that it is willing to abide by its agreements, the conventions, and the treaties to which it is a party.

I think the first thing that Hanoi must do is to abide by these conventions to which they were a party, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and that is where I have placed the emphasis in my discussion with the families—with the wives, with the mothers, and the fathers and the children of these men.

I am just as concerned about these families who suffer. I am concerned about the men who are serving in Vietnam at the present time, but I am also concerned about these POW's and those missing in action.

Senator PELL. I completely agree with you on the importance of putting the emphasis on the humane treatment. But is it not a correct

statement to say there is no real possibility of these unfortunate Americans being returned to us, prior to a settlement of the war?

Secretary LAIRD. I cannot read the intentions of the Communist enemy. I know that we and the South Vietnamese are willing to release prisoners of war. We have received assurances from the South Vietnamese who are holding North Vietnamese prisoners of war that they will release them. They are abiding by the Geneva Conventions, but they have announced that they will release prisoners from the North to return to their homes. I can only talk for our side. I cannot talk for the Communists.

Senator PELL. But from the viewpoint of the families, and I have some in my State, and not getting up their hopes, should we not concentrate, as you say you have done, and you, personally, I am sure have, on the POW's treatment? But our people must realize the men cannot be returned until the war is settled.

On the basis of history—

Secretary LAIRD. I think it is very difficult for us to anticipate the intentions of the enemy. But particularly when they refuse, even as of today, to live by the Geneva Convention. So making an estimate of their intentions, when they even today are not abiding by the Geneva Convention, is, I think, most difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we could move on.

Senator Cooper.

Senator COOPER. Thank you. I am not going to be very long.

I would like to direct my questions to this present situation in Vietnam and some of the political and military issues that I think arise from it.

OBJECTIVES OF BOMBING

The chairman, in his opening statement, said correctly that yesterday the Secretary of State gave three reasons for the bombing.

One, to protect American lives; two, to permit the withdrawal to proceed as scheduled; and, three, to assist the South Vietnamese in defending themselves.

I certainly agree with the first two objectives as proper goals.

NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I wanted to ask how many North Vietnamese troops are in South Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. At the present time there are on the borders—

Senator COOPER. How many divisions and total number of forces?

Secretary LAIRD. The North Vietnamese have over 100,000 troops in South Vietnam.

Senator COOPER. How many divisions?

Secretary LAIRD. They have 12 of the 13 main force divisions operating outside of North Vietnam at the present time.

U. S. ARMED FORCES THERE

Senator COOPER. Now, leaving aside the South Vietnamese forces for the moment, there are approximately 90,000 Americans there in our Armed Forces.

Secretary LAIRD. As of today we have 85,000.

Senator COOPER. How many combat troops?

Secretary LAIRD. We had 11 divisions. We have none now. We have about seven battalions there with the security responsibility.

U.S. FORCE REDUCTION AS ONE REASON FOR INVASION

Senator COOPER. And in your discussions about the reasons for this invasion, did you consider that one of the reasons is that our forces have been reduced to this low point?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Cooper, it is difficult for me to really explain why the North Vietnamese attacked across the DMZ. That is, it is difficult for me to read what their reasons were for going across the DMZ to initiate the attack. But I do think that they felt because of the massive withdrawals of Americans, that they would be able to attack the South Vietnamese and that they underestimated the strength of the South Vietnamese. They thought they could harass the U.S. Forces as we continued our withdrawal program.

Senator COOPER. That was as a practical matter, it seems, common-sense, that they certainly would have a better chance of success for their operations against these smaller forces than they would have had 2 or 3 years ago.

Secretary LAIRD. I think they underestimated the situation, Senator Cooper.

DANGER TO U.S. FORCES FROM SUCCESSFUL BREAKTHROUGH

Senator COOPER. Now, did you and your military advisers, General Abrams and others, consider that if the breakthrough should be successful that it would endanger the lives and security of our forces who are left there?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct, particularly in military region 1 where a large portion of our forces are around Da Nang. The safety and security of the American forces, I felt, was threatened, and so did General Abrams.

Senator COOPER. I agree wholly with that. On the basis of the information I have been given, I think that is right.

Secretary LAIRD. We did not want to take a chance with those Americans as we continue standing down forces and withdrawing them from South Vietnam.

AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT WITH BOMBING PROPOSITIONS

Senator COOPER. I think you have acted properly in that respect. We in the Senate have asked for the withdrawal of all these forces. We certainly have to protect them as they withdraw. So I agree with the second proposition, too, to permit withdrawals to proceed as scheduled.

I disagree with the third, however, and most of us do, to bomb or take military actions to assist the South Vietnamese in defending themselves.

As Senator Javits said yesterday, it comes to a point where we either make a decision to protect them forever or for other reasons we withdraw our forces.

BOMBING OF HAIPHONG AND HANOI

I want to address myself to the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi. As I have said, it seems to me that you have to weigh other factors. I am not now sitting as a military man, though I know a little bit about it, but it is hard for me to believe that it was absolutely necessary for the protection of the forces to bomb Haiphong and Hanoi. What do you say about that?

Secretary LAIRD. I think it was absolutely essential for protecting American forces and to show the determination of the United States to protect these forces as they withdraw, and the massive violation of the 1968 understandings was one which could not be dealt with lightly by our Government.

WEIGHING OTHER DANGERS OF BOMBING RECOMMENDED

Senator COOPER. I would assume you do not make the final political judgments. I assume, however, that you have something to say about them. I would hope that you would weigh the other dangers in the bombing. There has been a great deal of talk about the Soviet Union here today. We are facing negotiations with them. The SALT talks could be more important than other negotiations we have ever been involved in. I would hope that you would urge that we would not endanger those talks, that we would not continue this bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi or any other place in the north, except where it is unquestionably necessary to protect our forces. I support everything you do to protect our forces, but I think we are running a risk, a grave risk, a dangerous one, in this deep north bombing of the north. That is my own opinion.

ADMISSION THAT NORTH VIETNAM FORCES ARE OPERATING IN SOUTH

Has Hanoi ever admitted the presence of these forces in South Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. They have recently indicated that the North Vietnamese are operating in South Vietnam, but this was not the case for many years. But at the present time they are living up to something that has been a factor in the war for many years, and they are now admitting that the North Vietnamese are operating in the south.

ARE SOVIET PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

Senator COOPER. Do you have any information as to whether or not there are any Soviet military personnel or technical advisers in South Vietnam?

Usually when sophisticated equipment is furnished, as we have seen in Egypt, it is followed by either military or civilian technical personnel to assist in training. And in Egypt, it has been said, and I think it is correct, that the Soviets are operating some of this equipment. Are there any facts?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, there is evidence of that. Just a week or 10 days before the invasion across the DMZ by the North Vietnamese, a very sophisticated team of Soviet air experts was in Hanoi. They were seen by representatives of other nations that have representation

there. There are advisers from time to time helping the North Vietnamese with the military assistance program.

Senator COOPER. I accept your evaluation of the difference between our motives of providing defensive training and the provision of equipment for the South Vietnamese. But again, if this introduction of Soviet personnel should continue and grow, it could be that you would raise more and more difficult questions, and you might move into a situation like you have in Egypt. I think these things have to be taken into consideration, unless we become engaged in a much more difficult and much more dangerous position.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Cooper, the level of conflict is being established by the invading forces and the level of conflict can be changed by the invaders.

DETERMINATION TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY RECOMMENDED

Senator COOPER. It seems to me even this invasion describes a pattern which could continue to escalate: The North Vietnamese invade, the South Vietnamese with the assistance of our air power repels the invasion, and the North Vietnamese will retire, regroup, reequip and attack again, and the United States will have to use its air power to protect our forces, and, as you say, protect the South Vietnamese. It could be interminable, just like getting your hands in flypaper. I believe that it is the duty of the United States to protect our forces with the power we have as we withdraw, but I hope that the administration will make its determination at some point, and not too far away, that we will withdraw totally.

Secretary LAIRD. With the Vietnamization programs, the determination has been made, Senator Cooper, to terminate American involvement, but we do have the one reservation that the President has made on the prisoners of war and those missing in action.

Senator COOPER. Well, I want to say that I do see a vast difference between the policy of this administration and the one before. This administration is withdrawing its troops, it can't be denied. The policy of the last administration was to escalate, to continue the buildup. With the exception of building up those forces, I consider the cause of the war in every respect has been North Vietnam, the introduction of forces into South Vietnam and into Laos, and I think it is only fair and historical to say that.

But you are faced with this reality, and now it is becoming a tough one. With the exception of engaging in hostilities to protect our own troops during the process of withdrawal, I think our course should be total withdrawal.

COMMENDATION OF MILITARY

I would like to say one other thing. I promised not to be too long, but this is my chance to say it: That the military has been the subject of denigration for several years now. They have done their duty because of orders by civilians, and they have done it well. We ought to be very proud of them.

Secretary LAIRD. We thank you.

I would like to just add to that, Senator Cooper, the military continues to perform very well. The strikes on Haiphong and Hanoi, in

the Hanoi vicinity, were carried out in an outstanding manner as far as the performance of all of the aircraft and time over target, tankers, the fueling, the support aircraft, everything was done very well.

I operated in the area with the destroyer *Maddox*, back in the 1940's in the China Sea; and I was very proud of the destroyer that was operating up at the entrance of the Haiphong Harbor. That destroyer was using its guns upon the batteries of the enemy, it was firing; and when the A-7 was lost by antiaircraft fire, that destroyer was in there, in the entrance to Haiphong Harbor and picked up the pilot after he had been in the water only for 7 minutes, and they didn't stop firing their guns at the time they made the rescue.

On behalf of the President, I sent a special message to that ship, and I was very proud of the way it operated. But I have been proud of the manner in which all of our forces have performed, not only since the invasion across the DMZ, but also in their responsibilities of understanding what Vietnamization was all about, carrying out the training programs and the equipping programs, and understanding that it was their job to prepare the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, before I start my questioning, I would like to associate myself with the views expressed by Senator Cooper about our Armed Forces. They have had their troubles, as in My Lai and elsewhere, but they carry out orders in the great American tradition. They don't make policy—and I hope it may ever be so—and I would like to join Senator Cooper in a tribute to their fidelity, sense of duty, and efficiency. Our forces have fought with great skill in Vietnam and with gallantry in many instances.

IMPLICATION OF WITNESS' REFERENCES TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Mr. Secretary, I noticed one thing in your testimony which is corollary to what I am going to ask you. I notice interlaced in your testimony were frequent references to our Commander in Chief.

On the Commander in Chief level, and in connection with, for example, the passage of the war powers bill in the Senate, is there any new claim of authority to foresee almost at will in respect of these matters of undeclared war?

Secretary LAIRD. No, but I have always stressed the importance of civilian control over our Military Establishment and over all four of our services, and under our Constitution the Commander in Chief is the top civilian authority of our Government, the President of the United States.

Senator JAVITS. So there is no deeper implication than that?

Secretary LAIRD. There is no deeper implication than that.

Senator JAVITS. I am glad of that.

UNDERWRITING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SECURITY IF VIETNAMIZATION
UNSUCCESSFUL

Mr. Secretary, you heard from Senator Cooper. We had it out with the Secretary of State on our views, including my own, that the time has come to get out, in our national interest. Your statements respecting the success of Vietnamization lead me to ask you this question:

Suppose Vietnamization is unsuccessful. It is possible. For how long do we underwrite South Vietnamese security with the Army, Navy, and the Air Force of the United States?

Secretary LAIRD. We have almost completed the program of turning over full responsibility to the South Vietnamese.

I am not going to give a projection as to the time when phase II will be completed and when phase III will be completed; that is, phasing out our military assistance group. But we will have further announcements along that line as we make further progress.

But I do not accept the premise of that question because we are giving this program the planning, the training, the equipment that is needed and necessary for success.

I believe success is insured. We cannot insure the will or the desire of any person or any country, but I believe the South Vietnamese are showing the will and desire at this time, in the face of this invasion across the DMZ.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, as a former Congressman and very sophisticated man, wouldn't you regard it as highly improvident of the United States not to have a plan if Vietnamization was unsuccessful?

Secretary LAIRD. I would only say there was no plan that this Government had to end American involvement in Vietnam except the negotiating track in 1968. We felt that that was not a prudent policy for our Government, and so that is why we have established, adopted, and approved this second track to terminate American involvement in Vietnam.

Senator JAVITS. And do we or do we not have—

Secretary LAIRD. The negotiating track is still open and a viable track, but we had to develop another means to terminate American involvement and we did that. I believe that was prudent.

SETTING OUT WHETHER OR NOT VIETNAMIZATION SUCCESSFUL

Senator JAVITS. All right. Do we or do we not have any plan which will determine that at a given point, whatever that point may be, we will get out, whether Vietnamization is successful or not, or are we committed eternally to stay in so long as it is necessary to their security?

Secretary LAIRD. I think the facts show quite the opposite. We are terminating, we are withdrawing, and we have moved forward now; in the last 33 months, 87 percent of our forces have been withdrawn.

Senator JAVITS. I find both answers a little difficult to reconcile. I could understand if you told me, well, I am sorry, Senator, but I am not going to tell you that in public session. I would accept that.

Secretary LAIRD. I wouldn't tell it to you in private session because I have not made any forecasts or projections. The announcements will be made periodically.

We have a plan, we have a program, but the announcements will be made from time to time by the President of the United States, and whether I was in public or in private I would not give you those projections.

Senator JAVITS. My point, Mr. Secretary, was not quite that. I said I found it difficult to reconcile both answers; that you do not accept

the possibility of failure in respect of Vietnamization, but that you have a plan in the event of failure.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I can assure the good Senator from New York that we do not plan on failure. We plan on success.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, life plans on failure. We don't? So what do we do, then, if there is failure?

Secretary LAIRD. I have never gone about planning on failure. Maybe I am making a mistake, but I have never entered a political campaign, I have never entered anything I have done in my life, with that premise.

Senator JAVITS. Well, Mr. Secretary, I ask you this question: If Vietnamization is not successful, we will remain in South Vietnam in order to assist the South Vietnamese to defend themselves, however long it takes?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator, I would like to go through the Vietnamization program so that it is understood by each of you.

Phase I turns over ground combat responsibility, and that is a plan that has gone forward and it has been completed.

Phase II turns over artillery, air, logistics, and other support functions. We are well along on phase II, and that will be completed very soon.

Phase III involves reducing our presence to an advisory mission; and on its completion, we shall turn over the complete responsibility, and withdraw our advisers and our mission. Those two—phase II and phase III—are running concurrently. We will carry through on both phase II and phase III, as we have already completed phase I.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, you are the Secretary of Defense. You are on my side, I will press you no further.

STABLE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOVIETS

I have two other brief lines of questions.

The Secretary of State, as Senator Cooper and others have noted, said that the third reason for our acting as we are is to assist the South Vietnamese in defending themselves. I find the possibility of yet another reason in your public testimony.

In your prepared statement, I find the discussion of the relationships between ourselves and the Soviet Union, and it is paid off with the following statement:

For a stable military balance between us and the Soviets is and will continue to be a necessary condition for the foreseeable future. It is necessary not only for protecting our interests, but also for achieving the more stable and positive relationship with the Soviet Union that is so important to our hopes for a generation of peace.

So, I ask you, Mr. Secretary, is any of that equation factored into this action in North Vietnam as far as our air and naval forces are concerned? Are we seeking in this way to achieve "a stable military balance between us and the Soviets"?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, we certainly are seeking to achieve that. We are seeking to achieve it in many ways. First, in the SALT discussions that are currently going on in Helsinki.

Second, in the NATO initiative on which we are presently waiting for a response, as far as Ambassador Brosio is concerned, on mutual and balanced force reductions, and I would hope in this whole area of military assistance, whether it be in Southeast Asia or in the Middle East. So in all of those areas I think both of the major powers in the world today have very grave and important responsibilities.

Senator JAVITS. Do you then add reason No. 4 to the justification for our bombardment of North Vietnam as "the attainment of a stable military balance between us and the Soviets"?

Secretary LAIRD. No; I don't believe that I would attribute that as a reason for striking the logistics, the POL, the fuel supplies, and the trucks that were hit in the action in Haiphong and Hanoi. I would not add that as a fourth clause.

Senator JAVITS. Well, nonetheless, you said a minute ago that it is a factor. Shall we say it is not a cause but a factor?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I think the Soviet aid in the area is a factor, and the fact that the Soviet Union has refused thus far to use any restraint in controlling the use of these military weapons, whether they be the T-54 tank, which is operating in military region 3, or the other Soviet arms that make up almost the entire offensive capability of the Communists.

Senator JAVITS. Do we take it, therefore, that our Government has balanced the equation of attaining what is called here a stable military balance between us and the Soviets in terms of this action and the drawing in of American forces of great power from other places, including ships and air, as against the possibility of the Soviets getting some idea that we are weaker elsewhere and that we are very vulnerable because we are bogged down in Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. The situation is such, Senator Javits, that I have watched the movement of the ships, and so have the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and our naval units have been deployed very carefully. I can assure you that that is being taken into consideration so that we have adequate forces in the Mediterranean area. We have made no reductions as far as the Mediterranean fleet is concerned at this time.

We are watching that carefully, but we do want to have an insurance reserve in Southeast Asia as we continue these withdrawals.

COMMENDATION OF GENERAL ABRAMS

Senator Javits, I would like to pay my respects to General Abrams in the job he is doing. He is withdrawing right now at the rate of about a thousand men a day, and in order to make that withdrawal you have to stand down your forces 5 and 6 weeks in advance.

In the case of engineers you have to stand them down 3 months in advance, because to bring back the equipment—and we brought back about 128,000 tons during March—this is a major logistic feat that is being accomplished. We do want to have that insurance reserve there so that nothing happens and nothing can happen to the security and the safety of this withdrawal program.

General Abrams will be down at the 69,000 level on May 1. He will be down slightly below that on May 1. But it is essential that we protect these withdrawing forces.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I, of course, agree with that and I join you in the tribute to General Abrams' professional skill. I know him. I have the highest regard for his professional competence.

I have just one other question.

BASELINE COST OF \$7 BILLION INCREMENTAL

I noticed your figure of \$7 billion as the incremental cost for Vietnam operations currently. I noticed that juxtaposed to a preceding figure, a peak, I assume, of baseline cost of \$30 billion, an incremental cost of \$20 billion. What is the baseline cost on the \$7 billion?

Secretary LAIRD. The difference between the full cost and the incremental cost is the cost that would otherwise be incurred for baseline forces. All of the forces that are there in the Navy are part of our baseline forces. It is important to understand that most of the forces that are being used, U.S. forces, whether it be B-52, tactical air, or naval forces presently being used, are in our baseline force. We have already reduced our personnel below the figure that it was in 1964. We are down now 300,000 men and women, military and civilian, 300,000 below the figure we were at in 1964, so that you can see that all of this structure we are presently using, almost entirely, is in our baseline force.

And I am not referring to what our expenditure rate is at the present time. I am giving you the expenditure estimated for the current fiscal year. You get down to approximately \$7 billion and that is an incremental funding figure which includes our military assistance and our MASF program, so-called military assistance service funded program.

Senator JAVITS. What is the baseline cost?

Secretary LAIRD. I will give you that figure. It is a very small figure.

Senator JAVITS. You said it was a very large figure.

Secretary LAIRD. The incremental cost figure.

Senator JAVITS. The baseline cost figure.

Secretary LAIRD. I will give you that figure.

Senator Javits, it will be quite high when you look at your baseline cost figure because of the pay increases we have had. Right now we are down over 300,000 military and civilian personnel below what we were in 1964. Yet, in 1964, for that baseline force structure, pay and related costs were \$22 billion. This is for pay and related costs in fiscal year 1964.

The figure this year for the force that is 300,000 less is \$43 billion, an increase in these costs of almost 100 percent since 1964. So you can say the entire peace dividend has gone into the so-called increase in the cost of the baseline force structure.

Senator JAVITS. You will give us that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

COSTS OF VIETNAM WAR (SUPPLIED BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)

[In billions of dollars]

	Fiscal year—			
	1964	1969	1972	1973
In current prices:				
Incremental war costs.....		21.5	7.1	(9)
Baseline force costs.....	50.8	57.1	68.7	(9)
Total outlays.....	50.8	78.7	75.8	76.5
Full war costs (memo).....		28.8	9.1	*
In constant (fiscal year 1973 prices):				
Incremental war costs.....		27.0	7.5	(9)
Baseline force costs.....	83.1	78.2	73.8	(9)
Total outlays.....	83.1	105.2	81.3	76.5

* Fiscal year 1973 war cost estimates have not yet been released, except on a classified basis.

NO BREAKOUT OF VIETNAM WAR COSTS IN BUDGET

Senator JAVITS. There is one thing I would like to call to your attention. I have the budget of the United States here, and as a member of the Joint Economic Committee, I have reviewed it with considerable care and so has the majority on the committee. We charge in our report that there is no breakout of the cost of the Vietnam war that can be found anywhere in the budget. You have given us the figure of \$7 billion incremental cost.

Secretary LAIRD. I was giving you an approximate figure.

BREAKOUT OF VIETNAM WAR COSTS REQUESTED

Senator JAVITS. You will give us a figure of baseline costs. You gave us previous figures with which to compare baseline and incremental costs. Why aren't they broken out in the budget, and if they aren't, and they are not, will you break them out? In other words, what costs for the Vietnam war in fiscal year 1973 have been worked into our Government's overall budget estimates?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, it is very difficult. If you go back and wanted a figure for 1971-69, the costs are going down; and as we continue the Vietnamization program, we have been able to take those costs from \$20 billion to an expenditure of about \$7 billion in 1972, and those numbers have been released.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I am not right now arguing about the figures, but don't you agree with me that the American people ought to know what the Vietnam war costs and that it is not in the budget and that it ought to be broken out?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, we have given the figures and have gone over those figures in detail with the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and also with the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, and I have never denied any such request that was made by these two committees that have the overall responsibility for these funding requirements.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I hope we will get the figures that you mentioned. I would urge our chairman to request them.

The CHAIRMAN. They have been requested. It is only for him to supply them now.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

(The FY 1973 figures referred to are classified and in the committee files.)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Secretary Laird, I imagine you can recall when you were at the bottom of the pecking order in the House. If I repeat questions, will you tell me so, because I was down with Dr. Grayson on phase I, phase II, and phase III of the economic program.

SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST BECAUSE OF OFFENSIVE

Can the Defense Department, because of this latest offensive operation, live within its present budget, or will there be a supplemental request, in your judgment, because of this step-up?

Secretary LAIRD. As far as the funding is concerned, there will be a requirement to add certain funding on the TDY (temporary duty) assignments of certain forces, which is not covered in the budget submission.

As you know, Senator Percy, we cannot transfer among these accounts, and so it will be necessary for us to incur a deficiency in certain accounts because of the temporary duty assignment.

Senator PERCY. Do you have any idea how much this might be?

Secretary LAIRD. I am looking at the situation right now. It is hard to estimate what the overall impact will be. It depends on how long we keep our insurance Reserve on station, how long these temporary duty assignments are extended. It also depends on the amount of ammunition that is expended.

INCREASE IN U.S. PRESENCE SINCE OFFENSIVE BEGAN

Senator PERCY. Taking into account security precautions, we are drawing out a thousand men a day on the ground in Vietnam, despite this offensive on their part, and invasion. Can you give us any idea in a public forum how many men we have moved out there since the offensive began, and the breakthrough in the DMZ because of new ships being put out there, and new aircraft?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, we give you pretty good estimates on that. At the present time, we have afloat approximately 34,000. At the time the offensive started on March 30, when they made their attack across the DMZ, we had approximately 18,000. As far as naval force was concerned,

Senator PERCY. That is an increase of 16,000.

Secretary LAIRD. An increase in that area. It is made up of two carriers and other ships deployed since beginning of the North Vietnamese invasion.

The high level of the naval presence off of Southeast Asia—I think the highest naval presence was approximately a little over 40,000 in 1967. We are going to continue augmenting those forces. They may not be there on station all the time, but we will be able to make some rotation of our forces.

We have the *Newport News* that will be deployed there. We have some other ships that are being deployed. The *Newport News* is a ship that has a very good defensive capability, and it also has good offensive capability in that it has nine 8-inch guns. We will be augmenting our forces from time to time in that area.

Senator PERCY. In personnel, this is about a 50-percent increase. You say it is a considerable buildup in the number of ships?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

Senator PERCY. Can you give us an idea on personnel and planes?

Secretary LAIRD. It seemed to us it was better, and I know it was, on the best advice we could receive, we brought some of the destroyers that were up in Japan.

We had certain ships in the Philippines that were placed on station, but this is not an increase in the overall naval force. It is an increase, however, in the force in the vicinity of Vietnam.

We did this in the case of the Jordanian crisis. We moved in a considerable augmentation of the 6th Fleet. We moved in an additional carrier, an additional cruiser, and additional destroyers.

We also moved in additional submarines at that time and we moved an amphibious force into the Mediterranean. But this isn't an increase in the number of people in the Navy, it is a change of their operational area for a given period of time, and that is what naval power is all about.

Senator PERCY. There is a considerable stepup in the Air Force out in that area, both the Navy and the Air Force, itself.

Secretary LAIRD. Because of the carriers, that is true, and we also have placed some marines, Marine air capability at Danang, about a thousand men.

In order to get 1,000 in there and show up with a 5,500 decrease last week, of course, General Abrams went forward and withdrew about 6,500. It showed up as a decrease of 5,500 last week, but those two Marine squadrons are operating in that area at the present time.

Now, the B-52 and the tactical air augmentation with the exception of the Marines, they are stationed out of country, out of South Vietnam.

ARE HANOI AND HAIPHONG AREAS STILL BEING BOMBED?

Senator PERCY. I was told on Sunday, when I kept in touch from Illinois with the State Department, that as of Sunday afternoon this particular bombing of Hanoi and the area around Hanoi and Haiphong had been ended, but there was no implication that meant they would close any option in the future.

Secretary LAIRD. Some people have implied that and I don't want to mislead this committee in any way. That implication is a false implication.

Senator PERCY. So that the bombing raids are still going on in these two strategic areas; is that correct?

Secretary LAIRD. I am not going to outline target areas, but the bombing is continuing south of the DMZ, in the DMZ and north of the DMZ.

Senator PERCY. Certainly the North Vietnamese know where the bombs are landing and so it is not a breach of security.

Secretary LAIRD. I am not going to talk about events.

Senator PERCY. I was simply told that had ended. I heard on the radio this morning that this was confirmed. It had been ended. And just as I turned into the Senate garage, I heard the Defense Department had denied that and I am trying to find out. Inasmuch as the enemy knows what we are doing, can we find out whether these particular areas which are highly sensitive, a new phase of the war, are still being bombed?

Secretary LAIRD. The missions that went forward on Saturday, to which you refer, started over target at 2:30 and those particular missions have ended.

Senator PERCY. Have there been any new missions begun, then, that left on Sunday?

Secretary LAIRD. There were new missions on Sunday.

Senator PERCY. Did they bomb Haiphong and the areas around Hanoi?

Secretary LAIRD. They did—

Senator PERCY. How many tactical sorties are being flown each day?

Secretary LAIRD. Using U.S. time, and that was the question I understood you asked.

Senator PERCY. Is there something else you would like to add that you feel I should know?

Secretary LAIRD. No. I was giving you the time, so that you understood the time difference. I was using the time here in Washington.

RATE OF SORTIES

Senator PERCY. Can you give us some extent of the bombing? Again within the confines of security, how many sorties are being flown each day by American aircraft, naval or Air Force?

Secretary LAIRD. The rate of sorties has been increased with the augmentation of having four carriers on station and also having the capability because of the insurance reserve that we have placed in Thailand and Guam and in other places. So there has been an increase in the capabilities which we have and we are flying at an increased rate over last month.

I am not putting out the number of sorties per day, particularly now that we are operating in the North, because I am not going to give them a check on their particular radar capability. I don't believe that that serves any useful purpose and it could endanger the lives of American pilots.

But the South Vietnamese Air Force is flying over half of the sorties in South Vietnam. And for an example, on last Saturday the South Vietnamese, I believe, flew over 177 sorties, and that gives you the general range of the sortie rate.

B-52 SORTIES FLOWN EACH DAY

Senator PERCY. Can you give us a more specific idea as to how many B-52 sorties are being flown each day?

Secretary LAIRD. I couldn't give you the exact number of sorties. I can only say that the B-52 sorties have been decreased since 1969. We were flying at that time at the rate of about 1,800 a month. We will fly this year at the rate of about 1,000 a month.

145

Senator PERCY. I have heard varying figures as to how far north we have bombed in North Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. We have cut back the B-52's close to 50 percent.

NORTHERNMOST BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator PERCY. How far north have we bombed in North Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. We have bombed up in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Senator PERCY. And not beyond that?

Secretary LAIRD. We have not gone beyond that at the present time, but any area in North Vietnam is certainly—as long as that invasion across the DMZ continues—any area in North Vietnam is subject to attack.

VICINITY OF HANOI

Senator PERCY. When you say in the vicinity of Hanoi, that would be what, a radius of 25 miles, or farther than that?

Secretary LAIRD. The particular target involved was about 8 to 9 kilometers from Hanoi.

ALTITUDE OF BOMBING

Senator PERCY. If I recall correctly, back in 1966, when the decision was made to go in after the fuel depots, a great deal of low-level bombing was done so as to target them in as close as we could without hitting other objects, personnel, and so forth.

Can you tell us whether that same concept is being followed now, or from what altitude are we bombing Haiphong and Hanoi now?

Secretary LAIRD. The vast majority of the strikes are tactical air-strikes.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND B-52'S INVOLVED

Senator PERCY. How many tactical aircraft and how many B-52's were totally involved in the attacks on Hanoi?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I don't care in open hearing here to give the number of aircraft involved. The enemy has no way of knowing that and I am not going to divulge that at this time.

TONNAGE DROPPED

Senator PERCY. Is there any figure that you can give us on tonnage that has been dropped?

Secretary LAIRD. The raids were very effective on the selective targets that were approved in an area.

PURPOSE OF BOMBING

Senator PERCY. Was the bombing done in order to strategically take out certain sources of supply that would feed the forces moving south, which would endanger our forces there, or was it a tit for tat, a response essentially to the invasion of the North Vietnamese through the DMZ breaking the agreement that had been reached, or understandings, as you put it, and a warning to them that it could go even further, or was it a combination of the two?

Secretary LAIRD. My recommendation, of course, was based upon both, but primarily the first.

Senator PERCY. Primarily the first.

DEGREE OF SUCCESS AND TARGETS OF BOMBING

Can you describe to us the degree of success that was achieved? We have seen and heard descriptions of fuel burning. How successful were those raids and were you essentially going after what, missile installations or fuel depots or both?

Secretary LAIRD. We essentially went after SAM sites, fuel depots, truck parks, and other logistic supply complexes.

I would like to have the Chairman comment on that because he could give you the assessment.

Senator PERCY. Admiral Moorer, could you tell us how successful these have been. I am trying to get some feeling because I think we all would be interested in knowing whether the amount of fuel, for instance, that has been destroyed, could materially improve our position out there and the South Vietnamese position and set the North Vietnamese back months or maybe years.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Percy, as the Secretary of Defense has said, the specific targets were in the categories of petroleum storage areas, truck parks, and supplies. The attacks made on targets such as missile sites, for instance, should be considered as a means rather than an end. They were simply to protect the aircraft that were going in there.

Now, as far as the latter part of your question is concerned, in view of the fact that this massive movement across DMZ utilized such a very large number of trucks and tanks, that use large quantities of fuel as well as large quantities of ammunition. I don't think that there is any question about the fact that the loss of this petroleum supply and trucks coming in the Haiphong-Hanoi area will definitely impact on the scope of the activity south of the DMZ.

The North Vietnamese can move these supplies down by truck, by barge, and by train and the requirements that they have for fuel and ammo, in light of the massive way in which they embarked on this invasion, are higher than those they have had before.

So, in that sense, as was referred to previously, it does not take 2 months to get this type of supply down south. It does take 2 months if they plod slowly through the Ho Chi Minh Trail all the way down to Cambodia, but as long as they are transporting the material inside their own country down their established highway and railroads, they can certainly move it down there in a very short time. It is only about 200 miles.

Senator PERCY. We have certainly, through aerial reconnaissance, a pretty good picture as to where these depots are. We have been looking at them for a long time.

Do you have any feel as to what percentage of their fuel requirements we have been able to knock out with these raids?

Admiral MOORER. Well, sir, the indications are that the strikes were precise. Fortunately, the weather was good, and the effectiveness of the enemy defense effort was low, in the sense that they actually hit only two small attack aircraft. Consequently, I would say that in view

of the fact that the attacks were effective and precise, the damage to this supply base, which is supplying this invasion in the South, was significant.

Secretary LAIRD. We would be glad to show you some of the reconnaissance pictures taken by our aircraft, and I will have somebody come to your office to show you some of these reconnaissance pictures taken of the target areas by our aircraft.

I would state, Senator PERCY, that the situation was such there, there was a tremendous amount of antiaircraft fire against our aircraft. Over 200 SAM missiles were fired at the attacking aircraft as they came in over those particular target areas.

U.S. LOSSES SINCE OFFENSIVE

Senator PERCY. Can you give us, then, the figures for the number of planes that we have lost since this offensive, the number of our ships that have been hit, the number of dead, wounded, and missing in action?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, we will do that. We are announcing the figure on Thursday. It will be announced in Saigon. But it is in the area of 12 for the past week.

Senator PERCY. Twelve personnel?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

Senator PERCY. Not planes?

Secretary LAIRD. As far as the aircraft are concerned, two aircraft were lost on the raids this week. One was an F-105 and the other was an A-7. The pilot on the A-7, as I said earlier in response to a question by Senator Javits, was rescued.

Senator PERCY. And there is no change in that?

Secretary LAIRD. That is right.

Senator PERCY. How many American ships have been hit and what is the extent of damage?

Secretary LAIRD. We have had three ships hit. I believe two of them were hit by shore fire. Another one, it looks like there had been an accident.

Senator PERCY. And the dead or wounded in those hits?

Secretary LAIRD. As of this morning, these would be included in our figures, but they are approximately three.

Senator PERCY. Killed?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

RUSSIAN SHIPS HIT

Senator PERCY. Three killed. Could you clarify what we know, either through diplomatic protest or by our own reconnaissance and intelligence about Russian ships that have been hit?

Secretary LAIRD. There may have been Russian ships in the port hit by shrapnel or by debris from the bombing missions, or by SAM missiles or antiaircraft fire from the North Vietnamese. I would not dispute the claim that there may have been some shrapnel damage to some ships in the area, because with all of the firing that was going on, a vast number of SAM missiles being fired, the vast amount of anti-aircraft fire, and the bombing all at one time, I believe that it is a possibility, and so I would not dispute it. I would only regret the fact

that it did take place and we have sent such a message to the Soviet Union.

I talked to the Secretary of State today about that and such a message has been sent to the Soviets, but the Russian ships were not on the target list and were not in the target area.

NO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION IN BOMBING RAIDS

Senator PERCY. Because these hearings are on, presumably, military assistance, and we have been assisting the South Vietnamese to stand on their own feet, could you tell us how many South Vietnamese aircraft participated in these bombing raids with us and what the effectiveness of their participation was?

Secretary LAIRD. The South Vietnamese did not participate on these particular raids.

Senator PERCY. Why did they not participate?

Secretary LAIRD. We have not given them the capability to penetrate and attack outside of their country. One part of our program is to give them defensive capability to maintain their own in-country security, but we have not gone forward with a program that gives them that capability to operate out of country and to operate as the North Vietnamese do in Cambodia, Laos and in the south.

STRENGTH OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

Senator PERCY. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, as of mid-1971, reported that the South Vietnamese Air Force, as a result of our military assistance program, was larger than the air forces of Thailand, Pakistan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia, and was comparable in size to the Japanese Air Force.

The Vietnam Bulletin, which is issued right here in Washington by the South Vietnamese Embassy, in its February 1972 issue said that in December 1968, the blueprint for further Vietnamese Air Force expansion was established when the U.S. Department of Defense approved the improvement and modernization program.

I ask this question because I know when I was briefed by MAC/V out there in December 1967, I was skeptical as to the success of this particular phase of our program, whether or not the South Vietnamese could within a reasonable period of years be brought up to a level of sophistication to carry on air defense. From what I have seen so far, my skepticism was unfounded and they have done a better job.

The multiphase program of training and equipment acquisition was designed, as I understand it, to make the Vietnamese Air Force totally self-sufficient in the defense of the republic, thus allowing disengagement of the U.S. Air Force from the conflict.

As I understand it, this is not a new air force. According to the Vietnam Embassy, the Vietnamese Air Force numbered 16,000 men and more than 350 aircraft as early as mid-1966. So that when we started our phased step-up program we were not, apparently, starting, from scratch, as I thought at the time.

We started with a very substantial base. And the publication goes on to say that with nearly a thousand planes, the figure which you reconfirmed, I believe, and 40,000 airmen, the Vietnamese Air Force

has become one of the most formidable such forces in the world. This is now what the South Vietnamese Government officially says.

Can you clarify what the actual strength of the Vietnamese Air Force is in number of personnel and planes with the figures that I have? And are the figures that I have given accurate?

Secretary LAIRD. The figures that you have given are substantially correct. We discussed that a little earlier, Senator Percy.

I think one of the real success stories of the Vietnamization program is the modernization and the establishment of a viable air defense capability and tactical air capability on the part of the South Vietnamese Air Force. This was no easy task. It took the best military planning, the best civilian planning possible.

I sent out there a young man from Wisconsin that I brought into the Department of Defense, who was the President of Lawrence University. He became the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force—Curtis Tarr—who has gone on to be selective service director, and is now going over to the State Department. I sent him out there personally to set up the training program and review the training program for that air force.

They didn't have the proper manuals, the proper training facilities, the proper educational techniques. They have established an educational and training program that has made it possible for them to maintain these aircraft.

We give them training for mechanics and for pilots.

They have an air force now of over 1,000 aircraft.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIRCRAFT

Senator PERCY. Are these all American-made aircraft?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir.

Senator PERCY. Of the most modern and latest design? We are not giving them castoffs or obsolete models?

Secretary LAIRD. No; they do not have the most modern. We do not give them the F-4, we do not give them the large bombers like the B-52.

Senator PERCY. But do they have both fighters and bombers?

Secretary LAIRD. They have F-5's, which have a much shorter radius than the F-4. It does not give them the capability to operate and penetrate deeply into the north, but it gives them an air defense capability in-country.

They have the A-1 which is an old aircraft, and it is going completely out of our inventory. We have one squadron operating in Thailand and that squadron will finally be transferred to the South Vietnamese Air Force.

But they have a tremendous capability to give close-in tactical air support and those A-1's were among the few planes that could fly during that bad weather, as the North Vietnamese came across the DMZ and attacked the 3d Division. It was the A-1's that were up there, the South Vietnamese Air Force, and they performed very well, Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. And the B-52 is not a new plane, either.

Secretary LAIRD. But we have not given them that kind of capability.

The South Vietnamese helicopters total over 500. It is the fourth largest helicopter fleet of any free nation in the world. This helicopter force which they have is being maintained by them. They have capable and competent pilots.

They carried off the An Loc supply, they carried out the infantry and the airborne troops that were airlifted into that battle situation. They did it very well and very capably.

Senator PERCY. I have three questions on this phase of it and maybe we could finish the continuity of this and then I will be happy to yield.

U.S. INVESTMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIRPOWER

How much has the United States spent now, since the beginning of the buildup of the South Vietnamese Air Force, accumulative for aircraft, training of personnel, the whole business that we have invested in South Vietnamese airpower.

Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad to supply that for the record. (The information referred to follows:)

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

From FY 1963 through FY 1972 an estimated \$1,540 million was requested for support of the South Vietnamese Air Force including acquisition of aircraft, training, and operational support. In addition, during that period approximately \$320 million in excess equipment and aircraft (valued at acquisition cost) will be provided to the South Vietnamese Air Force.

Secretary LAIRD. Would you like on the A-1 our investment cost, or the cost we would carry those A-1's at the present time?

Senator PERCY. I think as long as it is a capable plane and as long as it is what we paid for it, I would prefer having our cost figures.

Secretary LAIRD. We can give you that. I don't think that is very meaningful, that cost figure. I have talked with Senator Pell about that. There are certain figures that are being used that are acquisition costs and to compare them with Soviet costs you get into a very difficult situation there.

Senator PERCY. Could you give us a ball park figure?

Secretary LAIRD. The A-1 is being completely phased out of the United States forces. We have no need for the A-1.

Senator PERCY. But does it have a resale value someplace else?

Secretary LAIRD. We have no demand for the A-1 except in Vietnam at the present time.

Senator PERCY. If you could give us the figures both ways, then.

Secretary LAIRD. We would perhaps have some call for them if they were cheap enough.

Senator PERCY. Could you give us a ball park figure, though? What are we talking about—\$100 million, a half million dollars? a billion?

Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad to supply that.

(The information referred to follows:)

A-1 PROGRAM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

One hundred sixty-seven (167) A-1 aircraft that were excess to USAF requirements have been turned over to the South Vietnamese Air Force. These aircraft are being phased out of U.S. inventory and there is no other requirement for them. Under these circumstances, it is important to recognize that there

is no provision of law which requires that a value be assigned to such Defense property made available to South Vietnam. However, in an effort to comply with your request we have determined that the aircraft involved had an initial acquisition value of \$59.8 million.

Senator PERCY. Do you have any kind of a rough estimate now as to what we have really put into the South Vietnamese Air Force? That is quite germane to my principal point.

Secretary LAIRD. It is very germane. The problem is we are transferring to the South Vietnamese Air Force very valuable military equipment and aircraft that have a defensive capability. Most of it is in the area of aircraft that we do not currently maintain in our inventory, but I do not want to downgrade its capability as far as defense is concerned.

