

DRUGS

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Oct. 13, 1972 C 27

Drug Peddlers Ignore Nixon Threat

By Jack Anderson

At a recent narcotics conference, President Nixon declared dramatically that keeping narcotics out of the country is "just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the U.S." The President then announced sternly that he would cut off aid to countries whose leaders "protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Predictably, these bold words drew election-year headlines for the President and warm approval from a public alarmed over the drug danger. Yet classified documents in our possession show that the President has refused to cut off aid, despite evidence that certain foreign leaders are protecting the drug smugglers.

The smuggling operations in Laos, for example, illustrate the difference between what Mr. Nixon says in public and what his intelligence documents show in secret. To prop up the Souvanna Phouma government, he has poured in more than \$200 million in military aid annually. Yet his reports from the CIA and other agencies give him every reason to cut off this aid.

Says one document: "A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including generals, princes, high-level bureaucrats and province governors."

The CIA specifically advised that Laotian generals are providing the transportation for

drug smugglers. Incredible as it sounds, the pikacs and trucks used to carry the U.S.-bound narcotics are provided by the U.S. military programs which Mr. Nixon has sworn to cut off.

The secret documents make clear that the President is putting his military policies in Asia ahead of the drug invasion. "The difficulties of undertaking such drastic action (as aid cutoffs) cannot be over-emphasized," declares another document on Laos, "since . . . the risk of jeopardizing some part of the military effort is high."

In Cambodia, President Nixon also continues to bolster an unstable dictatorship with \$240 million worth of U.S. aid a year. Yet Cambodia is an important transshipment point for dope. An intelligence document explains why Mr. Nixon, however, has no intention in Cambodia of carrying out his threat to cut off aid:

"If U.S. aid were withdrawn, the government's ability to withstand Communist aggression would be weakened to the point of collapse."

Saigon Smugglers

In South Vietnam, as well, the documents attest to "the corruption among government civilian, military and police officials, some of whom have been actively participating in the narcotics traffic themselves . . ." But again there is no real thought of cutting off aid.

The secret documents bluntly give the reason: "It is

not in U.S. interests to implement an aid cutoff, even to punish Vietnam for failure to control drugs . . ."

President Nixon's double talk on drugs is nowhere more apparent than in Thailand which gets over \$100 million in U.S. aid a year.

"We believe that major punitive measures (such as) withdrawal of aid, denial of Most Favored Nation status, etc. . . . would probably undermine our cooperative relations with Thailand and jeopardize ongoing security activities . . ." says a U.S. intelligence document.

The President's threats could also be carried out in Iran, which the CIA fears may soon become a major supplier for U.S. drug traffickers. But the CIA reports:--

"The Shah has spoken out on a few occasions . . . against addiction (and) rumors persist that some members of the royal family and parliament are narcotics users. Swiss authorities recently charged an Iranian Prince who accompanied the Shah to Switzerland with having transferred pure opium to Geneva."

Throughout Latin America, the same look-the-other-way policy prevails.

President Nixon, for instance, praised Paraguay for extraditing a notorious French narcotics smuggler, Auguste Ricord, to face trial in the U.S. What Mr. Nixon neglected to mention was that Ricord was relinquished only after we wrote a series of columns about Paraguay's government-

backed drug smuggling and after Democratic congressmen began talking of cutting off aid to Paraguay themselves.

If the President really wants to do something about Paraguay, he has CIA reports that two Paraguayan generals and the chief of its secret police are abetting the drug traffic. However, insiders say there is no real move to end the \$12-million a year aid to Paraguay.

In Panama, which gets \$18 million annually in aid, the President has intelligence reports saying: "One of the more glaring examples of official corruption in the country of Panama . . . General Omar Torrijos and President Lakas appear to be controlling factors in the narcotics traffic."

All over Latin America, the intelligence documents say, "the greatest detriment to effective enforcement is corruption. The corruption goes all the way to the top of some Latin American governments."

But in Latin America, too, President Nixon's vows to cut off aid to offending lands have been ignored. The documents say explicitly: "Coercive measures, such as reduction or termination of AID programs . . . generally have proven to be ineffective."

Footnote: The stack of documents in our hands also tells similar tales of rampant drug activity with various kinds of government collusion or inaction in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, Lebanon, India, Peru, Bolivia, Hong Kong and Syria.

Drug file

and the new Labor-HEW appropriations, the welfare reform proposal, the water pollution act amendments, the housing bill, and the new minimum wage legislation. But no mention was made of one issue which has been pending in the Senate far, far longer than any of these issues, and which deserves consideration as much as any of the pending bills.

Mr. President, I refer, of course, to the Genocide Convention. The convention was originally submitted to the Senate by President Truman in 1950. It took 21 years for the Foreign Relations Committee to report it to the floor. That has now occurred, and the Senate has a golden opportunity to act on the convention now.

If we fail to act on this convention prior to adjournment sine die—which now looks as if it will be in the next 3 weeks—we will lose this opportunity—perhaps indefinitely. This worthwhile convention deserves our consideration, and I believe we owe it to its proponents to act up or down on this convention after 22 years of indecision.

Mr. President, let us act on this convention without further delay.

SOUTHEAST ASIA HEROIN

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern) has challenged President Nixon to live up to his threat to cut off aid to all governments that do not cooperate with us in the war against the world heroin traffic. He and Frank Mankiewicz, his campaign manager, have demanded that the President start by immediately banning aid to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam. Frank Mankiewicz said:

That is where the majority of the world's heroin is coming from.

The Senator himself did not go beyond charging that one-fourth to one-third of U.S. heroin comes from Southeast Asia. But he added:

The reason that Richard Nixon has been unable to prevent this is that our allies in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics trade.

To bolster his case, the Senator from South Dakota quoted the following paragraph from what was supposed to be "a cabinet level report," which was made the theme of an article by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times of July 24:

... the governments of the (Southeast Asian) region are unable and in some cases unwilling to do the things that have to be done by them if a truly effective effort were to be made.

A few months ago the able and distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Internal Security (Mr. EASTLAND) commissioned Gen. Lewis W. Walt, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), to conduct an investigation of the world drug traffic. General Walt, who retired in early 1971, is one of our country's foremost soldiers and foremost citizens. I believe that he has produced a report of outstanding significance which merits the attention of every Member of Congress. In my remarks today I intend to quote specifically from those portions of General Walt's report which dealt with South-

east Asia, because I believe they constitute a definitive reply to the allegations made by the Senator from South Dakota and his campaign manager.

Fact No. 1, as General Walt points out, is that Southeast heroin accounts for no more than 10 to 15 percent of the total traffic coming into this country—not one-quarter, one-third, or one-half, as the Senator and Mr. Mankiewicz contend.

Fact No. 2 is that it is Burma and not Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand which is the heartland of the Southeast Asian drug situation.

Let me quote what General Walt had to say on the subject in his testimony of August 14:

The Southeast Asian drug situation must be dealt with on a regional basis. As I see it, there are five factors which contribute to the making of this situation:

The principal factor in the entire situation is the virtually total absence of any kind of governmental authority or machinery of control and repression in northern Burma, which is the heartland of the Southeast Asian drug situation.

The second most important factor is the criminal element in Southeast Asia, largely dominated by ethnic Chinese, operating in a Mafia-like manner through the old tongs, or Triad societies.

The third factor is the serious lack of experienced personnel and technological equipment, and of an established control apparatus which still hampers the efforts of the Southeast Asian governments.

The fourth factor, in my opinion, is the element of Communist involvement—in Laos, in Thailand, in Burma, and probably in Vietnam.

The fifth factor is corruption.

Looking at it from this standpoint, it is nonsense to suggest that the prime factor contributing to the drug problem in Southeast Asia is the existence of widespread governmental corruption.

Given the existence of the other four factors, there would still be a serious drug problem in Southeast Asia regardless of any corruption that might exist in any government.

There may be honest differences of opinion over whether corruption should be ranked ahead of the Communist factor or ahead of the lack of personnel and equipment. But I believe that no one can challenge the assertion that the Burma factor ranks first and the criminal factor ranks second in the Southeast Asian drug equation. Anyone who ignores these factors is simply not looking at the situation objectively or as a whole.

Let me expand on the statement that Burma is the heartland of the Southeast Asia drug problem.

Burma produces by far the bulk of the opium exported from the so-called Golden Triangle.

The great majority of the refineries in Southeast Asia are located in Burma. This was so even before the recent crackdown in Laos and Thailand which obliged many of the refineries to relocate in Burma.

Burma is the prime sanctuary and base of operations for the major groups of traffickers. It is in Burma that the great opium caravans originate which are the ultimate source of 60 to 70 percent of the traffic coming out of Southeast Asia.

These facts are common knowledge, and anyone who talks about the situation in Southeastern Asia, damning Laos and Thailand but ignoring Burma, is simply not presenting a balanced picture.

In his testimony of September 14, General Walt added further important information about the situation in

Burma. He pointed out that the chief reason why the Burmese Government has not been able to assert its authority in northern Burma is because of the chronic state of insurgency there, involving Shan and Kachin tribesmen and White Flag Communists. The White Flag Communists' insurgency, he said, has grown to the point where it absorbs probably 80 percent of the total counter-insurgency energies of the Rangoon government in northern Burma. Furthermore, it so happens that the area between the Salween River and the Yunnan frontier, which is firmly controlled by the White Flag Communists, is the most fertile opium-producing territory in the whole of Burma.

Said General Walt:

In view of the fact that Peking mothered the White Flag Communist movement and that it still controls them, it cannot escape morale responsibility for their role as prime producers in the Burma opium traffic. Moreover, the act of this insurgency places the Burmese Government in the invidious position of not being able to enforce its own laws in the area, and of having to tolerate opium trafficking by the regional military forces which oppose the Communists.

This is a situation which calls for some plain talk—all the more so because China has now been brought into the world community of nations.

Using a map that showed the main opium growing areas in Laos and Thailand, as well as the areas under Communist occupation, General Walt further demonstrated that in Laos the Communists control fully 80 percent of the territory where opium poppies are grown, and that they also control a significant stretch inside Thailand along the Laotian frontier.

General Walt gave high marks to the governments of Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam for the cooperation they are now giving us in the regional war on opium and heroin. In the case of Thailand, he detailed some of the impressively large seizures that had been made by the Thai authorities since the beginning of the year, and described the destruction of 26 tons of opium which were surrendered to the Thai Government by the Chinese irregular forces in northern Thailand, pursuant to an agreement which gave the CIF members status as Thai residents, land of their own, and resettlement assistance.

In the case of Laos, General Walt quoted a paragraph from the so-called cabinet-level report, a paragraph which had been overlooked by Mr. Seymour Hersh of the New York Times—and was later overlooked by the Senator from South Dakota and Mr. Mankiewicz.

Surprisingly enough, the most effective antinarcotics program in the area seems to be in Laos. . . . Ambassador Godley first convinced Premier Souvanna Phouma of the great importance the United States Government attached to the antinarcotics program and made it clear that few things could hurt the cause of Laos more with the American Congress and people than anything less than a maximum effort against the illicit traffic. Souvanna was sufficiently impressed by the importance of the effort that he placed his intelligence chief, General Khamhou, in personal charge of the program. Khamhou, one of the most powerful men in Laos, had a clear charter from his chief and went to work

with a real sense of personal dedication. He has been assisted by all appropriate parts of the U.S. mission. The overall antinarcotics effort in Laos appears to be making good progress; it is an example for other countries to follow.

I agree with General Walt's observation that, when they quote from confidential documents, newspapermen frequently have a penchant for quoting the "bad" paragraphs and ignoring the "good" paragraphs.

Mr. President, at this point, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD some of the key passages from General Walt's report on the Southeast Asia drug situation.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPTS FROM GENERAL WALT'S TESTIMONY ON THE WORLD DRUG TRAFFIC BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY, AUGUST 14, 1972

It is my understanding that you have asked me to present our findings on Southeast Asia before today's session of the subcommittee because there have been conflicting reports about the situation in that part of the world and because there is an intense congressional interest.

According to some accounts which have appeared in the press and on TV documentaries, the large-scale opium traffic in Southeast Asia has been made possible only because governments which are supposed to be friendly to us have failed to cooperate with us in combating the traffic and because top governmental officials in these countries have themselves been involved in the traffic. These were the allegations.

The administration has replied that these reports are false and exaggerated, that we are today receiving excellent cooperation from the governments in Southeast Asia, and that remarkable progress is being made.

Where does the truth lie?

It is obvious from a reading of the Congressional Record that many Congressmen have been disposed to believe the critics because in certain cases the critics have been able to allude to confidential official documents that appear to be highly critical of the Southeast Asian governments. I may say that I myself had read so many critical articles prior to my departure that I, too, was disposed to be skeptical, if not critical, before I embarked on this trip around the world. However, I came away with a final impression that was sharply opposed to my preconceptions.

First, Mr. Chairman, I should like to reply specifically to a statement that appeared in the New York Times of July 24, because it has been widely quoted and reproduced and has obviously had considerable impact. The article quoted the following paragraph from what it described as a "cabinet level report": I quote:

"There is no prospect of suppressing air and sea traffic of narcotics in Southeast Asia under current conditions or under any conditions that can realistically be projected. This is so because the governments in the region are unable and, in some cases, unwilling to do those things that would have to be done by them—and cannot be done by the United States—if a truly effective effort were to be made."

I have been given a copy of the so-called cabinet level report and here are my comments on it, sir.

First, let me say it is a great temptation for any newspaperman to quote from any classified document he happens to get access to. This is supposed to give him a scoop; and there are many people who believe that the

mere fact that a document is classified constitutes proof that the statements made in it are accurate. But from many, many years of experience in the assessment of intelligence, I know how misleading a single document or a single quotation from a classified document can be.

Those who have had the same experience I have had, would, I believe, agree with the following general observations:

(1) Honest and conscientious men looking at the same situation can come up with substantially different assessments.

(2) The classified files on any complex situation, therefore, will inevitably contain reports that differ significantly on details and even on fundamentals.

(3) Intelligence files will frequently also contain what we call raw intelligence; that is, reports that have come in from a variety of sources which may or may not be true, and which have to be substantiated before they can be considered hard intelligence.

(4) Those who have the responsibility of decision must weigh their intelligence files or their report files in aggregate, assiduously distinguishing between raw intelligence and hard intelligence.

(5) Reports that are 6 months to a year old must never by themselves be used as a guide to the current situation, even though their validity at the time may have been generally accepted. Situations can change radically in 6 months or even less.

