

TBL

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1972

(Southeast Asia)

PART 1

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 25 AND JULY 20, 1972

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Internal Security



THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1972

(Southeast Asia)

PART 1

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

—————
MAY 25 AND JULY 20, 1972
—————

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Internal Security



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

80-498 O

WASHINGTON : 1972

—————
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 55 cents

COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri, *Chairman*

CLAUDE PEPPER, Florida	JOHN M. ASHBROOK, Ohio
RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina	ROGER H. ZION, Indiana
ROBERT F. DRINAN, Massachusetts	FLETCHER THOMPSON, Georgia
MENDEL J. DAVIS, South Carolina	JOHN G. SCHMITZ, California

DONALD G. SANDERS, *Chief Counsel*

RICHARD L. SCHULTZ, *Associate Chief Counsel*

ALFRED M. NITTE, *Legislative Counsel*

JOHN F. LEWIS, *Coordinating Editor*

ROBERT M. HORNER, *Chief Investigator*

WILLIAM G. SHAW, *Research Director*

DEWITT WHITE, *Minority Legal Counsel*

HERBERT ROMERSTEIN, *Minority Chief Investigator*

(11)

CONTENTS

May 25, 1972: Testimony of—	Page.
Edgar M. Buell.....	7761
July 20, 1972: Testimony of—	
Charles Louis Weldon.....	7779
Appendix I: Committee exhibits.....	7805
Appendix II: Statement of Congressman John G. Schmitz titled "Com- munist Involvement in the Golden Triangle Opium Traffic".....	7817
Index	i

(iii)

The House Committee on Internal Security is a standing committee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to determine the rules of its proceedings.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 92D CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 22, 1971.

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-first Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, be, and they are hereby adopted as the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-second Congress * * *

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * *

(k) Committee on Internal Security, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

11. Committee on Internal Security.

(a) Communist and other subversive activities affecting the internal security of the United States.

(b) The Committee on Internal Security, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make investigations from time to time of (1) the extent, character, objectives, and activities within the United States of organizations or groups, whether of foreign or domestic origin, their members, agents, and affiliates, which seek to establish, or assist in the establishment of, a totalitarian dictatorship within the United States, or to overthrow or alter, or assist in the overthrow or alteration of, the form of government of the United States or of any State thereof, by force, violence, treachery, espionage, sabotage, insurrection, or any unlawful means, (2) the extent, character, objectives, and activities within the United States of organizations or groups, their members, agents, and affiliates, which incite or employ acts of force, violence, terrorism, or any unlawful means, to obstruct or oppose the lawful authority of the Government of the United States in the execution of any law or policy affecting the internal security of the United States, and (3) all other questions, including the administration and execution of

any law of the United States, or any portion of law, relating to the foregoing that would aid the Congress or any committee of the House in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Internal Security shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Internal Security, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

28. (a) In order to assist the House in—

(1) its analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of the application, administration, and execution of the laws enacted by the Congress, and

(2) its formulation, consideration, and enactment of such modifications of or changes in those laws, and of such additional legislation, as may be necessary or appropriate,

each standing committee shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.

* * * * *

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1972

(Southeast Asia)

Part 1

THURSDAY, MAY 25, 1972

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C.**

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Internal Security met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.

Committee member present: Representative Richard H. Ichord of Missouri.

Staff members present: Donald G. Sanders, chief counsel, and DeWitt White, minority legal counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

The committee meets today for the purpose of holding hearings under the ordered hearings concerning theory and practice of communism. Under the Reorganization Act, the minority is entitled to 1 day of hearings, and those hearings today are for that purpose.

I understand, Mr. White, you have Mr. Edgar M. Buell.

Mr. Buell, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee. I understand you will testify concerning your 12 years' experience in the country of Laos.

Mr. BUELL. I guess that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you first rise and be sworn, sir.

Raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BUELL. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Please be seated.

Counsel is recognized to proceed.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF EDGAR M. BUELL

Mr. WHITE. Would you please give your full name, Mr. Buell?

Mr. BUELL. Edgar M.

(7761)

Mr. WHITE. Would you tell us when and where you were born and something about your early life before you went to Laos?

Mr. BUELL. I was born on a farm near Hamilton, Indiana, in 1913, on the same farm my father and my great-grandfather were born on, and my son is on it presently.

I went to Laos, and I was a farmer, practically retired, when I went to Laos in 1960.

Mr. WHITE. In what capacity did you go to Laos?

Mr. BUELL. With the International Volunteers for Service.

Mr. WHITE. Would you give us a brief description of that organization?

Mr. BUELL. I think, to describe International Volunteers for Service is very simple. Very few people in this room, I doubt, know what International Volunteers for Service really is and what it was. But it was a group of volunteers that volunteered to go into foreign lands, undeveloped areas, where they have really no finances, and usually they would be contracted out to some other agency, such as U.S. AID, which they had in Laos.

I was a black sheep at that time. I don't have the greatest education in the world. I had quite a time getting through high school. I was the first to go with the organization without some type of a degree.

We are all very proud of IVS in them days and even today because there is no question that it was the forerunner of the Peace Corps. I think due to my going it has made it possible for a lot of young people, and older people even, to get into these organizations that do have experience other than education.

Mr. WHITE. How long did you stay with IVS?

Mr. BUELL. Nearly 2 years. Then I went with the AID department.

Mr. WHITE. Is it true you went in as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer in AID with a rather senior grade?

Mr. BUELL. No; I went in at a very low grade. I very quickly worked up to a senior grade.

Mr. WHITE. And you have been in that capacity ever since then, have you?

Mr. BUELL. Yes; up until this present assignment I got.

Mr. WHITE. Now, during this 12-year period, is it true that you were in very close contact with the communist forces in Laos and had an opportunity to observe their theory and practice of communism?

Mr. BUELL. Oh, I would say yes.

Mr. WHITE. What area were you stationed in, in Laos, Mr. Buell?

Mr. BUELL. In the northeast section.

Mr. WHITE. Would you point it out to us on the map there, the general area?

Mr. BUELL. This area right here, starting here and coming right up around to Dien Bien Phu.

Mr. WHITE. And on your northeast, you did have communist forces, did you not?

Mr. BUELL. Oh, yes, in the early days.

Mr. WHITE. And after that, what was on your northeast there? Did you have an opportunity to observe there how the communists take over territory?

Mr. BUELL. Oh, sure. You must remember most all of my work in them days was behind enemy lines. So you have got the enemy all

around you. And, of course, we worked with this great little le General Vang Pao, who even still continually keeps taking back that the communists take over. They take an area this year, and gets it back next year, which gives you a very good chance to observe what the communists did. Yes, I observed that closely.

Mr. WHITE. What were your principal functions in those early days from 1960 to '62?

Mr. BUELL. Building schoolhouses, getting them seeds—vegetable seeds, and so forth—clothing, just to help them to survive; as they would be run off by the communists, they would always lose practically everything they had.

These are terrific people we worked with. They stay in there and fight. When they heard somebody scream, they didn't run; they would stay and fight to the end. Because of this, they would come out with just what they had on their back, and you would get them started again.

At the same time, you would always start building schools or dispensaries, which we are very proud of. We probably have one of the better medical programs of this type in all the world. I won't back up from any of them. So you would start your medical programs and your educational programs immediately, usually on the ground. We didn't build hospitals, we didn't build schools out of U.S. commodities, but we supported them and we would train these people to help withstand this communist aggression as it would come against them.

Mr. WHITE. Would you classify these people that you were helping as refugees from communist aggression then?

Mr. BUELL. Oh, yes, a hundred percent.

Mr. WHITE. About how many refugees did you have to deal with in this period of time, say 1960 to '62?

Mr. BUELL. Well, around '62 to '64, we had in north central Laos pretty close to a half-million people—450,000.

Mr. WHITE. What was the makeup of these people, Mr. Buell? Were they all of the same ethnic background or were there various ethnic groups represented?

Mr. BUELL. No; that is a good question. I think that especially back here in Washington and some places such as Vientiane, in north Laos—that is the capital city—they get the feeling that they are all from this Meo tribe of people that we hear about, and now, I understand, they are called the Nemung people; they want to give them a better name or something. But they are far from being all Meo people. General Pao himself, also, for the record, is a Meo. Many people that have a little opposition to General Vang Pao and maybe to his program and to our program say he was a boy that came in from Thailand or something, but he is 100 percent ethnic Meo.

The Meo tribesmen in this group we worked with probably didn't represent at the most more than 25 percent of the people. But in the early days where it became known as the Meo program and Pop Buell a Meo lover was because the Meo was the first on their own to try to withstand the communist aggression.