U.S. TRAINED SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL

Senator PERCY. You would say from the standpoint of expenditure we have put a huge investment into that activity. How many men have we actually trained in the United States for the Vietnamese Air Force?

Secretary LAIRD. We have trained several thousand.

Senator PERCY. Do they engage in combat now over South Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes. Earlier today I went into that in some detail as far as the number of missions that they are presently flying.

I outlined the fact that during the early stages of the attack on the new 3d Division across the DMZ, the South Vietnamese Air Force performed well. They were flying over 200 tactical air sorties daily.

AIR SUPREMACY OVER SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator PERCY. Does the North Vietnamese Air Force engage in combat over South Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. They have not.

Senator PERCY. So that the South Vietnamese Air Force, with all we have put into it, and their capability, has air supremacy over South Vietnam without the American Air Force; is that correct?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct; at the present time the F-5's give them a capability. They do not have other aircraft that are capable of challenging Migs, however.

POINT AT WHICH SOUTH VIETNAMESE CAN HACK IT THEMSELVES

Senator PERCY. At what point, then, can they hack it themselves and, just as on the ground where we have simply said we are getting out—except for the small discussion we had about a residual force—we are getting out?

Secretary LAIRD. I didn't have any discussion about residual force. As you know, I don't really use that term. The men that served for long periods of time in Korea did not like to be called a residual force. They do not like to be classified as a residue—the remaining force in Korea. We have a remaining force now in Vietnam, and I am very careful about that.

PUTTING SOUTH VIETNAMESE ON NOTICE SUGGESTED

Senator PERCY. I will henceforth call it the remaining force, but I hope it doesn't exist after the end of this year. I hope we are out, lock, stock, and barrel. But what I am worried about, once we are out, are we going to continue this air offensive. From all you have said about their capability, and what they themselves have said about their capability, I wonder whether we haven't reached the point where today we ought to say as of a given date you are on your own, you have air supremacy and everything that money and training can give you, and you have to hack it on your own.

Secretary LAIRD. We have done a remarkable job in phase II which involves air logistics and artillery. It really has been quite a remarkable job and you are expressing a viewpoint which certainly is shared by many. It was almost an impossible job when we took over in 1969 and that program has moved along very, very well.

Senator PERCY. I am encouraged by what I hear and I do hope that we will put them on notice. By none of my questions do I want to imply that I have not been filled with admiration for the fact you have stood up against insurmountable forces at times. There are hawks and there are doves inside the Pentagon and, as I understand your position, you have been in the forefront of those who have felt they ought to be put on notice; we have done everything that we can, and they are going to stand on their own feet only when they know they have to be on their own feet.

I think from my standpoint that goes in the air as well as on the ground.

I commend you for what you have done to encourage the administration to withdraw these forces and at the same time cut the Armed Forces by 1,100,000 men and work toward a volunteer army.

So I think you have been one of the enlightened forces within the administration and I commend you for that. But as you can see, I think we can even go further and faster now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMIZATION

Secretary LAIRD. Senator, I want you to know that this program of Vietnamization has the complete support of the entire administration, the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Department of Defense. It has complete and total support as far as our Government is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I know the time is late.

Secretary LAIRD. I sort of enjoy being with you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I am bound to say your endurance and resourcefulness are unequalled in my experience. You have always succeeded in outlasting any committee that I have been on.

Secretary LAIRD. I used to do that to witnesses now and then and it is very difficult to change positions.

The CHAIRMAN. I regret that you have changed it. I wish we had your resources.

Secretary LAIRD. I thought you were being a witness when we started this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I have been left several questions, particularly by Senator Case, relating to information, and Senator Symington, who had another engagement.

INTERFERENCE WITH WORK OF U.S. JOURNALISTS

One pertains to the subject of information. There have been a number of reports recently, including one in the New York Times, indicating the increasing difficulty which American newsmen are encountering with Vietnamese officials while seeking to cover the war.

Is there anything the Defense Department can or is willing to do to prevent Saigon authorities from interfering with the work of U.S. journalists?

Are you familiar with this article?

Secretary LAIRD. I am not familiar with the article, but I can assure you that, concerning the Americans that are on the ground, and I referred to them earlier, we have some advisers, we have some security forces, and we have the American newsmen.

The American newsmen have a responsibility. It isn't a combat responsibility, but they have the responsibility to report fairly and openly on the conditions and the fighting that takes place in Vietnam. I think by and large they are doing a good job.

The CHAIRMAN. This report of the 14th in the New York Times says:

American military spokesmen also have become exceptionally tightlipped, especially about the role the B-52's are playing over the North.

* * * * *

Both Vietnamese and American authorities have threatened a number of American correspondents with disaccreditation, which now is tantamount to expulsion. Actual disaccreditation proceedings have begun against several newsmen.

Mr. Reporter, I will put the entire article in the record, but that gives you the gist of it.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Apr. 16, 1972]

SAIGON MAKING MOVES TO CURB BAD-NEWS COVERAGE OF THE WAR

SAIGON, South Vietnam, April 15.—With the Vietnam war in one of its most critical phases in a decade of fighting, the Saigon Government is again imposing tough restraints on news coverage, particularly that of foreign correspondents.

With the tide of battle going against Government forces in several areas, Saigon authorities are seeking to prevent newsmen from filing any dispatches that leave the impression that South Vietnam is not doing well.

Since North Vietnam began its offensive at the end of last month, Saigon authorities have been interfering with the flow of information, restricting the number of visas issued to foreign newsmen and preventing them from observing battles at first hand.

Yesterday, for the first time since the enemy drive began, South Vietnamese civilian and military policemen set up a checkpoint on Route 13, just south of the town of Bencat and 23 miles north of Saigon.

Ordinary civilian traffic is permitted past the checkpoint, but civilians with press credentials are turned back.

NO REASONS ARE GIVEN

Farther up the road, the South Vietnamese 21st Division is hemmed in by increasingly dangerous enemy forces. Beyond that, at Anloc, the capital of Binh-long province, the South Vietnamese Fifth Division is facing the possibility of

annihilation. Newsmen's only access to any of those actions is by car and the route includes the new checkpoint.

South Vietnamese military authorities have declined to give any reason why Route 13 has been closed to newsmen. Many news-gathering organizations, short-handed in the present emergency, have sought in vain to obtain visas for additional correspondents. Some have come, but only a few newsmen are admitted while many wait for visas for two months.

ROLE OF THE B-52'S

American military spokesmen also have become exceptionally tightlipped especially about the role the B-52's are playing over the North.

Administration officials in Washington were quoted yesterday as saying that President Nixon had ordered general expansion of B-52 raids throughout the southern panhandle of North Vietnam.

No announcements of such raids on North Vietnam have been forthcoming here, however, and officials say those attacks will be announced only after the entire series of raids. They do not say whether they are thinking in terms of days or months.

Both Vietnamese and American authorities have threatened a number of American correspondents with disaccreditation, which now is tantamount to expulsion. Actual disaccreditation proceedings have begun against several newsmen.

The aims of the North Vietnamese offensive are clearly more political and diplomatic than military. It is probably less important to the enemy to capture a town or a jungle area than it is to bleed Saigon's forces, dismember and rout big units and wreck national morale. This, Hanoi probably feels, will reap results at the conference table from both Saigon and Washington.

AMERICAN GENERAL ASSAILED

Accordingly, the American combat role is being kept as far out of sight as possible by spokesmen of both the South Vietnamese and American commands here.

A South Vietnamese spokesman here today indirectly criticized Maj. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, the United States Army's senior adviser for Military Region III. General Hollingsworth, interviewed earlier in the week near the scene of the fighting on Route 13, told newsmen how he intended to send "his" Vietnamese troops against the enemy, implying repeatedly that he was in direct command.

The Saigon spokesman asserted today that South Vietnamese generals did not need the advice of foreign generals and that to suggest that they did was to help the Communists.

Relations between Saigon and foreign correspondents have never been smooth. Now, United States officials generally appear to regard the situation with neither sympathy nor special interest and some confess that they share Saigon's antipathy toward the correspondents.

INDICATED MOVE TO DISCIPLINE AND EXCLUDE NEWSMEN

The CHAIRMAN. The article indicates that there is a move to discipline and exclude newsmen.

Secretary LAIRD. Cases of discipline that I know of, Senator, have to do with violations of the regulations which have been set up to protect American service personnel. There have been indications several times that while a SAR operation was going on—this is a search and rescue mission and these are very difficult operations to conduct—there have been breaks by certain individual newsmen. I don't think there are very many, but that is a violation, and until the SAR has been completed and we can report on the recovery or the lack of opportunity to recover the pilot, we do not permit those stories to be written.

That is possibly the only area in which a newsman picking up a story at an air base from some pilot is supposed to check that story with our MAC/V (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) head-

quarters public affairs people before he writes that story on a downed aircraft. I do not think that that is too much to ask of any American newsman, and 99 percent of the newsmen there are following that rule and that regulation.

There have been very few violations and I would certainly support the MAC/V public affairs officer if he does withdraw the credentials of any newsman who violates that regulation, because as long as I am in this position as Secretary of Defense, the safety and security of these men and their rescue must come first.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the reason. Most governments, of course, do this. It has not been customary in the past in ours.

Secretary LAIRD. That has always been customary in ours.

The CHAIRMAN. Another question.

Secretary LAIRD. We have always protected on search and rescue missions the people that we send in to carry on those missions. They are placing their lives in jeopardy for the recovery of another military person.

When an aircraft is downed, because a newsman hears about it at a military base and hears where the aircraft is down, I don't believe that story should be written until the final search and rescue mission by these American-trained military people has been evaluated and concluded.

GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S INTERVIEW WITH NEWSMEN

The CHAIRMAN. This, of course, doesn't deal solely with the specific case you mention. I will just give you a flavor. I didn't know you wanted to enlarge upon it.

A South Vietnamese spokesman here today indirectly criticized Major General James F. Hollingsworth, the United States Army's Senior Advisor for Military Region 3. General Hollingsworth, interviewed earlier in the week near the scene of the fighting on Route 13, told newsmen how he intended to send 'his' Vietnamese troops against the enemy, implying repeatedly that he was in direct command.

The Saigon spokesman asserted today that South Vietnamese generals did not need the advice of foreign generals and that to suggest that they did was to help the Communists.

These questions don't apply to a downed aircraft.

Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad to look over the article. I have not seen the article, Senator, but I will be very glad to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. It ends up.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. OFFICIALS AND SAIGON TOWARD CORRESPONDENTS

United States officials generally appear to regard the situation with neither sympathy nor special interest and some confess that they share Saigon's antipathy toward the correspondents.

WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION ON AIRSTRIKES

Another article says that increasingly information on matters such as airstrikes in North Vietnam is being withheld from the public and press. This is information which was once released by your Department and which is not unknown to the other side, since they see the planes. Why cannot the American people receive the same information? Why can we not receive sortie rates and bombing figures broken down by country?

Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad to look into that.
(The article referred to follows:)

U.S. TO END DISCLOSURE OF AIR STRIKES IN NORTH

[From the New York Times, Apr. 13, 1972]

Washington, April 11.—In a change of longstanding policy, the Pentagon said today that the United States command in Saigon would no longer make daily announcements of American air strikes over North Vietnam.

Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pentagon spokesman, said the change was intended to protect United States pilots who were "flying against the most sophisticated air defenses in the history of air warfare." The daily reports indicate to the enemy the level of the United aid effort, Mr. Friedheim said.

In the future, he said, announcements will be issued periodically at the discretion of Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the United States commander in Vietnam.

The United States had halted its bombing of North Vietnam in 1968, but has since carried out periodic raids under conditions that the United States has described as "protective reaction."

Heavy United States air strikes on the North were resumed last week following the latest attack on South Vietnam by Communist troops. This drew criticism from several members of Congress opposed to any step-up in their air war.

News men in Saigon have complained in recent months of a tightening of American information policies.

Secretary LAIRD. I do feel that the reporting has been very good from South Vietnam; 80 percent of all the reports are very favorable to the performance of the South Vietnamese forces and I think the South Vietnamese Government understands that. There has been very favorable reporting as far as they are concerned.

Now, there have been two or three instances where the South Vietnamese have not performed well and, of course, that makes greater news than where they perform well. I understand that we both have been here in the Congress a long time and we know it is more or less the unusual—if you criticize somebody—that makes more news than if you pat them on the back.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not arguing with you. I am just reporting the questions.

On April 12 the New York Times reported that the U.S. Command would no longer make daily announcements of American airstrikes over Vietnam. I suppose that is true. The reason given for this is the one you have given: protection of pilots.

Why is this policy adopted now when in earlier years strikes were regularly announced?

Secretary LAIRD. Those were protective reaction strikes we were discussing and we did give the number of aircraft that went in on protective reaction strikes on many occasions over the North. But when we now are not carrying on protective reaction strikes, when we are bombing north of the DMZ and in the DMZ area, we are not announcing the size of each strike so that the enemy can check out its equipment. That is just ridiculous.

DECLASSIFICATION OF MEMOS OF CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING 1968
UNDERSTANDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington left a question. You had quite an exchange, I believe, with him and others about these understandings of 1968. It was at length, as you recall.

The question is, Mr. Secretary, are you willing to declassify the memos of conversations relating to the 1968 understandings which you referred to in that exchange?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, first, I do not have the declassification of those particular minutes and of those meetings under the control of the Department of Defense. I have read them, I have gone over them, and I believe they have been supplied to your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't really know whether they have or not.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes; I think you have them.

The CHAIRMAN. If we do, is it all right with you if the committee declassifies them?

Secretary LAIRD. I come from the Congress and I always respect the rules of the Congress, and the rules of the Congress do not give you that authority.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not familiar with these particular papers. I am just asking. Senator Symington has had difficulty on this question of declassification and I thought maybe he wished to make them public. I have read numerous public statements about them, actually, but I didn't know there was this great difference of opinion about them.

Secretary LAIRD. I didn't, either.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought it was perfectly clear. That long exchange brought back memories of my reading about them at length. There was no written agreement. It was a statement of our position and they sat silent and left. The assumption was that this would lead to negotiations. The justification was that it would lead to negotiations, as I recall it. They would negotiate if we did certain things.

Secretary LAIRD. The language of the understanding was negotiated. Those minutes point that out and I am sure that they are available to you. You have an opportunity to read them at your leisure.

The CHAIRMAN. I had forgotten about them.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLANS REQUESTED

For the benefit of the committee, in considering these questions in the bill before us, could you provide copies of the military assistance plans for Korea, Cambodia, Greece, Thailand, Turkey, and Indonesia?

Secretary LAIRD. I would like to have General Seignious answer that question. He has been here all morning and I have great respect and admiration for him.

The CHAIRMAN. We all do.

Secretary LAIRD. We think he should have an opportunity to testify.

The CHAIRMAN. We always defer to the Secretary, but he can always ask one of his assistants to reply.

Secretary LAIRD. He is here to testify on the military assistance program and I would like to have him answer that question.

General SEIGNIOUS. Mr. Chairman, I will be delighted to recite country by country in an unclassified way, or provide for the record in a classified way why we are asking for the support of security assistance to these partners and these allies.

The CHAIRMAN. You can reply to the committee, as you say, in a classified way. This is for the information of the committee. We want to know the justification for these very substantial increases.

I won't go into the detail, but this request is nearly \$1 billion more than last year.

Secretary LAIRD. We have supplied it to the committee, though, Mr. Chairman—the breakdown country by country.

The CHAIRMAN. We wanted you to know this is the same argument we have had with the USIA. We wanted the specific documents on the

country plans. That is the only way we can justify to ourselves why you are asking for such a substantial increase, especially in some of these other countries such as Greece and Turkey and Indonesia that were not directly involved in the renewed escalation in Vietnam. I needn't tell you there has been a considerable opinion in this committee about the continued large military assistance to Greece. Since self-determination is the primary reason for the Vietnamese war, we often wonder about the self-determination in Greece and why we are not insisting on it in Greece. It creates a problem for some of us. Anyway, will you supply those reports for the executive record?

General SEIGNIOUS. Yes, I will be glad to insure that your committee has additional copies of the country programs that we haven't submitted already.

The CHAIRMAN. These are the military assistance plans?

General SEIGNIOUS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One or two others that I think may have been answered.

U.S. FORCES ENGAGED IN GROUND COMBAT

Are there any U.S. ground forces now engaged in combat activities, Mr. Secretary, or General?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, there are no U.S. ground forces that have a combat responsibility within South Vietnam. I don't want to confuse you with the answer to that question, because there are Americans who are engaged in ground combat, but they are in a security role around some of our particular installations. To that young man who is engaged in this security role, when the North Vietnamese attack he is engaged in combat, but it is different than having the ground combat responsibility.

The South Vietnamese have that responsibility, but our forces have certain security responsibilities. There is quite a difference.

In Tet of 1968 the U.S. forces had the ground combat responsibility in Vietnam. They no longer have that combat responsibility on the ground, and I am talking about the ground combat responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. This question was based upon a story in the New York Times of April 13. It says:

About 50 U.S. infantrymen of a 142-man company refused to move for an hour and a half today when ordered to go out and patrol the rolling hills around Phubai, 42 miles south of the demilitarized zone.

"We're not going!" some shouted. "This isn't our war. We're not going out in the bush. Why should we fight if nobody back home gives a damn about us?"

I will put the whole article in the record. That may be the explanation.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Apr. 13, 1972]

50 GI'S IN VIETNAM REFUSE PATROL DUTY, THEN AGREE TO GO

Phubai, South Vietnam, April 12.—About 50 United States infantrymen of a 142-man company refused to move for an hour and a half today when ordered to go out and patrol the rolling hills around Phubai, 42 miles south of the demilitarized zone.

"We're not going!" some shouted. "This isn't our war! We're not going out in the bush. Why should we fight if nobody back home gives a damn about us?"

In the end, however, all 142 men of the company, under the command of their battalion head, Lieut. Col. Frederick P. Mitchell, reluctantly joined the truck convoy to the hills southwest of the city.

The incident—involving Company C of the Second Battalion, First Infantry, a unit of the 196th Infantry Brigade—began with the usual grumbling of frustrated American soldiers fighting an unpopular war. All afternoon, the soldiers complained to one another.

"Man, the war stinks," one said. "It's a damn waste of time. Why the hell are we fighting for something we don't believe in?"

The Americans, with the knowledge that at least three North Vietnamese divisions were within one day's march, with mounting frustration and with the hot sun beating down on them, turned their pent-up anger on their company commander. But they relented.

They joined the 138 men of a sister unit, Company A, who reluctantly flew into an adjacent area during the morning. Dozens of Company A soldiers also complained bitterly about going out on patrol, but went no further than complaints.

Why did the men of Company C balk at going out into the field?

"I've been here too long," said Pfc. London Davis, 20 years old, of Bakersfield, Calif., his thumbs stuck between a bandoleer of bullets wrapped around his waist. "I'm too short (close to leaving Vietnam) for this kind of stuff. Man, I don't want to get killed now."

Pfc. William Bowlin, 20, of Walton, Ky., said: "Why should I go out there and do the fighting for the Vietnamese?"

"We're supposed to be doing defense, nothing else, not offensive," Private Bowlin said. "Going out on patrol—that's defense?"

Spec. 4 Keith Kohujek, 18, of Houston, said, "I don't want to go out and step on any booby traps and get killed. There are supposed to be booby traps all over the place. Nobody ever tells me what's going on."

The Second Battalion, First Infantry, which includes Companies A and C, is part of the 196th Brigade, which flew to Phubai Tuesday to protect some 2,500 American soldiers still below the demilitarized zone, which straddles the border between North and South Vietnam.

COLONEL ASSAILS NEWSMEN

Phubai, April 12 (AP).—Lieut. Col. Frederick P. Mitchell today assailed television newsmen and other journalists who were present when American infantrymen refused orders to go out on patrol.

"All you press are bastards. I blame you for this and you can quote me on it," he said to the correspondents.

In Saigon, the United States command said, "A rumor to the effect that the area was an ambush site loaded with booby traps circulated among some members."

The command statement, without offering any direct criticism of newsmen, said: "Numerous correspondents were in the area interviewing soldiers. Several soldiers told correspondents that they did not want to go into the field."

No soldier actually disobeyed orders or refused to go into the field, the command said. No disciplinary action was taken.

So-called combat refusals have not been infrequent among United States troops in Vietnam in the past 2½ years, especially since the American withdrawal began.

The United States command has adopted a policy of trying in most cases to reason with soldiers who refuse such orders, rather than invoking punitive measures. Usually, the soldiers eventually agree to carry out the orders, officers have said.

The most famous incident of the kind occurred August, 1969, when troops of another battalion of the 196th Brigade—then part of the American Division—refused orders to move forward during an operation aimed at reaching the site of a helicopter crash some 30 miles south of Danang.

PATROLS AROUND BASES

The CHAIRMAN. You do not consider patrols around bases as being combat?

Secretary LAIRD. While it is in a security role for the U.S. forces, I do not believe it is prudent for us not to have some U.S. security forces around our bases. Whenever that is possible, we certainly pro-

vide for it. But it is quite a different responsibility than existed before the completion of phase I of Vietnamization.

As for that young man, I always have to put myself in his place, Mr. Chairman. There are advisers who are out with the ARVN forces. They are in a combat role from time to time. I can assure you of that, even though they do not have the combat responsibility on the ground in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, in the broadest sense, everything we are doing has to do with security. The purpose of bombing Hanoi is to insure the security of our troops and bases in the South; isn't it? Isn't that what the thrust of your testimony has been?

Secretary LAIRD. The security of our forces, as we continue our withdrawals, is most important as far as I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure it is important to every Member of this House and this Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not arguing whether we should or shouldn't. Are they in a combat role? That is all I wish to ask.

RISK OF EXPOSING CARRIER IN GULF OF TONKIN

You mentioned the attacks upon our ships already and I don't want to go over it.

Do you think that the exposure, especially of the aircraft carrier in the Gulf of Tonkin is a risk that we should take?

Wouldn't it be extremely inflammatory if something happened to one of those carriers, either by gunboat or what have you, a kamikaze attack? It struck me the other day that when we move so many carriers, they are so big and clumsy that they might offer a target which could result in the damage or sinking of one, which would really call all bets off.

Secretary LAIRD. I would like the chairman to comment on that particular question, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Chairman, I have spent a large part of my life on an aircraft carrier, and I have never considered them to be clumsy. Insofar as the security of the carrier in the gulf is concerned, sir, these ships are kept in such a position that they are not exposed to the shore batteries or to the defenses along the coastline, as the destroyers are. Adequate defenses and warning systems are established for the carriers and I believe they are in a secure position.

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer is that there is not any appreciable risk?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG OR MINING HARBOR

The CHAIRMAN. Has any thought been given to imposing a mobile blockade or quarantine on Haiphong or mining Haiphong Harbor?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you go further?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, the answer to your question is that there are many contingency plans.

When I was a Member of the Congress in 1966 our House Appropriations Committee gave a great deal of thought and consideration—

The CHAIRMAN. Then these are old contingency plans? There is no immediate plan?

Secretary LAIRD. I wouldn't rule out—

WITNESS' RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS WEATHER CONTROL ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. You wouldn't rule it out.

Mr. Secretary, why do you decline to discuss weather control activities in North Vietnam when you freely discuss B-52 flights over North Vietnam? What is the sensitive nature of weather control, or whatever you may do with the weather? I don't understand it.

You seem to be very reluctant to proceed with our activities in the area.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not talk about things that we haven't done, and as for the B-52's over North Vietnam, we have announced that we have used the B-52's over North Vietnam.

In connection with the weather programs or such as have been discussed—and we had a discussion about the Philippines and Texas and the Caribbean, and several other areas—we have not conducted and are not at this time conducting such operations, but I am not going to rule them out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is understandable. In other words, you have never engaged in the use of weather control, although you have a capability of it? Is that the reason?

Secretary LAIRD. We have never engaged in that type of activity over North Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a perfectly logical answer. I don't know why you were so sensitive about it.

Secretary LAIRD. I am not sensitive about it, Mr. Chairman, but—

The CHAIRMAN. But you didn't discuss it.

CLASSIFIED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PLANS REQUESTED

The staff reminds me, General Seignious, thinking that maybe in my ignorance I didn't pursue the matter properly, that what we were asking for is not more copies of the congressional presentation document for the security assistance program, which we have, but the classified military assistance program plans for the countries I mentioned.

Did you understand what I was after or did you think we wanted further copies of the congressional presentation book?

General SEIGNIOUS. Mr. Chairman, the congressional presentation document describes the country plans, country by country, of each country we are providing assistance to. It does not provide the war plans of that nation; nor would I suggest you would desire that.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't want war plans. That has never been our interest.

Secretary LAIRD. If you tell us what you want—do you want the contingency plans of the nations involved?

The CHAIRMAN. We want what is called the military assistance program plans. That does not mean anything specific?

Secretary LAIRD. Military assistance program plan. We are familiar with those. I have gone over them. We have projections for those pro-

grams; they are working documents and we have no approved programs that stretch over a period.

The CHAIRMAN. How about leaving out the projections?

Secretary LAIRD. We do have it for the countries you mentioned and we will provide you that for fiscal year 1973.

(The information referred to follows:)

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PLANS, SUPPLIED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Committee was provided the Military Assistance Program Plans for the countries requested with the exception of Cambodia for which no country plan was prepared for FY 1973. These plans are classified SECRET and are on file with the Committee. That information in these plans disclosing tentative planning data on future years of the Military Assistance Programs was deleted.

The Military Assistance Program Plans are the raw data submitted through their respective Unified Commands by the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in each of the countries to which assistance is provided. The data included in these plans was subjected to intensive review and revision by various military echelons before it was provided to executive branch agencies and used as a basis for decisions on the 1973 Budget of the United States. The country data previously provided the Committee in the Congressional Presentation Document represents the result of the integration of the original plan together with the many subsequent reviews.

Secretary LAIRD. We have discussed with this committee on several occasions the 5-year modernization program for Korea. We understand that that must be approved on a year-to-year basis by this Congress and we have made that clear to the countries concerned. We have submitted the program on a phased basis to the Congress.

Last year you made reductions in these programs and I think that they were substantial. I think what the general was referring to was certain contingency plans that the nations involved might have, and we have never supplied those to the committee, where we have those plans. They are privileged as far as this committee is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for my ignorance on these plans.

We had a long discussion, you remember, about contingency plans. It isn't the battle plans, at all, in which we are interested. We are involved in the decision about a large amount of money and how it is to be spent in these countries and its justification.

Secretary LAIRD. We will give you all of that information country by country. I am prepared to go into any country you want to today.

EFFECT OF COMMITTEE APPROVAL OF REQUEST WITHOUT CESSATION DATE

The CHAIRMAN. Would you not agree, Mr. Secretary, that if this committee approves the request in the pending bill, especially that for Vietnam and Indochina, that it means that we approve the policy and the action presently being followed by our Government, unless we include a definite date for the cessation of our participation in hostilities in Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. I believe that your approval of this program that we have requested for Vietnam places the stamp of approval of this committee on our program to withdraw American forces and to turn over the security responsibilities to the South Vietnamese.

This is part of our Vietnamization program. These funds are necessary, absolutely essential to implement that plan.

The CHAIRMAN. And it approves the program, not only the program as sometimes described, but as it is presently being carried out. Doesn't it?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, this committee, as well as the Senate Armed Services Committee, have gone forward and approved the Vietnamization program. The aid in this particular bill deals with the economic aspect of Vietnamization, but I can assure you that the economic importance of the development of Vietnam is just as important and just as much a part of the Vietnamization program as the military and the political problems and improvements in that country.

LOGIC OF ATTACKS BEING NECESSARY FOR WITHDRAWAL QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. Last, I refer back to the question of the logic in the statement that these attacks are necessary in order to keep the North Vietnamese from preventing our withdrawal.

It seems very difficult for me to understand that the North Vietnamese wish to put any obstacle whatever in the way of our withdrawal and this seems an odd way to put this question.

I have been under the impression that the Vietnamese would like nothing better than to see us withdraw. They would like to facilitate it.

Secretary LAIRD. You are better at reading their minds than I am. I do not understand why they came across the DMZ with the massive invasion, and I do not understand—

The CHAIRMAN. This is why I am trying to throw a little light on it.

Secretary LAIRD. They had the capability, but why they chose this time to interfere with our withdrawal program I do not understand.

REASON FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION

The CHAIRMAN. I would be puzzled, too. Isn't it logical we look somewhere else, and that is the breakoff of the negotiations a good while ago and no indication and no belief on their part that Vietnamization will lead to our complete withdrawal and disengagement from Indochina? Is that not the only logical reason that is left?

Secretary LAIRD. I think the record on negotiations speaks for itself and that record shows who has been willing to negotiate and who has been willing to talk. We have been willing to negotiate; the President has set forth proposals recently, an eight point proposal.

The other side, the enemy, has shown a complete lack of interest in negotiation.

The CHAIRMAN. We are familiar with the form of the proposal. It is the substance of the proposals that are of interest and upon which there is a difference of view. It all centers around the survival of Mr. Thieu as the President of South Vietnam. That is the critical question in every one of these discussions that have come to our attention.

PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAMESE SELF DEFENSE

Lastly, what authority, in your opinion, does the President rely upon in ordering the actions by U.S. forces in order to assist the South Vietnamese in defending themselves? What do you conceive to be the authority of the President?

Secretary LAIRD. The authority of the President as we continue to withdraw toward the 69,000 troop ceiling in Vietnam, which he has announced—I think there is no mistake about that authority; it is the protection of the American personnel as he continues his withdrawal program.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the sole basis?

Secretary LAIRD. You don't need any more authority than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Is that all you rely upon, before I ask a critical question?

Secretary LAIRD. That is all I would rely on because I think that is sufficient, complete and total. The situation is somewhat different.

During the period of the buildup from 1965 to 1968, if you want to get back and discuss that, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I do not.

Secretary LAIRD. Maybe some other authority was needed. But the authority as far as the withdrawal of Americans and the protection of those withdrawals is absolutely explicit and fully outlined in the constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know why you should get so excited over this.

Secretary LAIRD. Because I do not believe it is up to me to defend the decisions of the past.

But as far as the withdrawal program is concerned, Mr. Chairman, and protecting those withdrawals and those American service personnel, there should be no question about the authority of the President of the United States, as our Commander in Chief.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I am amazed you are so sensitive about this because—

Secretary LAIRD. I am not sensitive a bit, but I am just surprised that such a question would be asked.

BASIS FOR ACTIONS ASSUMING NO RELATIONSHIP TO
PROTECTING WITHDRAWAL

The CHAIRMAN. The question is this: Assuming there is no reasonable relationship between what you are doing in North Vietnam and the protection of the withdrawal, then where does that leave you?

Secretary LAIRD. That is an assumption I completely reject.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you do. Where does it lead you in case there are people who do not see any reasonable relationship in the bombing of Haiphong and the protection of withdrawal of our troops in South Vietnam? If this is true, then you don't have any basis; do you?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, those people don't have the responsibilities I do, then. That is the only thing I can tell you, Mr. Chairman. Anyone who makes that kind of statement and that kind of an assumption doesn't understand what it is to have responsibility for American fighting forces in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. I know they don't have your same responsibility, but it seems to me there should be some reasonable relationship between what you are doing and this theory.

Our withdrawal of troops isn't a new subject. When you invaded Cambodia, you were giving the same excuses at that time.

Secretary LAIRD. We continued our withdrawals.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Secretary LAIRD. We continued our withdrawals. Withdrawals have gone on and 87 percent of our forces have been withdrawn. We are cutting back on our overall use of air power in the area and since 1968 this has been substantial. This record of success, as far as this program is concerned, I believe should be appreciated instead of being criticized.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not criticizing you; we are trying to find out certain principles of governmental action, one of which is that the Commander in Chief also is subject to the Constitution, like everybody else, and like this committee and the Congress.

Secretary LAIRD. I agree with that statement. That is a very sound and factual statement.

The CHAIRMAN. If his only authority is to protect the withdrawal of troops, and according to your testimony, so ably developed by the Senator from Illinois, about this astounding strength of the South Vietnamese, who are quite capable, it seems to me, of protecting our troops, if they are really going to withdraw, I think it raises a question, at least, as to whether or not the bombing really is related to the withdrawal of our troops and their protection in the process of withdrawal.

You say they are not engaged in combat. If they are not, I don't know why they should be in the combat zone. But I think a question worth at least pondering is whether or not there is any authority to continue to escalate the war, because after all, the Tonking Gulf resolution has been repealed, and the impression of most of the members here is that the only authority is the authority to defend our troops. If they are not threatened, then he doesn't have any authority to bomb North Vietnam. That is what I would think would be a logical conclusion.

Senator Percy said he had one or two more questions.

MOTIVATION AND ROLE OF SOVIET UNION

Senator PERCY. Secretary Laird, you indicated that you really did not know what motivated the North Vietnamese to invade through the DMZ.

The President and Secretary Rogers have made it eminently clear there is displeasure at the support being offered to this offensive by the Soviet Union.

What do you suppose motivates the Soviet Union and, representing the military, do you think this offensive could have been possible without the Soviet Union?

What role do we presume they had in it? Did they encourage it? What is their motivation in so encouraging it, if they did, or were they simply responding to military requests from an ally, North Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. First, the invasion across the DMZ could not have been possible without Soviet equipment, both the economic assistance, which was in the form of trucks and vehicles and which they call economic assistance, and the military equipment which was used, in the form of tanks, artillery, and other weapons.

Secondly, I cannot explain why the enemy decided to launch its attack against the 3d Division of the South Vietnamese forces, un-

less it was because that was the newest division of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces and they felt that they would have tremendous success by going across the DMZ and attacking that 3d Division.

It is difficult for me to fully comprehend, other than to attribute it to the fact that they wanted to attack the newest of the South Vietnamese divisions, and that may be the explanation.

They had the capability in Military Region 2 and in Military Region 3. In Military Region 2 they had well over 300,000 regular forces on that particular border. They have been challenged and they have not been able to do too much in that area.

In Military Region 3 they followed up with an attack about 3 days after crossing the DMZ. I believe that they may have wanted to start that attack at the same time that they crossed the DMZ, but I believe the original challenge there held them back for a period of some 3 days.

Now, the timing of the situation, I think, is something that is open to speculation. I can tell you that they have adequate capability to carry on this attack but not for an indefinite period of time.

I believe that in Military Regions 1, 2, and 3, and down into the area of 4 where they are making some challenges down in the Cambodian border area and in the U-Minh Forest, that they can perhaps sustain activity there for 3 to 5 weeks. They can sustain their activity on the DMZ for a longer period of time because of the shorter logistic supply routes into that area.

I am trying to give you as frank an answer as I can, but it is difficult.

MOTIVATION OF SOVIET UNION

Senator PERCY. I appreciate that.

We know that there is a pattern of restraint with respect to Soviet support of their allies in the Arab States, as they have done everything they could do to avoid a head-on confrontation with us. The stakes have been too big.

You have said, and the President has implied and the Secretary of State has said they are the principal suppliers, that this offensive could not have been carried on without the Soviet assistance and help.

Why didn't they restrain the North Vietnamese? What are they trying to accomplish? Did they want a confrontation? In your efforts to project what motivated them to do this, could you share with us a more sophisticated thought than I could give to it? Are they trying to wreck the conference in Moscow, to cut it off, or put themselves in a much stronger bargaining position? Is this the activity, then, and the real thrust of their activity rather than just a military offensive? Is it more in the area of strengthening their hand in diplomacy, very important diplomacy yet to come?

Secretary LAIRD. I cannot interpret fully what the intentions are of the Soviet Union in this area. I think that they have thought for a long period of time that the South Vietnamese operation gave them certain advantages, as far as they were concerned, in their overall military planning. They were able to devote a larger portion of the resources used for national security to the modernization of their forces, both conventional and strategic forces, from 1965 through the period of 1969, than we were because we were devoting so much of our

national security budget to the Vietnam conflict. I feel that from a standpoint of overall strategy they felt that for a small investment they could gain considerably because of past decisions that were made by previous administrations. Since I have been in this job I have tried to avoid getting into debates as to those decisions of 1964 and 1965 and 1966, but I think that the Soviet Union felt that this had a considerable effect upon their flexibility as they used their national security resources for modernization programs.

Now, I think that the Soviet Union has seen that this Vietnamization program is working. I think that the North Vietnamese realize that this Vietnamization program is working, and that the South Vietnamese are acquiring a capability to handle their own incountry security, and to this end I think it does somewhat concern them.

It is always difficult, though, for me to read these intentions. I know what they have done as far as increasing the capability of the North Vietnamese. I know what the North Vietnamese capabilities are. But when you ask me to pinpoint a reason why the Soviet Union did this, or the reason that the North Vietnamese chose the 3d Division to attack across the DMZ, it is very difficult for me.

I think that those questions should be addressed to the Soviet Ambassador and to the Soviet Government.

ARE WE GOING INTO WHOLE NEW PHASE?

Senator PERCY. Here is my last question, and I think I can very appropriately address it to you because it gets back to motivation again.

Our job is, as you well know, and I have been in your district and I know how close you stay to the people of that district—is to stay close to the people, our constituents, and I have been back to Illinois for an intensive 48 hours, and as I said to Secretary Rogers the Vietnam policy is on the defensive. Every place I went there was the same feeling—all summed up—here we go again.

The general feeling is that every offensive has been met by a counter-offensive, tit for tat, and this is the question the country is really asking: As we withdraw from the ground, are we really going to a whole new phase? You can't stand at O'Hare Airport and see the Navy moving out and see all of the wives and families saying goodbye to people without wondering and getting a feeling that here we go again.

As I heard the answers of Admiral Moorer to my questions about our intentions and what we are trying to do involving Haiphong and Hanoi, half of the reason is to get at the strategic target, and part of it is fuel depots. And if, without involving a lawsuit, I can read from the Pentagon papers, it just really seems like the same old story again.

Secretary LAIRD. I have no trouble with your reading from the Pentagon papers. I refer to them, however, as the McNamara papers.

Senator PERCY. Even his name comes up on this occasion.

Secretary LAIRD. I just wanted you to know the dates of the papers because there again you are dealing with the past, not the present or the future.

SETTING DATE AND GETTING OUT

Senator PERCY. Except the country is saying, here we are. We have been in the thing a decade and my whole point has been enough is enough. This is why, Mr. Secretary, I voted yesterday for the amendment to set a date and get out, and that means land, sea, and air. It does not end our assistance program. It does not go contrary to the Nixon policy and doctrine of helping people help themselves. But I maintain they are never going to know how good they are, nor are they going to have to use what they have until they are finally told this is it, and I hope we can tell them this is it and this year we are finished and through.

Secretary LAIRD. You are coming in quite late on that because this program is very well along. It is nice that you are concerned about it, but that is what this program has been all about. I think that this is something that has been coming forward and I would like you to look at our results because the results speak louder and more clearly than amendments.

I realize your frustration.

Senator PERCY. How many times have we sat, personally, and talked since January 1969 about this subject?

Secretary LAIRD. I understand that, but I think you should look at our results.

Senator PERCY. I am not detracting one iota from the results. I have lauded the results, saying they are not fast enough, but certainly in the right direction. Everything up to this point has been in the right direction and we only have this difference remaining for us to decide and I will take and accept your term, but I come back to lock, stock and barrel, out. That is the only way I can see we can get out of this involvement and get on with the job of Nation-building at home and building our own security and defenses, because this area is not vital to our security.

Secretary LAIRD. That is what Vietnamization is all about and that is what our program is about. The only thing is that you cannot wait for our program announcements, and that is the thing that disappoints me.

Senator PERCY. I wait with bated breath and I haven't asked you the questions I tried to get answered yesterday by Secretary Rogers. I have spared you that because I know you are waiting for the President's decision on this also and you will strongly advise him. I hope your advice will be as strong in this one as it has been in the others.

1966 QUESTION OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAMESE OIL STORAGE TANKS

But what I am worried about is that somehow with this magnificent program of withdrawal going forward, we are somehow at this strategic moment, when I would have thought the South Vietnamese would have been capable enough in the air to have managed and taken care of things—and I hope they will very soon—but here we were back 6 years ago, according to the New York Times report, the Pentagon papers tell us during the spring of 1966 the question of bombing North Vietnam oil storage tanks became a major policy decision. I quote from page 476 of the Times book:

"In support of the Joint Chiefs' view, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, the commander of American forces in the Pacific, in a cablegram to

the Joint Chiefs in January, 1966, made the evaluation that bombing North Vietnam's oil would 'bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither from lack of support.' Admiral Sharp also wanted to close North Vietnam's ports, presumably by aerial mining.

"It was late in May when President Johnson decided to order the oil bombing and he apparently set June 10 as the target day. But his decision 'was very closely held,' the analyst writes, and not even Admiral Sharp or General Westmoreland was told.

"The Central Intelligence Agency, in a last-minute evaluation ordered by the 'Vietnam principals,' reiterated its skepticism about the effects of oil tank bombing.

"Because of bad weather, it was June 29 before the oil strikes were finally begun, reportedly with great success. The Haiphong dock facility appeared about 80 percent destroyed, the study says, and the Hanoi 'tank farm' was apparently knocked out. Only one U.S. aircraft was lost to ground fire.

"A report from the 7th Air Force in Saigon called the operation 'the most significant, the most important strike of the war.'

"Official Washington reacted with mild jubilation to the reported success of the POL strikes."

AUTHOR OF MEMORANDUM

Secretary LAIRD. Who is the author of that memorandum?
Senator PERCY. This is the New York Times report on the Pentagon Papers.

Secretary LAIRD. Who is the author?

Senator PERCY. I didn't bring the official documents on which the Times reprint was based.