(6) Reports, including task force reports, will vary tremendously in quality. Some are outstanding; some are mediocre; some simply crumble before the test of time; some turn out to be odd mixtures of valid findings and of findings that miss the mark completely. Each report and each section of each report, therefore, requires careful evaluation.

In reading the report in question, I found several statements which are hardly in harmony with the paragraph quoted.

There was, for example, an entire paragraph devoted to the remarkable progress in Laos, while, on the subject of Thai trawlers, the report said, "For a number of reasons the suppression of illicit traffic by Thai trawlers appears both feasible and highly rewarding; it should clearly command highest priority."

The report to which the New York Times article referred was dated February; the team was in Vietnam in January. Their findings were based on the situation that existed during the previous 6 months to 1 year's time. So I am not challenging gospel when I tell you that my own assessment of the situation in Southeast Asia today differs radically from the quotation reprinted in the New York Times article.

Let me first give you a general statement of my findings and then I shall proceed to deal with the situation on a country-by-country basis.

Mr. Chairman, I would welcome questions at any time during my presentation, sir.

I will not tell you that all is well in Southeast Asia and that we have nothing more to worry about as far as the opium traffic in the area is concerned. The problem remains a formidable one and there are still many weaknesses to be overcome.

To the criminal element, the gigantic profits to be had from the opium trade constitute an almost irresistible enticement. For example, sir, a kilo of opium grown in Turkey, if it is sold to the government, a farmer gets \$15 for it. If it is sold illicitly he gets probably \$30 for it. Now, by the time that kilo of opium is changed into heroin and sold on the streets in New York, it is worth almost \$40,000—so you see the people in between, who are getting it here and selling it, are making a lot of money.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, can you give us an idea of the size of a kilo?

General WALT. A kilo is 2½ pounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. But in opium, what is the size of it?

General WALT. About the size of a building brick. I hoped to have a morphine brick here this morning but I don't have it; it has not been brought in yet. It may be brought in later. It is just about the size of building brick.

The traffickers are enterprising and highly organized and it is to be anticipated that they will move to sophisticate their procedures in an effort to circumvent the stepped-up security measures of the Southeast Asian governments.

The Governments of Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam are relatively new to the business of narcotics control and they suffer from a lack of specially trained customs and police officials and of logistical communications, and technological equipment. These weaknesses we are seeking to overcome through special training programs and advisory missions and through special equipment supply programs.

Some allowance must also be made for the political and social problems that have delayed regional action on the drug problem, including the fact that the Governments of South Vietnam and Laos have been fighting desperate and costly wars against the North Vietnamese invaders while the Government of Thailand has been having increasing difficulty with the Communist insurgency in its border areas.

Corruption throughout Asia is more widespread possibly than it is here in our country and this is a problem, too, that will have to be overcome or reduced to more acceptable dimensions.

But, acknowledging the dangers and the weaknesses, I still believe there is much reason for hope in Southeast Asia. There is movement there and momentum, and this momentum is in the right direction.

As the Senators know, our own Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs maintains missions in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and in many other countries. We tend to take the existence of these missions for granted. Actually, the mere fact of their existence is of profound significance because it speaks an extraordinary degree of cooperation between their governments and ours. There is no precedent in history for an arrangement between two governments under which government A gives government B the right to station law enforcement representatives on its territory, who operate their own intelligence system and their own network of informers, offering rewards for information in a more or less public manner. About the only power they lack is the power to arrest—and here I would observe that our own BNDD men are frequently invited to accompany law enforcement squads in other countries, in an observer capacity, in raids on traffickers and laboratories.

The implications of this arrangement go far beyond permitting American BNDD officers to operate on their territory. Every government that commits itself this far automatically incurs an obligation to cooperate with us in the field of narcotics intelligence and to take action on any hard intelligence which we pass on to them.

At the very least, this degree of cooperation must be considered pretty solid proof of good faith. It would be impressive standing by itself; but there are many other evidences of good faith.

For example, both the Thai Government and the Laotian Government have agreed in principle to special aerial photographic reconnaissance of their territory so that we will know, and they will know, precisely where the opium is being grown, and approximately how much is being grown. It is my understanding that the first systematic reconnaissance flights will probably be made in December of this year and January of next year,

September 26, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 16007

when the next opium crop matures and when the poppy field will have maximum visibility.

What the critics say is not completely untrue but, by and large, their criticism and the documents they quote in support of their criticism have to do with a situation that existed a year or so ago. Over the past year, however, the situation in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand has changed radically. It would be no exaggeration to say that all three governments in this period have made the quantum jump from an indifferent or, at the best, an unmotivated attitude toward the war on drugs, to the status of allies with the United States in this war.

These are my basic observations on the situation in Southeast Asia.

The Southeast Asian drug situation must be dealt with on a regional basis. As I see it, there are five factors which contribute to the making of this situation:

The principal factor in the entire situation is the virtually total absence of any kind of governmental authority or machinery of control and repression in northern Burma, which is the heartland of the Southeast Asian drug situation.

The second most important factor is the criminal element in Southeast Asia, largely dominated by ethnic Chinese, operating in a Mafia-like manner through the old tongs, or Triad societies.

The third factor is the serious lack of experienced personnel and technological equipment, and of an established control apparatus which still hampers the efforts of the Southeast Asian governments.

The fourth factor, in my opinion, is the element of Communist involvement—in Laos, in Thailand, in Burma, and probably in Vietnam.

The fifth factor is corruption.

Looking at it from this standpoint, it is nonsense to suggest that the prime factor contributing to the drug problem in Southeast Asia is the existence of widespread government corruption.

Given the existence of the other four factors, there would still be a serious drug problem in Southeast Asia regardless of any corruption that might exist in any government.

There may be honest differences of opinion over whether corruption should be ranked ahead of the Communist factor or ahead of the lack of personnel and equipment. But I believe that no one can challenge the assertion that the Burma factor ranks first and the criminal factor ranks second in the Southeast Asian drug equation. Anyone who ignores these factors is simply not looking at the situation objectively or as a whole.

Now, sir, I would like to go to specifics on Burma.

Let me expand on the statement that Burma is the heartland of the Southeast Asia drug problem.

Burma produces by far the bulk of the opium exported from the so-called Golden Triangle.

The great majority of the refineries in Southeast Asia are located in Burma. This was so even before the recent crackdown in Laos and Thailand which obligated many of the refineries to relocate in Burma.

Burma is the prime sanctuary and base of operations for the major groups of traffickers. It is in Burma that the great opium caravans originate which are the ultimate source of 60 to 70 percent of the traffic coming out of Southeast Asia.

These facts are common knowledge, and anyone who talks about the situation in Southeastern Asia, damning Laos and Thailand but ignoring Burma, is simply not presenting a balanced picture. . . . Most of the opium production in Burma, as you will see from this map, is concentrated in the Shan and Kachin States, along the Chinese frontier. The northern part of the Shan State above Lashio and east to the Chinese frontier has been the locus of the White Flag

Communist insurgency which is a pro-Peking and Peking-backed group.

In a period from March to June, after the harvest but before the monsoons set in, the opium is transported to the Thai and Laotian frontiers either by trains or porters or by caravans of horses and mules. The caravans can be very elaborate undertakings.

That is a map of Burma. You can see the general location in northeastern Burma and this is the area where foreigners cannot get into; it is an area controlled primarily by the tribal and political insurgents and is definitely not under the control of the Burmese Government and this is the center of the opium growing and the heroin manufacturing activity of Burma.

When it reaches the frontier area, the opium may be processed into morphine base or heroin in the three large refinery complexes in the Tachilek area, which is situated here, or at other refineries in the tri-border area which I spoke of earlier. . . .

As I said earlier, we saw from the aircraft the complexes in the Tachilek area which refine opium into morphine and heroin. This manufacture of course, takes place before the heroin is moved on down toward the Thai border and the Laotian border.

Alternatively, the raw opium may be moved into Thailand by a variety of devious routes and then transhipped by trawler from Bangkok to Hong Kong, Singapore, and other points.

The KKY and the Chinese irregular forces, who operate sometimes in competition, sometimes in collusion, are supposed to conduct the major convoy operations, while the KKY is reported to be in control of the three large refinery complexes in the Tachilek area.

Burma is a signatory of the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotics. The government appears to be unhappy about what the opium trade in its northern provinces is doing to its reputation, and it feels it is wrecking its reputation as a nation incapable of controlling the opium growing. Every once in awhile it will take a small affirmative action; it will seize some opium or destroy a few poppy fields or put enough pressure on some of the refinery operators to induce them to relocate. But it fears to take more radical action against the growers and the traffickers because it is already having more trouble than it can handle with the current crop of nationalist and left-wing insurgencies. The result is that Burma remains an open conduit through which a constant flow of opium and morphine seeps through Thailand and Laos, in large quantities, into western Asia, while an already significant and growing flow of heroin seeps through them to America.

Because it is fearful of compromising its neutrality, the Burmese Government does not want to enter into any bilateral arrangement with the United States. This can be understood. But it may be carrying things a little bit too far when the Burmese Government even turns down an offer from us of logistical and communications equipment for a beefed-up antiopium effort on their part.

These are facts which have to be kept in mind assessing the situation in Thailand and Laos.

Now, sir, I would like to go to the country of Laos. I want to deal next with this country because there has been a lot in the news about the opium traffic there.

Laos has accounted at the most for some 100 tons of the 700 tons or 12 to 15 percent, of the opium produced annually in the Golden Triangle and it probably accounts for much less today. Most of this has been consumed locally, but a limited amount has gone into the export trade. Laos has had a much greater importance as a transit area for opium and morphine base coming from Burma and as the locus, until recently, of a number of heroin refineries.

In Laos, as in Thailand and Burma, the opium is grown by primitive hill tribes—in

Laos primarily by the Meos and Yaos who have cultivated opium for generations. For them it represents their only cash crop and their only hedge against the possible failure of their rice crop. Their income from their plots of opium poppies may not run any more than \$60 to \$100 a year, but to a Meo family this is a very large amount which may make the difference between survival and starvation in a difficult year.

The opium is grown on mountain slopes at an approximate altitude of 3,000 feet, which seems best suited for its cultivation. As in Thailand and Burma, the tribesmen practice slash and burn agriculture. They clear an area on a hillside, burn the trees they have cut down, mulch the soil and then cultivate it for a number of years until it begins to show signs of exhaustion. Then they move on to another hillside or another area on that same hillside, and the process begins all over again.

Flying over northern Laos, I saw literally hundreds of clearings on the mountain slopes which had been devastated and then abandoned in this manner. In some parts of Laos the clearings occurred at such frequent intervals that it was as though an army of giant locusts had moved through the mountain jungles, pockmarking them with areas of total destruction. Needless to say, this is not good for the ecology of any country.

Here is a map which shows the major opium producing areas in Laos.

The area includes Phong Salu Province in the far north, Samneua Province in the northeast, and the Plaines des Jarres in Xiangkhoang Province. There was a time when these producing areas were divided more or less evenly between Meos under Pathet Lao, or Communist, influence, and Meos loyal to the Government in Vietnam. But as the Pathet Lao, with heavy North Vietnamese support, have extended their area of control, the anti-Communist Meos have been forced out of their opium lands and onto the plains, so that today the opium growing areas of Laos are overwhelmingly under Communist control. The opium agriculture in these areas, like all other agriculture, is under the village management of Hanoi-trained cadres.

In addition to the locally produced opium which was picked up from the hill people by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, horse and mule caravans brought large quantities of opium into Laos from Burma. The opium was moved to processing laboratories at Ban Houei Sai and other centers; then the opium, morphine, and heroin was moved out, generally by plane, to Thailand, Vietnam, and Hong Kong.

Why did the Laotian Government not move sooner to deal with the opium traffic in its country? There are several reasons that help to explain the lag, sir.

The first reason is that until recently the Laotian attitude toward opium was as tolerant as were Western attitudes 100 years ago. Opium was not a serious problem among the Laotian people and the heroin problem was nonexistent. There was no law against growing opium or merchandising it and no law against processing opium into morphine or heroin. And so, without violating any law, a handful of senior officers, including Gen. Ouan Rathikone, former commander of the Laotian Army, could line their own pockets by engaging in the opium trade. General Rathikone was retired from the Army last July.

Second, there was the Government's almost total preoccupation with the war that has ravaged their country for more than a decade now. Beginning as a domestic insurgency, this war has in recent years evolved into an open invasion by North Vietnam, involving as many as five divisions of the North Vietnamese Army at times. For a small coun-

try of 3 million people, the many scores of thousands of military and civilian casualties have had a devastating impact.

On top of this, the Government must cope with some 235,000 refugees who have fled from areas under Communist control. In the light of these facts, perhaps some allowance should be made for an attitude which accepted the war and the refugees as the Government's first priorities.

Third, there was the factor of corruption and vested interest. There can be no question that many well-placed people in Laos, both Laotian and ethnic Chinese, were making a good deal of money out of the opium business and doing it without violating any law.

With the major scandals that we have had in some of our metropolitan cities, reaching all the way up to police inspectors and judges, we are not exactly in the best position in the world to lecture other countries on corruption. But it is a fact that corruption tends to be far more widespread in low-income countries. When police inspectors and judges who make \$20,000 and \$25,000 a year succumb to temptation in our own country, we should not be surprised when their counterparts in other countries who work for bare subsistence salaries succumb in substantially greater numbers to the temptation of big money.

Fourth, there is the fact that opium in Laos did not become a problem that vitally affected American interests until the heroin epidemic hit the American forces in Vietnam during the summer of 1970. It took several months before we realized what was happening and it was getting on to mid-1971 before our war against the heroin epidemic in Vietnam went into high gear. It was about this time that we began to use our influence to persuade the governments of Southeast Asia to join us in more vigorous measures against the opium traffickers.

All governments tend to move with a certain time lag. On the whole, I believe that the Governments of Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand must be given credit for moving quickly and dramatically since we first raised the issue with them on a top priority basis.

Looking at the situation which existed a years ago in Laos, no one could be blamed for deciding that ingrained attitudes ran too deep to make any serious improvement possible. But then things began to happen.

The strength of the American reaction to the news of the heroin epidemic among our servicemen in Vietnam persuaded the Laotian leaders that they could no longer afford to remain indifferent or unmotivated if they wished to retain American support. And so, on November 15, 1971, the Laotian Legislature took the revolutionary step of passing a law banning the production, sale or use of opium. All of the Meo deputies, following the leadership of Gen. Vang Pao, voted affirmatively on this measure.

Even before the law was passed, the Laotian Government had acted to curtail refinery operations, destroying two refineries and seizing large quantities of drugs in the process.

