

[From the Elyria, Ohio, Chronicle-Telegram, Mar. 16, 1968]

"No one has yet invented a way to finance government without cost to the taxpayer. There are only ways of putting off the day of reckoning."

That fact of economic life is pointed out again by Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr., (D-Va.) in an article in Spotlight, a publication of the Committee for Constitutional Government, Inc.

The article was written before the gold crisis developments of the last few days, but it is especially timely in view of that crisis.

"No government," Sen. Byrd wrote, "can play a constructive role in the lives of its citizens except on the basis of economic strength. It is not that dollars are more important than people and their needs. It is simply that without a sound dollar, all programs and projects financed by the government will be undermined."

Sen. Byrd's warning deserves thoughtful consideration by all Americans. The day of reckoning may be nearer than most Americans have believed.

[From the Staunton, Va., Leader, Apr. 4, 1968]

The Senate would have won considerable applause had it also written into its excise tax bill the proposal of Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr., D-Va., to ban loans to countries trading with the Communist enemy in Vietnam.

### Andreas Papandreu Meets the Press

## HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 22, 1968

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, on March 10 the guest on the National Broadcasting Co.'s "Meet the Press" was Andreas Papandreu, chairman of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement and former Greek Cabinet member. Mr. Papandreu, who was freed in December after 8 months' imprisonment, spoke forcefully for restoration of liberties in Greece and against the oppressive military rulers who have governed for more than a year. It is particularly fitting that Mr. Papandreu's comments be reprinted at this time, because yesterday, April 21, was the anniversary of the coup that plunged Greece into darkness.

The "Meet the Press" interviewers were Robert Novak, of the Chicago Sun-Times, Philip L. Geyelin, of the Washington Post, and James Robinson and Lawrence E. Spivak, of NBC. Edwin Newman of NBC was the moderator. The full text of the interview follows:

Mr. NEWMAN. Our guest today on "Meet the Press" is Andreas Papandreu, the exiled Greek political leader who is coordinating the Greek resistance movement. Mr. Papandreu was a member of the Greek Cabinet and Parliament, and he served as chief aide to his father, George Papandreu when he was Prime Minister.

A former naturalized American, Mr. Papandreu was an economics professor at the University of California before he returned to Greece in 1963 to enter politics.

He was charged with high treason under the government of King Constantine and later arrested by the military junta. He was recently released from prison and has just arrived in this country on a visit.

We will have the first questions now from Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of the "Meet the Press" panel.

Mr. SPIVAK. Mr. Papandreu, in your speech before the ADA last night, you said, "I must add that the U. S. Embassy in Athens gave strong moral support to the King and the Greek establishment in their violation of the democratic processes in Greece, thus paving the way for the military coup of April 21, 1967."

Are you charging the United States with responsibility for the coup?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. The United States Embassy I charge with historic responsibility, not necessarily involvement in the coup itself. Actually coups don't occur accidentally. An atmosphere has to precede a coup, and the U.S. Embassy, I think, participated in creating the atmosphere that led to the coup, Mr. Spivak.

Mr. SPIVAK. You went further. The Washington Post quotes you as saying that the "present Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papadopoulos, is probably the first CIA agent who has managed to become a Prime Minister."

Are you saying that the United States helped put him in power?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. That is a fact, what I said in Oslo. Namely, Mr. Papadopoulos was the key coordinator of the Natsainas KYP, the KYP leader in Greece. KYP is the CIA of Greece, the Greek CIA. Papadopoulos was the contact man with the American CIA.

And I add that the American CIA finances the Greek CIA directly, not via the Greek Government, as Mr. Sulzberger himself, has disclosed in an editorial in The New York Times.

Mr. SPIVAK. Are you saying that the United States could have prevented the coup?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. The United States might not have been in a position to prevent the coup, but the United States could surely have overthrown the junta, had it wished.

Mr. SPIVAK. Do you say now that the United States ought to help overthrow the dictatorship?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. No less than that, Mr. Spivak. I would, however, qualify by saying surely it should not assist the junta, and the recent exhibitions of friendship, and the U.S.S. Roosevelt, the recent statements of Admiral Horatio Rivero in favor of the junta in Greece surely shocked the democratic forces of Greece that are struggling for a free country, for a country that can take its place among the western nations.

Mr. SPIVAK. Mr. Papandreu, when you look back to the period when you and your father ran the government, do you find you too may have been to blame for the coup to some degree?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Mr. Spivak, no one is ever free, totally, of some historic responsibility. No one. And it is not for me to judge whether I am or not. It is for others to judge.

Mr. GEYELIN. Mr. Papandreu, I understood you to say that you thought we should have moved in and thrown the junta out in the first instance. How do you do that?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. This is more complicated than that, Mr. Geyelin. If the United States did not lend its moral and material support to the government of the junta, the junta would collapse of its own weight, for it has no strength among the Greek people, and it has no strength in fact among the Greek armed services.

Mr. GEYELIN. Was there no danger of a civil war at that time?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Of course not. The junta has charged that the Communists had arms with which they would threaten to overtake the country. In the ten months of their government they have not been able to discover one single cache of arms. And, after all, the Democratic Center forces were overwhelmingly in the majority in Greece.

Mr. GEYELIN. Is it your view now that the Communists are possibly getting stronger, although you apparently believe there was no threat at the time of the coup? Do you think the junta is creating a threat?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. I should think that as time goes on it is quite likely that the more extremist forces in the country will become dominant.