Mr. WHITE. Can you tell us the techniques that were employed by the communists there to take over additional territory; what would be a typical communist tactic? For example, did they attack at night and

refugees out into the jungles, and so forth? What were their
ques?

Mr. BUELL. You work in different periods. The communists are pretty smart cookies, as you know. They work according to the problem at hand. This year is not the same as last year; next year is not the same as it was this year; and it is all according to what they need, what their needs may be. They may need rice—the communists may need rice in the worst way. If they need rice, they definitely will attack where there is rice territory; they will definitely take the people, because when they get the rice they want the people to grow the rice for them, which also in turn carries so much of your porter work. This is like a tax. You are taxed—if things are normal, you are taxed so many portering days for the year.

Mr. WHITE. Is this a kind of forced labor?

Mr. BUELL. Yes, it is forced labor. In other instances they might not need rice at all, and they might need just the territory and terrain, and people is the last thing they want because, if they get the people in that instance, they would have to take care of them and that would be porters. If they need people bad enough, there is no tactics that they will not use—they will use any tactics to get them.

Mr. WHITE. Can you give us some information about their technique of driving individuals—I am thinking of one instance I heard about where the communists drove about 6,000 people out of a village at night and into the jungle and followed them and massacred large numbers of them.

Mr. BUELL. This is a case by itself, I think. I think this took place in 1963—I think late '63. It was really the first big drive that the North Vietnamese made into Laos. Right outside of Ban Ban, which is close to the Vietnamese border, we had a hospital set up in there and we were going real strong. But their main objective here was to prove, once and for all, to the Meo people how strong they were; that the Meo, who at this time felt they was pretty good guerrilla fighters and pretty strong—to prove to them, once and for all, "Buddy, we are the power, and you had better come on or this is what will happen."

They had been fighting back and forth for about 6 weeks, and the Meo had been holding their own pretty well, and then they came in with enough force that they really had—civilians had to leave, and this is when they got caught in this battle that you can read about, and the final slaughter was pretty close to 2,000 people, at least 1,500 that was killed any way possible.

Mr. WHITE. And these were civilians, were they not?

Mr. BUELL. Yes, all were civilians.

Mr. WHITE. Unarmed civilians, I take it.

Mr. BUELL. Yes, I was in on this myself. General Vang Pao and I helped feed these people all the way. They stopped for a rest period of 3 or 4 hours.

Mr. WHITE. Is it correct that many of these people were disemboweled with knives and other things?

Mr. BUELL. I don't say many; you only have to do it to one out of a couple or 300; I would not say many, no. This is very common in northeast Laos, this is very common in Vietnam, this is a very common practice, very common.

Mr. WHITE. And did a number of these people die from disease and accidents incident to their flight?

Mr. BUELL. Yes; after this 2,000 we still lost about 15 to 20 percent afterwards, after we got them to where we could handle them and take care of them.

Mr. WHITE. Did you have medical assistance at the time of this massacre?

Mr. BUELL. We were just beginning; a man by the name of Dr. Weldon had just arrived, and we had just then begun to get different medicines and antibiotics and we could start caring for them—not in no big way at all, but until then we had very little; here we had started.

Mr. WHITE. Prior to the arrival of Dr. Weldon and his wife, whom I understand is also a physician, were you very active in the field of first aid and necessary surgery and things of that kind?

Mr. BUELL. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. Did you have occasion to perform amputations in this connection?

Mr. BUELL. Yes, I did.

Mr. WHITE. Were these, at least in many cases, the result of communist boobytraps, land mines, and things of that kind that the Meo people stumbled onto?

Mr. BUELL. Yes. In them days, of course, the communists learned this, too; they had not enough power to whip the Meo; the Meo was just as smart as they was. The boobytrapping deal could really get them. The Meo was not up on this. It was a communist best weapon to get them at that time.

Mr. WHITE. What kind of things did they boobytrap?

Mr. BUELL. Oh, anything: human beings, rice—rice is a real good one—any kind of food. Of course they had their pitfalls; they would boobytrap anything.

Mr. WHITE. You must have had some fear and trepidation when you performed your first amputation; didn't you?

Mr. BUELL. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. But it was a successful one?

Mr. BUELL. Really not that much, too, really not that much.

Mr. WHITE. It was a successful operation?

Mr. BUELL. Not as much as I would now, not after I have seen other people do it and see how it should be done.

Mr. WHITE. Well, the patient lived in that?

Mr. BUELL. In most instances, yes. You see, in each little battle superstition comes into your work there. Those tribes in the north were not and still are not accustomed to using the knife.

Mr. WHITE. Prior to some of these operations of yours, these people had no medicine or no surgery; did they?

Mr. BUELL. Very little, very little at all. Yes; I will have to say they had their own herbs, and so forth, out of the jungle and used with their opium, and, believe it or not, some of their forms of medicine and drugs—as you know, grandmother came from Germany and hers wasn't too bad, and theirs wasn't too bad, but nothing compared to what we had. They have a couple or three drugs that I still, in fact, if I can get them, I will use out in front of ours.

Mr. WHITE. The communists frequently use the term "democracy" in describing their governments as being the "people's democracy." What did you observe in this connection? Would you say that the communist regimes in Laos were democratic?

Mr. BUELL. Democratic as far as what the communist calls their democratic form of government. I feel in most instances in a wartorn country—and the war is still going on: it has been all these years—that the communists' form of government was a fair communists' democratic form of government, which is not easy to live under. But if you do obey or go along with it, you can live; you are never going to get ahead, but you can live under it and you will never be very highly educated, only the ones that they choose. But it would still be better than no form at all. But it is one long ways from being even what a lowland Lao or a Thai—not saying us people here—would call a democracy.

Mr. WHITE. Did they have an elective process there in the communist-occupied Laos? Were their public officials elected?

Mr. BUELL. Down in the village level itself only.

Mr. WHITE. Not above the village level?

Mr. BUELL. No. It was make-believe, and even in the village level it was very difficult to even be a voter.

The CHAIRMAN. At that point, Mr. Counsel, let me understand Mr. Buell. Now, you were not in the Pathet Lao-controlled territory, you were not working there?

Mr. BUELL. I have treated Pathet Lao, I have given them medicine and I have given them rice. When you are talking about Pathet Lao, you are talking about two different things—Pathet Lao and Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. The area of the country where you were working was not controlled by Pathet Lao?

Mr. BUELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, please.

Mr. WHITE. As I understand it, you testified that you were behind communist lines much of the time.

Mr. BUELL. Most of the time.

Mr. WHITE. This was not a hard-and-fast line?

Mr. BUELL. No.

Mr. WHITE. It sort of ebbed and flowed; did it not?

Mr. BUELL. There is never a hard-and-fast line until the communists once take over. If you will notice, back through the years, when they make a line, we don't cross their lines. When them and us together makes lines, they can cross, but we don't.

Mr. WHITE. What is the attitude of the communist government there in Laos concerning religion?

Mr. BUELL. The communists?

Mr. WHITE. Yes. Do they permit freedom of religion?

Mr. BUELL. No type no type whatsoever, not any. This is bad, too. You see religion when you come back to your democracy, especially your Buddhist people well, the Mco people, anybody, this is part of your democracy.

Mr. WHITE. How about freedom of movement within communist-held areas?

Mr. BUELL. In no way—we have very much trouble getting help for our own operation to work. We have to know what is going on back in there, too, and it is awfully hard for our people to get contact with their own relations, maybe 6 months, and this is on the ground, where you would think it would be easy to get contact. They don't move out.

Mr. WHITE. They are not permitted to?

Mr. BUELL. No, no, no. This is why I again—whenever there have been any communist soldiers taken prisoner—the Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, whatever you want to call it—that is why it is so hard to get information about them, because they just move one direction and that is all they know, that little job they have to do.

Mr. WHITE. Let us recapitulate a little bit, Mr. Buell. When we talk about “communists in Laos,” what people are we speaking of? When we use the term “communists in Laos” as a political force or a military force, what are we speaking of? Are we speaking only of the Pathet Lao, for example, or are we speaking of the Vietnamese or North Vietnamese or a combination of these; and has this changed from, say, 1962 up until the present time?

Mr. BUELL. As you know, say '55 to '60, '62, we had what we called the Pathet Lao. Now, I don't know, I don't think it should be, anyway, I don't, the Pathet Lao were not communists, they just were not communists, that is all, what we think of communists as North Vietnamese communists or Chinese communists or Russian communists.

Mr. WHITE. When you say “we,” you mean the people in Laos?