Alarmed by the evidence of mounting governmental pressure, several additional refineries closed down or moved their operations to Burma. Today, according to responsible officials who follow the situation in Laos, on a day-to-day basis, there is no evidence to indicate that there is a single heroin lab currently active in the country of Laos.

While there are unquestionably some corrupt officials in the Laotian police force and the Laotian Armed Forces, everyone in the Embassy with whom I discussed the matter, was completely convinced of the sincerity and motivation of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Gen. Vang Pao and of the key

officials appointed to deal with the problem of opium suppression.

In Vientiane I was able to meet with a number of the Laotian officials now involved in their country's war against opium and the opium traffickers. Among them were His Royal Highness Thao Mankhara Manivong, President of Narcotics Destruction; Mr. Chanthaboun Luangraj, Director General of National Police and President of the Sub-commission for Repression of the Narcotics Traffic; and Mr. Nith Singharaj, President of the Interministerial Committee for Narcotics Control. I had a chat with each one of these gentlemen and I may say that my conversations with them completely bore out what we had heard from Ambassador Godley and his staff, and that is, that the Laotian Government is now animated by a completely new spirit and that the officials assigned to deal with the problem have both a sophisticated understanding of it and the determination to really do something about it.

Despite the fact that they have had to build an antiopium apparatus almost from scratch, and despite the demands of the war, the Laotian Government's antinarcotics operation has drawn blood since the first of the year in the form of repeated seizures of small and large quantities of opium.

Their biggest haul to date was 89 kilos of opium—something over 200 pounds of opium. On June 14, when I was having lunch with Ambassador Godley in Ban Houei Sai on the Thai frontier, the report came in that the Lao police, acting on their own, had picked up another 12 kilos of opium in the nearby village of Ban Dan.

A recent report by the Embassy team contains language far more optimistic than any previous assessment of the situation in Laos. According to this report, the security measures instituted by the Laotian Government have surprised and discombobulated the traffickers so that there has been a dramatic reduction in the amount of traffic moving through Laos to other destinations. A direct result of the Government's drive has been a serious depression in the price of opium.

It is, of course, true that the Meo tribesmen whom we supported were opium cultivators, as were the Meo tribesmen on the Communist side. Virtually all Meos in both Thailand and Laos grow opium—because they have done so for generations, because they use it as a medicine and as an euphoric drug, because it is their one cash crop and because it can be stored against hard times.

Apart from declaring war on the Meos or forcibly uprooting them from their lands, there was no easy and immediate way of terminating opium cultivation by the Meos. An enduring solution would require resettling the Meos on a permanent basis, teaching them how to cultivate substitute crops, and providing transportation so that they could move these crops to market and giving them some kind of support during the period of transition. All of this is going to require a good deal of time and a good deal of money.

While there was much criticism of the fact that the Meos on our side were engaged in opium agriculture, I have thus far come across no criticism of the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese Communists for condoning and even encouraging the cultivation of opium by the Meo tribesmen under their control; or have I seen any mention of the fact that General Vang Pao's Meos have largely discontinued the cultivation of opium. In the first place because of Vang Pao's crop substitution program going back a number of years; in the second place, because the Communist advance has forced them out of their traditional lands, which were suitable for poppy cultivation, onto the plains, which are not suitable for poppy farming. Nor have I seen the question raised as to the ultimate purpose and destination of the opium which the Meos under Pathet Lao control are known

to be growing. Obviously, if they are growing opium, they are not consuming all of it; some of it must be sold somewhere.

To sum up, I would like to quote a statement that was made to us by one officer in our Embassy:

"If you want to gage the progress that has been made here, you have to be in a position to compare how easy it was for the traffickers previously with how difficult it has now become for them."

I should also like to quote, in summing up, the paragraph on Laos from the so-called "cabinet-level report," the same report from which the New York Times quoted a paragraph that appeared to be highly critical of the Southeast Asian governments. While there are some highly sensitive matters in the document, dealing with informers and technology, the paragraph on Laos contained nothing that in itself warranted classification and I have, therefore, been given express permission to read this paragraph to the subcommittee. I quote:

"Surprisingly enough, the most effective antinarcotics program in the area seems to be in Laos. *** Ambassador Godley first convinced Premier Souvanna Phouma of the great importance of the antinarcotics program and made it clear that few things could hurt the cause of Laos more than the American Congress and people than anything less than a maximum effort against the illicit traffic. Souvanna was sufficiently impressed by the importance of the effort that he placed his intelligence chief, General Khamhou, in personal charge of the program. Khamhou, one of the most powerful men in Laos, had a clear charter from his chief and went to work with a real sense of personal dedication. He has been assisted by all appropriate parts of the U.S. mission. The overall antinarcotics effort in Laos appears to be making good progress; it is an example for other countries to follow."

This paragraph was never quoted by newsmen who had access to the document—the same as they had access to the paragraph that was quoted. I do not know why this is so, but from a number of experiences, I have the impression that when they quote from confidential documents, newspapermen have a penchant for quoting the bad paragraphs and ignoring the good paragraphs.

I would like now, sir, to go to the country of Thailand.

Thailand has come in for a tremendous amount of criticism in a recent spate of feature articles and TV documentaries.

My investigation has convinced me that while some of the criticisms may have had a measure of validity a year ago, there has been a dramatic improvement in the situation since that time, in particular over the past 8 months; and I hope that my testimony will help to update the information available to Congress so that Members of Congress, in making their assessments, will not have to rely on the data of a year ago.

Opium cultivation was made illegal in Thailand by a law passed on January 1, 1959; but, as we found out in our own country during prohibition, it is one thing to pass a law and another thing to be able to enforce it.

In Thailand the problem of enforcement was complicated by the fact that most of the opium is grown by primitive hill tribesmen—Meos, Yaos, Lahus, and others—who live in isolated settlements and move from hillside to hillside and who, like their cousins in Laos, rely on opium as their only cash crop and as their hedge against starvation in a bad year. The principal cultivators of the opium poppy are the Meo tribesmen. I show you here a map of the distribution of the Meo tribes in northern Thailand . . .

. . . The Thai Government has very little effective control over these people.

There is, of course, no firm figure on total

September 26, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 16009

production; the best estimates are, however, that Thailand produces between 130 and 200 tons of opium a year.

The Thai Government has for a number of years now been seeking to discourage opium production by the hill tribes; but, as everyone who has been out in the area realizes, this is going to be a complex problem and it is going to require time. The optimum solution would involve helping the opium-growing tribesmen to convert their temporary settlements into permanent settlements by building roads and schools and dispensaries, teaching them to grow substitute crops which can realistically be moved to market, and assisting them during the period of transition.

In recent years the Thai Government has been going about this problem with genuine motivation. Its motivation springs in part from a desire to cut down on opium production and traffic in Thailand, in response to international criticism; but there is another important element, an element of self-interest, to this motivation.

The slash-and-burn agriculture—as I pointed out in my remarks earlier on what is happening in Laos where they are destroying the wooded hillsides—does devastating things to the ecology of a country. When the tribesmen abandon their wornout poppy plots to move on to a new hillside, the soil is left pulverized so that with each heavy rain some of it washes down into the valley. The progressive stripping of the hillside jungles is destroying the watershed, raising water levels in the valleys beyond the point suitable for rice agriculture and silting up the dams 15 years sooner than scheduled. Thai agricultural experts are sold on the need for dramatic action and the Government itself is clearly very much concerned.

In December of last year the Thai Government signed an agreement with the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, a pioneering agreement of its kind, calling for joint planning, with U.N. support, for a project designed to eliminate opium production by the hill tribesmen through a program of village development and crop substitution. The government also set up a variety of special agencies to deal with various aspects of the drug problem in Thailand, including a special program for hill tribesmen under the patronage of the king and directed by the king's nephew, Prince Phisidat, a young man of dedication and vigor, with whom I had a long conversation in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand.

There are massive problems to be overcome in weaning the hill tribes from opium agriculture. First, there is the problem of land ownership. Traditionally, the king owns all the mountains and all the seashores of Thailand and, therefore, all hillside agriculture is technically illegal. But if the hill people are to be persuaded to shift to other crops and a more stable agriculture, they have to be assured of the ownership of the land they till. The Thai Government has been encouraging the development of permanent settlements, ignoring the technical illegality of their own position while they grapple with the legal problem of land ownership.

The second problem involves finding suitable crop substitutes. Opium is very easily moved to market and it does not take a lot of transport and it brings a large and reasonably stable cash return. Corn or fruit or market vegetables would be much more difficult to move to the distant urban markets and the prices would fluctuate widely, according to the whims of the Thai merchants. Beyond this, there is the fact that with substitute crops like tea, coffee, and fruit, it would take 5 years before the first crop came in.

Third, there is the problem of teaching the hill people entirely new agricultural techniques, including terracing and windbreaks.

Fourth, there are no educated hill people who are available for immediate recruitment

as administrators or technicians and bare literacy probably does not exceed 5 or 10 percent among the hill people.

In Chiang Mai, I also had a long conversation with Mr. I. M. G. Williams, the U.N. representative who is working with the Thai Government on the hill tribe program. Mr. Williams is a dynamic man with a tremendous experience in the area. In World War II he served as a colonel with the British army in Burma and after the war he worked for many years in different parts of the Far East as an official of the British Colonial Office and the British Foreign Office.

Mr. Williams had the highest praise for the cooperation he was getting from the Thai Government, especially from his Thai counterpart, Chit Posayananda, whom we also met in Chiang Mai. Mr. Williams told me of their plans for a pilot program involving the construction of a model village with five satellite villages. The village would contain a headquarters and a dispensary and be staffed by agricultural experts who would be volunteers on the Peace Corps style.

Mr. Williams felt that despite the many difficulties there was reason for optimism. He said that there was a new mood among the hill people. They want to get away from the itinerant slash-and-burn agriculture and move into permanent settlements and get some education for their children. But he felt that the program was not moving as rapidly as it might, in part because his headquarters in Geneva insisted on the most painstaking studies before any action was taken in each case.

The government has pushed its efforts to the point where it has aroused open resentment among the Meos, making it markedly easier for the Communists to recruit Meo tribesmen for the guerrilla insurgency which has plagued northern Thailand for a number of years now. The Communists come to the Meos and say to them, in approximately these terms: "The government is trying to prevent you from growing opium poppies, which you have always done and which is your right. They are trying to take your only cash crop away from you. Come with us and we will let you grow opium poppies."

On the basis of such agitation and with cadres trained in Hanoi and Peking, the Communists have been able to establish fairly effective control over a strip of land perhaps 150 miles long by 25 to 50 miles deep along the northernmost portion of the Laotian frontier.

The Communists have about 3,000 guerrillas in the area who are extremely well equipped. We were told that they have AK47 rifles which are comparable to our M-16's, 60 and 81 millimeter mortars, B40 rockets, 57 millimeter recoilless rifles, and rubber landmines and booby traps similar to those used by the Vietcong. There is reason to believe that the movement is directed from China, among other things because the supporting propaganda operation, the Voice of Free Thailand, is located there. The Voice of Free Thailand has transmitters capable of reaching all the way to Bangkok and it carries sophisticated programs of music, news, and propaganda in both the Thai and Meo languages.

I have heard the question asked repeatedly how so much opium could be coming through Thailand if the Thais were really trying to stop it. While there is a lot of room for improvement in Thailand, I think the basic answer to this question is given by the fact that the powerful United States of America, with the largest, the best-trained and the best-equipped customs agency and drug repression agency in the world, is able to intercept no more than 15 percent to 20 percent of the drugs coming into this country.

In Saigon, before I left for Thailand, an earnest young newspaperman came to see and said that he was convinced that so much

opium could not be entering Thailand from Burma without the complicity of the customs authorities at the border. There are only four customs posts on the Burma border and there are literally hundreds, if not thousands of jungle trails. The smugglers don't have to pay bribes to get by customs; there is a simpler, easier, and cheaper way of getting their stuff into Thailand. Once they get into Thailand, to avoid ambushes by the Royal Thai Army, they traverse a network of trails along remote mountain ridges, traveling mostly at night and rarely following the same route on any two trips.

In Thailand, as in other countries, I asked the BNDD representatives whether they were able to share drug intelligence with their counterparts and whether the Thai authorities took action on the information they were given. They told me that the Thai authorities had never violated a confidence, that BNDD did share their intelligence with them, and that the Thais did follow through vigorously whenever they were given a lead.

I also asked about the charges of corruption in high places. I was assured categorically by the American drug control officials that they have absolutely no information pointing to the involvement of anybody in the Thai Government at the policymaking level.

Any government can be made to look bad if one focuses only on the failures and weaknesses and on unfounded allegations against that government; but I believe every government is entitled to credit for its record of positive accomplishments; and after my visit to Thailand, I am convinced that some of the accounts that have appeared in our media have failed to give the Royal Thai Government credit for all that it has done, especially over the last year, to help bring the flow of drugs under control on a national and international scale.

I have already mentioned Thailand's agreement with the United Nations. Thailand was also the first nation to enter into an agreement with the U.N. Committee for Drug Abuse Control, and together they are now engaged in a pioneering international project aimed at the suppression of opium cultivation through education and crop substitution.

The memorandum of understanding of last September between the Thai Government and the United States Government was the first document in which two countries jointly committed themselves to an all-out battle against the international drug traffic.

In April-May of this year, the Royal Thai Government, with United States technical and logistical assistance, created a special mobile enforcement unit designed to interdict narcotics in the north. This operation now has five offices in northern Thailand.

During the first week of June, acting on its own intelligence, it struck a major blow against the drug traffickers with the seizure of 1,600 kilos of opium concealed in the wells of tank trucks, as well as a large amount of chemicals used in the manufacture of heroin. I have some pictures here showing trucks and opium seized in Lampon. It is a regular oil tanker truck in which they found the stuff. There is the material, 2 tons of it, that they captured.

The Thai police officials took me to see the tank trucks and the seized bales of opium. It was an awesome thought to realize that when this stuff is converted into heroin, the amount seized would be worth some \$60 million here in the United States on the streets of New York, and that literally thousands of human lives could be destroyed or wasted as a result of this drug.

Following up on the seizure in northern Thailand, the largest opium seizure made until that time in Thailand, Bangkok police several days later seized the first No. 4 heroin laboratory discovered in the city. There had

been many other seizures, large and small of heroin and opium prior to my arrival in Thailand.

Two weeks ago the papers carried the news that the Thai authorities had seized another 2.5 tons of opium and another No. 4 heroin laboratory.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does that mean: No. 4 heroin laboratory?

