

PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE J, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION

PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON
NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961

JUNE 27, 1972

INITIAL DISSEMINATION:

- (1) OLC
- (1) OMS
- (1) LY/SO
- (1) OS
- (1) DDP/CI/ [REDACTED]
- (1) DBI/CINM [REDACTED]
- (1) EDP/NARCOS - 21-23

25X1A
25X1A

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1972

81-235

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, *Chairman*

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE W. MCGEE, Wyoming
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
WILLIAM B. SPONG, Jr., Virginia

GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois

CARL MARCY, *Chief of Staff*
ARTHUR M. KUHL, *Chief Clerk*

(11)

CONTENTS

Statements by—	Page
Bevans, Charles I., Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State; accompanied by Donald E. Miller, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; and G. Jonathan Greenwald, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State-----	44
Ingersoll, John E. Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, U.S. Department of Justice; accompanied by Donald E. Miller, Chief Counsel; and George Belk, Assistant Director for International Affairs-----	2
Rossides, Eugene T., Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Trade and Operations, Department of the Treasury-----	17
Insertions for the record:	
Foreign region personnel, supplied by BNDD-----	9
Foreign district offices, supplied by BNDD-----	9
Budget requests and appropriations for Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, supplied by Department of Justice-----	13
Bureau of Customs increases in manpower, equipment, and so forth, supplied by the Department of the Treasury-----	29
Information concerning the granting of diplomatic immunities to representatives of foreign governments and their personal baggage upon arrival in the United States, supplied by the Department of the Treasury-----	34
"Free Fix for Addicts?", article by John A. Hamilton, the New York Times, June 5, 1972-----	41
Twelve states which abstained at the Geneva Conference in the vote to adopt the protocol amending the single convention, supplied by the Department of the Treasury-----	47
Statement in response to Senator Pearson's request for additional discussion of the implementation of the additional authority and responsibility given the International Narcotics Control Board, supplied by Department of State-----	51
Answer to question submitted by Senator Percy to Mr. Bevans-----	55
Answer to question submitted by Senator Percy to Mr. Bevans-----	56
Letter to Mr. Charles I. Bevans from Senator William B. Spong, Jr., containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and Mr. Bevans' reply of July 14, 1972-----	59
Letter to Mr. Eugene T. Rossides from Senator William B. Spong, Jr., containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and Mr. Rossides' reply of July 28, 1972-----	67
Letter to Mr. John E. Ingersoll from Senator William B. Spong, Jr., containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and reply of August 2, 1972, from Mr. Gene R. Haislip, Special Assistant to the Director-----	71

PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS

TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator William B. Spong, Jr., presiding. Present: Senators Spong, Fulbright, Church, Javits, Pearson, and Percy.

Senator SPONG. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Committee on Foreign Relations this morning will hear testimony relating to the protocol recently adopted by a United Nations Conference in Geneva to amend the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1953. The Single Convention, to which the United States became a party in 1967, is the basic multilateral treaty governing international control of narcotic drugs, including opium, heroin, and cocaine. Ninety nations have ratified the convention and additional countries are in the process of becoming parties.

The protocol to amend the Single Convention is designed to provide for a threefold approach to the problem of preventing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and the abuse of those drugs: (1) It would strengthen the international control machinery to enable it more effectively to curb the excess and illicit cultivation of the opium poppy, as well as the illicit production, manufacture and trafficking in narcotic drugs; (2) it would expand the provisions of existing bilateral extradition treaties; and (3) it would establish guidelines for each nation's effort to avoid drug abuse and for the treatment of individual drug abusers.

I am pleased to welcome our witnesses this morning: Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs within the Department of Justice; Mr. Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations; and Mr. Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs in the State Department.

We all are, of course, intensely concerned with the rising problem of drug abuse in this nation and with the international traffic in illicit narcotics which, directly and indirectly, brings harm and misery to hundreds of thousands of our citizens. I hope that this morning, with the help of our witnesses, we will be able to view this problem in a

broad context, to learn more about the expanded effort being made by this Government to deal with this problem and, finally, and more specifically, to gain an understanding of how the new protocol would contribute to that effort.

Our first witness will be Mr. Ingersoll. We are very pleased to have you with us this morning.

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. INGERSOLL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ACCOMPANIED BY DONALD E. MILLER, CHIEF COUNSEL; AND GEORGE BELK, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mr. INGERSOLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee.

First of all, with the chair's permission, I will introduce my colleagues who are at the table. On my right is Mr. George Belk, the Assistant Director for International Affairs; and on my left, Mr. Donald Miller, the Chief Counsel of the Bureau.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you today in connection with your inquiry into proposed amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC DRUG TRAFFIC

I will first address myself to the nature of the international narcotic drug traffic, as you have requested. This traffic is a production and merchandising system based on the slavish demands of addicted individuals. In the United States we estimate these at approximately half a million, which we believe represents a sharp increase over the previous decade. The heroin market in this country presents an ideal circumstance for illicit traffic. The addicts are numerous, their demand is constant, their actual wealth or purchasing power, whether earned through wages or in crime, is considerable, and the product which they crave originates in countries where production labor costs are extremely low. From origin in the form of opium, the drug is converted into morphine base and ultimately refined into heroin. The entire movement is dependent upon clandestine activity.

The principal vulnerability of this commerce is in the length and complexity of its line of supply. This makes it susceptible to attack where police forces can be organized with knowledge and sincerity of purpose. The mission of our Bureau is to do just that in the United States and to provide technical expertise abroad so that foreign governments may do the same. I believe strongly in the desirability of combating this traffic at its source and for that reason have placed increasing emphasis on our Bureau's international mission. Attached to my testimony are tables indicating the scope of this increase in terms of the location and number of our foreign offices and the agent personnel which staff them.

Since fiscal year 1969, the number of our offices has increased by 260 percent and our agent personnel by 258 percent. In addition, I up-

graded our commitment organizationally in the fall of 1971 by establishing the position of Assistant Director for International Affairs.

One of the missions of our foreign offices is to gather intelligence concerning the nature and scope of the problem we face. In addition, since the fall of 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency has been given a mandate by the President to use its facilities also for obtaining drug intelligence. These sources of knowledge have been further augmented by the active commitment of the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury.

On the basis of current assessments, we estimate the total worldwide production of illicit opium at approximately 1,300 metric tons. Of this, perhaps 700 tons are produced in Southeast Asia, mainly in the triborder area of Thailand, Burma, and Laos, called the Golden Triangle. Principal producers of the remainder are India, at approximately 250 tons; Afghanistan, at 100 tons; Pakistan, at 100 tons; and until recent improvements in collection, Turkey, at 50 tons. An additional quantity of approximately 1,700 tons are produced for legitimate medical purposes in the Middle East and Central Asia.

We believe that between 6.5 and 10 tons of heroin are consumed annually in the United States which, on the basis of conversion ratios, equates to approximately 65 to 100 tons of crude opium. It is, therefore, clear that total illicit production is far in excess of that required to supply the United States and indeed most of the production of Southeast Asia is, and always has been, consumed in that area. In our programs and efforts to reform international law and control machinery, we are concerned with the whole of this illicit production but our specific operational aim is that part of the traffic which particularly supplies the United States.

Throughout the decades of the 1950's and 1960's, the narcotics supply line to the United States appeared to have achieved some degree of stability. The bulk of the heroin was derived from Turkish opium refined into morphine base in Turkey and then smuggled into southern France where it was further refined into heroin. From France, the heroin was usually smuggled in through the port of New York or indirectly by way of Canada. A persistent but smaller scale and less organized traffic in heroin originated in Mexico and affected the southwestern portion of the United States. Finally, a small trickle of Asian heroin accounted for occasional important cases, though constituting an insignificant portion of the whole.

EVENTS EXPECTED TO ALTER PATTERNS OF WORLD TRAFFIC

Three major events which have now been set in motion can be expected to radically alter the pattern of world traffic. These are first, the prospective elimination of Turkey as the principal source of narcotic drugs entering the United States; second, the launching of a vigorous and unprecedented attack on the centers of the French heroin underworld; and, third, the discovery by Asian traffickers of lucrative drug markets among Americans which they can be expected to attempt to exploit as they did previously with our troops in South Vietnam. Since these three developments can be expected to dominate the future shape of the narcotics traffic, I will turn next to consider each of them separately in greater detail.

TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S BAN ON GROWING OPIUM POPPY

The heroin entering the United States from Europe is largely the product of predominantly French and Turkish criminal organizations. For decades opium poppy crops have been raised by tens of thousands of Turkish farmers in the Anatolian Plain. It is grown in small plots in addition to other subsistence crops because of its cash value and it is also put to a variety of nonnarcotic uses. In theory, the Turkish Government has always maintained a monopoly on the purchase of the harvested opium for legitimate medical markets although until recently less than effective efforts were made to insure that this law was strictly enforced. In this environment, farmers would sell some part of their harvest to drug traffickers at the site of their local village without knowledge or interest in its ultimate destination.

The opium is often reduced to morphine base with crude processing materials at or near a village site. Turkish criminal elements have organized the movement of the morphine base from the village to assembly points in Turkey and finally to a point of ultimate delivery to a laboratory pickup man in France or West Germany. Often the morphine base will move by sea on board Turkish vessels and be thrown overboard at prearranged points in waterproof containers near the harbor of Marseille. Overland shipments usually pass through the Balkans into West Germany where some 700,000 Turks have settled since the postwar period.

This course of dealings has developed quietly and without interruption for over 20 years into a well-defined pattern of criminal activity. More recently, the policy of the U.S. Government has focused increasingly on destroying the very base of this pyramid of activity. That base is the illicit diversion of opium from areas of legal production by farmers ignorant of its destination or the havoc which it brings to the cities of our country.

After expressions of interest by the President, the Secretary of State, and strenuous representations by myself personally and by our Ambassador in Ankara, the gravity of the situation to the United States as well as other countries has come to be realized.

In June of 1971, the Turkish Government announced that a total ban on the growing of the opium poppy would be brought into effect, following the harvesting of the last legitimate crop in 1972. In the meantime, efforts to collect as much as is actually grown in the remaining period have been sharply increased, and it is expected that far less of the crop will be diverted to illicit purposes than was formerly the case.

I should emphasize that in spite of the fact that the Government of Turkey has changed its leadership twice since the declaration, there has never been any suggestion or apprehension on our part that it would not be carried through. Sometime in 1973, hopefully, whatever illicit opium stockpiles exist in Turkey should be depleted, and the base of narcotic trafficking activity for over two decades should virtually cease to exist.

Where will the French and Turkish traffickers turn? Will they be able to readjust and prove themselves versatile enough to establish new sources of supply? Before addressing this question, let me first examine the developments in France.

FRENCH HEROIN UNDERWORLD

The French heroin underworld is based principally in the Marseille area where most of the heroin laboratories are believed to be located. This has been reaffirmed by the seizure of two laboratories by French enforcement authorities during the first 6 months of this year. Many of these violators are of Corsican origin and are often men in their 50's who have been engaged in clandestine operations of one kind or another since the French underground resistance of World War II. A group will usually consist of a small number of principals with one or more contact men who deal with outlets in the United States. Others specialize in financial arrangements or in organizing couriers for smuggling into the United States. Falsified documents are extensively employed for this purpose, and smuggling techniques may range from body concealment devices to concealment within oscilloscopes, false bottom suitcases, boxes of frozen vegetables, ski poles, or automobiles.

The heroin traffic in southern France has grown like an abscess while the French Government and people remain unaware. Addiction was increasing in France itself, and it is currently estimated that approximately 20,000 heroin addicts are located principally in the Paris and Marsille areas. As recently as July of 1970, there were only seven full-time narcotics agents in Marseille assigned by the French Government to deal with this problem.

One of my first acts upon becoming Director of BNDD in 1968 was to visit our Ambassador in France to discuss the matter. This led to a meeting with the French Chief of Police Judiciaire in Paris in May of 1969. Thereafter, efforts to involve the French more actively culminated in the signing of a special agreement on February 26, 1971, by former Attorney General John Mitchell and the French Minister of the Interior.

President Nixon himself has discussed the matter personally with President Pompidou.

Public and Government interest is now at a peak in France, and the narcotics traffic is regarded as a No. 1 law enforcement priority. As a result, French police manpower dedicated exclusively to this effort has increased by 400 percent since 1969, to a present level of 145 officers, with 160 projected for the end of 1972. This escalation of activity has not only resulted in elimination of the two heroin laboratories previously mentioned, but also in significant seizures of heroin, including the largest single case on record in which nearly a thousand pounds were seized on board a French fishing trawler in the Marseille harbor destined for the Western Hemisphere, probably Florida.

Our own agent personnel in France has similarly increased from four agents in fiscal year 1969, to 11 in fiscal year 1972. This does not include a number of other agents working special assignments for shorter periods of time. There are numerous examples of outstanding police work which have resulted from these increases. Several months ago, two French nationals sought to recruit an American national in Paris for the purpose of smuggling a large quantity of heroin. Thereafter, one of our agents posing as an Air Force sergeant made contact with them, ostensibly for this purpose. The agent represented that he was assigned to a general's aircraft and could easily smuggle the contraband into the United States without detection.

In May of this year, the trafficker delivered 120 kilograms of heroin, worth approximately \$52 million in the streets of New York, to our agent in Brussels for smuggling on board the general's aircraft. Some part of the heroin was actually flown to the United States where a delivery under surveillance was made to drug violators in this country awaiting the shipment in New York. Five individuals were arrested at that time, including the alleged head of a trafficking system which had brought large amounts of heroin and cocaine into the United States for the past 7 years. Also among the five was a French citizen who is believed to be in charge of making financial arrangements for sophisticated groups of international traffickers. Simultaneously, on the other side of the Atlantic, the two French traffickers were arrested in Belgium.

The point I wish to emphasize here is that both the quality of international cooperation and the level of enforcement activity so much surpasses anything in the past that it admits of no comparison. For the first time in two decades, the French heroin underworld can no longer operate without fear. They no longer can trust to the safety of Marseille as their sanctuary.

It is our hope that the pressure will eventually cause them to break and disintegrate. Specialized operations which would be beyond their ability to appreciate, or even suspect, are underway.

The developments in France and Turkey represent an immediate promise for the future. Let me turn, finally, to the third element I have mentioned which, by contrast, confronts us with a new threat.

DRUG TRAFFIC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The drug traffic in Southeast Asia has historical precedence stretching back to the days of the clipper ships and the opium wars of China. It is both large and lucrative, and until recently has been aimed almost exclusively at markets in the immediate geographic area. With the exception of Hong Kong most of the traffic has been in smoking opium rather than in heroin. But the presence of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam immediately adjacent to a major production area has changed the picture.

In part because of the drug abuse epidemic sweeping the United States and because of the ready availability of drugs in Southeast Asia, many of our young soldiers proved vulnerable targets for the traffic in heroin. Our first indications of the presence of heroin in South Vietnam came in December of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned into a stream; and in 1971, the stream into a torrent of heroin pouring out of the Golden Triangle. New heroin refineries were established in Thailand and Laos specifically to serve this demand. Ethnic overseas Chinese merchant-traffickers who have long controlled the drug markets suddenly became aware of the new business opportunities represented in the American drug epidemic.

Criminally inclined Americans located in Southeast Asia likewise became aware of the profits to be reaped in serving as the link between criminals in the United States and traffickers in Asia.

In other testimony before the Congress earlier this year, I have dealt with the special enforcement units which we have created both in

Thailand and Laos. These efforts are already producing results. On June 10, our agents and Thai police officers seized 1,600 kilograms of opium together with an array of processing chemicals. The accompanying arrests led to the discovery and elimination of an illicit laboratory 2 days later. I have also previously dealt with the high-level cases involving ex-servicemen in Bangkok and drug traffickers in the United States.

As a result of accumulating intelligence, we have reason to believe that certain ethnic Chinese criminal elements in America have geared up an operation to take advantage of the heroin availability in Southeast Asia. Common language, culture, and in some cases perhaps family ties, make for a natural and easy connection with Asian traffickers who are also of ethnic Chinese origin. Chinese seamen serve aboard most of the world's merchant fleets, and we find that many of these are picking up quantities of heroin in either Bangkok, Hong Kong, or Singapore and jumping ship with it in a variety of North American ports. Here, prearranged contact is established with Chinese-American violators.

In essence, the evidence points to the establishment of a new pattern which affects places never previously of any significance to the drug traffic. Either as the result of actual seizures or our intelligence, we believe these shipments have come through such diverse seaports as Norfolk, Charleston, Miami, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Seattle, Vancouver, New York, and the Great Lakes' port of Chicago.

Our attack on this particular trafficking situation is engaging the efforts of our Asian and domestic regional offices in close coordination with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Bureau of Customs, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This effort has already produced significant arrests and seizures of several kilograms of heroin, particularly in New York and Miami.

In view of the abundant production of opium in Southeast Asia and the obvious efforts which are being made to market a portion of it in the United States, it is clear that this area could potentially replace Turkey as the source of heroin in our country. At the present time, the Asian traffic still remains relatively unorganized and contributes only a small, but nevertheless growing, percentage of the heroin marketed here.

TWO QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN FUTURE

Two questions, therefore, remain to be answered in the future, which are: (1) Can our enforcement and diplomatic efforts succeed in containing the Asian heroin traffic directed at the United States while still in its infancy, and (2) will the traditional drug traffickers in Europe and the Western Hemisphere be able to reestablish sources of supply in the heart of an alien culture? Neither of these questions can be answered with certainty at this time. We have and are continuing to make notable progress in containing Asian traffic. The accomplishments which I have mentioned today in the recent elimination of a heroin laboratory in Thailand, and the attack on ethnic Chinese trafficking systems in the United States, are examples of this.

The second question is more problematic. Thus far, there is no indication of any large-scale attempt by French, Turkish, or Western Hemisphere traffickers to establish organized sources of heroin in

Asia. However, we have to keep in mind that there still exist many French influences in the Indochina area. Hopefully, the pressure on both sides of the Atlantic may lead to the disintegration of these key elements altogether. We have, however, one clear example of the versatility of heroin traffickers in organizing criminal activity across cultural lines. One of the new variations on the European trafficking pattern has been the recent influx of Latin American violators.

According to our study of major seizures, their importance, though still second to the French, has grown steadily since 1968. They have been able to engraft the South American contrabandista system directly on to European sources of heroin. This proof of versatility re-emphasizes the need to keep a sharp watch on Southeast Asia and other potential sources of supply.

COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF NEW INITIATIVES

In the foregoing analysis of the international drug traffic, I have attempted to convey something of both the complexity of the problem which confronts us and the great scope of the new initiatives which are only now getting underway. Cause for optimism may be found in the fact that, whereas the problems have existed with equal complexity for many years, the breadth of our current effort far exceeds anything attempted in the past. In essence, our country has finally realized, and other key nations have finally realized, that the problem is a cancer and not a headache; and it must be treated with surgery and not with aspirin.

PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The spirit of this realization is also found in the progress in international law. In February 1971, an international treaty called the Convention on Psychotropic Substances was successfully negotiated in Vienna between 71 nations. This treaty will provide some minimum of controls over the international commerce in categories of drugs of abuse, which have previously been subject to no such restrictions. It is now before the Senate for advice and consent.

Similarly, our Government has proposed and sponsored amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, designed to strengthen the power of international bodies to enforce the restrictions on narcotics. On May 25 of this year, 71 countries attending the Geneva conference voted for adoption of these amendments, and 47 countries have already signed them subject to final ratification. Many opium-producing countries have complained that the Single Convention amendments force them to adopt restrictions on opium production while industrial nations are reluctant to accede to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances which affects the drugs they manufacture. Our Government, as one of the latter manufacturing nations, has sought to dispel these doubts by assuring all countries of our sincere support for the international control of all categories of drugs of abuse.

I have no reservations at all in recommending these major improvements in international law to the Senate and to the people of this Nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy to attempt to respond to any questions you have.
 (Attachments to Mr. Ingersoll's prepared statement follow:)

FOREIGN REGION PERSONNEL

Fiscal year	Agents	Support personnel	Total
End of 1969.....	26	4	30
End of 1970.....	27	9	36
End of 1971.....	49	24	73
Present onboard as of June 19, 1972.....	93	60	153
End of 1972 (planned).....	115	71	186
End of 1973.....	(1)	(1)	(1)

¹ No projected changes.

FOREIGN DISTRICT OFFICES

End of fiscal year 1969.....	13
Present	47

LOCATION OF BNDD FOREIGN DISTRICT OFFICES

FISCAL YEAR 1969

Mexico City, Lima, Rome, Paris, Beirut, Istanbul, Bangkok, Seoul, Singapore, Hong Kong, Montreal, Saigon, and Ankara.

FISCAL YEAR TO DATE

Vietnam:

Saigon.

Mexico & Central America:

Mexico City, Guadalajara, Hermosillo, and Monterrey.

Panama & South America:

Panama City, Panama; Caracas, Venezuela; Asuncion, Paraguay; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Lima, Peru; Quito, Ecuador; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Bogota, Columbia; Brasilia, Brazil; and La Paz, Bolivia.

Near East:

Ankara, Turkey; Istanbul, Turkey; Izmir, Turkey; Beirut, Lebanon; Kabul, Afghanistan; Tel Aviv, Israel; Tehran, Iran; and Islamabad, Pakistan.

Southeast Asia:

Bangkok, Thailand; Chiang Mai, Thailand; Vientiane, Laos; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Singapore; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; and New Delhi, India.

Far East:

Tokyo, Japan; Hong Kong; Manila, P. I.; Seoul, Korea; and Okinawa.

Europe:

London, England; Paris, France; Marseilles, France; Madrid, Spain; Barcelona, Spain; Rabat, Morocco; Bonn, Germany; Frankfurt, Germany; Munich, Germany; Milan, Italy; Rome, Italy; and Brussels, Belgium.

Senator Spong. Thank you very much, Mr. Ingersoll. It is very comprehensive testimony and most helpful.

ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

In an article entitled "The World Opium Situation," which was prepared by BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) and printed in the June 1971 Congressional Record, it was noted that one problem with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a lack of enforcement authority on the part of the International Nar-

cotics Control Board. Do you believe the protocol, in any way, helps to overcome this problem since it does not provide for any enforcement authority?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Mr. Chairman, it will help. It will certainly not solve the problem. First of all, the International Narcotics Control Board will be able to modify opium producing estimates in countries where it seems that surpluses led to diversion of legal stocks; and, second, the Board, under the terms of the amendment, may reduce a country's production by an amount equal to the amount that went into the illicit traffic in that country in a previous year.

In addition the Board may request, not force, but may request a country to admit an inspection team to examine the situation. The country can still reject help from the Board but at least it must do a study and submit proposed remedial measures to the Board.

Of course, one of the limitations of international treaties when dealing with criminal activity is that each government is sovereign in legislating and enforcing criminal law, and much will rest on world opinion as to the effectiveness of its performance. So it will help. It certainly by no means pretends to solve this particular problem.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN TERMS OF TREATMENT

Senator SPONG. You have touched on this next question in your testimony, particularly with regard to recent efforts in France, but in the article I referred to in the previous question it is noted that—and I quote:

Given the present scale of opium-based drug abuse, it is unlikely to be lastingly suppressed without greater international cooperation in treatment and enforcement programs as well as in attempts to control production directly.