(The following information was subsequently supplied:)

"United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-67," Study prepared by the Department of Defense, printed for the use of the House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1971, Book 6 of 12, IV C. 7. (a), "The Air War in North Vietnam."

The CHAIRMAN. Most of those have a heading.

Secretary LAIRD. I happen to know the author, but I thought you ought to put it in the record because these are raw papers.

Senator PERCY. Right. I would rather have read from the documents themselves which I spent a good deal of time studying.

Secretary LAIRD. You have it available here.

Senator PERCY. I didn't get the original documents fast enough for this purpose. This is the only quick reference I could pick up this afternoon.

1966 POL STRIKES

It goes on: "But, in conclusion, the flow of men and supplies to North Vietnam and to the Vietcong continued undiminished after the most successful strike of the whole war. It was clear that the POL strikes had been a failure. There was no evidence the North Vietnamese had at any time been pinched for POL. The difficulties of switching to a much less vulnerable but perfectly workable storage and distribution system, not an unbearable strain when the volume to be handled was not really very great, had been overestimated. Typically, also, the North Vietnamese adaptability and resourcefulness had been greatly

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underestimated. Secretary McNamara, for his part, made no effort to conceal his dissatisfaction and disappointment for the failure of the POL strikes. He pointed out to the Air Force and the Navy the glaring discrepancy between the optimistic estimates of results their pre-strike POL studies had postulated and the actual failure of the raids to significantly decrease infiltration.

"The Secretary was already in the process of rethinking the role of the entire air campaign in the U.S. effort. He was painfully aware of his inability to pinch off the infiltration to the South and had seen no evidence of its ability to break Hanoi's will, demoralize its population or bring it to the negotiation table.

"The attack on North Vietnam's POL system was the last major escalation of the air war recommended by Secretary McNamara."

ARE WE REPEATING HISTORY?

My own concern is that in this offensive, and you indicate no options are closed. Mining of the port is not closed as an option, with all of the risks that would be attendant to it. With the strikes continuing are we just repeating history? The American public that I have talked to in the last 48 hours say here we go again. Are we now seeking a military solution to a problem for which certainly this administration has done more than any other administration to find a diplomatic and negotiated settlement? But barring that point, isn't it time really that we not go back over these old tracks we have covered before and decisively get out at least by the end of this year?

That is a question.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Senator Percy, as I said earlier, I am not going to make a forecast as to the completion date of phase 2 or the completion date of phase 3 of Vietnamization. I have steadfastly refused to set those dates before this committee privately or publicly and I am going to continue to maintain that position.

I am not one of those who has talked about the light at the end of the tunnel or said the troops will be home by Christmas and made those sorts of statements, because I believe that had a great deal to do with destroying the credibility of the Department of Defense. I am not going to engage in those kinds of forecasts or projections.

The President of the United States will be making a statement the latter part of this month and I hope that you can wait.

Senator PERCY. I thank you very much and I do very much appreciate, all of us do, your candor and the time you have given us and your willingness to be here on an important matter not designed for this discussion but certainly related to it.

I do not detract again one bit from what I consider a magnificent job that you have done under extremely difficult circumstances. I suppose what we are doing in effect is lobbying you to use your force, your influence, as it has been so constructive to date, to continue the process that we began, to get out and say we have done enough, more than any nation should ever be expected to do under similar circumstances. I have confidence that, if they are ever going to be able to do it, they can hack it themselves right now and they ought to be given that chance to do it on their own.

Thank you very much.

WITNESS' TESTIMONY IN 1969

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there is some confusion. For the record, in your answer before this committee in July, 1969, you did say this: "I think we have certainly turned the corner. We have instituted this program of Vietnamization which I believe is moving forward very well."

It isn't quite the same as light at the end of the tunnel.

Secretary LAIRD. I read over that testimony last night and I thought it was very good.

The CHAIRMAN. It was.

Secretary LAIRD. I was referring to the fact that we were going down, down, down, and the other administration was going up, up, up.

Now if you look at any graph, any graph that I have ever seen devised by any human being, the corner has been turned and we have continued to go down, down, down.

Senator PERCY. Keep going.

Secretary LAIRD. I can assure you that corner was turned and we have made a conscious, deliberate decision that there will be no United States ground forces reintroduced into that area.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't want to pursue it. It reminded me of that.

Secretary LAIRD. I was glad to have the opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. It was very good testimony and it has succeeded in mollifying this country now for three and a half years when we really thought at that time we would be out of this in 6 months. I think that is an example of almost superhuman legerdemain. I don't know anybody else who could have persuaded us under the circumstances.

REQUESTED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PLAN

I want to get back to the one thing. The staff thinks I did not describe what we asked for a moment ago and I will try once more.

Secretary LAIRD. I know what you are talking about, and we will try to do a good job.

The CHAIRMAN. We asked AID for their country planning memorandums. Relying upon executive privilege, they declined to supply it. As a consequence, it forced the committee to have to reduce their request by almost 25 percent. I hope you won't put us in that position.

Secretary LAIRD. I just want to tell you that every time you cut military assistance and foreign military sales, we have to remake the plans; so they don't mean too much. I don't know what you want to look at those working papers for anyway because they don't mean very much. If you are going to cut the heart out of this program and take America off the beat and give—

The CHAIRMAN. The reason for the cut was because they would not give us the memorandums. AID organization has a similar one called country team submission. This MAP plan is called, as I understand, the military assistance program plan. I want to make it clear that if it has any future projections or battle plans or contingency plans, you can take those out. You can block them out. All we want is the basic material for this fiscal 1973, and the staff thinks that I didn't describe it adequately. General, you are the general who understands what we

are talking about, and is it your present intention that you can supply that?

Secretary LAIRD. We will work very cooperatively with your staff, and we will work to give you the best information that you need to make this important decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Some people think we need no information and that all our function is, is to OK things.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not share that opinion of this committee or any other committee.

CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION ON THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE

The CHAIRMAN. One last thing. In the security assistance program that was presented, you have an item, for example, third country assistance, without identification. On this item, I think we are entitled to know what countries are supplying third country assistance to a given country. Is there any reason why that could not be supplied on a classified basis?

General SEIGNIOUS. If the country that is providing that assistance has no objection, we have no objection to providing it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have it here. What I am getting at is that it is the responsibility of this committee to pass upon the request, as I have already noted.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Fulbright, where a given country gives us certain information on the amount of assistance they are giving to another nation, they give that to us in certain confidence. Now, if they have no objection to giving it to this committee, we will certainly—

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the people we are giving it to who receive it from third parties. Does the same rule apply there?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, it does apply. Take, for instance, Israel. We are giving foreign military sales credits to Israel. They are also getting some other assistance from some other countries. Now, we do not supply information on that additional assistance or credit transactions that Israel has with these other countries without the permission of the third country, but we will be glad to go to those countries and tell them that you have a great desire for this information, and we will see what sort of response we get.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—

Secretary LAIRD. If that is the case you are talking about.

CLASSIFICATION OF GREEK GNP QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about Greece. You have third country assistance of—well, I suppose it is classified—a substantial amount of money. You have the gross national product of Greece classified. I don't know why this sort of thing should be classified.

Secretary LAIRD. The gross national product of Greece is not classified.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in your book.

Secretary LAIRD. That happens to be on a page in which the—

The CHAIRMAN. In the book it is shaded and says, "This is classified." These are the type of things that we don't quite understand.

Secretary LAIRD. The gross national product figure in this particular book is classified, simply because the Greek Government classified that

particular figure, but we have another figure that we will supply to you as our estimates of the gross national product.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that these country plans—

Secretary LAIRD. The aid figure you are talking about on that particular line—

The CHAIRMAN. It is the line up above that is classified, and it doesn't indicate where they get the money.

Secretary LAIRD. It is the third country figure that is classified, not the gross national product.

The CHAIRMAN. They are both classified in my book.

Secretary LAIRD. In my view, GNP should not be.

The CHAIRMAN. They both are anyway. Maybe all of them are not supposed to be.

Secretary LAIRD. The gross national product estimates should not be classified.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, it shouldn't be, and the third country assistance—

Secretary LAIRD. But third country assistance on that particular chart is classified.

The CHAIRMAN. There is so much misinformation given this committee from various sources, not from you, that this is a sort of thing I think we are entitled to know. Now that we have an understanding about the other memorandums, I think it would be very useful and would be useful to the committee to make a decision.

Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to see if we can give you a figure on the gross national product of Greece. It is under debate in the Parliament involved, and I would doubt if they would want to release that information.

(The information referred to follows:)

ESTIMATED GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF GREECE, SUPPLIED BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The gross national product of Greece is estimated at \$10.7 billion in calendar year 1971.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you wouldn't leave, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You have had lunch and you come back and start all over now.

Secretary LAIRD. This is the second committee I have appeared before. I started out this morning with the Senate Armed Services Committee; so I sort of get double time by the Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. You should have triple time because I have also been at the Tactical Air Subcommittee under Senator Cannon this morning.

DECLASSIFICATION OF NOTES CONCERNING 1968 DEAL WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE

Would you declassify for us those notes you believe showed we had a deal in 1968 with the North Vietnamese.

Secretary LAIRD. I believe you have those notes at the present time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can we declassify them?

Secretary LAIRD. Under the rules of the Congress, I come from the Congress and I answered that question before, you would not have the authority under the rules of the Congress to declassify.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you also have those notes?

Secretary LAIRD. No, they are the property of the Department of State.

Senator SYMINGTON. If we sent them back to you, would you declassify them?

Secretary LAIRD. I would not because that is not my responsibility. I have tried to—

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you advise the Secretary of State to declassify them so we could form an opinion based on more facts?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I would have no objections to anyone reading those notes. I can assure you of that. I believe it would be rather helpful to this discussion particularly when the misinformation that exists in some quarters has been used quite recently.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will see what we can do. Let me congratulate you on your tolerance, and your willingness to give all the information you think we should have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 2:20 o'clock p.m., the hearing adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Aiken, Case, and Percy.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting this morning to receive public testimony on the Administration's foreign aid request for the coming fiscal year. This request totals \$2.2 billion, of which more than \$2 billion is requested for military aid sales and related programs.

We have a very distinguished group today, but it is quite a long list. We have nine witnesses scheduled, I believe. I hope each will be as brief as possible, so that we will be able to hear them all.

Our first witness is the former Senator, Joseph Clark, a former member of this committee and a very distinguished Senator, active in many important issues.

We are very pleased to have you again today, Senator Clark. You have a very long history and experience in dealing with this and other very important matters relative to the welfare of our country.

Would you proceed, please?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH S. CLARK, CHAIRMAN, COALITION ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND MILITARY POLICY

Mr. CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

I believe I can save you some time if you will permit me to have my prepared statement introduced in the record and then I will hit the high spots to save time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is the usual procedure. We will be very pleased to receive it and it will be a part of the record.

(Mr. Clark's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY JOSEPH S. CLARK, CHAIRMAN, COALITION ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND MILITARY POLICY

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: In opening, I would like to express appreciation for this opportunity to appear on behalf of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy of which I am Chairman. It is always a pleasure to appear before former colleagues. Hopefully I can make a contribution to a clearer understanding of national security needs and priorities.

The position taken in this testimony is that of the Coalition as determined through meetings of the board of directors and regular communication with member organizations. I speak in behalf of the Coalition.

The Coalition consists of 39 business, labor, scientific, religious, and peace groups bound together in support of four basic objectives:

1. To oppose wasteful military programs.
2. To encourage arms control and disarmament.
3. To direct resources to meet human needs.
4. To seek enactment of measures for conversion to a peacetime economy. Attached to this statement is a list of the Coalition affiliates, its board of directors and officers.

The bill under consideration today would authorize expenditure of \$780 million for military assistance, \$844 million for security supporting assistance, and \$527 million for military credit sales. In terms of 1973 dollars, this would increase fiscal 1973 budget authority for foreign military aid more than \$700 million over last year's appropriation.

Congress was entirely justified in making reductions in the President's fiscal 1972 request, and would be equally justified in cutting this year's request as well.

Children go hungry in our rural areas and urban ghettos, education languishes, air and water turn foul, our neglected cities cry without avail for the funds necessary to make them again decent places to live, and yet the administration continues to propose authorizations and appropriations which scatter arms, munition, and military manpower all around the globe, supports militaristic dictators in Pakistan, Greece, Brazil, Spain, Portugal, South Vietnam, and Cambodia, and transforms the Pentagon into a supermarket, without price control, for arms of all types—all at public expense.

Defense Secretary Laird has appeared before the House committee to defend the administration's request with an outmoded foreign policy wrapped in a new cloak. Based on the illusory "Nixon Doctrine," Mr. Laird's statement suggests that increased foreign military aid will move the U.S. away from its role as "world policeman." Clearly, what the administration proposes is not an abandonment of that role at all, but merely a shift in the manner in which it is to be fulfilled. In lieu of participation of U.S. military personnel in foreign hostilities, there will be U.S. trained and equipped proxies, but our presence continues undiminished, and at massive cost; and if the proxies fail the temptation to commit American forces to "save face" will be well nigh irresistible.

The "Nixon Doctrine" represents no basic change in the archaic and totally inappropriate cold war policy assumptions under which we have suffered for the last quarter century. President Nixon's dubious philosophy is summarized in this passage from his recent report to Congress *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace*: "American strength is essential if we are to move from an era of confrontation to an area of negotiation. As the world's strongest power this nation has responsibilities to its friends as well as unique opportunities for improving global stability." Under this thoughtless continuation of a policy seeking international influence through the accumulation of unneeded and unuseable military power our nation is reeling from the unnecessary expenditure of billions upon billions of dollars worth of our national resources for producing waste rather than human and material wealth.

Throughout the report there is much talk of meeting our commitments. Presently, we are allied to forty-eight nations on all continents of the world. These commitments, entered into by John Foster Dulles, were a reaction to what was then perceived as a threatening, expansionistic communist monolith poised ready to pounce on a defenseless Europe, Asia, Latin American and, eventually our own country. I think we all realize that the world has changed. A united, nuclear armed Western Europe stands firm on the Continent; The Peoples Republic of China has emerged as a salient, independent political force posing no threat to its neighbors; Japan's well oiled industrial machine has overcome the ravages of the last great war; the new nations of the Third World are making themselves heard; yet, American foreign policy has not responded to these dramatic changes. Even the President has admitted that, "The most prevalent communist threats now are not massive military invasions, but a more subtle mix of military, psychological and political pressures." Clearly, the old alliances and "commitments" are obsolete and should be abandoned after appropriate diplomatic negotiations. But the President maintains, "It will continue to be essential to maintain straightforward American deployments." I question how American military forces is to counter a "subtle mix" of pressures. The President still seems to be obsessed with

our role as the world's policeman. His basic assumption in the development of foreign policy is the old fashioned "balance of power" politics based on military might.

There has been no more glaring example of failure of military aid programs than the recent Indian-Pakistan-Bangladesh conflict. Even though massive shipments of arms to South Asia have been banned since the mid-sixties, we have continued to send the material necessary for maintenance of the sophisticated weaponry we provided. American arms were used by the Pakistanis to perpetrate the most appalling crimes against humanity since Hitler's Germany. American arms gave the Pakistanis unfounded confidence and boldness to wage war with India. And American arms aided India's crushing defeat of Pakistan. So we find ourselves today considering in this bill not only authorization for spreading more arms throughout the world, but also \$100 million in relief funds to reconcile our national conscience for damage our military aid programs helped cause. The Chinese and the Soviets must share the blame for what happened there, for they too provided arms to historic enemies, but let us recognize that the blood is on our hands as well. This incident in South Asia has done irreparable damage to America's image in the eyes of the world. If we persist in pursuing the kind of policy the President is now advocating as manifested in this foreign aid legislation before us, these kinds of incidents are sure to occur again, and again, and again.

I urge the members of this committee to take the role in foreign policy formulation that the President would deny you. In deliberation on this legislation, abandon the archaic, dangerous, wasteful, and outrageously expensive "Nixon Doctrine" that defines national security in solely military terms.

What is national security? In two days of hearings held under the auspices of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy on February 2-3 of this year, knowledgeable witnesses pointed out that the military mindedness of the administration had produced a series of disasters at home and abroad and had helped fuel an unnecessary and wasteful arms race with the Soviet Union. We already have "defense" in the traditional sense, but we are in danger of losing the society in whose name the ramparts are manned. National security means restoring the societies' health and hope at home and building international structures by which its people can cooperate in solving their global problems.

I believe the real threats to American security are not military. The United States, and for that matter all of mankind is today confronting very serious internal threats to security. These threats can be summed up as peace, poverty, population and pollution.

With the proliferation of nuclear arms the possibility of accidental or even intentional nuclear holocaust becomes much greater. And as the U.S. and the Soviet Union become increasingly involved in the affairs of the developing nations of the world, relatively minor conflicts stand to threaten the whole world's security as the great powers become embroiled in brush-fire wars.

The accelerating growth of world population, if continued, is expected to absorb the output of world food production within this century. Poverty will escalate to massive proportion as this occurs. In the developed parts of the world pollution will become serious as both industrial production, food production, and population increase.

Clearly the United States must now begin to deal with these salient threats to national security within the limits of a sound internal economy. The crises of priorities will not be served by a gradual shifting of resources from military to human survival needs. Rather, we must abandon our futile quest for military supremacy, and undertake bold initiatives to work with other major powers to meet the real threats to world survival.

Major reductions in the spending levels recommended in this bill are not only feasible; American security needs demand them. Specifically, military grants and credit sales to nations in areas of the world not under imminent threat of aggressive neighbors, notably Latin America, Portugal, Greece and Thailand, could be drastically cut. An end to America's shameful practice of shoring up teetering fascist dictatorships, especially in Southeast Asia, with massive injections of supporting assistance dollars could only have a salutary effect. Not only would this free million of dollars to meet domestic needs, but also it would improve our image abroad.

The Foreign Relations Committee has a deep responsibility to the American people to counter the mis-guided policy recommendations of the administration with swift decisive action. I can see no reason for exceeding last year's military aid spending levels, and perhaps upon careful consideration of actual aid needs,

further reductions can be made. If we are to be a respected member of the emerging poly-centric world community, we are going to have to begin respecting the rights of our world neighbors. Only in this way can we meet the challenge of tomorrow.

This testimony should not be construed as opposing all foreign aid. On the contrary, I believe that the United States is not doing enough for our friends living under truly free governments in the area of economic assistance for constructive, peaceful purposes. Increased emphasis should be placed on multilateral aid channelled through international institutions to eliminate the nationalistic strings that sometimes are attached to aid programs. I am no isolationist; however, I do oppose an anachronistic, misguided policy that encourages world strife, tarnishes America's image throughout the world, and diverts the flow of resources to endless military expansion from the desperate needs of peoples all over the world.

COALITION ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND MILITARY POLICY

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 Union of American Hebrew Congregations
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Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
Women Strike for Peace
World Federalists, USA
World Federalist Youth, USA

Mr. CLARK. The first part of the statement is an identification of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy, which I represent, and I note from your list of witnesses this morning that all except one of those who will appear before you are members of the coalition and will take, generally speaking, the same line which I do, and this is another reason why I think we can curtail to some extent the testimony.

SECRETARY LAIRD'S JUSTIFICATION FOR BOMBING QUESTIONED

The New York Times this morning contains a quotation from Mr. Laird, which is not strictly relevant to this testimony, but which I believe is worth calling to your attention. It is the quotation of the day and his answer, I think, to a question which you, sir, asked him as to the justification for the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong within the last few days.

Mr. Laird states:

It's the protection of American personnel. You don't need any more authority than that. It's sufficient, it's complete, and total. There should be no question about it.

I suggest to the committee there is a grave question about it, if it is right in logic. It has nothing whatever to do with the withdrawal of our troops from Vietnam. Who is keeping us from withdrawing those troops and in what way is the bombing of North Vietnam the sense of this withdrawal? It occurred to me it is a logical non sequitur which deserves to be called to the attention of the committee.

HOLDING AUTHORIZATION DOWN TO 1972 LEVEL SUGGESTED

Turning now to S. 3390, the bill under present consideration, I suggest that at the very least the committee should hold the authorization down to sums for military aid contained in the authorization and appropriations for last year.

This bill asks for \$780 million for military assistance, \$844 million for security and supporting assistance, and \$527 million for military credit sales.

In terms of 1973 dollars this would increase the fiscal budget for 1973 for foreign military aid by more than \$700 million over last year's appropriations. I would suggest that that \$700 million not be authorized because Congress was entirely justified in making reductions in the 1972 requests, and it would be equally justified in cutting this year's requests.

I call to the committee's attention the fact that this bill will support military manpower, arms and munitions all around the globe, support militaristic dictators in Pakistan, Greece, Brazil, Spain, Por-

tugal, South Vietnam and Cambodia, and transform the Pentagon into a supermarket, without price control, for arms of all types—all at public expense.

NIXON DOCTRINE

Of course, based on the Nixon doctrine, and I hope sometime this committee will make a very careful analysis of the Nixon doctrine which, in my opinion, has nothing new in it and should not be supported by the Congress of the United States. The self-styled and so-called Nixon doctrine is nothing more than a continuation of former policies under a new name and it is largely for the purpose of giving proxies of the United States assistance to enable them to carry on the militaristic activities which were formerly carried on directly in Vietnam, at least, and to a lesser extent in Cambodia and Laos with American taxpayers and with American military personnel.

I would suggest that the purpose of the Nixon doctrine is merely to save face in the event that the proxies are unable to support themselves through the aid given to them by the bills—by this bill.

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY HASN'T RESPONDED TO CHANGED WORLD

There has been a lot of talk through President Nixon's policy report about meeting our commitments. Presently we are allied with 48 nations on all continents of the world, thanks largely to John Foster Dulles and reaction to what was then perceived as a threatening expansionistic Communist monolith poised ready to pounce on a defenseless Europe, Asia, Latin America and, eventually, our own country.

I think all members of this committee, regardless of party, realize that this is no longer the case and that the world has changed.

A united nuclear-armed Western Europe stands firm on the continent; the People's Republic of China has emerged as a salient, independent political force posing no threat to its neighbors; Japan's well oiled industrial machine has overcome the ravages of the last great war; the new nations of the Third World are making themselves heard; yet, American foreign policy has not responded to these dramatic changes.

This bill is a good example of the fact that it has not.

The President maintains it will continue to be essential to maintain straightforward American deployment of military force. I question how American military force is to counter a subtle mix of pressures to which the President always refers. The President still seems to be obsessed with our role as the world's policeman and his basic assumption in the development of foreign policy is the old-fashioned "balance-of-power" politics based on military might.

This, I suggest, is an excellent area for this committee to get into some hearings in considerable depth. As the chairman remembers, a good many years ago, we had Secretary Rusk before us for quite a long time.

MEANING OF NATIONAL SECURITY

What is national security? In 2 days of hearings held under the auspices of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy in February of this year, knowledgeable witnesses pointed out that the military-mindedness of the administration had produced a series of

disasters at home and abroad and had helped fuel an unnecessary and wasteful arms race with the Soviet Union.

We already have defense in the traditional sense, but we are in danger of losing the society in whose name the ramparts are manned. National security means restoring the society's health at home and building international structures by which its people can cooperate in solving their global problems. We in the coalition believe that the real threats to American security are not military. The United States, and for that matter all of mankind, is today confronting very serious internal threats to security, which can be summed up as peace, poverty, population and pollution.

With its proliferation of nuclear arms, the possibility of accidental or even international nuclear holocaust becomes much greater.

And as the United States and the Soviet Union become increasingly involved in the affairs of the developing nations of the world, relatively minor conflicts stand to threaten the whole world's security as the great powers become embroiled in brush-fire wars.

Now, there is a big argument how deeply embroiled the Soviet Union is in the latest North Vietnamese offensive to which we have responded with massive bombing on Haiphong and Hanoi.

It is only necessary to mention the problem of the accelerating growth of world population, and we know that poverty will escalate to massive proportions as this occurs. In the developed parts of the world pollution will become serious as both industrial production, food production, and population increases.

I suggest that the United States must now begin to deal with these silent threats to national security within the limits of a sound internal economy. The crises of priorities will not be served by a gradual shifting of resources from military to human survival needs. Rather, we must abandon our futile quest for military supremacy and undertake new initiatives to work with other major powers to meet the real threats to world survival.

Major reductions in the spending levels recommended in this bill are not only feasible; American security needs demand them. This is a good place to start in changing our national priorities. I can see no reason for exceeding last year's military aid spending level and perhaps on careful consideration of actual aid needs this committee can make further reductions.

If we are to be a respected member of the emerging polycentric world community, we are going to have to begin respecting the rights of our world neighbors. Only in this way can we meet the challenge of tomorrow.

ALL FOREIGN AID NOT OPPOSED

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, this testimony should not be construed as opposing all foreign aid. On the contrary, I believe that the United States is not doing enough for our friends living under truly free governments in the area of economic assistance for constructive, peaceful purposes. Increased emphasis should be placed on multilateral aid channeled through international institutions to eliminate the nationalistic strings that sometimes are attached to aid programs.

We are not isolationists, the coalition; however, we do oppose an anachronistic, misguided policy that encourages world strife, tar-

nishes America's image throughout the world, and diverts the flow of resources to endless military expansion from the desperate needs of peoples all over the world, including right here at home.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Clark.

DIFFICULTY OF GETTING ENOUGH VOTES ON FLOOR

As you know, the real difficulty is getting enough votes on the floor of the Senate to use what power the Congress has, which is primarily restricted to the supply of money. This kind of bill would be, of course, a proper vehicle. I can assure you there will be an effort made to reduce the amounts.

It all depends upon how many votes we can muster in the Senate. I am very encouraged by the morning paper which indicates that possibly there is a growing sentiment in the House of Representatives to stop the war. If that develops, maybe we can do something.

Mr. CLARK. I am aware of that problem, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You know it as well as anyone.

We did pass out of the committee an amendment to the State Department authorization very similar to the Hatfield-McGovern bill. You are aware of that, I guess?

Mr. CLARK. I would have hoped that there might have been an earlier set date.

The CHAIRMAN. I was amazed we got anything at all.

Mr. CLARK. I know your frustrations.

The CHAIRMAN. It isn't a question of what you hope or what you like. It is, can you get anything.

Mr. CLARK. As I used to say at the end of the baseball season, "Wait until next year."

The CHAIRMAN. We have waited a long time. We have waited 4 years for this. We will do the best we can.

SUGGESTED HEARINGS ON NIXON DOCTRINE

Concerning the hearings you suggest on the Nixon doctrine, I thought after the hearing yesterday with the Secretary of Defense, there is not much mystery about it. It is quite clear that they have no intention of negotiating a settlement. They are going, it seems to me, all out for crushing North Vietnam to where they will give up.

It is the same idea they had back in 1966 and 1967. The difference is only a matter of degree. They believe, I suppose, by punishing them and destroying more of their people and property, that they will give up. That is all I can see as to the explanation of it.

Mr. CLARK. I am not at all sure the Secretary of Defense is the best person to expound the Nixon doctrine.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Mr. CLARK. Because this should be the State Department; it should be the White House.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Secretary comes through a little clearer. He reflects the thinking, and given an opportunity, you can see from what he says what really lies beneath the surface. He is not as equivocal as some of the other witnesses.

Mr. CLARK. I quite agree, but I suspect you will agree with me that during the last years, going back to the Johnson administration, that the Pentagon and Defense Department has usurped the conduct of foreign policy to an extent which is not justified by any constitutional principle.

The CHAIRMAN. Why isn't he a better spokesman to explain what the policy is?

Mr. CLARK. I think we should call on those who invented the Nixon doctrine to come down and justify it. Perhaps he invented; I hadn't thought he had.

The CHAIRMAN. There isn't any justification for it. The people understand it properly and are not bemused by what it means.

Mr. CLARK. Perhaps one way to get at it would be to hold hearings on the President's foreign state of the world message. I prepared a critique on that and I would be glad to let you have it. It occurs to me it is an amazing document. It should not be taken in a sense lying down by the Congress. It usurps to the President authority over foreign policy, which I don't think is justified by any constitutional principle and it uses the personal pronoun "I" or the adjective "my" 315 times in 215 pages.

The CHAIRMAN. That is nothing new. This is typical of all leaders of great countries. It assumes the absolute power they think is given to them by virtue of their position.

Senator CLARK. I guess all I am saying is "Don't get discouraged."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The next witness is Mr. Clarence Yarrow on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

STATEMENT OF CLARENCE H. YARROW, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Mr. YARROW. It is a privilege, Mr. Chairman, to succeed Senator Clark, and we readily endorse his comments all the way through.

I have testimony which I submit for the record and will not read.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine, it will be received and you can proceed as you will to summarize it, please, sir.

(Mr. Yarrow's prepared statement follows:)

TESTIMONY OF CLARENCE H. YARROW, ON BEHALF OF FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

My name is Clarence H. Yarrow from Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. I am International Affairs Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, but this morning, I am speaking as a private person on the invitation of the Friends Committee on National Legislation. While the FCNL is widely representative of Friends' groups around the nation, it does not purport to speak for all Friends who cherish their rights to individual opinions.

This Senate Committee faces a difficult problem in considering this bill, since it is but one piece in the implementation of a total foreign policy. This policy has been formulated over a number of years by the Executive Branch with very little Congressional advice, as you gentlemen well know. In a bill like this, the Congress can only whittle away at certain items, without changing the basic thrust, which is to increase the use of military expenditures to solve political problems all around the world. The result of the total policy is revealed in the catastrophe of the Vietnam war.

It is not only Congress that has little influence, but also the voters of this country. The American public has in many ways declared that it wants American

participation in this war ended. Yet the United States has greatly accelerated the air war during the last year at the same time that it was removing ground troops. This has provoked an attack which now threatens to bring U.S. forces, air, naval and ground, back into the picture.

The basic foreign policy, of which the Vietnam catastrophe is the logical consequence, is not new to this present administration. It was formulated in the early years following World War II. It is based on the division into two armed camps of those allies who fought together to defeat a most virulent form of nationalism which had its origins in the aftermath of the First World War.

The new embodiment of this policy created by President Nixon is set forth in a number of high-sounding phrases: "A Strategy for Peace based on Strength, Partnership and a willingness to Negotiate," "A National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," "Total Force Planning which integrates the capabilities of our allies into our military planning and fosters a higher degree of dependence upon their capabilities." All of this merely means that we are expecting our client states to do the fighting for us. The objective, the overall policy planning and control are still in the hands of the United States.

The new policy is based on the same assumptions and objectives that have guided our foreign policy since the time of President Truman. These can be summarized in three headings:

(1) The containment of communism is our mission. The communist, or socialist, world has changed drastically since 1950, and the U.S. perception of it has changed. But anti-communism still remains the most-used rationale for our policy.

(2) The defense of the "Free World's" freedom and internal stability is our manifest destiny.

(3) Our vital national interest is at stake wherever communism is threatening, and the vital interest of the United States is identical with that of the governments we protect from that threat.

This policy was successful in stabilizing the situation on the European continent. In Europe there was a considerable congruity of interests and objectives between the United States and the countries we were allied with. The governments were strong enough to identify their own interests and not just be enslaved by ours. We hope we are working ourselves out of a job in Europe. If the German treaties are ratified and President Nixon's trip to Moscow is successful, the foundations for peace in that area will be well laid. But the application of the same fundamental policy to other cultures and totally different conditions in the underdeveloped world has been a disaster. In these areas the three bases of foreign policy indicated above become highly fallacious. Despite the glaring gap between pretense and reality, we continue to repeat the familiar phrases, communist menace, free world, national interest.

Already the fallacies have appeared in the undeveloped portions of Europe, such as Greece and Turkey. In Latin America they have all along undermined constructive policies of aid; currently our relations with Latin American states have reached a new low. In Asia these assumptions appeared all the more glaringly incongruous when revealed in the climactic failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The preoccupation with containing communism has frequently lined us up in the Third World against the forces of nationalism, independence and self-determination, as in Guatemala, Brazil, Taiwan and the Portuguese African colonies. By inaccurately labeling dissent as "communist," repressive minority governments can enlist our help in overcoming opposition.

Military assistance that we provide in the name of regional stability, and which the present bill asks Congress to increase, has been an unstabilizing factor in many situations. Instead of being used against a supposed communist foe common to the United States, it has been used against a neighbor, witness the Pakistan-India wars; or it has been used to fight colonial wars, as in the case of Portugal.

Military assistance has all too frequently been used to prop up an elitist regime that is more interested in retaining its own power than in spreading the fruits of development to the people. As long as we try to purchase stability in these client governments, there seems to be no end to the funds that are needed. The protected government ignores much-needed reforms for the general welfare and comes under increased threat of subversion or guerrilla attack. This leads the government to ask the United States for more sophisticated and expensive arms to protect itself. In several countries we are undertaking the job of training police, supplying home guard units, building prisons for political prisoners held without trial, providing riot control equipment to armies and so forth. These are all parts

of the paraphernalia of rule by dictate rather than by consent. The more armed control is given to a government, the less that government needs to listen to the clamor for reform. All this is done in the name of defending the Free World.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in his statement to the House Committee on March 15th, laments the cutting down of appropriations for Korea in Fiscal Year 1972, and asks that these be restored to modernize the Korean army. It behooves Congress to ask how much of these arms are for the threat of external aggression and how much will be used for internal suppression. Quaker visitors in Korea report a widespread repression of student organizations and other vocal opposition during the last year. The government of President Park justifies this by its perception of an imminent threat of invasion and infiltration from the North. There is no question that North Korea is an armed camp, but this has been true since 1950; surely no one expects the North to renew the war on the heels of President Nixon's visit to Peking.

How can the degree of repression be assessed in the countries we aid? One index of repression is the number of political prisoners in a given country. The list of places where the problem of political prisoners is greatest sounds like a roll-call of our client states: Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Greece, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia. The report of imprisonment and torture of student leaders in South Vietnam is a gruesome one. The head of the Saigon Student Association, Huynh Tan Mam, disappeared on January 5th. There are reports from fellow students who have been released that he has been beaten severely by the police. The government does not even admit there was an arrest. In Indonesia there are still about 23,000 prisoners detained from the much larger number rounded up after the coup of 1965. Of these, 10,000 are in miserable exile on Buru Island separated from their families with no prospects of eventual trial or release. Recently there have been further arrests in connection with public criticism of the project to build a 30 million dollar tourist attraction promoted by President Suharto's wife. How can U.S. foreign policy support this type of "freedom" so generously?

Corruption of governmental and military personnel in recipient countries is another consequence of our policies. Where there is dire poverty and a poorly paid civil service, a large influx of wealth, in any form, undermines the probity of the public service and the confidence of the people in the government. Thus the price of security continues to escalate. Instead of working ourselves out of a job in these countries, we dig ourselves in deeper and deeper. In this sense the Nixon Doctrine becomes even more expensive than the policies of previous administrations.

A familiar thread that runs through all policy statements is that of "vital national interest." The term is a fluid one. It refers supposedly to our economic, military and political security. But it is difficult to see how our legitimate national interests are served by arming a tight military dictatorship in Indonesia or supplying the Thai government with a large contingent of military advisers and trainers.

What increase in security accrued to the United States by toppling a government in Cambodia through military training of Cambodians in South Vietnam or by fighting the CIA war in Laos?

If one scrutinizes the declarations about "vital interest" and "maintaining a Free World," it becomes clear that what is often meant are certain economic interests: access for U.S. corporations to raw materials, markets and lucrative investment opportunities. The term, "Free World," has little to do with the civil rights or freedom of the people of the countries involved. It means freedom for American economic interests to operate with little control. We are seeing these days a proliferation of multi-national corporations under American leadership. It is the freedom of these enterprises that much of our military assistance is evidently designed to protect.

Perhaps the greatest fallacy of all is that the vital interests of the countries we include in our orbit of security assistance ("overall force planning under the Total Force Concept") are synonymous with the vital interests of U.S. economic enterprises. In fact the extraction of raw materials or the use of cheap labor contributes little to the sort of economic development of primary interest to the peoples involved. Military regimes that help to secure stability in U.S. client states protect foreign enterprises but then further only the interests of the few nations who profit locally from sophisticated, export-oriented corporations.

The climatic futility of our policy with respect to poor, underdeveloped countries has been exposed in the Vietnam war. Here all the fallacies are shown in their most glaring detail.

First, we failed to realize that in Vietnam the aspirations of a people for independence, the strong trends to nationalism, were bound up from the beginning with a communist movement, not as in Europe with anti-communism. The more we opposed that movement, the more we forced the anti-communists in Vietnam to become identified with an alien force—the United States. This mistake was made by every president from Truman on. Thus anti-communism became also anti-nationalism.

Second, in the breathing period that we presumably had after 1954 to help South Vietnam get on its feet, we became identified with the support of the highly unpopular, repressive regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Nothing that we have done since has changed the situation. Our fight for the "Free World" is a fight for the regime of President Thieu whose support is the army and police that we have abundantly supplied and trained. We even supply, through military assistance or AID, the "tiger cages" for political prisoners.

Third, we have tried to sell our people on the idea that we are fighting for vital national interests in Indochina. When this drew us into even wider warfare in Cambodia and Laos, the argument of national interest became thin indeed. And so we are now trying to say that we are withdrawing and only helping the supposedly free South Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians to maintain their right of self-determination. Does anyone think that interest in this kind of freedom would last if the massive subsidy of the Security Assistance measures and the air force coverage were withdrawn? The people of Indochina want peace. Still, our massive air attack has escalated over the last three years, implemented by the most ingenious refinements of automated people-killing devices. Our inability to see that negotiations must involve our giving up South Vietnam as a secure base for American influence and operations has led to the longest war in the history of the United States and a totally devastating war for the Indochinese people.

Fourth, though the vital interest of the United States in Indochina has been explained in a whole series of ways, none of them has been convincing. As for the vital interest of the South Vietnamese people, it is hard to see how even the harshest regime from the North could have killed two million people and made refugees out of one-third of the population of the South, as the war has. If all this was necessary to preserve "freedom," one wonders if the freedom that has been secured is anything more than the privilege of a small elite around Thieu.

Studies have been made of the post-war development of South Vietnam for private foundations, for the U.S. government and for the Asian Development Bank. All of these assume a situation that is favorable to western or Japanese economic interests. All assume that a communist government in South Vietnam would make it difficult for private investment.

Thus as the war gets heated up again, the American people have a right to know what the U.S. commitments are. If we are committed to the defense of a shaky military dictatorship in South Vietnam for the indefinite future, Congress can expect continued major military and economic expenditures for years to come. The Vietnamese people can expect to continue to be crushed between the two grindstones of North Vietnamese military power supported by the U.S.S.R. or China and the ARVN paid by the United States.

In his statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs of March 15th, 1972, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird summarized his position by stating that there were only three basic alternatives relative to implementing national security strategy. The first is the adequate funding that he recommends. This, he says, will protect our vital national interests by building up the military capacity of our allies. The second alternative is reductions which Congress might make which would make it impossible to reach the Total Force Planning objective. This would return us, he says, to the role of "world's policeman." The third alternative is to reduce our funding for security assistance and also reduce our own defense commitments. In connection with this last alternative, he raises the threat of a gap in Free World security and a return to conditions preceding World War II.

It seems obvious from my prior analysis that alternative one is merely an extension of alternative two and probably a more expensive route. We are still presuming to be the world's policemen though we hope to purchase our security by arming others to fight for our "vital interests."

The third alternative needs to be rewritten as a viable and realistic basic premise of a changed foreign policy. A few of the elements of this new foreign policy might be these:

(1) The United States should support, encourage and respect a policy of non-alignment by developing countries as being in their own and our best interests.

(2) Military aid by our government must be minimized. It is much more likely to run against the interests of the people of the aided countries than for them. Indonesia is already a potential new Vietnam.

(3) The United States should use its developmental assistance and trade policies to support those leaders who seek to emphasize security through internal reform and economic development, rather than the suppression of dissent.

(4) U.S. policy should encourage regional organization for economic betterment and political security and regional organization which is nonaligned, rather than a SEATO-type organization which is part of the cold war.

(5) The United States must rededicate itself to the United Nations. That organization needs our best efforts to strengthen its peace-making and peace-keeping role in international affairs.

(6) The United States should develop trade and economic assistance policies that meet the fundamental needs of the poor nations rather than the advantage of overseas investors from the United States, Europe and Japan.

(7) The United States and the U.S.S.R. should come to some tacit or formal agreement to decrease and limit their arms sales competition and military give-away programs. Agreements probably would also involve the closing of many U.S. military bases overseas and meaningful arms control. In this connection, too, the Foreign Relations Committee should assume jurisdiction of the ship loan program since that program is another facet of military assistance with very serious foreign policy implications.

(8) Of first importance, the United States must end its military involvement in Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. All funds in this bill whose aims are related to the war should be eliminated. We especially urge an amendment to cut off all funds to carry on the war or pay for U.S. military or paramilitary action in, over, or around Indochina after a specific date in the near future, within 30 to 90 days after enactment of this bill.

(9) This bill also should include the provisions of S. 3084, introduced by Senator Nelson. It provides for a study and investigation to assess the extent of the damage done to the environment of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as a result of the operations of the Armed Forces of the United States in such countries, and to consider plans for effectively rectifying such damage. The bill asks for authorization of \$10 million for this purpose.

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION,
Washington, D.C., April 19, 1972.

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator FULBRIGHT: In our testimony today we referred to the problem of political prisoners in countries receiving U.S. military material.

The attached article from *The Asia Magazine* of March 5, 1972 contains further information on this subject regarding political prisoners in Indonesia, which should be of interest to the Foreign Relations Committee and members of the Senate. We hope it might be included in the hearing record in connection with the testimony of our witness, Clarence H. Yarrow.