General WALT. That is the pure—that is the white stuff and the most difficult to make.

One of the greatest problems the Royal Thai Government had to contend with involved the activities of the Chinese Irregular Forces—CIF—along the northern Thai frontier. It had been common knowledge for years that these forces were heavily involved in the flow of opium. The Royal Thai Government in March of this year moved to resolve this problem by granting resident status and resettlement assistance to the several thousand members of the CIF in Thailand in return for their promise to get out of the opium business completely and turn over their stocks of opium.

Now, these CIF forces—Chinese Irregular Forces—sir, came out of Mainland China at the time of the Communist takeover there, and they have been without a home and without any place they could call a home. And so the Thais took advantage of this and they offered them a home and they gave them land—if they, in turn, would turn over to the Thai government the opium that they had on hand, and would get out of the opium growing business. This was a businesslike deal.

The resident status was a particularly precious item of exchange for the CIF because they had up until then been suspended in a condition of statelessness. The resettlement assistance included the grant of a tract of land away from the Burmese border, an agreement to build essential structures and roads, the provision of livestock and equipment, plus cash aid over a period of several years until the settlement became self-supporting. All told, the Thai government committed itself to some \$1 million in assistance.

The CIF, on conclusion of this agreement, turned over to the Thai government 26,245 kilograms, or 26 tons of opium, which was publicly burned on March 7 of this year. For some reason this event received virtually no mention in the American press despite the fascinating history of this political-economic swap and despite the staggering amount of opium involved. At the current street price of \$390,000 per kilo, this amount of opium, converted into heroin, would be worth approximately \$3 billion. The amount of heroin equivalent which the Thai government negotiated off the world market in this transaction was far greater than the total amount of heroin seized by all the free world's enforcement agencies over the previous 12 months.

The news blackout of this incident is something that defies comprehension. I have had the Library of Congress research the matter and they tell me that they have been unable to find any article about the incident in 10 or 12 major newspapers which they checked.

Mr. Chairman, recently some question was raised about whether the 26 tons of opium burned actually was 26 tons of opium. I have here a few photographs I would like to show you of the preparation for the opium burn and of the actual burning.

This is the preparation for the burning. You will note the opium is on top and under the opium are piles of logs that are going to be used as fuel for the burning process. This shows the entire lot piled out on the vacant area where the burning is going to take place. This is a picture of the actual burning. There is nothing left there but the charred logs.

Mr. Ingersoll is going to elaborate on this in a few minutes.

I would like now to ask, Mr. Chairman, that my testimony be interrupted so that you can take the testimony of Mr. John Ingersoll, the director of BNDD; Mr. William Wanzeck, until recently director of the BNDD bureau in Bangkok; and Mr. Joseph Koles, forensic chemist for the BNDD, on the steps they took to make certain that the 26 tons of opium that were burned was really opium and that they were not burning hay or something else. I respectfully suggest that these three witnesses be called to the stand in a group.

EXCERPTS FROM GENERAL WALT'S TESTIMONY ON THE WORLD DRUG TRAFFIC BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1972

I have prepared this special map of Southeast Asia, including Burma, because I wish to enlarge on my initial presentation.

Fact No. 1 that emerges from this map is that in Laos the communists occupy some 80 to 90 percent of the opium growing areas. The diagonal lines indicate the areas under communist occupation, and the heavy black boot-shaped line indicates the major opium producing area. Obviously, the Meo tribesmen who now produce their opium under communist control aren't "eating" it all.

Fact No. 2 which emerges from the map, is that the communist-led guerrillas in Thailand are in effective control of an important stretch of opium producing land along the Laotian frontier. The diagonal shading on the Thai side of the frontier indicates the area under communist control.

In both Thailand and Laos, the villages where the opium is grown are controlled by communist manager-cadres, trained in Peking and Hanoi. Both movements are armed to a large degree with Chinese weapons, and both have their major radio propaganda operations based on Chinese territory. The money which they make from selling opium is used to support their respective insurgencies.

A highly interesting feature of the current political situation in southeast Asia is this road, marked with a double line, which 25,000 Chinese communists have been building across northern Laos in the direction of the Thai frontier. Eight meters wide and hard-surfaced, the road is now only 50 miles away from that portion of the Thai frontier where pro-Peking guerrillas are already in control. The road is reported to be very heavily protected by radar and anti-aircraft batteries.

The Communists component also plays a vital role in the Burma drug situation. Burma, as I pointed out in my previous testimony, is the single most important factor in the southeast Asia drug situation. This is where most of the opium is grown, it is where most of the refineries and traffickers are concentrated, and it is the ultimate source of most of the morphine base and heroin, as well as raw opium, that comes out of southeast Asia. The Burmese government is unhappy about the situation, but there are several major insurgencies in the area which prevent it from exercising any effective control.

Most of the opium in Burma is grown in the Shan state, which you see here. Some is also grown in the Kachin state to the north. Both the Shan tribesmen and the Kachin tribesmen have been in a state of insurgency against the Rangoon government ever since Burma became independent. But by far the most serious insurgency in the area is the white flag communist insurgency, which is under the immediate control of the Burmese Communist Party and of Peking. Here again, it is Peking which has armed the insurgents and trained their leaders, and which supports them with a China-based radio operation.

Over the past year, the white flag communist insurgency has grown to the point where it absorbs probably 80 percent of the total

counter-insurgency energies of the Rangoon government, in northern Burma.

The Shan and the White Flag Communist insurgencies overlap each other. The heartland of the Shan insurgent movement is shown on this map in the area surrounded by a wavy line. The White Flag Communists are in pretty solid control of the area east of the Salween River, marked in lighter shading.

All of the armed groups in Burma, pro-Communist and anti-Communist, have been involved in the drug trade. This goes for the Shan and the Kachin insurgents; for the anti-Communist KKY or Burmese self-defense force, and for the Chinese irregular forces; and for both the White Flag Communists and the Red Flag Communists, a smaller group which is supposed to be under Trotskyist influence. Opium is the nearest thing these groups possess to gold—and they have all used it with abandon to purchase arms and support their activities.

The situation has been marked by a strange division of labor and by some highly enterprising, if unprincipled, accommodations between the rival factions. The KKY and the CIF are the dominant forces in the Thai-Laotian border area. Both of these forces have been heavily involved in the transport and smuggling of opium, and the KKY has also been heavily involved in the refinery operation. On the other hand, most of the opium in Burma, as I have pointed out, is grown by Shan tribesmen, under the control of the Shan states army or under the control of the Communists.

The shaded area which the communists control east of the Salween River is reputed to be the most fertile opium producing territory in the whole of Burma and is credited with some 25 percent of Burma's total production. Burma's production is estimated at some 400 tons a year, but the tribesmen use most of it for themselves, exporting only some 100 to 150 tons. Because it produces the largest surplus of any area in Burma, the territory under communist control may be responsible for as much as 40 to 50 percent of Burma's entire opium export.

How does the opium get from the areas where it is grown to the Thailand-Laos border? Obviously, it has to change hands in order to do so: It has to get from the Shan insurgents and from the white flag communist Shans into the hands of their hated enemies, the KKY and the CIF. To permit the consummation of these mutually profitable transactions, clearly, hostilities must be temporarily suspended by both sides. The town of Lashio—shown here on the map—is the principal exchange point, where the producers deliver their opium and where the caravans form up to move the opium south to the tri-border area.

In view of the fact that Peking mothered the white flag communist movement and that it still controls them, it cannot escape moral responsibility for their role as prime producers in the Burma opium traffic. Moreover, the act of this insurgency places the Burmese government in the invidious position of not being able to enforce its own laws in the area, and of having to tolerate opium trafficking by the regional military forces which oppose the communists.

This is a situation which calls for some plain talk—all the more so because China has now been brought into the world community of Nations.

WHAT SENSE TO THE VIETNAM WAR?

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, another monsoon season will soon be over in Vietnam.

But the tragedy of the war goes on. Indochina has been turned into a grim and sordid theater of the absurd, where

Drug file

Instead of being used as whipping boys by pacifists they should receive the thanks of a grateful country not only for their qualities of obedience and sacrifice but also for one of the most amazing achievements in all wartime. This achievement has been the maintenance of generally good troop morale in the kind of action they have had to fight in Vietnam.

Not the least of Lavelle's aims is that his conduct has given the antiwar careerists another stick with which to beat the whole concept of collective security in this world. To be sure, it is not much of a stick. But, then, they don't need much of a stick.

POSITION PAPER OF SENATOR MCGOVERN ON SOUTHEAST ASIA NARCOTICS TRAFFIC

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, last week at a State Department conference the President reviewed the activities of his administration in the fight against drug addiction, and especially against the international traffic in narcotics. He asserted once again that great progress had been made, and he restated his determination to win the battle.

The Senator from South Dakota, as the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, has issued a detailed indictment of the administration's effort to control the international narcotics traffic. He presented facts and figures in support of his view that these efforts fall far short of the full-scale attack proclaimed by the President. The position paper presented by the Senator from South Dakota reflects a great deal of careful research. Administration sources have characterized it as naive, but they have not yet denied any of its substance. In spite of any differences, however, he has set forth certain truths which no one can deny; namely, that American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia is a major factor in the problem of drug addiction here at home; and that Southeast Asia will be the source of a larger and larger share of the heroin traffic as long as our involvement in that area continues.

In his statement on Monday the President laid great emphasis on his progress in inducing other governments to agree to intensifying their efforts to stamp out the traffic in heroin. Holding up the stick as well as the carrot, he promised to use his authority to cut off military and economic aid to any country whose leaders participate in or condone activities that contribute to our drug problem.

Mr. President, these are persuasive words. Unfortunately, they hide the grim reality known to any one who has examined the situation in Southeast Asia. With American prodding and the help of American dollars the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand have enacted punitive legislation and added narcotics personnel to their police forces. They have made some arrests and destroyed some opium. Yet, no one serious believes that these nations are fully committed to the task.

These are societies that have traditionally tolerated both opium and official corruption. The infusion of large quantities of American dollars and men has certainly not reduced that tolerance. High officials in all three nations have

been accused of personal involvement or complicity in the drug traffic, and whether or not the charges are justified in any specific instance, it is obvious that individual officials have been and are now involved.

It is also obvious that these governments either cannot or will not control the heavy flow of opium and heroin right in their own capitals. Any American serviceman in Saigon knows where he can buy drugs quickly and cheaply. In Bangkok heroin abuse among the 1,500 military and civilian dependents in the American secondary school has reached epidemic levels. Officials now estimate that as many as 30 percent of these American youngsters are involved in heroin abuse. High grade heroin is available on the streets of Bangkok at 50 cents a fix.

In spite of these grim facts, the President could not possibly cut off military and economic aid to Thailand or South Vietnam as long as he continues the military action against North Vietnam in defense of the Thieu regime in the South. Even as American ground forces are being withdrawn from South Vietnam, economic and military aid to that nation becomes all the more essential to the President's policy. And as our ground forces are reduced, Thailand become increasingly vital as the launching pad for our air attacks.

Thus, these nations can rest assured that the threat issued by the President on Monday could not have been meant for them. They may go through the motions of enacting and enforcing laws against the opium trade if the United States insists. Indeed, there are undoubtedly some officials in these nations who are sincerely convinced of the evil nature of this trade. But in the final analysis they know there will be no penalty for negligence as long as the American military effort continues.

Mr. President, when I consider how many thousands of young Americans have encountered the living death of heroin addiction, and how many more are threatened each day, and I know that thousands could be saved if we were to leave Southeast Asia, I can see no possible offsetting gain for this Nation in pursuing the war further.

In the hope that they will contribute to greater public understanding of the cost of this war, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the position paper of the Senator from South Dakota and the comments of Mr. John Finlator, former Deputy Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF JOHN FINLATOR, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

I have read the position paper of Senator McGovern concerning the Southeast Asia narcotics traffic and I support the major allegations that Senator McGovern has made. Increasingly the American heroin market is being supplied from the Golden Triangle region of Laos, Burma, and Thailand. Southeast Asia clearly has the potential to replace Turkey as the major supplier

of heroin to the illicit market places of this country. We are at present in the midst of a dramatic changeover. Although the seizures of heroin from Southeast Asia are smaller than those from Europe, the incidence of seizures are growing at an alarming rate.

The failure of the present administration to stop the flow of heroin to this country as well as to make inroads in the demand side of our society, is clear evidence that we do not have a total commitment to what the President calls the number one domestic priority of his administration.

President Nixon's programs have been fragmented and ineffective with the only visibility being a reorganization or shuffling around of responsibilities from time to time: a new prevention office in the White House, a new, confusing enforcement in Justice to chase the street addict-pushers, another new office in Justice to gather drug intelligence, all with high sounding titles and high salaries which outstrip those of the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Commissioner of Customs.

We are making only a small dent in the amount of drugs coming into this country. It will remain thus until we reach that plateau of total commitment. It is just not there. We need stronger efforts than those we presently espouse in the areas of treatment, rehabilitation, education, prevention, research, and enforcement. Senator McGovern has spoken out on these subjects and I trust he will speak of them again.

We are in worse shape in the war against drug abuse today than on the day the present Administration took office. This lack of success may not be placed entirely on the desk of any one group or administration but Senator McGovern offers a hope of a stronger commitment than any we have seen thus far.

If, indeed, the problems of narcotics trafficking and addiction is our number one priority, its solution will require the bringing together of a massive amount of the brainpower, manpower, and resources of this country. In this we have failed and instead have putted around the problem in fragmented, piecemeal manner. If the problem is not one of a high priority, then we have not done so badly.

Hopefully, Senator McGovern is going to give us more insight into an outstanding beginning.

John Finlator was with BNDD from its inception in April, 1968. He became deputy director in 1969 and retired on January 1, 1972. He was the first director of the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control when it was created in February, 1966. He has been in government since 1936.

He is presently writing a book on the domestic and international narcotics traffic which will be published by Simon and Schuster.

CURBING THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFIC

The crime problem in our country has never been as serious as it is today. We all know this from our own experience, and we can see it in the deserted streets and parks. The FBI crime statistics confirm what we all know to be true. They show a 33% crime increase since 1963.

The greatest single cause of our high crime rates is the need of heroin addicts to commit muggings and burglaries to finance their habits.

The heroin refined from the seemingly innocent opium poppy is responsible each year for thousands of drug-related deaths and millions of drug-related crimes. The lives of more than half a million Americans are stunted by dependence on this drug.