Mr. BUELL. Yes. We might get to shooting guns here; it is the people of Laos, yes. But then you must say in '62 or '63, when they ran into the problems, we ran into problems, America and others, and he had to turn to somebody for help, so there was only one way to turn, and that was to the communists for help, and the communists are the ones that helped him; so this is where the Pathet Lao deal comes in, and I got to kind of believe that where the lines have not been drawn, and say there were no war tomorrow, that the remaining people that are Pathet Lao would still just be Pathet Lao; they would not be communists.

It is a political party, like Democrats and Republicans, and they would still be that way if the North Vietnamese would get out, we would get out, and everybody else would get out; it would come back to that. I don't think there is a chance of that. But after Souphanouvong had to go and get support from the other side, okay, then, he kept needing help so bad that there had to be other peoples come in to run their own show.

We are pretty much on that ourselves; we should be, anyway. We give a couple of million dollars away and we like to know how that is spent. So in order to do that, the North Vietnamese had to bring people in to run their show. Now, remember, that is 12 or 15 years ago, and when the North Vietnamese began to run their schools, and so forth, they were built and the teachings and the propaganda in them was communist, which now, 15 years later, there are no longer Pathet Lao, you might say, running this government.

Mr. WHITE. Is this really a communist military government of that area?

Mr. BUELL. Yes, I would call it so.

Mr. WHITE. Even though it may be enforced by civilians?

Mr. BUELL. I would call it so. I think you have to make a little different break there between there and North Vietnam itself. I think, probably, the communist-run form of government in Laos is probably more military run than in North Vietnam itself.

Mr. WHITE. Did the North Vietnamese withdraw their troops from Laos after the 1962 agreement, when most U.S. if not all U.S. forces were withdrawn?

Mr. BUELL. I will have to say no.

Mr. WHITE. They did not?

Mr. BUELL. I will say no.

Mr. WHITE. Did they withdraw any significant number of troops from Laos, that is, the communists?

Mr. BUELL. Numberwise in no way could I quote. They did withdraw some troops, but I will have to say a lot of them remained. I am talking about northeast Laos. Remember this always when I am talking; this is northeast Laos.

Mr. WHITE. To go back for just a moment again, Mr. Buell, when you first went to Laos you took up the languages or dialects used by the population; did you not?

Mr. BUELL. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. How many dialects do you speak there?

Mr. BUELL. The first one was no trouble when I went to Laos; it was the nicest little country you ever saw. I was on the Plain of Jars, and I learned the Lao language, which was important. Then when things hit the fan I had to go with these hill tribes, and this is where I learnt the Meo language. And then from there, of course, now, if you speak Laos, you can easily learn Thai; and I can speak four other tribal languages pretty good.

Mr. WHITE. How many different ethnic groups are there in northeast Laos, sir?

Mr. BUELL. In northeast Laos there is about 15 different ethnic groups.

Mr. WHITE. Would you name some of those for us?

Mr. BUELL. First you have got your ethnic groups of Thai, which are much different than what we think of Thailand; there are red Thai, white Thai, black Thai. We have the Lao Tong, we have some Ekaio, there are three different classes of Meo people, and you have some Yao. Most of your Yao is in the west, and we don't have them in the north. We have two groups of Chinese ethnic groups that come down through from Hainan, and then you have about three different types of what we call just Lao ethnic groups.

Mr. WHITE. When the communists take over a community, what technique do they use to gain control of the community? Do they attempt to do this through the village chief, for example, or what happens?

Mr. BUELL. If they are coming in working—and I have worked directly with some of their agents—they work no different than we do. In fact, I have got to say that I hopefully learned quite a lot from their methods. They come in naturally and ask if they want schools and explain what the schools are to them. In most instances back up until 1961 or '62, schools were nearly an unheard of thing in the mountain areas.

Naturally, well, they think maybe they do want schools, and they will help them to build a school and they will help them to build bridges across the streams that they have walked across for generations, and little things like this. They will bring them in different types of seeds. And one of the big things they do, if they tell them they are going to bring them a handsaw and an ax that day to build a bridge, that ax and handsaw is there the next morning. If they tell them they will bring them a dozen pencils tomorrow, then the dozen pencils is there. They don't need a world of paperwork, you know, or a lot of hearings and things like we have in order to even decide a little subject right or wrong; it is done. This works.

If they are getting opposition, then they have to use the rough methods which kills him. And they work with the village chief when they are doing it that way, but when they come to the rough deal, they work with the village chief in a different way; they just then kill him.

Mr. WHITE. What do they do after they kill the village chief then?

Mr. BUELL. "This is it. You do now what we tell you to. You give us so many of these girls to go with us, and you raise us so much rice, and you agree to what we are telling you or we will be back with the next phase."

Mr. WHITE. Do they make a practice of capturing women, taking away girls?

Mr. BUELL. Yes, yes; very much so, very much so.

Mr. WHITE. What is the purpose of this?

Mr. BUELL. Mostly nurses, schoolteachers, and, as I have said before, the North Vietnamese makes good use of their womenfolks, much different than, as far as I am concerned, other places in Southeast Asia. I would say maybe they started sooner.

Mr. WHITE. In what respects do they do this?

Mr. BUELL. They do use them more; again I can't say this about our own area now, but they started, they was the first to start using women as nurses, as medics in the fields, as schoolteachers. When I first arrived in northeast Laos, there was not a woman schoolteacher; the Vietnamese had already done this.

Mr. WHITE. You mentioned General Vang Pao. Did he launch an attack, a counterattack really, against the communists in northeast Laos about 1965?

Mr. BUELL. Yes, all the way up; terrific—terrific.

Mr. WHITE. How successful was he?

Mr. BUELL. The Vietnamese at this time had not been clear into northeast Laos so strong; he launched an attack against the Pathet Lao and backed them clear back into Sam Nua city all the way, and this is when the Vietnamese, in turn—they was up there, and the Vietnamese had the borderline, and this is when the Vietnamese really came in, in force, and the Pathet Lao started running toward Vientiane.

Mr. WHITE. Did this military activity by General Pao have the effect of engineering a large number of Vietnamese troops?

Mr. BUELL. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. These troops might otherwise have been engaged presumably in South Vietnam?

Mr. BUELL. Not at that time, not then, not at that point; later on, yes, but not then.

Mr. WHITE. Do you consider General Vang Pao as an individual who is only defending his homeland and his people, or is he fighting in addition for some principle such as anticommunism?

Mr. BUELL. He hates communism; probably, next to me, he hates it worse than anybody in the world.

Mr. WHITE. You know General Vang Pao very well, do you not?

Mr. BUELL. Yes; it is a father-and-son agreement.

Mr. WHITE. He calls you "father"?

Mr. BUELL. That is right. He loves his people. General Pao does know what democracy is. He is a very highly self-educated man. In the early beginning, I would say that when he took over—and he had to take over, somebody had to take over—that he was more or less fighting for his people and northeast Laos, but soon that little world moved so fast, not only for me but for his thinking, that he could see what would happen.

He began to hear about the U.N. and the United States, and so forth, and to answer your question, I would like to say it like I heard a general from the U.S. about 1965 or '66. After we got run down from the north, he asked what did he need, did he want a lot of men—this was the third time they got offered men, I mean GI's from the United States—did he want that, what did he need to help; and his answer to this man was: "Sir, we don't need your boys; all I need is for you to supply me. When I say 'supply,' I mean supply me with anything I need, and you will not have to send your boys."

Mr. WHITE. This was General Pao speaking?

Mr. BUELL. Yes. "I feel what I am doing is my part of fighting for what the free world is fighting for. You have got people in Germany, you have people in Africa, now you have got people in Vietnam. This is what I feel I am doing for the free world." I think this well answers this question.

Mr. WHITE. This was General Pao speaking?

Mr. BUELL. Yes, his own words.

The CHAIRMAN. At that point, Mr. Counsel, the North Vietnamese units to which you refer, where are they, in what section of Laos are they now operating?

Mr. BUELL. Again, in northeast Laos they have control. Here we are right here, coming up into China; here is Dien Bien Phu; here is Sam Neua, a city up in Sam Neua, and here is your border. They now have control of everything right across that. At one time I had a hospital up in here. At one time I had a headquarters right there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they operate solely as North Vietnamese units or are they mixed with indigenous communist forces?

Mr. BUELL. Mixed—well, as far as I am concerned they are all North Vietnamese. But if you are talking about ethnic groups, they are with them, yes, but to me they are all North Vietnamese. In this area up here there is no Pathet Lao there.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard there are often Chinese advisers with the North Vietnamese forces. Do you know whether that is true or not?

Mr. BUELL. I would say possibly; I myself have never seen a dead Chinese adviser, I have never seen what I would call a dead communist Chinese soldier. Now, I think people get this wrong. In northeast Laos we have Chinese.

Mr. WHITE. Indigenous Chinese?