Mr. GEYELIN. All you would have us do now, as I understand it, is what? Withdraw recognition from this government or withdraw all aid? What would you have us do, specifically?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Let me put it this way: Recognition is a formal thing. Sometimes one recognizes even governments it doesn't like. First of all: to stop the display of enthusiasm, love and affection for the government; second: to stop shipping arms to the junta with which they subjugate the Greek people. After all, what are the Greek people to say when the alliance which they joined to protect their freedoms arms this mafia, these few officers, to keep the country in bondage.

Mr. NOVAK. Following up Mr. Geyelin's question about extremist elements in the resistance, Mr. Papandreu, the government-controlled Greek newspapers are now contending that your call for a united liberation front is in effect an invitation for the Communists to cooperate with you, is that correct?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Mr. Novak, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, which I have the honor to lead today, calls upon all Greeks, not upon parties, not upon party platforms, to join in the effort to overthrow the junta and establish on a permanent and solid basis a democratic process, democratic institutions. Those Greeks who wish to offer time, effort and their life in the effort to establish democracy in Greece—which, after all, is the key principle of the Western World—those Greeks are all welcome. None excluded.

Mr. NOVAK. Even if they are Communists?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. I will not look at the files of an individual. Any individual who wishes to offer his services for democracy may offer his services. We do not form a front among parties. We merely call upon the Greeks to join the effort to one single objective: overthrow the junta and establish a democratic government where the Greek people freely, with judicial protection, may express their views and run their own country.

Mr. NOVAK. As far as not forming a front among parties is concerned, as I understand it, the leader of the Greek Communist Party, the KKE, speaking from Rumania, had endorsed your purposes.

Do you rebuff that endorsement or do you refuse to in any way collaborate with him?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. My position, Mr. Novak, I have made very clear. The Panhellenic Liberation Movement is a coordination of resistance movements. It is not a collaboration among parties.

Mr. NOVAK. Going back, Mr. Papandreu, in April, at the time of the coup, some of the colonels claimed that if you had—if the elections had taken place and the Center Union Party had won, you would have invited Communists into the government in a coalition popular front. Was that charge correct or not?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Mr. Novak, why should it be valid—after all, our party had 53 per cent of the vote in '64. On the basis of objective estimates, we would have had more than 53 per cent of the total national vote in '67. Why would any party invite any other party to collaborate when it can run the country on the basis of its own strength? So the question itself is not a sensible question—not your question, but the question that has been put and which you transmit.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Papandreu, you have made some very serious charges saying that the Central Intelligence Agency of this country is directly supporting the junta leaders,

and you have said you would bring out proof of these charges. When could we see these proofs?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. When did I make the charge that it is supporting? And in what fashion did I make the charge?

Mr. ROBINSON. You said the Prime Minister Papadopoulos was in the pay of the CIA. You said that the Minister of Coordination—

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Not in the pay. What I said was that Mr. Papadopoulos was the contact man between the Greek CIA and the American CIA and that the American CIA financed directly the activities of the Greek CIA, not via the government, a question which as Minister to the Prime Minister I raised—one of the reasons in fact that I have been charged, early, as being anti-American, a charge that is false, [but] I am against interference of the irresponsible agencies in the internal affairs of other countries.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Papandreu, as far as I can see from your country, you have had no support there. The Center Union Party has denounced you, Karamanlis, probably one of the most famous Greek exiles, has not come to your support. The Royal Family has not come to your support. Where is your backing?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Mr. Robinson, the Center Party has never denounced me. One man dared say something under the pressure from the junta, and he has been scratched from books of the party officially in Greece. Mr. Spaneriggas who made this statement is no longer a member of the Center Union. As for Mr. Karamanlis, I don't need Mr. Karamanlis' support. He is the head of a different party. As for the King, he has no business supporting anybody, me included.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Papandreu, when you went to the United States Embassy in Athens a few weeks ago to get a visa—

Mr. PAPANDEOU. No, not to get a visa; I got my visa in Paris.

Mr. ROBINSON. The United States Embassy anyway reported back to this government here that you gave them assurances that you would not indulge in political activities while in this country. Is this true?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Quite to the contrary, there was no discussion about what I would be doing. When asked by Mr. Pattakos, the Deputy Premier of the junta what I would do abroad, I said I would be true to myself; you know my history and you can guess the rest. And my discussion with Mr. Talbot had nothing to do with my own personal plans.

Mr. SPIVAK. Mr. Papandreu, as you know you have been called far left by some and Communist by others. How do you describe your politics?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. My politics can be described in very few words. Politically I am a fanatical democrat. I believe in the Bill of Rights, the freedom of speech, of press, of syndicalist and political organization.

I believe, second, in a judicial system which is independent of the executive and can protect the citizen from police and arbitrary executive intervention.

Socially and economically, I am what you may call a New Dealer. Insofar as foreign policy is concerned, I believe that Greece as a member of the western alliance ought to have a voice in matters that affect its own future. It should not be a satellite, but an ally. And I do want to register my great chagrin, Mr. Spivak, that today this alliance that Greece joined to protect its freedom is supplying the junta with arms. This is unacceptable, Mr. Spivak.

Mr. SPIVAK. Would you under any circumstances support a Communist regime in Greece or would you fight it as you are now fighting the junta?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. I am against totalitarianism of all forms, Mr. Spivak, and this is something that is in the record. I shall fight for freedom no matter who threatens it.

Mr. GYELIN. Mr. Papandreu, when you attack the United States government for its policy in Greece, are you talking about Pres-

ident Johnson's policy or the Secretary of State's, or are you suggesting that there are agencies such as CIA that are out of control and beyond the effective discipline of the government?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. I have myself been very puzzled to understand the way the political process leads to a policy, a foreign policy. I am aware from my experience in Greece that the various agencies of the U. S. government have often not been in accord and that often the more irresponsible elements make out—the responsible elements being forced to follow a fait accompli.