Heroin addiction alone is more than sufficient to account for all of the 5.5 million robberies, burglaries, and thefts reported to

It is important for us to understand that until this rule came along, American fighting men were able to attack enemy aircraft and attempt to destroy them wherever they happened to be, whether in the air or on a runway.

Another rule in effect said that in North Vietnam, trucks driving on a highway could not be fired upon unless they show hostile intentions toward our fighting men. I suggest that my colleagues think about that one and try and figure out what it means.

Perhaps the rule which has received the most attention and which the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt had been violated involved an enemy radar site high on a mountain range overlooking Laos. The radar site in question provided group control intercept to the Mig fighter planes which could come over low, attack our helicopters as they were doing rescue work, and attack our tactical aircraft. Because it is impossible for a radar to show hostile intentions, as such, it was very difficult for our men to make a decision whether the target should be destroyed. It is my personal belief that a radar site shows hostile intentions merely by existing in a location of strategic importance to the enemy. It exists only for purposes which mean the loss of aircraft and men to us.

This of course was the target which General Lavelle and General Abrams finally agreed should come under the rules and be attacked. As we all know, they were later rapidly corrected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their decision.

Mr. President, I mention these rules as background for our understanding of the case involving General Lavelle. What he did was make a decision—and he made it alone—that any of our aircraft flying over Northern Laos would be constantly engaged by groundfire, whether the fire was observed or not. And under this interpretation of the rule, he issued verbal orders that all weapons and ammunition would be expended during each reconnaissance flight and that a returning pilot, when being debriefed by the intelligence group, would report that enemy action had been taken and that he had retaliated.

Now that is the case involving General Lavelle. Let us take a look at the size of it. During the period of time in question, roughly from November 1971 to March 1972, as many as 40,000 sorties may have been flown. We are not able to get the exact number but estimates place it between 25,000 and 40,000 sorties. But the number of cases involving falsified reports is something like 20 or 30. Thus, despite what some members of the communications media have tried to make out of this violation, I believe any fair observer would have to admit that, even though General Lavelle was wrong, we are not talking about a massive number of illegal strikes. I do not give this as an excuse for General Lavelle, because it is my feeling that if only one out of 40,000 had been performed illegally and followed by a falsified report it would be sufficient to condemn the general's action. What I am saying is that the inci-

dent does not add up to an enormous and continuous disregard for the general rule in question.

I know that some Members of the Senate might ask why have not other officers involved been punished. I would remind them that the first thing a man learns in the military is the discipline of command and the absolute necessity of obeying command orders. If suddenly, in the military structure, officers junior to the men in command began to refuse orders or to question orders, the result would be utter and complete chaos. Now I will admit that there are ways a junior officer can express his dissatisfaction—he can ask for written orders and he can write a paper outlining his disagreement with those orders which can be placed in a proper file should anything ever come of the incident. This was not done in any of these cases. As General Slay explained, when he was ordered as operations officer of the 7th Air Force, to do the things that General Lavelle wanted done he naturally assumed that General Lavelle had permission from people senior to him. So General Slay obeyed the orders, as did the commanders under him, the pilots and everyone connected with the procedures. Perhaps well over 200 people knew what was going on but it was not until Sergeant Franks, a very trustworthy and valued member of the Air Force enlisted personnel decided that he could no longer do these things, because he felt it was against his Christian training. As we all know, he wrote a letter to Senator HUGHES explaining his feelings and Senator HUGHES very correctly contacted Chairman STENNIS of the Armed Services Committee and the hearings in the Lavelle case were set up.

Mr. President, although a full report will be made available to the Senate at some future date, I think it is safe for me to report here that no one other than General Lavelle is responsible for what occurred. I say this knowing full well that some segments of the communications media had intimated that other officers of higher rank participated in the decision.

The whole episode to me has been most unfortunate. It is unfortunate that a fine career officer like General Lavelle made the mistake that he did, even though I can see how he might feel in his own mind that he was justified. And, of course, the episode has not put the Air Force in a good light because the question repeatedly asked is why could it not have been detected. Let me just say that I think that if my colleagues could have sat through all the hearings they would begin to realize the impossibility of that happening. The question arises as to whether we can prevent similar incidents from happening in the future. My answer is that as long as human nature exists and men can do right or wrong there is no way that we can absolutely prevent future occurrences.

I would suggest, however, that in any future war in which we may become engaged that we try not to write rules of engagement that will hamper our chances of victory. I think I can say without any fear of contradiction that

had the rules of engagement not existed this war could have been won a long time ago and a great many American men would not have died.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "The Lavelle Episode," written by William S. White, and published in the Washington Post of September 23, 1972.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE LAVELLE EPISODE

(By William S. White)

The case of one Air Force general who exceeded his bombing authority in Vietnam has now turned out to be just that—the case of one Air Force general who exceeded . . . et cetera, et cetera.

There is, in short, no evidence of some conspiracy within "the higher brass" to escalate the war, or to challenge in any way the constitutional supremacy of the civilian authority. Particularly, there is no valid showing that the military superiors of the now disciplined and retired Gen. John Lavelle were slyly or otherwise egging him on to hit unauthorized targets in Vietnam.

Professionally "antiwar" people inside and outside the Senate for weeks have used the Lavelle episode, which is deplorable enough in its real nature but not one-tenth so deplorable as it has been made out by them to be, for carom shots all over the place. They have hit the war itself, the military in general, and, of course, that obviously evil thing called the Pentagon.

Their intermediate target has been Gen. Creighton Abrams, who succeeded as top commander in Vietnam upon the retirement of Gen. William Westmoreland. Abrams is now under nomination by the President to be Army Chief of Staff.

It appears plain that having been well and truly cut up symbolically by the new isolationists and new pacifists he will at length be confirmed by the Senate. From the outset of the Lavelle affair the "antiwar" zealots had characteristically followed the Gilbert and Sullivan dictum of verdict first—evidence later. But even they are at last reluctantly acknowledging that Gen Abrams (as also the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas Moorer) was innocent of Lavelle's transgressions.

If it seems a pity nevertheless that Abrams had to go through all this in order to be allowed to begin to round out the last phase of a distinguished military career, then so it is. It is a great pity, indeed. For the critics of the Vietnam command, first in Westmoreland's and then in Abrams' charge, for years have not been able to grasp one fairly obvious point. This is that the uniformed commander of Vietnam never made the war and never voted—as many of them in fact had done—for the policies that created and sustained it.

The commander's job has been solely to carry out the orders of three American Presidents, orders always harsh with difficulty and sometimes heartbreakingly so. Sometimes, indeed, diplomatic concerns at the civilian level have required the general on the spot to see the enemy run pretty well free while his own troops and air power were fettered by directions from Washington. This restraint has been right and proper; but it has not been easy.

That two successive representatives of the dreadful "brass"—Westmoreland and Abrams—have with massive fidelity and military self-sacrifice been obedient at every turn to civilian direction should speak more than sufficiently for their ingrained respect for the constitutional supremacy of the civil authority.

the FBI last year. American heroin addicts each year spend more than five billion dollars on their drugs, making the illegal heroin traffic one of America's largest industries. Although not all crimes are reported to the FBI, this five billion dollars is three times the entire \$1.5 billion price tag of the 5.5 million property crimes reported to the FBI last year.

A recent survey of New York City jails indicated that more than half of those arrested use heroin. In large cities generally, one third or more of muggings and burglaries are committed by heroin addicts. Some criminal court judges find that 75% of their cases involve individuals with a history of drug abuse. No wonder crime has been called "the heroin tax." With addicts spending at least five billion dollars a year on their habits, the heroin tax has a price tag of \$100 a year for every family of four.

The addict is a victim, too. The addict's life becomes a constant search for the drug. Addiction consumes and destroys him. Seeking to escape from pain, boredom, or misery, the addict is caught in the narrowing trap of an artificial euphoria. And heroin is a major killer as well. Addiction is the greatest single cause of death in New York City for people between the ages of 15 and 35.

Furthermore, heroin addiction helps finance the growth of organized crime. It is estimated that organized crime gains profits of nearly a billion dollars a year from narcotics trafficking. These revenues can then be invested in other criminal enterprises.

For the addict and for our whole society, nothing could contribute more to improving the quality of life than an end to heroin addiction.

NIXON'S PROMISE—AND PERFORMANCE

Speaking in September, 1968 about the rising heroin problem, candidate Richard Nixon proclaimed: "We need action on the part of the nation's highest officials—that is what this crisis calls for and that is what I pledge the day after we take office in January."

After thirty months of his "action" to deal with the "crisis", Richard Nixon had to acknowledge his dismal failure and admit that the problem was still growing. "Heroin," he said on June 17, 1971, "is a fact of life and a cause of death for an increasing number of Americans." That same day, he submitted to Congress a drug bill which declared: "Drug abuse is rapidly increasing in the United States and now afflicts urban, suburban, and rural areas of this nation."

As the last quote indicates, under the three and a half years of the Nixon Administration, heroin addiction has spread rapidly throughout all segments of the population.

Suburban high schools have discovered heroin problems where there were none before. A recent study found that *one and a half million Americans between the ages of twelve and eighteen have used heroin.* This is one American youth in seventeen.

Until recently, heroin was an urban problem centered in New York City. But the Attorney General of Iowa said last year: "It is still inconceivable to most Iowans that heroin addiction *could* be a serious problem here. But the alarming fact is that heroin addiction has made a formidable inroad in Iowa."

Pointing up the failures of the Nixon years, John Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, said in February: "At the end of 1969, our statisticians, employing proven statistical methods, estimated the actual number (of heroin addicts) to be 215,000 with a margin of error not likely to exceed plus or minus 16%. At the close of 1971, we believe the number to be almost 560,000."

Ingersoll's estimate of a 77% increase in two years is the most sophisticated estimate that has been made. Other indicators tell a similar story.

In 1966, 1,449 young men were rejected for the draft because of heroin use. In 1970, fewer young men were examined—but 50% more were rejected.

In 1969, 1,013 drug related deaths were reported in New York City. In 1971, over 1,300 were reported. Substantial increases were reported in city after city. The increases were from 72 to 139 in Baltimore; from 202 to 310 in Chicago; from 65 to 199 in Detroit; from 135 to 180 in San Francisco; and from 24 to 83 in the District of Columbia.

These facts reflect the failure of the Nixon Administration to stop the spread of heroin addiction in the United States. They explain why Richard Nixon had to admit in his drug bill last year that "drug abuse is rapidly increasing in the United States." *One American in 400 is now a heroin addict.*

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Solving the heroin problem is an exceptionally complex matter. Crucial steps must be taken in many areas. We must increase efforts to cure individual addicts, to resolve underlying social problems, to break up the organized syndicates that purchase, refine, smuggle, distribute, and sell heroin, and to prevent the illicit production of opium.

Each of these efforts is difficult. There is no assurance that any of them will succeed. But we owe it to ourselves and to the many victims of heroin addiction to pursue every possible approach to ending the scourge of heroin addiction.

The Nixon record is vulnerable on every front. What I wish to examine in this presentation, however, is the record of the Administration in one critical area—the international heroin trade. What has President Nixon pledged; and what has he accomplished, in halting the flow of heroin from remote corners of the world into our streets and schools?

THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRADE

In September, 1968, candidate Richard Nixon declared: "We must move against the source of those drugs. In doing so we must seek out the cooperation of friendly nations which have been made conduits for these drugs. . . . A new Administration will accelerate the development of tools and weapons to detect narcotics in transit."

On June 17, 1971, he reaffirmed that conviction. "Domestic enforcement alone," he said, "cannot do the job. If we are to stop the flow of narcotics into the lifeblood of this country I believe we must stop it at the source."

Nixon not only has made this commitment; he has even claimed success. He claimed on July 9, 1971 that "we are dealing very effectively with the problem at its source."

Despite Nixon's claim, an increasing amount of heroin is being smuggled into this country.

On June 27, 1972, BNDD Director John Ingersoll estimated that heroin is being smuggled into the U.S. at the rate of 6½ to 10 tons a year. A year ago his estimate was 5 to 6 tons.

In September, 1970, Ingersoll said: "Every time one addict is cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of heroin available."

A year ago Richard Nixon triumphantly announced that—continuing a policy begun under the previous Administration—opium production was being phased out in Turkey. He reminded us that Turkey has in the past accounted for 80% of heroin smuggled into the United States.

Yet recently the Administration has been hinting that stopping opium production—dealing with the problem at the source, in Nixon's phrase—is not the answer at all.

There are some questions that Americans should be asking.

If opium production in Turkey is being

phased out, how can heroin importation—and addiction—be increasing?

After years of emphasizing the importance of meeting the problem at the source—and claiming success—why is the Administration backing away from emphasis in this approach?

And why is it that the drug problem is worse than ever, four years after Richard Nixon called it a crisis and demanded immediate action?

THE SOUTHEAST ASIA HEROIN TRADE

The answer is that more and more of the heroin entering the United States originates in Southeast Asia. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimates that more than half of the world's illicit supply of opium, the raw material for heroin, is grown in the "Golden Triangle" region where the borders of Thailand, Burma, and Laos converge. One year's crop of 700 to 1000 tons can be refined into enough heroin to supply America's addicts for ten years. More and more of this heroin is reaching the American market.

Southeast Asia has been a major producer of opium and has had opium addiction problems of its own for a long time. But only in late 1969 did the white, pure No. 4 heroin that is used by American addicts begin to be produced in Southeast Asia. When it appeared, it appeared in earnest. John Ingersoll says: "Our first indications of the presence of (No. 4) heroin in Southeast Asia came in December of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned into a stream, and in 1971, the stream turned into a torrent of heroin pouring out of the Golden Triangle."

Since there was no indigenous demand for No. 4 heroin anywhere in Southeast Asia, its appearance signified an intention to supply the U.S. market. The first victims were our GIs in Vietnam. Possibly 100,000 GIs became heroin addicts in Vietnam during 1970 and 1971. Now that many of our GIs have come home and the market for No. 4 heroin has diminished in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian heroin is being marketed in our country.

Our inability to prevent this has been a consequence of our priorities. The top and really only priority of our government in Southeast Asia has been to fight the war. The political and military priorities of the war have relegated other problems to distant back burners. The U.S. has always tolerated corruption on the part of our Southeast Asian allies as long as they fight the war and follow our policies. Black marketeering, stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation, and smuggling are tolerated, and all are rampant. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated any differently.