Would you evaluate international efforts in terms of (1) treatment; (2) enforcement programs; and (3) control of production?

Mr. INGERSOLL. In the area of treatment, I would say that only a handful of countries are performing effectively. In those cases, I think the drug problem is rather small, with the exception of the United States.

The World Health Organization provides materials and references on treatment programs that are available or in use in the world in various nations; and each country that has had a severe drug problem and that has mounted a treatment program has seemed to do this in direct relationship to its own culture and standards. For example, the United Kingdom treats its addicts in a manner that is far different from the way Japan approached the problem, Japan required mandatory treatment programs and a drug-free treatment environment whereas in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, treatment is not institutionalized completely and heavy use is made of drug maintenance programs.

In the United States we are taking a middle road, I think, between these two extremes.

The country of Iran has a very serious addiction problem and in this case both the World Health Organization and the United States have offered assistance. Article 15 of the Protocol embodies language which implies the desirability of parties having treatment programs. This is a matter of local decisionmaking and one which each government has to undertake itself.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN TERMS OF ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS

In the area of enforcement, the situation again is improving. I think the reason we have had so much difficulty in persuading governments of other countries to step up their enforcement programs is because drug problems have not been of high priority in enlisting their action and for many years the common retort was, "That is an American problem."

Now, more and more of these countries are finding a spread of the drug problem within their own territories and so they are taking increasing action and paying more attention to it.

At a World Conference I attended last October, for example, the delegates repeatedly referred to this as a worldwide scourge and I think that best typifies the reaction of many governments at this time.

The example of Turkey, while it will not put a complete stop to narcotic trafficking and will indeed not stop drug addiction in the United States itself, does show what can be done by a government which is concerned that it was unable to control diversion of what started out to be a perfectly legitimate production for use in medicine. And because it could not control diversion into illicit trafficking, it decided to cease opium production altogether.

INCREASED CONTROLS

The same kind of approach would not be successful in many of the other countries I have mentioned because they simply don't have the same degree of control over the territory in which opium is produced that Turkey has. Nevertheless, in these other countries we have seen increased controls. For example, Laos, until last fall, did not have a law that made the production and movement of opium illegal. It passed a law, and since that law has been in effect they have been very effective in enforcing it.

In many countries in Southeast Asia—Thailand is another example—there was no law against opium production until the late 1950's and it apparently takes a great deal of time to overcome the inertia that an absence of law has created.

I might also add to this that many nations are moving toward the establishment of central narcotic bureaus for law enforcement and regulatory purposes—places such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, and perhaps generally.

ARRIVING AT NUMBER OF U.S. ADDICTS

Senator SPONG. In your statement you used the figure of a half million for the number of those in the United States that you estimate are presently addicted to hard drugs. How did you arrive at that figure?

Mr. INGERSOLL. This is a statistical extrapolation of some known data which mainly is based on addicts who have been identified either by virtue of having come to the attention of local police agencies or to medical authorities throughout the United States. From this sample, using a well-verified statistical technique that is used in other processes in estimating populations, the figure of about 565,000 has been obtained.

Before that technique was used, estimates that were reported on the bases of just the sample figure which was derived from the reporting of about 40 communities around the country.

ESTIMATE REVISED UPWARD

Senator SPONG. How much of an upward revision does this represent?

Mr. INGERSOLL. That is very hard to say, Mr. Chairman, because until the last 2 or 3 years no effort was made to estimate the total population. I think that it is fair to say, however, that it represents a substantial increase over what existed 10 or 15 years ago. By that, I mean very substantial.

COORDINATION PROBLEMS

Senator SPONG. There have been reports that the activities of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the U.S. Customs have sometimes been hindered by coordination problems. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that such reports, and particularly what appears in the popular press from time to time, are gross exaggerations. I think it has to be expected that where two organizations are operating in the same area from time to time that there will be conflicts, and I am not going to deny that operational conflicts have occurred. However, I do not think that these have impeded the Government's program against drug trafficking and I think that a look at the record of both the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Bureau of Customs during the last couple of years show the great improvement that both agencies have demonstrated. This supports my contention that whatever minor operational conflicts may have occurred in the field from time to time certainly have not impeded overall progress in controlling the traffic; and, I might say, that at this time the relations between the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Commissioner of Customs have never been better. We are in constant communication and we direct our forces explicitly and personally from time to time when we have a mutual operation going.

IS CIA INVOLVED IN OPIUM PRODUCTION IN INDOCHINA?

Senator Spong. There have been reports of CIA involvement in opium production in the Golden Triangle area of Indochina. Do you care to comment on those charges?

Mr. INGERSOLL. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, there is absolutely no basis to those charges.

Senator SPONG. Senator Pearson?

Senator PEARSON. Just two or three questions came to mind as I followed your very excellent statement.

GOVERNMENT EFFORTS RELATING TO ADDICTION INCREASES

I would be interested if you would put in the record, although it deals with our domestic effort, what the effort of our Government has

been in relation to the increase of addiction in the last decade that you cited, and I would like, if you would, to put the figures as to your budget requests and budget authorizations and appropriations and manpower figures in.

I must say that while there is a limit to the number of people who might serve our Government in overseas capacities, the recitation of the number from four to 11 in Marselles seems like a relatively insignificant increase at the very heart of what some of this problem is.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Senator, I will be very happy to comply with your request but may I point out also that our agents have no enforcement authority.

Senator PEARSON. I understand that.

Mr. INGERSOLL. They are present there for advisory purposes—

Senator PEARSON. I understand.

Mr. INGERSOLL (continuing). And to provide assistance. I think what we should examine is the increase in resources that other governments have put into this campaign.

Senator PEARSON. And they are substantial, are they?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

BUDGET REQUESTS AND APPROPRIATIONS FOR BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

(Supplied by the Department of Justice)

Attached is a tabulation of the budget requests and appropriations for BNDD and its predecessor agencies during the previous ten years. One of these agencies, the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, did not exist for this entire period of time.

These figures do not represent total Government expenditures on drug law enforcement activities inasmuch as other agencies, particularly U.S. Customs, have been involved in this effort to some degree throughout the period in question.

COMPARISON OF BUDGET REQUESTS AND APPROPRIATIONS ENACTED

[In thousands]

Year	Requested	Approved by Congress	Year	Requested	Approved by Congress
1. 1962:					
(a) FBN.....	\$4,462	\$4,462			
(b) BDAC.....	NA	NA			
Total.....	4,462	4,462	5. 1966:		
2. 1963:			(a) FBN.....	6,050	6,050
(a) FBN.....	4,777	4,767	(b) BDAC.....	2,199	2,199
(b) BDAC.....	NA	NA	Total.....	8,249	8,249
Total.....	4,777	4,767	6. 1967:		
3. 1964:			(a) FBN.....	6,275	6,275
(a) FBN.....	4,450	5,350	(b) BDAC.....	5,107	5,107
(b) BDAC.....	NA	NA	Total.....	11,382	11,382
Total.....	5,450	5,350	7. 1968: BNDD.....	14,374	14,374
4. 1965:			8. 1969: BNDD.....	20,455	18,533
(a) FBN.....	5,657	5,657	9. 1970: BNDD.....	27,772	27,772
(b) BDAC.....	NA	NA	10. 1971: BNDD.....	44,201	43,592
			11. 1972: BNDD.....	66,639	65,039
			12. 1973: BNDD.....	73,053	74,053

¹ Approved by House and Senate Subcommittees. Transfer to GSA for space not reflected.

(See p. 73 for additional material.)

RECORD OF WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT

Senator PEARSON. You made particular reference to France and, of course, I understand that, but you also indicated that some of the processing was being done in West Germany. What is the record of the West German Government?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I didn't mean to imply that we know of any heroin processing that is occurring in West Germany; however, West Germany is used as a trans-shipment country from Turkey and from the Middle East into France. It may be possible that violators will be moving, or may have already moved to Germany because of the pressure in France. We are particularly concerned about cities such as Hamburg, but we have dialog and communications with a variety of people in the West German Government, members of the Bundestag, members of the Government itself and the police. The West Germans at this time are moving toward the establishment of central coordination of narcotics control which at the present is mainly in the hands of the several provinces. As you know, West Germany is a federated government of the almost pure variety and enforcement responsibility basically lies at the province level.

A meeting, for example, was called by Minister Emke who is the Chief of Ministries of the German Government, of all of the provincial prime ministers—and they have all agreed to coordinate and cooperate with the national government in this effort.

BNDD has offices in three cities in Germany—Bonn, Frankfurt, and Munich, and the German police and German customs service have made several large seizures of morphine base. They are setting up an intelligence unit at this time. This will be a computerized intelligence system with some 2,000 terminals to feed narcotics intelligence into a central unit; so we think they are doing quite well.

USE OF DRUGS BY U.S. TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Senator PEARSON. Has there been a significant increase in the use of drugs and drug addiction among our troops in Western Europe, especially in Germany?

Mr. INGERSOLL. There is some increase; however, most of this is in the use of hashish. There is sporadic availability of heroin but not continuing availability of heroin to our troops in West Germany. Of course, we were very concerned that the same type of situation that occurred in South Vietnam does not occur there; and the U.S. Army in Europe is very active in enforcement and education and other preventive efforts.

ENFORCEMENT OF ABSOLUTE BAN BY TURKISH GOVERNMENT

Senator PEARSON. Let me ask you this last question and that is: You have expressed considerable confidence that the Turkish Government with the changes of administration and the passage of the law would be able to enforce its absolute ban at the end of the 1972 crop. Given the failure to enforce its prior reputation of having a monopoly on the purchase of that opium that was produced, do you see a greater capacity or greater resolution on the part of the Turkish Government or is it easier to control an absolute ban than it is the absolute, total purchase of the production?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Senator PEARSON. What is the source of this confidence you have in the implementation of the Turkish Government in its very considerable and very laudatory act?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, it is easier to enforce an absolute ban provided that the proper inspection of the terrain is carried out; and we have reason to believe that they will do that. I think also an understanding of the Turkish mind underlines some of the confidence that I have. The peasant class in Turkey understands either a complete ban or complete permissiveness in these kinds of matters and they have difficulty in understanding the gray area in between, particularly since there is no significant addiction problem in Turkey. The peasant farmer on the Anatolian Plain looks at the opium plant as a useful plant, not only because of the cash that it provides but also because it serves as fuel, as fodder; the oil is useful in cooking; the seeds are useful as condiments on bakery goods—he cannot understand the problems and the difficulty that the white powder derived from opium causes on the streets of New York and elsewhere in the United States. But he can understand when his government says no more production; and the government officials in Turkey involved in this program are optimistic that the farmer will comply, particularly since the Turkish Government will be compensating the farmer for the cash loss that he will incur during the first several years while changes in economic development are being made.

Senator PEARSON. I thank you very much, Mr. Ingersoll.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPONG. Thank you, Senator Pearson.

POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED ILLICIT TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

I would like to pursue for a moment, Mr. Ingersoll, the possibility of increased illicit trade in Southeast Asia.

It has been suggested that the Florida based Trafficante family has become involved in Southeast Asia. Also, in 1971, after certain suitcases containing heroin were seized at Orly Airport in France, sources in Vietnam and Laos suggested that the French connection was arranged by a man named Theodas, who is a member of the French-Corsican underworld and manager of a hotel in Vientiane, Laos.

Could this be considered evidence of a move of the illicit traffic toward Southeast Asia?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that the probability that French traffickers will move to Southeast Asia is quite good and I think they probably have been making arrangements ever since the ban on Turkish opium production was announced. There is probably still a considerable amount of opium that originated in Turkey in the pipelines that will satisfy their requirements for an undetermined period. However, as they move to Southeast Asia their logistical lines of supply will be extended. I think this will make them more vulnerable to effective police intercession.

As I mentioned in my statement, there is still a heavy French influence in Indochina and I am not naive enough to believe that all connections between French and Asian criminals have been broken merely because of the absence of the French Government in that area.

COUNTRIES NOT PARTY TO SINGLE CONVENTION

Senator SPONG. Are there countries which are not parties to the Single Convention which could in your judgment, become major producers as our efforts in Turkey and elsewhere take effect?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there are some producing countries at this time that are not parties to the Single Convention. Iran is one although it does participate in United Nations activities in drug control. Iran is taking steps to ratify the Single Convention and, I believe, Laos is as well.

Senator SPONG. How about in the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. INGERSOLL. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I can answer that question, but I will be very happy to supply an answer for the record, if you wish.

Senator SPONG. Thank you.

(See p. 65 for State Department answer with which Mr. Ingersoll concurs.)

CURBING PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY OF OPIUM

Senator SPONG. In comparison with the amount of opium needed to supply addicts, the production is quite large. Do you believe production and supply can be curbed?

Mr. INGERSOLL. In terms of the requirements in the United States it is true that production is very large; however, until this year, to the best of our knowledge, most of the opium production was used throughout the world and the demand in various parts of the world is still quite high.

As far as the United States is concerned, I think that we cannot just focus our efforts on the control of supply. It seems to me this is an emergency type of effort that we have to maintain until we reduce the demand in this country; and the demand can be reduced by first providing adequate treatment for those who are addicted at this time. Then, hopefully, we can change the attitudes of Americans toward drugs and drug abuse over a longer period of time so that the demand will disappear.

But I regard law enforcement and control efforts as really a first aid treatment, if you will; an emergency activity pending a long-range solution to the overall problem.

BASIS FOR PRODUCTION FIGURES

Senator SPONG. I am going to ask you to provide the following for the record, if you will: I would like a country by country estimate of illicit opium production in the current year, and a comparison with the estimated production in those countries 5, 10, and 20 years ago. In addition, I would like to know what basis you have used for your estimate. I know this is not easy but we would like for you to do as well as you can with this, Mr. Ingersoll. (See p. 72.)

SUCCESS OF EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO STEM DRUG PROBLEM

Senator SPONG. I would like to ask you to summarize on one point: Do you believe that the drug problem in Europe is now being successfully stemmed, or would you say that present European efforts are 50 percent or 75 percent successful—or would you use some other figure?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I don't know that I can quantify that, Mr. Chairman, because I think Europe is just getting started and they are where we were maybe 5 or 10 years ago, both in respect to the extent of the drug problem and their reaction to it. I think most Europeans will agree with that assessment; they are at least 5 years behind us in all respects.

Senator SPONG. And certainly a part of their increased interest in enforcement has been the fact that the problem is growing within their own countries?

Mr. INGERSOLL. There is no question about that. It seems to be human nature to wait until a problem becomes a crisis before action is taken against it or before it is given priority attention. I think that occurred in the United States as well.

PARTICIPATION IN PROTOCOL

Senator SPONG. There is a disparity between the number of parties to the Single Convention—I believe there were over 90—and the number of countries which have thus far signed the protocol, 47, expanding the powers of the International Control Board.

Do you attach any significance to this and do you expect full participation in the protocol?

Mr. INGERSOLL. I think the representative of the State Department can answer that better than I can, Mr. Chairman; however, I do know that these amendments were very controversial among the parties to the Single Convention and also those who participated in the Geneva Convention, and I thought 41 signing subject to ratification was a good record in view of the handicap we started with. But I would prefer to defer to the State Department representative on that question.

Senator SPONG. We will be hearing from him.

Thank you very much.

Senator Pearson, do you have any further questions?

Senator PEARSON. No.

Senator SPONG. We would appreciate the information we requested for the record.

Mr. INGERSOLL. We would be very happy to provide it.

Senator SPONG. Thank you for your testimony; and Mr. Belk and Mr. Miller, thank you.

Senator SPONG. Mr. Rossides?

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE T. ROSSIDES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENFORCEMENT, TRADE AND OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Mr. ROSSIDES. Mr. Chairman, good morning.

Senator SPONG. We are pleased to have you with us. Do we have copies of your statement?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Mr. Chairman, I did not bring a prepared statement. I thought I would give a general statement and answer any questions. I apologize but I have lived with this problem and I can easily lay out to the committee and submit whatever additional information or put my opening remarks into a more formal presentation.

Senator SPONG. It is not at all necessary. Are there some prefatory remarks you would like to make?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I would very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPONG. All right.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Let me say, first of all, that it is a great pleasure to be invited by this committee to discuss what I consider, and I think you consider, one of the crucial problems facing our Nation, namely, the problem of drug abuse. I think this distinguished committee can play an additional role in this matter.

BIPARTISAN EFFORT IN AREA OF DRUG ABUSE

I think what we have seen in the last three and a half years is a tremendous bipartisan effort and accomplishments in the area of drug abuse.

Frankly, prior to January 1969, very little was done in this area on a coordinated basis either by the executive or the legislative branches of Government; and since that time under the leadership of President Nixon, with the full bipartisan support of the Congress, in my judgment, we have made substantial progress.

I happen to take an optimistic view that for the first time we are succeeding; we are turning the tide in a multidimensional approach and attack on this problem.

PROBLEM ELEVATED TO FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE

I think the President's multifaceted program has led the way, and if I could quickly mention them and the first and most important point, frankly, is what concerns this committee particularly: For the first time we elevated this problem to a foreign policy issue. Instead of the nonsense of the past of dealing with foreign governments by agents, as dedicated as they may be, that is not their function, for the first time we elevated it to a foreign policy issue and the President took a direct, personal interest, solicited the cooperation of foreign governments such as Mexico, Turkey, and France, through the Department of State; directed Secretary of State Rogers to make this a high priority item.

The Department of State has done an enormous job in this area in the last 3½ years. It has been an unheralded job and I would like to lay out some of the things that I think they have accomplished.

First of all, the Ambassador now is informed this is a foreign policy issue. In the past, whoever held the idea that the enforcement problem was a foreign policy issue? Mr. Chairman, I submit that 50 years from now, the role of the President and the Congress in alerting not just our Nation but the world community to this problem, will go down in history far more than what we are doing in Vietnam and elsewhere in many ways.

We have had a U.N. International Narcotics Control Board for many, many years, and it did literally nothing. Governments talked about this and gave an annual comment, a few of them; but once the President raised this in his U.N. speech on the 25th anniversary, again it alerted the world. That does not mean we don't have a lot

more to do, because I am not that optimistic in that sense. We have to pressure ourselves: we have done a tremendous job in 3½ years; we have to do a lot more. Many of our friends and allies around the world have done a fine job, but they have got to do a lot more; and I am not so sanguine that without continuing attention by our Government, and particularly the Congress, it is apparent our officials cannot speak out as easily as the Congress, to keep the viewpoint that this is an urgent world problem. Let's take France, Mr. Chairman, as an example—

Mr. PEARSON. Pardon me. What do you mean when you say, "our officials cannot speak out"?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, Senator, what I mean is, you cannot—I cannot criticize another Government, because it is misinterpreted. I can congratulate other Governments and say "we can do more, and they have been doing a good job"; that is what I meant.

Senator PEARSON. I see.

MEXICO

Mr. ROSSIDES. Mexico has done a fine job, but she has to do more. France has done an outstanding job, which I will indicate, but more should be done; but just like our own Government, more should be done in this matter.

FRANCE

But France, who had not been as aware of this matter before, through the diplomatic efforts in raising this to a diplomatic level where the President himself became involved, the Department of State became involved, and the extraordinary job done by Ambassador Watson—I guess of all of our Ambassadors around the world—I would have to single out Ambassador Watson's performance in working quietly and effectively with the French Government to obtain their cooperation and pointing out that it is their problem as well. The French Government realizes they have a great number of addicts in France, and that is a world matter and a humanitarian matter; and, I think, as Mr. Ingersoll pointed out in response to a question from Senator Pearson, it is not so much the number of our agents there, it is how much of an increase of agents by the French Government, and they have done an extraordinary job in the last year. Their seizures by their French customs service on March 2 of 935 pounds stems directly from the initiatives taken to make this into a world problem, to make it realized that it affects everybody.

TURKEY

Now, in Turkey, they have done a fine job, and it was a courageous act by the Turkish Government to legally ban the opium production as of this weekend. The enforcement of that we have to pay a great deal of attention to and keep working cooperatively with them to insure proper compliance.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

So I say that in this area of foreign affairs—take Southeast Asia, which is another great problem area—the whole history of the people

is smuggling as a way of life. We have made a lot of advances there in hopes of preventing the percentage of opium and heroin coming from Southeast Asia, to keep that percentage from increasing. For the first time we are a little bit ahead of the game through the initiatives we have taken under the leadership of the Department of State in working with these various Governments in setting up teams.

SOUTH AMERICA

Through our efforts in the customs service, we uncovered the major ring in South America, the now famous, or infamous, *Ricord* case; and somehow not only the French Corsicans came not only across the South Atlantic but also through South America and in the United States. Through the contrabandista system, goods are smuggled into the Southern Hemisphere; and with an empty airplane at destination, why not put something in it and bring it here; and we stopped that.

LEADERSHIP OF STATE DEPARTMENT

The first thing was to raise the drug problem to the diplomatic level, and the leadership of the State Department in this area has been, in my judgment, tremendous in projecting the interests of the United States and the world community, and, frankly, this is an issue on which all Governments can agree upon, and it can help bring the world community together, which it has done in this example more than it has done in other issues which are divisive.

CUSTOMS-TO-CUSTOMS COOPERATION

As an example, one of the programs we started in the Treasury in the spring of 1969 was customs-to-customs cooperation. This was the first line of defense, Mr. Chairman, for in our country and in most countries, there are efforts to prevent the smuggling. We were able to successfully have in the past the Customs Cooperation Council to pass smuggling laws. We are very proud of our sister customs service officers in France.

Mr. Chairman, we actually had meetings with the Communist countries behind the Iron Curtain, customs to customs, and I also had the pleasure of hosting the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Directors of Customs, as an example, during their recent visits to the United States.

Let me go quickly to the other points of the administration's multifaceted program and then stress Treasury's specific role and then answer any questions.

ROLES STRESSED ON FEDERAL LEVEL

You cannot just talk about this as an enforcement problem, obviously. As the President stressed, for the first time on a Federal level, the crucial roles of research, education, and rehabilitation, enormous increases in budget, and, I think, significant and successful attempts for better coordination of the many diverse agencies working in this area of the Federal Government.

DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CRIMINAL STRUCTURE IN LEGISLATION

Third, we differentiated between the criminal structure in the legislation that passed the Congress as between heroin and marihuana, so the one which is the more serious remains a felony, of course, but on the marihuana, the gradation and also flexible penalties for handling youthful offenders, so with a first offender that slate can be wiped clean whether it is a soft or a hard drug.

INCREASE IN BUDGETARY SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

Fourth, substantial increase in budgetary support for Federal law enforcement in the two main agencies, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and our own Bureau of Customs. Additionally, in this area last year, the President initiated the Treasury-IRS drug traffic program where we do tough tax investigations of the middle- and upper-echelon drug dealers, extremely successful programs which I will comment on further.