Mr. GYELIN. Would you have us now cut off economic assistance of all kinds to the junta at the expense of the people in order to weaken them?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Indeed I would. For the Greek people have to bear one kind of sacrifice or another. One is the economic sacrifice for the short run. But if the junta were to survive because of economic and military support of the West, then the sacrifices would be much greater for they would have to engage in an active resistance effort, very costly, very costly indeed to Greece, Europe and the free world as well.

Mr. GYELIN. The junta is making a campaign now through a public relations agency in this country to attract private American investment. What is your advice to those potential investors?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Stay out, for when we return to Greece, we shall question all those who decided to help the junta during this period.

Mr. NOVAK. Mr. Papandreu, in your address to the ADA last night, you said that the junta did not even have the support of the Army last April. Do you feel that there is still lack of support in the Army, and that is the basis for a possible counter coup today?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Yes, Mr. Novak, I believe this quite deeply, because the Greek Army today resents the fact that a Mafia, using the intelligence apparatus at its disposal, has taken over control, has sacked over 2,000 NATO-trained officers, and is attempting through intelligence methods and through political commissars in every unit to run the Army. There is no longer an Army in Greece. It is a setup of political cliques. The Army resents this and will have the opportunity itself, we believe, to upset the junta.

Mr. NOVAK. Why didn't the Army then respond to King Constantine's attempted coup in December? In fact, why didn't the people, if they were as anti-junta as you say—why didn't they respond to the King in December?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. It is a monument of mismanagement, Mr. Novak. The Army, itself, had not been alerted. The King, himself, decided suddenly on the date of the coup, in response to Mr. Karamanlis' appeal to the Greek people the 9th of December—I think the King became concerned that Mr. Karamanlis would make the coup and chose to make it very rapidly himself to prevent Karamanlis from carrying through a coup against the junta. It was so badly managed. And, first of all, how would the people know? He didn't even have a radio station. A taped statement from Larissa, a second-rate station, reached some Greeks.

Now, of course, I have to add that the King could have stayed there and fought. He could have. In Macedonia there were military forces ready to fight and win. As for the Greek people, the King is not a symbol they can easily follow after the events of July, 1965, and thereafter.

Mr. NOVAK. Are you suggesting that if Mr. Karamanlis had led the coup, if it had gone as you say it was originally planned, that it might have been successful?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. His record is far superior to that of the King. I think it might have been better.

Mr. NOVAK. One thing I don't quite understand is that in the Nazi occupation in

World War II there were repeated incidents throughout the villages of Greece against the occupation forces, even though it meant death. Why are there no such incidents against the junta if the people are against the junta?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. It is not quite true there is no resistance in Greece, Mr. Novak. Publicity is a little difficult to get. Let's not forget we have 4,000 prisoners today and heavy convictions; we have mass firings of Army officers and civil servants. What do these things suggest? Why the tortures today? One should read the Amnesty International Report, Mr. Novak, to know the extent to which this junta has surpassed the Nazi techniques in psychopathic punishment and torture, things which are not well known abroad, for the public relations firms, including the Litton firm, which has turned out to be nothing else but a public relations firm for the junta, managed to put a cover of secrecy over what happens in Greece.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Papandreu, you were a very prominent personality in Greece, Don't you think it is strange that the junta let you go?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. I do indeed. I think it is one of their critical errors. They will regret it.

Mr. ROBINSON. Might they think that you are not particularly dangerous to them—

Mr. PAPANDEOU. I think that this is what they thought, and it is not for me to judge whether I am or not, but I believe they will regret this mistake.

Mr. ROBINSON. Did you give the junta assurances that you would not engage in political activity when you went abroad?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. Quite to the contrary. None. Quite to the contrary, I said flatly that I would return to the Greek political life when the people called for me. Quite to the contrary, I have made the opposite statement.

Mr. ROBINSON. These statements you are making abroad, does this not endanger your father?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. It endangers my father, indeed, and possibly myself.

I think that I should mention to you today, Mr. Robinson, that a government newspaper asked that the prosecutor in Greece, the public prosecutor, visit my father and ask him whether he allies himself with me or not. If he allies himself with me, then he has to be charged before a court martial with high treason. If he disowns me, then, of course, this means something for his political—his great political and historic career. This is the kind of people they are, and so far as my personal safety is concerned—you asked earlier about evidence. Well, I have evidence. It is in a safe and it is my security.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Papandreu, just before the coup d'etat last year, you made a speech where you charged that the CIA formulated American policy, and you criticized this policy for trying to isolate the Soviet bloc from making gross errors in Vietnam, in Latin America and with our allies in NATO. Do you still stand on these charges?

Mr. PAPANDEOU. I have made—it is not a charge; it is an observation, and it is an observation which I believe objective and which I make with a great deal of sadness, Mr. Robinson, because I have lived and worked and enjoyed my life here for 22 years. I, along with many others who today are Americans—I am no longer one—feel that the foreign policy formation process in this country does not satisfy the rules of democratic government which exist in all other sectors. The checks and balances which are so important in all democratic processes in your country don't work in the case of foreign policy. The Pentagon and CIA and State Department bureaucracy play more of a role than they should. This is my point, and it is a point of critical importance to the survi-

# Says exiled Andreas Papandreou, The 'Greek Problem' Is Really An American Problem

By ANDREAS PAPANDEOU

THE Truman Doctrine, giving the reason for American intervention in Greece in 1947, contrasted two ways of life. One, it said, is "based upon the will of the majority . . . free elections . . . freedom from political oppression," and the second "relies upon terror and oppression . . . suppression of personal freedoms." After 20 years of overt and covert American intervention, after the expenditure of over \$3.5-billion in a country about the size and population of Illinois, the result has been the triumph of the second way of life.