This is especially relevant in light of the increasing military aid being sent to Indonesia under the provisions of the foreign military assistance bill. This has been increasing at a very significant rate as follows:

Fiscal year:	<i>U.S. military assistance to Indonesia</i>	<i>Deliveries</i>
1967	-----	\$700,000
1968	-----	3,100,000
1969	-----	3,900,000
1970	-----	4,400,000
1971	-----	12,600,000
1972 (estimate)	-----	21,500,000
1973 (request)	-----	34,400,000

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD F. SNYDER.

[From the Asia magazine, Mar. 5, 1972]

THE PRISONERS OF BURU

HELD WITHOUT TRIAL OR HOPE OF TRIAL, 10,000 MEN WAIT ON AN ISLAND
IN THE MOLUCCAS

(By Dom Moraes)

Ambon from the air looks mysterious and romantic. It is a rugged island with hills wooded even more thickly and lushly than in most parts of Southeast Asia. The hills were shrouded in mist, through which inexplicable plumes of smoke drifted. Lagoons lay off the coast, emerald, translucent, and stained with sunken reefs. The little plane bucketed around for half an hour before it decided to descend. When it did, it was with an immense bump, which aroused the Indonesian military personnel who surrounded us. They scraped crumbs of sleep from their eyes, drained their noses with their fingers, flicked the result on the airplane floor, and rubbed their moustaches into shape with the moist residue.

Loud, rusty Landrovers took us from the airstrip. They bumped us for half an hour through forests and past rickety little villages, and deposited us by a bay. A loud, rusty boat creaked us over the bay for the next hour. The greenish, smoky water was spattered with rain and catamarans. On the far side lay what is euphemistically called the city: Ambon proper, the capital of the Moluccas: a shanty town with an excessively muddy market and stalls which sell tinted portraits of the Beatles, tennis shoes, and mosquito coils. They smell, when kindled, like rancid incense, but are essential in Ambon, and indeed anywhere around it: the mosquitoes are the anopheles kind, and the size of dragonflies.

From our sad hotel, redolent of drains, we overlooked a tennis court, where the local military officers took their exercise, capering slowly in shorts. The GHQ of the Pattimura Regiment were opposite. Up in the hills above town there were clear, pure rivers: "and ponds where boys to bathe delight," sandy pools where children swam: villages full of friendly, concerned people whose main ambition in life seemed to be to have their pictures taken. In town, however, were the military, and the tennis court, and the neat houses of the military. "Life here is wonderful," said a Javanese officer. "It is so relaxed. Of course, in Buru it is different, is that not so? Ha ha, ha ha, ha ha," he said.

In 1965, Indonesia, not for the first or last time in its political history, was in a state of chaos. Sukarno was still in power, but he was ailing and elderly, and it was clear that he wouldn't last. The Army, the most authoritative body in the country, was split into a right and a left wing. The left wing, backed by the PKI, the Communist Party, decided to try and eliminate the right wing. It made, in September 1965, a clumsy and very amateurish attempt to do so. An abortive coup took place, but only four rightist Generals were killed. Suharto, now President of Indonesia, wasn't at home when his assassins called. He escaped death, therefore, mobilised loyalist troops, and utterly crushed the revolt.

This put the right wing of the Army in power. The Generals were shaken by their narrow escape, and they saw Communists under every bed. They started a witch hunt. It is alleged by foreign correspondents who were present in Indonesia at the time that 500,000 people were "executed" purely on suspicion of being Communists by the end of 1965. Six months later, an inquiry team from the University of Indonesia, appointed by the Army, proffered the figure of one million. It is alleged also that 170,000 people were thrown into prison. Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister, admitted in an August interview that some 60,000 of these people were still in prison. They were divided into A, B, and C class prisoners.

The A class consists of known Communists who were "provably" implicated in the 1965 coup attempt. They will eventually stand trial, though at the present turnover it will be roughly 200 years before they are all tried. The C class were incarcerated purely on suspicion of Communist sympathies, and 15,000 were recently released. But the B class are the worst off. They were arrested as "known" Communists who were not provably implicated in the coup, and they have never been tried at all. Not only have they never been tried, but the Government of Indonesia admits that they are unlikely ever to be tried. Ten thousand of them are imprisoned on the island of Buru, a 12-hour steamer ride from Ambon.

Buru is larger than Bali, an immense sprawl of forested hills lying in the Banda Sea. Lazy, voracious sharks cruise off its shores, but few boats visit it. The dense forests contain wild boars, and the rivers are musky with crocodiles.

There are some 40,000 local inhabitants of Ambonese blood, a mixture of Melanesian and Malay: they farm and fish. The only export item of any consequence is a pungent, lethal oil which the Indonesians claim is a panacea for all ills, whether applied externally or swallowed. Since large parts of the island valleys are swamps where malarial mosquitoes proliferate in terrifying numbers, the inhabitants certainly need some kind of panacea: though possibly not this one.

The first political prisoners were moved into Buru in 1969. They had previously been held in various prisons in Java, notably at Seremban. Conditions there, I was told by some former inmates, were very bad. When political detainees were first brought in, it was customary to separate them, and confine them in cells occupied by hardened criminals, who bullied and persecuted them and stole their food. This was only done for a brief period, as a lesson: afterwards the political prisoners were locked up together, 10 or 12 to a cell. Rations were short, but could be supplemented by food provided by the families of the prisoners. It was possible, too, to receive news of one's family, and of the world.

Conversely, it was possible for the world to demand news of the prisoners. This may have bothered the Indonesian authorities: in any event, they announced in 1968 that they had decided to set up a rehabilitation centre on Buru, where the B class prisoners would be able to cleanse themselves spiritually and start a new life through labour on the land. The following year, the first batches of prisoners started to arrive. They included a number of people who had little or no previous experience of manual labour: among them were the famous lawyer and professor, Dr Suprpto, and the finest writer Indonesia has produced since the war, the poet and novelist Pramudya Ananta Toer.

The government of Indonesia allowed a press party to visit Buru in 1969, when the first camps were opened. Since then, the door had stayed closed. In 1971, Errol Hodge, the ABC correspondent in Djakarta, applied determined pressure, and the door opened a little way. The Government said it would allow another press party into Buru (at a cost of US\$400 per head). It screened the applicants carefully: they accepted some of the locally posted foreign correspondents, but others, notably the Tass man in Indonesia, were turned down. When Frank Fischbeck and I applied, a week before the expedition was due to start, the Government were reluctant to accept us. It was obvious that they were, though they never explained why.

The day before the trip started, however, the press party had been reduced to four men. Some correspondents had withdrawn because of the expense of the odyssey and the West German television team had been involved in a car accident. We pressed our cause ardently, on that final day, with the stout officer (we had christened him Tubby) with whom we had dealt unsuccessfully all week. "If you won't accept us," I said furiously at last, "I shall feel that your Government has something to hide, and I will write an article to say so." Tubby looked at me in alarm. "We have nothing to hide," he said. "Prove it," I said. Tubby's chins wobbled, he mopped his brow, he said, "OK. You may visit Buru."

This explains what Frank Fishbeck and I were doing in Ambon that humid, rainy afternoon. We did not know what lay ahead, or what we would see, but we both felt that faint throb in the blood, like a little dynamo, which pervades pressmen when they know they are doing something worthwhile. The Government had provided us with brochures which made Buru out to be a kind of island paradise. But at a briefing before the party left, the Attorney General of Indonesia had been asked about Pramudya Ananta Toer. Was he allowed to write? The Attorney General beamed and nodded. Allowed to write? Of course he was allowed to write. "But," and he laughed heartily, "he is not allowed to have a pen or paper."

At nightfall we left Ambon. A small troopship waited by the quayside, dimly lit in the darkness. There was a smell of rain and the sea. The officers who had accompanied us from civilisation stepped smartly aboard, followed by batmen carrying their cases. They went below, where the cabins were. We humped our own cases on deck, and were waved by a surly NCO to six canvas cots under a tattered tarpaulin. The private soldiers occupied similar cots all around us. Conveniently close to where we lay (there was no room to stand) was an open lavatory whose stench, even before the trip had started, was intolerable. Our bottle of whisky passed from hand to hand. This seemed the only way to sleep.

I awoke with a start. My watch said 1:30. There was a roar of rain on the tarpaulin overhead, and dwarf Niagaras dripped from every rip in the fabric.

Gothic roars of thunder filled the air. When the lightning crackled, it illuminated black masses of land on the starboard side. Then the rain stopped, and the moon made a sudden path of light over the sea. When dawn broke, hours later, there were flying fishes skipping over the ridged blue waves. A green coastline slept beyond. There were sandy coves, and catamarans ridden by careful fishermen. "Those are not prisoners," said a helpful officer. "Prisoners cannot fish in the sea." The sun was up, and his gold teeth shone in the sun.

At 9:30 that morning, we reached Namlea, which, if you stretch a point, can be called the capital of Buru. It was no more than a village: the people came out to study our accompanying officers, they came out of their shanties and hovels, knuckles pressed to teeth, eyes wide, as though listening to a symphony. We were quartered, four to a room, in the local Officers' Mess. A gramophone was switched on as soon as we arrived. The raucous cries of Tom Jones filled the still, tropical air. In a chicken coop near the lavatory, which stank no less than the one on the ship, were four small deer with enormous lustrous eyes, ropes knotted round their legs. People like to have prisoners.

General Wadli was the officer in charge of Buru affairs. He had a mouth like a shark and a moustache like an actor, and was exceptionally affable. When we left Namlea for our first visit to the camps, on a small shabby landing craft, he played dominoes all the way with three other officers (one of them, Sutrisno Hamidjojo, had been, until the week before, the officer in charge of Buru affairs), and they all emitted the high screams of laughter that most Indonesians habitually emit, every time a hand was completed. It took us an hour to cross the belligerent blue bay—heavy clouds spat down at us all the while—and a hand of dominoes doesn't take, really, much time, so there was laughter all the way from the officers.

The flying fish sped away from the bows of the craft. They rose and turned and skipped on the waves. They were free. We passed an observation post where the soldiers saluted. Then we arrived on the farther shore. Heavy with forest, the hills rose beyond. We started to walk. I walked with General Wadli, whose gait suited his name. I asked him about the administrative problems in prison camps. "I am in charge," he smiled affably, "but I am in charge in Djakarta. I will only visit this place every three months. You see," he said confidentially, "prisoners are not particularly interesting people." I did not reply. "You must believe me," he said.

"We are generous to these people," he said. "We have even offered the families of these people facilities to come here next year and live a family life. Seventy-five per cent have refused. You see? Nobody wants to associate with these fellows." I asked how a B class prisoner could be released. "Oh, he can be released, if we are sure that he does not have Communist sympathies any more." But how, I inquired, was this to be ascertained? Did the Government have a computer which checked people's politics? "No, no," giggled the General. "Are we a Fascist dictatorship?" He added that anyone who claimed to be cured of Communism and wished to be released would have to apply to a committee. It would take up to two years for any decision to be made.

We moved up from the salt flats on the beach, and walked inland, past a village of thatch houses which nestled amidst wavery palms. "Do the prisoners associate with the local people?" "No, the local people are suspicious of them. The prisoners keep to themselves." Beyond the village, lush tropical forests surrounded us. About a mile up from the beach, a gateway stood: on the trail beyond was a sign post with a street name. There were orchards on either side of the trail, plots of vegetables, paddy fields, all very neat and orderly. Further on were stout wooden huts. They were crowded with prisoners, who eyed the passing soldiers rather sullenly. They seemed most young, healthy men.

"Their ages vary. They are between 20 and 60. The young men are healthy. They live an outdoor life, you see." A brick mosque offered us some welcome shadow beyond the wooden huts. "The bricks for this mosque were made by the prisoners. We shall build a Catholic church and a Protestant church next to this mosque. You see, the foundations are already there." A number of the prisoners have turned to the solace of religion since their entry into Buru: but it is perfectly conceivable that they have done so because to practice a religious faith is a way of convincing their captors that, assuming that they ever were hardcore Communists, they have now had a change of heart.

The 10,000 prisoners are scattered over 18 camps around the island. Camp Four, where we now were, was one of the earliest ones, but the most recent. Camp 18, was only built eight months back as more prisoners were sailed in.

"At first," said an officer, and pointed to the forested hills, "all the area around the camps was like that." He indicated some bamboo barracks to the left. "That was all we built. The prisoners had to clear the forest to build their camps and start agriculture. The Government provided equipment and seeds. The prisoners chopped down the trees for wood to build bridges and houses. The Government provides each prisoner with rations for eight months after he arrives. After that they eat what they grow."

We stopped in an open shed where we lunched off coconuts and cassava, sweet potatoes, corn, and bananas. This was the produce of the prisoners. Beyond the shed was a bamboo hut which we were told was the hospital. It was shady inside, and cool: five young men were lying on rough beds, with their eyes closed. One had cut his foot: he opened his eyes and seemed happy to have company. The other four looked painfully up. They had malaria. One young man in the corner shivered uncontrollably. He was wrapped in a torn blanket, and had a cloth wound round his head, over which he had pressed a pillow. His eyes were wide, trapped and animal. He looked terrified not only by his illness but his circumstances.

"Jogjakarta was my home," he said in a bare whisper. "They arrested me in 1965 because they said I was a member of the Students' Front." (This had alleged Communist affiliations). "It was not true." The officers smiled indulgently. One felt the boy's forehead. "He has fever," he informed me. "That at least is true." He turned away. A nervous young man stood in a corner, swallowing convulsively each time he was asked a question. "He is a prisoner, but he assists the official doctor. There is a Government doctor, but prisoners with medical education help out. Question him, question him: of course he will answer." The young doctor swallowed once more as I confronted him, and tried to be obsequious.

He said that the diet of the prisoners was very healthy: they grew and ate cassava, papaya, and bananas, which provided them with vitamins. But "perhaps" he said, swallowing, they needed vitamin pills, and antibiotics. Malaria here was very severe, there were many mosquitoes, and not enough medicine. One of the officers noted this down on a rather soiled notepad. "We will see that the medicines you require are supplied," he said. The young man ducked his head in apparent thanks, but did not seem much cheered up by this promise. When we left the hospital, the malaria patients closed their eyes once more.

The prisoners were busy in the fields. They were digging out aqueducts for irrigation: some carried the excavated earth away in baskets slung on bamboo poles, two men to a pole. Their faces were inexpressive. Near a pump system, banks of flowers stood. They were tended by sad men, one of whom talked to us, rigid at attention all the while. He was 42, and came from Jogjakarta like the boy in the hospital. "I was a Government servant, a civil servant in irrigation work. That is why they put me here, with 15 others, to tend the flowers and watch the pump." He was a short, bearded man, with red, mournful eyes and the soft defeated voice common to all the prisoners we had so far spoken to.

"I have four children. The Government has said they will permit our families to come and live here, but I do not want this. The Jogjakarta schools are better: here they only have a primary school." (This was built for the children of the locals.) "I do not know how my wife feels about it. I have only had one letter from her in the last year. Yes, I have written to her often, but I don't know if she has received any of my letters." He stood there, still stiffly at attention, as we prepared to leave. When we offered him our hands his face suddenly lit up. He shook hands eagerly, as though he had partly forgotten what a handshake was like. He watched us walk away and his face became inexpressive once more.

The sturdy young men dug the red earth, and did not smile. "They are busy now," the officers said. "But they are *very* happy." The prisoners we spoke to looked at the officers around us, prodded the dirt with their toes, and would not say whether they were happy or unhappy in Buru. Around a turn in the trail, we heard a handsaw at work, and above its whiz and hiss, a singing voice: its notes wavered and lifted in the hot air. The singer was a man of middle years, squatting in a ditch as he sawed. He squinted up at us under his straw hat. He said he had made the words of the song up. Then I asked him why he sang. "When you are sad, you sing," he said, and looked at the officers, and said no more.

Barsuki Effendi was a small frail man in shorts. He was digging in the fields. "I've been in prison three years now," he said. "But I've only been here since August 1971. The work is very hard. I'm trying to accustom myself to agriculture.

But I haven't done this before. Before, I directed films." This came as rather a shock: one doesn't expect to find a film director digging up a field. Barsuki Effendi didn't seem to care about the officers present; he talked freely, and in English. "*Pintjang*, 'The Cripple,' a film I made in 1954, won an international film prize in Italy. *Pulang*, 'Homecoming' won another prize at the same festival in 1956. These were not political films at all."

Barsuki was, however, a member of LEKRA, an association of artists and writers which is said by the Government of Indonesia to have been Communist. "It was not a Communist body. But on October 23, 1965, I was arrested and imprisoned for four and a half months. After I was released, I could not direct films, so I worked as a salesman. My second arrest was on March 28, 1969, and it came as a complete surprise. They asked me if I was a member of the Communist Party. I said I was not. I said I had done nothing wrong. My normal duty was to make films. Since 1965 I had not even made films. Up till now I cannot see how I am what the Government says I am, a danger to society." He shrugged a little, and smiled.

When Barsuki was incarcerated in Djakarta, his wife was allowed to visit him once every two months. "But I have no letters now, no news. I don't know how my family lives. I suppose my wife must be working. My daughter's 14 and I have a son of seven. The situation on Buru is all right: I don't discuss it with the other prisoners. In the evenings I only have a relax, because I am so tired after the day, I coordinated my work unit—I am the foreman—so I have to plan the work for the next day. The biggest problem, next to worry about my family, is trying to accustom myself to this work. I am not a farmer. I am a film director." He nodded to the officers with us as we left, carelessly, with a smile.

How does one describe a prison camp? The condition of the younger men in Buru, physically seemed to me to be excellent, despite the prevalence of malaria. But how did one look into their opaque, veiled eyes, and say what fervours and miseries lay beyond? "You can lock up a man's body," someone once said, "but you cannot imprison his mind." Certainly this is the worst thing anyone can do to a man: to imprison his mind; and it seemed to me that on Buru this was done very successfully and simply. Tire a man out with manual labour, so that he cannot think: cut him off from all news of his friends, his family, and the outside world; and it seems to me that you have imprisoned his mind in the tallest walls possible.

Until September 1971, I was told, no prisoners were allowed to write or receive letters. Since then, they have been allowed to write and receive a letter a month. This letter can only be written to, or received from, parents, wives, or children. If you do not have parents, a wife, or children, you are not allowed to write or receive any letters at all. The monthly letter may only discuss family affairs, and is liable to censorship. Though the Indonesians swear that quantities of mail travel to and from Buru every month, I met no prisoner who had received more than a letter or two during his imprisonment there. Mentally this is clearly the most terrible torment that any man can suffer anywhere in the world.

In terms of physical comfort, I would not think that the younger prisoners (and the average age of a prisoner is 30) suffer very much. Vegetables are the staples of their diet, though some catch river fish to supplement it. Poultry are kept for eggs, and sometimes the prisoners may eat a chicken or duck. But they receive no meat ration. There are cattle and buffaloes provided by the Government, but these are for milk, not slaughter. An officer told me that the prisoners receive a ration of soya bean cake: "they have enough calories without meat," he said. Medicine, however, is obviously very short. The worst, however, for the intellectuals and older men, was obviously the daily manual work.

The officers once more played dominoes all the way across the bay. Military men are not really my favourite people, and though some of these who accompanied us had pleasant faces there were few who could be called sensitive. Back at the Officers' Mess at Namlea, the correspondents brought out a bottle of whisky, and sat with it under the stars. Within seconds an officer came up, seized the bottle, poured himself a tumblerful, without saying a word, then walked off. Another officer came up with a receptacle which contained three grayish calf foetuses, and demanded that we fill it with whisky. Apparently he maintained his virility by consuming whisky flavoured with foetus. We quickly hid the bottle from other prying hands.

General Wadli briefed us, after dinner. There were not exactly 10,000 prisoners, he said, on Buru. There were 9,957. Forty-one had died, and two had escaped and been killed by the local people, who are told by the military that prisoners

are dangerous. Of those in camp, 65 were University graduates, and this includes 13 economists and 12 teachers. There are also 343 people "from various academics" who never completed their University courses, possibly because of their imprisonment. Everyone in the camp, said the General, practised a religion: there were 5,097 Muslims, 4,676 Christians, 184 Hindus and Buddhists, but no aesthists. In a camp full of supposedly hardcore Communists, this seemed distinctly odd: but the General said so, and we wrote it neatly down.

Night fell over Namlea. All around us on the sprawling forested island, other men were lying down to sleep. But they would not board the transport back to ambon, or the plane away. Some would dream that they were at home, and awake to the reality around him: a dozen other men in the wooden hut, each one with his separate loss, but each one equally unfree. The officers had promised us a treat for the next day: it was a very hard trip, they said, a very strenuous walk, but at the end of it, they promised, we would be allowed to interview the famous writer, all of whose books are now banned in his own country: the writer who had been in Buru since the start, Pramudya Ananta Toer.

At dawn the next day, we started out by landing craft across the bay once more. There were wooden fishing huts in stilts in the sea. We heard the crying of gulls, the splash of flying fish, and the slap of the dominoes as the officers shuffled and dealt. Presently, as we neared the farther shore, we saw the wide mouths of two rivers, yellow and muscular and bearded with thick luxuriant plants. A village stood on stilts at the edge of the bay, and its children waved; precisely opposite, in a watch post also on stilts, soldiers snapped into noisy formal salutes. We entered the river that forked left. It was like the Amazon, broad and winding away into heavy hirsute trees and bushes.

We proceeded up the river, and soon all signs of human habitation disappeared. Small birds scouted the shallows for insects, and we saw a couple of crocodiles yawning voluptuously in the sun. The forest loomed all around, utterly impenetrable, and slow brown water washed back thickly from our bows. There seemed a countless number of mosquitos and flies to pester our eyes and lips. Two hours up the river, at a cleared pitch in the forest, the landing craft wallowed around to the bank and dropped its door. We scrambled out and were instantly surrounded by saluting soldiers. They led us from the bank to a trail cut out of the forest, which led us presently to an area of fields and wooden huts.

This was Camp One, the first camp established on Buru. The fields and huts were tidy: "since the prisoners have been here three years, they have been able to organise the camp properly." By a trim row of huts were two graves, carefully kept. "Those who die on Buru," we were told, "are buried on Buru. It would be too difficult to return the bodies to their families." We passed impassive prisoners at labour under the heavy sun. The trail was of hard, packed mud, like concrete underfoot. One of the officers complained that his feet hurt, and took his boots off. By the end of the day, I was uncharitably pleased to see, he had developed a bad blister. Meanwhile, we stumbled on.

It was a very long, hard, hot walk. Eventually we stopped amidst a settlement of wooden huts, neatly arranged on either side of the road. To one side there was a large hall where the prisoners are said to have meetings, and by it a small military house where we lunched once more off cassava, corn, and bananas. The officers were tired. They took their boots off and wiggled their toes. If we liked, they said, we could wander off by ourselves and interview the prisoners. We gladly accepted the offer. Across the road, I found an oldish man seated in the shade of his hut verandah. He had a worn, tired face, and asked me for a cigarette, which I lit for him. He sucked at it with real pleasure.

The officers on Buru told me that the prisoners, since they produced tobacco, are allowed to smoke their own cigarettes. That afternoon, however, every prisoner I met asked me for cigarettes. They have no money to buy any. The surplus produce from the camps is sold in Ambon, but the money is used to supply materials to repair the huts and sheds and none is handed back to the prisoners. The oldish man in the hut wasn't really so old. He was 40. He had worked as a petty clerk in Surabaya. His union had had some rather tenuous affiliations with the Communists. So he had been arrested in 1965. He had a wife and seven children, but had not heard from them since his arrival on Buru, which had been in 1969.

He had no hope left. He did not think he would ever see his family again, "and maybe my wife has remarried. I do not know." It was his lunch break. He had eaten some cassava. In another hut we were accosted by a man who spoke English. "Are you happy on Buru?" Laughter, but there was an edge to it. "Of course,

no, no." "The Government says you're happy." More laughter. "Of course, yes, yes. What else will they say?" He had worked in a bank, and his union had been affiliated to the Communists, "but I, no." He pointed to a young man who lived in the same hut. "That boy arrested 1965. Now he 18, 19. When he arrested he 12, 13, yes? He very bad Communist." The boy looked dreamily across the dry fields at some fertile landscape he was too young to remember.

We plodded on towards Camp Two, keeping to the packed mud trail between the fields. It was incredibly tiring, the sweat flowed off us, and towards the end the only thought or vision in my mind was of cold water and somewhere I could sit and take my boots off. We straggled in, at last, to a military post. Dancers were leaping about in front of it: a gamelan band was producing a sad, wild melody. "Those are all prisoners," an officer said with a thick tongue. "They are welcoming General Wadli. The musicians made the instruments themselves." We collapsed into chairs, while the dancers leapt, and the band played outside, and filled ourselves with the liquid from heavy coconuts.

It was here that we were to meet Pramudya. He was accompanied, we were told, by the famous lawyer, Dr. Suprpto. "Where did they come from?" "They were brought from Camp Three, where most of the intellectuals are kept. It is too far to walk, for us. So we had them brought here. Yes, they are already here, but let us first eat our lunch. Afterwards you may interview them." Had Pramudya and Suprpto had their lunch? "I do not know. But yes, I think so." Numbers of dishes of curried chicken, rice, and salad were fetched in by the soldiers and arranged on a large table. The officers tucked in, with excellent appetites. Afterwards they yawned, stretched, and issued a few laconic orders.

They then collected in a corner of the room, leaving a small space available for the correspondents around a wooden bench where we were told the prisoners would sit. The private soldiers meanwhile collected at every window, peering in with expressions of deep interest. More orders were issued, cancelled, and re-issued. The confusion common in Indonesia supervened. We were told Pramudya and Suprpto were not going to arrive for an hour. Some of the other correspondents went out to listen to the gamelan, and if I have ever heard music that was sadder, or more obviously played by imprisoned men, it was that, and then I looked up and saw two small thin men at the door, surrounded by guards, and it was them.

They came in awkwardly and shyly, like small boys brought into an adult party. They wore clean bush shirts and trousers, and each one had a black cap on. It was party dress. Suprpto had a beautiful, wrinkled face, but though he was 56, he seemed somehow less old than Pramudya, who is 46. Pramudya had the arrogant flare of the nostrils, the coldness of the eyes, and the gentleness which most writers have: he looked as though he would not, in the past, have suffered fools gladly. But both Suprpto and he, now, had a strange defeated humble look: not so much as if they were broken, but as if their hearts were. They shook hands with an unaccustomed air and sat down on the wooden bench.

I asked Pramudya when he had known he was to meet the press. "Just now," he replied. His voice was soft and a little hoarse. Was he glad to meet the press? Did he have things to say to the press? He looked round at the officers, who were examining him like some rare beast, and the private soldiers massed at the windows, at the ABC and Dutch television correspondents holding out their microphones, at Frank's camera, and said with a tiny apologetic laugh, "It is very hard to say." Was he able to write on Buru? "It is very hard to say." Then, after a pause, he said, "No." Why not? "It is very hard to say." Did he want to write? "Yes, but I am too tired. Always I am too tired."

"I am not used to work on the land," he added. Was he allowed to write? Did he have writing materials? "It is very hard to say." Then he looked at the officers and said, "Yes, I am allowed. I have materials. But I am too tired. We have to dig the fields. We report at 6 a.m. and work till 1.30 p.m. Then from 2:30 p.m. to 5 p.m." Suprpto said in a husky, rather weak voice, "We are not accustomed to agriculture. We can do it but—" with the same apologetic laugh as Pramudya, "we are not very productive." Since the prisoners only eat what they produce, the physical frailty of both men seemed to explain itself. Had they enough food? "It is very hard to say," replied Pramudya softly.

We asked if they had heard that the Government was prepared to allow families on Buru. They said they had. Did they want their families to come? "I am unprepared to ask my wife to come," Pramudya said. "The economic and cultural conditions are unsuitable," which I thought was putting it mildly. He has eight children, as has Suprpto, who was also unwilling to bring his family to Buru. "My wife has tuberculosis," he said, tapping his chest. "There is no

medicine—" and paused abruptly under the eyes of the officers. Had they heard from their families? Pramudya had had two letters from his wife in his three years on Buru. He had written frequently, as had Suprpto, who had had no letters at all.

"Would you call yourself a Communist?" somebody asked Suprpto. He smiled sadly. "I was never a Communist. I don't know why I was arrested. I taught Law at Bandung University and I had my own practice. As a lawyer, I defended many cases for peasants and liberals. Maybe some of the people I defended were Communists. I do not know." The question was repeated to Pramudya. Suddenly Pramudya drew his thin body erect, his eyes lit up, and he ceased to be a prisoner and became a dignified, very tired, very intelligent man. "I am what I am," he said. "I have no clear political ideas. I have no political education. I am a humanist. I was a member of LEKRA, but that is not a Communist organisation."

The question was rephrased. "When you were arrested in 1965, would you have called yourself a Communist? Have you changed since then?" "Everything changes," Pramudya replied. He was asked what he looked forward to in the future. "If I could write, my memoirs," he said, I would write, "But I cannot write." Hastily he added, "I am too tired. Professor Suprpto and I are in the same camp, so are several writers I know, but we do not work in the same field, and when we meet we are too tired to talk. So I do not write and I do not talk." He paused, and said suddenly, "The future? In Buru I have no future. Conditions for me here are too difficult. I want to return to Java, to my home."

"I used to be free in everything, thinking and talking and doing, but now I am a prisoner. Now it is very hard for me. I lost my freedom, I lost my family, I lost my work. I am a writer. That's all. That's all. I want to write. One day I will write. That is my work and dedication." Then he paused, and looked down at his hands, which were locked in his lap. Suprpto looked at him with a sort of understanding pity. Somebody asked if they were aware of world events. Did they know that Communist China had been admitted to the UN? They shook their heads: and to inform them a little, we asked them if they knew that the Americans had landed on the moon, et cetera: they seemed pleased and bewildered to hear about the world they had left behind.

The officers, however, clearly felt that this interview had started to slip beyond their control. Sutrisno Hamidjojo cleared his throat and bellowed suddenly, like a barman late at night, "Time's up!" The guards surged towards the two frail men. I asked Pramudya quickly, "Do you have messages I could deliver?" and he looked utterly bewildered and said "Clothes. We need clothes," and abruptly they were caught up in a tide of soldiers and swept away. Just before this, Errol Hodge of ABC pressed two notebooks and a pen into Pramudya's hands, and I gave him my pen, but whether he was allowed to keep them seems to me open to doubt. Very tired and utterly depressed, we walked to the edge of the Waiapu river nearby and boarded launches to return to the landing craft.

The officers took a launch with a canvas roof: we were waved into an open one. On the way downriver, the sky darkened, and a torrential thunderstorm broke over us. It endured for the hour that we were on the launch. We reached the landing craft sodden from head to foot, and found the officers, dry and warm, already playing dominoes. They roared with laughter when they saw us. The long trip back started, punctuated by the slap of dominoes and the laughter of the officers. Outside, it continued to rain. I thought of the two frail men we had met, walking back to their camp under this downpour: a minor hardship perhaps compared to others they suffered, but I felt even more depressed than before.

What has condemned the prisoners on Buru to their terrible situation is not cruelty but stupidity. It was stupid, in 1965, to decide that a mass of small, helpless people, clerks and bank tellers and office workers, were all hardline Communists: stupid to decide that boys of 12 and 13 were hardline Communists: stupid to decide that several of the leading intellectuals of the country were hardline Communists without any trial or investigation whatever. It is stupid to have kept them locked up for six years, unable to communicate with their families, and eventually committed them to Buru, 2,000 miles from their homes. It is stupid to try and turn intellectuals into manual labourers.

The Government of Indonesia includes many intelligent and well-intentioned men, and if they could override this military stupidity, the country would be the better for it. As it is, all one can do is to plead for the deliverance of the prisoners on Buru. At the very least, the Government of Indonesia could put them on trial, and allow the courts to decide whether they are Communists and a menace

to society, as they are now described. To keep them incarcerated indefinitely without news of their families or any knowledge of when or if they will be released is where stupidity crosses the borderline into cruelty. The Indonesians are not by nature cruel: how can they permit the Buru camps to exist?

In Djakarta, we attended a small dinner party in a Catholic convent. This convent is much concerned with trying to help the wives of the Buru prisoners. "There must be 4,000 affected wives in this city," said a nun. "So far we are only in contact with 300. But they are spreading the word to the others. You see, most of these women were left without property or money. They have to work to survive. But it's difficult for them to find employment, because their husbands are political detainees. It would be easier if their husbands were murderers. We try and help them find employment, and if they can sew or bake we find a market for their produce, to enable them to survive."

I talked to a neat, pretty little woman whose husband had been in prison since 1965. "No, I have not seen him since. But I used to deliver food at the prison every day: they could not live on the food they were provided with. One day in 1969 the food was sent back. They said my husband was not in that prison any more. They would not tell me where he was or even if he was still alive. I went to a high Government official. He said, 'Your husband is on Buru. I would advise you to obtain a quick divorce.' The military people, you know, are always hateful when they talk to us about our husbands. They say, 'What does it feel like to be without a husband for six years?' They mean it in a sexual way."

Through this lady I was taken to the house where Pramudya's family now lives. Peter Schumaker, a Dutch correspondent who was with us on Buru, brought along a tape of our interview with Pramudya, and a photograph of him, to show Mrs. Pramudya. She lives in a village, in a sparsely furnished house, and has a tragic and beautiful face. She was dressed in her best for the occasion, as were the five children who were present: three others were at school. Her mother and brother live in the house with her. She looked at the picture of Pramudya and said very tenderly, "How thin he is now!" She showed the picture to the youngest child, who is only seven and does not remember his father. He looked at it fixedly.

The eldest child is 16 and does remember Pramudya: throughout the time we were there she sat in utter silence, with a stricken look on her face. "We met in 1954," Mrs. Pramudya recalled, "at an exhibition of books in Djakarta. I was selling his books at a stall when we met. Three months later we were married." She brought us orange squash and some really excellent cakes. We complimented her on them, and she smiled wryly. "That is the way I keep myself and the children now," she said. "I bake these cakes for sale. Before this we lived in a house in town, but when they arrested my husband the military requisitioned it and confiscated all our possessions. I worked as a saleswoman for a while. The children have all been to school. My husband would not be ashamed of me."

Peter switched the tape on, and Mrs. Pramudya bent forward to hear it. The children sat around her: "they are my comfort now," she sad said: and even the youngest ones strained to listen, their large eyes intent. But I could not take my eyes from the madonna face of the mother, widowed while her husband was still alive. When the tape had ended, she leant back in her chair and drew breath deeply. "I have had no letter from my husband for three years," she said, "though I have written every week, and I do not know if he has had a letter from me. For more than three years I have not heard his voice. Thank you for allowing me to listen to his voice," and I thought of the hot, fetid, malarial island 2,000 miles away, the wooden huts and the fields, and the frail man at work in those fields, the gigantic balloon of the sun above him, and sharks flaying the sea beyond.

WHERE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY HAS GONE WRONG

Mr. YARROW. In trying to say in a very words where the American people and the Government and the President have gone wrong in the whole situation in foreign policy, I think it is clear that a foreign policy was designed for containment of communism in the early days, as Senator Clark has suggested, is no longer valid and yet is being pushed to its ultimate limits.

Now, in Vietnam I think the analysis which our organization has made over the years indicates the reason that this whole policy comes to a climactic disaster.

In Vietnam we have the greatest expression of the identity of a Communist movement with a nationalist movement, and perhaps it is more nationalist than it is Communist. So we are set in full panoply with all of our might, not just against a Communist movement, but against a very long-sustained and long-continuing nationalist movement of the Vietnamese people. The more we help the government that is subservient to us the more we are in that position.

This is not new, but I heard a little story from a Vietnamese friend, a young Vietnamese friend, which I think illustrates the kind of tenacity of the Vietnamese people.

In the days of 1785, Quang Trung was the leader of a revolt against the overlords of North and South, and in an attempt to unite the country he moved south with his troops and vanquished 50,000 Siamese invaders in the Mekong area. While he was away from the Hanoi area, the Chinese moved in, the Ching Dynasty, and took over the North. He decided to make an immediate attack on the North and by dividing his army up in groups of three, two men carrying and another in the hammock, he was able—with one sleeping and two walking—he was able, as the story goes, to march by forced marches 10 days to the Hanoi area and vanquish the Chinese Army.

Whether you credit the story or not, this is just an indication of the long-sustained feeling of the Vietnamese and the fact that they will not give up.

I think our policy has been predicated and its present form is predicated on the thought if you sock them hard enough, they will give up. We tried that, as you said, and now we are trying it again.

But it is a disparate situation to see the might of the airpower being mustered against these people.

One wishes that the Senate committee would consider the commitment that we have. The news goes out that a vast armada of air and sea ships is now being readied and already at sea on its way to Vietnam. Are we committed to fight there over the long, long-continuing future?

S. 3390

As to the bill, S. 3390, it certainly is just a small part of this total foreign policy, which the Congress has had very little to do with in its formulation. I would hope that the Congress would, and the Senate particularly, do as much as they can in putting it down.

We as an organization would be opposed to all of the military aspects of the bill. We feel that the military assistance is being used all around the world to support corrupt governments, repressive governments. It is siphoned away a great deal by corruption. It is part and parcel of a foreign policy in which, as Melvin Laird said in his speech before the House committee on March 15, the United States is not the policeman of the world, but is merely a policy of "Total Forces Planning which integrates the capabilities of our allies into our military planning." To my mind this means that we are getting others to police the world with us.

ALTERNATIVE FOREIGN POLICY

An alternative foreign policy is outlined briefly in the paper that I have delivered. It seems to me that without executive leadership it is difficult, but it is up to the Congress and especially the Senate com-

mittee, to try to outline an alternative policy which would substitute neutralization of the areas of the world for militarization, which would substitute support of friendly governments that are designed to help the people in those areas rather than to help our interest, which would support the United Nations in any effort that it can make to try to bring about a better world.

STUDY ON PROPRIETY OF NEUTRALIZING SOUTHEAST ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Yarrow, you will recall that some years ago this committee had a study made on the propriety of neutralization of Southeast Asia, and Vietnam in particular, by some distinguished scholars in the field. I think the import of that study was that this was a practicable way to reach a solution that would keep us, Chinese, the Russians and everyone from dominating that area and allow those people to work out their own salvation. It was not well received by the then Administration, and, insofar as I know, it hasn't been revived. I think it is a very useful device, if it could be implemented in this area. I agree with you on the support of the United Nations.

If the great powers, especially Russia and this country, would be willing to use the United Nations, it is a vehicle that could be used. The difficulty is persuading our Government and the Russians to use it in a situation like this.

CONGRESSIONAL DISAGREEMENT WITH WITNESS' POLICIES

The committee, as you know, last year on the bill before us recommended \$350 million for military assistance, but that was increased on the floor by \$150 million. It was increased to \$500 million.

I can only say what I said to Senator Clark. In carrying out the kinds of policies that you dictate, so far at least the Congress as a whole has not agreed to that. They increase the amount reported by this committee nearly every time.

Mr. YARROW. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate having you here, but I hope you will direct your persuasion to some of the members who have not voted in accordance with the policies of which you are speaking.

CHURCH-CASE AMENDMENT

Mr. YARROW. We appreciate your efforts, and particularly I would like to remark on the Church-Case amendment, which is an excellent step in the right direction, but it still does not go far enough. But any step of this kind will, I think, help to galvanize some leadership around the country.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what it is intended to do. It will not go very far unless there have been some changes on the floor on the votes in both houses, because it is very similar in its effect to the so-called McGovern-Hatfield effort made last year.

Thank you very much, Mr. Yarrow. I appreciate your taking your time and giving us your views. The Friends Committee, of course, has been long noted for its devotion and its efforts in this field. I only wish you had more influence as I wish this committee had more influence. We share that frustration.

Mr. YARROW. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator AIKEN.

Senator AIKEN. I have no questions. I can't help but note that the public interest does not seem to be news. I contrast this hearing room with the situation yesterday and the day before when something like 40 reporters were around the place and every television network had cameras and lights blinding us. Yet I think the public testimony is important too, but apparently that belief on my part is not shared by everyone, particularly in this year of 1972.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The next witness is Mr. Earl Ravenal on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists.

We are very pleased to have you. You represent the Federation of American Scientists, I believe.

STATEMENT OF EARL C. RAVENAL, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

Mr. RAVENAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee.

In the historic Senate vote of October 29, 1971, on the Foreign Assistance Act for fiscal year 1972, Congress served notice on this Administration that it does not accept the logic of the Nixon doctrine. The Nixon doctrine attempts to maintain American political and military positions around the world, but more economically, less conspicuously, and more acceptably to the American public, through the substitution of military assistance for direct U.S. deployments. Though a reduced appropriation for military assistance was finally passed,¹ Congress has sent them a message, and the message remains: that not merely the instruments—as the administration would have it—but the substance of American foreign policy must change, and adjust appropriately to a changed international system. Congress was suggesting to the Executive that it considers our military assistance, and our military alliances, not as assets but as contingent liabilities.

The executive branch has not been sensitive to the message; it has treated the action of Congress as irresponsible and destructive. Now it has introduced an expanded military assistance request for fiscal year 1973—\$2.151 billion for grant, credit, and security-supporting assistance—evidently in an effort to remedy the “shortfall”—though Secretary Laird has denied that interpretation, and other Pentagon sources are reported to be considering supplemental legislation to restore the 1972 cuts.

The administration has mobilized its rhetorical resources for this last ditch fight with Congress for an expanded military assistance program. Secretary Laird has called it “an indispensable tool for implementing our national security strategy of realistic deterrence.”² He characterizes it as playing “a central role in fulfilling the Nixon doctrine objective of a more equitable sharing of the Free World defense

¹ On Mar. 2, 1972, for \$1,500,000,000 (including grant, credit, and security supporting assistance), about half a billion dollars less than the administration's original request.

² Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, “National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence,” Defense report for fiscal year 1973, Feb. 15, 1972, p. 122.

burden." The President, in his message accompanying this legislation, warns Congress against "a repetition of these reductions and delays" and repeats all the old incantations: "call into serious question the firmness of our commitments," "have a destabilizing effect," "period of transition," et cetera.

ADMINISTRATION'S TOTAL SPECTRUM OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The administration has placed heavy emphasis on a total spectrum of security assistance: This includes grant military assistance (MAP); foreign military credit sales (FMS); supporting assistance (including expenditures for "public safety"—that is, the training of internal security or paramilitary forces); a contingency fund for the President's special application; and "non-funded" assistance, such as the transfer of "material declared excess"; the lending and leasing of ships; and cash sales from government or commercial sources. In fact, the administration advertises that it is shifting its stress from grant aid to the other categories—although its request for grant aid itself (\$780 million) is the highest since fiscal year 1967.

COMMENTS ON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS

A few comments are in order here. First, the proposed extension of the time limit on credit repayments from 10 to 20 years goes far toward obliterating the distinction between loans and outright grants. This request should be rejected.

Second, the proposed increase in the ceiling on "excess defense articles"—to \$735 million at acquisition cost helps to boost U.S. arms transfers to a historic high water mark and allows the concealment of values and the evasion of congressional scrutiny and control. This request should be rejected.

Third, the proposed appropriation for public safety, though small in annual terms—\$5.4 million for fiscal year 1972—is the thin end of the wedge in committing the United States to the survival of client regimes against internal opposition that is quasi-political. This type of security assistance should be phased out.

Fourth, ship loans have become a steadily encroaching category and have now approached major proportions—several hundred million dollars a year. These should be fully priced and considered as part of the regular military assistance request.

U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS

Fifth, the administration's proposal fails to mention a \$2¼ billion item: Service funded military assistance for Vietnam and Laos. Since 1966, massive direct arms transfers to these two countries—and until this year also to Thailand—have been concealed in the regular functional categories of the U.S. defense budget. By 1967 this concealed and evasive category accounted for a larger amount than grant aid and credit sales together. By 1968 it was almost double the amount for grant aid and credit, and it has on the average, stayed at this ratio up to and including the administration's fiscal year 1973 military assistance proposal. Congress should keep this preponderant category of

military assistance in the front of its mind in considering the total implications of U.S. arms transfers to other nations.

Taking the total spread of U.S. arms transfers together, it emerges that this total has taken a quantum jump since the present administration has been promoting its philosophy of national security and its concept of foreign policy. From an average of \$5 billion during the 1960's, total U.S. arms transfers have risen to a level well over \$7 million a year.

Indeed, though there is considerable sleight of hand in the military assistance budget, the administration does not disavow this massive increase; in fact it is the announced cornerstone of its worldwide political-military policy—which is a policy of mechanistic force substitution to uphold inherited strategic, political, and economic objectives, particularly in Asia, and also in the eastern Mediterranean. It is a program of retrenchment without withdrawal.

CONGRESS' ALTERNATIVE VIEW

The executive branch, in the remoteness and abstraction of its strategic and economic analysis, does not comprehend or appreciate the vital political criteria that Congress brings to bear—that reflect the desires and needs of its constituency, the American people, and its concern for America's purpose in the world. For it should be clear that Congress is beginning to evolve and express an alternative view of the world and the proper role of the United States. Economic assistance is to emphasize humanitarian support, with a few illusions of its efficacy in buying friends. Military assistance is to be minimal and is to be restricted to those situations in which the United States has clear value sympathies or obvious and direct strategic interests. The basic presumption of non-intervention is beginning to find its voice.

ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPT TO RESTRUCTURE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

To circumvent the intention of Congress, the administration is playing the perennial game of attempting to restructure the foreign assistance program. It is particularly attempting to bypass those congressional committees—such as this one—that are concerned with the total impact of our political-military programs on the foreign relations of the United States. The administration's move, in 1971, to segregate and group those elements of foreign assistance that are related to international security—though it has the plausible advantage of bureaucratic neatness and manageability—hastens the day when the military portion of international assistance will be administered solely by the Pentagon and submitted solely to the Armed Services Committees of Congress, where it will presumably be reviewed solely for its efficiency in reducing or offsetting direct U.S. force structures. In other words, in the view of this administration, our foreign policy itself is simply another weapons system.

Another effect of segregating military assistance from developmental and humanitarian aid is subtly to take away the very influence that was supposedly to be given to the State Department to manage the totality of international assistance programs. The Pentagon, with its overwhelming organizational resources, its close day-to-day ad-

ministrative responsibilities, its direct contact with foreign military institutions, and—I might add—its covert determination to maintain and even extend its domination of this area of policy, is more than a match for the State Department. Secretary Laird cheerfully delegates to State the “statutory responsibilities for policy guidance,” confident that the real decisions will be made in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the White House staff.

QUESTIONS CONCERNING ADMINISTRATION'S EXPANDED
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

It is proper to ask several kinds of questions about the administration's expanded military assistance program:

First, can the administration's overall goals—retrenchment without withdrawal—actually be accomplished, or are they in fact contradictory? Will the United States be more or less involved as it extends its military assistance more broadly throughout the world?

Second, in many cases, are increased levels of security assistance necessary—for example, in Korea, where we have already invested over \$4 billion in military aid, and the existing force ratio of South against North is already more than adequate?

Third, is our military assistance program sometimes counter productive, impeding rather than enhancing the establishment of real stability through political solutions? Throughout Asia—in Korea, China, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Pakistan—our arms transfers have either kept countries divided that might be reconciled, or have kept countries together that should have been separated.

And fourth, and most important, should a program of expanded arms transfers—whether through grants, loans, leases, or even profitable commercial sales—be the foreign policy of this country?

“MODELS” OF ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

To answer these questions, we must look at the significant cases which constitute the various “models” of the administration's military assistance program:

First, there is the model of Vietnam and Vietnamization, which the administration regards as the crucial test of the Nixon doctrine. For fiscal year 1973 Vietnam will again claim about \$2.5 billion in military resource transfers—one third of the world total. The administration has indeed reduced direct American participation on the ground. But the war persists; our involvement is apparently inextricable; the destruction of life, nature, and society continues; and we cannot win, or even stave off ultimate defeat, by fighting in South Vietnam, or by carrying the war to Cambodia, northern or southern Laos, or now again to North Vietnam.

Then there is Korea, where the administration proposes again to spend several hundred million dollars, ostensibly for massive modernization, but actually just as much for the operation and maintenance of the already overbearing Korean force structure—though there will now be some sharing of these costs by the Republic of Korea. But “how much is enough”? The South Koreans already have an army of 560,000 and an air force of 235 planes, behind thick static fortifications, against the North Korean army of 360,000 and air force of 555 planes. And where is the promised “trade-off”—the saving in

terms of direct U.S. costs? We have withdrawn only a fractional division of about 20,000 men and have retracted our forces from the front line, but the final withdrawal of the remaining U.S. division was vetoed last summer at the White House level. Evidently, in the crunch we are unable to cash in our military assistance and reduce our own structure.

And there is Cambodia, which the President has called "the Nixon doctrine in its purest form." Cambodia became an emergency aid case with the extension of the war in April 1970 and has graduated to become the second largest recipient—about \$1 billion over the current 3 budget years. What has been achieved by this desperate transfusion of military means in a situation that we ourselves caused and are perpetuating—what beyond the impressment and decimation of a whole generation of Cambodian youth, the dismal shuffle of unrepresentative and increasingly repressive governments, and the prospect of further military humiliation?

Another model is Greece. There, with typical analytic acuity and political blindness, the administration trades off support, over \$100 million for a repulsive regime against the homeporting of our naval forces and other supposedly NATO-justified functions. I do not here attack the concept of NATO, but rather the elasticity of the NATO rubric for rationalizing the extension of military support for politically embarrassing governments. It seems that, once we are involved in an alliance we are on "automatic pilot": political reason is forgotten or avoided; cost effectiveness takes over and dictates our foreign policy.

And now we have Portugal, where, for the first time in many years, substantial credits are extended in return for the continued use of the naval base in the Azores—to the dismay of our African friends and significant groups of American citizens who see Portugal's resources now freed for employment in the suppression of political movements in its African colonies.

Finally, we have the case of Latin America—militarily meaningless but politically notable. Here the administration requests a raising of the regional ceiling from \$100 to \$150 million. Secretary Laird claims to be "preserving the environment within which social and economic progress can occur." But where is the evidence that this progress occurs more or faster or better for our military meddling? Our access to the military castes of Latin American countries might even—as in the recent example of Chile—go in the direction of perverting these establishments and weakening their commitment to the orderly processes of constitutional government. Secretary Laird also purveys the not so subtle suggestion that our present clients can go elsewhere for their arms purchases. If this is true, it nevertheless evades the question of whether it should be an article of American policy to finance these competitive, ornamental, or status-enhancing purchases, and whether the United States really reaps the political credit that is claimed.

REALPOLITIK AND DEVOTION TO BALANCE OF POWER

The vastly expanded military assistance program of this administration is a consequence and a buttress of the Nixon doctrine. It is also a contribution to the larger foreign policy stance of this administration: a stance of realpolitik and devotion to the balance of power.

It should be recognized that playing the balance-of-power game does not imply merely the exercise of a benign and clever diplomacy—the substitution of an era of negotiation for one of confrontation. Rather, it will require the continual brandishing of threats of military force and the perpetual risk of intervention and escalation of conflict.

ALTERNATIVE TO ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY

This administration considers its course of active power balancing so correct, so uniquely indicated by circumstances, that it is quick to brand any opponent "isolationist." But the alternatives to the Administration's policy are not necessarily a "Fortress America" posture—quivering behind our ramparts, paranoid about the rest of the world—or a reversion to worldwide ideological confrontation—with American forces directly and universally deployed.

The true alternative is for America to recognize the rest of the world, to accept an international system of autonomous states—in short, to behave as a nation among nations. This might well imply a world without substantial U.S. arms transfers—without U.S. control or regulation. But it would not necessarily be a world without security or a world that would be inimical to our abiding national interests.

The resurgent—indeed, "insurgent"—attitude of Congress in recent sessions has, in view of the failure and sham of the administration's technical and strategic justifications for military assistance, been healthy and constructive in preventing larger amounts of resources from leaving the United States and in forcing military planners to justify military assistance in ways that are related to the Nation's true security interests and most worthy hopes for the development of the rest of the world. It is entirely appropriate for Congress—which cannot promulgate "state of the world" messages—to take advantage of whatever political instruments might be available, especially the processes of review, authorization and appropriation. Congress should be impervious to administration charges of irresponsibility, or to the anguish of executive branch functionaries, who may finally be forced to be responsive to the popular will and to rethink their meticulous allocations.

National security remains an essential condition for our welfare. But it is not the goal of our entire system; it is only a condition. No one is asking that the U.S. abandon its security interests—only that we define them and justify them.

(Mr. Ravenal's prepared statement follows:)

THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEW MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

(Testimony of Earl C. Ravenal, Former Director, Asian Division (Systems Analysis), Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1967-69). Associate Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., Appearing on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists, Before the United States Senate

ABSTRACT

In the historic Senate vote of October 1971 on the Foreign Assistance Act, Congress served notice on this administration that it does not accept the logic of the Nixon Doctrine. Now the Executive Branch has introduced an expanded military assistance request for FY 1973, in an effort to remedy the "shortfall." Indeed, a significant increase in the average level of arms transfers to the rest of the world is the cornerstone of this administration's policy—a policy of

mechanistic force substitution, to uphold inherited political-military objectives, particularly in Asia. It is a program of retrenchment without withdrawal.

The Executive Branch, in its remote and abstract strategic and economic analysis, does not comprehend the vital political criteria that Congress brings to bear—that reflect the desires and needs of its constituency, the American people, and its concern for America's purposes in the world. The administration is still playing the old game of restructuring the military assistance program in order to bypass the political scrutiny and world view of Congress. Segregating and grouping the military elements of foreign assistance hastens the day when military assistance will be administered solely by the Pentagon and submitted solely to the Armed Services committees of Congress, where it will be reviewed only for its efficiency in reducing direct U.S. force structures. In other words, in the view of this administration, our foreign policy itself is simply another weapons system.

As we look at the typical recipients of the administration's expanded military assistance program—Vietnam, Laos, Korea, Cambodia, Greece, Portugal, Latin America—we should ask several critical questions:

First, can the administration's overall goals—retrenchment without withdrawal—actually be accomplished, or are they in fact contradictory? Will the United States be more or less involved as it extends its military assistance throughout the world?

Second, in many cases, are increased levels of security assistance necessary—for example, in Korea, where we have already invested \$4 billion in military aid, and the existing force ratio of South against North is already more than adequate?

Third, is our military assistance program sometimes counterproductive, impeding rather than enhancing the establishment of real stability through political solutions?

And fourth, and most important, should expanded arms transfers—whether through grants, loans, leases, or even profitable commercial sales—be the foreign policy of this country?

In addition to buttressing the Nixon Doctrine, the expanded military assistance program of this administration contributes to its larger foreign policy stance of Realpolitik and devotion to the balance of power. This does not simply imply clever diplomacy—the substitution of negotiation for confrontation. Rather it will require the continual threat of military force and the perpetual risk of intervention and escalation.

Though this administration is quick to brand any opponent "isolationist," the alternative is not "Fortress America." The true alternative is for America to behave as a nation among nations. No one asks that the United States abandon its security interests—only that we define them and justify them.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEW MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

In the historic Senate vote of October 29, 1971 on the Foreign Assistance Act for FY 1972, Congress served notice on this administration that it does not accept the logic of the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine attempts to maintain American political and military positions around the world, but more economically, less conspicuously, and more acceptably to the American public, through the substitution of military assistance for direct U.S. deployments. Though a reduced appropriation for military assistance was finally passed,¹ Congress has "sent them a message," and the message remains: that not merely the instruments—as the administration would have it—but the substance of American foreign policy must change, and adjust appropriately to a changed international system. Congress was suggesting to the Executive that it considers our military assistance, and our military alliances, not as assets but as contingent liabilities.

The Executive Branch has not been sensitive to that message; it has treated the action of Congress as irresponsible and destructive. Now it has introduced an expanded military assistance request for FY 1973—\$2.151 billion for grant, credit, and security supporting assistance—evidently in an effort to remedy the "short-fall"—though Secretary Laird has denied that interpretation, and other Pentagon sources are reported to be considering supplemental legislation to restore the 1972 cuts.

The administration has mobilized its rhetorical resources for this last-ditch fight with Congress for an expanded military assistance program. Secretary

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Laird has called it "an indispensable tool for implementing our National Security strategy of Realistic Deterrence." He characterizes it as playing "a central role in fulfilling the Nixon Doctrine objective of a more equitable sharing of the Free World defense burden."² The President, in his message accompanying this legislation, warns Congress against "a repetition of these reductions and delays" and repeats all the old incantations: "call into serious question the firmness of our commitments," "have a destabilizing effect," "period of transition," etc.

The administration has placed heavy emphasis on a total spectrum of security assistance: This includes grant military assistance (MAP); foreign military credit sales (FMS); supporting assistance (including expenditures for "public safety"—that is, the training of internal security or paramilitary forces); a contingency fund for the President's special application; and "non-funded" assistance, such as the transfer of "material declared excess," the lending and leasing of ships, and cash sales from government or commercial sources. In fact, the administration advertises that it is shifting its stress from grant aid to the other categories—although its request for grant aid itself (\$780 million) is the highest since FY 1967.

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And fifth, the administration's proposal fails to mention a \$2¼ billion item: Service Funded Military Assistance for Vietnam and Laos. Since 1966, massive direct arms transfers to these two countries (and until this year also to Thailand) have been concealed in the regular functional categories of the U.S. defense budget. By 1967 this concealed and evasive category accounted for a larger amount than grant aid and credit sales together. By 1968 it was almost double the amount for grant aid and credit, and it has, on the average, stayed at this ratio up to and including the administrations FY 1973 military assistance proposal. (Congress should keep this preponderant category of military assistance in the front of its mind in considering the total implications of U.S. arms transfers to other nations.)

Taking the total spread of U.S. arms transfers together, it emerges that this total has taken a quantum jump since the present administration has been promoting its philosophy of national security and its concept of foreign policy. From an average of \$5 billion during the 1960s, total U.S. arms transfers have risen to a level well over \$7 billion a year.

Indeed, though there is considerable sleight of hand in the military assistance budget, the administration does not disavow this massive increase; in fact it is the announced cornerstone of its worldwide political-military policy—which is a policy of mechanistic force substitution to uphold inherited strategic, political, and economic objectives, particularly in Asia, and also in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is a program of retrenchment without withdrawal.

The administration intends to "reduce overall costs through specific force trade-offs under total force planning."³ It proposes to "reduce our direct presence abroad." But it can only hope to "reduce the likelihood of direct U. S. military involvement in the future."⁴ It is this false premise of the Nixon Doctrine—that military assistance reduces U. S. involvement—that Congress has most specifically rejected in its treatment of the Foreign Assistance Act last year.

² Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, "National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," Defense Report for FY 1973, February 15, 1972, p. 122.

³ Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

The executive branch, in the remoteness and abstraction of its strategic and economic analysis, does not comprehend or appreciate the vital political criteria that Congress brings to bear—that reflect the desires and needs of its constituency, the American people, and its concern for America's purposes in the world. For it should be clear that Congress is beginning to evolve and express an alternative view of the world and the proper role of the United States. Economic assistance is to emphasize humanitarian support, with few illusions of its efficacy in buying friends. Military assistance is to be minimal and is to be restricted to those situations in which the United States has clear value sympathies or obvious and direct strategic interests. The basic presumption of non-intervention is beginning to find its voice.

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It is proper to ask several kinds of questions about the administration's expanded military assistance program:

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⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

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win, or even stave off ultimate defeat, by fighting in South Vietnam, or by carrying the war to Cambodia, northern or southern Laos, or now again to North Vietnam.

Then there is Korea, where the administration proposes again to spend several hundred million dollars, ostensibly for massive modernization, but actually just as much for the operation and maintenance of the already overbearing Korean force structure (though there will now be some sharing of these costs by the Republic of Korea). But "how much is enough"? The South Koreans already have an army of 560,000 and an air force of 235 planes, behind thick static fortifications, against the North Korean army of 360,000 and air force of 555 planes. And where is the promised "trade-off"—the saving in terms of direct U. S. costs? We have withdrawn only a fractional division of about 20,000 men and have retracted our forces from the front line; but the final withdrawal of the remaining U. S. division was vetoed last summer at the White House level. Evidently, in the crunch we are unable to cash in our military assistance and reduce our own force structure.

And there is Cambodia, which the President has called "the Nixon doctrine in its purest form." Cambodia became an emergency aid case with the extension of the war in April 1970 and has graduated to become the second largest recipient—about \$1 billion over the current three budget years. What has been ourselves caused and are perpetuating—what beyond the impressment and decimation of a whole generation of Cambodian youth, the dismal shuffle of unrepresentative and increasingly repressive governments, and the prospect of further military humiliation?

Another model is Greece. There, with typical analytic acuity and political blindness, the administration trades off support (over \$10 million) for a repulsive regime against the home-portion of our naval forces and other supposedly NATO-justified functions.⁷ I do not here attack the concept of NATO, but rather the elasticity of the NATO rubric for rationalizing the extension of military support for politically embarrassing governments. It seems that, once we are involved in an alliance, we are on "automatic pilot": political reason is forgotten or avoided; cost-effectiveness takes over and dictates our foreign policy.

And now we have Portugal, where, for the first time in many years, substantial credits are extended in return for the continued use of the naval base in the Azores—to the dismay of our African friends and significant groups of American citizens, who see Portugal's resources now freed for employment in the suppression of political movements in its African colonies.

Further hundreds of millions of dollars and increasingly sophisticated hardware are extended in the Middle East, in the effort to balance the arms competition and bring about a precarious stability—though, in this region, for one, the complexity of our present involvement warns against simplistic analysis.

Finally, we have the case of Latin America—militarily meaningless but politically notable. Here the administration requests a raising of the regional ceiling from 100 to 150 million dollars. Secretary Laird claims to be "preserving the environment within which social and economic progress can occur."⁸

But where is the evidence that this progress occurs more or faster or better for our military meddling? Our access to the military castes of Latin American countries might even—as in the recent example of Chile—go in the direction of perverting these establishments and weakening their commitment to the orderly processes of constitutional government. Secretary Laird also purveys the not-so-subtle suggestion that our present clients can go elsewhere for their arms purchases.⁹ If this is true, it nevertheless evades the question of whether it should be an article of American policy to finance these competitive, ornamental, or status-enhancing purchases, and whether the United States really reaps the political credit that is claimed.

The vastly expanded military assistance program of this administration is a consequence and a buttress of the Nixon Doctrine. It is also a contribution to the larger foreign policy stance of this administration: a stance of Realpolitik and devotion to the balance of power. It should be recognized that playing the balance of power game does not imply merely the exercise of a benign and clever diplomacy—the substitution of an era of negotiation for one of confrontation.

⁷ Press conference, November 12, 1971. Reported in Department of State Bulletin, December 6, 1971, p. 646.

⁸ See Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Rather, it will require the continual brandishing of threats of military force and the perpetual risk of intervention and escalation of conflict.

This administration considers its course of active power balancing so correct, so uniquely indicated by circumstances, that it is quick to brand any opponent "isolationist." But the alternatives to the administration's policy are not necessarily a "Fortress America" posture—quivering behind our ramparts, paranoid about the rest of the world—or a reversion to worldwide ideological confrontation—with America's forces directly and universally deployed.

The true alternative is for America to recognize the rest of the world, to accept an international system of autonomous states—in short, to behave as a nation among nations. This might well imply a world without substantial U.S. arms transfers—without U.S. control or regulation. But it would not necessarily be a world without security or a world that would be inimical to our abiding national interests.

The resurgent—indeed, "insurgent"—attitude of Congress in recent sessions has, in view of the failure and sham of the administration's technical and strategic justifications for military assistance, been healthy and constructive in preventing larger amounts of resources from leaving the United States and in forcing military planners to justify military assistance in ways that are related to the nation's true security interests and most worthy hopes for the development of the rest of the world. It is entirely appropriate for Congress—which cannot promulgate "State of the World" messages—to take advantage of whatever political instruments might be available, especially the processes of review, authorization, and appropriation. Congress should be impervious to administration charges of irresponsibility, or to the anguish of Executive Branch functionaries, who may finally be forced to be responsive to the popular will and to rethink their meticulous allocations.

National security remains an essential condition for our welfare. But it is not the goal of our entire system; it is only a condition. No one is asking that the U.S. abandon its security interests—only that we define them and justify them.

QUESTION OF WHAT IS IN U.S. SECURITY INTEREST

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ravenal. I think you are quite right on what you say at the end. The real question is what is in the interest of our security and that is where the great difference comes. They think that the military assistance and military activities assure security. I don't think so. I think it has been undermining it the way it has been applied. I think that is a very fine statement. Thank you very much.

Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ravenal. I think your statement will be a real contribution to the record on this legislation.

Mr. RAVENAL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Robert Alpern, SANE, A Citizens Organization for a Sane World.

Mr. Alpern?

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT ALPERN, SANE, A CITIZENS' ORGANIZATION FOR A SANE WORLD

Mr. ALPERN. Good Morning, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning.

Mr. ALPERN. I would like to thank the chairman and members of this committee for hearing a cross section of views on foreign military and economic assistance, especially emergency relief and rehabilitation aid.

My testimony is a citizen's perspective on our aid commitments to Bangladesh as of mid-March 1972.

WITNESS' EXPERIENCE IN BANGLADESH AND INDIA

On March 15, 1972, I returned from Bangladesh and India after gathering firsthand experience, for 2 weeks, among the people, from government leaders—Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Prime Minister Gandhi—local administrators, relief workers, economists, Ambassador Keating, and AID representatives.

I was one of 70 Americans from 37 States, who participated in the airlift of understanding of the Emergency Relief Fund.

We arrived in Bangladesh as the final wave of 9,898,843 Hindu and Bengali refugees were returning from Indian refugee camps. Some had spent up to 9 months away from Bangladesh/East Pakistan after fleeing the savage repression and destructive actions of General Yahya Khan's West Pakistan Army and paramilitary forces numbering about 94,000 men. We have all heard much of those who fled to India, but little has been said of the other 10 million to 15 million humans who were refugees within Bangladesh, moving from their destroyed villages like nomadic tribes to avoid the rampaging Pakistan army.

At least 20 percent of the 75 million people who make up Bangladesh were displaced—driven out of the country or roaming about within it—seeking shelter and food. Hard estimates point out that at least 2 million homes were completely destroyed and several million were damaged. Since a family unit comprises five to seven people, between 15 to 20 million persons were left homeless.

I travelled by public bus through the eastern and south eastern part of the country to villages in the districts of Comilla, Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts. The destruction I saw substantiates the above tragic statistics.

REBUILDING EMERGENCY FACING BANGLADESH

The hostilities ended with India and the Mukhti Bahini defeating Pakistan on December 17, 1971. Three months later the eighth most populous nation in the world, about the size of Arkansas, is faced with the critical emergency of rebuilding its shattered country before the monsoon rains come in June turning large areas into lakes. This would be the equivalent of our having 40-50 million people needing food, shelter and jobs. Hundreds of thousands of houses have to be built; food in great quantities must be on hand; seed in certain districts, is needed, and people must find work if Bangladesh is to avoid a new human disaster of the dimensions it experienced in the floods and cyclone of August and November 1970.

FOOD SITUATION IN BANGLADESH

At the end of February 1972 in UNROD (United Nations Relief Operations in Dacca) information paper No. 3—"Blunt Facts on Relief and Rehabilitation in Bangladesh," Toni Hagen refers to UNROD field reports on food reserves.

Now, towards beginning of March the situation has deteriorated rapidly: the reserves are being exhausted, both at farmer level and in government stocks; the boro crop will in large areas of the northwest be an almost total failure due to lack of fertilizer, fuel for diesel pumps, and due to destruction of many pumps.

The fact that there is sufficient food in the country right now and for the next few weeks is no guarantee that considerable segments of the population may not be hungry or may not even be starving; for the wrecked transport system does not allow any substantial food movements.

The popular new democratic government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is presently trying to get the inputs it needs to protect its people from the difficult weeks and months which they face. A failure to meet this challenge could weaken his government and produce serious internal dislocations.

On March 16th the U.S. cancelled \$97.8 million for "humanitarian relief" in Bangladesh. According to State Department officials, this cancellation was made "because the original purpose of the assistance, to prevent famine, has been accomplished." Just having returned from the Bengal nation, this piece of news startled me. Anyone who believes the threat of famine has been eliminated has not been reading field reports of the U.N. relief people, in Dacca, or listening to Bengali leaders or relief workers. I communicated my findings to AID officials and took issue with their optimistic insistence that there is ample food in Bangladesh. No one that I personally spoke with in the areas I visited talked with such assurance about the food situation in the months ahead. AID pronouncements seem to be fashioned for good public relations. They speak more about commitments than actual performance.

U.S. COMMITTED AID DELIVERED TO BANGLADESH

This is the most serious question—how much of the U.S. Government's commitment to aid Bangladesh has actually been delivered (offloaded) since December 1, 1971? A very helpful exercise is to review U.S. food aid to East Bengal from November 1971 (prior to the India-Pak war), as shown on data sheets from AID/Asia dated March 16, 1972; \$240 million (CCC (Commodity Credit Corporation) Cost) for specific relief actions was committed and of this only \$91.3 had been delivered. Data on U.S. relief inputs from December 1, 1971, to the present does not seem to be obtainable. Right now the Government Accounting Office (GAO) is trying to develop a detailed analysis of U.S. aid to Bangladesh so that we may then know precisely if we have lived up to our commitments. According to an UNROD report issued in Dacca on March 9, 1972, no U.S. wheat, rice, or edible oil had been received so far this year and none was scheduled to arrive until May 15, 1972.

U.S. RELIEF EFFORTS AND INDIAN AID TO REFUGEES

In terms of national wealth and resources, the U.S. relief effort for Bangladesh has to date been less than inspiring. Despite our facility for transporting military forces and equipment anywhere in the world with great speed, U.S. emergency aid deliveries have been marked by unconscionable delays. It is hardly in keeping with our often expressed policy of providing humanitarian assistance to people in time of natural or manmade disasters. One way of looking at the dimension of U.S. relief is to consider what the Indian Government did in coming to the aid of almost 10 million refugees suddenly thrust upon them. India, one of the poorest and most populous nations in the

world, has expended over \$465 millions to shelter, feed, and care for these refugees.

Indian aid to Bangladesh refugees,¹ Mar. 25, 1971-Feb. 25, 1972

	<i>Millions</i>
Direct budgetary expenditures, 6.8 million refugees in camps (through Dec. 31, 1971)-----	² \$320
Projection from January to March 1972 -----	60
Repatriation of refugees—Transportation -----	4
Journey allowances -----	5.3
2 weeks' rations -----	12.0
Cash allowances on arrival in Bangladesh -----	32-36
Cost of rations provided refugees awaiting rehabilitation -----	6.7
Additional food grains for refugees in transit, camps, and other unforeseen items -----	25-40
	465-483

¹ Source Indian Embassy.

² Does not reflect indirect costs of 3 million refugees residing outside camps.

Prime Minister Gandhi told our group, that this huge refugee program had set India's development plans back 1 year and created new social and economic problems for her people. But, it also instilled a new national spirit among India's masses.

NECESSITY OF AID IN REMAINING 6 WEEKS

The lessons of the recent past should now be clear. With only 6 weeks remaining before monsoon rains turn large areas of Bangladesh into lakes, severely limiting access to them, the United States and other nations must vigorously mobilize their aid efforts through the U.N. if possible or unilaterally if necessary. This period is one of do or die for hundreds of thousands of people.

PRIORITY NEEDS

A set of priority needs derived from UNROD sources, discussions with Bangladesh officials and personal findings is listed below:

A. Transport.—Trucks, 4,000-5,000; flat bottoms, 25-50; outboard motors for native boats, 1,000; Bailey bridges, 6,000 feet; fork lifts, 75; STOL (transports), 5; helicopters (transports), 10-20; petrol—(1). Storage tanks; (2) fuel.

B. Food.—Food grains, 200,000 tons per month; edible oil, 50,000 tons.

C. Housing.—Corrugated iron sheets, 200,000 tons; timber (corner posts), 400,000 tons.

D. Cash.

E. Clothing.—Raw cotton, 90,000 tons; yarn.

One point I would like to make. In much of the relief effort that has come to Bangladesh, the western nations have sent western style garments instead of cotton and yarn, that could better be used for getting factory and cottage industry people back to work making their own style of clothing. The clothing that was delivered is therefore not being worn. A stigma is attached to the people who would wear it. They don't want to wear western clothes.

CRITICAL PRIORITY OF TRANSPORTATION

As can be seen, transportation is a critical priority if aid is to get from dockside to where it is needed. Much of the equipment shown above is to be found in Southeast Asia less than 2,500 miles away. To date we have invested over \$120 billion in Vietnam. Now that we are reducing our ground forces and withdrawing logistical support materials, it would seem most appropriate to transfer part of this investment from war use to lifesaving use by diverting some of it to Bangladesh instead of bringing it back to the United States, leaving it on site, or scrapping it.

Another way to expedite relief aid would be to authorize UNROD to use cash received from the United States and other countries to purchase food grains and edible oil in areas closer to Bangladesh rather than shipping them from points around the world. Shipping time from Texas ports has been taking 2 months.

LESSON OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

The lesson of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan should now be perfectly clear. By supplying \$2 billion since 1954, in arms and related equipment, to an unpopular military regime, we became an accessory to one of the worst human slaughters in history. A striking contrast between U.S. foreign arms aid and emergency relief is that the military always gets the lion's share over what we provide for humanitarian aid. This is also true of all recent administration budgets, including fiscal year 1973's, where 60 percent of each tax dollar will go for wars—past, present, and future—while only 18 percent is allocated for human resources. To many Americans our present priorities are wrong. Instead of going to lifesaving uses, their precious resources are being eaten up by the insatiable Pentagon military giant demanding more overkill weaponry each year.

On the Indian subcontinent the United States is viewed as a military giant which regularly allies itself with authoritarian military regimes. We are also known to be opposed to social, economic, and political changes in the unevenly developed countries.

If we can contribute to Bangladesh's survival in these next critical weeks, we will be keeping alive a newly independent pocket of democracy in south Asia. This in turn will give strength and hope to people who have questioned our role in this part of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Alpern.

We are very pleased to have this firsthand report from a very tragic part of the world. I think your advice is very well taken.

Senator Aiken, do you have any questions?

SOURCE OF SANE SUPPORT

Senator AIKEN. Where does your organization get its support? Is it all membership fees?

Mr. ALPERN. No? Which organization are you talking about—SANE or the emergency relief?

Senator AIKEN. The one you are representing this morning.

Mr. ALPERN. SANE is a 27,000-member, national membership organization which gets its support from members dues, \$10 a year.

Senator AIKEN. And that is your entire income?

Mr. ALPERN. That is our entire income. We do not receive any subsidies from foundations or from the Government.

WITNESS' SOURCE OF INFORMATION

Senator AIKEN. I was wondering where you get some of your information.

For instance, who told you that on March 16 the United States canceled \$97.8 million for humanitarian relief in Bangladesh?

Mr. ALPERN. All of the newspapers in the United States.

Senator AIKEN. Who told you that? Do you go by whatever you read in the newspapers?

Mr. ALPERN. Well, not all the time.

Senator AIKEN. Do you know who released that? Who gave out that information?

Mr. ALPERN. The State Department, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Will you furnish the documents proving it to this committee?

Mr. ALPERN. I would endeavor to do that.

(The information follows:)

[From the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 17, 1972]

U.S. CUTS DACCA RELIEF AS NO LONGER NEEDED

WASHINGTON.—The United States has canceled more than 60% of the \$158 million President Nixon has said was committed for humanitarian relief in Bangladesh, State Department officials say.

Although department spokesman Charles W. Bray stated earlier this week that the \$158 million figure is an "accurate statement of the commitment," other officials now indicate \$97.8 million has been cut off "because it is no longer needed."

The disclosure seems sure to rekindle the quarrel between the department and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, who has accused the Administration of misleading the public over the American commitment to Bangladesh.

The Massachusetts Democrat said only a relatively small amount of the promised aid had been delivered and the Administration was using the excuse of poor distribution facilities in Bangladesh to hold up the relief.

He said the State Department and its subsidiary, the Agency for International Development, would not give his subcommittee on refugees figures of how much aid had been delivered.

Department sources, however, said \$44.2 million in food and a small amount of home-building materials were delivered to East Pakistan between November, 1970, when the nation was devastated by a cyclone and December, 1971, when the Indian-Pakistani war broke out.

Since aid was resumed this year, the officials said, about \$16 million has been delivered, is on the way or is available for shipment.

GOAL HELD REACHED

"The rest of it has been canceled," one State Department official said, because the original purpose of the assistance, to prevent famine, has been accomplished.

One source was asked why, if the \$97.8 million were no longer necessary, President Nixon had asked Congress this week for \$100 million more for South Asia relief. The source replied that the President's new request would provide a margin to meet new conditions as they arose in Bangladesh, while the previously committed aid was for a problem now solved.

Kennedy, who has asked for a General Accounting Office report on the Bangladesh relief program, also has accused the Administration of sloppy accounting procedures that have resulted in large amounts of grain being lost.

One AID official said bookkeeping problems were caused by the war conditions in the area which resulted in diverted shipments. But, he said, "every ounce of wheat is accounted for" and the government is unsure of the location of only a small amount of rice and edible oil.

U.N. AID OFFICIALS FEAR BANGLADESH FOOD CRISIS

SAY LACK OF TRANSPORT, GOVERNMENT DELAY KEEP EXISTING SUPPLIES FROM POPULACE

DACCA.—The head of the U.N. relief program in Bangladesh said Thursday the country is "heading for disaster" because of a food shortage and lack of response to a U.N. money appeal. He forecast food riots "a few weeks from now."

"Bangladesh has been a playground for charitable hobbies," said Toni Hagen, Swiss director for U.N. relief operations in Dacca.

"You can't build bridges with baby food and you can't transport food with blankets," he told a news conference.

Bottlenecks in Bangladesh ports receiving rice and wheat shipments from abroad are so great that the shipments have virtually halted. The clogged grain pipeline stems from congestion in port warehouses, according to U.N. officials.

AID REQUESTED

Erna Seilver, Austrian ambassador to India and head of a special U.N. team surveying relief, said she had cabled U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim requesting \$100 million worth of goods to combat supply bottlenecks.

U.N. officials report 220,000 tons of food grain—a six-week supply—is backed up in the ports, unable to move inland because of disrupted communications and lack of transport. Another 66,000 tons of grain are in government warehouses in the interior, where the bulk of the new nation's 75 million people live.

The relief officials say 11,143 tons of wheat from Switzerland and the United States, and 18,300 tons of rice from the United States are all that is scheduled to arrive in the ports of Chittagong and Chalna in the next 90 days. With the officials hoping to keep at least 150,000 tons of grain moving each month, this 29,443 tons will amount to only a 10-day supply. There has been slow response to a worldwide appeal three weeks ago for \$626 million in aid for Bangladesh.

Hagen met Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman twice this week to discuss the faltering program.

A week ago Hagen said the U.N. program and the two dozen voluntary relief organizations operating under its umbrella would pull out unless the government started unloading and moving more grain. He says he has noted some improvement. But the prime minister's coordinator of external relief assistance, Abdul Ran Choudhury, criticized the relief agencies and charged they were taking up too much time making surveys.

Relief sources say that rice in private stocks has been depleted by widespread smuggling across the border to India where prices are higher. Sheik Mujibur has called for the formation of citizens' committees in the northern border areas to combat the smuggling.

The Indian government has begun shipping the first 80,000 tons of 500,000 tons of wheat it has promised into north Bengal. This is coming overland across the northern border.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 12, 1972]

KENNEDY CRITICAL ON AID TO BENGALIS

SAYS NIXON MISLED CONGRESS ABOUT AMOUNT DELIVERED

(By Benjamin Welles)

WASHINGTON, March 11.—Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, today charged the Administration with having "seriously misled" Congress and the public about the volume of humanitarian aid delivered—as distinct from promised—to the people of Bangladesh.

Mr. Kennedy, who is chairman of the judiciary subcommittee on refugees, has long sponsored relief aid to Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, and has led Senate attempts to prod the Nixon Administration into recognizing the new nation.

Citing statistics gathered by subcommittee investigators and checked both with the General Accounting Office, the Congressional fiscal "watchdog," and with the Agency for International Development, Senator Kennedy charged that only \$10-million in United States relief could be traced as having arrived in Bangladesh from the start of civil strife there last March 25 to its end Dec. 17. Senator Kennedy contrasted this with President Nixon's statement in his State of the World address Feb. 9 that said: "We committed \$158-million both through the United Nations and bilaterally for the 60 to 70 million people in East Pakistan to help avert famine and stem the further outflow of refugees."

DISPUTES AID STATEMENT

The Senator also took issue with a statement by Maurice J. Williams, AID's deputy administrator, before the Senate judiciary subcommittee in February. Mr. Williams stated that "the U.S., actually delivered about \$65-million in food and essential relief" in support of the U.N. humanitarian program in East Pakistan."

Mr. Williams said today in a telephone interview that approximately \$10-million in United States humanitarian relief for victims of the civil strife had actually reached Bangladesh. "Without the war, more would have been received," he said.

He insisted, however, that \$55-million in United States food and relief supplies under previous programs—including aid for victims of a cyclone and tidal wave in 1970—had also begun to reach East Pakistan during the civil war. This statement was challenged by Senate aides, who said that the Agency for International Development had declined to furnish them with a statistical breakdown to support their contention.

Citing port congestion, disruption of transportation and other problems caused by the war, Mr. Williams said that approximately 200,000 tons of United States food grains worth \$17-million had been diverted to Saigon, Singapore and Jakarta or had been sunk in the course of hostilities or were otherwise missing. On the other hand, he said, \$9-million worth of United States food grains that had been diverted later were re-routed to Bangladesh.

'NO EFFORT TO MISLEAD'

"We mounted a massive relief program. We delivered all the relief that could be delivered," Mr. Williams insisted. "We expanded the transport capacity to receive the relief goods in the ports and up-country. We succeeded in avoiding famine."

"There was no effort," he said, "to mislead the public or the Congress."

But Mr. Kennedy maintained, in a statement released by his office, that the Administration's relief program in Bangladesh had been "oversold and over-announced" and that on examination it revealed "doubled-talk, incompetence or both."

He charged that President Nixon's "commitment" of \$158-million included approximately \$49-million in aid programmed months before the Pakistani Army moved against an autonomy movement on March 25, 1971, and was thus unconnected with it. Of the remaining \$109-million "committed" for victims of the civil strife, he said, \$87.9-million was in food.

He said, however, that of this sum \$44-million in contracts were canceled and \$25.8-million represented contracts not signed. Of the balance of \$18-million, he said, only \$3-million could be traced to Bangladesh by congressional investigators.

After scrutinizing other Administration statements, Senator Kennedy said, it had been discovered that of 5.3-million announced for transportation assistance to the United Nations or to the Pakistani Government "very little was delivered."

Of \$5.5-million—including \$3.5-million in Pakistani rupees—listed for United Nations administrative support, "less than half was actually delivered," he said. Of \$10.4-million in Pakistani rupees released for public works he said, "none was delivered."

Even United States aid commitments to Pakistan made prior to the outbreak of the civil strife appear largely unfilled, Senator Kennedy said. For example, disposition of a \$38.1-million commitment for 1970 cycle relief is still "unknown and under review by the GAO and by the judicial refugee subcommittee," he said.