Mr. BUELL. Right, that work with us. Some people might get that wrong. Now, about 2 years ago, not too far from what was my headquarters then, there were five Chinese killed—I did not see them; General Pao saw them—which could have been advisers, but the number of advisers down in any area that we have ever worked in, I have just about got to say that there is none.

Now, our people that are up in there, our own people that have been taken over by the communists, now that the Chinese has got working advisers, techniques, and so forth up in this area—we have really never had Chinese that much.

As far as these problems over here, that is an altogether different story; that has been known for years what was going to happen there, the road coming down there; and that is Chinese, as far as I am concerned, China owns that part of Laos.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. WHITE. Would it be accurate to say, from your experience and observation in Laos, that the North Vietnamese communists there have been following Mao's concept of power coming from a gun barrel?

Mr. BUELL. Pretty much so, yes; pretty much so—not all the way, but pretty much so.

Mr. WHITE. Are there relief programs? I think you have indicated they do have some sort of a relief program. Are they pretty well limited to what you have said?

Mr. BUELL. The communists?

Mr. WHITE. Yes.

Mr. BUELL. Yes; they have relief programs and they are limited. Your relief programs—naturally anything that is done or worked with is—in some form, in turn, helps them out very much. For instance, the big takeover we had in the area a couple or 3 years ago was hundreds of sewing machines in a cave. I know the communists gave out sewing machines. Sewing machines were not only to help the family, but to make clothes for the soldiers. For crops, they give them fertilizers and give them better seeds but, in turn, they are taxed to turn them back.

Mr. WHITE. What kind of percentages tax do they impose?

Mr. BUELL. It can go according to the troubles and times. It can go up as high as 60 and 70 percent, and when a percentage is put on, it is god; you have a poor crop or a big crop, you still get whatever that percent is.

China is a little bit better than what the Vietnamese is. China, of course—I would rather live under China's communism, period, than I would under North Vietnamese.

Mr. WHITE. Why is that, would you say?

Mr. BUELL. They are just not as rough; they are a little more human, much more so.

Mr. WHITE. You mentioned opium a while ago, Mr. Buell. We are interested in the possible communist exploitation of opium in attempts to subvert not only the U.S. forces in South Vietnam, but also possible exportation, either directly or indirectly, to the United States. I understand that opium is a common agricultural crop, or has been. When you first went to Laos, what was the situation in regard to production of opium in the area in which you worked there in the northeast?

Mr. BUELL. I kind of hate to comment on this, because I think I hate opium and drugs and some of these heroin much more than a lot of people back here that talk about it and pretend they do. I kind of got the name of helping the people of northeast Laos growing better opium in the early days, which is not too far from being true. But it was their sole way of making a living. It was their only product they had that they could sell or trade. There was no roads; there are still no roads. It would be good to tell them to raise a lot of corn and other things, but be sure, Mr. Congressman and Senators, that you have got vehicles, and so forth, to carry it on out. Our main opium territory was up here in the northeast, all in through here, from here across to here, coming up here just like that; that was my opium territory.

Mr. WHITE. What makes good opium territory?

Mr. BUELL. It is all determined by the ground, climate—ground and climate; it is a sweet soil and a cold, rainy season, not monsoon rain season. But as I drew that line, if you can see, that now all belongs to the enemy today. The opium that northeast Laos itself now grows, the people on the government side, is not anywhere near enough for their own use. The people there themselves that used to grow opium and sell it actually have to import opium to use.

Mr. WHITE. From whence do they import this opium?

Mr. BUELL. It comes from the north; most of it does come from the north that they use themselves because it is so much cheaper than it is from the south or from the west.

I think it is interesting to note that we feel that in northeast Laos in the past—I was going to say 12 but I will say 15 years—that the use of opium has decreased possibly 70 percent, at least 60 percent, 60 to 70 percent, has actually decreased—the use of opium.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the reason for that, Mr. Buell?

Mr. BUELL. I would say it is practically all education, education on their own part, that they have seen the Westerner—many of them have seen Western people now—that you can live to be older than 30 years old or 35 years old if you do a little more and take a little better care of your body. They have seen, without the use of it, that you not only become a better citizen, you become a better soldier, you become a better everything, you can become a scholar.

And also I won't cut our drug program short. Our drugs have done wonders to help. Because opium, the main part of it—they never did use opium like we think of it, as whiskey or something in the tavern—they used it for medical purposes, and some would get hooked on it. But our medical program has done wonders.

Mr. WHITE. Isn't it true that opium was one of their basic medicines, particularly for people with lingering illnesses, tuberculosis, cancer, and things of that kind?

Mr. BUELL. Very true, and it works.

Mr. WHITE. It kept the patient sedated?

Mr. BUELL. It worked. When I say "it worked," I don't mean it cured him, but it took care of the pain, which is the way it should be.

Mr. WHITE. Has opium been used as a method of suicide?

Mr. BUELL. Oh, yes; there is no question about that; it is a real good one. About that much, on the top of that pencil, that black part, will just about take care of anybody.

Mr. WHITE. That is a pellet about the size of a bean?

Mr. BUELL. Yes; take that and in a couple of hours you have had it.

Mr. WHITE. This is swallowed?

Mr. BUELL. Yes. This still goes on. A Meo or your hill tribes will not shoot themselves or have an act of violence; there is no suicide like this. They have a tree weed in the jungle even more powerful than opium that they use for suicide.

Mr. WHITE. Back again to this massacre that we were speaking of a while ago, was this opium method of suicide used by many of those people?

Mr. BUELL. They were just killed; kids were pounded against stones and killed; there were several people that shot their own people; this still goes on. These people are so damned strong against communism, especially a Meo, that if people cannot keep up on the trail, old people, they will kill them, they will kill their own people before they will let them stay behind.

Mr. WHITE. And be captured by the Communists?

Mr. BUELL. Yes; that is absolutely true.

Mr. WHITE. Back now to the opium thing, can you make an estimate of, say, the total tonnage of opium that has been grown in northeast Laos there in the province, say, in times of peace when maximum production was possible? Could you give us an estimate?

Mr. BUELL. All of north and northeast Laos, which we will call my area, which takes this up in here, is completely a guess, and when I say "completely a guess," 10 ton, 30 ton, probably a hundred tons.

Mr. WHITE. Would not exceed a hundred tons?

Mr. BUELL. No more than that.

Mr. WHITE. And this could be reduced by conditions of war, could it?

Mr. BUELL. That is right. I would say that would be the peak that you could get in peacetime; I would say this would be their peak. Because when they are growing opium—these people didn't grow opium knowing that this piece of ground would grow just as good opium as this. Because they are great land lovers, they love their land, they will not abuse their land just to grow an extra crop. They grow what they need to take care of their own needs that year. They are not like us Americans, to hog the market; next year corn will be a big price, so they double their corn allotment; they don't do it that way. That would be about the amount for a normal, peaceful year, I would say; no more than that.

Mr. WHITE. Is the opium poppy difficult to cultivate?

Mr. BUELL. Very, very difficult to cultivate; it is hard to keep growing. You have to even be careful when you hoe it. Everything is done by hand. When you hoe it you have to be sure the ground is not too wet to turn the plant. As I have said before, it is the hardest plant, I think, on earth. I don't think there is a plant on earth that takes as much out of the soil as opium.

Mr. WHITE. How about the harvesting of it?

Mr. BUELL. This is very, very difficult.

Mr. WHITE. How is this done? Would you tell us about it?

Mr. BUELL. The opium poppy—first you have to seed the opium poppy, which you all have seen poppies; it is the same thing. After

the petals fall off, they have little knives that they go around in the morning and split just a little hairline open in two or three places on that little poppy head, and they do that early in the morning while it is cool, and when the sun comes up, that will bleed out your raw opium. And this will last for about a week on one little head; that is how many times you have to go and come back. And then what is also difficult about it is that the crop never matures at the same time like we think of our wheat crop or other crops; it can extend as much as a month or 6 weeks to get the whole crop harvested.

Mr. WHITE. Does raw opium have a limited shelf or storage life or can it be kept indefinitely?

Mr. BUELL. No, it can't. It should be sold at the end of 2 years. It has deteriorated very little at the end of 2 years. But the end of the third year, it has deteriorated by 70 to 80 percent, and by the fourth year you might say, as far as selling, absolutely worthless.

Mr. WHITE. Is the quality of opium grown there, in the northeast part of Laos, particularly, of good quality opium?

Mr. BUELL. So they say; probably some of the best in the world. That is northeast Laos. Down in the south, further down, where we are at now, what we grow is very, very poor. But that up there is good. For instance, you could take 2 kilos of opium—one out of there and one out of west Laos or Burma—and have them on the market and you could get nearly twice as much for a kilo if they know it is from there.