I point this out not to denigrate the Truman Doctrine (it is for American citizens to make appraisals and, if necessary, reappraisals), but rather to emphasize what few Americans realize—the extent and the repercussions of United States intervention in Greek affairs. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has defined the "Negro problem" in the United States as being basically a white problem—the product of a society infected by white racism. In

ANDREAS PAPANDEOU served as Deputy Minister for Economic Coordination in 1964 and 1965 in his father's Cabinet. Previously, he had studied at Harvard and for several years taught economics at various American universities.

the same way I believe the "Greek problem" may be defined as being basically an American problem—the product of a foreign policy distorted by a phobia about Communism.

An analogy may be drawn between Greece and Vietnam. The United States intervened in both countries, essentially for the same reason. The "domino theory" was propounded in each case. "If Greece goes," the theory said, "then Turkey and the Arab world and Italy also will go, and the entire Mediterranean will be lost." And "if Vietnam goes, the rest of Indochina also will go, and then Thailand and Indonesia and Burma, until all of Southeast Asia is lost."

There has been one basic difference, of course, between Greece and Vietnam. The Soviet Union remained neutral regarding Greece but has sent large-scale aid to North Vietnam. Moscow has accredited a new Greek Ambassador and has extended its commercial agreements with the junta Government. And whereas Tito closed his frontiers to the Greek revolutionaries, Mao has vied with the Russians in providing assistance of all types to North Vietnam, including laborers, foodstuffs and arms. During the Greek civil war, the United States was able, without committing any fighting units, to get what it wanted—that is, the defeat of the insurgents

and the establishment of a reliably anti-Communist regime in Athens.

But the end of the civil war in 1949 did not mean the end of American involvement in Greek affairs. Washington continued to bolster and "guide" the various Athens governments, expending a total of \$1.4-billion in military aid between 1950 and 1967. This enabled the representatives of the Defense Department and of the C.I.A. to play an even more important role in Greek affairs than did members of the State Department. The American military has made the substantive decisions concerning the weaponry and structural organization of the Greek Army and has exercised, through the palace, a considerable influence on promotions among Greek officers.

A number of personal experiences brought home to me the nature and extent of this outside intervention in our domestic affairs. In 1960, for instance, when I was on leave of absence from my position at the University of California and serving as economic adviser to the Bank of Athens, I was visited by the head of the C.I.A. in Greece. His purpose was to persuade me to pressure my father, a leader of the centrist parties, to accept a C.I.A.-sponsored change in the Greek electoral system

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Continued

designed to disfranchise the left. I said I doubted that my father would support the plan, for, although he was strongly anti-Communist, he did have respect for the democratic system. The C.I.A. official stood up abruptly, pointed his finger at me and said sharply: "You tell your father we get what we want!"

Some years later, when I had left my academic career in the States, entered Greek politics and was serving as an elected Deputy and as a member of the Cabinet, I discovered that the C.I.A. was free to operate as it wished in Greece, and that neither I nor my colleagues could effectively control it. The Greek C.I.A., the K.Y.P., was financed directly by its American counterpart rather than by the Athens Government, so it was virtually an appendage of its foreign paymaster.

THE result of 20 years of such relations between Washington and Athens was the junta coup of April 21, 1967. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the head of the junta, Col. George Papadopoulos, was the liaison between the C.I.A. and the K.Y.P. and that one of the two other leaders, Nicholas Makarezos, was the key intelligence officer of the K.Y.P. It is also noteworthy that within three

weeks of the coup the newspaper columnist Marquis Childs informed his readers of the Johnson Administration's relationship to it. The C.I.A., according to the columnist, reported the imminence of a coup, whereupon a top-secret meeting of "military, intelligence, State, all the powers dealing with the Greek problem" was held in Washington.

"The solemn question," Childs wrote, "was whether by some subtle political intervention the coup could be prevented. . . . The consensus around the table, after some hand-wringing and agonized appraisals of the consequences, was that no course of action was feasible. . . . Walt Rostow, the President's adviser on national security affairs, closed the meeting with these words: 'I hope you understand, gentlemen, that what we have concluded here, or rather have failed to conclude, makes the future course of events in Greece inevitable.'"

Whatever the origins of the coup—and history doubtless will yield further interesting revelations—the fact remains that the present dictatorship represents the failure of United States policy in Greece. Rule by junta, after all, is the precise opposite of the democratic aspirations enunciated in the Truman Doctrine. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the junta is intensely unpopular; the continuation of U.S. support for the dictatorship is likely to lead to another Vietnam in Greece. On the

first anniversary of the coup, The New York Times reported: "What was patently a dictatorship a year ago is still patently a dictatorship; and the saddest thing is that the chances of eventual bloodshed are probably increasing."

UNITED STATES assumptions and policies regarding Vietnam have been reappraised and apparently modified. A similar reappraisal is urgently needed regarding Greece before the Vietnam tragedy is repeated there. Such a reappraisal will require that certain widely accepted myths be dispelled.

Myth No. 1 is that democracy was a failure in Greece, that the Greek people are not ready for democracy. In view of recent sensational developments in the United States, this charge is at least piquant. The fact, of course, is not that the Greeks are unprepared for democracy, but rather that they have never been allowed by their foreign "protectors" to practice it. In 1841 the British Minister to Athens, Sir Edmund Lyons, stated: "A Greece truly independent is an absurdity. Greece is Russian or she is English; and since she must not be



The Papandreous: Andreas, seen with his wife and two of their children in Paris, left, and his father George, 79, a former Premier of Greece and leader of the leftist Center Union party. Both men were arrested shortly after the coup, and the elder Papandreou spent part of his confinement in a hospital, right. When the right-wing junta declared an amnesty for prisoners, Andreas went into exile.