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

Fifth, you cannot beat this unless you get the community involved in this problem; and I have said this in public many times, it is a two-way street. Unless the community cooperates with the law enforcement agencies, it will not beat the heroin problem. Blacks are breeding blacks in this country, and Spanish are breeding Spanish speaking—and whites are breeding whites; the drug traffic in Bedford-Stuyvesant, my home borough in Harlem, St. Albans, Watts—are run by blacks, drug traffickers elsewhere by Spanish speaking, and by whites elsewhere.

CENTRAL ROLE OF STATES

Now, sixth and last is, of course, the central role of the States. Now, before this administration, frankly, a number of States—California and New York—which had the main problem were doing the best work, but a lot of it going down the drain because you did not have the total picture: a total program, diplomatic as well as Federal enforcement and rehabilitation.

We must understand that there are over 350,000 State and local law enforcement officials, and that is crucial; and I cite you the example of Japan, Mr. Chairman, the closest to the source with the largest supply, the largest supply of opium in the world, had a serious heroin problem after World War II. She has beaten that problem by tough enforcement, by her customs service and her internal police, and by her educational programs and total community action.

TREASURY'S ROLE THREEFOLD

Very quickly, Treasury's role is threefold: Our primary responsibility is to stop smuggling; and before January 1969, Customs was literally out of that business, and this administration brought it back into it with enormous accomplishments with the support of the Congress on Appropriations Committees and the full Congress.

Statistics on seizures I can supply; just as an example, last year over 1,000 pounds, 1,109 pounds of almost pure heroin, an extraordinary accomplishment, Mr. Chairman; in addition, the number of arrests and seizures of all drugs have increased dramatically. No one knows how much is getting in. That is a statistics game, but we certainly know from the amount that we have seized, the amount that foreign governments have seized, that in my judgment the supply of heroin has peaked. It does not mean the number of addicts has peaked, but I think for the first time we are finally giving the smugglers and drug peddlers a run for their money.

A second area, an extraordinarily successful one, and I am going to have our 12-month report shortly, is our IRS drug program.

We have, in a short 11 months, 718 middle- and upper-echelon drug dealers in the United States under tax investigation, 412 agents throughout this country. We have had tremendous cooperation with our sister Federal enforcement agencies and local and State police—there is an example of a key organization in southern California with narcotics agents that we have been trying to get for years and could not get the actual narcotics evidence. We have them under a solid tax investigation, and with the cooperation of our sister agencies with California and Federal, we are going to break that organization and take the profit out of it.

The third area of Treasury involvement, we have from the very beginning of this administration at Treasury, taken the position in dealing with any country on this problem of lining up the various items of American interests in that country, so when we talk about economic aid, economic assistance, that certainly had to be a factor in relation to whether or not that country was properly enforcing its drug laws and cooperating with us. Now, of course, there has been the bill that has passed the Congress, and upon the President's determination that a country is or is not cooperating, it is up to the Secretary of the Treasury—

Senator SPONG. That legislation originated in this committee.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Right. This is a most important position, just like our position on expropriation. What a country does on drugs should concern not just the United States, but all the international lending institutions. It is silly to be pouring money into a country and have it go down the drain because that country really is not doing its job on drugs.

Mr. Chairman, that is a quick overview. Let me mention specifically some of the things we did.

For instance, in Virginia, we have increased our number of people there. We don't have many people there, but as an example one of the substantial cases that we had which affects Virginia and the District of Columbia. It started out as a mail case which Customs had uncovered—William Herman Jackson—and he had a smuggling apparatus stemming from Southeast Asia here, and stemming from that lead and tip and involving cooperation with other agencies, we were able to convict three members of that group just last month, and they are awaiting sentencing today. But it is a tough problem. I think we are making substantial progress; a lot more has to be done.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPONG. Thank you, very much.

PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION BETWEEN BUREAUS

You mentioned increased coordination and cooperation between the various governmental agencies. I asked Mr. Ingersoll to comment upon any problems of coordination between the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and the Customs Bureau. I wonder if you have anything to say with regard to that?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, I would echo Director Ingersoll's comments, Mr. Chairman. Certainly there is bumping as there are in many aspects of governmental operations where two agencies in part of their duties overlap. I am not trying to belittle that, but I think it is a normal amount of bumping. In the beginning, it might have been more than that. We have it under control, and I think the two organizations are working much better today.

But let me say this, that that is like a pimple compared to the success of the beefing up of both of these organizations and the cooperation that has occurred between them. There is a problem, a small one, and I am not too concerned about it. We are working it out within the executive, and with the coordination of our committees.

METHOD OF ILLEGAL ENTRY

Senator SPONG. What method of illegal entry represents the most difficult problem for the enforcement efforts that you are connected with?

Mr. ROSSIDES. The most difficult method of entry of any enforcement effort, not just our own, at this point involves the light aircraft coming across the southern border, and small craft landing along the coast. Last year, Treasury proposed and the Appropriations Committee and the Congress approved—I forget the amount; I think it was approximately \$15 million—for equipment for this anti-air intrusion program along the southern border. We are working in close coordination with the Navy on the development of proper radar and sensor devices which are semi-operational now and will be operational within the next—fully operational say, within the next month—to help close part of that gap along the southern border. When I say part of it, we can't patrol the whole border, but there are certain key spots which radar today cannot handle and that is what we are going after, and we are making it tougher on the air intrusion by the light aircraft. This is simply the contrabandista system, and it ties in with other aspects of the problem.

And here is what we are trying to say to our colleagues and friends in South America, and this is being projected by our Ambassadors: the contrabandista system of smuggling goods is too dangerous when it involves drugs. One is that it may seep into their own societies in South America, but allowing the smuggling to go on by light aircraft into South America helps destroy their economies, reduces the amount of duties that they collect by customs, unfair competition to the honest businessman trying to sell in a particular country. But that is the biggest problem we have today, the method whereby we think most of the heroin and marijuana is coming, via light aircraft.

CBS DOCUMENTARY

Senator SPONG. Did you see the CBS documentary Sunday night?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I did, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPONG. Would you care to comment on it?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, they never did contact us. I think they were a little bit in error regarding the question of the air intrusion, because we have a program and it is working, not working perfectly; it is improving and it is making it tougher. In my judgment, we are cutting the supply; and the fact that one department didn't apparently want to answer their question—as an example, we are the ones responsible, and they never came to us because we have a program which is off the ground on the anti-air intrusion. However, I will say it was a remarkable performance in working and developing the actual methods of the aircraft. I congratulate them on that. As I say, there were just one or two points that I would have nitpicked with them on, but I thought it was a remarkable show as to our problem. We are doing more than indicated, but that is a different question.

DRUG TRAFFIC THROUGH HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA, AND DULLES AIRPORT

Senator SPONG. You made some mention of my own State of Virginia. Our State crime commission filed a comprehensive report a few months ago and mentioned the traffic coming through the port of Hampton Roads. Would you comment on the extent of the drug traffic through Hampton Roads; the success or lack of success of efforts to curb it; and the extent of drug traffic through Dulles airport?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Right. We don't know the extent; no one knows the exact figures and that is one of the great problems in this area. In our tax program we can give exact figures—how many people, how much seizure—but in smuggling we don't know. To use the word substantial would be overstating it for Virginia as an entry point. Hampton Roads is not a basic entry point although there is some.

The same at Dulles. Dulles is not a main entry point from overseas. The key entry points are Miami, the whole southern border, where light aircraft are used; of course, there is entry through New York, Lake Champlain and Rouses Point. We have increased our manpower at Dulles, for instance, couriers come in, and transit elsewhere, say, at Houston where there is not extreme foreign entry and Customs might not conduct extensive searches. So I would say there has been some increase through Dulles. So we have increased manpower and are working closely with Virginia authorities to handle the matter.

I think of more interest is the fact that in our IRS drug trafficker program as of this week, we had 19 targets in Virginia. This morning I was informed that five more have been added this month so there are 24 middle- and upper-echelon drug traffickers, smugglers, financiers, dealers who are under tax investigation in Virginia.

Senator SPONG. Senator Pearson?

JAPAN'S SUCCESS IN PREVENTING DRUG SMUGGLING

Senator PEARSON. I was intrigued by your comment in relation to the Japanese and I think if I remember your statement, you said that

through tough enforcement and educational programs they had beaten the problem. I am intrigued that any nation or group of people who have a problem of this severity can beat the problem.

Would you expand on that?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, Senator Pearson, and they have, and we should use that as an example, and particularly since they are closest to the largest supply of heroin. As a matter of fact, one of the positions that this administration has taken was that in the multidimensional attack you just simply cannot talk about trying to stop the growing of opium as a source around the world; you have to attack that but if you are depending on that, forget it. I think the figures presented this morning show what a small percentage of the total opium production in the world can supply all the heroin needed in the United States.

What the Japanese found after World War II was a very serious heroin addiction problem and they went at it, yes, by their very great social control of their community, I guess, but what they—the Japanese authorities—diplomatic and enforcement—have stressed to us was the tough enforcement by their customs service primarily to prevent the smuggling into Japan of drugs.

Every internal policeman—and take the Japanese police force in Tokyo; it is not a question of a special squad of 100 or 300 or 500 men; every one of the 40,000 policemen in Japan, in Tokyo, is a drug expert in the sense that he has had the requirement to go through a drug course and is looking for drugs. Sure, they have a special squad, but every one of them, and they feel that they get more concern, they get as concerned about a marihuana seizure today as we do about a heroin seizure. And it is there; it is a question of probably they don't have the question of corruption, rooting out corruption in this problem.

I first became aware of it through the Washington Post—I had not been as aware of Japan's enormous success in this until the Washington Post, a few years ago, wrote a long article, very detailed, a full page on the inside as well as the front page, an article about their efforts.

U.S. CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT COMPARED TO JAPANESE CUSTOMS

Senator PEARSON. Would you say your customs enforcement is as good today as the Japanese were at the time? Where are we deficient?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, let me say, as good as the Japanese are today.

Senator PEARSON. At the time they were "beating the problem"?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I would say they have a tighter control but I don't have enough of the details. Let's put it this way, Senator: When we came—when this administration came on board we had 9,000 personnel in the Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs had been the poor sister at the Treasury then and before, when I was there in the 1950's, in the Eisenhower administration. All the attention was on the revenue side and they did not have the support they should have had from the Office of the Secretary, frankly.

President Nixon in 1969 proposed a major supplemental on July 14, 1969, and pointed out that customs—directed them to initiate a major antismuggling program. So from that point we increased to approximately 13,000. We have come a long way.

In comparing us today to the Japanese customs, I think it would be

unfair to say we are weaker or stronger. I would have to get a closer comparison. I would have to say we have such an enormous increase that we are proud of it, and these men in customs and IRS have made the seizures; manpower is one of the differences. We need a heck of a lot more manpower. We have a lot of mileage to cover and need additional equipment for the southern border. But we have been given just about as much in the past as we were able to digest at that time and we have no fault to say to our Appropriations Committee at this time.

I would say that we have had other problems. Take the fact we had to supply the sky marshals. It was a program that had to be developed where they would be up in the air and on the ground and doing pre-departure controls, so we had an additional thousand we had to train there. It was like bringing customs out of the dark ages in 1969.

On enforcement, on tariff and trade affairs, they had simply been neglected and they are well on their way to being the premier customs agency in the world; but I would say—I don't want to say the Japanese are ahead of us—but we can profit from their experience.

Senator PEARSON. I thank you very much and I thank the chairman.
Senator SPONG. Senator Fulbright?

LACK OF CORRUPTION IN JAPANESE FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. This Japanese experience interests me as it did Senator Pearson. Why don't they have corruption in their forces?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, I cannot say, Senator, that they don't, and I threw that out without enough thought, possibly; but in our discussions with our Japanese colleagues and customs service, it is clear that drugs—that no quarter is given when it comes to drugs, anyone who accepts bribes and so on, it has developed that you just don't do it or else, in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to get at what is behind it. I mean—

Mr. ROSSIDES. The fear.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously there is a lot of money in Japan, just as there is here. When you say they don't have corruption, the reverse, I assume you mean we do have it. How do they treat their people when they do catch them; what do they do with them? Do they convict them or do they allow them to go on bail? Is it 4 or 5 years before they come to trial?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I am not qualified—

The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to make a case.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I don't know all the facts whether there is or is not corruption, and, really, I don't want to get off on that too much; I can discuss it a little bit. I think it is that the way we understand it, that there is such a fear of drugs in the Japanese society that when they attack this problem I think anyone who might have wanted to try to corrupt an official found that he was not successful but I would have to—

The CHAIRMAN. How did they create such an attitude? Is this an educational project?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Oh, yes, in good part, part of the multidimensional approach is educational and they stressed the educational—in their

journals, in their literature regarding the problems of drugs and what it does; in other words, to them drugs pollute the mind and body; it is as simple as that.

The CHAIRMAN. They have educated. We ought to know that, but how did they educate them? We ought to be able to learn from the experience of some of these people who solved this problem.

Mr. ROSSIDES. I think for the first time we in the last 3½ years have done an enormous job in education.

The CHAIRMAN. Have the Japanese done the best of any country you are aware of?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

CHINESE EXPERIENCE

The CHAIRMAN. What about the Chinese? After all, we first read about the Chinese in the opium wars; they had their experience with it, too. Is it a problem there?

Mr. ROSSIDES. We understand no, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It used to be a very great problem?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Very much so; in fact, I recall when the President returned from his historic trip to the People's Republic he pointed out in his conversation, one of the comments, the feeling he got was that the Chinese were very annoyed at the white race because it was the white race that had introduced opium into China.

The CHAIRMAN. How did they control it?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, the Chinese Communists have ways of controlling their people a lot more than we have in controlling our people and I don't think we want to use those methods, but we understand that the People's Republic made a set program of eliminating perhaps not fully, but eliminating the use of opium in Red China and quite successfully. Now, our main problems are the other Chinese, the overseas Chinese, who, our intelligence indicates, are the primary group in control of the opium traffic in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. They do it to make money. They don't use it?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator SPONG. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

TREATY RECOMMENDED

Mr. Rossides, you are making an enviable record as Assistant Secretary in this area. Do you recommend this treaty to us?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Very much so, Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Now, will you tell us—

Mr. ROSSIDES. For the first time this protocol puts a little more teeth into the United Nation's efforts. A lot more can be done by the United Nations, and this protocol will help substantially.

CHINESE COOPERATION IN DAMMING UP THE FLOW OF DRUGS

Senator JAVITS. Now, will you tell us to what extent, if any, the Chinese are now cooperating in damming up the flow of drugs, especially heroin or cocaine or those derivatives?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, when you say the Chinese, Senator, are you talking about—

Senator JAVITS. Mainland Chinese.

Mr. ROSSIDES. The People's Republic?

Senator JAVITS. Right.

Mr. ROSSIDES. We have had no—I don't want to say no problems—no problems that we know about of any effort by the People's Republic to be in control of the drug trade either to our troops or to the United States. Now, charges had been made, as you know, in the past and, frankly, I have read practically every one of the intelligence reports because we made special efforts to try to find out whether or not any evidence could be traced back to the People's Republic, and every one of the agencies had to come up with a negative.

ANTIMARIHUANA AND ANTIHEROIN CAMPAIGNS

Senator JAVITS. Now, there was a television program on the other night which indicated that we are spending a good deal of money to control the growth of marihuana or to spot its importation from Mexico. Can you give us some idea as to what funds and resources we are throwing into the antimarihuana campaign as contrasted with what we are doing about hard drugs?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, Senator Javits. We do not distinguish between antimarihuana and antiheroin campaigns. Unfortunately, when we initiated Operation Intercept in 1969, and I was cochairman of the committee that started it in February of 1969 in finding out what is the scope of the problem and what do we recommend to the President, I was cochairman along with the now Attorney General, and that was a task force on heroin, marihuana, and dangerous drugs; it covered everything. But when we submitted—when the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Kennedy, submitted a report to the President in June and then a decision was to move ahead and have a massive effort at the border, it was unfortunate that everybody took it as if we were just going after marihuana because 15 percent, we estimated, of the heroin used in this country comes from opium grown and cultivated and refined in Mexico.

INCREASES OF MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT

We increased efforts along the borders particularly, Senator, as I earlier pointed out; we had very few personnel in customs and we increased by 1,000 through the special supplemental appropriation that was submitted in September of 1969 and passed by the Congress in the fall of 1969. In addition in 1971, in the regular appropriation, Customs has increased manpower in this area at least 2,000 during the last 3½ years.

So for the first time we are getting the equipment—in last year's appropriation bill approximately \$15 million for aircraft, radar, and sensing devices to take care of the main problem, namely, the intrusion by light aircraft, as well as small craft.

For the first time we are contending with smugglers. In my judgment, we have actually made them take a step backward because of the antismuggling program, the efforts of the Bureau of Narcotics

and Dangerous Drugs and most recently the tremendous efforts of the Internal Revenue Service on tax investigation.

The actual figures I will be happy to supply for the record of the increases of manpower and equipment, but there has been a substantial budgetary increase on enforcement, as well as the education and research.

Senator JAVITS. Would you supply that? I ask unanimous consent that it be included at this point in the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS INCREASES IN MANPOWER, EQUIPMENT, AND SO FORTH
(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)

	1968	1972	Increase
Manpower.....	8,103	11,120	3,017
Cost of operation.....	\$89,911,000	\$193,340,000	\$103,429,000
Aircraft.....	1	26	25
Automobiles.....	313	903	590
Boats.....	0	22	22
Sector intelligence units.....	0	5	5
CADPIN (customs automatic data processing intelligence network).....	0	21	21
		\$ 160	\$ 160

¹ Estimated.
² Computer.
³ On-line terminals.

REPORT OF FEDERAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND HARD DRUG ABUSE

Senator JAVITS. Now, are you familiar with the report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, headed by Governor Raymond Shafer, of which I am a member and which found that marihuana should not be classified with the dangerous drugs, so called, like heroin, and that it is a diversion of our effort and resources to put them on a parity in terms of enforcement?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, let me say this, Senator: I have read—I am familiar with—the report; I have not read it all. The HEW Special Action Office would be more responsible on the medical aspects of the problem but I do agree with the administration's position regarding marihuana, that it should not be legalized; and I would point out, though, that I agree with the Commission's position to the extent that you must differentiate between heroin and marihuana, and this administration early in September of 1969, as part of the drug abuse bill that was before the Congress at that time, recommended a differentiation and penalties as between heroin and marihuana, which was most important; but it has not gotten the credit for that; and we also put in the provision, first offender provision, so that any youth on a first offense, whether it was marihuana, heroin, or anything, the slate could be wiped clean.

STOPPING SMUGGLING

But, Senator, I have seen too many cases of heroin where the person started on marihuana; and when we are going after smugglers, the smuggler does not say, "I am just a heroin smuggler"; he may have started out as a diamond smuggler, gold smuggler, or watch smuggler, so what we are trying to do is to stop smuggling and I am sure the Commission, which I am sure they did want was to stop the smuggling of items coming in—you can't say, "Now at San Ysidro

we will just look for heroin"; we are looking for and stopping smuggling, so you will stop both. Our main emphasis is heroin.

NO PHYSIOLOGICAL PROGRESSION FROM MARIHUANA TO HEROIN

Senator JAVITS. If you will forgive me—it is kind of a mixed bag; it is one thing for a smuggler to be smuggling heroin and marihuana and I can agree with you on that, and the Commission did not come out in any way to denigrate our effort to stop smuggling; but it is quite another thing for you to extrapolate that those who use marihuana go to heroin. The Commission, after spending several million dollars, found exactly to the contrary, that they don't. There is no causal relationship. It surprised me, too, but after all, that is why objective, rational people were appointed to look at research results rather than extrapolating from one case or whatever we might know. As a matter of fact, I don't know of any such cases and I have had a lot of experience in this field.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Senator, I didn't mean to—I qualify it; absolutely, there is no physiological progression from marihuana to heroin and I was not suggesting that. I did not mean to suggest that, because I think that we have properly downgraded the marihuana in comparison to heroin; and our efforts are heroin oriented, no question about it. You take our IRS drug trafficker program, that is, after the heroin rings, there are of the 178 targets that we have around the country, there are several, say, that are large scale marihuana smugglers or dealers but this is heroin oriented.

TREATY'S EMPHASIS ON HARD DRUGS

Senator JAVITS. So we have a right to expect that in the implementation of this treaty, this convention, the emphasis will be the same on hard drugs?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir.

DIFFICULTY OF GETTING PROBLEM AT PRODUCTION END

Senator JAVITS. Now, isn't it a fact, and I don't want to detain you any further—other members are waiting to question you—isn't it a fact that the whole poppy production which is necessary to supply all the demand in the United States can be confined to such a small area that it is extremely difficult to get at this problem at that end? I am not saying that we shouldn't try but to get at the dreadful addiction problem which we have in the United States, especially in my home area where an estimated half of the addicts are and where the figure has risen within a decade from an estimated 100,000 to an estimated 350,000, isn't it a fact that this cannot be our main reliance in dealing with this scourge?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Absolutely, Senator, and that thinking in the past is what has helped cause the problem today. This administration reversed that and it has put that down in the order of priority and has pointed out that less than—I think it is—1 or 2 percent of the land-mass that is commonly being used to supply poppies can supply the U.S. market. That does not mean, though, the tremendous achievement with the treaty with Turkey has not been as significant as we hoped

because they were the symbol, because some 80 percent of the heroin stemmed from poppies grown there.

But the first order of priority is to keep the stuff out, education, research, and rehabilitation. We turned that around. Before we had the idiocy of thinking, "Oh, well, we will just stop it at the source and that will take care of it," instead of the combined attack through education, through research, rehabilitation, enforcement, working with the foreign governments to enforce, stop it from being smuggled in and working at it internally.

Senator JAVITS. I am satisfied with your answer; I get its implications, but I think what you said might be translated to mean that first priority should be this effort to eliminate growth and so on; you don't mean that?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No; I meant the opposite.

Senator JAVITS. I understand you now, what you meant, but you said it differently.

NUMBER OF HARD DRUG ADDICTS IN NEW YORK

Senator SPONG. Senator Javits, just for your own information, Mr. Ingersoll testified earlier that his most current figure on the number of hard drug addicts in the United States is a half million; based on your New York figure, you would have more than half.

Senator JAVITS. I wouldn't say that. I hope and pray we don't have half, but our figures are a little bit higher. There is a difference in figures, but the order of magnitude is the same. If they have doubled, more than doubled in 10 years or tripled in 10 years, I think the impact on the country is the same. I don't challenge Mr. Ingersoll's figures at all.

Senator SPONG. Senator Percy?

EMPHASIS SHOULD BE IN HARD DRUGS

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, I would reemphasize what Senator Javits has said on the question of priority. We handled that legislation in the Government Operations Committee and affirmed that virtually the entire emphasis of this should be in hard drugs. The last figure I had—560,000—a tremendous figure now, far higher than the quarter of a million we were talking about a relatively few months ago.

JOB DONE BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR WATSON

I understand you mentioned in your testimony that Ambassador Watson has done an outstanding job in France, and I did insert a newspaper article in the Record some time ago that commented on the job that he has done. What can we learn from his experience—how he went about it, what he did that could be usefully employed as techniques and approaches and procedures in other countries where we need similar cooperation?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I would say that he took seriously the President's and Secretary of State's statement that this was the highest priority item, No. 1.