Mr. WHITE. All of this territory is presently in the hands of the North Vietnamese communists, is it not?

Mr. BUELL. Practically all of it, 95 percent.

Mr. WHITE. And, to your knowledge, is this opium being exported from Laos to North Vietnam?

Mr. BUELL. No, I can't say. If I was saying—I have no pictures, I have nothing on it—I would say most of it is going up into North Vietnam in the raw opium form.

Mr. WHITE. And does this exceed the demands or the requirements of the North Vietnamese for opium?

Mr. BUELL. This I would have no idea; I really wouldn't. Again, if North Vietnam is growing any opium, which I don't know—I am sure you people probably can find this out some way—if they was growing any opium—I know pretty well where their opium land is—it could exceed their use if they had a good crop of opium and was growing opium on the opium lands, but this I don't know.

Mr. WHITE. You don't know whether or not the North Vietnamese

Mr. BUELL. I am sure they have got enough opium, because, again, the North Vietnamese are pretty strict on their opium laws. After all, an opium addict is looked down on in North Vietnam about like they are looked down on in my area. You don't only go so far into using opium in that world.

Mr. WHITE. If they had exportable surpluses there in North Vietnam, where would these be exported? Could these be sent down the Mekong River to South Vietnam, for example?

Mr. BUELL. Not in my area you couldn't.

Mr. WHITE. But from North Vietnam?

Mr. BUELL. I would say they would not be going down the Mekong in North Vietnam; they could be going down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

It doesn't take much to carry opium; a kilo of raw opium is a bundle only about that big around, and it can turn into quite a few shots somewhere along the line.

Mr. WHITE. Do you know of any distilleries in your area there for distilling opium into heroin?

Mr. BUELL. I don't think there is a distillery in my area. I am sure that General Vang Pao would not allow a distillery. Since we have got into the Drug Act ourselves in Laos, trying to stop the flow of drugs down the Mekong River and out of Burma, General Vang Pao probably is one of the greatest cooperators that we have got.

If you had asked me that question 5 years ago, I could have taken you right to three distilleries myself in Vietnam, which we don't own any more, and one down in Xieng Khnong, and I could have taken you to three over on the west side. But I would not say myself that there is not one existing; they could exist on the west side. But where I was they don't exist, and I know there is none in my territory, which could very easily be done. General Vang Pao could easily be making an agreement with the North Vietnamese, which is nothing uncommon in Southeast Asia, to get the raw opium down to him, and he has all the protection that a man would ever need to get it out, but he absolutely really controls the opium.

Mr. WHITE. He is not doing that?

Mr. BUELL. Oh, no, no, absolutely. There was a day that he was, he was in it; this is when it was a way to make a buck, bootleg days.

Mr. WHITE. In those days, it was not illegal, was it, to grow opium or to transport it?

Mr. BUELL. It was just the same as it is now, still illegal, but they just ignored the laws; there was no law enforcement. Those people didn't know what law was—that kind of law. There wasn't anybody in the world to tell me what to do; that is my ground, a farmer, and the farmer is pretty damned independent.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Buell, we have read reports in the newspapers that American-controlled transportation may have been used for transporting opium in Laos. Would you have any opinions on this?

Mr. BUELL. Did you ever read that I transported any?

Mr. WHITE. No, sir, I never did.

Mr. BUELL. Well, I probably have. I will say it plainer. I have. And you would have, too, and the chairman would have, too.

Mr. WHITE. Would you explain this to us?

Mr. BUELL. There is no roads in north Laos. There was; there is no more. That is another thing the communists always takes care of, the roads, they seal up the roads. Again, as I say, opium comes in small packages and you can have your year's crop in one pocket. So I am sure that there have been times when our Ambassador or when we had Congressmen from the United States visiting over in north Laos who had their own airplanes chartered and they was with the Prime Minister or with General so-and-so and shaking his hand and going around with him, that they brought out opium themselves. Yes, there has been opium brought out on United States aircraft in these ways; but I am the first to say that as far as Air Continental, Air America, or any of our planes that ever made any type of a business or knowing deliberately that they was bringing out opium in northeast Laos, I

have to say absolutely no to that. There is instances where opium has been brought out on our planes, definitely.

Mr. WHITE. But that was without knowledge or intent?

Mr. BUELL. That is right. I have read these things in the newspapers also, and it is just a bunch of poppycock, that is all. We have got better Americans over there than that.

Mr. WHITE. Would you tell us just a word or two about the Weldons as a medical team over there?

Mr. BUELL. Of course, you don't like to blow your own horn. They are just a pair of wonderful people and as devoted and dedicated pretty near their lives to helping the people of all Laos. It so happened that Dr. Weldon, when he first came to Laos, fell in love with the north-east and north Laos program, that they have gone all over Laos. There cannot be too much said about them.

The medical program—Dr. Weldon right now is working much on this drug program that is going on, doing a wonderful job—he has had much bearing on. When we talk about the use of drugs and about the medical program, and so forth, in Laos, much credit has to go to him.

Mr. WHITE. Before the Weldons came to Laos, was the Tom Dooley Hospital or Hospitals operating in Laos?

Mr. BUELL. We had the Tom Dooley Hospital over on the Mekong River; it was operating over there. I am sure, had Tom Dooley lived and had time, that he also would have had a big program in Laos.

Mr. WHITE. How did his program or what they have attempted to carry on since he died, how did that compare with the program run by the Philippine Brotherhood—in size and effectiveness, I would say.

Mr. BUELL. Don't forget I am a little prejudiced; I think we can run a medical program better than the Philippines do. They are good. I have had Philippines work for me very much, but the Philippines really never had a program. Their program was always, which it is still today, under the supervision of Dr. Weldon, and they do a fine job. All the money that is used by the Philippines in Laos is U.S. money. It is called Operation Brotherhood, and I think that probably we do a little better training even than what the Philippines can do.

Mr. WHITE. What kind of religious programs are being conducted in Laos now, Mr. Buell? Do we have clergymen over there that are doing missionary work?

Mr. BUELL. The French have been in there for years and years, a couple hundred French Catholics. I have a couple of Catholic priests that work with me in the north that are people out of this world; they would both be elected to Congress; they should be somewhere, anyway. We do have another Protestant organization that is the Christian Alliance—I think it is an organization of several Protestant groups—that also does a very fine job, and we all work together.

Our AID program helps haul them around even, and if I need a good AID worker to go out in the field with me someday, I might just call on Father Bouchard to go and do it, or I might call on this Protestant preacher, and they will go out and do it and still not sell their goods that much.

We have another group working with us now and doing us a lot of good, World Vision, which is not solely a religious group, but sponsored very much by religion, and they are really helping us.

Mr. WHITE. Have any of these clergymen been killed in the course of their duties?

Mr. BUELL. Yes; in my group alone—I think again, don't put this in the *Saturday Evening Post* or something, but I worked with 17 priests in the north, and either seven or nine have been killed by the Vietnamese, not by the Laos.

Mr. WHITE. By the North Vietnamese communists?

Mr. BUELL. Yes. This pretty well answers your question about what the North Vietnamese communists think about religion, and I am not a Catholic.

Mr. WHITE. I think this just about concludes our questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I would like to ask you one or two questions, Mr. Buell. You have had an intriguing, very, very interesting experience in Laos. Did you work solely with the refugees in Laos?

Mr. BUELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you are also working in an area where the people are already settled?

Mr. BUELL. Yes, sir; but everybody is a refugee.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the cause of the refugee problem—leaving communist-controlled territories where the Pathet Lao have taken over?

Mr. BUELL. I have to ask you again, otherwise you are asking me: What causes a refugee in my area?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I am going to get around to asking you a question about the charge that has been made that American bombing has been a major factor of the refugee problem in Laos.

Mr. BUELL. I wasn't going to answer your first question, but I will, being as you are coming up with the next one.

As far as I am concerned, all the refugees that I have worked with, all of them—and we started out with a peak of 450,000—has and was caused by fear of communism takeover; and when the North Vietnamese came into the picture this fear even became much greater and would even cause them to leave.

We actually got, in '64 and '65—I got many refugees, had the Vietnamese not come into the picture, would not have been refugees, they would have stayed with the Pathet Lao. In fact, we have a world of what you call Pathet Lao refugees, if you want to call them that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Buell, let me ask you this question; you are familiar, of course, with the lines along which the Pathet Lao is organized: Are they organized along the same lines as the Vietcong; that is, are they divided into local forces, regional forces, and main line forces?

Mr. BUELL. Again, I am really saying things that I don't believe, ordinarily. To start with, again, you have got to say there is no Pathet Lao any more. In northeast Laos, the Pathet Lao just don't exist, it isn't, so help me God.