Russian, it is necessary that she be English. . . ."

This great-power *Realpolitik* persists to the present day. One example was the agreement in October, 1944, between Churchill and Stalin dividing the Balkans into spheres of mathematically graded influence: In Rumania, there was to be 90 per cent Russian influence; in Bulgaria, 75 per cent Russian influence; in Yugoslavia, 50 per cent Russian and 50 per cent British influence, and in Greece, 90 per cent British influence. What has happened in Greece and in the other Balkan countries since World War II has much more to do with such pie-slicing than with any alleged unpreparedness for self-government. In this connection, it is relevant to note that the correspondents of the German magazine *Stern* have reported that the C.I.A. con-

ducted a secret poll of Greek political attitudes in March, 1967. The poll indicated that if elections were held as scheduled on May 28 the Center Union and the left would receive 63 per cent of the votes. Is it far-fetched to assume that the reason for the 1967 coup was a determination to forestall such a political outcome? And does it not follow that the ultimate cause for the present dictatorship is not that democracy in Greece was malfunctioning but rather that it simply was not allowed to function when the people's will appeared to threaten certain vested interests, both domestic and foreign?

**T**HE second myth about Greece is that her people are generally apathetic and accept the junta. This contention appears to be justified by the lack of any armed resistance, though this lack compromises the validity of the junta argument that the coup was designed to forestall an imminent Communist uprising. If the colonels' contention is true, why have they been unable to discover a single cache of arms during the year they have been in power?

In any case, developments in Greece since the coup all point to popular alienation rather than cooperation. Despite frantic efforts, the junta has not been able to win the support of any outstanding politician or intellectual. This isolation has led the junta to step up its mass purges,

### **"No major intellectual or politician backs the junta"**

arrests for "subversion of the social order" and barbaric torturing of prisoners, which have been described in a report of "Amnesty International" signed by Anthony Marreco of the British bar and James Becket of the American bar.

To repair its tarnished image the junta has engaged the services of the New York public relations firm of Thomas J. Deegan Company, Inc., which handles the Time Inc. and Coca-Cola accounts. For a reported fee of \$243,000 a year, the Deegan concern is arguing that perhaps there have been occasional excesses in Greece but "there are no Ilse Koch lampshades," and so the country qualifies for a Coca-Cola bottling plant—"the symbol of peace and freedom."

The Anti-Dictatorship League of Greek Officers has circulated among 3,000 officers a proclamation denouncing the junta as "a major national disaster" and calling for "the complete restoration of democratic institutions in Greece." And on April 18 *The Guardian* quoted an "experienced journalist" who went to Greece to evaluate public opinion as having said: "I knew they were unpopular. But—damn it!—I couldn't find anyone, apart from their placemen, who now supports them."

The third myth about Greece is that she has no future because of inadequate human and natural resources. Quite the contrary, one can easily establish that Greece has natural resources far richer than those of Israel and capable of supporting the population at a much higher living standard. Greece also has trained personnel to exploit her natural resources, but they are unused and being driven out of the country. The real Greek problem is not inadequate natural and human resources, but a fossilized establishment which has stifled national talent and creativity.

**T**URNING from myths to realities, the immediate task is to get rid of the military mafia, which, despite its populist rhetoric, has merely frozen a bankrupt and discredited status quo. The end of military domination is the objective of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, which I am honored to serve as chairman of its national council. The movement comprises the resistance organizations committed to the liberation of our country and to the restoration of the sovereignty of our people through free elections for the Constituent Assembly and the establishment of a government reflecting the will of the nation. The fundamental rights of citizens are to be guaranteed by a bill of rights, by

**66U.S. policies regarding Vietnam have been reappraised and apparently modified. A similar reappraisal is needed regarding Greece before the Vietnam tragedy is repeated there.99**

an independent judiciary and by armed forces subject to the authority of a duly elected civilian government.

The struggle for freedom will succeed because the alternative is not viable; the junta has no answers to the problems of Greece. It offers merely an archaic religiosity and an atavistic chauvinism. In a country in which the incredibly obsolete school system is a fundamental obstacle to modernization, the Minister of Education has banned miniskirts for girls and long hair for boys, has ordered Sunday church attendance and has proscribed "indecent" films and magazines. Because of the menace of surrounding Slavs and Communists, said this official, "the first and greatest aim of all schoolwork is the cultivation of the nationalistic and Christian conscience of students." This is all strongly reminiscent of Chiang Kai-shek's drive to revive the moral precepts of Confucianism. But just as Confucianism was found to be irrelevant to the problems of modern China, so hyper-orthodoxy is irrelevant to the problems of modern Greece.

**T**HE junta has survived to celebrate its first anniversary only because of direct and indirect support from the United States. Greece and Finland are the only countries exempted from the ban on American investments abroad. The World Bank, which refused a loan to the parliamentary Greek Government, extended to the junta a loan of \$12.5-million, and this despite the refusal of the Euro-

pean Investment Bank to extend credits to Greece until the restoration of democracy. As soon as the dictatorship announced plans for a referendum on a new constitution, Washington hastily volunteered an official "welcome," while neglecting to note the prevailing martial law and the patently fraudulent nature of the proposed constitution. This document excludes those whom the regime defines as Communists, limits the right of private assembly, abolishes trial by jury, allows unlimited detention before trial and curbs freedom of the press. And when the junta leaders are asked when their constitution will come into force or when parliamentary elections will be held, they reply, "When the aims of the revolution are accomplished."