The Ambassador, and I have talked to him personally about these matters, told me he spent 75 percent of his time on this drug matter

because he understood it. He came back and I remember talking to him about it when he visited. He took a walking trip through Harlem and the South Bronx in New York City, my home area; but what the Ambassador did, and here is a businessman who came in as an ambassador, his was the quiet technique, the effective technique, of getting a job done.

He was not trying to be bombastic and make loud speeches of attack and so on; he worked quietly day in and day out with French officials on the highest levels, explaining and asking how to cooperate, and very important, two things, to point out they had their own drug problem, and this is one of the major breakthroughs, that you cannot be a major transit production place without having it seep off into your own society, into your own culture.

Second, and very important, is that this is the kind of traffic that everyone could be against and he capitalized on that point, the criminal elements were reaping huge profits out of this and that this affected other nations and other allies and here he was able to work quietly day in and day out, but the intensity of his concern and if this—and it is, I say—I am one to extol the virtues and accomplishments of the State Department in this area—it has been unheralded. You know everyone tries, wants to talk about Vietnam or SALT and so on, but as I said earlier, this problem, if it is as serious as we think it is, and I have suggested to some of the people in the media to stop the nonsense of sending someone for a 1-day visit to some of these places. "If you want to do a job, if you are concerned about the drug problem in New York City, and I don't know how many men you have in Saigon but send a team to Turkey, to France, to Mexico, not for a 1-day visit, keep them there, and report day in and day out what that country is doing." I, as a Government official, cannot be asking every day what is France doing, what is Turkey doing, what is Laos doing, but the newspapers can report it factually, report what is happening, what is being done, and not enough of that is being done.

But Ambassador Watson, in typical methods of diplomacy in his own quiet, effective way, has transmitted to his own staff and to the French officials the intensity of the problem and that has helped.

Senator PERCY. Well, having worked with him over a period of years on a number of international problems and seeing him deal with the International Chamber of Commerce's problems, I know he zeros in on a problem, makes his mind up as to a solution and if he can be part of it, and he is effective, and I imagine what you are saying then is that all of our embassies have to recognize that the President has assigned priority No. 1 to this particular problem, and that it must be implemented in the effort that we put in abroad.

WILL IRAN REPLACE TURKEY AS MAJOR SOURCE OF OPIUM?

Can you tell me a little about Iran? Is there any likelihood that Iran will replace Turkey as a major source of opium after Turkey imposes its total ban after this year?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Probably not; probably not, because they have better enforcement of production there. They had legal production; they had gone out of legal production in the 1950's but then when Turkey and Afghanistan continued the illegal production, they found out that

drugs were being smuggled from those countries into Iran which has a very large addict population. So the Iranian Government reinstated the legal production for the addicts in Iran. For the older ones, there are very strict procedures as to who gets the drugs, and they are trying to curtail it that way. They have stated publicly and the officials have stated to me, and stated it publicly to the Shah, if Turkey and all her neighbors go out of legal production, she will.

Now, Turkey has, as of the end of this week, banned production.

Our greater problem would be India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Senator SPONG. Iran has been tough, if not tougher, than the Japanese as far as penalties are concerned.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Correct, Mr. Chairman. I forget the figure, but it is a death penalty, and I forget whether 40 were executed last year.

Senator SPONG. More than a hundred have been executed, I believe, since they enacted the stiff penalties. Excuse me, Senator Percy.

SENATOR SPONG'S TRIP DURING RECESS

Senator PERCY. It is all right. I subscribe to the Spong report and I noticed with great interest the latest edition which shows the routing of the trip you intend to take during our recess.

Senator SPONG. I will be glad to take you with us.

Senator PERCY. I can't go but I am delighted you are probing these areas.

DISCUSSION BETWEEN SHAH OF IRAN AND PRESIDENT NIXON

Certainly the Shah has been most cooperative, and I am wondering if there is anything you could say as to whether this was a subject of discussion between His Majesty and the President when the President was there?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Not really; it was—I understand it was on the agenda; we recommended it; and I know the State Department did; but I don't know what—if it was discussed. I am sure it was discussed but I don't know what the substance of the discussion was.

Senator PERCY. But we really feel in Iran now adequate procedures have been adopted to prevent Iran from becoming—

Mr. ROSSIDES. The transit point.

Senator PERCY (continuing). A source of supply?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I believe so. On top of that, Senator, we are much more concerned with our cooperative and other programs with the surrounding countries.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Senator PERCY. Do you have an estimate of how many diplomats have diplomatic immunity, how many employees of embassies come into this country with diplomatic immunity?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I do not. I think the State Department representative may want to comment on it. I don't know the figures, but let me mention this, and we have been working with the State Department about it in this area. There is abuse of the diplomatic immunity by various individuals but it is a tricky and complex area; obviously, the ambassador coming into a particular country and he is the ambassador

to that country, has diplomatic immunity. What the degree is for the people down the line is another question. One of the major cases that we *in customs succeeded in uncovering* was when a customs inspector at JFK uncovered 170 pounds of pure heroin, and the person had the diplomatic passport but he was not accredited to the United States; it was the son of the Panamanian Ambassador to Taiwan, a case you may recall. He had five suitcases and there was a technique of having it in transit. When the inspector wanted to open it up he said, "I am in transit," and we said, "Sorry," and he took the chance because he was not a technical expert on diplomatic immunity. We said, "No," and he had no diplomatic immunity despite the fact that he may have had a diplomatic passport.

We work with the State Department, and the State Department has—my understanding is—talked with the various embassies quietly and with various governments, to make sure that they will be as tight and tough as they can about diplomatic passports.

Now, certain countries, and I didn't want to get into the names of the countries, are very lax about this, and we are tightening up and we give a much tougher examination to a diplomat coming, or alleged diplomats or persons who are alleging diplomatic immunity from those countries, primarily a few in South America.

Senator PERCY. I would like to have a figure from the State Department as to how many people we are talking about that we have to be concerned about if they have diplomatic immunity.

Are there known techniques? Can you tell me what we can do? In other words, if a dog is sensitive by odor to the presence of the drug, is it possible then for any procedure to be worked out without invading diplomatic courtesy to then impound and hold in escrow a suitcase, whatever it may be, until such time as proper authority is brought from that country to open it and inspect to see if their employee is in effect using diplomatic immunity to smuggle?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Let me submit for the record a memorandum in conjunction with the State Department. We obviously have sensing devices. If we have a sensing device, and there is something in a pouch or bag, then the question is whether or not the diplomatic immunity prevents our opening it. But we have a suggestion there that maybe we can work out a procedure for those persons even if they have diplomatic immunity so it is put on the side and not opened unless an appropriate person from that country is present. It is a tough one; historically every so often a major case stems from the use by diplomats of that diplomatic immunity.

(The information referred to follows:)

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE GRANTING OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES TO REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR PERSONAL BAGGAGE UPON ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES

(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)

Under the provisions of items 820.10 through 820.60, Tariff Schedules of the United States, free entry is accorded, upon the request of the Department of State, to the baggage and effects of representatives and employees of foreign governments and of certain public international organizations such as the United Nations, their immediate families, suites and servants, whether accredited to the United States or en route to or from other countries to which accredited.

Free entry is also accorded under similar circumstances to baggage and effects of diplomatic couriers, designated high officials of foreign governments and distinguished foreign visitors and their immediate families, and persons designated pursuant to statute or treaties ratified by the United States Senate.

The privilege of free entry of baggage and effects does not necessarily entail freedom from inspection. Sections 10.29(c) and (f) of the Customs Regulations as presently in effect limit the granting of inviolability to the persons and baggage of the foreign representatives listed below:

1. Ambassadors.
2. Ministers.
3. Charges d'affaires.
4. Secretaries, counselors, and attaches of foreign embassies and legations.

Ordinarily no distinction is made between those foreign representatives who are accredited to the United States and those who are in transit to or from other countries to which they are accredited.

The baggage of foreign representatives of classes other than those listed above is subject to inspection. In the case of routine arrivals of persons carrying diplomatic passports, however, there is little likelihood that any baggage examination will be made. The usual procedure in connection with such an arrival consists of the prior submission by the Department of State to the Bureau of Customs of a request for free entry and other privileged treatment for the arriving foreign representative. The Bureau then screens the request and, if it appears to be in order, approves it and so advises Customs officers at the port of intended arrival. Unless Customs Officers at the port have a valid reason to believe that the baggage of the arriving foreign representative contains contraband merchandise, no search will be made. Further, the baggage of the foreign representatives listed in sections 10.29(c) and (f) of the Customs Regulations is presently inviolable as previously stated. Diplomatic pouches are exempt from examination, of course.

On the other hand, when a foreign representative arrives in the United States unannounced, Customs officers at the port of entry examine his credentials (including his passport and visa) and determine at that time whether he is entitled to diplomatic immunity and exemption from baggage examination.

Personal baggage accompanying consular officers and their families is exempt from examination pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations unless Customs officers have serious reason to believe that it contains articles other than for official or personal use, or articles which are prohibited importation or exportation under the laws or regulations of the United States. That Convention has been ratified by the United States Senate.

At the present time, a task force within the Bureau of Customs is rewriting and clarifying the Customs Regulations pertaining to the inspection of diplomatic baggage.

The following figures, provided by the Department of State, give the approximate number of foreign nationals resident in Washington who have diplomatic immunity:

Attached to Embassies:	
Diplomats -----	1, 700
Employees -----	3, 200
Attached to diplomatic missions to OAS:	
Diplomats -----	100
Dependents of diplomats -----	85
Total -----	5, 085

¹ Excludes family members, for whom accurate statistics are not available.

SMUGGLING ON MILITARY TRANSPORT

Senator PERCY. How about our own? I wouldn't want to imply we are just concerned about people from abroad coming to this country; how about stopping it on military transport? How closely are we watching this? And I must say, I have observed at Air Force bases the laxity of import customs procedures, and we know, revealed in the

Government Operations Committee, in those hearings on the Southeast Asian problem, that American personnel were using General Abrams' plane to smuggle liquor in case lots.

Now, if they can bring in a hundred cases of liquor and get by with it, certainly using military transport with the number of planes we have got going back and forth must be a tremendous temptation, particularly with the thousands of American forces that are dealing with or are users of drugs, and the high incentive to bring it back in, not only for sale but for their own personal use if they are on it.

MILITARY AND DRUGS

Mr. ROSSIDES. This is one of our major concerns and one of the major reasons why we moved in as quickly as we did regarding the military and drugs a year and a half ago.

Two aspects: One, I frankly would like to say a word and congratulate the Department of Defense on its drug—antidrug abuse efforts. When we came in, the administration—the best pamphlet on drug abuse, frankly, was in the Department of Defense. They were alert; they were trying to get out information to the troops and so on.

Now, when it hit in December of 1969, the first really sizable evidence of No. 4 heroin going to our troops in Vietnam, I am frankly surprised the enemy had not tried to do that earlier, and then in 1970 a lot more, in the summer of 1970 much more. The Department of Defense moved quickly on a number of fronts, but the one front we were involved in, we immediately moved into a close customs-military working relationship to develop the manpower; the military did a lot of the customs work because we simply did not have the manpower, but DOD with its amnesty program tied into a tough predeparture inspection of troops coming back and their effects helped, in my judgment, to reduce a great deal of the drugs coming in.

I think the efforts of Dr. Jaffe, and the military personnel helped to reduce the percentage; but the key problem currently and for the future is the fact when you have over half a million Americans near the closest source of supply of opium that obviously a certain percentage of the fellows are going to develop contacts, techniques, procedures, routes, and personal contacts, that could develop a source of a smuggling route. This is why I said earlier that I felt that for the first time we were a little ahead of the game. We estimate up to 10 percent, 5 to 10 percent of the heroin in this country comes from opium produced in the Golden Triangle. The President and the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice, moved quickly and we now have country plans and our Ambassadors are working actively with these various countries. We have a long way to go, Senator, but for the first time at least it is out in the open and we are moving.

Senator PERCY. I have no further questions.

SURVEY TAKEN IN ILLINOIS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING

I would like just to comment on a survey that I took among my own constituents in Illinois, asking them two questions: "Where do you think Government should cut its spending?" The space program was very high, and the military.

Second, "Where would you like to see Government increase its spending?" Way ahead of anything else was drug abuse control.

I think one of the most popular bills we ever passed was the \$800 million to combat drug abuse, and certainly everyone in the country is recognizing that the high cost of crime, running in the tens of billions of dollars, is so directly related now to the fear they may have in their own homes. Heroin use in the Chicago area is spreading to the suburbs at a rate three times as fast as heroin use in our city areas, and crime is following right with it.

I really feel that an outstanding job is being done but probably all we can say is whatever we are doing is not enough.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir.

Senator PERCY. I think we will certainly support all of your efforts in this area.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Thank you.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPONG. Senator Church, do you have any questions?

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY LAST YEAR OF PATRICK MURPHY, NEW YORK CITY POLICE
COMMISSIONER

Last year, this committee had a hearing on international traffic in narcotics. We considered a number of bills that were then pending before the Senate, one of which in modified form was enacted into law dealing with the sources of heroin in foreign lands and what this Government could do to discourage the production of illegal poppy and the illegal traffic of heroin and derivatives. At that time, we had as one of our chief witnesses the police commissioner of the city of New York, Patrick Murphy, and I remember rather vividly his testimony.

He said:

I call for greater Federal efforts directed at the sources of illegal narcotics abroad because law enforcement at our borders, as intensive, well financed, and ingeniously equipped as it has been and promises to be, has not succeeded and probably cannot succeed in substantially reducing the flow of illegal drugs into this country. It is simply a physical impossibility to close our borders to the narcotics traffic as long as opium and heroin are available abroad to the hordes of parasites who consider the possibility of detection an acceptable risk to take in light of the fantastic profits they can make. Often enough unfortunately they succeed.

It has thus become obvious that no amount of money spent by local governments for narcotic enforcement can produce any substantial results while the sources of heroin remain unmolested.

In developing that point, he described the United States as though it were a sieve, the holes of which could not be plugged no matter how much money we spent even if we finally put the Armed Forces of the United States to constructive use such as trying to plug those holes. Even our Army, he testified, would be insufficient. We talked about the myriad of ways which heroin can be smuggled into this country no matter how elaborate the efforts is to prevent it from happening.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No, Senator, if you want me to elaborate I will be happy to. I don't want to get into a dispute with our distinguished commissioner in New York city. He is wrong; Japan has proven he is wrong about the question whether you can stop smuggling. You can stop it; you have to have a total war and it includes not just smuggling. If all you did was to depend on trying to stop smuggling,

forget it; you are not going to do it. If you allow a foreign government and foreign countries to produce it at will, to refine it at will, and have a massive amount coming in—

Senator PERCY. But you see that was his point.

Mr. ROSSIDES. No; wait a minute; if I may finish.

Senator PERCY. His point, as I understood it, was you have to reach the sources.

Mr. ROSSIDES. He is wrong there, too. That was what I wanted to get into.

Senator PERCY. You don't have to reach the sources?

MULTIDIMENSIONAL SUPPORT

Mr. ROSSIDES. You have to have multidimensional support which I believe the President—and with the full support of Congress embarked on earlier—and in my judgment, for the first time we are contending with the smugglers; for the first time we are getting them to take a step backward and it is—very quickly—on the enforcement end it is a several pointed program. Crucial is the need to stop the smuggling but also crucial is to get the various countries to do their job. It is idiocy to talk about the United States doing in this area what we have tried to do, say, in the military; it is not up to us to police the world on heroin enforcement but it is up to us, and the State Department has been doing this, to get France to contribute more people in its own interest to enforce it, which they are doing.

So if France is having tough enforcement internally and at its borders by customs, if Turkey is doing the same, if Mexico is doing the same and we are doing the same at our borders and internally, we can make the—we can put them out of business.

PROGRAM OF TOUGH TAX INVESTIGATION

Additionally, internally we have this program which I mentioned earlier of tough tax investigation; we have over 718 under investigation now to take the profit out, but it has now been determined, and I agree with you thoroughly, that the source, stopping the source, the idea of putting in the amount of money that would be required for crop substitution, is ludicrous. It was a misguided thought in the past and has led us to most of the problems we have today because less than 2 percent of the total production of opium would easily supply all the U.S. markets. So what are we going to do, hop from one country to another and another? But the effort and the agreement with Turkey was historic and of substantial importance because Turkey was the symbol and because she supplied about 80 percent of the opium that came in as heroin for this country.

My point is that—

UNITED STATES PAYS TURKEY

Senator PERCY. But we pay Turkey, do we not?

Mr. ROSSIDES. We have a program of crop substitution and effort which, in my judgment, is a sound one; but that is it. In other words—

Senator PERCY. But we pay Turkey, do we not?

Mr. ROSSIDES. We have an agreement to assist them in a cooperative effort.

Senator PERCY. Doesn't that involve money?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes.

Senator PERCY. Can't you answer my question?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes.

PROBLEM WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator PERCY. All right. Now, having paid Turkey for doing it, what kind of problem does this present with other countries? Should they ask equal treatment?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, Senator, but my point is, that is why I stressed the point that it was worth it in Turkey because they were the symbol and they supplied most of the heroin. We are not—we have now told these other countries we are not—"doing the same with you; it is your job to police your own area," because here, Senator, in this area we now have the opportunity; they are members of the U.N., with this protocol they will have to do more and if we beef up properly our own external and internal enforcement at the borders and internally we may not have to rely on whether or not a particular country is not cooperating because the rest of the world community will cooperate, and with the force of public opinion we can do it.

Senator PERCY. But you just said that 2 percent is enough. So suppose you get less than one or just one or two or three countries that don't cooperate, then don't we still have the problem?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, but then it would be easier to have the enforcement against them. Say a particular country X, and there are one or two that I don't feel are cooperating adequately, Senator, are transit points, say; well, you can concentrate your enforcement capability there so if any traffic is coming from those countries they are going to get a very special review. The development of intelligence—you are going to work in that particular area, so what I am trying to say is that for the first time we are turning the tide but we are so far down and we have a long way to go to get back up to where we were—I am basically optimistic; I think we have turned that tide.

PRESIDENT HAS DISCRETION TO WITHHOLD AID

This committee can help not just in this protocol but in the amendment passed last year about economic aid, for instance. My own feeling is you just don't deal with a country on isolated points, but we now have the statute which Treasury has been in favor of and Treasury has felt this before, that if a country is not cooperating, what is the sense of pouring millions into that country of any kind, whether it is a grant or loan.

Senator PERCY. And the law now permits the President discretion to withhold aid?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Correct, but we need the spotlight put on these countries by the Congress and media more and more.

TAKING PROFIT OUT OF DRUGS

Senator PERCY. Why wouldn't it be a great help to take the profit out of drugs?

Mr. ROSSIDES. It would be.

Senator PERCY. Isn't that the tremendous magnet that makes the whole system operate and makes it function through the underworld?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Correct, Senator, and this is one of the programs that we at the Treasury are most proud of. The President initiated last June of 1971, and we now have as of 11 months, June 1, 718 middle- and upper-echelon drug traffickers in 38 States, 51 metropolitan communities, under tough tax investigation and as of June 1 we collected more cash than was appropriated.

Senator PERCY. But to take the profit out of it—that way you have got to catch them, don't you?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No, no; that is my point. You say catch them. We don't have to catch them. The beauty of this is you don't have to catch them with the drugs. What we do is we have a target selection committee chaired by my office, composed of BNDD and the Bureau of Customs and the IRS. We have target screening to get at their targets; working with the State and local police we get additional targets, and one case I mentioned, in southern California, a major ring, the major ring in southern California, for years the narcotics agents, Federal and State, had been after them and we couldn't get the goods on them because they can insulate themselves from the goods at the street level. When we started this tax program we suddenly found out a lot of income had not been reported and we indicted one of that group and are going to be indicting several more. I say this is one of the most effective ways to do this.

Senator PERCY. What I wanted to suggest was something much more sweeping than this, a general availability to addicts through supervised clinics of free drug substitutes that would satisfy their craving so they wouldn't be forced to turn to robbery to get the money to buy drugs from the underworld. It seems to me that would be the most direct and effective method of taking the profit out for the criminal element and the pressure off of the addict.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, this is another part of the administration's program, the multidimensional approach on the research and rehabilitation and treatment, more money for the first time; before January 1969 it was zero—well, not zero but practically zero—the only two States really doing anything were New York State and California and for the first time I think it is \$300 or \$400 million appropriated in the special action passed by the Congress and the methadone program is one the administration has been pushing. If you are talking about methadone as the substitute, fine; I don't profess to be a doctor but I rely on my former boss, Senator Javits, when I was with him in the Attorney General's office—I relied on Senator Javits and Governor Rockefeller to say methadone is the way and the doctors I have talked to, fine, that does not mean methadone for everybody.

Senator PERCY. I understand.

Mr. ROSSIDES. That is part of it but in the District of Columbia, in Washington, D.C., earlier this year you may recall, Senator, the Washington Post, which has not been notoriously friendly to this administration, had an article pointing out that for the first time heroin supply was down, the availability, but it said that for the first time the treatment at clinics couldn't take the number that were coming but they did a little bit later.

Senator PERCY. Yes, but this is what makes me think that there is great promise in this clinic approach as a pressure valve——

Mr. ROSSIDES. Oh, yes.

Senator PERCY (continuing). To give addicts an alternative to having to deal with the criminal element, the underworld, and pay the price, the profit that the underworld now realizes from victimizing the heroin addict.

BRITISH SYSTEM

Senator SPONG. I was under the impression that Senator Church's question was much more probing than just methadone. Consequently, without reviewing what the administration has done, and what it hasn't done, would you comment on the British system?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Right. Well, he said substitute, sir.

Senator SPONG. He did?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Heroin maintenance is a myth. The British system is moving away from it. The Vera Institute program, in my judgment, is erroneous and counterproductive. There was a recent article in the New York Times by one of the members of the editorial board—I can't remember his name, and I would like to submit it for the record—who had a detailed article pointing out those few who were advocating heroin maintenance and had failed to reveal all the facts, and the British were moving away from it; it would be a disaster to the blacks, and it would be—I am not going to get into the medical aspects, but I would like to submit one article because it is a very interesting one.

Senator SPONG. We would be pleased to receive it.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, June 5, 1972]

FREE FIX FOR ADDICTS?

(By John A. Hamilton)

A free fix for junkies? An experimental program that gives heroin to heroin addicts under the label of "research"?

Community leaders in New York City, where a scaled-down proposal along this line is receiving renewed interest from the Lindsay administration, have denounced the idea as "a cruel hoax" and as "colonialist-type thinking." The nation's leading drug experts are also strongly opposed to the whole concept.

Dr. Vincent Dole of Rockefeller University, who developed the use of methadone in the treatment of heroin addiction, calls the thought of dispensing heroin itself "insanity." Dr. Jerome Jaffe, head of President Nixon's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, notes the need to supply addicts with as many as five shots of heroin daily and concludes that any heroin-dispensing program would prove "a logistical nightmare."