But now, to back up, before the Vietnamese came in, when the Pathet Lao was in control and doing their fightings, and so forth; no, their patterns were not like the Vietnamese. But there is no Pathet Lao in northeast Laos.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the fighting slowed down in that area since the invasion by the North Vietnamese?

Mr. BUELL. Yes; for the past couple or 3 months it has really slowed down. I would say it has more or less come to a standstill. They are not—we are not going over and stepping on their toes or anything like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate returning to the area?

Mr. BUELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I commend you, sir, for the service that you have performed in the country of Laos.

The meeting will be adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., Thursday, May 25, 1972, the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1972

(Southeast Asia)

Part 1

THURSDAY, JULY 20, 1972

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Internal Security met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Mendel J. Davis presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Richardson Preyer of North Carolina, Mendel J. Davis of South Carolina, John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, Roger H. Zion of Indiana, and John G. Schmitz of California.

Staff members present: Richard L. Schultz, associate chief counsel; DeWitt White, minority legal counsel; Herbert Romerstein, minority chief investigator; and George Armstrong, minority investigator.

Mr. DAVIS. The committee meets today for the purpose of receiving the testimony of Dr. Charles Weldon in connection with the committee's continuing inquiry into the theory and practice of communism on both the domestic and international fronts.

I understand that the witness has spent approximately 10 years in Laos in almost daily contact with the forces of communism.

Dr. WELDON, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee. Will you please rise and be sworn.

Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. WELDON. I do.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you want to proceed, please, Counsel?

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES LOUIS WELDON

Mr. WHITE. Would you please state your full name?

Dr. WELDON. Charles Louis Weldon.

Mr. WHITE. Would you give us a little biographical background, where you were born, your education, and so on?

Dr. WELDON. I was born in south Louisiana, just north of New Orleans, in 1920, and shortly after that, when I was about 3 years old, I moved to west Texas and I was raised out in west Texas and

(7779)

went through high school in San Angelo, and then I went to Texas A. & M. and took petroleum-chem. engineering. In my senior year I went into the service. This was the beginning of World War II. I spent 5 years in the Marine Corps as an infantry officer, and at the end of the war I decided I would like to go into medicine rather than continuing in engineering.

I went back to school and got my medical degree from Louisiana State University Medical School in New Orleans. I finished medical school in 1951 and after my internship, and so forth, I went into practice in the rural community in Louisiana about 30 miles west of Baton Rouge.

My wife is also a doctor. We finished school together; we have practiced and worked together.

In 1961 we left Louisiana and went to American Samoa and worked in American Samoa for about 2 years with the Department of Interior.

Mr. ZION. Would you speak into the microphone, please.

Dr. WELDON. After leaving American Samoa we went to Laos in 1963, and we have been working in Laos since 1963.

Mr. WHITE. Are you employed with a Government agency in Laos, Doctor?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir; I work for the United States Agency for International Development.

Mr. WHITE. How would you describe your capacity in Laos? You are there as a physician, of course. Do you have a title there with the mission?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. Like most missions in AID the Laos mission is divided into various technical services, among other offices, and so forth. But I am chief of the Public Health Division. In other words, I am senior adviser to the mission, also to the Ministry of Health on matters relating to health.

Mr. WHITE. When you first went to Laos did you also render medical care to a considerable extent?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. When I first arrived in Laos the United States mission was not particularly involved in medical assistance, and I didn't have then the administrative responsibilities that I have now, and I had much more time to actually work as a doctor and I spent a very large proportion of my time then, actually, in a strictly medical capacity and clinical capacity, taking care of sick people.

Mr. WHITE. How would you describe the public health situation in Laos at the time you arrived there?

Dr. WELDON. It was pretty bad. Even in 1963 there was a pretty nasty little war going on in Laos. The North Vietnamese had not left the country as they had agreed to under the 1962 Geneva accords, and even though there was not a whole lot heard about it, there was, as I say, a considerable amount of military activity going on in the northern part of the country.

People were being displaced by the enemy. A lot of people were being injured, and so forth. At that time there was really no medical care at all for the people in the northern area of the country and very little medical care for people in the rest of the country. There were only six Lao doctors in Laos at the time.

Mr. WHITE. And what was the population of the country at that time?

Dr. WELDON. The population, there has never been a very accurate census of the country, but the population is probably around three million or a bit over three million.

Mr. WHITE. Would you describe the military activity a little more in detail, Dr. Weldon? You say in the northern part of the country, was this primarily the northeastern part?

Dr. WELDON. That is right, particularly Sam Neua Province, the province that forms most of the border of Laos with North Vietnam, and there was really a partisan type of war going on in the north. On one side of the mountain you had basically a hill rice farmer trying to protect his farm and his country against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao and associates, and on the other side of the hill you had mom and the kids trying to scrape out a living. But it was really a group of peasantry that was trying to just protect themselves from the invader. There was very little of the regular military up in this area at that time. Most of these were irregulars that were just trying to defend their homes.

Mr. WHITE. And what was the character of the North Vietnamese forces at this time? Were they regular North Vietnamese forces or guerrilla forces?

Dr. WELDON. In 1963 most of the North Vietnamese that were involved were primarily cadre. A company sized unit of Pathet Lao may have had three, four, or five military or political advisers that ran things and were really military and political cadre.

Mr. WHITE. At this time did their objective appear to be taking and holding ground, or was it primarily to protect routes into Vietnam?

Dr. WELDON. That is a good question. I am not sure I can answer it. It has been very controversial as to their intent at that time. Regardless of what their intent was, as far as I am concerned they were people from another country that had invaded Laos and they were taking territory. As to why they were doing this, as I say, this is something we have talked about quite a bit.

Mr. WHITE. Did this military activity generate a number of refugees?

Dr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. Would you describe the situation to us, please?

Dr. WELDON. In 1963 upon my arrival?

Mr. WHITE. Yes. Let us take it forward from there, then.

Dr. WELDON. Well, as you know, there has been military activity going on in the country for some time prior to my arrival in 1963. At the time of my arrival, I don't recall exactly, but I believe there were around 90,000 people in the northern part of the country on a refugee status. In other words, they were displaced from their homes probably within the last year, a maximum of 18 months.

We have tried, and I think fairly successfully, to rehabilitate people as quickly as possible. We don't usually keep them on a refugee status over 18 months. This is the maximum length of time for them to go through a crop cycle.

The crop cycle is of course conditioned by the monsoons, and if someone is displaced right at the end of the rice-growing season, then it may be up to a year and a half before they will have time to prepare land and go through a completed crop cycle.

So we had, at the time of my arrival, roughly 90,000 people who had been displaced in the last 18 months, or some period of time less than that, and these were in scattered groups, primarily in Sam Neua and Phong Saly, the two northern provinces.

Mr. WHITE. Were these individuals forced to leave their homes? That is, were they compelled to leave, did they have an option of staying, or did they leave voluntarily as a class? Did you hear any expressions from them or see any evidence to indicate the answer to that question?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, I think so. First of all, of course, they had made the decision themselves, no one made the decision for them. They had previous experience with the communists, both the indigenous communists, the Pathet Lao, and the Northern Vietnamese. To live under the communists was just unsatisfactory to them, and when there was a danger of them falling under communist control, they left, they fled.

Mr. DAVIS. Excuse me just a moment. You say there were 90,000 refugees in 1963 when you arrived?

Dr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. Was this number a great increase in the last 18 months or was it an average since the military activities had begun prior to 1963?

Dr. WELDON. I think it had a tendency to increase a little bit, Mr. Davis, probably in 1961. Probably there were very few refugees prior to 1961; there had been a few but not very many. But from 1961 to 1963 there had been some increase. If you recall, there was a considerable political upset in 1961 when the Lao Captain Kong Le revolted against the central government and took over for a while, and there were quite a few people displaced at that time really by an internal disruption.

Mr. DAVIS. So these were all freshly displaced from a new conflict that you were dealing with when you first arrived?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. These people in 1963, most of them had been displaced, as I say, within the last year or at a maximum of a year and a half. But there had been a tendency for the number of people to increase from 1961 to 1963. The reason for the increase during that period of time was primarily because of the military activities that were being carried on by the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese in the two northern provinces that border on Vietnam, Sam Neua, and Phong Saly.

Mr. WHITE. Dr. Weldon, was the figure on the number of refugees 9,000 or 90,000?

Dr. WELDON. 90,000.

Mr. WHITE. And these refugees generally moved from the northeast toward the southwest and the south; is that correct?

Dr. WELDON. That is correct. The movement has primarily been to the south and toward the west, actually. This is speaking in the broad sense now. There might be local movements that were not in these directions, but in the last 9 years the tendency has been for people to move away from North Vietnam, and this is south and to the west.