Opium was being grown, smoked, and smuggled in Southeast Asia when the U.S. first became involved in the region during the 1950s and 1960s. But the opium traffic was viewed as a minor local problem and ignored. The U.S. built up a vast military and political apparatus in Indochina to fight the war. We ignored the fact that virtually every link in that apparatus was simultaneously becoming part of a vast opium producing, refining, and smuggling apparatus which today is well on its way to replacing Turkey as the major source of heroin entering the United States.

Here are some of the broad outlines of the Southeast Asia opium and heroin trade as it has developed:

In Laos, opium is grown by the Meo tribesmen we organized into General Van Pao's "secret army"; in fact, once the U.S. began providing them with liberal food supplies to assure their allegiance, many of them were able to switch to opium as virtually their only crop.

In Burma, opium is grown by the Shan rebels, the biggest opium growers in the

world. They are armed with American weapons and are able to thwart central government control. Their weapons were provided by the CIA or were acquired by trading opium with government officials in Laos and Thailand for guns supplied by (and stolen from) the U.S. military aid program.

Opium is also grown by hill tribesmen in Thailand.

Opium from Burma is transported into Thailand by remnants of Nationalist Chinese (KMT) forces driven out of China in 1949. These forces are armed with U.S. weapons and have been supported in the past by the CIA. The Thai government now uses them to patrol its rugged northern frontier with Burma and to help suppress the growing insurgency in northern Thailand.

Opium is transported by the Royal Laotian Air Force and the South Vietnamese Air Force, which have been organized, financed, and supplied by the United States, and on local commercial flights as well.

Opium and morphine base (which is refined from opium) are transported from Thai ports in fishing trawlers to clandestine laboratories in Hong Kong. This could not happen without the complicity of the Thai police and customs authorities.

Heroin is refined in laboratories in Thailand, Laos, Burma, and Hong Kong. In the quantity and quality of its output, Hong Kong now rivals the refining capacity of Marseilles.

From Southeast Asia, heroin has been smuggled to the United States via many routes. There have been seizures of heroin sent to the U.S. from Southeast Asia via the military postal system. Southeast Asia heroin has been seized in France on its way to the United States, and Southeast Asian heroin is reaching the United States by way of Latin America. A courier ring was uncovered smuggling Southeast Asian heroin to the U.S. via the Philippines. Another courier ring was uncovered this year operating through Bangkok. An increasing amount of heroin refined from opium grown in Southeast Asia is smuggled to the U.S. by seamen from Hong Kong.

The Nixon Administration ignored the drug problem in Southeast Asia until 1971 when heroin use reached epidemic proportions among our GI's in Southeast Asia. By that time it was too late. The Administration's hands were tied. Our allies in Southeast Asia had developed a vast opium producing, refining, and distributing network while the U.S., with its great power in Southeast Asia, patrolled the air, the land, and the sea, organized armies, created and destroyed governments, promoted intrigue, but ignored the opium trade. Important members of the armed forces and governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are raking in big profits from the drug trade. They are not about to forgo those profits.

The US Army Provost Marshal in South Vietnam, in a 1971 report, stated that the opium trade in South Vietnam is controlled by a four tiered pyramid. At the top "are the powers behind the scenes who can manipulate, foster, protect, and promote the illicit traffic in drugs." "The people comprising this group," the report stated "may be high level, influential political figures, government leaders, or moneyed Chinese members of the criminal syndicates now flourishing in the Cholom sector of the City of Saigon."

The Provost Marshal identified Tran Thien Khoi, chief of South Vietnam's customs fraud repression division and brother of Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, as "a principal in the opium traffic."

General Ngo Dzu, II Corps commander in South Vietnam and a staunch supporter of President Thieu, was identified last year as

a major narcotics trafficker. Thieu promoted him after a whitewash investigation.

General Ouane Rattikone controlled the largest heroin laboratory in Southeast Asia during his tenure as chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army (the only army other than the U.S. Army that is completely financed by the U.S. taxpayer). This laboratory was the major supplier of heroin for U.S. forces in South Vietnam at the peak of the heroin epidemic.

A high-level CIA intelligence report made public by Jack Anderson states, "A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including Generals, Princes, high-level bureaucrats and Province Governors." Another intelligence report states, "Most of the refineries in Laos operate under the protection of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces . . ."

NBC News reported on July 15, 1971 that both President Thieu and Vice-President Ky were financing their election campaigns from the narcotics traffic and labeled President Thieu's chief intelligence adviser, General Dang Van Quang, as "the biggest pusher in South Vietnam." Quang's involvement in the heroin trade has been confirmed by other sources.

The Nixon Administration denied and covered up these facts and stood by helplessly because it cannot crack down on the corrupt governments it is trying to prop up. Meanwhile, our allies in Southeast Asia made millions of dollars peddling heroin to GI's in South Vietnam who were risking their lives trying to defend them.

Today, they are making great profits supplying heroin to addicts in America.

In 1970, the BNDD broke up a Filipino courier ring which had smuggled approximately 1,000 kilograms of Southeast Asian heroin into the United States in the previous year.

That was enough to supply 15% to 20% of the estimated U.S. consumption at the time.

On April 5, 1971, 7.7 kilos of Double U-O Globe brand Laotian heroin (the same brand produced in General Ouane Rattikone's laboratories) were seized in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

On November 11, 1971, 15.5 kilos of the same brand of Laotian heroin were seized in New York City.

The new Laotian Ambassador to France was caught in April, 1971 when he arrived in Paris with 60 kilograms of heroin in his suitcase. That is enough heroin to supply five thousand addicts for a full year.

In January, 1972, U.S. customs inspectors in Honolulu broke up a smuggling system and arrested three couriers body-carrying heroin from Bangkok to buyers in San Francisco and New York.

On April 5, 1972, a seaman was arrested in Miami with 10 kilos of Double U-O Globe brand Laotian heroin and on April 11 another seaman was arrested in New York with another 5 kilos of Southeast Asian heroin.

And on August 23, 1972, the same day that Richard Nixon delivered his acceptance speech, the BNDD announced the seizure of 9 kilograms of Southeast Asian heroin in New York City and the uncovering of a smuggling ring. The BNDD noted that there had been another seizure of Southeast Asian heroin in the same area the month before.

The seizures are only the tip of the iceberg. John Ingersoll of BNDD told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 27 that "we have reason to believe that certain ethnic Chinese criminal elements in America have geared up an operation to take advantage of the heroin availability in Southeast Asia. . . . The evidence points to the establishment of a new pattern which affects places never previously of any significance to the drug traffic. Either as the result of actual

seizures or our intelligence, we believe these shipments have come in through such diverse seaports as Norfolk, Charleston, Miami, New Orleans, Seattle, Vancouver, New York, and the Great Lakes, port of Chicago."

As one Republican Congressman has said, "Vietnam is truly coming home to haunt us. No matter what they say. . . the first wave of this material is already on its way to our children in high school."

It is impossible to be sure just how much Southeast Asian heroin is now entering this country. NBC's estimate in a recent special broadcast was that one third of heroin entering this country now comes from Southeast Asia. A recent report by the Strategic Intelligence Office of BNDD stated, "More of the heroin reaching the U.S. is from this area than conventional knowledge has recognized. A recent study by BNDD chemists, involving 109 traceable heroin samples, revealed 28 (or 25.7 percent) to be of southeast Asian origin."

The percentage of heroin entering this country that comes from Southeast Asia is increasing; the Golden Triangle region of Laos, Burma, and Thailand clearly has the potential of replacing Turkey as this country's major heroin supplier. Whether that potential is realized will depend on how the United States responds to the problem. So far, the U.S. has met this challenge with half-measures and cover-ups.

Nixon Administration officials have heralded their achievements and claimed increasing cooperation with the governments of Southeast Asia. However, independent information from Congress, the news media, and concerned citizens has brought the Administration's credibility into serious question, and recent leaks of secret Administration documents directly contradict their public statements.

Nelson Gross, the State Department's chief narcotics spokesman, told a Congressional inquiry on June 9 that "we feel that during the past year some real progress has been achieved" and that "the governments of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have already joined us in the fight."

This official optimism was flatly contradicted by a Cabinet level report dated February 21, 1972, prepared by officials from the CIA, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. According to *The New York Times* of July 24, the report stated that "there is no prospect . . . under any conditions that can realistically be projected" for stemming the smuggling of narcotics in Southeast Asia.

"Our answer is categorical," Nelson Gross told the Senate. "The governments of Southeast Asia are not engaged in drug trafficking." Secretary of State Rogers claimed in May that the governments in the area are actively cooperating in efforts to curb the drug trade. But the Cabinet level report stated, "The governments in the region are unable and, in some cases, unwilling, to do those things that would have to be done by them if a truly effective effort were to be made. . . . The most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion, and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place."

Nelson Gross insisted that there were only "unsubstantiated allegations" implicating General Ouane Rattikone in the drug trade. However, General Rattikone has acknowledged his complicity, and John Warner, chief of the Intelligence Office of BNDD, has since confirmed Rattikone's complicity.

In July, 1971, a Congressional committee was told that "U.S. military authorities have

provided Ambassador Bunker with hard intelligence that one of the chief traffickers is General Ngo Dzu, the commander of II Corps." The U.S. Embassy permitted the late John Paul Vann, the senior U.S. adviser for II Corps, to respond: "There is no information available to me that in any shape, manner or fashion would substantiate the charges." He also indicated that General Abrams had no such information. General Dzu was then promoted. *The Washington Post* later obtained the secret documents whose existence had been denied and published them in June, 1972.

Nelson Gross denied there was a serious problem. In a letter to the Senate Committee he said: "Southeast Asia is not a major source of heroin on our market" and that "only five percent" and "certainly no more than 10 percent" of heroin used in the U.S. comes from Southeast Asia. But it was pointed out above that a survey of 109 seizures of heroin in this country by BNDD found that 26% came from Southeast Asia.

The Washington Evening Star-Daily News on August 19, 1972 reported on secret intelligence summaries compiled by CIA and BNDD that contain some of the facts that the Administration will not acknowledge in public. The summaries state that "officials of the Royal Thai Army and Customs at the several checkpoints along the road to Bangkok are usually bribed and 'protection' fees prepaid by the smuggling syndicates or by the driver at the checkpoints."

The summaries also clearly explain why the U.S. has been unable to deal effectively with the Southeast Asia drug trade. They state, "priorities related to requirements of the Vietnam war may limit pressures that can be applied". The "war on drugs" has become a casualty of the war in Indochina.

Our political and military commitments to the governments of Southeast Asia have prevented any effective action to stop the narcotics traffic. These commitments are the result of our determination to fight the war in Indochina. We have allied ourselves with corrupt governments that are complicit in the drug trade and this fact is coming home to haunt us.

Ending the war in Vietnam will free us to make the narcotics traffic our number one priority in the region.

Heroin addiction in our country has brought living death to hundreds of thousands of Americans. It is a major force behind our intolerable crime rates. It is fueling the activities of organized crime.

We can no longer tolerate the narcotics traffic and we can no longer support the corrupt governments of Southeast Asia that profit from it.

Our commitment to the war in Indochina is based on a false notion of national security. Since Richard Nixon took office, the United States has spent \$60 billion to fight the war compared to less than \$1 billion to combat the narcotics problem. Can anyone say that the North Vietnamese are a greater threat to our national security than the crime, violence, and internal decay caused by narcotics?

It is time to stop fighting the war in Vietnam and see how we can effectively fight the war on drugs.

KEEPING THE BROKEN PROMISES

What are the prospects for the future?

In order to halt the international narcotics trade it will be necessary for the next Administration to keep the promises that Richard Nixon has broken.

He said on June 18, 1971 that controlling the heroin trade is his first priority in relations with the countries involved.

"I intend," he has said, "to leave no room for other countries to question our commitment to this matter."

Those promises have been broken. Stopping the heroin trade has not been the Adminis-

tration's top priority. In failing to crack down on the Southeast Asia heroin trade, the Administration has left plenty of room for other nations to question our commitment.

There is no way to control the international narcotics trade while winking at one of the major areas of supply. We will simply have to make a top priority effort to control the Southeast Asia narcotics trade. Ending the war will be the key.

In the following specific ways, Richard Nixon's determination to continue the war in Vietnam has prevented him from being able to crack down on the Southeast Asia heroin trade:

(1) He can't cope with the problem without admitting the facts about his corrupt allies in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam who are supplying heroin to the U.S. market. If he admitted these facts, support for the war would dry up overnight. Richard Nixon has therefore chosen to ignore the problem.

(2) Richard Nixon is trying desperately to prop up these weak, corrupt Southeast Asian governments. He does not want to expose scandals which would threaten their fragile existence and lessen their ability to fight the war.

(3) We can never bring the necessary pressures to bear on these governments as long as we need Vietnamese soldiers, Lao mercenaries, and Thai air bases to fight our war.

The best case in point is Thailand. As a major opium grower and the conduit through which Burmese opium is smuggled, Thailand is increasingly the key to controlling the Southeast Asia drug trade.

At the same time, as we increase our reliance on air power, shift troops from South Vietnam to Thailand, and reopen air bases in Thailand, Thailand is becoming increasingly crucial to our war effort.

The war effort is also dependent on Thai mercenaries in Laos and South Vietnam.

As long as the U.S. is relying on mercenaries and air bases that are available only with the approval of the Thai government, obviously there is a limit to how much pressure we can bring to bear on them. The war gives the corrupt Thai government a veto power over American policy. As long as the war continues, we will never be able to pressure the Thai leaders to give up the enormous profits that they are making from the opium trade.

In the following ways; ending the war will facilitate controlling the Southeast Asian heroin trade:

(1) The end of the war will free us to make a crackdown on narcotics the top priority in our relations with the nations of this area.

It will free the President to meet this issue head-on instead of covering it up for political reasons.

(2) Political settlements at the end of the war are likely to lead to the emergence in Laos and South Vietnam of new governments that would be less corrupt and more likely to suppress the opium trade. The people and governments of Laos and South Vietnam are likely to realize that if they are serious about rebuilding their countries, they will have to root out corruption and curb the growing drug problems that are ravaging their societies.

(3) The end of the war would completely turn the tables in Thailand. We would no longer be dependent on the Thai government for the war effort; instead, they would be dependent on our economic aid to bolster their topheavy economy. A threat to cut off aid would give us tremendous leverage.

The Thai government could seal off the Thai-Burmese border, if they were determined to do so. Virtually all of the Burmese opium passes through Thailand. Most of it is carried in large mule caravans by the KMT. Some is carried by Burmese Shan rebels, but the KMT units tightly control the border

and tax every pound of opium that crosses into Thailand. This shows that the border can be controlled. If the opium can be taxed, it can be stopped. But it will require a vigorous effort by the Thai government. The United States must pressure the Thai government to make that effort.