One of the founders of the British system for treating narcotics addicts, Dr. Richard Phillipson, shares these views. The British system rests on the treatment of addiction as an illness rather than as a crime and, for a while, this treatment consisted mostly of dispensing heroin to heroin addicts. Dr. Phillipson, who is now with the National Institute of Mental Health in Washington, warns against this nation's trying slavishly to follow his original model. He points out that while some heroin is still dispensed in Britain, the British system recently has been moving toward an increased use of methadone.

Nonetheless, despite all this, there are those who persist in advocating a heroin-dispensing program for New York City. The Vera Institute of Justice has presented a formal proposal to Mayor Lindsay's Narcotics Control Council and some members of this council are urging its implementation, linking the drug problem with the crime problem and arguing that if addicts received free heroin they would no longer rob to maintain their habits.

Such an argument may now have special appeal to Mayor Lindsay. Out flat emotionally after his futile Presidential foray, badly bruised in budgetary scuffles with both the City Council and the Board of Estimate, the Mayor is reported interested in launching new programs in problem areas that would at least give the appearance of innovation and activity.

But the fear of crime, as real as it is, and the need for a mayoral initiative are hardly persuasive reasons for launching a heroin program in the face of community and medical opposition. The proposal has serious flaws. It is said that heroin is essential to "lure" street addicts into treatment programs, but the truth of the situation in New York City is more the reverse. There are long waiting lists of addicts unable to gain entrance into existing treatment programs, especially the more successful methadone programs. There is less a need for a "lure" than for expansion of these programs. At Rikers Island and at the Tombs, the Manhattan House of Detention, men behind bars plead with medical visitors.

"Hey, man," one said to Dr. Dole recently, "I'm in here now. I've been in here before. I'll be in here again. I need to get into a drug program."

Dr. Dole told him that most programs were now full.

The methadone programs that Dr. Dole runs require funds. Any experimental heroin program would drain away funds. Where methadone can be administered once a day and addicts can be stabilized to hold jobs, heroin would have to be administered more often and addicts would continue to suffer the "highs" and "lows" that go with such addiction. The staffing of a heroin program would have to be double or triple or more that of a methadone program. Again, a drain on scarce funds.

Dr. Phillipson's "grave reservations" about giving addicts a free heroin fix find support in the most recent figures made available by the British Home Office. As of the end of 1970, these figures show that Britain had only 1,430 narcotics addicts, compared to the estimated 150,000 now in New York City. Of these addicts, the Home Office figures show that only 183 were being maintained on heroin. Another 254 were receiving a combination of heroin and methadone, while the bulk, some 738, were receiving methadone alone. A remaining group of 255 were listed as "therapeutic" addicts, having acquired their addictions from drugs taken during illnesses or operations; these were receiving a variety of other drugs.

Thus, the free fix that the British now give addicts is not usually a free heroin fix, as some advocates of a heroin program here seem to imply; on the contrary, the British are moving away from the use of heroin and toward the use of methadone. The Vera Institute's proposal for a heroin experiment has a section devoted to a discussion of the British system, but it somehow neglects to mention either Dr. Phillipson or the figures from the Home Office.

Senator SPONG. Mr. Ingersoll did not touch on this subject today, but he made a speech earlier this month in California in which he said substantially what you have just said, so I assume you concur in his views?

Mr. ROSSIDES. I have not read his speech, but I have discussed this with Dr. Jaffe, the medical adviser, and I concur definitely in that, what you are referring to—Mr. Ingersoll's remarks and Dr. Jaffe's position on this.

THRUST OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORT

Senator SPONG. I want to clarify several points in your replies to Senator Javits and Senator Church. I think the Turkish experience was a noble gesture on their part and a good thing on our part. But, do you advocate giving any priority to this method of curtailing abuse throughout the world?

Mr. ROSSIDES. Definitely not; that is correct, Mr. Chairman. I think it was well worth it regarding Turkey because she supplied so much of it here, but we are not about to be giving that kind of money to other countries just because they raise opium. The thrust of our diplomatic effort is to get each nation to meet its responsibilities to the interna-

tional community, to protocols and conventions that they are part of, and to their own people.

HEROIN MAINTENANCE

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, would you yield just one minute? I would like to say that heroin maintenance is a big problem for us in New York and I have thought it over very carefully and I have been active in this field since 1955, when I was Attorney General of New York, and I think in the totality our experience in this country, considering the black community and the poor community, I would now be against it, especially with methadone as a very feasible alternative.

DEGREE OF SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN MARIHUANA AND HEROIN

Senator SPONG. Thank you.

Now, one other question. I am not sure that I understood your answer to Senator Javits regarding the degree of surveillance and enforcement between marihuana and heroin. Would you discuss that in more detail?

Mr. ROSSIDES. What I meant is this, Mr. Chairman: We are concentrating on heroin so that if we had one man available and we have a tip on marihuana and heroin it is not a close question. If we had 10 tips on marihuana and three on heroin, those three would be on heroin; that is the thrust of it.

Along the border when a group is dealing with smuggling, as you saw from the film the other night, it can be heroin and marihuana so if we are tracking a plane we don't know whether it is heroin or marihuana, or an individual in a truck; that is my point. We seized 170,000 pounds of marihuana last year. These were major seizures along the border, and in cars and trucks, 300-pound lots, 500-pound lots, but we don't have the problem—I think the Senator is thinking more about the internal part when the local police—you are not going to be—you don't have the manpower to be worried about some kid that has possession of some marihuana; you are going after heroin but at the borders, we are stopping and investigating a smuggler.

Senator SPONG. You may have covered this in response to Senator Percy, but I want the record to reflect it fully.

DO ALL DIPLOMATS HAVE COURTESY OF PORT?

Do all diplomats have courtesy of the port, i.e., do they enter without the customary inspection by customs officials?

Mr. ROSSIDES. No, sir; we will submit the differentiation as to who does. Obviously, an Ambassador and obviously key officials and it does not mean an ambassador traveling through the country; he has to be accredited to that country. We will lay out those rules and it may be a fruitful area which we are pursuing with the State Department, maybe a fruitful area for further discussion with this committee. (See p. 34.)

Senator SPONG. Thank you very much for your testimony this morning.

Mr. ROSSIDES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. Mr. Bevans?

Mr. Bevans, we thank you for being here. And, I thank you for your patience. Because Mr. Ingersoll had to catch an airplane, we allowed him to testify earlier, but I think the more logical proceeding would have been to have heard from you first.

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES I. BEVANS, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY DONALD E. MILLER,
CHIEF COUNSEL, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS
DRUGS; AND G. JONATHAN GREENWALD, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL
ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. BEVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this distinguished committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you. I think the discussions this morning and statements made were most interesting. I am very glad to have with me this morning Mr. Donald E. Miller, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Mr. Miller was Alternate Representative of the United States to the United Nations Conference at Geneva this year to amend the Single Convention. Mr. Miller is at my right.

I also have at my left Mr. G. Jonathan Greenwald of the Legal Adviser's Office of the Department of State who also was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Conference in March of this year.

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to present its views on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

**AMENDMENTS RESULT OF INCREASED DRUG TRAFFIC, EXPERIENCE UNDER
SINGLE CONVENTION**

The amendments embodied in the protocol, which was submitted to the Senate by the President with his message of May 4, 1972, are the result of the terrifying increase in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and nearly 8 years of experience under the Single Convention. The development of the amendments and their adoption are a part of President Nixon's all-out effort to combat the scourge of drug abuse.

U.S. DELEGATION TO U.N. CONFERENCE IN GENEVA

At the United Nations Conference held in Geneva March 6 to 24, 1972, which adopted the Protocol, the U.S. delegation was headed by Ambassador Nelson G. Gross of the Department of State and, in addition to other members of the Department, the delegation included representatives of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and two congressional advisers, the Honorable Ancher Nelsen and the Honorable Charles B. Rangel.

The composition of this delegation reflects the representation of both the legislative and executive branches of the Government in the formulation of the amendments. The broad international interest in the amendments and acceptance of their provisions is reflected in the

sending by 97 States of representatives to the conference and by five other States of observers.

ADOPTION OF PROTOCOL

In adopting the protocol, 71 States voted in favor of it, none against, and 12 abstained. Up to June 23, 47 States had signed the protocol.

ADAMENDMENTS WILL BE OF SUBSTANTIAL VALUE

We believe that the amendments will be of substantial value in stemming the flood of illicit traffic by strengthening the international drug control machinery, assuring expert assistance to countries that need it in controlling drugs, facilitating the prosecution of narcotics laws offenders, and providing for national measures against the abuse of drugs.

Along with these benefits, we believe the many consultations, discussions throughout the world and the debates in the conference that led to the formulation and adoption of the amendments have sharpened a worldwide awareness of the dangers of drug abuse, and have impressed upon all nations the need for more effective international cooperation, better national controls and more active efforts to prevent the abuse of drugs.

AMENDMENTS STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

Most of the amendments have for their purpose the strengthening of the International Narcotics Control Board. Those amendments will:

(1) Increase the Board's present membership from 11 to 13; (2) assure better continuity by increasing the term of office from 3 years to 5 years, with a provision for staggered terms; (3) strengthen the independence of its administrative staff; (4) assign the Board explicit responsibility for preventing illicit cultivation of the opium poppy and the illicit production, manufacture and traffic in narcotic drugs, and for limiting the legal cultivation, production, manufacture, and use of drugs to the amount required for medical and scientific purposes; and (5) expand the types of information governments are to provide the Board; also expand sources of information beyond that supplied by governments and organs of the United Nations to include information supplied by the specialized agencies of the United Nations—including WHO, among others—and by other intergovernmental or international nongovernmental organizations with special competence in the drug field.

AUTHORIZATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS IN NEW AMENDMENTS

The new amendments will authorize the Board (1) to take action not only where it has reason to believe that the aims of the convention are being seriously endangered by the failure of any country to apply the convention but also in cases where there exists evidence that a country may become an important center of illicit activities regarding narcotic drugs; (2) to take the initiative in proposing that a study designed to develop remedial measures be conducted in a drug troubled area by the government concerned in cooperation with the Board; and

(3) to recommend to competent United Nations organs or to specialized agencies that technical and financial assistance be provided a government to carry out its obligations under the convention.

The Board is not only authorized but is also required, where there is a serious situation that needs cooperative action at the international level, to call the matter to the attention of the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs with appropriate recommendations. The Council in turn may then draw the attention of the General Assembly to the matter.

MEASURES EXPECTED TO INCREASE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF BOARD

One of the amendments creates a direct link by which, for the first time, States will be able to pass timely information to the Board on international illicit traffic and the Board will be authorized to take remedial action.

The Board is also authorized to require a State to reduce its legal production of opium when the Board considers that there is a link between production of opium in that country and the international illicit traffic.

These are the principal measures that are expected to substantially increase the authority and responsibility of the Board to curb excess production and manufacture of narcotic drugs and illicit drug activities.

PROVISIONS ON EXTRADITION EXPANDED

The provisions on extradition in the Single Convention will be expanded to include the substance of provisions embodied in the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (hijacking) to deny drug offenders a haven anywhere from prosecution. The amendments in this connection will rectify at one stroke the gap in those of our bilateral extradition treaties which do not presently cover narcotics offenses.

MEASURES REQUIRED OF PARTIES

The amendments requiring the parties to take measures for the prevention and abuse of drugs by education, treatment, aftercare, and rehabilitation of individuals as is provided in the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and to consider, where appropriate, the establishment of regional drug centers for scientific research and other cooperation are considered to be of substantial importance.

EFFECTS OF RATIFYING PROTOCOL

The Department of State is convinced that the amendments in the protocol will constitute an important improvement in international cooperation and controls regarding narcotic drugs.

The Department of State is also convinced that ratification of the protocol by the United States will encourage many other states to ratify and bring into force at an early date the many improvements that will be effected by entry into force of the protocol.

The protocol came into being within a relatively brief period as the result of the initiative taken by the United States; other countries will be expecting us to take the lead in ratifying it. Also, our ratification of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, now pending in the Senate, would encourage approval not only of that convention but also approval of the present protocol by other countries. The Department of State hopes the Senate will soon give its advice and consent to ratification of that convention and the Congress will enact the implementing legislation required for its application.

ADVICE AND CONSENT RECOMMENDED

For over 60 years the United States has been in a position of leadership in the development and continually strengthening international controls over drugs subject to abuse. We believe that leadership is especially important at the present time.

The Department of State joins with the President in strongly recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the protocol.

Senator SPONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Bevans.

PROSPECTS FOR WIDESPREAD RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOL

What are the prospects for widespread ratification of the protocol?

Mr. BEVANS. Mr. Chairman, we consider those prospects to be good. We had a total of 97 countries participating in the conference directly, with five others having observed there; 47 of them had signed at the time we received the latest report, June 23, 71 voted to adopt it; no one voted against the convention; 12 countries present abstained.

ABSTENTION OF 12 STATES

Senator SPONG. Why did 12 states abstain and can you tell me or furnish for the record a list of the States that did?

Mr. BEVANS. We will be glad to.

Senator SPONG. Fine.

(The information referred to follows:)

TWELVE STATES WHICH ABSTAINED AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN THE VOTE TO ADOPT THE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION

(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)

The twelve states which abstained at the Geneva Conference in the vote to adopt the Protocol Amending the Single Convention were Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Some of the states that abstained explained their reasons for doing so.

Burma explained that it was in general agreement with the broad principles underlying the amendments but abstained because it considered some would be difficult to implement in the sensitive circumstances prevalent in Burma.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explained that it abstained from voting on the Protocol as a whole because it contained a number of provisions unacceptable to it. It considered it inappropriate that the Protocol's provisions extended to States which were not parties to the Convention, particularly since Article 40 of the Convention prevented a number of States from becoming parties.

The USSR was also opposed to the granting of extensive powers to the Board and objected to the Board's determining the drug requirements of States. It welcomed, however, the spirit of understanding and compromise which had led to the adoption of an article on reservations which would enable reservations in respect of a number of articles, in particular those which were not acceptable to the USSR.

Bulgaria explained that it abstained for the reasons stated by the USSR.

Poland explained that it abstained because it could not understand the insistence upon amending the provisions of the Convention with respect to the powers of the Board regarding annual estimates of drugs; that it opposed the inclusion of an amendment giving the Board authority with respect to the amount of opium that may be produced. It also stated that the fact that several countries had been prevented from attending the Conference was contrary to the universal approach necessary for a successful fight against drug abuse.

Mr. BEVANS. In many instances, the state that did not sign at the Conference just had not made up its mind at that time. It wanted to study the protocol further.

(The following information was subsequently supplied by the witness:)

In other instances the Delegation was not provided with full powers by its government which wished to reserve the option until it had studied the protocol. Then, again, there are a few States which have not signed or adhered to the Convention and they may not sign the protocol until they take that step.

Senator SPONG. New York kept doing that during the ratification of the Constitution or something; they abstained forever. We would, for the record, however, like to have a list of those which abstained. (See p. 47.)

SANCTIONS AGAINST NATIONS REFUSING COMPLIANCE WITH BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Are there any effective sanctions against those nations which refuse to comply with International Narcotics Control Board recommendations?

Mr. BEVANS. Mr. Chairman, we have considerably strengthened those sanctions. We continue to have the recommendatory embargo. We did not succeed in getting the mandatory embargo. We don't feel that was a great loss because even though we have had the recommendatory embargo provision in conventions for some 30 years, they have never recommended an embargo against any state. They have considered it at times but they didn't find it necessary. They got action.

We do believe that by the formulation and negotiation of this protocol we have aroused a worldwide interest, and we have taken the leadership which will be followed in faithfully applying the protocol; but just having the protocol itself, we do not think, is going to be enough. Like any treaty, you have to have the public officials and the public back you up to have it enforced and we believe that that will continue to exist.

PARTICIPATION IN PROTOCOL

Senator SPONG. I asked this question of Mr. Ingersoll and he referred it to you, so I will repeat it:

There is a significant disparity between the number of parties to the Single Convention and the number of countries which have thus far signed the protocol expanding the powers of the International

Narcotics Control Board. Do you attach any significance to this and do you expect full participation in the protocol as well?

Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir; I do expect full participation in the protocol. We must remember it was just in March that this protocol was adopted and it was a hardfought conference. We didn't get everything we asked for but we accomplished a great deal and I am fully confident that all the states party to the Single Convention will eventually become parties to this protocol.

Now, of course, the first 40, the required number to bring it into force, are the hardest ones to obtain but once an international instrument like this is brought into force, the momentum increases for approving it by ratification or coming in separately by accession.

Senator SPONG. So your answer is that you do not attach any significance to the present disparity and you anticipate full participation?

Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator SPONG. All right, sir.

HANDLING TURKEY UNDER PROTOCOL PROCEDURES

In the case of Turkey, considerable expense is anticipated in adjusting their economy from its reliance on opium production. How would Turkey have been handled under the procedures provided by the protocol had there been no other assistance and no other agreement?

Mr. BEVANS. We—Mr. Chairman—I do believe that we would have had some progress in having Turkey improve her control of the drugs there; but I don't think we would have been able to do it in time to accomplish the objective which we believe we are accomplishing by Turkey's having reached the decision to discontinue altogether the production of opium. It is one of those matters, I think, very much of time and I do not anticipate that this protocol is going to cure every evil of the drug traffic and drug abuse. It is only one of many measures but we consider it a very important one of the measures required.

EFFECT OF PROTOCOL ON NEED FOR BILATERAL DRUG AGREEMENTS

Senator SPONG. The United States presently has bilateral drug agreements with several countries, including France and Mexico. Does the protocol either increase or diminish the need for such additional agreements?

Mr. BEVANS. I would say in the course of time it would decrease the need but I would say that it would not replace it altogether and I think we are going to still continue to need such agreements at least until the protocol enters into force and even after that I believe we will need some, but I believe it will decrease that need, but I can't say it will replace it.

WILL COUNTRIES RESTRICTING POPPY PRODUCTION REQUIRE AID?

Senator SPONG. The United States is scheduled to provide \$35 million to Turkey over several years for crop substitution and other activities to curb poppy growth. Does the State Department believe similar aid will be required for other countries which we hope to induce to restrict production?

Mr. BEVANS. Mr. Chairman, I think that depends very much on the circumstances, upon the urgency of the particular case and whether some other measures might be effective. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is conducting a very intensive course of training and supplying equipment and other materials like that to help countries to do better law enforcement in order to have better controls and the like. So it is difficult to say ahead of time just what would have to be done in a particular case.

The Turkish case, I think, was one of the most urgent cases and required the action that was taken in the supplying of the funds.

REACTION OF TURKISH PEOPLE

Senator SPONG. Does the State Department have any reports on the reaction of the Turkish people to the agreement banning poppy production?

Mr. BEVANS. Well, the reports that I have seen have indicated that they are going along with what their government requires of them. Of course, whether they are Turks or whether any other people, farmers are among the most conservative people in the world and when you have generation after generation accustomed to growing a particular crop it takes a good bit of doing to get them to change, but we are optimistic about the program succeeding.

CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

Senator SPONG. Is the United States currently negotiating drug agreements with any other countries believed to be sources of illicit drugs?

Mr. BEVANS. Well, when you ask if we are negotiating drug agreements it would depend upon what particular kinds. We are negotiating agreements to give technical assistance training for better policing and better finding and locating of illegal cultivation of the opium poppy, better customs inspection and the like. I am not aware of any other country right now in which we are giving aid on a scale comparable to that in the case of Turkey.

Senator SPONG. Are you including within the activities of technical assistance, encouragement for growing crops that are alternative to the opium poppy?

Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir. That would be very much along that line and would bring our Department of Agriculture into the picture in assisting with those matters.

Senator SPONG. Senator Pearson?

Senator PEARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AREAS OF DISAPPOINTMENT

Mr. Bevens, I want to compliment you and those who negotiated this agreement for getting what you did. Of course, we never achieve all of the goals in international conferences that we seek, but what were some of the points of agreement that were considered to be of major importance that were not subject to agreement? Where, may I ask you, were your areas of disappointment?

Mr. BEVANS. Well, actually, we started out by seeking more than we proposed during the conference. We had a team headed by Ambassador Popper, our Ambassador to Cyprus, and Ambassador Jova, our Ambassador to the Organization of American States, who consulted with many governments to ascertain just what measure of agreement might be reached at the Conference. As a result of those consultations, our proposals were shaken down pretty close to what we obtained in the Conference. We were asking for a mandatory embargo, for example, and that was given up; we were asking for a particular right of local inquiry which was transformed into a provision for on-the-spot study. I don't think we lost much in these changes.

IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENTS

Senator PEARSON. You indicate that the amendments will strengthen the International Narcotics Control Board and that the amendments would further authorize the board to, for example, prevent the illicit cultivation of the opium poppy and take action where there is reason to believe that the aims of the conventions are not being seriously carried forward. How are you going to do that? What is the implementation?

Mr. BEVANS. Well, we look at the system, how it works; each country is required to give an annual estimate of the amount of drugs that it is going to require for consumption, the amount it is going to need to manufacture other drugs and the like.

The country is also required to submit annually statistics on the amounts of drugs it actually produced, imported and exported, consumed, utilized in manufacturing other drugs and drugs seized. The Board examines any disparity between the estimates and the statistics and where it finds there is an excess of amounts in the statistics they look into that and try to find out why it exists. If the statistics exceed the estimates for the year the country concerned will be asked to cut back that much in the next year unless it can show a good reason for the increase. With respect to the production of opium, we have been able to obtain in this Protocol a requirement of reporting on the amount of opium that is going to be planted, on the amount that is expected to be produced, so that the Board can look ahead and estimate better what the world supply of opium is going to be for medical purposes.

Senator PEARSON. I wish you would put it in the record. That bell is a vote.

(The information referred to follows:)

STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR PEARSON'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY GIVEN THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

(Supplied by Department of State)

Article 2 of the Protocol amends Article 9 of the Single Convention by adding to that article an additional paragraph reading as follows:

"4. The Board, in co-operation with Governments, and subject to the terms of this Convention, shall endeavour to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of drugs."

In its application of the provisions of the above-quoted new paragraph 4 of Article 9, the Board may exercise the additional authority granted it in other amendments to the Single Convention. For example, under Article 6 of the Protocol the Board may take action not only on the basis of information submitted to it by Governments under the Single Convention or of information communicated by United Nations Organs but also on the basis of information communicated to it by specialized agencies of the United Nations or by other governmental organizations or international non-governmental organizations which have direct competence in the matter. This substantially broadens the Board's sources of information for asking explanations from governments, making recommendations to governments, or taking other action under the Convention. If the Board has reason to believe that the aims of the Convention are being seriously endangered by the reason of the failure of any country or territory to carry out the terms of the Convention, the Board may propose to the government concerned the opening of consultations or request it to furnish explanations. Even if there is no failure on the part of a country in applying the Convention, but it has become, or there exists serious evidence that it may become, an important center of illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of, or traffic in or consumption of drugs, the Board may propose to the government concerned the opening of consultations. These new provisions permit much earlier and broader action by the Board in the taking of measures to correct a dangerous situation before it becomes too serious and to look into situations that it could not consider under the Convention in the absence of the Protocol.