Senator ARKEN. I don't believe you can do it.

AID APPROPRIATION BILL

Do you know when the aid appropriation bill, which provided aid for Bangladesh, was finally passed by the Congress?

Mr. ALPERN. I believe it was in February.

Senator AIKEN. No, it was March 2, I believe, that it finally passed. When was that signed by the President?

Do you know how much was appropriated for relief of Bangladesh in that bill?

Mr. ALPERN. According to my knowledge, there was supposed to be \$200 million?

Senator AIKEN. That is correct, \$200 million.

PRESIDENT'S ADDITIONAL REQUEST

Do you know that the President had soon thereafter requested an additional \$100 million?

Mr. ALPERN. Yes, I believe I am familiar with that.

Senator AIKEN. You say none of the food was delivered?

Mr. ALPERN. That is the point I am trying to make, Senator.

SUPPORT FOR DOCK STRIKE

Senator AIKEN. Are you aware of the fact that some of the nicest people in the United States, the most important ones, were supporting the dock strike at the very time the dock strike was preventing the delivery of that food to Bangladesh?

I am not going to call names. They are important people and ambitious, too.

Are you aware of the fact they were supporting the dock strikes at the same time?

Mr. ALPERN. I am aware there was a dock strike.

Senator AIKEN. And the dock strike had nothing to do with the failure to deliver food to Bangladesh?

Mr. ALPERN. It may have, but there are other ways of transporting materials, sir. We find it very easy when we want to move military equipment around the world.

Senator AIKEN. On March 14 the President requested an additional \$100 million for refugee relief and humanitarian assistance in South Asia, in addition to the \$200 million appropriated 3 or 4 days before.

AID REPORT OF APRIL 14, 1972

Have you read the report from AID to the Congress under date of April 14, 1972?

Mr. ALPERN. No, I have not seen that report, at the moment, sir. The last one I have is the March 24 report prepared by the AID office.

Senator AIKEN. Are you aware in the first month after the \$200 million appropriation was approved by the Congress, that \$43,570,000 had been channeled through the United Nations to Bangladesh?

Mr. ALPERN. I was not aware it was that much. I thought it was \$35.6.

Senator AIKEN. And also that \$35 million had been made available to UNROD.

Mr. ALPERN. That would be the United Nations.

Senator AIKEN. \$31 million was turned over to the United Nations in cash for that?

Mr. ALPERN. I think that is all one figure.

Senator AIKEN. Have you read this?

I am going to ask to have it put in the record.

Mr. ALPERN. I wish you would.

Senator AIKEN. And it is going to make your testimony look a little bit funny.

(The information follows:)

SOUTH ASIA RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

(Supplied by AID, April 14, 1972)

Of the \$200 million appropriated by the Congress in FY 1972 for South Asia Relief and Rehabilitation, \$71,270,000 has been used to date (mid-April). Of that amount, \$27.7 million was obligated *prior to the December, 1971 Indo-Pak War*. These funds were used for relief of civil strife victims following the onset of disturbances in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, on March 25, 1971. The bulk of this assistance, approximately \$20 million, was used to aid the nearly 10 million Bengali refugees who fled to India. The funds helped meet basic medical and shelter needs of the refugees in India. The balance of \$7.7 million was provided for use in East Pakistan primarily to augment the disrupted transport system and avert the possibility of famine. These funds were made available in the form of cash grants to relief agencies and direct U.S. procurement actions in support of relief activities.

New postwar assistance committed under the \$200 million appropriation has reached a level of \$43,570,000, all of which has been channeled through the United Nations or U.S. voluntary agencies. The United Nations Relief Operation in Dacca (UNROD) is the largest and most important relief organization in Bangladesh. UNROD's role is to support the relief and rehabilitation efforts of the Bangladesh Government, marshal worldwide contributions, and coordinate the myriad activities of voluntary agencies.

Support for the UN Program. Initial U.S. Government assistance for the UN program was a \$300,000 grant for administrative expenses of UNROD's relief operations. In response to a UN report outlining the urgent relief and rehabilitation needs in Bangladesh, a second grant of \$35 million was made to UNROD—\$31 million was turned over to the UN in cash, and the balance of \$4 million is being used by the U.S. Government to procure additional relief commodities as the UN may request. This grant helped alleviate UNROD's urgent need for cash to sustain its relief activities. The funds provided are expected to be used for a wide variety of purposes, including chartering aircraft, minibulkers, tugs and barges; procuring vacuators and other cargo handling equipment; funding local costs involved in the repair of port facilities; paying stevedores; and procuring relief commodities such as roofing materials, cement, fuel, fertilizer, power tillers, irrigation pumps, high-yield variety rice seeds and other basic needs. The \$35 million grant, along with contributions of other nations, gives the UN Relief Operation in Dacca the resources and flexibility it needs at this stage of the overall relief effort.

Aid to Voluntary Agencies. U.S. Government support of the voluntary agencies program in Bangladesh now exceeds \$8 million in grants. The first of these was a \$650,000 grant made to CARE for housing. The grant will assist CARE in implementing a 62-village housing demonstration project. Part of the grant will enable CARE to continue research on cyclone-resistant shelters—a past, present and future need of Bangladesh.

In addition, a grant of \$3 million was made to Catholic Relief Service (CRS) to purchase and transport metal roofing sheets for use in Bangladesh. The roofing is part of a program to house an estimated 200,000 returned refugee and displaced families.

To aid 9,000 former college students made destitute by the recent fighting, many of whom were Mukti Bahini guerillas, a \$1.7 million grant was made to the International Rescue Committee (IRC) for college scholarships. This will enable 9,000 students to resume their studies for at least one year. In the field of health,

a grant of \$450,000 was made to IRC for emergency financing of the local costs of the Cholera Research Laboratory, which operates a hospital in Dacca and another in Matlab Bazaar. In addition, the grant funds will assist the Laboratory to provide emergency preventive and therapeutic health services.

A \$1.5 million grant made to the American Red Cross will enable the society to help the International Committee of the Red Cross carry out a program of nutritional and medical assistance for some two million persons, including minorities, having special needs. One-third of the grant funds provided are for a two-month charter of large cargo aircraft to support this program.

A grant of \$1.5 million is pending to the Foundation for Airborne Relief for airlifting food and supplies within Bangladesh.

P.L. 480 Food. The U.S. response to relief and rehabilitation needs in Bangladesh is an integrated effort encompassing a full range of assistance, including the provision of urgently needed food supplies through the P.L. 480 program. Food stocks in Bangladesh have reached the dangerously low level of approximately 240,000 metric tons. In response to UN requests for food assistance, the U.S. Government has authorized a total of 500,000 metric tons of wheat, rice and vegetable oil for Bangladesh, with a total value of approximately \$72.6 million including freight. This food assistance has been scheduled to arrive at the rate of approximately 125,000 tons per month beginning in May. Deliveries of this food are being rushed. The first shipment of 23,000 tons will arrive the last week of April. On the basis of available information the 500,000 tons of Title II food commodities in the pipeline, plus some 1,200,000 tons from other governments (programmed for early delivery) will meet current food requirements at least through August. Of this total, India, favorably situated to move grain overland and possessing an historically high level of stocks, has agreed to provide 750,000 tons of wheat and rice to Bangladesh and is working to move this food by summer and by early April had reached the level of 7,000 tons daily.

In addition to foodgrains and vegetable oil, high protein food blends for children granted by the U.S. last year are being made available as needed. Some 25,000 tons of this highly nutritious food recently arrived in Bangladesh, enough to give vital food supplements to 3 million children for 3 months. While the need for added international food assistance to Bangladesh is still great, the threat of serious famine has been alleviated for the time being. The major need for imported food will be in the fall when a traditional food deficit occurs in Bangladesh prior to harvesting of the rice crop.

Additional Assistance. Additional grants to support the UN and voluntary agencies programs in Bangladesh are expected to be made as needs are more clearly identified and added assistance is deemed necessary. We also expect to provide funds directly to the Government of Bangladesh in the form of grants for urgent repair and rehabilitation needs.

As its relief and rehabilitation needs are being met, Bangladesh will face the longer-term task of reconstruction. A team of UN and World Bank experts has just completed an assessment of reconstruction needs and costs. After moving to counter the immediate threat of hunger, attention will be given to the reconstruction of basic infrastructure—restoring telecommunications, rehabilitating jetties and inland waterways facilities, procuring tugs and barges, repairing navigational aids, and meeting a wide range of other urgent requirements.

U.S. GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS FOR RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN BANGLADESH

Organization	Purpose	Amount
Cash grants to the United Nations.....	Repair and expansion of transportation network, relief import financing, and U.N. operating costs.	\$35,300,000
Cash grants to U.S. and international voluntary agencies:		
CARE.....	Low-cost housing.....	650,000
Catholic Relief Services.....	Metal roofing sheets.....	3,000,000
International Rescue Committee.....	Emergency education assistance.....	1,170,000
Do.....	Cholera research laboratory (Dacca).....	450,000
International Committee of the Red Cross.....	Cash grant.....	1,000,000
Do.....	Charter of C-130 cargo plane.....	500,000
Foundation for Airborne Relief (pending).....	Airlift of food and relief supplies within Bangladesh.	1,500,000
Total grants to voluntary agencies.....		8,270,000
Total nonfood aid.....		43,570,000

Commodity	Metric (Approximate) tons	Delivered world market value (millions)	Date
Food for peace under Public Law 480:			
Wheat.....	300,000	\$22.5	Feb. 28 and Mar. 17.
Vegetable oil.....	50,000	21.25	Mar. 10 and Mar. 21.
Rice.....	150,000	28.85	Feb. 28 and Mar. 30.
Total food.....	500,000	72.6	

Note: Total U.S. Government commitments, \$116,170,000.

WITNESS' SOURCE OF FUNDS

Senator AIKEN. Who put you up to it? Where do you get the money for it?

You say you get it from membership dues?

Mr. ALPERN. My trip to Bangladesh was paid for by myself, with the support from a few friends in Baltimore, Md., who know my work over the years. SANE did not pay my way to Bangladesh.

PUBLIC LAW 480 HELP

Senator AIKEN. Has public law 480 been any help to the Bangladesh?

Mr. HALPERN. Yes, it was of help during the refugee period in India.

Senator AIKEN. Do you know the amount of food which had been delivered under public law 480 recently?

I am not going through all of this. I am simply going to have this entire report put in the record.

Mr. ALPERN. I do want to say one thing, Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I don't want to talk any more.

BIHARI REFUGEE CAMPS

Did you see the refugee camps of the Biharis?

Mr. ALPERN. No.

Senator AIKEN. Do you know what a Bihari is?

Mr. ALPERN. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. They didn't show you the Bihari refugee camps?

Mr. ALPERN. Some of the people in our group who stayed in Dacca did get to see the Biharis. I went by bus to the eastern and southern districts, the agricultural areas and the port areas of Bangladesh, so I did not get to speak to the Biharis. I did see the destroyed Port of Chittagong and I did walk in many areas where there were human bones.

I don't want to sound completely gloomy. I do hope that the information——

CORRECTNESS OF WITNESS' INFORMATION QUESTIONED

Senator AIKEN. Your information is not correct, that is all. Somebody is feeding you the wrong stuff.

Mr. ALPERN. This is based, sir, upon my personal experience in the country, not upon what people are feeding me, and I do hope the new

direction which you point out is going to be the future one of our Government's aid, relief aid to Bangladesh, instead of the past history, which is what I was trying to delve into. I hope that we will be making a commitment to save lives, rather than to make the commitment and not live up to it, which has been the situation up until recently.

Senator AIKEN. You were saying certain food had not been delivered and it has been.

The U.S. Government authorized a total of 500 metric tons of wheat, rice and vegetable oils, a total value of approximately \$72.6 million, including freight.

Mr. ALPERN. Senator Aiken, I do not question—

Senator AIKEN. Scheduled to arrive at the rate of 125,000 tons per day beginning in May. That is the earliest they can get it there.

Mr. ALPERN. That means for 5 months this year no U.S. food grains have reached Bangladesh.

Senator AIKEN. That means for 5 months the dock strike was on and they couldn't deliver it to starving people anywhere.

Mr. ALPERN. The dock strike has been over for a number of months.

Senator AIKEN. Hearts bleed for Bangladesh. I agree that we want to do everything we possibly can, but I, for one, will not let my heart bleed for the Bangladesh and at the same time work to prohibit the delivery of food to them.

That is all. I hope you will read all of this and don't believe one side of the story from now on.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Dr. Richard Cash, the Bangladesh Information Center.

We are very pleased to have you. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CASH, THE BANGLADESH INFORMATION CENTER

Dr. CASH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I do not have a written statement at this time to file with the committee. This will be in your hands within a few hours.

(Dr. Cash's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CASH PRESENTED ON BEHALF OF THE BANGLADESH INFORMATION CENTER

Mr. Chairman: I am glad to have the opportunity to talk today on the pressing needs now facing the new nation of Bangladesh and I would like to commend this committee for providing time to air citizens' views on that country's urgent problems.

I am submitting the following statement at the request of the Bangladesh Information Center, an independent, non-governmental organization representing Americans who are concerned about the past year's crisis in South Asia.

On April 10th I returned from two months in Dacca, Bangladesh, where I was local director of the International Rescue Committee. I had previously lived in Dacca between 1967 and 1970 as a physician with the Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Laboratory.

In the interval between my original visit and my trip this year the country has undergone profound change. Four months have elapsed since the end of the Pakistani occupation and although Bengali villagers have displayed remarkable resilience and have persevered in the face of oppressive odds, there is still much to be done in the way of rebuilding the country.

In the best of times Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income well under a hundred dollars. The population is composed almost entirely of rural peasants. Poverty is rampant.

But today, due to the prolonged period of destruction one witnesses an even lower depth of poverty. Throughout the countryside I came across one burned out and looted village after another. Tons of crops have been destroyed, thousands of cattle killed and scores of fields left unplanted. The sheer magnitude of the physical destruction is awesome. Bangladesh planners estimate that three billion dollars (or three-fourths of the country's GNP) will be required simply to reset the nation on its prewar footing.

Nevertheless, as extensive as this physical destruction is, the real tragedy of the past year is best understood not by counting the number of bridges destroyed, but by examining the number of lives uprooted. At its core the tragedy of Bangladesh is a human tragedy. No household has been left untouched.

While it is wise and indeed necessary to begin any account of the Bangladesh disaster by appreciating these sad events of the past, it is dangerous to risk over-memorializing the atrocities, and by so doing to avoid facing up to the present pressing realities.

Virtually all of the ten million refugees generated by the war have now returned and are busily rebuilding their homes and preparing their fields for the summer (aus) crop soon to be sowed. The country's sorely gutted infrastructure is also being repaired; one can observe teams of peasants rebuilding bridges oftentimes with the use of no tools save their own bare hands.

This display of resilience is truly remarkable. I would venture that few societies if forced to confront the same difficulties could pick themselves from the ashes as rapidly. The efforts of the Bengalis at self-restoration deserve praise and attention, but I am afraid that much of the press has so far chosen to highlight only the negative aspects of the first few months of the fledgling nation. The skillful reconstruction efforts which are beginning to be apparent in the countryside will hopefully be matched by equally impressive performances by Bangladesh's leaders. The leadership has the backing of the great majority of people. This is a popular government overwhelmingly elected in a free and open ballot. Bangladesh's critical test in the immediate future will be the agility of its administration. The government is functioning without the advantage of the presence of many of the most skilled civil servants who are being detained in West Pakistan, and whose release is linked to an overall settlement of the prisoner of war issue.

As a physician, I am most familiar with the health and nutritional problems of Bangladesh and would like to discuss for a moment these and several related points. According to a study made in the Faridpur area just prior to my departure, twice as many children as before the war are now considered severely undernourished. Among refugees three times as many children have been affected. I am talking about a total of two million children. A nationwide nutrition survey is now being carried out in Bangladesh under the direction of the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta. The data provided by this survey may well be crucial in assessing the nutritional needs in the months ahead.

Many observers maintain that sufficient food stocks will be available in the country to avert a major famine. While it is true that considerable amounts of grain are on the high seas headed for Bangladesh, and additional quantities have been promised by neighboring countries, notably India, it is not certain whether all of the pledged amounts will reach Bangladesh in time to be delivered to the areas of greatest need. Under the most favorable circumstances it will be difficult to assure food supplies for every section of the country. Some pockets of severe food shortage cannot be avoided. If the donor countries misjudge their food shipments it may be too late to save the lives of thousands. Furthermore, severe undernutrition will make the population more susceptible to the many infectious diseases that ravage the countryside. The largest cholera outbreak since the formation of the Dacca Cholera Research Laboratory occurred in November. Smallpox is now raging in the southwestern section of the country. Cholera and smallpox are the two diseases which kill the most people during times of famine in that part of the world. Moreover, the verdict is not yet in as to whether severe undernutrition will have a lasting effect on the intellectual capacity of the victim should he survive.

Not only must food be shipped to Bangladesh but it must, of course, reach its final destination in the countryside. The transportation system in Bangladesh

has been severely affected. Bridges, rail lines and ferries have been destroyed in large numbers. Repairing the transport system has been given top priority by UNROD and the Bangladesh government. Other urgent needs are the building of houses and rehabilitation of industry. The monsoons are but two months away and are a time when shelter will be desperately needed. Cement, lumber, corrugated iron sheeting must be bought in large quantities. Much work is going on in this area. The industrial sector suffers from shortages of spare parts and raw materials. Both could easily be supplied.

The 100 million dollar request for humanitarian assistance included in the President's budget request this year deserves swift congressional approval. There is no doubt that the money can be spent and will be spent on much needed items. It is hoped that the extension of diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh by the United States will mark a turning point in our relations with that struggling country.

A good deal of concern has been quite properly expressed about the large sums of money appropriated by Congress in fiscal year 1972 which have yet to be expended. Recently, however, our government turned over 35 million dollars to the UN relief operation and I am hopeful that in the near future the remainder will be rapidly applied.

An eighteen member World Bank-U.N. survey team under the direction of Madame Erna Sailer, Austrian Ambassador to India, filed a report of its findings, outlining recommendations for foreign assistance to Bangladesh during the upcoming fifteen months. The team concluded that approximately 650 million dollars should be provided from outside nations for reconstruction needs in the fields of agriculture, transportation, telecommunications, health, power, trade and industry. This estimate does not include food requirements (placed at an additional 300 million dollars) nor longer range development needs.

The 100 million dollar request now before this Committee represents a fair but minimum response from our government. Accepting the informally established formula which suggests that U.S. donations should approximate 40 per cent of the world community's donations, a U.S. commitment of 250 million for fiscal year 73 would be in line, assuming that other nations commit their fair share. As important as the amount of money appropriated, is the structure of the aid relationship. Presently U.S. donations to the UN-Bangladesh relief program are linked to purchases either in the U.S. or in Third World countries. The latter alternative should be greatly encouraged, especially in countries within close proximity to Bangladesh.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the time has come to reexamine our military assistance commitments to the nations of the Asian subcontinent. Since partition the U.S. has provided approximately 1.5 billion dollars in military assistance to Pakistan and 85 million dollars to India. In my opinion that aid has produced no benefits for the taxpayers of this country who have been asked to shoulder the burden. Furthermore, the military aid, authorized and appropriated in the same package as development loans and grants had the ill effect of beclouding our nation's entire economic and technical assistance effort. If allowed to stand on their own records technical and economic aid programs would, I believe, win widespread praise and support from the American people.

It is important that aid be given through both multilateral and bilateral channels. USAID's reservoir of experience in Bangladesh has produced impressive results. Some of the best foreign aid projects in that part of the world, such as the Cholera Research Laboratory, the Rice Research Institute and the rural works program were undertaken bilaterally by the U.S.

I would like to close with a brief comment on the Bengali attitude toward Americans in Bangladesh. During my two month stay I met no hostility directed toward me as an American. Even at the village level everyone makes the distinction between views of the American people and policy of the Administration. Everywhere there is recognition of the support demonstrated by the people of this country. Although I left prior to the announcement of U.S. recognition most of those with whom I spoke looked forward to relations with the U.S. and were anxious for the resumption of some forms of bilateral U.S. aid. Such aid would prevent Bangladesh from becoming too dependent on other nations and would make a valuable contribution to its reconstruction. If necessary Bangladesh will go it alone. The will and desire are certainly there. But it would be cruel if they were not assisted in the alleviation of their suffering and the rebuilding of their country. The present proposed funding will go a long way to helping this battered nation.

Dr. CASH. I appreciate the opportunity to speak and commend the committee on allowing interested citizens such as myself to testify on this year's foreign aid legislation.

I have been asked to speak on behalf of the Bangladesh Information Center. This is a group of determined Americans—physicians, university professors, and lawyers, who have been concerned about the situation in Bangladesh.

I have just returned from 2 months there, where I was a local director for the International Rescue Committee. I previously lived in Dacca for 3 years, between 1967 and 1970, as a physician with the then Pakistan-SEATO cholera research laboratory. I am now a physician in Baltimore.

DESTRUCTION IN BANGLADESH

The destruction that I noticed on my return to Bangladesh is awesome. This has been well reported in the press. Up to 3 million people have been reported killed, 1.5 million houses, in a conservative estimate, have been destroyed. In addition, hundreds of bullocks are dead and scores of fields remain unplanted.

Now, while it is wise to begin any account of the Bangladesh disaster by appreciating the sad events of the past, I think it is dangerous to risk overmemorializing the atrocities, and by so doing avoid facing up to the present realities of the situation.

POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SITUATION

There are many problems facing Bangladesh and any observer who has been there knows that the months ahead are critical, but I would like to emphasize many of the positive aspects which I do not think have been reported adequately in the press.

It was my impression, both while living in Dacca and touring the countryside that there was a tremendous amount of energy and effort being put forward by the peasants to rebuild their country.

Homes and bridges are being rebuilt at an incredibly rapid rate. I saw three bridges being rebuilt within a short 3-week period of time, all by hand labor, by human chains bringing dirt up from the lower areas and creating bridges with it.

Fields are being prepared for the summer planting and there is tremendous vitality and vibrance within the countryside.

A rural agrarian society such as Bangladesh, that has existed on a subsistence level, has in many ways a better chance for rapid recovery than a country with a sophisticated technology such as our own. There is a tremendous resiliency within Bangladesh, which must be stressed.

HEALTH NEEDS OF BANGLADESH

I am most familiar with the health needs of the country, having worked as a physician there, and I would like to dwell on this for one moment. The nutrition aspect and the food shortage were brought up in the previous testimony.

A recent survey, completed about 2 days before my departure from Dacca 2 weeks ago, demonstrated that twice as many children in one particular area (Garidpur District) were severely malnourished, com-

pared to prior to the outbreak of hostilities. This was a well-conducted survey.

Among the refugees, over three times as many children are severely malnourished as compared to prior to the outbreak of hostilities. I am talking about 2 million children who may be severely malnourished at this time.

Now, at this time there is a nationwide nutrition survey being conducted in conjunction with the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta, Ga. There are a number of epidemiologists out there now and the results of this survey will be forthcoming, I am sure, within the next few months. This will be extremely valuable in assessing the nutrition needs of the country.

Now supposedly, according to Government sources and other people that I spoke with in Bangladesh, there are theoretically enough food grains in the pipeline to avoid famine. This, however, implies that all of these food grains will reach Bangladesh in time, and does not allow for a great deal of leeway. As I say, the nutrition situation there is borderline at best. Once the first adult or child dies from lack of food it becomes too late.

It takes many weeks to get food even from an area as close as Burma because it must be shipped and then offloaded and brought up-country by boat and truck, and so on.

The undernutrition situation also, of course, makes the population possibly more susceptible to other diseases such as cholera and smallpox.

They had a massive cholera outbreak in Dacca in November, the largest that has been seen at the cholera laboratory in its existence—since 1963.

There is now smallpox in the southwest section of the country and there is a team assessing this and providing vaccination protection.

TRANSPORTATION, HOUSING AND INDUSTRY NEEDS

I want to emphasize the food cannot do any good unless it reaches its destination. They need a very good transportation system within the country. Unfortunately, many bridges and rail lines have been destroyed and there are not enough trucks. The rebuilding of the transportation system has been given No. 1 priority by both UNROD and the Government.

Housing, of course, is another obvious need. With 1.5 million houses destroyed, cement, lumber and CI (corrugated iron) sheeting are, of course, desperately needed.

Finally, a major priority is industry. There is a lack of spare parts and a shortage of raw materials, such as cotton, to begin the industries again.

NEEDED FUNDS FOR REHABILITATION AND RELIEF

Certainly the \$100 million asked for in the 1972 foreign assistance bill is greatly needed both for rehabilitation and relief, and I can assure you that this money will be very well spent. It is greatly needed.

Just a few days back, an 18-member U.N. World Bank team led by Madame Seiler, the Austrian Ambassador to India, assessed the rehabilitation and relief needs of the country and labeled immediate needs at \$650 million.

I understand that Congress has informally established a rule of thumb which suggests that the United States provide 40 percent of the total worldwide contributions for relief in Bangladesh. This would amount to a commitment of \$250 million, assuming other countries donate their fair share.

QUESTION OF BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL AID

I would like to mention one last point and that is the question of bilateral versus multilateral aid. I feel there is a definite need for both. One should not exist without the other.

Certainly there is a tremendous reservoir of U.S. experience and good will within Bangladesh. There have been some extremely successful projects.

I know bilateral aid has come under considerable criticism of late. I think a great deal of improvement would accrue if there was a separation of military from development aid.

This country has supplied \$1.5 billion in military aid to the Government of Pakistan since 1947 and I fail to see how this has benefited the taxpayers of the United States. The best policy would be to suspend all military aid to all South Asian countries, including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Far more urgent tasks are available to expend American funds.

It is also important, I think, that a healthy portion of funds earmarked for use in South Asia be spent within the countries of that area.

As noted in the previous testimony, there are many supplies within South Asia and Southeast Asia which could be sent to Bangladesh.

U.S. IMAGE WITHIN BANGLADESH

I would like to close by imparting my impression of the present image of Americans and the American Government within Bangladesh. I think this is interesting and important, especially now that our image in Asia at this time is probably the lowest since the Second World War.

I think there is a very clear distinction made even at the village level between Americans and American foreign policy. Never in my 2 months there—and I did not meet anyone who could testify otherwise—did I meet any hostility or any prejudice to me because I was an American.

I will relate one personal experience. I took a motorboat trip to a health hospital in a rural area and all along the way as I was traveling down the river, people would rush to the shore waving and cheering, demonstrating a tremendous amount of warmth to me as an individual.

Americans have been told we are fighting in Vietnam to establish a democratic country. Well, Bangladesh is a country democratically based. It is a country where the Government has been freely elected, in a free and open ballot, and I think Americans believe that the United States will support free democratic countries such as Bangladesh. It is most important that we keep this trust.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Cash. I think that is a very useful firsthand report.

AVERTING FAMINE AND SUFFERING IN AREA

Senator AIKEN. I think that is very factual and valuable testimony which we have just heard and I am satisfied that both the U.S. Congress and the U.S. executive branch will do everything possible to avert famine and suffering in that area.

As a matter of fact, I had something to do with the beginning of this feeding program in 1954 and I think we have to do everything we can to avert this suffering.

There may be some who say let Russia do it, but Russia can't do it. They have food shortage of their own at this time. As far as I am concerned, the United States will contribute whatever is necessary, but we can't do it all. It all has to be done by people, people living there and people living in other countries.

I don't think they have seen the end of their troubles over in that South Asian area yet because there are real problems and difficulties lying ahead.

However, I think the United States did avert famine of the kind that they used to show in photographs, showing trucks going through the streets of the city every day picking up people who died from malnutrition or actual famine during the night.

I recall the difficulties we had with the first food we sent into India, where it was made rather difficult to distribute that food to the people for whom it was actually intended at the price. They were supposed to pay for it. But that is in the past now.

DOING ALL WE CAN THROUGH MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATION RECOMMENDED

I feel that we should do all that we can through multilateral organizations, the International Red Cross, CARE, about 60 of them in all.

I agree with you there are some instances where bilateral arrangements are still very much in order, but let's do all we can through the international organizations.

I think you gave good testimony, and it was factual.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

SENATOR CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was good testimony. Just a couple of questions occurred to me.

POSSIBILITY OF USING COUNTERPART FUNDS TO BUY INDIAN GRAIN

I had to be at another meeting earlier. I am sorry I wasn't here to hear the testimony of those who mentioned the possibility of getting a substantial amount of food from other countries in the area.

Is one of these countries possibly India? The reason I ask this is that the United States has an enormous amount of Indian currency in Public Law 480 counterpart funds. Would it be possible to use a substantial amount of those funds to buy Indian grains for Bangladesh? This money is not useful unless we can find to buy with it. It would be in our interest and India's at the same time.

Dr. CASH. Well, as I understand, India has had a small surplus crop this year and is providing a part of this to the Government of Bangladesh. However, the amount of food that is needed could not possibly be met by India, itself. They require I think, something like 200,000 tons per month over the next year and much of this is going to have to come from outside of the subcontinent itself.

They are getting some from Burma; much of the edible oils, and so on, are going to have to be imported in from outside.

HOW LONG WILL SITUATION CONTINUE?

Senator CASE. How long is this going to go on? You can have that kind of situation continue. Is this a goal that we are working on?

Dr. CASH. There have been a lot of comments in certain journals that Bangladesh is going to be an international basket case or on the dole forever, and this is just true. The area has tremendous potential for food grain production. Even though the output per acre is one of the lowest in the world, with improved agricultural techniques and improved irrigation, they can produce three crops a year.

It is important to emphasize that, no matter what, Bangladesh is going to make, it. If it can get aid, if it can be helped through the present critical situation and over the next few years, I think it is going to get its head above water.

There is a great deal of potential for food grain production in the area and it requires improved technology and better methods of production, and these methods are available. It must be spread out to the rural communities and, of course, this is the object of all foreign assistance programs, to make an area self-sufficient. This is a definite possibility for Bangladesh.

Senator CASE. That is a very reassuring statement, and I am glad that you made it.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN BANGLADESH

What is the political situation there? Is the Government in control? Is it restraining the fanatics who would like to have a bloodbath with those people who were not with them at the beginning?

Dr. CASH. My distinct impression was, yes, the Government is in firm control and the vast majority of the people support the Government. There are dissident elements, as there are in any country, but these are a very small minority. The so-called bloodbath the critics have referred to and have kept predicting since December, just has not occurred. I get the feeling sometimes that certain people who have been making these predictions would almost like to see their predictions come true. It vindicates them. However, this bloodbath has not occurred. There have been sporadic killings of individuals, but there has been nothing on the scale that some people have been fearing.

Minority groups are being protected at the present time and it is my feeling that over time these groups will be reintegrated into the country. It will take time.

There are wounds that are very deep that will have to be healed, but I am optimistic these wounds will be healed in time.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. Allard K. Lowenstein, National chairman, Americans for Democratic Action.

Mr. Lowenstein is a former Member of Congress and has been very active in these affairs.

We are very pleased to have you with us.

**STATEMENT OF ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN,
AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION**

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. It is a great honor to appear before three of the prophets of the decade and I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here with Mr. Isaacs.

Senator CASE. Don't you think we ought to have a demurrer for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. As to what?

Senator CASE. You didn't hear what he said?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. You can't demur for being a prophet. That is a matter of fact. I said all of you were prophets.

Senator AIKEN. I was reading the New York Times this morning and I noticed that long list of contributors to the 1970 campaign. Of those who gave \$25,000 or more to someone's campaign, I noticed that with only four or five exceptions all of the contributors' candidates lost.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Whereas in your case you don't spend anything.

Senator AIKEN. I am not offering that as a consolation. The more they gave, the more sure the candidates were to lose.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. What I want to do this morning, if I may, is to discuss the peculiar confluence of events that is occurring as this hearing is going on, and I want to bring to the attention of the committee a number of forces that I believe are heading toward collision at a time that would be very dangerous for our country and for those of us who love this country very dearly. I can't, I think, discuss anything else right now without the awareness of what is going on in Indochina; if you don't find a way to react to it now, it can head toward a very difficult situation.

**ADMINISTRATION REASONING CONCERNING AUTHORITY FOR
ESCALATION**

In the last few days this committee heard statements from major officials of the administration. They suggested that the escalation is taking place under the President's authority to protect our troops. Almost in the same breath we were told by the Secretary of State that we will not allow the major offensive attack on South Vietnam to succeed and that in fact we will take whatever action is necessary to prevent this situation.

The administration can do whatever is necessary to prevent an unwanted result in Indochina and lacking any constitutional authority that can be cited with the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf, it will say that it is doing this under provisions to protect our troops.

Under that circular reasoning, as long as we keep any troops there, we can do anything we please.

The administration now says that it will in fact do whatever it pleases to achieve the desired military result.

In my view, the Constitution does not authorize this sort of performance by the administration. This administration is now risking a repeat of the collision that so shook the country 2 years ago.

WITHOLDING AUTHORITY FOR CONTINUED FUNDS SUGGESTED

This committee has before it a bill at this time which gives it, I believe, the opportunity to do something very important.

I, of course, would have supported the proposal by Senators Church and Case, but I would now suggest something which 2 years ago I would have thought irresponsible if advocated by those opposed to the policy in Indochina. Now the only reasonable response to the administration's behavior is to withhold authority, for continued funds for military assistance in Indochina. The administration does not consult with the Congress about what it does and reserves to itself the right to do anything it pleases. It has used appropriations for purposes not authorized by Congress. The Congress should now restore the balance of powers between the branches of government so that appropriated funds are used for their intended purposes.

In the name of getting our prisoners back we created more prisoners. And in the name of getting our troops withdrawn, we sent more troops, if not on land, then by sea and by air.

ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS

I would call to your attention as part of what I think this committee ought to study, the extraordinary fact that as of today we are dispatching into the Indochinese theatre of war an enormous additional amount of military hardware and personnel: 36 more ships, 390 more planes, 32,500 more men.

Now, this additional deployment of troops in the middle of a period which has been described as withdrawal is in fact being concealed from the country, which raises the additional difficulty that a policy which is described in one way is carried out in the opposite way. The people of a free society are denied information on which they can judge whether they support the policy which they are not told about.

CONSEQUENCES OF ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

If the administration is not warned about the consequences of this repetition, concealment, deception, and misstatement before the country discovers it—and if it continues the recent escalation in such a way as to assure that the other side cannot be induced to negotiate a political solution contingent on the return of our prisoners—then the kind of convulsion I spoke of earlier today will face us.

While one views that prospect with dismay, one has to view it, if one understands the feeling of the people in the United States, as one of the contingencies that it seems to me this committee, as one of the guardians of the Constitution in the last decade, ought to be aware of when it considers additional appropriations for military assistance to Indochina.

COMMITTEE RESPONSE TO PRESENT REALITIES SUGGESTED

I would hope that this committee would make clear its commitment for seeing that the constitutional authority of Congress is preserved, not by some future declaration but by some response to the present realities. Then people in the country would feel encouraged to know

that some part of the Government was responsive to the fear that has grown all over the United States against the arbitrary misuse of power without consultation, as exemplified by Secretary Rogers telling this committee that secrecy in this type of thing is very important and, therefore, consultation is impossible. I would hope that the President would reexamine his actions and understand that the commitment to Vietnamization was not a commitment to send in more units or to create more prisoners, but the reverse.

POSSIBILITY OF COLLAPSE OF SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Three years ago in the House of Representatives I made a speech. Although I normally think it is in bad taste to quote myself, the speech seems apropos to what I want to say today. When I came back from Indochina, I remarked that I could find nobody in our Government—no prominent American or South Vietnamese, military or civilian—who thought the present Government of South Vietnam would be able to maintain itself even in 2 or 3 years if our ground support were withdrawn.

In face of these facts I said the notion that we should protect our military presence for any additional period of time seems to me utterly untenable.

We are told if we pull out our Armed Forces precipitously the Saigon government is going to collapse. If it is going to collapse when we pull out our Armed Forces, should he not face the possibility of such a collapse now? That was in September 1969.

Events since then, I think, have sustained that judgment. We are now told in 1972 that we still can't withdraw and that we have to again reescalate our involvement in the war in order to protect the same government of Saigon.

SUGGESTED COMMITTEE ACTION

I believe that this committee would be sending an important message to the country—and even more importantly to the administration—if it were to say that as long as we are concealing a military buildup, as long as we are taking funds that are supposed to be used under the spirit of the Mansfield amendment—the spirit that I believe exists throughout the United States to end our involvement—that further funds will not be forthcoming and will not be authorized for use by the governments in Indochina. That would not jeopardize a single American life or the security of any unit, but it would mean the prophetic suggestion made by the distinguished Senator from Vermont some years ago.

But someone will ask whether it is proper for me to reveal the shipment of forces to Indochina that have not been announced by the Pentagon itself. I have deleted carefully from what I have read into the record today any material that would indicate a specific location of any of the units being sent, lest the life of any American be jeopardized and the security of any unit be jeopardized. But the fact of the matter is that today the lives of men are jeopardized and the security of the units are jeopardized and that, therefore, we have an obligation as we protect their exact location, to reveal the fact that they are being

sent. For that reason I want to reiterate what I said in passing a moment ago: Way beyond what the American people know, we are now dispatching enormous quantities of material and of personnel into the Indochinese theater in violation of the spirit of Vietnamization and pledges made to the country over the last 3 years. Those details will come out. They can't be kept secret. When the truth comes out the country's sense of betrayal can produce a situation not terribly different from what happened in 1970 after the invasion of Cambodia.

I don't think any of us want to go through that again. I think the administration ought to know the risks that result if it continues on the course that it is on now, and I believe this committee is the place for that warning to be forthcoming. This is the committee that has the greatest faith of the American people in terms of its history and in terms of its courage in saying things that other people have not said, and I ask your consent to insert in the record at this point an editorial from the New York Times of today and an article from the Washington Post of today, which discussed these particular points, I think, eloquently, and to include in the record some testimony about the dispatch of units into the Indochinese area collected by the ad hoc military committee, a group of individuals functioning in the last week or two.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Apr. 19, 1972]

THE STRATEGY OF FAILURE

President Nixon's decision to turn the clock back four years by escalating the bombing of North Vietnam from its southern pandhandle to the Hanoi-Haiphong area is an exercise in folly and futility. It revives a strategy tried for three years and abandoned finally by President Johnson in 1968 because it was demonstrably a failure. The mystery is why it is being tried again.

Secretary Rogers and the White House in separate statements have indicated that the bombing was meant in part as a threat that Mr. Nixon will "take whatever action is necessary" to halt the North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam. The lull that has followed evidently is intended to underline this warning. Both statements ruled out the reintroduction of American ground forces into the war or, of course, the use of nuclear weapons. The threat then, directed presumably at Moscow as well as Hanoi, is that a continued Communist offensive will bring back large-scale bombing of North Vietnam as in 1965-68—extended, perhaps, to the mining or bombing of Haiphong harbor and other ports. But neither Hanoi nor Moscow is likely to be intimidated now by a threat they have already faced down.

Officials in Washington and Saigon acknowledge that the current North Vietnamese offensive is being fueled by supplies already in South Vietnam or nearby. Bombing Haiphong, the so-called "top of the funnel," they assert, is aimed at the supplies that might reach the front during the summer or later and keep the battle going then—at a time even more embarrassing politically for President Nixon. If the Administration's object is to prevent this, it is doomed in advance to fail.

As long ago as July 1966, the C.I.A. and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency reported that sixteen months of bombing North Vietnam "had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South." Moreover, the intelligence estimate concluded that this situation was "not likely to be altered" by mining Haiphong and other harbors or adopting other military proposals then contemplated for expanding the air offensive.

A year later, after the air offensive had been expanded in most proposed ways except for hitting Haiphong harbor, Defense Secretary McNamara reported that "there continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist, or her ability to ship the necessary supplies south."

The risk of conflict with the Soviet Union and China dissuaded President Johnson from attacking Haiphong harbor. He concluded that the Communist superpowers were more likely to increase their involvement than to back down if their supply ships were sunk. The damage reported by Moscow to four of its ships last weekend, although American planes had orders to avoid Haiphong harbor, emphasizes the danger.

President Nixon may be prepared to run this risk. He may be gambling that the Soviet Union will restrain Hanoi or restrict its supply flow rather than accept a confrontation that would endanger Mr. Nixon's May 22 visit to Moscow and, with it, such other Soviet objectives as a strategic arms agreement, increased trade with the United States and Bonn's ratification of the German-Soviet treaty and the European status quo.

But a SALT agreement and detente in Europe are as much Mr. Nixon's objectives as the Kremlin's, and they are important to his re-election campaign. Is he prepared to risk them and the peace of the world by going beyond implied threats of a naval-air blockade of Haiphong—which are unlikely to intimidate Moscow—to the reality? Does he dream of turning Soviet supply ships around in the Gulf of Tonkin the way President Kennedy turned them around during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962?

One danger is that the Soviet Union may feel that Mr. Nixon is bluffing and, calling him, find that he is not. Since the Cambodian invasion of 1970, the President's aides have boasted of Mr. Nixon's "unpredictability." The stakes are too high for the nation or the Congress any longer to accept such risks.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 19, 1972]

AN AD HOC COMMITTEE TO KEEP TABS ON THE MILITARY

A Commentary by Nicholas von Hoffman

The other night the phone rang. A woman identified herself as a member of the Ad Hoc Military Buildup Committee was calling to say that Haiphong would be subject to a B52 attack within 24 hours. She gave a list of the specific targets which, she said, would be distributed to the bomber pilots. She provided the name of the unit that had drawn up the list of targets and made the maps. She knew the commanding officer's name.

She and her buddies have sheets and sheets of other information concerning the war. She can tell you, for instance, that the USS Nitro, an appropriately named ammunition ship, will sail from Quonset, R.I., today for the Earl Ammunition Depot in New Jersey where it is supposed to take on its cargo and proceed to an as-yet-unknown destination.