The U.S. House of Representatives has passed an amendment to the foreign aid bill that cuts off aid to Thailand until the President determines that Thailand is cooperating to stop the narcotics traffic. It is a step in the right direction, but it has the drawback of allowing a Presidential determination of cooperation. President Nixon will not cut off aid because he needs these air bases. The Secretary of State claims that Thailand is already "cooperating," and the President already has the power to cut off aid to Thailand but has not used it. The Senate should also pass this amendment, with the provision that restoring aid to Thailand is dependent on *significant achievements* in stopping the narcotics traffic as determined by Congress or by an independent body.

(4) The reason that the government of Burma is unable to stop the opium traffic is that the opium growing areas are controlled by rebel bands armed with American weapons (they obtain those weapons by selling opium to corrupt Thai and Laotian officials). When the war ends and the United States stops sending arms into the area, the flow of arms to the rebels will be disrupted. If corruption in Laos and Thailand were controlled and if the borders were sealed, the Burmese rebels would find it difficult to market their opium or to obtain weapons. With a shortage of weapons and money, the rebels would be weakened and it would be easier for the Burmese government to regain control of the opium growing areas. In the past, the Burmese government has cracked down on the opium traffic when it has been able to.

In addition, ending the Vietnam war and reorienting our foreign policy may improve our relations with Burma and make cooperative efforts more likely.

These points must be placed in the context of a full program to stem the international narcotics trade. Such an effort must include four components. There is nothing mysterious about these recommendations. Some are official Administration policy and all have been discussed and advocated for a long time. But these recommendations are meaningless as long as the war continues and the Southeast Asia narcotics trade continues unchecked.

(1) *Direct Diplomatic Pressure*—The United States should exert maximum pressure on other governments to crack down on the illicit production and smuggling of opium. This effort must be placed at the top of the agenda of our foreign relations. Every possible diplomatic lever, including possible reduction or cessation of foreign aid, must be brought to bear. If necessary, the President should directly take charge of this effort and should personally negotiate with the leaders of other countries.

In this effort, the U.S. must use the carrot as well as the stick. Other countries, too, have an interest in halting the drug trade. They have their own opium and heroin problems. If given a realistic alternative to involvement in the drug trade, foreign countries may well find it in their interest to cooperate in international control efforts.

Unfortunately, the opium trade is an important source of income to hundreds of thousands of farmers around the world, and, in some cases, to entire national economies. Consequently, the United States must be prepared to assist in making sure that realistic alternative sources of income are available. This should include price support payments and, in the long term, investments in the areas affected to help create alternative sources of income.

(2) *International Cooperation*—U.S. action

is needed at once, but the proposed U.S. actions would be more effective if taken by an international organization. The U.S. should attempt to organize the international community to pressure offending nations to clamp down on the narcotics trade. The International Narcotics Control Board should have authority to investigate alleged non-compliance with international obligations in any nation that is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Economic sanctions, including the withholding of international development funds, and possible trade restrictions, should be available as a tool of last resort in the event of persistent failure by any nation to cooperate. An effective program of economic assistance to opium producing areas converting to other crops should be developed under international auspices. So far only a tiny step has been taken in this direction.

(3) *U.S. Agencies*—We should strengthen the U.S. agencies that are responsible for controlling the international narcotics trade. An additional \$40 million should be appropriated for the Customs Bureau and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for hiring and training specialists in drug law enforcement.

A conflict of jurisdictions between BNDD and the Customs Bureau has undermined the effectiveness of Federal control efforts. We cannot expect other nations to take us seriously when we urge cooperation if we are unable to coordinate our own efforts. Yet President Nixon has been unable to gain control over this conflict between two Federal agencies, and the conflict has repeatedly jeopardized important cases. BNDD should be assigned primary responsibility in controlling the international trade, and the President should be prepared to step in personally to ensure that this mandate is carried out.

(4) Finally, increased research efforts can contribute to improving our ability to control the illicit narcotics traffic. The development of cheap, non-addictive synthetic pain-killers could make it possible to completely outlaw opium production throughout the world. If legal crops for medicinal purposes can be marked with practical tracer elements, this would make it much easier to detect opium diverted into the illegal market. And there are even indications that remote sensor devices can be developed that would permit direct detection of heroin shipments. All of these possibilities should be vigorously pursued.

The international law enforcement strategy is clearly not the total solution to the drug addiction problem. A two-pronged approach is needed—rehabilitation of those who are now addicted and law enforcement and education to prevent the spread of heroin addiction. Here are some of the elements of a total approach to drug addiction:

Rehabilitation of Addicts—Any serious assault on the drug addiction problem must include an extensive rehabilitation program. A broad range of treatment facilities—methadone maintenance, therapeutic communities, detoxification, and abstinence—must be available; we must seek to guarantee that any addict seeking treatment can gain access to a suitable modality of treatment. Vocational training and counseling and other supportive services must be available, and we must attempt to eliminate unfair job discrimination against ex-addicts. Today there are waiting lists in our methadone programs; methadone is frequently the only treatment available (although for many addicts, such as young veterans who have been addicted only a short time, methadone may not be suitable); and supportive services are frequently absent. Even if it were possible to suddenly stop the flow of heroin into this country and prevent more people from becoming addicted, there are already more than a half million heroin addicts in our country who need treatment.

Domestic Law Enforcement—Domestic law enforcement efforts must be pursued as an adjunct to the international control effort, to make it as difficult as possible for the heroin traffickers to operate. Law enforcement efforts should be directed not at the street level pushers who are usually addicts themselves but at those who organize, promote, and profiteer from the spread of heroin addiction.

Even if the domestic and international control efforts cannot eliminate the heroin traffic, it is reasonable to hope that they can reduce heroin availability on the street and curtail experimentation and thus help stop the spread of addiction (although confirmed addicts will still do whatever is necessary to obtain the drug).

Drug Education—Like the law enforcement effort, drug education programs that frankly and openly present the facts about various drugs can help discourage experimentation with heroin among youths.

Although President Nixon said in March, 1970 that drug education is the highest priority of his Administration, the drug education budget for fiscal 1972 in the Office of Education was 13 million—one fourth the cost of one C-5A transport.

Other Drugs—International enforcement efforts must not be limited to heroin. Other drugs, including cocaine, methadone, and barbiturates, must be included; they are problems now and could become more serious if heroin becomes scarce. Synthetic drugs equivalent to heroin may also become available. Control efforts must be pursued now before these problems grow.

Underlying Social Problems—Solving basic problems of poverty, alienation, and lack of opportunity will be the key to a long range solution of our drug problems. Until the underlying social causes of drug abuse can be cured, drug abuse cannot be completely eliminated. As long as the belief persists that it is possible to solve problems by taking drugs, it will always be possible that a new drug problem could emerge.

These considerations, however, should not discourage us from making an immediate effort, pursuing every possible avenue, to cure the heroin plague. Heroin overshadows all other drugs in its disastrous impact on our lives. Heroin is responsible for much of the crime, violence, and insecurity that haunt urban life; heroin addiction has destroyed the lives of hundreds of thousands of addicts; and heroin trafficking has fueled the growth of organized crime. Heroin is our worst drug problem and solving it would immensely contribute to improving the quality of our lives.

The effort to solve the heroin problem must cease to be fragmented and haphazard. We must pursue it with the same determination and seriousness of purpose that we invested in the Manhattan Project and the space race.

CONCLUSION

The difficulties in attempting to control the international narcotics trade are obvious. Opium is grown in many countries and total U.S. consumption is small compared to world-wide production. The intention in this presentation is not to propose panaceas or to paper over problems but rather to clarify some of the reasons for past failures and to point the way toward a more realistic effort. International enforcement efforts are not the full answer to the drug problem nor is Southeast Asia the only opium-growing area that could replace Turkey in supplying the U.S. market. But our failure to face up to the problem in Southeast Asia has been one major reason for the failure of the "total war" that Richard Nixon declared on heroin. The next Administration must face up squarely to the fact that Southeast Asia is fast becoming this nation's major heroin supplier.

It would be wrong to see only the problems

that beset the international control effort. There are also some important facts which indicate that an international control strategy will have some reasonable prospect of success. The poppy has a long growing period and is easily detected from the air or by satellite. Poppy cultivation is possible only in certain fairly restricted climates. Cultivating the poppy is exceptionally demanding; few who are not accustomed to that life would be willing to adopt it. Consequently, the international syndicates will not easily be able to persuade farmers elsewhere to cultivate the poppy, if they lose their source of supply in the Golden Triangle.

In the 1950s Iran was able to gain control over remote hill tribes and halt opium production. India and China have had considerable success in controlling the illicit production of opium and preventing diversion into illegal channels. Turkey's recent agreement to terminate opium production—culminating a decade of negotiation and pressure—illustrates what can be achieved, when narcotics control is made a top priority. It is now time to place cracking down on the heroin trade at the top of the agenda in our relations with all of the nations involved. No objective we are pursuing in Vietnam is so important as to justify jeopardizing our efforts to control the heroin trade.

The next President can act to end the war, and crack down on the supply of heroin from Southeast Asia. This is the fight that America should be pursuing.

This is the fight that, as President, I intend to win.

THE EAST LOS ANGELES DOCTORS HOSPITAL

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, October 22, 1972, marks the 10th anniversary of the founding of the East Los Angeles Doctors Hospital. It gives me great pleasure to congratulate this private institution on its 10th anniversary because of the excellent health-care delivery services it has provided to the community. Working together, the hospital and the community have relied upon each other for the advancement of medical services, the development of health care career opportunities for young people, the encouragement of neighborhood beautification, the stimulation of art and design as an adjunct to environmental improvement, and the creation of a treatment and convalescence that not only reduces the apprehension of the patients but also serves to hasten their recovery.

It has been a decade that the East Los Angeles Doctors Hospital has grown from 39 beds to 150 beds. It has been a decade of service to an area in which resides the greatest concentration of Mexican Americans. And, it has been a decade of creative experimentation making a hospital the focus of community service—of integrating medical services with the general elevation of people's expectations and, most important of all, a decade of providing access to health care for thousands of people.

Here is a private institution—a tax-paying institution—a nongovernment funded institution, that has unilaterally developed and implemented community action programs without the need for grants or Federal subsidies.

Here is an institution—East Los Angeles Doctors Hospital—which has created cash prizes, scholarships, and purchase commissions for local Barrio

19 SEP 72

38

Nixon Defends His Record In Combating Drug Trade

By ROBERT B. SEMPLE Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 — President Nixon, in another quick response to charges raised by his Democratic opponent, defended today his record on narcotics control and pledged to cut off aid to any foreign government whose leaders "protect" international drug traffickers.

Appearing before an international narcotics control conference at the State Department this morning, Mr. Nixon told a group of senior officers from United States embassies in 55 countries that his year-old "war" on drugs had shown measurable progress but that "we must do more to win this war and we must do it even more quickly."

Senator George McGovern, the Democratic Presidential nominee, charged yesterday in a statement issued in West Virginia that Mr. Nixon had failed

to "crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam" because the Administration needed "air bases in Thailand, Laos mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."

Name Not Used

In his comments this morning, Mr. Nixon did not mention Mr. McGovern by name. This has become his custom. Mr. Nixon also did not directly respond to the South Dakota Democrat's allegations.

He listed five countries — Laos, Thailand, Turkey, France and Paraguay—where United States officials, working "in partnership" with local authorities, had produced "important breakthroughs," including large heroin seizures and, in the case of Turkey, a decision to eradicate the opium poppy.

In addition, Mr. Nixon asked the embassy officials to convey a "personal message" to the foreign authorities when they returned overseas.

"Any government," he said, "whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to the drug problem should know that the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime. We shall not hesitate to comply with that law where there are any violations."

Mr. Nixon described international drug traffickers as "a menace not just to Americans alone but to all mankind."

"These people are literally the slave traders of our time. They are traffickers in living death. They must be hunted to the end of the earth. They must be left no base in any nation for their operation," he said.

The statutory basis for Mr. Nixon to suspend aid to foreign governments lies in Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. Mr. Nixon has yet to invoke the authority granted him, and despite his threat this morning, there are few officials here who seriously believe that he would order such strong sanctions against the Thais and the Laotians while the war in Vietnam continues.

At the same time, however, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has helped organize and subsidize a task force operating in northern Thailand to intercept opium, morphine base and heroin that flows southward from Burma.

The bureau is now organizing a second such force in Bangkok.

The President's personal response to Mr. McGovern's charge fit the pattern of Mr. Nixon's campaign. Mr. Nixon and his subordinates have greeted nearly every McGovern charge, involving such varied matters as the role of women in government, the plight of flood victims in Pennsylvania and the broader issues of welfare and taxes, with virtually instantaneous rebuttal.

Remarks Taped for Radio

Underscoring the political nature of the argument were three other developments late today. The Committee for the Re-election of the President taped Mr. Nixon's remarks and then made them available to radio stations.

Meanwhile, the McGovern forces seized upon and distributed a statement by a former

member of the Administration, John Finlator, supporting Mr. McGovern's allegations.

Mr. Finlator, who retired last January as deputy director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, said that Mr. Nixon had allowed the "golden triangle" of Laos, Burma and Thailand to be the major supplier of heroin to the illicit market places of this country and charged further that "we are in worse shape in the war against drug abuse today than on the day the present Administration took office."

Mr. McGovern, campaigning in Cincinnati, said that Mr. Nixon's remarks this morning left "decisive questions unanswered."

Charging that the Saigon regime was riddled with drug profiteers, Mr. McGovern challenged the President to invoke the authority of the foreign aid act and impose sanctions on the South Vietnamese Government.

Administration officials do not dispute the fact that the "golden triangle" is now a major source of supply. But they argue that Mr. McGovern's allegations of inaction are out of date, that the Thailand task force has made heavy inroads on drug traffic and that the Central Intelligence Agency, reversing long-standing policy, is now moving aggressively against traffickers in Indochina.

In support of his position, Mr. Nixon also said this morning that Federal antidrug funds had increased elevenfold since 1969, that arrests had doubled in the same period and that a recent sharp increase in heroin prices on the East Coast suggested that "the supply is drying up."

Treaty Change Voted

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 (AP) —The Senate ratified today, 69 to 0, a revision of a 90-nation treaty on narcotics. The change is designed to strengthen international control of drugs.

Under the revision, the International Narcotics Control Board will be directed to limit worldwide production of narcotics to the quantity needed for medical and scientific use and to refer evidence of illicit production and drug trafficking to other nations and to the United Nations General Assembly.