After taking such action the Board may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so, call upon the government concerned to adopt remedial measures as would seem under the circumstances to be necessary for the execution of the provisions of the Convention.

The Board may also under the amendments, if it thinks such action necessary, propose to the government concerned that a study be carried out on its territory. The Board may, at the request of the government concerned, make available the expertise of one or more persons to assist the government in the study. If the Board finds that the government concerned has failed to give satisfactory explanations, or has failed to adopt any remedial measures which it has called for, or if there is a serious situation that needs cooperative action at the international level with a view to remedying it, it may call the attention of the parties, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to the matter. It is required to do this in especially serious situations. The Council may in turn draw the attention of the General Assembly to the matter. These amendments will give the Board a considerable increase in authority to obtain full information regarding a dangerous situation, supply expert assistance to a country when needed, encourage a country to take necessary measures to curb drug traffic, and provide, for the first time, consideration by the most representative United Nations political organ when a particularly grave situation warrants activity at that high level.

The Board may, when taking the above-mentioned measures, recommend that the parties stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to a country concerned, either for a designated period or until the Board is satisfied as to the situation in the territory. Although never used, the authority to recommend an embargo is considered to be an important residual power for use, or potential use, in certain circumstances.

The Board may, with the agreement of the government concerned, recommend to the competent United Nations organs and to the specialized agencies that technical or financial assistance, or both, be provided to a government to carry out its obligations under the Convention. This is an important recognition—for the first time in a drug control treaty—that simple police measures may not always be enough and that in some instances a state that wishes to do a better job may have a complex social and economic problem that the appropriate international bodies will have to assist it with.

If under Article 11 of the Protocol the Board finds that a country has not limited the opium produced within its borders to licit purposes in accordance with relevant estimates and that a significant amount of such opium produced, whether licitly or illicitly, has been introduced into the illicit traffic, the Board may decide to deduct all or a portion of such amount from its estimated production for the next year in which such a deduction can be technically accomplished. If the situation is not satisfactorily resolved the Board may take the measures mentioned above. This amendment gives the Board a clear mandate to take measures

necessary to curb the production of opium where a clear link to the illicit traffic has been established.

Under Article 5 of the Protocol the Board may, with the consent of a government concerned, amend the annual estimates submitted by that government and, in case of disagreement between the government and the Board, the latter may establish, communicate and publish its own estimates for the information of states dealing with that government. This provision, which is in addition to the special power with respect to the estimate for production of opium, will have a salutary effect in keeping estimates closer to actual needs for drugs.

The foregoing are the most important of the additional measures that may be taken by the Board. With specific authority and responsibility for limiting the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an amount adequate for medical and scientific purposes and a mandate to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of drugs, the Board will be able to function far more effectively after the Protocol is brought into force. The new powers are far-reaching and emphasize the need for governments to be cooperative and activist in drug control. They rely to a considerable extent on high visibility public disclosure and discussion of serious problem situations. No state wishes to be considered soft on drug control and we do not think any government will regard these powers lightly. We think, therefore, that these powers and this Protocol will substantially increase the possibility of meaningful action to implement the high aims of the Convention.

Senator SPONG. We will recess for 10 minutes while we go vote, and we will then come back.

Senator PERCY, would you like to ask questions now?

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, did the bell just ring? I wonder if it would be all right if I asked the three or four questions that I have?

Senator SPONG. You proceed and I will go vote and then come back.
Senator PERCY. Very fine. Thank you.

EXTRADITION PROVISIONS OF PROTOCOL

The questions I have, Mr. Bevans, deal, first, with the extradition process.

Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir.

Senator PERCY. I know this is a difficult one to negotiate in view of the differing systems of justice that various countries have. Is there any likelihood that the extradition provisions of the protocol would be controversial enough to retard the pace of ratification?

Mr. BEVANS. I doubt it, Senator Percy, because the protocol provides that the provisions therein on extradition are subject to the constitutional limitations of a party, its legal system and domestic law. This gives a country considerable leeway in deciding whether it can apply those provisions. We feel that it supplies a workable framework which would be available to any country that really wants to make a serious effort to extradite and we believe the world interest is aroused to the point where they are going to deny any haven to offenders of the narcotics laws.

(The following information was subsequently supplied by the witness:)

Furthermore, the language of the Protocol under which narcotics offenses are to be deemed to be included in bilateral extradition treaties is taken from the 1970 Hijacking Conventions, which has already been signed by 81 countries and has been ratified or acceded to by 36 countries and is presently in force.

Senator PERCY. From our standpoint, with what countries will this provision prove the most useful?

Mr. BEVANS. It would be the countries from which opium is flowing into the United States or from which operations are conducted but where our present bilateral extradition treaties do not cover narcotics offenses. We would close this gap immediately once this Protocol is in force and, although we are pursuing as fast as we can the amendment of our existing bilateral extradition treaties, that will require considerable time and we don't know when we shall have all those treaties amended.

PROCEDURES TO GET BOARD TO ORDER OPIUM PRODUCTION REDUCTION

Senator PERCY. What procedures would a state have to take to get the Board to order a reduction in production of opium? In other words, could an approach by the United States alone bring about a reduction order?

Mr. BEVANS. If the United States found that there was evidence of some other states piling up opium which might have a tendency to seep into the illicit market, we could report that to the Board and ask that something be done about it. The Board would be entitled to look into the situation and take appropriate action including a reduction of opium production where circumstances warrant.

WOULD TREATY PRECLUDE DOMESTIC REFORM IN MARIHUANA LAWS?

Senator PERCY. Now, my last areas may have been covered by previous witnesses before I was able to come in, but I think because of your own responsibility, duplication here may be desirable, certainly in view of Senator Javits' concern also.

As I understand the treaty, it requires all parties to maintain domestic criminal penalties against the use, possession, or trafficking in marihuana. Now, as we know, we have had many commissions which have taken positions on this. The President's Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse recently recommended the elimination of all criminal penalties for private use of marihuana. This approach has been supported by the Le Dain Commission in Canada, two committees of the American Bar Association, the Committee on Crime headed by John Finletter, former deputy director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and others.

My specific question is, would the treaty if ratified preclude this domestic reform in the marihuana laws?

Mr. BEVANS. The provisions in the single Convention applicable to marihuana must be considered in the light of the definitions at the beginning of that Convention. Marihuana is a member of the Cannabis family of plants. Cannabis is defined in article 1 of the convention as meaning the flowering or fruiting tops of the Cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and the leaves when not accompanied by the tops), from which the resin has not been extracted and by whatever name they may be designated.

Then Cannabis resin is defined as meaning the separated resin, whether crude or purified, obtained from the Cannabis plant; and then we have the Cannabis plant defined as any plant of the genus Cannabis.

But in examining through those provisions, one will find the statements regarding Cannabis are general; for example, article 28, paragraph 3 of the Single Convention provides that the parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of and illicit traffic in the leaves of the Cannabis plant.

Now, it seems to me that the misuse of the leaves is essentially in this particular case a matter for national legislation but you would be obliged to prevent illicit traffic in the leaves of this plant—

Senator PERCY. Well, just the usage, because I think this could really be a hangup in our ratification of this treaty, if we could not remove the use of marihuana from the criminal category.

Mr. BEVANS. May I ask my colleague, Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. Senator, there is a paper that was prepared by a distinguished lawyer in Boston, William Chayet, for the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. He conducted a survey of the requirements of the Single Convention and he came to the conclusion that the United States is not obligated under the provisions of article 36 to maintain imprisonment penalties—

Senator PERCY. I am very sorry I am going to have to leave; otherwise, I will miss this vote.

(The following information was subsequently supplied:)

ANSWER TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY TO MR. BEVANS

Question: Would the protocol, if ratified, preclude domestic reform in the marihuana laws? Despite the mounting evidence that mere users of marihuana should not be defined as criminal, would the Congress be barred by international law from enacting the recommendations of the Marihuana Commission?

Answer: The Protocol is compatible with the liberalizing trends in United States drug legislation which reduce penalties on users as well as with the further liberalizing trends with respect to marihuana recommended by the groups you have mentioned.

The Single Convention, to which of course the United States is already a party, requires the United States to adopt such measures as will ensure that production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of cannabis or marihuana, as any other drug controlled by the Convention, will be limited exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. It does not specify the precise measures a party should take but it requires that activity in cannabis or marihuana contrary to the Convention "shall be punishable offenses when committed intentionally, and that serious offenses shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty."

The Protocol introduces significant additional flexibility into these provisions by providing that "when abusers of drugs have committed such offenses, the Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition to conviction or punishment, that such abusers shall undergo measures of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration . . ." This provision would leave it to the discretion of the United States whether it wished to provide criminal penalties for use of marihuana, perhaps including imprisonment, or whether it wished to discourage misuse of the drug through other means such as education. Ratification of the Protocol would thus increase the range of options open to us.

Senator PERCY. I will submit my question for the record because I think it should be answered. I have one other question.

Mr. BEVANS. May I give you a reply in writing?

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much indeed.

(Short recess.)

Senator SPONG. I apologize for that interruption, Mr. Bevans.

Senator Percy did not complete his questioning. He will submit his question to you for the record, which will be held open.

Mr. BEVANS. Thank you, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

ANSWER TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY TO MR. BEVANS

Question: The decisions as to which drugs should be controlled by the Psychotropic Convention, and on which schedule they should be placed, would be made by the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which is not a health or scientific body. Can recommendations of the World Health Organization be ignored by the Commission in favor of "economic, social, legal, administrative or other factors"?

Answer: Recommendations communicated by the World Health Organization to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs regarding controls over a substance under the Convention on Psychotropic Substances can not simply be ignored by the Commission. Although the Commission is empowered to make the final determination whether a particular substance with respect to which the Organization communicates a recommendation shall be controlled or the existing controls over a substance shall be changed, the Commission is required to take into account, "the communication from the World Health Organization, whose assessments shall be determinative as to medical and scientific matters."

Article 2 of the Convention, which provides in paragraph 4 for the making by the Organization of assessments of substances and for the communication of those assessments with recommendations regarding controls, provides in paragraphs 5 and 6 as follows:

"5. The Commission, taking into account the communication from the World Health Organization, whose assessments shall be determinative as to medical and scientific matters, and bearing in mind the economic, social, legal, administrative and other factors it may consider relevant, may add the substance to Schedule I, II, III or IV. The Commission may seek further information from the World Health Organization or from other appropriate sources.

"6. If a notification under paragraph 1 relates to a substance already listed in one of the Schedules, the World Health Organization shall communicate to the Commission its new findings, any new assessment of the substance it may make in accordance with paragraph 4 and any new recommendations on control measures it may find appropriate in the light of that assessment. The Commission, taking into account the communication from the World Health Organization as under paragraph 5 and bearing in mind the factors referred to in that paragraph, may decide to transfer the substance from one Schedule to another or to delete it from the Schedules."

The above-quoted provisions were formulated and adopted on the basis of many years of experience by representatives of governments in dealing with the placing of drugs under international controls. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs is composed of dedicated and conscientious individuals and their views are based upon the advice of health authorities and other authorities of their respective governments. Their views are very strongly health-oriented as is indicated by the composition of the delegations participating in the twenty-fourth session of the Commission. Thirteen of the twenty-four member states of the Commission were represented by authorities of health agencies. Sixteen alternate representatives and advisers were from health agencies. Twenty-five of the individuals participating had the title of doctor. It would seem unthinkable that such individuals would not be sincere in taking into account the assessments and recommendations of the World Health Organization and be equally assiduous in seeking to solve public health and social problems resulting from the abuse of drugs. The decisions taken by the Commission with respect to controls over psychotropic substances and over preparations containing those substances are required by the Convention to be taken by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Commission.

U.S. FOREIGN AID WHICH HAS GONE INTO DRUG PROGRAMS

Senator SPONG. I would like, for the record, to ask you to provide a country-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assist-

ance which has gone into drug programs in the past 5 years. (See p. 61.)

PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG EFFORTS

I would also like to ask you if there are other nations participating in international drug efforts outside their borders. For example, are other nations contributing adequately to the U.N. Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control? Have other nations sent personnel into still other nations to work on drug control?

Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir.

Senator SPONG. Could you respond to the last question?

Mr. BEVANS. About whether they are adequately contributing to the U.N. fund?

Senator SPONG. I asked: (1) if there are other nations participating in international drug efforts outside their own borders; and (2) if other nations are contributing adequately to the United Nations special fund for drug abuse control; and (3) if other nations have sent personnel into other countries to work on drug control.

Mr. BEVANS. We have some figures here, Senator. I could read them to you, if you wish me to do so with respect to the U.N. fund that you mentioned.

Taking our own contributions first, of \$2 million, Canada, \$150,000; France, \$100,000; the Federal Republic of Germany, \$310,482; the Holy See, \$1,000; Morocco, \$2,000; Saudi Arabia, \$2,000; Sweden, \$20,790; Turkey, \$5,000; Vietnam, \$1,000; and then we have a non-governmental figure, \$6,830, which brings those contributions to \$2,099,102.

Senator SPONG. Of which how much is ours?

Mr. BEVANS. Ours is \$2 million of that. Now, we have some pledges; may I mention those? The pledges now made and existing are Canada, \$250,000—

Senator SPONG. In addition to the amount they have already contributed?

Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir. I understand that is additional. They have given \$150,000 and they have pledged an additional \$250,000; Cyprus \$2,550; Greece, \$2,000; Iran, \$5,000; Italy, \$101,350; Norway, for the fiscal year 1973, \$41,580; the United Kingdom, \$125,000; which is a total of existing pledges of \$602,106.

Unspecified pledges of contributions have been made by Argentina and Switzerland. India has offered to contribute expertise, training, and educational facilities.

Senator SPONG. In addition to the moneys subscribed or pledged, are there any nations participating in drug efforts outside their own borders?

Mr. BEVANS. May I ask Mr. Miller if he will answer that?

Senator SPONG. Yes.

Mr. MILLER. I can try to address myself to that, Mr. Chairman. There have been officers from France in the United States; in fact, in the agreement that was worked out with France between the Attorney General of the United States and the Minister of Interior of France it was in the agreement for a French officer to be stationed in the United States.

Additionally, Mexican officers, frequently, from time to time, and working in cooperation with U.S. officers in border areas come across to assist in investigation. Likewise, the Mounties from Canada frequently come into the United States helping us in a case; but insofar as the concept of stationing officers in other countries is concerned, this really is entirely a U.S. effort. Other countries have not engaged in that type of program yet. We are now concentrating on having schools in foreign countries training foreign officers on how to conduct drug investigations. Hopefully, the concept will spread.

Senator SPONG. Is Germany doing anything beyond its borders?

Mr. MILLER. I have heard that Germany is working to some extent in Afghanistan to help their police set up better law enforcement measures generally, and included in that would be drug control efforts.

Senator SPONG. Mr. Ingersoll earlier this morning mentioned the difficulties in Germany proper because of the federal structure of its government. Do you share his view that there will be a national effort in Germany in the near future?

Mr. MILLER. Oh, indeed, I think it is well on its way.

Senator SPONG. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Senator Percy will submit his questions and I will look forward to anything documented that you want to give in response to a question I put to you.

The hearing is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the committee to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX

JUNE 29, 1972.

Mr. CHARLES I. BEVANS,
Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. BEVANS: Pursuant to the hearing on June 27 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, I would appreciate it if you, on behalf of the Department of State, would supply the following information for the hearing record:

1. A list of the countries with which the U.S. has bilateral agreements relating to drug control.
2. A country-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assistance which has gone into drug programs in the past five years, together with an indication of the specific purpose for which the funds have been used.
3. A listing of contributions by the U.S. and other nations throughout the world to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control.
4. A summary of activities undertaken by other nations to curb the drug trade outside their borders. (There is no need to include participation in the Single Convention, since we already have a list of those nations.)
5. A summary of activities undertaken by the Department of State to restrict the international flow of illegal drugs.
6. A list of the 12 nations which abstained from signing the Protocol.
7. A list of nations which are considered potential sources of illegal drugs but which have not signed the Convention.
8. A country-by-country breakdown of the number of State Department personnel abroad engaged in drug control work with an indication of the exact activities in which they are involved.

How do these personnel figures compare with similar figures for 5, 10 and 20 years ago?

9. In which countries have personnel in the Department of State been most active in efforts to control drugs? Has this pattern changed over the past five years, and do you expect it to change in the next several years?

10. Which diplomats have "courtesy of the port," i.e., which ones can enter without the customary inspection by customs officials?

What evidence is there that diplomatic immunity is being abused with respect to drugs? Are diplomats from one part of the world believed to be abusing diplomatic immunity more than those from other parts?

Thank you for your assistance on these matters.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., July 14, 1972.

Hon. WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR.,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPONG: I thank you for your letter of June 29, 1972 requesting, pursuant to the hearing on June 27 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, that I supply on behalf of the Department of State certain information for the hearing record.

The Department of State appreciates this opportunity to supply in the enclosures to this letter information on the following items set forth in your letter:

1. A list of the countries with which the U.S. has bilateral agreements relating to drug control. (Tab 1)
2. A country-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assistance which has gone into drug programs in the past five years, together with an indication of the specific purpose for which the funds have been used. (Tab 2)
3. A listing of contributions by the U.S. and other nations throughout the world to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control. (Tab 3)
4. A summary of activities undertaken by other nations to curb the drug trade outside their borders. (There is no need to include participation in the Single Convention, since we already have a list of those nations.) (Tab 4)
5. A summary of activities undertaken by the Department of State to restrict the international flow of illegal drugs. (Tab 5)
6. A list of the 12 nations which abstained from signing the Protocol. (Tab 6)
7. A list of nations which are considered potential sources of illegal drugs but which have not signed the Convention. (Tab 7)
8. A country-by-country breakdown of the number of State Department personnel abroad engaged in drug control work with an indication of the exact activities in which they are involved.

How do these personnel figures compare with similar figures for 5, 10 and 20 years ago? (Tab 8)

9. In which countries have personnel in the Department of State been most active in efforts to control drugs? Has this pattern changed over the past five years, and do you expect it to change in the next several years? (Tab 9)

10. Which diplomats have "courtesy of the port," i.e., which ones can enter without the customary inspection by customs officials? (Tab 10)

What evidence is there that diplomatic immunity is being abused with respect to drugs? Are diplomats from one part of the world believed to be abusing diplomatic immunity more than those from other parts?

I hope that the enclosed information will be useful to you. If I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES I. BEVANS,
Assistant Legal Adviser.

[Enclosures: Tabs 1-10.]

1. COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
RELATING TO DRUG CONTROL

Austria	Italy
Belgium	Japan
Bolivia	Laos
Cambodia	Mexico
Canada	Netherlands
China, Republic of	Poland
Cuba	Portugal
Czechoslovakia	Romania
Denmark	Spain
Ecuador	Switzerland
Egypt	Thailand
France	Turkey
Germany, Federal Republic	United Kingdom
Greece	Viet-Nam
India	Yugoslavia

2. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BREAKDOWN OF AMOUNT OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WHICH HAS GONE INTO DRUG PROGRAMS DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS

*AID assistance in narcotics control*¹

	<i>Thousands</i>
Fiscal year 1967: Turkey, agricultural development and control loan----	\$3,000
Fiscal year 1970:	
Mexico, Enforcement equipment (grant)-----	1,000
Fiscal year 1972:	
Vietnam -----	500
Public safety-----	450
Customs advisers-----	50
Thailand -----	1,046
Customs survey-----	16
Drug abuse research-----	30
BNDD program ² -----	1,000
Laos -----	1,100
Public safety advisers and equipment-----	107
Customs advisers and equipment-----	514
Treatment and rehabilitation-----	111
Special narcotics investigation group (equipment)-----	66
Program support including project manager, Air America Inspection Service, Air Support, Communications-----	302
Turkey -----	15,700
Foreign exchange compensation-----	5,000
TMO—Collection final crop-----	300
Agriculture Development including Agricultural Advisers-----	10,400
Philippines: Public Safety including advisers, equipment and participants	230
Bolivia: Bolivia narcotics brigade budget support-----	19
Argentina: Customs training in United States -----	12
International organization: U.N. Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control ²	2,000
Interregional costs-----	25
Total -----	20,632

¹ Training in narcotics control has been a regular feature of the Office of Public Safety Police Academy in Washington since 1962. Additionally, as part of AID's regular public safety program, narcotics advisory assistance had been provided to Vietnam prior to fiscal year 1972.

² Funds transferred to another U.S. agency for implementation.

NOTE.—Additionally the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) regularly conducts training programs for foreign officers. Since 1968 BNDD has given intensive drug enforcement training to approximately 2,000 law enforcement officers from 56 foreign countries, including the areas of Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America, the Near East and South Asia. BNDD estimates the total expenditure for this 5-year program to be nearly \$500,000.

3. CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE U.S. AND OTHER NATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND FOR DRUG CONTROL

<i>Contributions Paid</i>	
United States-----	\$2,000,000
Canada-----	150,000
France-----	100,000
Germany, Federal Republic-----	310,482
Holy See-----	1,000
Morocco-----	2,000
Saudi Arabia-----	2,000
Sweden-----	20,790
Turkey-----	5,000
Vietnam-----	1,000
Nongovernmental-----	6,830
	2,590,102

<i>Pledges</i>	
Canada-----	\$250,000
Cyprus-----	2,550
Greece-----	2,000
Iran-----	5,000
Italy-----	101,350
Norway-----	74,626
Sweden (Fiscal Year 1973)-----	41,580
United Kingdom-----	125,000
	602,106

NOTE.—In addition, India has offered to contribute expertise, training, and educational facilities.

4. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER NATIONS TO CURB THE DRUG TRADE OUTSIDE THEIR BORDERS

Outstanding example of drug control cooperation with the United States by other nations—Canada, France, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and others—are set forth in "United States Foreign Policy 1971, A Report by the Secretary of State" (see Tab 5, paragraphs 8-16).

Thirteen other nations sent top-ranking police officials to a two-week seminar sponsored in Washington in September 1971 by BNDD together with the narcotic control agencies of France and Canada. The participants discussed all aspects of the international drug traffic and the means of combatting it.

The meeting in Canberra, Australia, in November 1971 of regional enforcement officers was a first step toward increased regional cooperation on efforts to cope with the growth, production and trafficking in illicit drugs in Southeast Asia. Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet-Nam participated in that meeting. The U.S.A., the United Nations and INTERPOL were represented by observers.

The contributions and pledges to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control by 16 other countries in addition to the U.S. and the offer by India to contribute expertise, training, and educational facilities (see Tab 3) are further examples of activities that should assist in curbing the illicit drug trade outside their borders.

In 1971 President Pompidou of France submitted to the United Kingdom and other European Community Governments a proposal to promote greater cooperation on drug abuse and illegal drug traffic among those governments, which is being acted upon by the Community.

The Federal Republic of Germany has assigned men to Afghanistan and Turkey to assist in police training, including drug control.

5. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO RESTRICT THE INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF ILLEGAL DRUGS

(The following, with minor modifications, is taken from "United States Foreign Policy 1971, A Report of the Secretary of State")

The Department of State is the primary agency for coordinating international controls over drugs. Its activities to restrict the international flow of illicit drugs are being conducted on many fronts.

Assigning the drug problem high priority among foreign policy issues, the Department last August appointed at the Assistant Secretary level a Senior Adviser to the Secretary and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, Nelson G. Gross.

Drug Control Coordinators have been designated for the Department's regional and functional bureaus, and in July the regional bureaus began setting up Interagency Narcotics Control Committees with representation from State, A.I.D., Justice, Treasury, Defense, CIA, and USIA. Drug control officers have also been designated at most of our missions to coordinate the Country Team efforts abroad.

In August, the President further strengthened the Department's role in dealing with the foreign supply and international trafficking in drugs and narcotics by establishing the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State. Other members of the Committee are the Attorney General; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Treasury; Ambassador George Bush, U.S. Representative to the United Nations; Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz.

Specifically, the Cabinet Committee will: (1) develop comprehensive plans and programs for drug control; (2) assure the coordination of all activities of international scope; (3) evaluate all such activities and their implementation; (4) make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning funding of activities; and (5) make periodic reports on the progress of its operations to the President. The Cabinet Committee is supported by a Working Group composed of high-level personnel from each of the member agencies plus the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. After three informal meetings, the first formal meeting of the Cabinet Committee was held on September 28 and the second on December 16. The subgroups have met dozens of times.

A major project initiated by the Cabinet Committee is the preparation of narcotics control action plans for more than 50 countries considered to have a current or potential involvement in the production, processing, consumption, or transiting of illicit hard drugs. The focus is on world supplies, trafficking, and smuggling of heroin and cocaine destined for the U.S. market or U.S. personnel abroad. The action plans include a description of the drug situation, a statement of goals, the strategy to achieve such goals, estimated costs, priorities, and a general timetable for implementation. These plans are being forwarded to Foreign Service posts to serve as a basis for opening discussions with host governments for the negotiation of bilateral narcotics control action programs.

One of the principal international goals of the United States is an end to opium production and the growing of poppies. The development of effective substitutes for the opium derivatives, particularly codeine, which is now used for medical purposes, would eliminate any valid reason for opium production. In the interim, because there are still indispensable medical uses for opium, and because production of the opium needed for medical purposes is a legitimate source of income in some countries, we are pressing ahead with programs (1) to develop synthetic substitutes for opium derivatives, (2) to assist countries in their efforts to end illicit drug processing and trafficking and illegal opium production, and (3) to make national and international control more effective.

A major effort is being mounted in the law enforcement field. Intelligence gathering on international narcotics trafficking has been strengthened, and all appropriate law enforcement arms of the U.S. Government—the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Bureau of Customs, and Public Safety

Division of A.I.D.—are stepping up their activities abroad. These efforts have already begun to yield results. Information furnished by French authorities in cooperation with American agencies led to the seizure of the equivalent of over two tons of heroin in 1971. Hong Kong police, in cooperation with our BNDD, seized over 12,000 pounds of opium in 1971 compared with 95 pounds in 1970.

On a day-to-day basis, the U.S. Government is proceeding both bilaterally and multilaterally against the illicit drug traffic and the supplies that feed it. Bilateral cooperation has been closest with Canada, Mexico, France, Turkey, and other countries which have a special relationship with us or to the problem of drug control as it affects us. Collaboration with Canada and with Mexico is especially important because of our common frontiers.

A Franco-American Intergovernmental Committee on Drug Control has been meeting periodically to review the cooperative arrangements and to discuss how to improve them. At the invitation of the Americans and French, Canadian representatives from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have also participated in the work of the Committee since November 1970. The primary objective of this trilateral cooperative effort is the discovery and closing of heroin conversion laboratories in France and the interception of the illicit heroin traffic to North America. An agreement signed with France in February 1971 provided for French agents to operate in the United States and for U.S. agents to operate in France. The success of this cooperative effort has been demonstrated by substantial heroin seizures made by French and American police.

The Governments of the United States and Mexico have been collaborating in narcotics trafficking programs since 1969 when a Joint Working Group was established. Our cooperative effort has resulted in the seizure and destruction on Mexican soil of large quantities of narcotics and psychotropic substances aimed at the illicit market.

On June 30, the Prime Minister of Turkey announced that the production of opium would be banned in that country. A decree specified that production will be restricted to four provinces for the fall 1971 planting, and that complete abolition of opium production will go into effect when the crop is harvested in June of 1972. Since that announcement, two additional steps have been taken by the Government of Turkey. The first was the passage in August of a strict opium licensing and control law. Secondly, the Turkish opium monopoly has completed purchases of opium gum from the 1971 harvest. The collection of 149 tons, which was more than double the previous year's 61 tons, was larger than any annual collection in the past eight years and represents a significant reduction of leakage into illicit channels.

In response to the Turkish decision to ban opium production, the U.S. Government sent a high-level mission headed by the Secretary of Agriculture to Turkey to provide technical advice on agricultural and agro-industrial development in the area where poppy growing will be eliminated. We have assured Turkey of our readiness to provide financial assistance to help prevent foreign exchange losses from legitimate exports of opium gum and poppy products and to help establish development activities in the affected areas.

The agreement with Turkey was particularly significant since it will remove the major source of opium for heroin marketed in the United States. We are interested in similar cooperative arrangements with governments of other countries along the illegal trade route which runs from the Middle East through Europe to North America, and increasingly through South America.

We are also seeking cooperative plans with the governments of countries in Southeast Asia where there is substantial illegal or uncontrolled production of opium. That is the area to which the illegal traffickers will turn increasingly as existing sources of supply in the Middle East are closed to them. Two major accomplishments can already be cited. On September 28, 1971 the United States and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding by which the two countries pledged mutual action against the supply and trafficking of illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs. Of equal significance, on November 15 the Lao Government implemented a narcotics law which for the first time in Laotian history prohibits the growing, processing, trading, and use of opium and the opiates. These actions will form the basis for cooperative efforts between the two countries and the United States to combat the drug problem in Southeast Asia and reduce the flow of heroin.

In Vietnam the United States is fully supporting the Vietnamese Government's anti-smuggling and narcotics campaign to prevent drug abuse by Vietnamese and

Americans alike and eliminate Vietnam as a transshipment point for narcotics to the United States. Among our forces, U.S. military authorities in Vietnam are also applying vigorous control measures to the same end.

In the international field we have been working multilaterally, within the United Nations and other international organizations, and within the framework of the international drug control system established and operating under treaties. International efforts to bring opium and other narcotics under effective control have a long history and have in fact been successful in controlling the legal manufacture of narcotic drugs for medical use. Although world requirements for morphine have increased more than five times since the 1930's, there is no evidence of any substantial leakage to the illicit traffic from the licensed factories. Now the challenge to the international control system is to bring the illegal and uncontrolled production of narcotic raw materials under equally effective control and similarly to extend control over psychotropic or so-called mind-bending substances.

The United States, which produces a large percentage of the psychotropic substances entering the illicit drug traffic, joined with 22 other nations on February 21, 1971, to sign in Vienna a Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This is the first international instrument for the control of such substances as the hallucinogens (including LSD), amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers. On June 29 the President submitted the Convention to the Senate for its early advice and consent to ratification.

In March 1972 the United States Delegation, headed by Mr. Nelson G. Gross, the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, and Mr. William I. Cargo, Director of Planning and Coordination, and including other members of the Department of State, together with representatives of the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Health, Education and Welfare, took a leading part in the adoption of the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, which is now pending before the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

6. NATIONS WHICH ABSTAINED FROM SIGNING THE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS

Twelve of the nations which participated in the Geneva Conference at which the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted in March 1972 not only abstained from signing the Protocol at the Conference but also abstained on the vote to adopt the Protocol. Those twelve nations were Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, Panama subsequently signed the Protocol in New York. Colombia, Finland, and Israel, which also participated in the Conference, have subsequently signed the Protocol in New York.

Other nations which participated in the Conference and have not yet signed the Protocol are Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Burundi, Canada, Ceylon, Dahomey, El Salvador, Gambia, India, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

It should be noted that signature of such an international agreement has essentially symbolic significance. States which sign do so subject to ratification. Those which do not sign may nonetheless accede to the agreement. In many cases a State prefers not to sign but to study the agreement in its capital and then make the decision whether to become a party to the agreement in the course of its ratification procedure. Signature of an international agreement, on the other hand, is a pledge to submit that agreement to a State's ratification procedure but does not prejudge the decision that may be reached therein. We know that a number of states which have not yet signed the Protocol feel favorably about it and, in some instances, cosponsored the amendments with the United States.

7. NATIONS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ILLEGAL DRUGS BUT WHICH HAVE NOT SIGNED THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS

The following nations are potential sources of illegal drugs, either as producers or as stations on the illicit traffic route. Depending upon illicit traffic develop-

ments, other nations may become sources as well: Bolivia; Colombia; Laos; Nepal; and Singapore.

8. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BREAKDOWN OF NUMBER OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ABROAD ENGAGED IN DRUG CONTROL AND INDICATION OF EXACT ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THEY ARE INVOLVED

Each U.S. diplomatic mission has designated a Drug Control Coordinator.

In the countries named in the attached list, for which Narcotic Control Action Plans have been or are being developed, the Coordinator will be devoting all or a major part of his time to drug control efforts.

In the following countries where drug control is critical for U.S. policy objectives, several officers are actively involved in and give substantial portions of their time to drug control matters including the Chief of Mission, the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Chief of Political or Economic Section, as well as at least one other mission officer: Paraguay, Panama, Mexico, Turkey, Afghanistan, Thailand, Laos, Viet-Nam, Burma, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Canada.

This engagement of State Department personnel abroad in drug control work has taken place during the past year and reflects both the extent of the drug abuse problem in the United States and the U.S. Government decision to make drug control internationally a high priority foreign policy objective.

NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTION PLANS

Africa.—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya.

Near East and South Asia.—Afghanistan, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Nepal, Ceylon, Israel, Greece, Egypt.

Latin America.—Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Jamaica, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guyana, Barbados, Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles.

Europe.—France, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada.

East Africa and Pacific.—Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia.

9. COUNTRIES IN WHICH PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAVE BEEN MOST ACTIVE IN EFFORTS TO CONTROL DRUGS

State Department personnel abroad have been most active in cooperative efforts for drug control in the following countries:

Turkey	Laos
France	Paraguay
Mexico	Panama
Federal Republic of Germany	Burma
Italy	Viet-Nam
Thailand	

This pattern has been established during the past year. In June 1971 the President made drug control a high priority foreign policy objective of the United States. In August 1971 the President established the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control. Since that date narcotics control action plans have been developed for about 60 countries (see list under Tab 8).

It is expected that this pattern will continue during the next several years. Subject to budgetary and personnel resources made available, the Department of State is prepared to maintain and, if required, to intensify these efforts.

10. DIPLOMATS WHICH HAVE THE "COURTESY OF THE PORT", E.G., THOSE WHICH CAN ENTER WITHOUT THE CUSTOMARY INSPECTION BY CUSTOMS OFFICIALS

All diplomats accredited to the United States, those accredited to other countries transiting the United States, and those accredited to the United Nations are, under the present United States Customs Regulations, permitted entry without examination of personal effects. Those regulations are, however, presently being redrafted with a view to conforming them with the tenets of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which permits the inspection of personal bag-

gage of a diplomat if there are serious grounds for presuming that it contains other than articles for official use of the mission or for his personal use or members of his family or articles whose import or export is prohibited by law.

There is evidence that diplomatic immunity has been abused by some holders of diplomatic passports, especially by ones other than those referred to above. There have been a few actual instances of abuse by diplomatic agents but it would be difficult to conclude that those from any one part of the world are abusing diplomatic immunity more than those from other parts.

JUNE 29, 1972.

Hon. EUGENE T. ROSSIDES,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ROSSIDES: Pursuant to the June 27 hearing on the international drug situation before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I would appreciate having the following questions answered for inclusion in the hearing record:

1. How many official points of entry into the U.S. are there and how do you determine how to allocate your resources among these points?
2. Through which points of entry do you believe the major portion of the heroin comes? Where have your largest seizures taken place?
3. Has the entrance pattern been consistent throughout the last 5 to 10 years, i.e., are most of the drugs coming in through one section and has this been true over a period of time, or has there been a change in the pattern?
4. Please provide, for the record, a breakdown of the location of your agents dealing with drug control and seizures. Please compare this with the location of such agents for drug-related purposes 5, 10, and 20 years ago.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, D.C., July 28, 1972.

DEAR SENATOR SPONG: In reply to your letter of June 29, 1972, I am submitting the answers to the four questions you posed, plus some additional information which may be of assistance to you.

For your information and guidance in evaluating the following answers, you should be aware of the distinction between the various types of customs officers.

Customs Inspector.—Uniformed officer stationed at all normal points of entry to examine passengers, baggage, cargo, and vehicles entering the United States. (3348 current strength)

Customs Patrol Officer.—Uniformed or plainclothes officer who patrols the waterfronts and airports to detect those who might attempt to circumvent normal inspection channels. (606 current strength)

Special Agent.—Plainclothes officer who conducts the investigative work in an effort to be prepared to apprehend the smuggler when he arrives, or identify and arrest those who have penetrated the customs barrier. (1012 current strength)

Question 1.—How many official points of entry into the United States are there and how do you determine how to allocate your resources among these points?

Answer.—At the present time there are 297 official ports of entry into the United States as well as 74 official stations, making a total of 371 official points of entry. Within the larger ports are numerous administratively-determined locations at which Customs Inspectors are located to clear passengers and/or merchandise into the country. In large ports this could be a bridge, highway, or tunnel, an airport, a rail station, a ferry dock, a marine terminal, or any combination of these facilities. The number of Customs personnel that are assigned to various ports and stations depends upon the quantity of merchandise, number of carriers, number of passengers, hours of service required, and distance to the next Customs port or station along the land border or coastline. Such complex considerations make determination of manning level dependent upon individual consideration of each port's particular traffic patterns and location.

Question 2.—Through which points of entry do you believe the major portion of the heroin comes? Where have your largest seizures taken place?

Answer.—We believe that the major entrance points for heroin are New York City and Miami, Florida. Our intelligence reports that large amounts of heroin

are also being smuggled into the United States in vehicles crossing our Southern borders from Mexico and in cargo shipments from vessels coming in at our large seaports.

We have made two fairly large heroin seizures from vehicles crossing our Southern border in the past two years and have made three large heroin seizures from cargo shipments in the past five years.

Our largest seizures over the past two years have been from

- (a) Contrabandista aircraft flying the South America/Miami route;
- (b) Trapped automobiles from many European ports to Canada, Mexico, and eastern seaboard cities, mostly New York and New Jersey; and
- (c) The son of a foreign diplomat who used his status to clear heroin-loaded suitcases at Miami and New York.

Question 3.—Has the entrance pattern been consistent throughout the last 5 to 10 years, i.e., are most of the drugs coming in through one section and has this been true over a period of time, or has there been a change in the pattern?

Answer.—During the past 5 to 10 years, patterns have changed from the traditional "mule or courier" body carrying or using false-bottom suitcases arriving in the United States from Europe direct to the eastern Seaboard or through Canada or Mexico. Today large organizations ship 50 to 100 kilograms at a time, are well-financed, always have controllers on the scene, and when they are arrested are much more inclined to cooperate than the couriers of the past.

Most of the large heroin seizures in the past were made in New York City or its environs. This is still true today, but Miami personnel have made some very large seizures during the past two years.

Enclosed are records of major heroin seizures over the past two years. You will note that most of the seizures originating in Europe or South America are large seizures, the small ones are from Southeast Asia or from Europe to Canada in false-bottom suitcases.

Question 4.—Please provide, for the record, a breakdown of the location of your agents dealing with drug control and seizures. Please compare this with the location of such agents for drug-related purposes 5, 10, and 20 years ago.

Answer.—We believe you are most interested in our Special Agent positions in question four, but we have also added our present disposition of CPO's. Since over the period of years offices have been added and deleted, we have grouped the figures by major geographical areas.

	1952	1962	1967	1972	1972 CPO's
Northeast (New York, Boston, Baltimore, Rouses Point, etc.)	52	86	94	231	317
Southeast (Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans, San Juan, Virgin Islands, etc.)	16	30	38	146	160
Southwest (Houston, San Antonio, El Paso, New Orleans, San Ysidro, etc.)	57	41	55	324	33
West coast (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, Anchorage, Seattle, etc.)	24	62	32	178	78
Midwest (Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo, etc.)	20	17	69	98	18
Foreign	12	23	15	35	
Total	181	259	303	1,012	606

[The present complement of CPO's is a marked reduction in the numbers we previously had. The chart depicts the smuggling potential today by comparing entries and arrivals to the number of CPO's]

	1947	1960	1971
Vessel arrivals	59,000	53,000	51,000
Aircraft arrivals	68,000	167,000	308,000
Passenger arrivals	3,900,000	4,731,000	13,698,000
Formal entries	1,086,000	1,476,000	2,773,000
Number of patrol officers	1,650	550	606

We believe that the effect of the patrol officer is to either force the smuggler to go through normal channels where he is vulnerable to the Customs inspector, or to lay more detailed plans which are time-consuming, costly, and make him more susceptible to discovery through investigation by the special agents.

I sincerely hope that the above information is adequate for your needs. Should any further questions arise, please let me know.
Sincerely yours,

EUGENE T. ROSSIDES.

[Enclosures.]

SIGNIFICANT HEROIN SEIZURES IN UNITED STATES AND CANADA JULY 1970 TO PRESENT

- A. Bulk shipments of heroin moved from South America to U.S. via Contrabandista Aircraft.
- B. Bulk shipments direct from France to the New York area in Automobiles.
- C. Bulk shipments from France and Spain to San Juan, Mexico, and Canada in Automobiles later driven across the borders.
- D. Bulk shipments from South America and Europe in suitcases carried by Diplomats.
- E. Bulk shipments on cruise ships to the Caribbean and on to South Florida and other U.S. ports.
- F. Small shipments from Southeast Asia via APO, MAC, and Body Carries.

Port of entry	Date	Quantity (pounds)	Smuggling method employed	Country of departure
Miami, Fla.	July 29, 1970	4	Courier/suitcase	Curacao.
Do	Oct. 20, 1970	94	Private air	Paraguay.
Toronto, Canada	Nov. 28, 1970	22	Suitcase	Frankfurt.
Montreal, Canada	do	18	do	Paris.
Miami, Fla.	Dec. 12, 1970	40	Unknown	Unknown.
Do	do	210	Cargo air	Paraguay.
San Juan, P.R.	Jan. 18, 1971	58	do	Dominican Republic.
Forth Monmouth, N.J.	Apr. 5, 1971	17	Official mail	Bangkok, Thailand.
New Jersey	do	97	Automobile	Le Havre, France.
Honolulu, Hawaii	May 16, 1971	4	Thermos jugs, suitcase	Hong Kong.
Miami, Fla.	May 22, 1971	155	Cargo air	Buenos Aires.
San Juan, P.R.	May 29, 1971	246	Automobile	Bilbao, Spain.
Montreal, Canada	June 22, 1971	110	do	Le Havre, France.
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y.	July 8, 1971	156	Suitcase, diplomat	Panama.
Toronto, Canada	July 15, 1971	4	Suitcase	Italy.
Laredo, Tex.	Aug. 26, 1971	24	Automobile tires	Mexico City.
New York	Sept. 14, 1971	206	Automobile	France/via England.
Do	Sept. 22, 1971	186	do	Genoa, Italy.
Do	Sept. 29, 1971	69	Suitcase, Braniff baggage switch	Chile/Argentina, Paraguay.
Do	Oct. 6, 1971	39	Cargo, oil paintings	Argentina.
Sacramento	Nov. 11, 1971	3	Mail, APO	Thailand.
Travis AFB	Dec. 30, 1971	17	Cargo, military airlift	Do.
Miami, Fla.	Jan. 3, 1972	238	Laundry bags, cruise ship	France.
Do	Jan. 10, 1972	147	do	Do.
Honolulu, Hawaii	Jan. 26, 1972	18	Courier, body	Singapore.
New York	Jan. 27, 1972	86	Unknown, possibly champagne boxes.	France.
Miami, Fla.	Apr. 5, 1972	22	Seaman courier	Hong Kong.
New York	Apr. 26, 1972	18	Teakwood chests	Do.
Detroit, Mich.	May 10, 1972	5	Housesearch	Unknown.
New York	May 11, 1972	2.2	Lancia automobile, imported July 1, 1970.	Le Havre, France.
Do	May 16, 1972	264	Military footlockers	France via Belgium.
Seattle	May 24, 1972	10	Molded oriental plaques	Damascus, Syria.
Douglas, Ariz.	May 26, 1972	6.8	Vehicle door panels	Mexico.
Blaine, Wash.	June 12, 1972	18	Stereo speakers	Hong Kong via Vancouver, B.C.
New York	June 27, 1972	4	Housesearch	Hong Kong.
Do	July 4, 1972	6.5	Suitcases	Bangkok.

COCAINE SEIZURES AUGUST 1970 TO DATE

- A. Bulk shipments of cocaine moved from South America to U.S. via contrabandista aircraft and in household effects.
- B. Couriers traveling from South America to U.S. via commercial air and vehicle make probes at numerous Ports of Entry.
- C. Seaman couriers on Chilean and Columbian vessels continue activity.