The Nitro, the committee will tell you, is "normally associated with the aircraft carrier Saratoga." The Saratoga recently set sail out of Florida for Indochina, so you know where the Nitro is going.

The committee is about 10 people working out of 67 Winthrop St., Cambridge, Mass. Their espionage equipment consists of a set of telephones through which they reach anti-war servicemen all over the world who call collect to 617-492-5570 to say what's going on at their base or installation. Worried wives and parents, who want to find out where their serviceman's unit is should pay for their own calls.

The committee, which is only as old as the new buildup in the fighting, has already run up a \$10,000 phone bill, and, not having access to the public purse as does the CIA, is grievously short of money. Contributions may be sent via the boards of social concern of the United Methodist or Presbyterian churches.

Doubtless some of the info it gives out is gafalixed up, but these are the errors of people inexperienced in collecting intelligence data, as opposed to Melvin Laird's lies. Since our government withholds and distorts information as a matter of policy, the committee is about all we've got.

There have been a couple of stories about it in the Boston papers, and the wire services have done one or two shorties, but its work is still generally unknown to the public. "Most of the papers have referred to us as 'persistent rumors,'" says Sam Butterfield, a committee member who is also the daughter of a career Navy man whose specialty is intelligence, "but finally we made the grade the other day as 'sophisticated Washington observers'."

Nevertheless, if the committee says that the attack carrier Kitty Hawk steamed out of the Subic Bay naval base on April 2 on such short notice it left 300 of its crew behind; or, if it says the destroyer escort USS Roard (DE 1053) left the same port on emergency orders for Vietnam, both ships probably did. Likewise, when the committee passes on a bulletin board notice from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines saying, "Everyone is on alert. This includes the Phase, the flight line, recovery teams and supervisors. Supervisors will accompany all flights and teams. Everyone should make arrangements for dependents before going TDY."

Riffling through the committee dispatches from around the world gives you an idea of the magnitude and variety of the American power converging on Vietnam, that overly liberated, overly defended land: Iwakuni, Japan, reports the arrival of more than 100 C-141 cargo planes, probably from Travis Field, Calif.; Yokota Air Force Base, Japan, reports two squadrons of F-4 Phantoms and A-6s with 250 crew members and maintenance personnel sent to Vietnam; Hickman Field, Hawaii, reports eight men from the 619th Support Group have left for Thailand with an additional 300 men from this unit on alert; Mather Air Force Base, Calif., reports the B52s and KC-135s in its 320th Bomb Wing are on alert; the 3d Marine Air Wing, the 62d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, the 334th, 5th, and 6th Air Force Squadron, the 33d Communications Squadron, on alert, in the air, on the way.

Sounds almost Homeric, the recital of the military units bound again for war, an it's epic in the death they do, and will do. Those clumsy blind, inaccurate B52s flying by night at high altitude, letting go on a city of 300,000. Ah, Dresden, Coventry, Hamburg and Tokyo. Six of those bombers can kill and flatten anything in a territory three miles long and half a mile wide.

This act of terror against a city's civilian population is too much to react to. The details tell us more. The new plastic, antipersonnel bomb discovered by Project Air War, another nest of spies for peace, there's a revealing device. Plastic shrapnel doesn't show up on an X-ray machine, you see, so they will have to probe for every bit and splinter.

Yes, and babies, too.

TROOPS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lowenstein. Are those troops on the aircraft carriers and the Air Force? They are not ground troops?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. We had testimony about the number of ships and planes being made available.

OPPOSITION TO FUNDS FOR OTHER AREAS

Are you suggesting no money be authorized in this bill for Indochina? What about the rest of it? Is the rest of it agreeable to you?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. No; I would not say that. If I were discussing each item in detail, I would have objection to some other funds. But because of the crisis in Indochina, I wanted to limit any comments to the subject of Indochina. I have opposed funds in the past for other areas and would still oppose such funds.

I am not opposed to military assistance where it is justified. I was afraid if I took each country up—

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted a general statement. This committee on two occasions, I believe, has taken the position on Greece. There is no use going over that again.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. As I think you may be aware, I was a sponsor of the amendment in the House to delete military assistance to Greece, which obtained some enormous support at that time, and I think 12 votes, but I think the support has built up since then.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. We will certainly miss you, Al, in Congress. I used to see you once in a while when we had similar ideas.

ENDING CONFLICT BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM

But those who say today we should get out over there—I would like to get us out of there. I would rather get us out in July than December, however, if that is possible. I think it is if we work at it and forget some of the other things. Some say we should accept the North Vietnam terms or conditions for ending the conflict between the United States and North Vietnam. Would you go along with that?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. No, I think that my phraseology of it would be much closer to yours, which is that we should have announced that we want to leave, and having not done that, we should have announced that we have fulfilled our commitment and leave, and to do that get our prisoners back, as the McGovern-Hatfield proposal suggested a year ago.

Senator AIKEN. They asked repudiation of the present government in Vietnam and also the withdrawal of our what we call defensive weapons, with which we have liberally armed the South Vietnamese people.

I might even go along with that provided Russia and China would do the same for the North Vietnamese, if they would say, let's withdraw the weapons we furnished them over the years. We might get together. I don't think we are going to. I think that is too much to hope for.

I do want to tell you now how vigorously I opposed the bombing of North Vietnam in 1966, when I felt the United States was the aggressor, and I am not in favor of the bombing now. I am sorry it had to be resorted to.

But I am even more sorry that the North Vietnamese, possibly spurred on by somebody else, saw fit to commit their entire Armed Forces to the invasion of South Vietnam. This makes a completely different situation and I have felt that we should be practically out of there by the 1st of July. But in view of the demonstrations and the other things that are being brought up—they are having a demonstration on the Senate floor now I understand, with a lot of people involved, not Cliff Case and me, but a lot of people over there—that it is going to be difficult to get out by the middle of the summer completely and let them go on their own.

I don't absolve North Vietnam at all now. I had a lot of sympathy for them for a while, but the situation being what it is, as I say, this being the year 1972, it makes it a little difficult.

DIFFICULTY WITH RECIPROCAL WITHDRAWAL SITUATION

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Concerning two comments you made. One is the suggestion of a sort of reciprocal withdrawal by the United States. I think the difficulty with that reciprocal withdrawal situation is that there aren't, and haven't been, Russian and Chinese troops, or Russian or Chinese bombers flying over Saigon. If we had withdrawn all of our troops and if we were not bombing North Vietnam, I would say your proposal of reciprocal withdrawal of material would make sense.

PREVIOUS BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. I thought we were in real difficulty the day at the White House we were going to start the bombing of North Vietnam.

At that time it was estimated there were about 5,000 North Vietnamese who had infiltrated South Vietnam to help their friends and neighbors and relatives. It was felt that bombing the north would soon make Hanoi realize that she was wrong and she would ask for us for terms for getting out, but it didn't work that way and I didn't think it would. You didn't either.

DESCRIPTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE AS INVASION QUESTIONED

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Right. The second comment that I would like to add to what you said has to do with the invasion. We are talking about South Vietnam going to North Vietnam, and if I may, I would like to recall an episode that occurred when I was being briefed in Vietnam, when I was there as a Member of Congress.

I will not refer to the exact location, but what happened will be of interest to you because it is prophetic of what we were told about Vietnamization. The President told us it would make it possible for the South Vietnamese Government to stand on its feet. Some of us questioned that would happen. When I was there I was told by a succession of eminent military authorities the following things in the particular area I am now referring to.

The first fact was that the infrastructure of the Vietcong had been destroyed and 90 percent of the fighting in the area was now being done by the North Vietnamese.

Then later I was told that Vietnamization was proceeding way ahead of schedule. In fact by the end of the calendar year all of the South Vietnamese units would be trained, equipped and deployed.

When the briefing ended it sounded awfully good. The Vietcong had been destroyed and the Vietnamization was so far ahead of schedule. All of the South Vietnamese would be trained and equipped and deployed by the end of the calendar year. We can withdraw all of our forces except possibly air cover and leave the fighting to the South Vietnamese.

Oh, they said, that is not what we said. What we said is the opposite. We said we can in fact count on Vietnamization succeeding. We understand that it is designed to make it possible for the South Vietnamese Government to fight the Vietcong. Oh, I said, you just told me 90 percent of the fighting is being done by the North Vietnamese. What you are now telling me is if Vietnamization succeeds the South Vietnamese Government will be able to fight 10 percent of the fighting at the end of the time and all of their forces will be trained, equipped, and deployed. The reply was, of course, it would be very unfair to expect them to be able to fight the North Vietnamese Army units.

My contention is sooner or later if we talk about Vietnam from a theater from which we withdraw, the Vietnamese will have to fight whoever we are fighting. We can't stay permanently to protect them against their own people and against what we call invasion. So I am troubled at the description of the North Vietnamese offensive as an invasion of South Vietnam because that restructures the historical quarrel whether it is one country or two countries, which can only leave us there permanently, and that is what I thought we concluded we couldn't do. Our interests are not to stay there eternally to see to it that at some point President Thieu can stand on his own feet.

Therefore, I think from this I could see why I would bridle under the suggestion what we call "invasion" justifies our reescalating. We can't set the terms under which the North Vietnamese will fight the war, unless we are prepared to fight the war to defeat them.

Honorable people say let's win the war and get out. This administration is losing the war and staying in. It is 180 degrees in the reverse.

Senator AIKEN. A lot of mistakes have been made over the last 10 years. I do recall one August when we were assured our boys would all be home by Christmas.

That is all I have.

Senator SYMINGTON (now presiding). Senator Case.

Senator CASE. I just want to say it is good to have you back and good to have you on the firing line. I wish you were still in the House, too. I don't think I have anything.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Lowenstein, we are delighted to see you. Did you happen to follow the testimony of Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird in the last few days?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I did.

PRESENT SOUTH VIETNAMESE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES

Senator PERCY. I wonder if you would care to elaborate on what you see as the ability of the South Vietnamese to take over now their own defense. What would you envision would happen if we get out in accordance with the views of this committee and stop all funds as of December 31, 1972? What would you envision would happen over there? What would be the capability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves? Do you think that there would be, as was implied, the slaughter of 1 or 2 million people? None of us want a bloodbath.

But do you think that this resolution that we have passed in the Foreign Relations Committee is realistic, sensible, and should be adhered to and fought for on the floor of the Senate?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I think the central difference about Vietnamization that separated those of us who opposed it and those who supported it, was the feeling among those of us who opposed it that no matter what we do, the Saigon government will fall when we leave. It has not developed support. While it is one thing to aid a free government that has the support of its own people, as with our support to West Berlin and Israel, it is a different business to eternally try to support a government that doesn't have the support of its own people and that will fall when we leave.

I would say in response to your question my view is when we leave, whenever that is, this government will fall. It is a fact that we ought to face. It doesn't change that fact to protract our stay there. What happens when it falls depends in part on how it failed. That is why some of us hope there will be a coalition government negotiated, aimed at producing an interim period against the kind of problem that might occur if South Vietnam collapses in a military defeat. But we can't force, in my view, on the Saigon government that kind of determination of its role.

If it wants to fight on by itself then, of course, it must do that. We don't want to dictate to them. All we can say is that if you want to

fight on by yourself, we have done more than any other country in history has done for anyone. We are finished and now you must face the choice. Either you will accept coalition and you will negotiate a political arrangement or you will fight on without our help because we can't make you win the war. There is no way that can happen, as I think President Kennedy was warning us before 1963.

So we get then to the question of the bloodbath. In the name of preventing a bloodbath, we have committed acts of such enormity in creating deaths; it sits ill on any American to discuss bloodbaths. We have had enough bloodbaths. But the least we can do is to stop being the cause of the bloodbaths, which is what we do when we send a thousand sorties of B-52's over villages 10,000 miles away when they don't know who we are and raining death on them on the pretext we are saving them.

I remember when the colonel said we had to destroy the city to save it. We have escalated the policy to destroy the whole countryside to save it. So I would hope that there would be a negotiated settlement which would return our prisoners and establish a coalition government and guarantee the Vietnamese people the right to relocate. If Saigon chooses to fight on, then our only position, it seems to me, is we have to leave. We simply have to do what this committee has said we should do, which is to terminate our involvement as soon as possible, and in my own view it should be somewhat sooner. But I will settle for the end of the year. That is better than the following year.

Senator PERCY. Do you think the raids over Haiphong and Hanoi will weaken the resolve of the North Vietnamese Government to fight? Will it intimidate them and cause them to lighten up or will it cause them to further escalate, based upon our escalation and counterescalation experiences of the past decade?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. It seems quite clear that every time we escalate, they counterescalate. When they counterescalate we cry foul. Our assumption seems to be we have the right to escalate at will. If they don't accept that new set of rules, I think it is quite clear they will reescalate as long as they need to.

Was it Ho Chi Minh who said to the American correspondent some years ago. Tell us how long you Americans want to fight 1 year, 25 years—and we will be glad to oblige.

We are told, when it is convenient, that this war is a matter of our security. Although this doctrine now, we are told that the North Vietnamese and their allies are the aggressors and presumably the Vietnamese could eventually penetrate our fleet and air power and land in this country if we don't defeat them now in Asia.

I think every American knows if they made it to this country, that every American would fight to get them out, however long it took. And if it took us 25 years, we would get them out.

I suspect it is time we understand that their sense of us is exactly that. They are going to continue fighting until we leave.

So it seems to me very clear the more we escalate, the more we guarantee, we can't see any kind of reasonable way to end our involvement.

I acknowledge that nowhere can we guarantee the end of the war, but we can unilaterally end our involvement in the war providing we set conditions that don't require them to surrender in order for us to

end it. That means that McGovern-Hatfield's proposal is in the spirit of what needs to be done, that we will leave as our prisoners come back.

REQUIREMENT THAT WE DEPOSE THIEU

Senator Aiken asked what I felt about the requirement the other side has made that we depose Thieu. I think that is a semantic problem. I don't think we need to depose Thieu. I think all we need to do is leave and Thieu will find ways to depose himself.

I see no reason in the world to have to phrase what the condition is for our leaving. It should be the return of our prisoners. The conditions will be as the other side has said repeatedly. We can't meet their conditions and try to impose on them a military solution, which is what we do when we escalate the bombing. Now we are discussing mining Haiphong, which, I suppose, if it means anything, it means we are prepared at least to discuss a confrontation with a great many countries that so far we haven't had to confront in the pursuit of this illusion that we can make Thieu a government that can stand on its feet.

EFFECT OF TERMINATING PARTICIPATION IN WAR ON U.S. PRESTIGE

Senator PERCY. Lastly, would you think that if we did terminate our active participation in this war, with proper notice, as I hope we have already given—certainly we have tried to give it in many ways—that we would do irreparable damage to our national prestige any more than France suffered when it decided to leave Algeria?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I don't know if we set out to destroy our national prestige or if we have taken guidance from the Soviet Union and China on what to do to hurt our national prestige. I don't know if we could have done any more effective job than we are doing in Indochina. The best thing we could do for our national prestige is to leave with the prisoners coming home, and had we done that years ago we would be a much healthier Nation now.

EFFECT OF ESCALATION ON U.S. PEOPLE

I mentioned earlier today that one of the things that troubles me is that the administration is now committed to whatever steps are necessary to gain a military victory in this struggle now in progress. It may think it can do this without further splitting and convulsing the American people. It can't. If anyone is under the illusion there is going to be quiet in the United States if the escalation continues, they just don't understand the mood of this country.

Let's focus on people in our country who are supposed to fight wars—the younger people whose views on this war have been clear for years. If this escalation continues, if Secretary Rogers is to be taken at his word, that we will take whatever steps are necessary, I am afraid we will encourage the notion that the unresponsiveness of Government to constitutional constraint, to the views of the people, requires the people to do things to indicate their feelings that can only add to the difficulties the United States is already enduring.

In that connection, let me finish my reply with a rather remarkable letter I came across the other day written by Senator Edward Kennedy

to Joseph Alsop, who has been one of the profound pundits on Indochina over the years and who has proven to be consistently miraculously in error.

Mr. Alsop wrote Senator Kennedy deploring the political actions of the young people in America demonstrating against our own country's successes on the battlefield. Senator Kennedy's reply to that was:

We are a nation constantly being reborn and we can thank our God that those who have duly arrived in our society will not casually accept the views and presumptions of their fathers, much less their errors. They do not protest their country's success on the battlefield, doubtful as those successes may be, they protest the very existence of the battlefield because it has no place in the vision of the country. I support them in that.

I think every American, I suggested earlier, would fight for this country if it were jeopardized. As you pointed out, we were not jeopardized, and we are destroying a country 10,000 miles away that couldn't hurt us if it wanted to. Then the young Americans are asked to fight.

In the absence of such authority, I hope this committee will stand on its legs and say to the American people you cannot use money to withdraw soldiers under the conditions you stated, to send more over.

Before you arrived, I was reading into the record evidence of war troop shipments going over in large quantities, more ships and planes, the exact reversal of withdrawal, and I think the central dilemma that this committee must face with this bill before you, and I want to thank——

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much indeed.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I want to be sure the record includes those who arrived later were among the prophets.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sorry I was not here to hear all of the witnesses. Let me say, a great deal of what you say I am in agreement with, and we thank you for appearing. We have been having a long-planned discussion about the Vietnam war on the floor.

The next witness will be Mr. Timothy Butz, representing the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

Do you have a statement you would like to read?

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY BUTZ, VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR

Mr. BUTZ. Yes, I do, Senator.

Senator Symington, Senator Percy, 1 year ago today, members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War came to Washington to establish Firebase Berrigan on the grounds of the Mall. We came not to perform theater, but rather to direct our energies and hopes toward the one institution in the U.S. Government that we felt could end the Indochina war and redirect this country toward the revolutionary goals that a ragged group of rebels fought so hard for in 1776. We talked freely and openly to this committee, to ad hoc hearings, and to every Senator and Representative that would listen. The men who once were members of the elite Special Forces told you of torturing prisoners. The men who had once "humped the boonies" with infantry and the airborne, told you of free fire zones and search and destroy missions. All of us talked of war crimes that we committed or witnessed

that were the inexorable result and logical extension of U.S. military policy. We came to you last year in the hopes that you would take our experience and testimony and act upon them.

Today we return, hardened by a year of continuing and escalating air war. The nightmares that we brought back from Vietnam have been compounded by a year of increased bombing that can only be explained in terms of the destruction it brings to the people and lands of Indochina. We have been made better by the realization that in the 366 days since our Operation Dewey Canyon II began, over 750,000 tons of bombs have been dropped on Indochina. We have been disillusioned by inaction on the part of the Congress to enact and enforce effective legislation that could end American involvement in Indochina, and we have been disgusted by the continual usurpation of congressional powers by the executive branch. We have been radicalized by the rhetoric of Vietnamization, a policy that brings Americans home only to replace them with computers and aircraft to kill and maim Indochinese. We are outraged by the selection of Haiphong and Hanoi as military targets, when all evidence shows that such bombing only serves to create civilian casualties and suffering on the part of noncombatants

NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

The current escalation of bombing and the selection of Hanoi and Haiphong as targets has underlined and emphasized the need for congressional action to end American involvement in Indochina. The April 15 raids on the Hanoi-Haiphong areas demonstrates that the administration is prepared to lock this country into a protracted "perma war" rather than to carry out the mandate of the American people who want an end to American involvement in Indochinese affairs. The administration has shown through these raids that it will not abandon its dream of a military victory in Vietnam, a dream that could cause the total destruction of all of Indochina if left unchecked.

EFFECT OF BOMBING ON CIVILIAN POPULATION

In the 2 preceding days of hearings before this committee, both Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird have come forth to defend the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong as being in line with the policy of Vietnamization. What neither of these men addressed themselves to was the effect of the bombing on civilian populations. Both "The Pentagon Papers" and "A Study on the Air War" prepared last year by the Center of International Studies at Cornell University document that targets of strategic bombing in North Vietnam are located near predominately civilian areas. The use of B-52's and saturation bombing against North Vietnam means, in effect, that there were large numbers of civilian casualties. A mission of six B-52's can destroy every structure in an area that measures one-half mile long by 3 miles wide. There can be no distinction of military targets from civilian structures under those conditions.

MILITARY VALUE OF TARGETS

The military value of such targets is another question that deserves the attention of this body. Studies prepared by the International Secu-

rity Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense all point to the same fact. As the International Security Agency wrote in their March 1967 memorandum, "Experience has indicated that systematic operations particularly against road and rail routes (in the Hanoi-Haiphong area) adds simply and slightly to repair burdens, while at the same time involving substantial civilian casualties."

Another report, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in October 1967, showed that even a combination of bombing and the mining of Haiphong Harbor would serve no military purpose. The study stated:

The combined interdiction of land and water routes, including the mining of the water approaches to the major ports and the bombing of ports and transshipment facilities *** would *** not be able to cut off the flow of essential supplies and, by itself, would not be the determining factor in shaping Hanoi's outlook on the war.

If this bombing is ineffective against the ability of North Vietnam to mount and support military actions, and the prime victims of such actions are civilians, then a logical conclusion would be that the targets are deliberately designed to cause civilian casualties. This is also in line with the policy of Vietnamization and automated air war. The statistics show that in the 3 years of this administration, that 3.2 million tons of bombs have been dropped in Indochina, covering 2 million refugees in Cambodia, 300,000 refugees in Laos, and over 1 million refugees in South Vietnam.

ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPONS

According to two investigators for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Profs. Egbert Pfeifer and Arthur Westing, approximately one-half of the ordnance dropped in Indochina consists of antipersonnel weapons. The first of these anti-personnel weapons used in Indochina was the "pineapple" bomb, 1,000 of which were dropped by a single aircraft over an area of 200 meters wide by 500 meters long. The pineapple proved to be ineffective because the 250 steel ball-bearing pellets it contained sprayed in a horizontal pattern when the bomb detonated, and could not hit people who were in holes or caves.

The Air Force then developed this BLU 24, commonly called the guava. The guava has the advantages of the pineapple in that thousands of them can be dropped by a single aircraft over a large area. An added advantage to the guava, however, was the fact that it was capable of being detonated in the air throwing between 260-300 pellets in a 360 degree pattern, hitting people who were seeking refuge in caves and holes.

Some of the newer ordnance along these lines include this fragmentation bomb. This bomb casing failed to explode when dropped on the Tan Hoi hospital in North Vietnam last December. The casing itself breaks into 320 pieces of shrapnel, so tiny as to do little damage to a vehicle or a structure, but large enough to kill or maim a person.

This fiberglass bomb has also been introduced to the air war. The manufacturer of this particular bomb told Fred Branfman of Project Air War that the casing itself breaks into pieces that measure one-eighth of an inch by one-sixteen of an inch, by the depth of the wall.

The point behind showing these weapons to you gentlemen, is to give you an idea of what the air war means to civilians in Indochina. None of the weapons I showed you are capable of doing substantial damage to a vehicle, bridge, or building. Their only target is human flesh. This is Vietnamization. This is why the Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was not out of line with the policies of making civilians the final victims of this war.

DAILY DESTRUCTION FROM U.S. BOMBING IN INDOCHINA

While the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong have justifiably sparked response from the American people, the events of last weekend must be viewed in the context of the daily destruction that occurs from American bombing in Indochina. Under the policy of Vietnamization, the Plain of Jars in Laos has been destroyed, and its 50,000 residents killed, maimed, and refugeeed. This, of course, was done without the consent or the advice of the Congress. The decision to eradicate the Plain of Jars was made in the same fashion as the decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong. It was a decisionmaking process that involved a select few individuals in the executive branch of the Government, a virtual act of oligarchy rather than democracy.

CONGRESS MUST ACT NOW

Congress must act now. The people of this country are tired of a war in which this country has no vested interest in terms of our own national security. We are tired, but not so tired that we are willing to allow the war to continue, to allow Indochinese to be killed by American aircraft, dropping American bombs, flown by American pilots, controlled by American computers. If this body and this system of Government are to ever regain the faith of the people, then you must take positive action to stop this barbaric destruction of Indochina.

Our leaders from Washington to Eisenhower have warned us of the tyranny that would result if one branch of the Government ever assumed excessive power. We see in Indochina today the most striking example of this warning in the history of the Republic. We see a tiny group of men committing this Nation to a full scale war entirely of their own initiative. We see most clearly the unconstitutional use of power which the chairman of this very committee has called "presidential dictatorship."

I am grateful that the majority of the members of this committee are on record as opposing this war. I applaud your principle and courage, for example, for the vote which you took to recommend cutting of funds for the Indochina war. But that is not enough. The actions of this committee must be reputed on the floor of the Congress.

I ask you now to take far less of a risk than you once asked me to; I ask you not to risk your lives, but simply your ease; I ask you simply to ask this Senate to put aside all other business until the question of the war is resolved, to legislate an end to this war immediately if possible, or filibuster an end to all other business if necessary, but in any event to make the same pledge to yourselves that I and so many of my brothers have made to ourselves: not to rest until this ugly, bloody chapter of our history is finished.

In the name of 50,000 of my brothers who lay dead and buried in the soil of this land, most—like me—mere teenagers when sent to fight in a war they neither understood nor believed in;

In the name of tens of thousands of my compatriots who now lay rotting in Veterans' Administration hospitals—armless, legless, blinded, burned, maimed, or deprived of their faculties for thought or feeling;

In the name of Huyen Tam Mam, Ngo Ba Than, and 100,000 other political prisoners suffering in the tiger cages and prisons of Nguyen Van Thieu;

In the name of American prisoners of war, both present and those who will become prisoners as a result of the current bombing;

In the name of 10 million Indochinese refugees, living landless and homeless in bare camps and absolute poverty;

In the name of hundreds of thousands of Indochinese peasants now huddling underground in caves and holes, hiding from American bombs;

In the name of my mother and father who have watched two of their three sons march off to war;

In the name of the dozens of unarmed men, women, and children who, before this testimony is over, will be burned alive by our napalm, cut to pieces by our fragmentation bombs, riddled by our antipersonnel weapons, and buried alive by our heavy explosives;

I beg you, I urge you, I plead with you, I demand, end this war.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Butz.

Senator Percy.

RECENT ACTIVITIES OF VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR

Senator PERCY. We very much appreciate your being here. I have benefited greatly from my discussions with members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

I wonder if you could describe for me the activities of Vietnam Veterans Against the War in recent months?

Mr. BUTZ. Senator Percy, we are currently engaged in Operation Rolling Thunder III. Operation Rolling Thunder III is a lobbying effort in support of any and all acts of legislation which would end the Indochina war, particularly the Mondale bill in the Senate.

We are experiencing internally a time of reorganization, restructuring, analyzing the current political situation, and what we can do to be effective in creating not only peace in Indochina but a democratic society in this country.

I think that we are very frustrated right now with the fact that 366 days ago at this moment we were marching up Pennsylvania Avenue trying to raise the consciousness of the country, trying to make some effect on the Senate, and that 1 year later we look back and we see virtually no change except an escalation. We see no end to the war in sight. All we see is a continual shroud of secrecy coming down around the air war. We see continual repression and political dissent in this country and we have learned more and more about the total barbarity of conduct in this war.

I came back from Vietnam in 1968 and we never used any fiberglass bombs in 1968. Do you realize what these things do? When a person is hit by a fiberglass bomb this splinters and rips into a person's body and it shreds everything. You can't put a person under an X-ray

machine and examine him to remove the shrapnel or the fiberglass. You have to cut the body open, remove the intestines and probe the body cavity. I want to ask you, who is the war criminal in a case such as this?

Senator PERCY. As Senator Symington has an urgent appointment he must meet, would the Senator like to ask any questions?

Senator SYMINGTON. Your statement is impressive.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: STRENGTH AGAINST WEAKNESS;
WEAKNESS AGAINST STRENGTH

The idea, as I have said on the floor of the Senate in 1956, 1967, 1972, as I see our foreign policy, is to be one of strength against the weak and weakness against the strong. That has been demonstrated.

It is difficult to understand a war where we were told that one of the chief reasons for fighting it was fear of the People's Republic of China.

It is difficult to understand the acceleration of the war into Cambodia and into North Vietnam, at the same time the head of our Government visits the People's Republic of China. It is hard to understand, under all the circumstances, whether what is going on will improve the planned visit of our Chief Executive to Moscow.

On the other hand, we here in the Congress operate with increasing lack of knowledge as to any details. Perhaps there is something about this we don't know, at least as of now.

I commend you for your interest and wish more people had been knowledgeable about the type and character of attacks going on in Vietnam. I think their attitude toward this war would change.

Actually, what we are doing, as stated on the floor of the Senate today, is destroying that country, including the people. It will be 50 years before this land can be used again, tilled by the people who are now refugees in the cities.

Thank you for appearing this morning.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

I wish every one of our colleagues could have been here today. I think we all appreciate the fact that when you come to Washington in your battle fatigues we can readily identify you.

It has been helpful to me in seeking you out to again add to my own knowledge and understanding of the problem, and when you describe war and all of its horrors you do so with great authenticity. So that we are grateful for your being here.

I will ask the staff to see that copies of your testimony be personally delivered to each Senator who could not be here this morning.

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR

I am interested in your organization. Are you gaining in numbers? How do you organize? How do you reach other people? What sort of research do you have that supports your organization?

Mr. Butz. The Vietnam Veterans Against the War organized into 26 regions by geographic location. We have a governing body that is representing each region and one regional coordinator elected by the constituency of the region takes on the business of running the organization.

In terms of recruitment we are working more and more closely each and every day with GI projects, especially in terms of trying to make the air war an issue and trying to reach more Air Force and Navy personnel.

We are growing, but the very fact you can identify me by my jungle fatigues—I didn't want to put my jungle fatigues on and come talk to you today. I would have preferred to have stayed at home and read a good book and drank a little wine and do a thousand other things.

I think the question we are facing right now in the organization, we have to put on jungle fatigues again. I wore these greens for a year and a half in Vietnam and I didn't want to dig them out again and I don't think the people here with me want to dig theirs out again, and I wish this Congress would use its power for a change and develop some backbone and stand up at the present time and stop this insanity. The next time I put on my greens who knows what it is going to be. It is just a frustration I think so many people in this country are experiencing.

Senator Percy. I can only say that I will repeat what Jack Kennedy used to say, that I am just one of a hundred. He finally decided to do something about it and realized the limitations of his power and he decided to get in that chair. But unfortunately he made some very bad decisions with respect to Vietnam and for some very bad reasons, in my judgement, so this administration has inherited this problem and I was hopeful we were getting out totally and completely at the earliest possible moment.

COST OF WAR IN HUMAN HORROR

One cost of this war, and you have dramatized the cost of the war in human horror, that they are human beings and——

Mr. Butz. Very beautiful human beings.

Senator Percy. And we have to feel deeply about their loss and meaning.

PROBLEMS OF DRUG ABUSE

One other loss we have suffered is the problem of drug abuse and its relationship to the war in Vietnam.

The whole feeling in this country and the feeling of men who go abroad, feeling as you do, and who take up drugs over there—we now have, as we know, figures I revealed for the first time, not 300,000 heroin addicts in this country, but 560,000 heroin addicts in this country. And as a result of the bill that I put into Congress 8 months ago on drug abuse, a special office headed by Dr. Jaffee is now embodied in law. We have moved and moved rapidly. The drug problem had been in the center of our cities for 20–25 years, in the black communities for generations, but when it reached the suburbs, that is when government really began to move. That is a terrible thing to have to say about our sense of priorities, that we waited that long. But we now have a magnificent piece of legislation, a very aggressive program. It is possible for your group to supply to those of us deeply interested in the problem information on the relationship of this war to the use of drugs, how sensitive it has been on the part of our veterans, what has happened to some of them.

Mr. BUTZ. I am sure.

Senator PERCY. I think this is information we would like to get to the American public. I would like to get it to the drug abuse special office in the White House.

Mr. BUTZ. Aside from the Vietnam War, I think the problem of drug abuse among veterans, and in society as a whole, the heroin addiction problem program is one of our organization's prime concerns. We have seen too many of our brothers wasted away by scag and I am sure that we would be more than glad to help you if you think it would be of help.

Senator PERCY. It would be of great help to us and, as you know, Secretary Packard in testimony before hearings I was conducting in the Senate Government Operations Committee, said he did make a reversal in policy of the Defense Department to not give dishonorable discharge to a person on drugs but to treat it as an illness, not a crime, and to open the hospitals, the veterans hospitals, and to seek men out and compassionately deal with them because a part of this problem is related to their feeling about the war.

Mr. BUTZ. I would like to point out though one problem that we are having. We do have a lot of communities working with drug addiction. We have several programs—Philadelphia, New York, where we try and get into the VA hospitals and direct our energies and efforts toward veterans who are drug addicts, that we have met with quite a bit of opposition on the part of the VA, and this may be something that you would like to look into. We could supply information on it at a later date.

Senator PERCY. You furnish that information to me and we will see that you get no opposition.

Mr. BUTZ. Thank you.

Senator PERCY. We are going to treat this in the way it should be treated, not the old way, which is out of date as of 6 months ago.

ATROCITIES OF ENEMY

The charge has been made, of course, that those of us who have opposed this war, and I have steadily and consistently opposed it for years, considering it the most dreadful mistake this Nation has ever made, are in the position of always pointing out what American bombs do but never pointing out the atrocities of the enemy.

In order to see both sides of the coin, I went to Vietnam. I went through the village of Dak Son a few days after the terrible atrocity there, which was pictured in Time Magazine and other magazines, when the Vietcong came in at night in a village occupied largely by women and children and massacred by fire, burned alive several hundred people, and we went to see the burned-down thatched huts and the smoke still in the holes that people had crawled into to get away from the fire. Then, of course, they suffocated in there.

We know that there are atrocities on the other side.

To give both sides of the coin and to answer the charge that our veterans are only pointing out American atrocities, not atrocities on the other side, and to see that this is a horrible war on both sides, would you care to give any instances or experiences that you have seen of atrocities committed by the North Vietnamese or by the Vietcong against their own Vietnamese people?

ABERRATION OF BEHAVIOR VERSUS STANDARD OPERATING POLICY

Mr. Butz. I would speak to that in this point. During the Tet 1968 there was a decapitation of a body on my base. It was done by the NLF forces. However, what we are talking about when we talk of war crimes is aberration of behavior versus standard operating policy. The war crimes that had been committed on the part of the Vietnamese, as reported by first hand testimony by veterans and others who have observed the war, do not have the pattern, they seem to be aberrations of behavior rather than standard policy.

When you saturate—bomb Hanoi, Haiphong and the area in between them, which contains a million people, that is totally indiscriminate and that is continually what is going on now and that whole policy of saturation bombing—I was 30 miles from a B-52 strike one time and the ground shook right underneath my feet. I can imagine what it did to the people in the forest. These are free fire zones where anything living and walking is a target without discrimination between combatant and noncombatant.

TET OFFENSIVE

Senator Percy. Wasn't the Tet offensive a policy though, simultaneous attack on civilians, carried on directly by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong?

Mr. Butz. The Tet offensive was a very well coordinated military attack. I think we have learned a lot from the Tet offensive. I think that perhaps the charges of massacre were greatly inflated on the part of the administration.

I know that we have members of our organization that will testify that most of the destruction that took place this way was not done by the NLF but rather by the American artillery fire and American bombers.

I am not going to say that either side is blameless and I am not going to say that there are no war crimes on the part of the NLF and NVA because all of us here know this is not true, but we are trying to point out, and I don't know how many times we have to talk about this, that it is a policy with this government to conduct war in this fashion, and we are so concerned about this policy, not just in terms of Vietnam, but what it means in terms of how this Government is going to deal with people in this country.

Senator Percy. I am trying to give you a chance to establish, that you see both sides of this, that you do see the horrors on both sides, and that you are not in any sense just trying to undercut the faith of people in our Government. And what we are doing is a plague on both Houses.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIETCONG POLICY OF EXTERMINATING
PUBLIC OFFICIALS

Can you answer this specific question? The charge has been made, and from everything I have seen, and I have seen it validated in the Pentagon papers, from intelligence and counterintelligence reports, that it was the policy of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong to exterminate, to kidnap, to murder, public officials, elected officially at the local province level, to just simply make it too dangerous for anyone to hold office, public office in the government of South Vietnam.

Do you have any personal knowledge or could you use your information network to bring to us personal knowledge of that so that at least that horror and that policy, the same policy of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, could also be brought to world attention, which would then make more credible all of the statements that you have made from first-hand knowledge about the horror of war, as we do it by automated system from the sky, but which really affects people and does get at people?

OPERATION PHOENIX

Mr. BUTZ. I think the American counterpart to what you are talking about was the assassination program called Operation Phoenix, and under Operation Phoenix the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army has killed more Vietnamese than the NLF assassination squad has. And if you would like figures to document that I will provide this to the committee at a later date. But those are the facts.

Senator PERCY. Do you have any first-hand knowledge though?

Mr. BUTZ. Of assassinations?

Senator PERCY. Yes.

Mr. BUTZ. No; but I can produce people, very good friends of mine, a former CIA operator who took part in Operation Phoenix, and I am sure he will be more than glad to talk to this committee about that operation.

HORROR OF WAR ON BOTH SIDES

Senator PERCY. I would be most interested in getting whatever information we have there, together with your comments and disclosures, to see that we give equal time to both sides. To just point out that the war is a horrible thing on both sides, the civilian, the unsuspecting and innocent civilian many times is the victim of this, and this is what we're trying to do, not just end the American involvement, but we would like to find a way to end the whole and total war, if we possibly can, and this should be the objective of the nations of the world.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

I do very much appreciate your appearance here today. I think it has been extremely helpful and very powerful testimony. It simply cannot be refuted in many respects because it is a first-hand observation, and I commend you on being here with us to tell your story.

Our last witness is the Rev. John Coventry Smith, representing the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church.

I wonder if it would be agreeable to you if your full statement went into the record? We will also distribute it to the committee members who could not be here today. I wonder if it is too much of an imposition to ask you if you could summarize your statement?

STATEMENT OF JOHN COVENTRY SMITH, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. SMITH. This is what I expected to do. The statement is in your hand.

(Mr. Smith's prepared statement follows:)

TESTIMONY ON THE FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION BILL BEFORE
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. SENATE, WEDNESDAY, APRIL
19, 1972

PRESENTED BY THE REV. JOHN COVENTRY SMITH ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE U.S.A.

My name is John Coventry Smith. I am president of the World Council of Churches but I am here today as a minister and a former moderator of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

My testimony is based on pronouncements adopted by successive general assemblies of our church by substantial majorities in a democratic process. The general assembly functions in a representative capacity. Its pronouncements on social issues are understood to be for the guidance and not binding upon the conscience of the constituent membership, who remain free to address themselves responsibly to these issues as Christians and citizens.

There are many issues that we could focus on in the military assistance authorization bill which is presently before your committee. However, I should like to concentrate on two of these items—funding for the continuing war in Indochina and military assistance to Portugal.

The 179th general assembly (1967) of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, said, "There is no normal issue more urgently confronting our church and nation than the war in Vietnam."

Every year since 1967 the general assembly has taken stronger and stronger actions. In 1971 we said "... our Government's continuing military involvement in Indochina is immoral and unjust."

I was present at all five of these assemblies. Delegates are newly elected every year by the presbyteries. Each assembly has at least 95 percent new people who were not there the year before. After 5 years of consistent opposition to the Vietnam war it can be assumed that what we are saying represents a deep continuing concern of our church.

We appreciate the fact that U.S. ground troops are being withdrawn from Vietnam in substantial numbers, and that this has been done according to a careful schedule for more than 2 years. It is true that U.S. casualties from the war are down substantially. But it is equally true that large numbers of Vietnamese continue to die every day in what seems to be a never-ending bloodbath. It must be made clear that this is not simply a question of Vietnamese killing other Vietnamese, but our country's continuing involvement in that war in a far more sophisticated manner. It is an automated war with extensive anti-personnel bombs being employed. How tragic it is that in 3 years this administration has dropped more tons of bombs in Indochina—3 million tons—than President Johnson's administration did in 5 years.

We have disregarded the cost in Asian lives of the policies we pursue. It is not enough to find the war policy "misguided" or to emphasize the pragmatic conclusion that "the costs of Vietnam outweigh the benefits." One of the crucial moral realities is that Vietnamization continues the warfare by proxy. Changing the color of the corpses does not achieve justice, even though it may mollify U.S. public opinion for a time.

More than a year ago when it became evident that this administration was keeping to its schedule of withdrawing ground troops, we were also assured that a second schedule of withdrawing military support was now to be put into operation.

Yet the bill before you provides over \$300 billion to carry on the war in Cambodia, over \$49 million to carry on the war in Laos, and over \$585 million to carry on the war in Vietnam, not including direct military costs of the U.S. Armed Forces in that area or hidden support by agencies such as the CIA.

The effects of the warfare in Indochina are even more dire than the threat which aroused our military intervention. Any subsequent imaginable bloodbath could not be worse than the brutality of the present conflict. In Vietnam alone over one-third of the 18 million South Vietnamese people have become refugees, mostly because of bombardment and forced evacuation by the allies. The refugees are often without food, shelter, or medical care. Indeed, a recent General Accounting Office study reported that the United States has cut its teams providing medical care from 194 men in June 1970 to 45 men last September, with a total phaseout due in July of this year.

Our general assembly has affirmed its conviction that a political settlement is the only legitimate solution to the war in Indochina. Our might, money, and manpower have failed to provide this political settlement and there is no indication that it ever will.

I could deal further with other issues such as the fact that American military policy has led to the violation of international and American norms of warfare and the fact that we have failed to pursue a just cause by just means of warfare. One must raise serious questions about the observance by the United States of article 23 of the Hague Convention—the international rules of war to which we are signatory—which states: "It is especially forbidden * * * to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering" because of our use of antipersonnel weapons which do not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, whether men, women or children.