The protocol also provides for international extradition of drug offenders.

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Nixon Warns of Aid Cut To Drug-Dealer Nations

By GARNETT D. HORNER

Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon today warned that he will not hesitate to cut off all American economic and military aid to any government whose leaders participate in or protect the drug traffic.

He also praised the Central Intelligence Agency for its role in fighting international drug traffic and said the agency has been "much aligned."

He said the CIA has "performed superbly" fighting the international drug trade. "In the field of intelligence," he added, "we always find that the failures are those that are publicized. Its successes by definition must always be secret. In this area, there are many successes, and particularly ones of which this agency can be very proud."

Critics of the CIA have charged that the agency has aided drug traffickers in Southeast Asia to help maintain alliances.

He spoke of "fine initial progress" in immobilizing and destroying sources of drugs coming to the United States.

He said, "France, Paraguay, Laos, Thailand and Turkey are just a few examples of the many countries where the work of American officials, from the ambassador down, in partnership with local officials, has produced important breakthroughs — huge heroin seizures, key arrests, or in Turkey's case — the courageous decision to eradicate the opium poppy itself."

The President said he considers keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States "just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States" because the drugs can endanger the lives of young Americans just as much as would an invading army.

Speaking at an international conference on drug control at the State Department, he asked American officials from around the world to confer with foreign officials with whom they deal "this personal message" from me:

See DRUGS, Page A-6

Continued From Page A-1

"Any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug program should know that the President of the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime.

"I shall not hesitate to comply fully and promptly with that statute."

Nixon said he has been "cracking the whip" over government agencies involved in dealing with dangerous drugs

to get them to "quit fighting each other and start fighting the problem."

Citing some results, he said the number of arrests of drug traffickers in the last fiscal year was double the number arrested in 1969, and the seizures of heroin and other illicit drugs are at an all-time high.

"Very sharp increases in the prices of heroin throughout the eastern United States indicate that the supply is drying up and that the pressure is on the criminal drug trade," he said.

Nixon's statements apparently were in response to a statement yesterday by Democratic presidential candidate Sen. George S. McGovern.

McGovern said the number of heroin addicts in the United States had doubled since 1968 and charged that Southeast Asia had become a major source of heroin because the administration would not crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam.

Nixon made no direct reference to McGovern's charges, but his comments appeared to be a sharp counterattack.

The President's praise of the CIA role follows claims and official denials that the agency's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia.

In a book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," that was published recently, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of whether CIA operatives knowingly engaged in such traffic to help maintain alliances.

More specifically, McCoy accused officials in governments of U.S. allies in Southeast Asia—particularly in Saigon—of profiting from the traffic.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

U.S. Is Backbone of Laos Drug Trade

By Jack Anderson

The U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial CIA-run airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountainous Asian land of Laos.

But now, from the files of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, we have evidence that U.S. ground and air equipment — if not U.S. personnel — has formed the backbone of the Laos opium trade.

"Selected Royal Lao Army and Royal Lao Air Force units, utilizing air and ground equipment furnished by the United States, provide the means for protecting, transporting and processing of narcotics," reports one intelligence summary on Laos.

"A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including Generals, Princes, high-level bureaucrats and Province Governors," says the report.

Another document complete with a secret CIA map, reports unequivocally: "Most of the refineries in Laos operate under the protection of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces . . . Some reports suggest that a senior Royal Laotian Armed Forces officer may hold an ownership interest in a few of these facilities."

To end narcotics running by the highset echelons of Laotian society, the documents propose drastic action.

"An important target group will be the Air Force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics.

"Officials high and low who are found to be involved in a substantial way will have to be removed from positions of influence," urges the memo. It recommends curtailment of some aid to Laos.

"This is aimed specifically at eliminating the use of all U.S.-owned aircraft operated by the Royal Laotian Air Force or U.S.-leased aircraft, including U.S. support items, in the transport of narcotics."

In recent months, America's spokesmen claim a new Laotian anti-heroin law is having some effect. But, in fact, only lowly opium hustlers are arrested; the generals and princes go untouched.

Jonah and the Whale

The Federal Reserve Board is supposed to supervise banks, not do their dirty work. But recently the Fed aided the banks in an attempt to take over an entire industry.

The victim of this power play was supposed to be the

armored car and courier industry, a collection of small companies all over the country.

The banks would like to swallow up the industry, and the Fed has been deliberating whether to grant permission.

Unwilling to play Jonah to the banks' whale, the armored car and courier companies are fighting back. As part of their counterattack, one courier firm hired Dun & Bradstreet to survey how good a job the courier companies do.

They decided to survey the Fed's own outlying banks, figuring that if the Fed's own branches liked the courier service, this would be convincing argument that the industry deserved to survive.

Dun & Bradstreet gathered 20 interviews with Fed banks before their bosses in Washington got wind of the survey.

Off went a peremptory telegram. "It appears inappropriate for officials of Federal Reserve banks and branches to express any opinions about courier services," wired Board Secretary Tynan Smith, noting that a Fed decision on the takeover was pending.

To make absolutely sure the courier survey was stymied, Smith added: "Please keep us informed if you are contacted for such information." This so

intimidated the regional Fed officials that two of them, who had already given interviews, tried to withdraw them. Other officials insisted their replies be totally anonymous.

Although the survey was aborted, the courier services did get some use out of it. Based on the incomplete returns, it showed the Fed banks were generally satisfied with the private courier services.

No Spanish Allowed

A top anti-poverty official has scolded subordinates for speaking Spanish at a recent meeting that included Spanish-speaking officials.

"I was appalled," wrote operations chief James Griffith, "to hear a meeting of in-house (anti-poverty) people closed with a statement in Spanish and answered in Spanish. This was absolutely uncalled for and taken as a direct insult by the persons in attendance."

Griffith's rebuke was directed at migrant staff official Pete Merilez. Asked for an explanation, Griffith told us: "We poor gringos who don't speak Spanish sometimes get embarrassed when we hear others speak it. We get the feeling they're speaking behind our backs."

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3 *Jan*

U.S. Fears Increased Flow Of Heroin From New Sources

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Staff Writer

American narcotics specialists are privately expressing concern at the prospect of an increase in the illegal flow of heroin into the United States from South and West Asia as the supply of drugs from other foreign sources dwindles.

Confidential studies prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government bureaus warn that the halt in Turkish opium cultivation may spur international drug traders to tap fresh sources of narcotics in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

Turkey's legal opium production is scheduled to end this year as a result of U.S. subsidies aimed at encouraging Turkish farmers to grow other crops. Most heroin reaching the United States is refined in France from opium of Turkish origin.

The CIA studies, made available to The Washington Post by columnist Jack Anderson, estimate that about half of the total world raw opium supply of 2,500 tons is produced in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iranian output was lumped to 156 tons in 1971 from eight tons in 1969, when Iran legalized opium production.

Until now, little of the opium grown in South and West Asia has served as the raw material for heroin smuggled into the United States. But according to the CIA "the withdrawal of Turkey from the illicit world market" threatens to attract narcotics merchants seeking new sources of supply.

The U.S. government studies calculate that India produces about 200 tons of illegal opium per year. Most of this opium enters a domestic black market serving some 300,000 Indian addicts. So far, the studies say, India has not been a significant narcotics exporter.

The studies caution, however, that India could become a supplier of the U.S. market unless the New Delhi government acts to suppress its internal narcotics trade. Or as one of the reports puts it:

"India is frequently cited in United Nations bodies as a model for controlled opium production and distribution. From the U.S. standpoint, this myth has been detrimental even though India is not a source of U.S. heroin supply.

"Because the myth absolves New Delhi from dealing seriously with its own addiction and traffic, it has been able to strike a pose of moral superiority internationally. This blocks U.S.-Indian cooperation on narcotics matters and diverts India from a potentially useful role in developing effective multilateral pro-

grams in the United Nations, which is a focal point of U.S. policy strategy."

The U.S. report urges that actions be undertaken by the Nixon administration to "expose the existence of India's illicit markets," adding that "the United States might lose some good will in the process of exposure but not on a scale to offset the likely gains."

Turning to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the CIA studies assert that "laxities in law enforcement" in those countries "appear to offer a trafficker easier access to tribal producers" of opium than in other parts of the world.

"According to another classified U.S. government report, Pakistan produces about 175 to 200 tons of illicit opium per year, most of it cultivated in the country's northwest tribal regions.

The report blames the Pakistan government's failures to suppress the drug trade on inefficiency and "official cordialities" that the Pakistan authorities are unwilling to tackle the drug problem because

they fear "a hostile response from the politically sensitive frontier tribal areas."

Recalling that "a number of diplomatic representations" made by the United States to the Pakistan government have had no "apparent effect," the report recommends that the Nixon administration apply "pressures and inducements" including a halt in U.S. aid to persuade the Pakistanis to deal with their drug output.

According to the U.S. studies, Afghanistan produces between 100 and 125 tons of opium a year, cultivated mainly by Pushtun tribesmen in the eastern parts of the country. Most of Afghanistan's narcotics output, a study states, is exported illegally. "Smuggling is a way of life in Afghanistan," it says.

The study further warns that drug networks operating out of Afghanistan are ripe to be taken over by international traffickers because the Afghan authorities take a benign attitude toward narcotics traders.

The U.S. study attributes the continuation of the Afghan narcotics trade to "official corruption" as well as to a lack of interest on the part of the country's authorities.

The report warns against vigorous U.S. actions that might increase Afghan dependence on the Soviet Union. It further concludes: "It is unrealistic to expect Afghanistan, which suffers little from the narcotics problem itself, to give its solution the highest priority in view of the extremely limited human and financial resources of the country."

A CIA memorandum issued on June 9, meanwhile, voices alarm at the growth of opium production and addiction in Iran.

The memorandum stresses that Iran could become a transit area for illegal drugs moving from South Asia toward Western Europe and the United States. Some 170 tons of illicit Afghan and Pakistani opium are currently smuggled into Iran every year. According to the document, an Iranian prince who accompanied Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was recently charged by the Swiss authorities with carrying opium to Geneva.

After a 14-year ban on opium output, the Shah legalized the production of drug in 1969, partly in order to stop a drain on the country's foreign currency reserves through smuggling. His decision was denounced by the United Nations at the time as "tragic" for both Iran and other nations.

Since then, says the CIA memorandum, Iran has registered about 90,000 narcotics addicts. But this represents only one-fourth of the estimated 400,000 drug users in the country.

This year, the memorandum calculates, the demand for opium in Iran will total about 350 tons—roughly two-thirds of which will come from domestic production and the rest from contraband supplies.

The CIA document estimates, however, that Iranian opium production should soon satisfy and even exceed internal needs. At that point, the memorandum warns, the country could become a narcotics exporter and also a drug transit channel.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Sept. 5, 1972 B 11

New Drug Wave Points Westward

By Jack Anderson

President Nixon's herculean effort to stop drug smuggling has at last slowed the flow of heroin from Turkey and Southeast Asia. But a new tidal wave is rising in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.

Even our mideastern ally, Iran, has started to grow its own opium under government control, but the government may not be able to stop illegal shipments from being diverted to America.

This is the warning of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has also reported ominously: "Rumors persist that some members of the royal family and parliament are narcotics users. Swiss authorities recently charged an Iranian Prince, who accompanied the Shah to Switzerland, with having transferred pure opium."

Secret documents from the CIA and other intelligence agencies describe dangerous opium buildups in South Asia. This could be a shot in the arm for the Mafia, whose supplies in Turkey and the Thailand-Laos-Vietnam area are slowly beginning to dry up.

The new smuggling menace was raised by the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence in memos dated June 26 and June 9.

"Whether or not substantial quantities of South Asian opium are diverted to the U.S. and Western Europe will depend, in the final analysis, on

the Western traffickers," reports the CIA.

"Tribal producers in Afghanistan and Pakistan undoubtedly would be willing to sell to Western traffickers . . . The potential for substantial diversions of opium westward exist . . ."

"Luxuries in South Asia would offer a distinct advantage to international traffickers if they should decide to tap the South Asian opium market."

Opium Gum

In Afghanistan production is up. Starving peasants, "lacking adequate food supplies because of recent droughts, have resorted to chewing opium gum to ease hunger pains."

In Pakistan, too, production "may have risen sharply since 1969," says the CIA. In both countries "penalties for narcotics violations are minimal."

The intelligence documents also suggest that the Mafia would have no trouble corrupting officials in both countries.

In Afghanistan, the documents report, "official corruption including high-level protection of narcotics dealers is . . . a problem" and "smuggling is a way of life."

In Pakistan, "official corruption is reported to be a serious problem" among the Land Customs, Sea Customs, provincial police and para-military forces.

Worse, "the existing hashish

network in Afghanistan and Pakistan could be used to send substantial quantities of opium westward," warn the intelligence documents. Afghans already have "professional and sophisticated" means of getting hashish by air to Tehran, Beirut and Frankfurt and by sea to Karachi. Some has reached the U.S.

As for India, the documents say it now produces about three-quarters of the world's legal opium for medical purposes. The widely held view that India is effectively controlling its opium production is a "myth," the documents allege.

Iran still doesn't produce enough legal opium for the country's registered addicts, who receive the drug under a national program. But the opium harvest is increasing.

Meanwhile, allege the documents, "the estimated 100-300 tons currently being smuggled into Iran, that could become available, exceeds the total opium equivalent needed to supply the U.S. market."

Diplomatic Grievances

Diplomats at the State Department have been complaining about undiplomatic treatment from their bosses. This week the squabble among the striped pants set will boil over into a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee.

Chairman Wayne Hays (D-Ohio) is finally yielding to Senate pressure and holding

hearings on a bill to give State Department workers an independent grievance board.

Two present and one former foreign service officers are breaking the gentleman's code of silence and spilling their woes.

One witness is John Hemenway, a conservative diplomat who claims he was fired because he argued with his bosses over U.S. policies in Berlin.

A present foreign service officer, John Harter, who fought and won an appeal against shabby treatment from the department, has told his story in a letter to Hays. Even State's grievance board upheld Harter, urging that he be promoted, given a new job and reimbursed for his lawyers' fees.

The State Department, however, has largely ignored the recommendations which are now eight months old.

While the Hays hearings have made the State Department anxious over what further horror stories may surface, some of their fears are unwarranted. Hays has confided that he does not expect a bill out of his committee until the next session.

This means that the Senate would have to go through the entire process of passing their version of the measure again before any grievance board is set up outside the department's own jurisdiction.