Mr. WHITE. Doctor, you have stated that these people had prior experience with the communists and that they found living under them

unsatisfactory. Do you have knowledge of the atrocities that were committed by the communists in the course of their attacks upon the people of Laos?

Dr. WELDON. Not really personal knowledge, no. Naturally I was not in the country prior to 1963. But the type of things that disenchanted them with the communists was not really so much atrocities prior to that time as the way the communists operated and what they did to the people.

First of all, they took a lot of their young men, and women, too, away from them, and they never saw these people again. They took them to North Vietnam to retrain them for them to become political and military cadre. They had a tendency when the North Vietnamese political cadre moved into these areas, they had a tendency to completely subvert the local government, particularly the village leader, which is really the basis of government in Laos. If this guy didn't play ball with them, they replaced him one way or another; I mean either arranged that he was replaced by another person or he was eliminated. Also, the communists had no respect for their traditions, their religious traditions, and their customs, and so forth.

The fact that they took their young people, the fact that they disrupted both their political and social systems, is very unsatisfactory and unsavory to them.

Mr. WHITE. With regard to disrupting their religious practices, would you tell us more about that? What were their religious practices and what did the communists do about them?

Dr. WELDON. Well, there are basically two religions involved in this group; one is Buddhism. Most of the Lao-Thai people from an ethnic standpoint are Buddhist. The hill tribes like the Meo, which is the main ethnic minority involved in the northern part of Laos, these people are primarily animists; they don't have a very structured or formal type of religion.

But in both instances the communists' political cadre particularly had a tendency to possibly stop, not in a real overt manner to stop the religious practices, but they deprecate them. They tell the people that this is a waste of time, it is a lot of foolishness, and so forth, but they try to discredit the local communities, and so forth, and since in most instances they control the resources, I mean even food and this type of thing, it is very difficult often for these people to survive because they will not allow the people to support them, and so forth.

Mr. WHITE. That is, to support the religious people, the monks and priests, and so forth?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. They tell the people that this is a waste of time and effort, and so forth, that it is not a very productive pursuit; and since people are not making any real contribution to the community they should not have food or any other things that they need to survive.

Mr. WHITE. During the time that you have been there have there been efforts made by foreign missionaries to help the Lao people?

Dr. WELDON. Oh, yes. We have two very active missionary groups in Laos. One of them is Catholic and the other is Protestant. Both groups work very closely together and we have worked very closely with both groups. It is really a joint effort to take care of the refugee population, particularly.

7784

Mr. WHITE. Have the North Vietnamese communists indulged these religious missions there? Have they allowed them to operate or have some of the clergymen been killed in their efforts?

Dr. WELDON. They have pretty high casualties, particularly among the Catholic fathers. Some of the Catholic fathers are very militant anticommunists, and they are real targets. We have had a lot of them killed, and they have obviously been deliberately killed.

Mr. WHITE. Do you have any idea how many figures on that?

Dr. WELDON. I can't remember exactly, but I can look this up for you, but the Catholic priests that we have worked with have rather detailed histories on all of these things. If I remember correctly, I think since probably say 1954, or say 1955, from the time Laos got its independence—for some reason or other the number 16 sticks in my mind—I am not sure, but I think there have been 16 missionary priests that have been killed by the communists. This is in a group of, I don't really know, maybe 30 or 40 missionaries.

Mr. WHITE. Over a period of how long a time would you say this is?

Dr. WELDON. I would say probably starting in 1954 after the 1954 accords, so this has been over a period of 18 years. In addition to being killed, there are a lot of them that have been injured. Father Martin that works down in the southeastern area, and, I have forgotten, 3 or 4 years ago his jeep was ambushed and he lost his right leg. The two other people that were with him were killed. There have been quite a few of them wounded.

Mr. WHITE. The last witness on this subject before the committee was Mr. Edgar Buell, whom I am sure you know very well. He described to us a massacre that took place at Ban Ban or, more accurately, at Phu Nong, I believe, just outside of Ban Ban. He indicated that you had assisted in the aftermath of this massacre. Can you tell us something about that?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. The place you have reference to, Phu Nong, is in the northern part of Laos just south of Ban Ban, a few kilometers south of Ban Ban up in the mountains. This is on the east side of the Plain of Jars. At the time there were about 9,000 refugees in this one enclave. These were people from the area who had been compacted into a rather small mountain valley. As you know, Route 7 that comes out of Vietnam passes through Ban Ban and into the Plain of Jars; this is one of the main supply routes of the communists into Laos.

They weren't very happy about the Lao Government maintaining this enclave on the mountains that overlooked Route 7 so they wanted to eliminate it. They made several attempts to overrun it, and they were not successful. So this was primarily by Pathet Lao troops. Since the Pathet Lao had not been able to overrun it, they put two battalions of North Vietnamese into the operation, and they did overrun it. The people fled as best they could, and the enemy tried to apprehend them, tried to capture them, and wanted them to remain in place.

I am not sure exactly why they wanted them to remain in place. Most likely they needed manpower in that area, primarily porters and this type of thing. They were very anxious to keep the people there. But the people fled, and it's very rugged mountainous country, and at the end of about 4 days they were so tired they had to stop and rest some. The main body of this group slept in a little high mountain val-

ley and bivouacked there. During the night the enemy spotted them and just about dawn, as it started to break light, the enemy opened up on this group of people with mortars and automatic weapons, and so forth, and they killed probably around 1,500 or 1,600 of them; they just slaughtered them. The ones of them that did escape continued to flee, and it took them about 12 days altogether to reach a place of safety. And after this massacre, in a week or so that ensued before they were in a safe place, they were again in very difficult country, and—

Mr. WHITE. I know this must be very difficult for you, Doctor, to remember this.

Dr. WELDON. I am sorry, but these are—I feel rather foolish, but these are, these people were very good friends of mine. Anyway, they continued to flee, and a lot of the older people and some of the small children, and so forth, could not stay up with the main body, maybe the father and mother were already carrying a child or two, you know, and the North Vietnamese continued to harass these people and try to prevent them from getting to safety.

So, when it was no longer possible for one of the people, say the mother or a child, to stay up with the main body, and they were going to fall into the hands of the enemy on some occasions, actually the father shot them. But they lost about 1,500 or 1,600 of the people.

Mr. WHITE. Now, this group in general was unarmed civilians, were they not?

Dr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. These were not military personnel?

Dr. WELDON. No, these were unarmed civilians.

Mr. WHITE. Now, you participated in, of course, the care of these people that were gotten into refugee centers?

Dr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. What happened to them thereafter, Dr. Weldon, were they resettled?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. We resettled these people. First, of course, it was just emergency care, medical care, giving them food, blankets, clothing; they had lost all of their household goods, of course, and they needed cooking pots and simple hand implements, this type of thing, and so forth. But as soon as we get people back on their feet, then they are dispersed into areas where they can start farming again, build their homes, and the like.

Mr. ZION. Dr. Weldon, about what time frame are we talking about, when was this particular massacre?

Dr. WELDON. If I remember correctly, this is April of 1964. It was either April or May, I think it was April of 1964.

Mr. ZION. Did you happen to know Thomas Dooley?

Dr. WELDON. No, sir.

Mr. ZION. You didn't succeed him there? You apparently came in about the time he died?

Dr. WELDON. That is right. Dr. Dooley had left Laos sometime before I arrived, maybe a year.

Mr. ZION. I was with Mead Johnson and Company at the time and we were privileged to supply him with some nutritional supplies he needed in Laos, and Dr. Hans Snively, who was medical director of Mead Johnson at the time, spent a little time with Dr. Dooley in his

mission, and you have perhaps read his book or you have lived his book. I would guess. So you didn't actually know Dr. Dooley?

Dr. WELDON. No. As I say, he had been gone from Laos for at least a year and possibly a little longer than that before I arrived.

Mr. ZION. Last year I was in Geneva talking to the Red Cross trying to get some cooperation among the European countries as pertaining to the Geneva Convention as it applies to prisoners. The Red Cross told me that they had provided some Red Cross supplies to the Pathet Lao, that they had accepted some, but would not permit any of these supplies to be used for the loyal Laotians, nor had they made them be used by the South Vietnamese or the American prisoners. Did you have any association with any Red Cross activities during the time you were in Laos?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir: we have worked with the representatives of the International Red Cross continuously, the whole time that I have been there.

Mr. ZION. In your experience did they permit any of the Red Cross supplies to be used by other than the Pathet Lao or the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong?

Dr. WELDON. You see, I am looking at the thing from the opposite side of the fence. The International Red Cross people that I am working with are in Vientiane with the central government, and they are working with the noncommunist people.