Our hope is that our Government will commit itself to a schedule of complete termination of all U.S. military involvement in Indochina. This bill offers a vehicle for an amendment cutting off the funds and thus assisting the administration in keeping to their schedule.

Let me add two other points. We are deeply concerned about the agony of our fellow Americans who relive brutal deeds, who must live with wounds or the loss of loved ones, or who suffer the anguish of separation from those who are prisoners of war. As a church, we seek to administer to these people in many ways. But we are convinced that the American prisoners of war—about whom we are also deeply concerned—will not be returned until American military involvement in this war is ended. We work a grave injustice on these men and their loved ones to pretend otherwise.

Secondly, we would urge all parties involved in this war to enter discussion of procedures to guarantee the safety and political freedom of those South Vietnamese who have cooperated with the United States or the U.S.-supported government. We recognize that we have some responsibility toward those persons who have supported our policies there, however mistaken those policies may have been.

I should like to turn now to the second concern—military aid to Portugal. Portugal has the last colonies in southern Africa. The clear abhorrence of the American people and churches for colonialism of any kind, arising out of our own struggles against a colonial master in the Revolutionary War, has placed the issue of Portuguese colonialism high on the agenda of our general assembly.

We have noted with approval statements made by our Government that rule by a minority in suppression of a majority must eventually cease in Africa. We had begun to hope that these last vestiges of outworn colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (Bissau) were on the way out and with our encouragement.

We thus view the \$436.5 million plus executive agreement with Portugal concluded on December 9, 1971, as a profoundly tragic step backward taken against the principal of self-determination in Africa.

The \$3 million excess material grant contained in the bill before your committee will not only furnish troop support material but will also enable Portugal to buy arms for use in Africa with money that it would have otherwise used for nonmilitary purposes. Portugal's foreign currency reserves are reportedly under considerable strain in large part because of its wars in Africa.

The military grant aid of 0.9 million dollars contained in this bill should be suspended and serious consideration given to an embargo on the shipment to Portugal of all arms, defoliants and equipment with military potential.

Any such grant is regarded both by black Africans and white Portuguese as support and encouragement for the continuation of colonialism which disfranchises millions of Africans and uses African natural resources primarily for the benefit of non-African white governments.

Let me make that clear that the general assembly of the United Presbyterian Church does not oppose foreign aid. We have indeed supported the concept of economic assistance over the years. We were thus gratified when the Congress separated economic assistance and military assistance into separate bills last year.

As a church, we stand ready to take part in post-war assistance that will further reconciliation and reconstruction. We are hopeful that our Nation will do the same. But in our various conversations over the years with all parties to the war in Indochina they have told us that a stop to the killing

must be our first priority—and then, and only then, can we legitimately talk of the needs of post-war Vietnam.

There are some who characterize our stance as neoisolationist. Nothing could be further from the truth. Let me say that we urge restraint and redirection of our aid. Just as our denomination recognizes that we are an American expression of a worldwide religious fellowship, so we recognize as citizens, that the interdependence of the United States with other nations of the world must increase—both because it is right and because the forces of history require it. We support, for instance, a strengthened United Nations as one of these expressions of interdependence.

We would urge the U.S. Government and private U.S. corporations unilaterally to reduce weapons sales, grants, and all other forms of military aid, to developing nations and to seek multinational reduction of the same.

We emphasize the multinational approach. We have been much impressed by a statement of former Ambassador Ernest Gross who said 6 years ago "Unshared and unchecked power breeds corrosive self deception." As early as 1966 he was saying this about our participation in Vietnam. Our unilateral decisions as the most powerful nation in the world have blinded us to what we are doing to people in Africa through support of Portuguese colonialism.

Our thanks to you and your colleagues, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear before your distinguished committee.

Mr. SMITH. I have with me Mr. Josiah Beeman, director of the U.S. Presbyterian Washington office.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

As I summarize, you should know that I am an American citizen. I have been all my life. I lived in Japan before World War II and spent the first 6 months of World War II in an internment camp in Japan. I was in Korea in 1950 when the Communists came across the line; so I know something of the Asian situation.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CHURCH AND ASSEMBLY

I am President of the World Council of Churches, but I am here representing the United Presbyterian General Assembly. I make this distinction between the assembly and the church because no one speaks for the church or for all of the people in the church. He may speak for the assembly, which meets once a year, then adjourns, and another assembly meets 12 months later. The assembly may speak to the people of the church but the people of the church must make up their own mind as to what decision individually they make as citizens.

ASSEMBLY ACTION ON VIETNAM

I want to speak about Vietnam and then one word on the aid to Portugal. There is no action of the assembly that has been taken more often than the action the last 5 years by the assembly of the U.S. Presbyterian Church on Vietnam. We began in 1967 by simply saying this was one of the greatest moral issues that faced the church and the Nation and we ended in 1971 saying our participation was immoral and unjust.

I was present in all of those assemblies. You may know each assembly is made up of different people. We are not reelected like Senators and Representatives. Usually 95 percent of each assembly is new. And

so when five assemblies say practically the same thing, a cross section of the church has said it.

We became convinced a year ago that this Administration had a schedule of withdrawal from Vietnam and that parallel to it, it had a schedule not only of withdrawing combat troops but withdrawing aid from Vietnam and that this also would be put into operation. We were aware at that time that there might well come a time when the Nation faced a real nitty gritty withdrawal that would be opposed and we would still go through with it and we have come to that time. We are in the midst of it, and I think events of these last few days would indicate we are at that crisis decision. Will we continue to withdraw?

WINDING DOWN OF U.S. PARTICIPATION, NOT WAR

Actually, I think it now becomes clear we did not mean we were winding down the war. We were winding down American combat participation in the war. But we were willing to support indefinitely continued participation on the part of the Vietnamese.

We assumed, and I say this with understanding but with criticism, that if no American boys were being killed we could still use other people to do the killing and to be killed. And the increase in casualties is of Asian people and we can still say that since Americans are not being killed we are winding down the war. I think we say it far too glibly.

VIETNAM WAS A MISTAKE

I think the great majority of us in the church, at least, and I think in the country, believe that though we went into Vietnam with good intentions, it was a mistake.

WITHDRAWING FROM MISTAKE

The question is, first, if you persist in a mistake, after you know it is a mistake, does it not become then a moral responsibility. A mistake may be an honest mistake and not a moral responsibility, but once you realize that it is a mistake and persist in it as a moral responsibility, how do you withdraw from a mistake?

It is becoming increasingly evident that if we are to have the sole responsibility, if we are going to have the very difficult thing of actually saying goodbye, we go like a guest that is leaving a home and pauses in the doorway and never leaves. I don't think we ought to turn our backs and run.

I wonder if the time has not come for us to try again to break out of the circle. When we escalate and someone else invades, we don't break out of it just by talking about it.

Senator Aiken proposed a year ago this February that the time had come for the people of Asia to take some responsibility for the settlement in Asia with which they would have to live and which they would have to maintain, and we should now say we want a cease-fire and return to Japan, and Indonesia, and India, and I think Senator Aiken now would add China, and say this is mainly your problem, we are so

much a part of the problem we can no longer contribute to the solution.

ALL-ASIAN PEACE CONFERENCE PROPOSED IN 1966

Senator PERCY. You might have read in 1966 that I proposed an all-Asian peace conference which my worthy opponent at the time, Paul Douglas, a man for whom I have great affection and admiration, promptly condemned. Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung turned it down, but President Johnson commended it, as did former President Eisenhower, former Vice President Nixon and Dean Rusk. Thailand said they would help sponsor it. Burma said they would hold the conference in that country, and about six other governments came out and supported it. I always felt you had to move that problem out to Asia, and I wouldn't mind it if the People's Republic of China were in the conference. It is about time the nations of Asia sit down and help settle problems of their region.

Mr. SMITH. We would say we would abide by decisions made.

Senator PERCY. Certainly. Well, I commend you on that thinking and it is not too late to start. Paris is a dead end street as far as success. If the format doesn't seem to be very good, why not move it out?

Mr. SMITH. We would support you.

AMENDMENT REPORTED BY COMMITTEE

Senator PERCY. When you say in your testimony that you feel that an end should be brought to this war and there should be a schedule for complete termination, do you support the amendment that we reported out the other day?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, but I would suggest a slightly different thing. I would put it in these terms. Don't make it a payment up to a certain date and cut the whole thing off, but make it in two or three parts.

Senator PERCY. Phase out?

Mr. SMITH. Phase out. And link it to the administration's statement that this is their program to phase out.

MILITARY AID TO PORTUGAL

If I may be permitted one more word on Portugal. I am amazed and I don't believe it, but it is in the figures of the aid bill. Last year there was nine-tenths of a million military aid went to Portugal and this year there is \$2 million plus nine-tenths of a million. This is doubtless a payment in military aid for our further participation in the Azores.

Senator PERCY. I would anticipate there will be a lot of protest on that.

Mr. SMITH. It seems, you know, here is a European country that is a part of NATO and our friend and we give the \$2 million. But this has reverberations into the very heart of Africa.

The greatest proportion of the military budget of Portugal is spent in subduing their colonies, Mozambique and Angola in particular. These are the only remaining European colonies. After all, the English and the Belgians and the French and even the one Spanish colony has been freed. The people of Angola and Mozambique are no different than

the other Africans. They are anxious for their freedom and expecting to get it.

There are three independent movements in Angola alone and all three are led by graduates from Christian schools. We have used the Bible in Africa. One of the Ambassadors said the Bible was a more revolutionary document in Africa than the Communist manifesto.

Actually, in the minds of Africans, it goes deep; our giving \$2 million to Portugal means we are supporting their continued suppression and the white Portugese believe that is true. We say we no longer believe in the white minority suppressing a black majority, but then we give them \$2 million to continue to do it.

I think that an action in the Senate drastically reducing this amount for these reasons would be greatly appreciated.

UNSHARED AND UNCHECKED POWER

I once was greatly impressed by something that Ernest Gross said, former Ambassador Ernest Gross, and I have tried to live with it in the last year. He said it about the Vietnam war 6 years ago. "Unshared and unchecked power breeds corrosive self-deception."

I think the Vietnam war has proved it. I think an action like this without knowing its implications is another kind of thing that would upset the world.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much indeed.

I am advised by the staff that the Defense Department actually proposes a total military assistance program for Portugal totaling \$3 million for fiscal year 1973.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

I would like to commend you for the comments you have made on postwar construction. I think this was most foresighted and noteworthy and typical of your concern for the effects of the war on the civilian population which have caused you and others in your assembly great anguish.

I have no further questions to ask.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Senator PERCY. The committee will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon at 12:50 p.m. the hearing adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX

STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN DON EDWARDS (D-CAL.) ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY IN GREECE

Last year the Administration proposed an increase of approximately 50 percent in U.S. military aid for Greece. This would have brought it to the highest level in history. Congress rebelled against this proposal to help the Greek dictatorship on a scale far above that of our aid to any democratic Greek Government; it is inserted in the Foreign Aid Bills the House amendment, limiting aid to Greece to the amount given in the previous year and banning *all* aid unless the President certified that it was required by overriding American interests.

It is no surprise that the Administration has made that certification—not because any such overriding interest does in fact exist, but because the Administration has repeatedly committed itself to the support of the Greek junta through

the mouths of such spokesmen as former Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans and Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew. Indeed, the President's certification contained only the barest formal obeisance to the law's requirement that he give the reasons for it.

But it is shocking that, in the face of the clearly expressed views of Congress, the Administration is once again proposing to raise military aid to Greece to record levels. Moreover, it is planning to supply Greece with Phantom jets, which none of our other allies has yet received, at a time when the barefaced military pressure of the Papadopoulos regime on the freely-elected government of Cyprus is threatening to upset the peace of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is not even claimed that these planes are needed to protect Greece against any threat from the East. Against whom *are* they intended to be used? The Greek regime's recent pressure on Cyprus suggests an ominous answer, and the reported uneasiness in Ankara over the proposed deal is easy enough to understand. Is it the Administration's purpose to encourage an arms race between two NATO allies in the interest of the American armaments industry?

Military aid of the type and on the scale proposed for Greece would be hard to justify even if the Greek government exemplified those principles of freedom and democracy which NATO is pledged to protect. But in fact, it is the negation of those principles. The weapons that we give to Papadopoulos and Co.—and the Greek regime is becoming more Papadopoulos and less Company with each governmental reorganization—are weapons that we know will be used against democracy, not for it.

Two years ago the Defense Department told us: "Most importantly, the Greek Government announced that in accordance with a specific timetable, to which it has thus far carefully adhered, the institutional structure of a democracy prerequisite to elections will be in place by the end of this year. This timetable is a public commitment on the part of the Greek Government. It seems to be a reasonable time element, i.e., the end of this year. A yardstick has now been established to measure the Greek regime's performance." That year has passed and so has the next, and the "institutional structure of a democracy prerequisite to elections" is still not in place. Moreover, the junta has frankly told us that there will be no progress toward elections this year either. So much for the value of the Greek regime's "public commitment;" by the yardstick which the Defense Department itself proposed, the junta's promises are worthless.

There have, indeed, been changes in the form of the Greek regime in the past two years. Some prisoners have been released—but new arrests take place continuously. Sometimes those arrested are released after long periods of imprisonment, often over a year, without ever having any formal charges brought against them. Sometimes they are held for months and then brought before courts-martial, despite the junta's pledge, given over a year ago, that political offenses would henceforth be judged by the civil courts. But in either case, they are still likely to be savagely tortured. This happened to Christos Sartzetakis, the model for the incorruptible judge in "Z," and to Agamemnon Koutsouyorgas, who had been the lawyer for Andreas Papandreou; both were arrested in the night (a violation of the junta's own constitution), imprisoned and brutally tortured. Sartzetakis was released after a year without trial or charges. Koutsouyorgas was finally brought to trial on a charge of conspiracy and acquitted because of the complete lack of evidence against him, after he too had spent over a year in prison. It happened to Joseph Valyrakis and Ioannis Kyriazis, sentenced to long terms after being held in isolation for many months and subjected to sadistic tortures. The attached extracts from the record of their trial are notable for the way in which the prosecutor and the Chairman of the Court-Martial express their cynical acceptance of the use of torture. And it happened to the American citizen John Koronaios, arrested, tortured so badly as to seriously undermine his health, and finally sentenced to eight years in prison when he was at last brought to trial sixteen months after his arrest.

The press, freed of prior censorship two and a half years ago, has since then operated under a press law which is so profuse in prohibitions that the junta can at any time find grounds for prosecuting a paper which displeases it. That some papers nevertheless test the limits of their freedom by carrying material displeasing to the junta is a tribute to the courage of their editors. The risks they run are illustrated by the case of the *Athens News*, described in the attached article from the *Washington Post*.

To take the place of a real parliament and genuine elections, the junta has established an advisory council or "mini-parliament," a body for which there is

no provision in the junta's own constitution. This strange chamber is partly appointed by Papadopoulos and partly "elected" by some twelve thousand appointed functionaries. It has no power to legislate, or even to discuss anything not submitted to it by the government. Indeed, its only real function seems to be that of supplying a ready-made audience whenever Papadopoulos feels like making a speech.

Martial law has been lifted—but not for the country's three major cities and their surrounding areas, where all the principal newspapers of the country are published and all its principal organizations have their headquarters. Moreover, the regime's spokesmen have threatened that if political leaders go to the areas where martial law has been lifted to make political speeches, those in Athens who handle the arrangements will be prosecuted there under martial law decrees and before military courts.

But in one respect there has really been a major change; where two years ago Papadopoulos still seemed only the first among equals in the junta, today he reins in solitary splendor. His two fellow-triumvirs, Deputy Premiers Pat-takos and Makarezos, have been deprived of the Ministries of Interior and Co-ordination through which they formerly exerted real control over important areas of the government. Now they are merely gargoyles ornamenting its facade. And the Regent, General Zoitakis, who at least theoretically exerted a brake on the power of the regime through his exercise of the royal prerogatives, has been removed on the charge that he tried to act independently. In his place, Papadopoulos has named himself Regent without giving up his posts of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, etc.

It would be bad enough to give aid to such a regime if it were content to use it to oppress its own people. But the Greek junta is also engaged in active mischief-making abroad. I have already mentioned Cyprus, where the Athens regime has had the insolence to send a series of ultimata to President Makarios dealing with the composition of his cabinet, the constitution of his security forces, the attitude he is to take toward the subversive activities of the notorious Colonel Grivas, and other aspects of Cypriot affairs. There is strong reason for believing that agents of the junta were involved in an attempt to assassinate Makarios, and that they have not excluded the possibility of trying again.

But Cyprus, where the Greek regime claims special rights as the embodiment of Hellenism, is not the only country where it has engaged in subversive action. The attached article from the *Washington Post* of April 5 reports that the sinister forces which seek to undermine Italian democracy and bring back Fascism in that country have received important aid from the junta—not merely moral support, but money and training as well.

Thus if we continue to send aid to the junta, we will be supporting tyranny in Greece and subversion of friendly governments abroad. Is this compatible with either the honor or the interests of the United States? In what way can it be reconciled with our goal of helping to build a democratic world? Is it not a violation of our obligation to NATO if we continue to send aid to a regime which uses that aid to undermine democracy in its neighbors?

We should have stopped all aid to the Greek regime long since. By continuing it, we have made ourselves accomplices in the junta's crimes in Greece and abroad, and convinced an increasing section of the Greek people that we are their real oppressors, and the junta only American puppets. A similar view is widely held in the democratic countries of Europe; it undermines the American position everywhere.

I therefore urge, in the interests of freedom and justice as well as in the narrower national interest of the United States, that the Foreign Aid Bill contain a provision banning any aid to Greece, and that this ban be an absolute one, affecting both all existing programs and the proposed shipments of Phantom jets. It should also prohibit the use of any funds in connection with the projected arrangements for basing ships of the Sixth Fleet on Greek "home ports."

A COURT-MARTIAL IN ATHENS

On January 20 and 21, 1972, a group of eight persons accused of membership in the Panhellenic Liberation Front (PAK) were tried before the Athens court-martial. Below are excerpts from the interrogation of the two principal defendants, Joseph Valyrakis and Ioannis Kyriazis.

Prosecutor: You have spoken of tortures. Where were you tortured more; at the security police or at the military police?

Kyriazis: I have been tortured in many ways.

Prosecutor: Sure, you wanted to work in the resistance. Didn't you know that if you were arrested you would be interrogated for three or four days? What did you expect them to do, give you flowers?

Kyriazis: (On the appearance as a witness of the police officer Haralambos) It is impermissible that my torturer should testify before the court!

Chairman of the court-martial: Sit down!

Kyriazis: I can't, Mr. Chairman. Pardon me, but I can't. I am 30 years old, and my health has been destroyed.

Chairman: You should have thought about your health before.

* * * * *
Kyriazis: It is a lie when the witness says I wanted to play the hero. It hurts me.

Testimony of Valyrakis

Chairman of court-martial: Why did you tell the Security Police that you had contact with Galanopoulos?

Valyrakis: I had no contact with Galanopoulos. But when one is being constantly shuttled back and forth between the Security Police and the Military Police, one can confess a great deal—even that one is Napoleon the Great. . . .

Prosecutor: Why do you say in your interrogation that you know Galanopoulos, and now deny it?

Valyrakis: I had to say it, so that the mistreatment would finally cease. . . . I am ashamed of the methods of investigation, which are a scandal for the 20th century. Both before and after my flight, I was mistreated with methods such as those in the Holy Inquisition used.

Chairman: How do you know what methods the Holy Inquisition used?

Valyrakis: I have had to suffer terrible tortures. For more details I refer you to the investigation cells of the Military Police. . . .

Chairman: But in your interrogation you say other things.

Valyrakis: I hope you are never arrested and locked up in prison. But he knows very well that he beat the soles of my feet with an iron bar while others beat my breast.

* * * * *
Valyrakis: I am a member of PAK, which has its headquarters in Sweden and was founded by Andreas Papandreou for the purpose of leading the resistance to the dictatorship in Greece.

Chairman: With what means was this resistance to be carried on?

Valyrakis: With permissible and legal means.

Chairman: What are these means?

Valyrakis: I believe that every people has a holy and inalienable right to decide on its own fate.

Chairman: Is there any objection to that?

Valyrakis: Of course there is objection today.

Chairman: You haven't told me what means you use for this.

Valyrakis: We protest with our voices, with pamphlets, with small explosive devices.

Chairman: The small explosive devices, are they a legal means?

Valyrakis: Yes, if they are used against a regime that has abrogated the constitution. . . . Since it has been suggested that I was confused and let myself be misled, I declare that I am completely responsible for my own deeds. I have been charged with being a collaborator with Communism and a fellow-traveler. Communism and fellow-traveling are two terms which, as they are used in the official language, describe everyone who acts in any way against the regime. In this sense I accept the accusation. But I have never had anything to do with Communism. I detest every manifestation of totalitarianism, and therefore I am against the present regime. . . . There were never bombs or small explosive devices before April 21. We had no reason for them. When the country returns to normal conditions, all resistance will end. . . . My defense can conclude with the declaration that, in full consciousness of my present situation, I am proud of my deeds, and a condemnation by you would for me be an honor. . . .

Chairman: Did your father, a hero of the Albanian war, a democratic citizen, tell you to do such things? (Note: Valyrakis's father, a Center Union Deputy from Crete, died of a heart attack shortly after his son's arrest.)

Valyrakis: My father told me to make no concessions.
Prosecutor: So don't make any concessions! Go to Constitution Square, if you want to, and say out loud whatever you wish!
Valyrakis: Then I would be sent to the island of Leros.
Prosecutor: Quite right, for here we have law and order.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 5, 1971]

THE CASE OF THE MISSING PARAGRAPH

By Maurice J. Goldbloom

Author of the book "American Security and Freedom," Goldbloom has followed Greek affairs since serving as labor information officer of the U.S. economic mission in Athens in 1950-51. He edits the bi-monthly News of Greece.

Spiro Agnew remarked in Athens: "Greek newspapers have been very kind to me. I am not used to such treatment. You're spoiling me." The Vice President might have felt a bit less euphoric if his junta and embassy guides had shown him a copy of the Athens News of Oct. 17-18. Over a story of his arrival in Athens, that English-language daily placed his headline:

Noticeable Lack of the Common Man

BOMBS, RECRUITED SCHOOL CHILDREN GREET AGNEW

Unfortunately for Yannis Horn, the paper's editor and publisher, the facts to which the headline referred were not in the article as it appeared in the paper, though they were in the article as it was written. (A separate story, immediately below the main one, did however report the explosion of bombs under two autos belonging to American military personnel shortly before Agnew's arrival.)

The junta's secretary for press and information, Loukas Panangelis, immediately sent a protest to the Athens News about the headline, and on Oct. 19 the paper responded with an editor's note on its front page. In it, Horn wrote that omission of the paragraph reporting the two bombs and the closing of the schools so that children could greet Agnew was "indeed a grave error on our part for which we apologize." Explaining that the paragraph had been "inadvertently removed . . . in the process of composing the page, he then published the missing information.

In a publisher's note three days later, Horn returned to the fray, pointing out that "during the democratic period, the papers were always free to express their own interpretation of the degree of participation of the people in a certain public meeting . . . Anyway, whatever has been written on the number and origin of the people who participated in the welcome of Vice President Agnew is of no essential importance, for there existed the American CIA who know well who and how many attended.

On the following day, the government announced that Yannis Horn would be prosecuted for violating the press law by putting a headline over a story which did not correspond to the story's contents. He thus faced up to five years prison for a typographical error.

A VAGUE RESTRAINT

Of course the reason for the prosecution was not the dropping of a paragraph in the composition of a page; it was the insistence of the Athens News on printing things the junta preferred to see ignored. It has not been alone in this; some of the Greek-language papers in Athens and Salonika also go as far as they feel they can in covering the news in spite of the risk of prosecution under the press laws. All Athens papers publish full reports of congressional hearings and debates dealing with Greece; as long as they stick to the text and add no commentaries of their own, they are not in danger of prosecution. Athens News, however, has gone further than even the most daring Greek papers.

It was the only Athens paper to print such things as the New Year's statements of former Premier Panayotis Kanellopoulos and a letter to NATO from Greek political prisoners. When Prof. George Anastaplo of Chicago wrote a letter

describing his last visits with the late poet George Seferis, Athens News printed it with notations of how many words were deleted as violations of the press laws. It was obvious to any reader that the words deleted were the ones describing the Greek regime.

Readers of Athens News had long wondered how the paper managed to escape unscathed. The ambiguities of the press law—both in its original form and as recently revised—are quite adequate to give the government a basis for prosecuting anyone against whom it has a grudge; it is precisely this vagueness which is the most effective restraint on the press. But a prosecution of Athens News would have to take place in full view of the tourists who were its major audience; it would seriously tarnish the junta's image abroad. Besides, the normal reader of the Athens News must have seemed to the junta to be beyond redemption in any case; after all, they could and did read foreign papers.

This did not mean that Athens News got away scot free; the junta has means of reprisal short of prosecution. One such harassment was refusal to install two teletype machines which the paper needed to receive the United Press International and Reuter news services. Horn, in an open letter, told readers he had traced this reprisal to KYP, the Greek central intelligence service.

The Agnew visit, however, was of prime importance to the junta. The Vice President was by far the biggest fish they had ever netted in Athens, and they were not about to let their moment of semi-respectability be spoiled by the discordant note sounded by Athens News. This time, indirect sanctions were not enough. Yannis Horn had to be tried, even if the pretext was a transparent one.

TRIAL AND CONVICTION

On Nov. 8, Horn appeared before the Athens misdemeanors court, charged with violating Article 70 of the new press law: "The . . . use of headlines, photographs or representations which do not give the exact content of the text, or may create an impression to the public different to that drawn from the entire content of the text, is punished by imprisonment of at least six months and a fine of 100,000 metallic drachmas (\$3,333).

The first prosecution witness was Athens Police Chief Nicholas Daskalopoulos, who testified that there had been no bomb explosions (the police had in fact issued a communique on the explosions, though denying that these had been linked to Agnew's visit). He said that the purpose of the headline had been to create misleading impressions and cause anxiety among the paper's readers. Other prosecution witnesses added nothing of significance.

The defense witnesses were hardly calculated to conciliate the junta.

One was John Capsis, who had been sent to prison for publishing, as editor of the now closed newspaper Ethnos, an interview in which the former cabinet minister, John Zigdis, urged to replacement of the junta by a government of national unity to deal with the Cyprus crisis: (Zigdis is still in prison for giving the interview.) Now out of prison, Capsis is co-editor of To Vima, which under his guidance has become increasingly daring in its publication of items unpalatable to the junta. Capsis also led the attack on the new press law in the Journalists Union.

Another witness recently released from prison was George Drossos, a former press minister under the Papandreou cabinet. He had become famous as a reporter because of his role in tracking down the facts in the Lambrakis murder, described in the film "Z." Defense witnesses testified to the accuracy of the headline's statements and the probability of a typographical error.

The prosecutor argued for conviction on the ground that even if the newspaper had included the two omitted passages, the headline still reflected Horn's antagonism to the government. He said that "the defendant's newspaper had shown an opposition's attitude." And he asserted that the defendant "omitted the paragraph about explosions and recruited children because otherwise he would have been accused of spreading false reports." This theory suffered from certain defects: The reports were not false, and Athens News had in fact published the paragraph in question a day later.

The defense counsel, George B. Mangakis, showed the court other newspapers with misplaced headlines. In one case the newspaper Acropolis had placed the headline "Funeral" over a story on the marriage of Vice Premier Pattakos' daughter. There had been no prosecution and probably no thought of one in any of the cases he exhibited. (Acropolis, a royalist paper before the coup, had initially shown enough independence to get it into occasional trouble with the junta. But its owner had got into financial difficulties, the junta had come through with

a large loan to the paper, and it and its afternoon sister, Apogevmatini, had swung wholeheartedly into the junta's camp.) Mangakis also showed the court stories in other papers reporting the explosion of the bombs and the recruitment of the school children.

The court found Horn guilty and sentenced him to seven months in prison, 10,000 drachmas (\$333), and deprivation of the right to buy duty-free newsprint for one month. It held that the headline had been intended to create a certain impression; the conclusion was inescapable that Yannis Horn had been convicted not of publishing a misleading headline but of thinking subversive thoughts.

Horn is now free while appealing the case; meanwhile, Athens News continues to appear and keep carrying items the regime would prefer suppressed.

With journalists like Yannis Horn and John Capsis, the Greek press will retain an important measure of freedom in the face of repressive laws, as long as the junta hesitates to close down unfriendly papers completely. But it is freedom at a price: risk of harassment, imprisonment and perhaps eventual complete destruction, as in the case of Ethnos.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 5, 1972]

RULING GREEK JUNTA IMPLICATED IN ITALIAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY

(By Claire Sterling, Special to The Washington Post)

ROME, April 4—There is increasing evidence that the ruling military junta in Greece has been helping to finance and train an underground fascist-terrorist network operating in Italy for about four years.

Rumors circulating for some time to this effect gained substance last week when three Italian fascists were indicated for a series of bombings which had previously been blamed on left-wing anarchists here.

At least one of the three had been in close touch with the Greek junta since April, 1968, when he organized a visit of 51 Italian fascists to Athens at the junta's expense.

Since his arrest, a good deal of incriminating evidence has come to light about regular visits to Italy by junta emissaries, consignments of money and the organization of a training camp somewhere in Greece for Italian "Black Revolutionaries."

The disclosure that the Greek colonels have been meddling in Italian affairs might have shocked Italians more were they not reeling from so many other shocks already, including the mysterious death of Milan's millionaire publisher, Giagiacoem Feltrinelli, and discoveries by police, indicating that the country is honeycombed with heavily armed rightist and leftist guerrilla groups.

CONFUSION PREVAILS

The fact that in one instance both fascists and anarchists are presently in jail for the same bombing—the one that killed 16 people in a Milan bank in December, 1969—has inevitably added to the prevailing confusion here during Italy's tense campaign for next month's parliamentary elections.

Italians have been passionately divided about the guilt or innocence of the anarchist railway worker, Pietro Valpreda, who was arrested for the Milan bombing, on the frail testimony of a single witness, now dead. Valpreda is still being held in prison even after the indictment of the three fascists for the Milan bombing.

Rather cryptically, the fascists are accused only of "promoting, financing and organizing" the Milan bombing. It remains to be seen whether the anarchist Valpreda will be charged with carrying out their orders.

Either way, there is little doubt that the three arrested fascists were up to their necks in a plot to generate the kind of fear and disorder which might open the way for a right-wing dictatorship.

SECRET MEETINGS

Tape-recorded telephone conversations prove that they decided on a nationwide wave of terrorism at a secret meeting in Padua in April, 1969. Since that meeting, there have been nearly 250 bombings up and down the Italian peninsula, about half of which are thought to have been of fascist origin.

The specific part played by these three was pinned down by an intrepid magistrate who insisted on looking into the matter long after it was presumed closed. He discovered the supplier from whom one of the three had bought 50 timers of the kind used to set off the Milan bank bomb.

All three men—Pino Rauti, Giovanni Ventura and Franco Freda—were already in jail when this last charge was laid against them. Ventura and Freda had been arrested for bombing the Milan fair and railroad station in April, 1969 and for several train bombings the following August.

Rauti, evidently a much higher-ranking leader in the movement, was imprisoned last December for trying to reconstitute Mussolini's Fascist Party, which is outlawed in Italy whereas the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) is not.

The three men are not common thugs. They might indeed be called uncommon thugs in that each, in his way, has intellectual pretensions.

Rauti, a former editor of the right-wing Rome daily *Il Tempo*, once wrote a widely circulated book called "Red Hands on the Armed Forces."

Ventura and Freda own bookshops, in Treviso and Padua respectively, and the latter in the particular prides himself on being an ideologue not just for his anti-Semitic theories but for having invented something he calls "Nazi-Maoism."

It is impossible to say how far these indictments may cut into what was expected to be a very large neo-fascist party vote in the coming May 7 elections. But the dent is bound to be sizeable.

Freda was expelled from the party 10 years ago for "ideological indiscipline."

LAW AND ORDER PARTY

"His position on the Jewish problem left us no option," a spokesman for the party's Padua branch says.

Rauti, however, is not only a member of the party's national executive but a candidate in these elections.

A candidate like him could hardly improve the "new" image, carefully drawn and expensively publicized, of the neo-fascist party as "the" party of law and order.

Party strategists had considered this image indispensable because Italy for all its rolling political and economic ailments, is clearly not ready for fascism.

The temptation to swing right is undoubtedly strong, among many workers as well as in the middle class and aristocracy. The country is now in the second year of its worst economic recession since the war, with unemployment well over a million, industrial production still falling and net investment down by 18.4 per cent in the last year.

In addition, a 10-year experiment in moderately progressive government by a center-left coalition has ended in ignominious collapse. And militant leftists have been doing their best to bear out the rightists' argument that without the far right the country is ungovernable.

FASCISM UNLIKELY

Nevertheless, as the influential *La Stampa* of Turin observed, Italy in 1972 does not have the depressed social structure of Spain in 1936 or Greece in 1967.

Nobody would seriously compare its political and economic pressures today to the strains prevailing after World War I, which led to Mussolini's march on Rome. Most commentators believe that the great mass of present-day Italian voters would be repelled by open violence.

Such interest as they are taking now in the neo-fascist party would seem in good part to be the result of a desire to believe that the party isn't as bad as it seems.

So far as the elections are concerned, the identification of political convicts like Rauti, Ventura and Freda with the neo-fascist party has been a godsend to the Christian Democrats in particular.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

A month ago, they were expecting the party to double its vote, mostly at their expense, and come back to parliament with 50 deputies.

Now that the uglier side of the neo-fascist party has been exposed to public view, there is something like euphoria in Christian Democratic circles.

At the very least, they say, they should win back much of the electoral ground they lost to the neo-fascists in last June's administrative elections.

At best, since they are busily remaking their own image as a rightward-looking party of law and order they might even hope to win it all back and possibly even more.

[From South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, May 5, 1972]

HOW MUCH RUSSIAN AID FOR HANOI?

(By Henry Keys in Washington)

Available evidence from U.S. Government sources does anything but support Nixon Administration suggestions that Moscow has planned, directed and boosted its military hardware supply for the current North Vietnamese drive into South Vietnam.

If anything, Soviet military aid has plummeted.

The following table, prepared by U.S. intelligence sources, shows U.S. estimates of communist aid to North Vietnam in millions of U.S. dollars since 1965.

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	Total
Military aid:								
Soviet Union.....	210	360	505	290	120	70	100	1,655
China.....	60	95	145	100	105	85	75	665
Total.....	270	455	650	390	225	155	175	2,320
Economic aid:								
Soviet Union.....	85	150	200	240	250	345	315	1,585
China.....	50	75	80	100	90	60	100	555
East Europe.....	15	50	90	120	135	205	185	800
Total.....	150	275	370	460	475	610	600	2,940
Grand total.....	420	730	1,020	850	700	765	775	5,260

In short, Soviet military aid has gone down steadily from a peak of U.S.\$505 million in 1965.

While U.S. intelligence sources say there has been an increase in Soviet military aid in the current winter/spring period, it has shown only a "slight increase," and is not far out of line with the general downward trend.

No evidence is available anywhere that suggests that Russian military personnel are manning anti-aircraft weapons or tanks in the North Vietnam offensive.

At the same time, there is no question but that North Vietnam is using a great deal of Russian equipment, such as MiG aircraft, and tanks.

But most of this appears to have been supplied in the period preceding the Tet offensive of February, 1968.

For the most part, this equipment appears to have been moved out of North Vietnam to China to avoid destruction at the peak of the Johnson Administration's bombing raids against North Vietnam in 1967-68.

Just where Hanoi stored other sophisticated military equipment it is now using is not known.

There is no question that Soviet military aid, indeed all communist aid, to North Vietnam has been moderately substantial in past years, moderately, that is, by comparison of U.S. aid to South Vietnam.

Neither Moscow nor Peking has ever made any secret of this. Indeed, Moscow has consistently bragged that its aid has been so much greater than Peking's.

According to a statement published last February by the Defence Secretary, Mr. Melvin Laird, almost 90 percent of communist military assistance to non-communist governments round the world during 1955-1971 has been Soviet.

Half of this has gone into the Middle East—to Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

As far as Vietnam is concerned, however, half of the military aid it has received has been from the Soviet Union, mostly from 1966 to 1971, with only 30 percent coming from China.

For Hanoi, the benefits have been fairly substantial.

The accompanying Defence Department table (although approximately a year old) fairly accurately reflects North Vietnam's military situation today compared with that of South Vietnam.

It is difficult to explain what the Administration suggestions of excessive military assistance are all about, for they have been suggestions rather than official or difficulty substantiated statements.

The critics, many of them knowledgeable, express little doubt that the purpose is to explain away the possible impending failure of the Administration's Vietnamisation programme, and blame its failure, if it fails, on Moscow.

Washington Daily News analyst R. H. Shackford, in direct criticism of the Administration's suggestions that Soviet Russia is supplying the necessary muscle to the North Vietnamese offensive, wrote: "The Nixon Administration for three weeks had escalated its claim that the Soviet Union is primarily to blame for the new military crisis in Vietnam. It has accused Moscow, on the eve of Mr. Nixon's trip to Russia, of making the offensive possible with its military aid.

"Top Administration officials have called the North Vietnamese attack a 'flagrant, massive invasion'—an all-new war—made possible by sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union.

"There are no comparable figures for American aid to South Vietnam. They always have been classified. But the United States has spent more than \$100,000 million—in aid to Saigon as well as the costs of its own war effort and those of South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and other allied countries.

"Overall cost of the war to the United States reached a peak of about \$30,000 million a year in 1968. The Defence Secretary, Mr. Melvin Laird, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week the United States is now spending either \$6,000 million or \$10,000 million a year on the Vietnam war, depending on which accounting figures are used.

"But this does not include the massive increase in American air and naval forces rushed to the war zone in the last three weeks.

"The grand total of all communist aid to Hanoi in seven years, therefore, is less than the minimum amount the United States is spending this year in South Vietnam."

On trial, it would seem, is the Administration's Vietnamisation programme, no more, no less.

As usually in war, it is not the money, the bombs or the guns but the men behind them that count.

NORTH VIETNAM

Population: 22,675,000. Military service: 3 years minimum. Total armed forces: 492,000. Estimated defense expenditure 1970, U.S. \$584 million.

Army: 480,000; 14 infantry divisions (about 12,000 men each); 1 artillery division (of 10 regiments); 2 armoured regiments; About 20 independent infantry regiments.

50 T34 and 60 T54 med tanks; 300 PT76 lt tanks; BTR40 APC; SU76 and JSU122 SP guns; 75mm, 105mm, 122mm, 130mm and 152mm artillery; 57mm, 75mm, 82mm and 107mm recoilless rifles; 82mm, 100mm, 107mm, 120mm and 160mm mortars; 107mm, 122mm and 140mm RL; 6,000 37mm, 85mm and 100mm AA guns.

35 SAM battalions (each with 6 SA2 launchers).

Deployment: about 90,000 in South Vietnam, 75,000 in Laos and 40,000 in Cambodia.

Navy: 3,000; 2 coastal escorts (ex Soviet); 4 motor gunboats (ex-Chinese).

About 24 gunboats (Chinese, and less than 100 tons). About 3 motor torpedo boats (Chinese, and less than 100 tons). About 12 small patrol boats (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 9,000; 164 combat aircraft; 10 SL28 light bombers (Soviet); 40 MiG21F/PF interceptors with Atoll AAM. (Soviet); 25 MiG 19 interceptors (Chinese); 60 (Chinese) and 10 (Soviet) MiG 17 interceptors; 10 (Chinese) and 10 (Soviet) MiG15 interceptors; 8 AN2, EAN24, 10 IL14 and 20 L12 transports; 20 M14 and 2 M16 helicopters.

Para military forces: 20,000 frontier, coast security and people's armed security forces; about 425,000 regional armed militia.

SOUTH VIETNAM

Population: 18.8 million; Military Service: 2 years minimum; Total armed forces: 500,000; Estimated GNP 1970: U.S.\$4,900 million; Estimated defence expenditure 1971: U.S.\$564 million.

Army: 414,000; 10 infantry divisions; 1 airbourne division (3 brigades); 6 independent armoured cavalry regiments; 3 independent infantry regiments; 18 Ranger battalions; 1 Special Forces group; 35 artillery battalions.

M24, 200 M41 and 40 AMX13 lt tanks; 250 Commando and Greyhound armed cars; M3 scout cars; M59 and M113 APC; 105mm and 155mm SP-gun.

Deployment: about 23,000 in Cambodia.

Navy: 31,000; 1 destroyer; 3 destroyer escorts; 6 patrol escorts; 2 patrol vessels; 3 coastal minesweepers; 70 fast patrol boats; 20 motor gunboats; 23 landing ships; About 200 landing craft (most less than 100 tons); About 6000 river patrol boats (most less than 100 tons); About 350 motorised coastal defence junks.

Marine Corps: 15,000; 1 division.

Air Force: 40,000; 275 combat aircraft; 1 tactical fighter squadron with F4 (combat squadrons have from 15-20 aircraft); 6 fighter-bomber squadrons with Skyraider; Some RC47 reconnaissance aircraft; 80 O1 armed light aircraft; 20 AC47 and 25 C119 transports; 35 Choctaw, 230 UH1 and 10 CH47 helicopters.

Para-military forces: 555,000. Regional Forces—285,000, forming about 1,700 rifle companies, at the disposal of the provincial governors. Popular Forces—250,000, a home guard of about 7,500 platoons, with light arms.

Police field force—20,000, including special internal security units with armed vehicles and helicopters. There is also a people's self defence force of about 1.5 million.