There is no doubt that the referendum, scheduled for September, is an effort to forge permanent bonds for the Greeks. The constitution will not be a subject for debate, for the referendum will take place under martial law, with the public intimidated and democratic leadership suppressed or tortured.

Greece does need a new constitution if it is to take its place among the democratic nations of Europe. It needs a constitution that will guarantee basic human rights, give the widest possible freedom to political expression and activity, separate church from state and centralize the country fiscally and administratively. But a referendum is not the method under which a constitution should be adopted for it is innately totalitarian. After the liberation of Greece, a freely elected constituent assembly should

formulate and adopt a new constitution, one that will lay the foundation for a free and open society.

When Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford urged Congress on May 17 to approve a resumption of full-scale military aid to Greece, he justified the request by pointing to "the ferment existing today in Eastern Europe" and adding: "If the nations of Eastern Europe are beginning to feel a greater desire for freedom, we would do well not to rock our boat in that region. If we front with our allies, it would offer encouragement to [Eastern Europeans]. It would give them incentive to free themselves." In other words, the "incentive" for democracy in Eastern Europe is U.S. support for dictatorship in Greece!

Not being able to comprehend this logic, the Greek people naturally wish that American policy-makers would devise some less devious means for satisfying the democratic aspirations of their foreign policy.

**T**HE NEW YORK TIMES has been more straightforward regarding U.S. motives. It had this editorial comment:

"Washington has decided to do everything it can to provide the Athens junta with the prestige and respectability it has hungered after since its putsch of last April.

"The reasons given for this course are drearily familiar: The United States cannot risk a vacuum on NATO's southern flank at a time of



**FANCY FOOTWORK**—Premier George Papadopoulos celebrates the anniversary of the coup he led in April, 1967, by dancing with the Royal Guard. The regime

expanding Soviet influence in the Mediterranean; the colonels are a fact of life and Washington will get more moderate performance out of them by displays of friendship than by maintaining correct but cool relations.

"It is questionable, however, whether the Greek armed forces, purged of more than 200 experienced officers, could fill any meaningful NATO role. And it is ridiculous to argue that the United States needs the colonels more than the colonels need the United States. . . .

"The United States will be risking not only its reputation and goodwill but an element of its long-run security if it becomes involved in the unsavory business of helping to maintain the Greek dictatorship in power."

This critique exposes a basic flaw in the policies of the United States and of the 19th century's Great Powers. This flaw is the mechanistic geopolitical view of Greece as simply a strategic base in the Eastern Mediterranean. The trouble with geopolitical reasoning is that it subordinates—and often ignores—the political half of the word. It overlooks the fact that a base is not merely a geographic position, it is also a people. Without the active support of the people, the base cannot endure.

Gladstone pointed this out in criticizing the assumption of Tory policy that it was to Britain's interest to preserve the Ottoman Empire (and Ottoman rule over the Balkan Christians) as a barrier against Russian expansion to the Mediterranean. Gladstone maintained instead that "the breasts of free men" constituted the most effective resistance against Russia. His contention was borne out repeatedly when independent Balkan states were created and, to Britain's surprise, proved to be fiercely nationalistic and resistant to Russian control rather than tools for Russian expansion.

Gladstone has also been proved correct by developments since World War II. Though Churchill and Stalin arranged for stipulated degrees of British and Soviet domination in the Balkans, the Balkan peoples have rejected such determination of their fate by foreigners, whether Russians or Westerners. Surely policy-makers with any sense of history must realize that if Gladstone's plea for "the breasts of free men" was valid in the 19th century, there can be no question as to its validity

are infinitely more alert and politically conscious. Which means, more specifically, that support for the Athens junta not only will fail to encourage democracy in Eastern Europe or anywhere else, but will fail even to protect United States interests in Greece.

On March 1, 1967, barely six weeks before the colonels seized power, I set forth my views regarding the international position of Greece as follows:


"Greece, as a developing nation, a nation barely emerging from a semicolonial status, is extremely sensitive about its national independence, its freedom to chart its own international political course, its right to pursue freely its own national interests without placing in a quandary its allied relationships. We do not raise the question concerning the participation of Greece in the NATO alliance. But at the same time we demand that Greece be recognized as an independent nation which, pursuing its own particular interests, has chosen to be a member of the Western alliance.

"Greece refuses the status of a poor relative or of a satellite. It insists on its right, while executing its obligations as an ally, to determine its own course. It affirms its right to expand its commercial, economic and cultural relations with all other nations, independently of the bloc to which they belong. It assigns special importance to developing good relations with its Balkan neighbors, the countries of the Near and Middle East and the new nations of Africa. It insists on its right to follow closely developments in the European area, where a reduction of tensions, a rapprochement among nations of the East and West and a new approach to European solidarity are taking place. But above all, Greece insists that its allies cease interfering in its internal political affairs."

I remain convinced that this statement defines properly not only the fundamental interests of the sovereign Greek nation but also the legitimate interests of all great powers.

SINCE the terrible assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, this stand takes on an urgent importance. Senator Kennedy was an ardent foe of the Greek military dictatorship. He stated in March that if he were elected President he would cut off all military aid to the junta. He was against violence as a way of life. I think it is time that those of us who believe as he did, who treasure the basic rights of man, whether we be Greeks, Americans, Britons or Swedes, form an alliance to protect these rights and to fight with all means the disease of fascism and totalitarianism which is eating into the free world. When countries such as the United States or other NATO nations send arms to the military clique in Greece to be used to subjugate a people, then they are encouraging brutality and force everywhere and sowing the seeds which will eventually destroy their own institutions. In the name of Robert Kennedy, let us try to stop this horrible sickness. ☐

Continued



CHANGING OF THE GUARD — Troops before a Government building during the coup. Papandreou says junta leaders were close to the Greek intelligence apparatus, which the C.I.A. supported.



FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF ( SEE PAGE 10 )

PROGRAM Firing Line STATION WETA TV  
NET Network

DATE April 30, 1972 8:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

FULL TEXT

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.: Mr. Andreas Papandreu --  
did I get that wrong?

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: No, it's okay.

BUCKLEY: Sorry. Was an American citizen for a while. He was automatically given citizenship when he served in our armed forces during the Second World War. And in any case he had attended Harvard University and gone on to do graduate work in economics. In fact, he became a professor of economics and headed the department at the University of California at Berkeley, when suddenly he felt the call of Greek politics, ditched it all, and went back to Athens in 1959. A few years later he was a minister in his father's cabinet and the leading Greek noncommunist leftist.

But late one night in April, five years ago, a group of colonels staged a coup and democratic government, once again, was terminated in Greece. Mr. Papandreu was kept in prison for about eight months and then released.

He is once again a professor of economics, this time at York University in Toronto. He has written a book about his experiences in Greek politics, Democracy at Gunpoint, and has another book coming out on what he calls "creative capitalism".

Meanwhile he continues to apply such pressures as he can against the government of the colonels. He is particularly active in the lobby that seeks to influence Congress and the White House to put pressure on the colonels to democratize their government. Which seeks also to deprive the Greeks of military aid in the event that they do not do our bidding.

I should like to ask, Mr. Papandreu, do you believe that the United States government should deny economic or military aid to all nondemocratic powers?

*next page*

War strategic games that are ruining not only us but the world and you...

BUCKLEY: But you can't be.

PAPANDREOU: ...as well.

BUCKLEY: You can't be left out. You'd be gobbled up.

PAPANDREOU: Well, look. What do you think we are now?

BUCKLEY: Well...

PAPANDREOU: We are gobbled up by the Pentagon right now.

(Both men talk at once)

BUCKLEY: I think, if I may say so, that's your superstition.

PAPANDREOU: If -- superstition?

BUCKLEY: Absolute superstition.

PAPANDREOU: Let me give you some facts, sir.

BUCKLEY: Okay.

PAPANDREOU: W. W. Rostow, February 1967, subcommittee of the Security Council of the United States, reviewed the Greek situation. Conclusion: the Center Union and Papandreous will win in May '67.

BUCKLEY: Oh, I -- everybody agrees...

PAPANDREOU: That being...

BUCKLEY: Sure. Everybody knows that.

PAPANDREOU: ...against the interest of the United States, proceeds Mr. Rostow, therefore necessary to move toward a dictatorial solution in Greece. Source, because you like sources: Marquis Childs' syndicated column, plus oral confirmation by Marquis Childs to me in person, Spring 1968. Available in print.

BUCKLEY: To say that Marquis Childs said it doesn't mean that it's true. But...

PAPANDREOU: All right.

BUCKLEY: ...but let's -- let's oblige it...

17

PAPANDREOU: All right. Next...

BUCKLEY: Go ahead.

PAPANDREOU: ...who made the coup in Greece? Five men. I can reel off their names. It don't make much sense; Greek names are difficult to pronounce if you're not a Greek. But the five men -- I'll reel them off -- Papadopoulos, Makarezos (?), Patakos (?), Hadzipatro (?), Foralis (?). This is the group.

Of the five, the four members of the Greek intelligence agency. Therefore of the five, the four members necessarily and inevitably of the CIA. The coup was a CIA coup. And it was a Pentagon supported one.

We hope that by next fall an army officer who has escaped the junta to which he belonged -- we hope, I say -- will be secure enough abroad to be able to give testimony to personal participation in Greek uniform of CIA personnel, as in Cambodia and as in Laos.

By the way, it might be of interest to you that the overthrow -- the officers who overthrew Sihanouk in Cambodia were trained in Greece by Papadopoulos. Just as you may be interested to know that the Italian neofascists, the MSE in Italy, is getting today its guidance by the junta. And there is now documentary evidence of this in Italy.

The famous general who tried the coup a little while back -- not general but prince, in fact, Borgese (?), Borgese is now in Corfu, working very closely with the Greek junta and preparing the next few moves in Italy.

So we're talking about a pattern here...

BUCKLEY: Mr. Papandreou, I wish -- I wish that the CIA were one half as powerful as you depict it as being. We would have much less difficulty throughout the world.

I do know that Papadopoulos was investigated as far back as 1958 because it was suspected that he was involved in a coup. I also know that there are coups in Greece before CIA was invented.

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: It's the obvious, it's the ordinary thing in Greece...

PAPANDREOU: The ordinary?

BUCKLEY: ...not the extraordinary thing.

Marchetti

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA  
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )  
 )  
 Plaintiff, )  
 )  
 V. )  
 )  
 VICTOR L. MARCHETTI, )  
 )  
 Defendant. )

CIVIL ACTION  
NO. 179-72-A

FILED

MAY 19 1972

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT,  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The United States has filed a complaint seeking to enforce specific performance of a contract it made with the defendant. The complaint asks for a permanent injunction against disclosure by the defendant, his agents, servants, or employees, assigns, and all others in concert or participation with him, of information obtained by him while an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), all in violation of that contract.

The controlling issue in the case, as set forth in defendant's trial brief (p. 16), is "whether the facts are to be judged according to the First Amendment doctrine or according to the common law of contracts." It is the Court's view that it should be viewed according to the latter.