Port of entry	Date	Quantity (pounds)	Smuggling method employed	Country of departure
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y.	Aug. 8, 1970	2½	Body carry	Argentina.
Do	Aug. 20, 1970	4½	Suitcase	Chile/Mexico.
Miami, Fla	Sept. 2, 1970	4	do	Colombia.
Dulles Airport	Oct. 5, 1970	26	Comm. Air, Sec.	Do.
Do	Oct. 7, 1970	8½	do	Do.
Hoboken, N.J.	Oct. 12, 1970	6½	Vessel	Chile.
Miami, Fla	Oct. 14, 1970	34	Diplomat suitcase	Do.
Norfolk, Va	Oct. 22, 1970	4	do	Do.
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y.	Nov. 11, 1970	1½	Smuggler's vest	Do.
Miami, Fla	Nov. 14, 1970	12	Suitcase	Peru.
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y.	Nov. 18, 1970	8	do	Peru, Colombia.
Do	Nov. 21, 1970	5	Crew comm./Air	Colombia.
Miami, Fla	Dec. 4, 1970	88	Cargo air	Peru.
Tampa, Fla	Dec. 7, 1970	34	Vessel	Chile.
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y.	Dec. 10, 1970	11	Suitcase	Bolivia.
Honolulu, Hawaii	Dec. 11, 1970	8	do	Colombia/Mexico, Sidney.
Miami, Fla	Jan. 20, 1971	16	Suitcase	Chile.
Laredo, Tex	Feb. 14, 1971	12	Rental vehicle	Unknown via Mexico.
Mexico City Airport	Feb. 16, 1971	17	Suitcase	Chile.
Do	Feb. 19, 1971	4	do	Do.
Do	Feb. 21, 1971	9	do	Do.
Do	Feb. 22, 1971	18	do	Do.
Do	do	4	do	Do.
Miami, Fla	Feb. 24, 1971	10	In-transit baggage switch	Unknown via Panama.
St. Thomas, V.I.	Mar. 14, 1971	9	Suitcase	Peru via Trinidad.
New Orleans, La	Mar. 23, 1971	9	Tables via air cargo	Chile.
Baltimore Airport	Apr. 20, 1971	7½	Girdle, pracleared	Ecuador via Nassau.
Los Angeles Airport	Apr. 27, 1971	2½	Body carry	Colombia.
Philadelphia Piers	May 5, 1971	2½	Body carry and crew quarters	Chile.
Miami Airport	May 17, 1971	2	Body carry	Colombia.
New York piers	May 18, 1971	5½	Body carry and crew quarters	Peru.
San Antonio Airport	May 23, 1971	2	Body carry	Do.
Miami Airport	May 30, 1971	2	do	Colombia.
Do	June 5, 1971	2	Coffee cans	Do.
Los Angeles Airport	June 9, 1971	7	Suitcase	Mexico.
Do	June 10, 1971	6½	do	Do.
Do	June 22, 1971	1	Body carry	Colombia.
Miami Airport	June 26, 1971	5	Suitcase	Costa Rica.
New Orleans, La	do	4½	do	Nicaragua.
Miami Airport	June 28, 1971	3	do	Peru.
San Ysidro, Calif	July 3, 1971	2½	Body carry	Mexico.
Tucson	July 29, 1971	3	Car, under front seat	Do.
Nogales	Sept. 7, 1971	2½	Car	Do.
Miami Airport	Sept. 11, 1971	2½	Body carry	Ecuador.
New York	Oct. 6, 1971	19½	Cargo, picture frames	Argentina.
Los Angeles Airport	Oct. 15, 1971	4½	Body carry, purse	Peru.
J.F.K. Airport	Nov. 11, 1971	5½	Body carry	Chile.
Los Angeles Airport	Nov. 21, 1971	1	Wooden statues in suitcase	Bolivia.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y.	Dec. 4, 1971	10	Suitcase	Spain.
San Ysidro, Calif	Dec. 8, 1971	4½	Car/spare tire	Mexico.
Los Angeles Airport	do	3	Body carry	Colombia.
San Juan Airport	Dec. 11, 1971	1	Body carry, shoes in suitcase	Do.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y.	Dec. 23, 1971	4½	Body carry	Chile.
San Juan Airport	Jan. 9, 1972	3	do	Colombia.
Miami Airport	Jan. 13, 1972	54	Household effects/air freight	Chile.
San Juan Airport	Jan. 23, 1972	1	Purse	Colombia.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y.	Jan. 27, 1972	6½	Suitcase	Ecuador.
San Ysidro, Calif	Jan. 28, 1972	2½	Body carry	Mexico.
Los Angeles Airport	Feb. 1, 1972	11	Body carry, suitcase	Peru.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y.	Feb. 2, 1972	10	Suitcase	Colombia.
Miami Airport	Feb. 4, 1972	23	Aircraft spare parts	Do.
Do	Feb. 10, 1972	4	Body carry	Do.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y.	do	4	Courier overcoat	Panama.
Do	Feb. 17, 1972	6	Body carry	Colombia.
Miami Airport	Feb. 25, 1972	6½	do	Ecuador.
San Juan Airport	do	1	do	Colombia.
Port Newark, N.J.	Mar. 6, 1972	1	Body carry, seaman	Do.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y.	do	4½	11 pairs of shoes	Do.
Morehead City, N.C	Mar. 8, 1972	4½	Seaman's quarters	Do.
Niagara Falls, N.Y.	Mar. 10, 1972	2½	Floorboard auto, teddy bear	Canada.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y.	Mar. 12, 1972	2	Trousers pockets in suitcase	Ecuador.
Miami, Fla	do	3	Envelope in hand	Do.
Do	Mar. 29, 1972	4.6	Looseleaf binders	Colombia.
Do	Apr. 5, 1972	6.6	Sides, false-bottom suitcase	Do.
Houston, Tex	Apr. 12, 1972	2.5	False sides, suitcase and men's shoes.	Do.

Port of entry	Date	Quantity (pounds)	Smuggling method employed	Country of departure
J.F.K. Airport	May 4, 1972	7	Girdle, body carry	Panama.
Do	May 7, 1972	2.5	Hollowed-out book covers	Colombia.
Do	do	2.5	do	Do.
Miami, Fla	do	2	do	Do.
New Orleans Airport	do	9	False-bottom suitcases and hollowed-out book covers.	Do.
Miami Airport	do	1.5	Religious pictures	Do.
Do	May 9, 1972	5	Hollowed-out packet	Do.
Detroit	May 10, 1972	4	Housesearch	Unknown.
Miami Airport	May 12, 1972	13	Private aircraft	Colombia.
Los Angeles/San Ysidro	May 16, 1972	8	Vehicle doors	Mexico.
Los Angeles Mailroom	May 17, 1972	2.2	Hollowed-out book	Colombia.
New York Pier 2	May 18, 1972	17	Bags on rear of hi-boy	Unknown.
Miami Airport	May 19, 1972	9.4	Suitcase at airport	Do.
Do	May 25, 1972	1	Shoes	Colombia.
Do	do	1.5	do	Do.
Do	do	2.6	Body carry	Do.
Do	do	2.2	do	Do.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y.	May 26, 1972	1.0	Manila envelope	Do.
Miami Airport	May 28, 1972	4.6	Body carry	Do.
Miami, Fla	May 30, 1972	6.6	Body carry (2)	Do.
Detroit, Mich	May 31, 1972	10.3	Convoy, search in house	Colombia via Miami.
New York	July 4, 1972	5.5	Body carry	Colombia.

JUNE 29, 1972.

Hon. JOHN E. INGERSOLL,
 Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
 Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. INGERSOLL: Thank you very much for taking the time from your busy schedule to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee on June 27. As I indicated at that time, I have several questions which I would like to have answered and included in the hearing record:

1. In testimony about a year ago before the Senate Appropriations Committee, you noted that 50 to 60 tons of opium could satisfy the addict population of the U.S. You also noted, however, that Pakistan illicitly produced an estimated 175 to 200 tons annually, that Afghanistan may produce 100 to 125 tons and that the Golden Triangle area of Burma, Thailand and Laos may provide as much as 1,000 illicit tons. In your testimony today you indicated that 6.5 to 10 tons of heroin are consumed annually in the U.S. Are the figures of last year and this year comparable after conversion has taken place? What amount of space is required to grow this amount of opium?

2. For the record, could you provide us with a country-by-country estimate of illicit opium production in the current year and compare this with estimated production in these countries 5, 10 and 20 years ago? Also, for the record, could you provide the basis for the estimate?

3. For the record, could you provide us with a country-by-country breakdown of where narcotics control agents are currently stationed and where such agents (from predecessor agencies) were stationed 5, 10 and 20 years ago?

4. Do you have a current estimate of the total amount of heroin entering this country? Where does most of it originate? What is the basis for this information?

5. How much heroin which was destined for U.S. consumption has been seized in 1971 and 1972? Where did the major seizures take place? Is it possible to determine where this heroin originated?

6. What kind of shifts in this geographical pattern of heroin trafficking can we expect in response to our expanded enforcement effort?

7. What is the going street price of heroin today? Who profits from the heroin trade?

8. The international drug traffic has developed largely since World War II. Could you give us a brief history of such development, touching on major traffickers, routes, successes and failures of efforts to curtail the trade?

Again, thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS,
Washington, D.C., August 2, 1972.

CAROLYN FULLER,
Legislative Assistant, Office of Hon. William B. Spong, Jr., U.S. Senate, Wash-
ington, D.C.

DEAR CAROLYN; This is in response to Senator Spong's request for additional information for the record of the recent hearing on June 27 in connection with the proposed amendments to the Single Convention.

I apologize for the tardy response, but the breadth of the material and the press of other duties has occasioned some delay.

In his letter the Senator lists eight specific areas on which he wished to receive responses. Some of these questions are unanswerable because of the paucity of data. For example, with reference to Question #2, until the last several years there was no effort to estimate the amount of illicit opium production worldwide, and no reliable figures can be given for an earlier period. Again, with reference to Questions #1 and #4, a systematic means of estimating the amount of heroin entering the United States has never been devised; and so figures with considerable latitudes are customarily cited. Nevertheless, we have attempted to respond to each question to the extent of our knowledge. Each of these responses is contained in separate attachments to this letter.

In addition to the matters contained in the letter of June 27, the Senator also requested that we identify potential opium producing countries which are not currently members of the Single Convention. These are Greece, Iran, Laos, Cambodia, The People's Republic of China, and Columbia. China, of course, has traditionally been excluded from agreements to which the United States was a party. Evidence concerning Columbian opium production is scanty but at least some potential is believed to exist.

Sincerely yours,

GENE R. HAISLIP,
Special Assistant to the Director.

[Enclosures.]

Question 1—Are the figures of last year and this year comparable after conversion has taken place?

Answer—This year's figure represents an increase from 50-60 tons of opium to 65-100 tons of opium.

What amount of space is required to grow this amount of opium?

Answer—Opium yield per unit of land is a function of climatic factors and input of labor and plant nutrients. Yields vary from year-to-year and from area-to-area. The average yield per hectare of land (2.7 acres) in Turkey is about 10 kilograms (22 pounds). These factors applied to the estimate of 65-100 tons equal 175,000-270,000 acres.

Question 2—For the record could you provide us with a country-by-country estimate on illicit opium production in the current year and compare this with estimated production in these countries 5, 10 and 20 years ago? Also for the record, could you provide the basis for the estimate?

Answer—Until the U.S. Government began in 1969 to direct world attention toward control of illicit drugs at the source, no comprehensive effort had ever been made to define the total world drug problem. Most of the data available on opium production, for example, concerns legal or controlled production. BNDD began in 1970 with the cooperation of other U.S. Agencies to gather available data with a view toward estimating illicit opium production. The basis for our estimates include historical data, analysis of user markets, seizures of contra-band drugs, and intelligence information from a variety of sources.

Attached is the estimates of illicit opium production worldwide.

ESTIMATES OF ILLICIT OPIUM PRODUCTION WORLDWIDE

	Tons
A. Illicit production of opium in Southeast Asia, principally the tri-border countries of Thailand, Burma and Laos-----	750
Consumed locally in the rural areas before distribution-----	450
Distributed to wholesalers in Bangkok, Vientiane, Hong Kong-----	300
	750
B. Breakdown of the 300 tons distributed by wholesalers: To supply traditional Chinese markets outside of the producing countries:	
Hong Kong-----	120
Malaysia, Singapore-----	30
Philippines-----	10
Macao-----	10
Cambodia-----	1
Vietnam-----	29
	200
Retained in Bangkok, Vientiane and Hong Kong to supply urban demand (in Bangkok and Vientiane) and to convert to heroin to supply U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, Okinawa, Thailand, Philippines and the growing market in the United States-----	100
	300
C. Estimates of licit and illicit production in other areas of the world:	

Country:	Licit (tons)	Illicit
Turkey-----	150	35 to 50 tons.
India-----	1,200	250.
Afghanistan-----	0	100 to 150.
Pakistan-----	0	175 to 200.
Iran-----	150	(?).
Mexico-----	0	5 to 15.
U.S.S.R.-----	115	(?).
PRC (China)-----	100	(?).
Yugoslavia-----	830	1.7.
Japan-----	5	(?).
Total-----	1,720.830	566.7 to 666.7 tons.

Total estimates worldwide illicit production: 1265 to 1365 metric tons.
 Question 3—For the record, could you provide us with a country-by-country breakdown of where narcotics control agents are currently stationed and where such agents (from predecessor agencies) were stationed 5, 10 and 20 years ago?
 Answer—Attachment 1 reflects the locations and the number of agents assigned overseas by the predecessor Federal Bureau of Narcotics.
 Attachment 2 reflects the current plan and the actual number of agents presently assigned overseas in the locations indicated.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS

Year and location	Agents	Year and location	Agents
1952: Rome, Italy-----	3	1967:	
1962:		Rome, Italy-----	3
Rome, Italy-----	3	Paris, France-----	2
Beirut, Lebanon-----	1	Marseilles, France-----	2
Paris, France-----	1	Beirut, Lebanon-----	2
Marseilles, France-----	1	Istanbul, Turkey-----	2
Istanbul, Turkey-----	1	Mexico City, Mexico-----	3
Bangkok, Thailand-----	2	Lima, Peru-----	1
Hong Kong-----	1	Bangkok, Thailand-----	2
Singapore-----	2	Hong Kong-----	1
Mexico City, Mexico-----	1	Singapore-----	1
Monterrey, Mexico-----	1	Seoul, Korea-----	1
Total-----	14	Total-----	20

BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

	Author- ized agents	On board		Author- ized agents	On board
Mexico and Central America:			Singapore		
Mexico City.....	8	7	Saigon, Vietnam.....	2	2
Guadalajara.....	3	3	Total.....	3	3
Hermosillo.....	2	2			
Monterrey.....	2	2			
Total.....	15	14	Far East:		
Panama and South America:			Tokyo, Japan.....	4	4
Panama City, Panama.....	2	0	Hong Kong.....	3	2
Caracas, Venezuela.....	2	2	Manila, Philippine Islands.....	2	2
Asuncion, Paraguay.....	2	2	Okinawa.....	1	0
Buenos Aires, Argentina.....	6	5	Total.....	10	8
Lima, Peru.....	2	1	Europe:		
Quito, Ecuador.....	2	2	London, England.....	1	1
Brazilia, Brazil.....	1	1	Paris, France.....	7	5
Bogota, Colombia.....	2	1	Marseilles, France.....	4	2
La Paz, Bolivia.....	1	0	Madrid, Spain.....	2	2
Total.....	20	14	Barcelona, Spain.....	2	2
Near East:			Rabat, Morocco.....	1	1
Ankara, Turkey.....	4	4	Bonn, Germany.....	1	1
Istanbul, Turkey.....	2	2	Frankfurt, Germany.....	2	2
Izmir, Turkey.....	2	2	Munich, Germany.....	2	2
Beirut, Lebanon.....	3	2	Milan, Italy.....	2	2
Kabul, Afghanistan.....	2	1	Rome, Italy.....	3	3
Tehran, Iran.....	2	2	Brussels, Belgium.....	1	0
Islamabad, Pakistan.....	1	0	Total.....	28	23
New Delhi, India.....	1	0	Canada:		
Total.....	17	13	Montreal.....	2	2
Southeast Asia:			Toronto.....	1	0
Bangkok, Thailand.....	10	9	Vancouver.....	1	1
Chiang Mai, Thailand.....	2	1	Total.....	4	3
Vientiane, Laos.....	2	2	Grand total.....		
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.....	2	2		115	94

Question 4—Do you have a current estimate of the total amount of heroin entering this country? Where does most of it originate? What is the basis for this information?

*Answer—*The current estimate of heroin entering this country is 6.5 to 10 tons annually. This figure represents the amount of heroin thought to be needed to support the habits of approximately 530,000 U.S. heroin users. About 60% originates from Near East countries' illicit opium. The remaining 40% originates from Southeast Asia and from Mexico. These estimates are derived from seizures of contraband which can be traced to the source through identification of traffickers.

Question 5—How much heroin which was destined for U.S. consumption has been seized in 1971 and 1972? Where did the major seizures take place? Is it possible to determine where this heroin originated?

*Answer—*Since January 1971, significant amounts of heroin destined for the U.S. have been taken out of the heroin supply lines. BNDD domestic offices and the Bureau of Customs have together removed over a ton of heroin since the beginning of last year.

A breakdown of the heroin removed by agency is as follows:

HEROIN REMOVED FROM THE DOMESTIC MARKET

[Amounts in pounds]

	1971	1972 (through May)
BNDD.....		
Customs.....	432	595
	1,109	106

Since most of this heroin was either seized at a U.S. border or removed within the United States, it can safely be said that this heroin was destined for sale on the street in the United States.

However, since heroin is processed from opium, and this comes into this country indirectly from the opium producing countries of Turkey, Mexico, Laos, Burma, and Thailand, it has been necessary for the U.S. effort to extend itself beyond its own boundaries.

With this in mind it is significant to note that BNDD coordinated with foreign governments in stopping heroin before it could reach U.S. borders. This effort has led to seizures, not only of heroin, but also of large quantities of opium and morphine base from which heroin is processed.

The BNDD/Foreign cooperative seizure totals are provided below :

BNDD/FOREIGN SEIZURES

[Amounts in pounds]

	1971	1972 (through May)
Heroin.....	937	1,730
Morphine base.....	2,271	874
Opium.....	1,440	843

Since one pound of morphine base chemically converts into approximately one pound of heroin, BNDD considers the 3,145 lbs. of morphine base seized in the 17 month period as 3,145 lbs. of heroin equivalent. Opium converts to morphine base on a 10 : 1 basis. BNDD therefore considers the 2,283 lbs. of opium seized to be 228 lbs. of heroin equivalent.

Thus, the foreign cooperative seizures might also be presented as follows :

	<i>Heroin or heroin equivalent</i>	<i>Pounds</i>
BNDD/foreign seizures :		
1971		3,352
1972 (through May)		2,688

For the most part individuals arrested in BNDD/Foreign cooperative seizures have previously been identified by BNDD intelligence as those persons responsible for maintaining the illicit drug pipeline to the U.S. or to U.S. servicemen abroad. Therefore, the heroin removed can be said to have been designed for consumption in the U.S.

Although the Bureau does not have complete statistics for foreign seizures made without BNDD assistance, numerous significant seizures by foreign governments (some of which are listed in the enclosure) indicate that foreign efforts are also intercepting a portion of the heroin on the way to the U.S.

The sum total of all the hard data available indicates that from January 1, 1971 through May of this year, BNDD, Customs, and BNDD forces in cooperation with foreign governments have removed at least 8,282 lbs. of heroin or heroin equivalent destined for consumption in the United States.

One point, however, should be made with regard to these seizures. It is impossible to estimate the degree to which the drug traffickers are able to resupply the heroin which is removed from their pipelines. Thus, it is impossible to know how much or the degree to which these seizures have caused a reduction in the supply of heroin to addicts in the U.S.

In answer to the second portion of Question 5, there have been numerous major seizures worldwide in the past 18 months. The majority of these cases involved extremely large seizures of either heroin or morphine base, and most that we have knowledge of took place in Europe and serve as evidence that Europe is heavily used as both a conversion point of morphine base to heroin and as a transshipment point of heroin to the U.S. Major seizures have been made in boats off the shore of Marseilles, in Spain, France, Germany, and Italy and in Vietnam, Hong Kong, Laos, and Thailand.

Major domestic seizures were made mostly in port cities or cities near sea coasts. Frequently these seizures were made in cooperation with Customs.

A representative list of major seizures made since January 1971 is attached as an enclosure. To the degree that it is possible, the probable source and intended route of the intercepted drug is also enclosed.

SIGNIFICANT SEIZURES

Date	Place	Substance	Amount (pounds)	Countries/agencies involved	Probable opium source	Intended route or destination
NDD/foreign cooperative:						
March 1971	Marseilles, France	Heroin	37	French authorities, United States, BNDD	Turkey	Marseilles, France to Italy to New York City.
August 1971	Vietnam	do	97	Thailand Narcotic Bureau, Vietnamese National Police, United States, BNDD	Southeast Asia	Undetermined.
October 1971	Paris, France	do	233	French CNO, United States, BNDD	Turkey	Through Paris to New York City.
April 1972	Rapallo, Italy	Morphine base	112	Italian authorities, United States, BNDD	do	Through Italy, probable destination to United States.
Foreign only:						
December 1971	Germany	do	506	German Customs	do	Undetermined.
March 1972	France	do	321	French Customs	do	Do.
Do	Marseilles, France (in a Marseilles port).	Heroin	900	do	do	To Guadelupe, Mexico, to Miami, Fla.
April 1972	Hong Kong	do	80	Hong Kong Narcotics	Southeast Asia	Undetermined.
NDD (domestic):						
January 1972	Miami, Fla	do	372	BNDD	Turkey	France to Miami to New York.
Do	New York City	do	78	do	do	France to New York City.
NDD/customs:						
May 1971	San Juan, P.R	do	246	BNDD, U.S. Customs	do	France to Spain to Mexico to United States.
September 1971	New York City	do	200	do	do	France to New York City.

76

Question 6—What kind of shifts in this geographical pattern of heroin trafficking can we expect in response to our expanded enforcement effort?

Answer—Immediate shifts for which there is already some indication involve greater exploitation of Southeast Asia and Mexican sources. Beyond this, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India must be considered potential sources.

Question 7—What is the going street price of heroin today? Who profits from the heroin trade?

Answer—The going street price of heroin varies from city to city depending on the demand for heroin in relation to its availability. Thus, a national "average" price must be interpreted as a general guideline since the price is subject to fluctuation in any given area, and certainly from city to city.

With this in mind the daily cost of heroin to an addict is about \$30 a day with the average dose costing about \$6; this price may vary from \$2 to \$12 a dose depending on the city.

Almost all persons who are involved in heroin production and distribution profit from it. This includes the poppy growers, whose profits are smallest, the chemists who convert morphine into heroin, those who arrange and finance heroin smuggling into the U.S., the smugglers themselves, the high and mid-level wholesalers, and street level pushers.

Within the United States, heroin dealers, regardless of their level of involvement, usually realize 100% profit on whatever they invest in their "business".

Question 8—The International drug traffic has developed largely since World War II. Could you give us a brief history of such development, touching on major traffickers, routes, successes and failures of efforts to curtail the trade.

Answer—Traffic in contraband narcotics from Europe to the U.S. was completely disrupted during World War II. In the aftermath of the war the traffic was fairly rapidly reestablished with opium from the Near East to heroin laboratories in Italy and France. Heroin imports from Europe to the United States became a major interest for organized crime which resulted in new Federal legislation in 1956 required mandatory sentencing for narcotic traffickers. U.S. addict populations appeared to stabilize at less than 100,000 during the 1950's and early 1960's. During this period the illicit traffic can be characterized as highly organized with very limited amateur participation because of the high risk created by mandatory sentencing.

During the early and mid-sixties drug experimentation with marijuana and the hallucinogens developed along with the youth culture and has been associated with numerous social phenomena current during the past decade. Since 1969 rising heroin abuse has been documented and is associated with a variety of social factors.

From a law enforcement standpoint the drug problem has simply grown faster than our criminal justice systems' ability to handle it. Increased demand for drugs along with increased availability are apparent factors reflected in current problem definition.

Since the sources for illicit narcotic drugs are external to the U.S., the national policy has been to cooperate with other nations in strengthening international controls over drugs. Since 1969 extraordinary emphasis has been placed on control of illicit drugs at the source. In line with this emphasis all feasible means are being considered for development of programs to bring about more effective international control of drugs. The drug control programs with Mexico, France, Turkey, Thailand and Laos are being followed up with appropriate programs in other areas as opportunity permits.

Attachments: Examples of significant cases. Papers detailing trafficking routes.