Upon beginning his employment with the United States, the defendant executed the following two secrecy agreements:

"SECRECY AGREEMENT

23 March 1955  
Date

1. I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures.
2. I agree to honor the requests of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to my application for employment or rendition of services whether it be accepted or rejected.
3. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in the Central Intelligence Agency, unless specifically authorized by a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.
4. I agree not to disclose processing procedures I have observed in the Central Intelligence Agency.
5. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application for employment to the Central Intelligence Agency.

/s/ Victor L. Marchetti  
Signature

/s/ William E. Greenip  
Witness"

"SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Victor L. Marchetti, understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central Intelligence Agency, I may be or have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the United States Government. I have read and understand the provisions of the espionage laws, Act of June 25, 1948, as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

"2. I acknowledge, that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim, in or to any of the information or intelligence or any method of collecting or handling it, which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America, in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish or reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means, any classified information, intelligence or knowledge except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing, in each case, by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representatives.

4. I will at all times comply strictly with the Central Intelligence Agency Security Regulations and appendices thereto, which I have read and understand.

5. I understand that no change in my assignment within the Central Intelligence Agency will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain equally binding on me after the termination of my services with the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 3 day of Oct. 1955.

/s/ Victor L. Marchetti (SEAL)"

When he terminated his employment in 1969, he executed the following document:

"SECURITY OATH

I, \_\_\_\_\_, am about to terminate my association with the Central Intelligence Agency. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with that Agency, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States of America. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794),

and by the National Security Act of 1947 which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence Agency operations, sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or other Government employee or official without the express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims which I may have against CIA or the United States Government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of CIA concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to CIA, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as CIA will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Central Intelligence Agency I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Agency, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information, which it is my duty in the national interest to disclose to the Central Intelligence Agency, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

5. I have been advised that in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify CIA immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to the United States Government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the Espionage Laws, Act of June 25, 1948 (18 USC secs. 793 and 794) and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of that Act, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and the United States Government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal  
this 2 Sep 1969.

/s/ Victor L. Marchetti (SEAL)  
Signature"

Subsequent to termination of his employment the defendant authored an article entitled "Twilight of the Spooks." He sent this article to a magazine publisher. Subsequently he visited and submitted the manuscript to six other publishers. With one of these he ultimately signed a contract for its publication



and received an advance on royalties. The article has never been submitted to the CIA, nor has consent of its Director or his authorized representative been obtained for the revelations contained in the article.

Specifically the Court finds that at least five of the items mentioned in the Karamessines affidavit and testified to by Karamessines on the stand as appearing in the defendant's article "Twilight of the Spooks," were classified; and at least three items which were taped for television interviews also fit that category. Attempts were made by the defendant to show that the material was improperly classified; that it was information which was publicly known anyway; and that, contrary to the Karamessines affidavit and testimony, revelations of the type made by the defendant would not compromise the security of the United States or endanger its intelligence operations. Objections to these attempts were uniformly sustained by the Court during trial. It was the view of the Court at trial, and still is, that it is not the role of the Court to determine whether material should be classified or whether, even if classified, its revelation is immaterial. Nor should the Court make a determination as to the validity of the CIA's judgment on the compromise vel non of this country's security and intelligence operations. By contract the defendant has relegated that decision to the CIA. As pointed out in the testimony of Karamessines, on the subject of whether the information is already

public, it is one thing to have unconfirmed report, rumor, suspicion and speculation as the source of such information. It is quite another thing to have such information revealed by a person who bears the credentials of a former CIA employee. Even though the information is incorrect, it in some instances was sufficiently close to the truth to be damaging. But damaging or not, it was information obtained by the defendant as a result of his employment with CIA, and consequently its revelation is restricted.

In the opinion of the Court the contract takes the case out of the scope of the First Amendment; and, to the extent the First Amendment is involved, the contract constitutes a waiver of the defendant's rights thereunder. It is these documents that the Court feels distinguish this case from New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and render it no more than a usual dispute between an employer regarding the revelation of information obtained by that employee during his employment. Consequently, there is no prior restraint and no such heavy burden on the United States to show irreparable damage to the country as was imposed by New York Times.

There is no suggestion that the secrecy agreements were the product of any fraud or duress or that the defendant was not fully competent at the time of their execution.

The Court finds that, contrary to the documents' proscriptions, the defendant has divulged and published and revealed, by writing and by word, information relating to the national defense and security and information of that nature relating to intelligent sources, methods and operations, both classified and otherwise, without first obtaining consent of the CIA.


The defendant does not contest that he has made the revelations and admits that at least some of the information in the article he gained as a result of his employment with CIA. Indeed, he trades upon his former connection with the CIA as putting him in a unique position to reform the intelligence gathering community of the United States. He seeks to avoid his contract by arguing that the First Amendment gives him rights which transcend any contractual obligations which might be imposed by the United States, and argues further that the United States cannot be considered a traditional employer but must only operate within the prohibitions of the First Amendment, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding.

Defendant cites no case which holds that the United States may not be viewed as an employer with the same contract rights as any other employer and this Court is unwilling to so hold.

In the Court's view the United States has made its case for specific performance when it shows the contract, a breach thereof, and the inadequacy of monetary damages.

The defendant further contests the jurisdiction of the Court, principally on the ground that there is no specific authority for a Federal Court to award injunctive relief for threatened danger to national security. This argument, however, fails along with the failure of the First Amendment argument. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 clearly gives the District Court original jurisdiction of all civil actions.

A permanent injunction will be issued, identical in terms to the temporary restraining order heretofore entered. It is so ordered, and such an injunction will be entered upon presentation.

  
United States District Judge

Alexandria, Virginia  
May 19th, 1972