Mr. ZION. And they did receive International Red Cross supplies?

Dr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. ZION. You are not then aware what sort of Red Cross activities are carried on by the other side?

Dr. WELDON. I don't know what is carried on the other side, Mr. Zion. I have not had any knowledge of what Red Cross activities are going on over on the communist side.

Mr. ZION. You have no knowledge, then, either by escapees or direct association with any prison camp activities, either in Laos or prisoners that were taken in Laos and transported perhaps to China or North Vietnam?

Dr. WELDON. I talked to some Lao, quite a few Lao over the years, that have been prisoners of the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, but I can't recall this particular subject of the Red Cross coming up, and I can't remember ever discussing anything that related to the Red Cross activities on the communist side.

Mr. ZION. In Geneva the International Red Cross people told me that when they had requests from the communist bloc for supplies, they sent them to them, and they also sent additional supplies above those that were requested so that they could be used for the prisoners that had been taken by the communist forces. And they told me that those extra supplies that they had sent for the prisoners were invariably returned, that they apparently didn't want to see the International Red Cross supplies used for communist prisoners, though they were willing to use them for their own forces.

But you were not aware of this, you had no opportunity to observe this?

Dr. WELDON. This subject has just not come up. I have no knowledge of what Red Cross activities might be going on. Different Laotians

that I know that have been prisoners of the communists at different times, this has just never been discussed, I never thought to ask them about it.

Mr. ZION. Did any of the Lao prisoners that you talked to, have they ever been retained with American POWs, or in association with them, to your knowledge?

Dr. WELDON. No, sir.

Mr. ZION. It would be your presumption, then, that they might have been separated had there been American prisoners of war and Laos prisoners of war?

Dr. WELDON. Yes; it would certainly seem that the Americans were kept separate.

Mr. ZION. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WHITE. Doctor, can you tell us about any more or any other major atrocities such as this massacre following the evacuation of Ban Ban?

Dr. WELDON. Well, there are a lot of things that have happened like this over the years and it's still going on to an extent. I mean, you know, the ambush on the roads that continue up to today, this type of thing, where civilians are in taxis or something like that, and the taxi is shot up, or sometimes the act is very deliberate, it is not just an inadvertent sort of thing.

I recall within the last several months there was a taxi stopped just north of Vientiane, and there were about 14 people on there, I believe, and these were civilians. There were no soldiers on the taxi. There were quite a few women and children in the group, and they stopped the taxi, had them get off, and after they had gotten out of the taxi, then all these people were shot with AK-47's.

You see, it was not just a simple act of ambushing a taxi on the road, I mean they took this and stopped the vehicle; they knew they were women and small children and they shot all of them.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Would counsel yield at that point?

Doctor, a few years ago Allen Dulles indicated in testimony before the Congress that in his judgment the central communist tactic in Southeast Asia was terror, whether this terror manifested itself in the systematic assassination of village chiefs or reprisals against those who might cooperate, come into a hut at night, slitting a throat, that there was everywhere in Southeast Asia this climate of terror which permeated the average Laotian, Vietnamese, and so forth. Would this be a reasonably accurate appraisal on the basis of your firsthand knowledge and, if so, what part does terror play in the average life of the person that lives in Southeast Asia?

Dr. WELDON. Terror is a very significant part of the communist type of operation in two situations. First of all, even in the political situation they fairly well control, quite frequently they use terror to discredit the central government; they show that the government does not have the capacity to protect the people, and so forth. The other thing they use terror for is often in areas that geographically are important to them that they do not have the resources to put in or the possible manpower to put into that area to control it, so they go into the area and they shoot a few people, and they give them a message. I will give you a good example of this in a minute. But they go in

there and shoot a few civilians and what they are saying is, "You shape up, you do what we tell you, or you die; you play ball, or you die."

(At this point Mr. Schmitz entered the hearing room.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. How does this affect the people over a period of time?

Dr. WELDON. The main thing is that it has just terrified them of living under the communists and particularly the North Vietnamese, and this is why when the enemy approaches these people immediately flee. This is why we have such a refugee problem in Laos. I know, and I imagine it's a large factor also in Vietnam.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Were there any places in Southeast Asia where the element of terror is removed? It's my understanding that even in villages in Vietnam and Laos that seemingly you are under government control, noncommunist control, that they are still within these villages often, communist agents, sympathizers who enforce the same type of terror, particularly where there was any effort to cooperate with either the South Vietnamese Government or the Americans during the early part of the so-called Vietnamization.

Dr. WELDON. This is true in Laos, Mr. Ashbrook, but I don't think that it has had quite the significance in Laos that it has in Vietnam. I am talking about in the government-controlled areas. They have not used nearly as much terror in Laos as they have in Vietnam, but this is beginning to be more and more evident, it seems to me, in the last 2 or 3 years, where there are more assassinations, there are more ambushes, there are more threats, you know, in the village; there is more infiltration of the village particularly by young people that were taken out of the village maybe even 8 to 10 years ago, have been trained as political cadre, and have just recently been returned to their villages to start to organize, and so forth.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you.

Mr. WHITE. Dr. Weldon, you mentioned that you would tell us of an example of these terror tactics.

Dr. WELDON. One of my first experiences in Laos with this type of thing, way up in the northern part of the country, a little place called Phia Kham, we had heard that there had been some trouble at Phia Kham, and I did not know the nature of it. Anyway, I flew into the place, and when I got there, I found seven wounded men and all seven of these people were elderly men in their late forties and fifties and maybe even older than that. Someone 50 in Laos is a pretty old man, generally speaking. Anyway, these seven elderly men were all shot through the thighs, and this struck me as a little odd that all seven of these guys had the same type of wound.

Anyway, we evacuated these people and got them to the hospital and got them straightened out. I naturally was interested in what had happened. Well, the night before that this small group of North Vietnamese had come into this village. They arrived just before dark, and the people had put them up and cooked food for them and made them comfortable for the night, and so forth. The next morning they again prepared food for them to take with them. They were obviously getting ready to leave, and they helped them get ready and gave them food to take with them, and so forth.

When they were ready to leave, they singled out these seven old men, these were the seven elders in the village, they got these men, they lined them up in the center of the village, and when they lined them up, they shot each one of them through the thighs, and then they left. They didn't say anything, they just left.

Now, when I first heard this, it seemed like a rather asinine thing to me; it just didn't make sense. But again, to get back to what we said previously, this again is the way that they use terror. The message was very clear: "Your government can't protect you; you do what we tell you or you die." It's that simple. This is what they were resorting to.

Mr. WHITE. A few minutes ago you mentioned the instance of the people who were taken out of the taxi, told to dismount, and were subsequently shot with AK-47's. Would you say, for the record, what an AK-47 is?

Dr. WELDON. This is an automatic rifle. This is a basic infantry rifle that the communists use, both the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao nowadays.

Mr. WHITE. Where are these produced, do you know?

Dr. WELDON. I think most of them are being produced in China now. I think the weapon was developed in Russia, but I think most of these are being produced in China now.

Mr. WHITE. This is the standard infantry weapon of the North Vietnamese?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. It is the counterpart to the M-16.

(At this point Mr. Zion left the hearing room.)

Mr. WHITE. In these areas that have been or are being held by the communists, what, if anything, do they do about education and medical care, Dr. Weldon?

Dr. WELDON. It has been my impression from talking to people who have lived under the communists that they have a fairly effective program of education at the elementary level. They have built a lot of schools and they have developed teaching materials, particularly books, for the first, second, and third grades. There is a very high proportion of the children that are in school in the communist areas. Also, they have developed medical care, usually at a rather low level, but somewhat comparable to what we are doing on the other side. They have no trained medical people, and they have to do with medical auxiliaries that are very low-level people, but they are making some attempt to provide medical attention to the people.

Mr. WHITE. What has been done in the other areas, those still under the control of the central government and where our mission is operating, in the way of education and medical care?

Dr. WELDON. Even though I have been intensely interested in education, this is not primarily my field, and I have a practical knowledge, but as far as the detailed knowledge of what is going on in education, I really don't have it. But this is one of the basic programs that we have been carrying on in Laos, to try to help the Laotian Government provide at least an elementary education to all the Lao children. I think we are coming close to achieving this.

Mr. WHITE. Excuse the interruption, but prior to our initial efforts in Laos, say 10 years ago, what was the educational level there, what was the literacy rate or illiteracy rate; do you happen to know?

Dr. WELDON. When I got there, the figure was quoted as 98 percent illiterate. Whether this is correct or not, I don't know, but it was awfully high, anyway. There were very few people who had an opportunity to gain literacy.

Mr. WHITE. You mentioned what efforts had been made in the primary areas. How about secondary and higher educational?

Dr. WELDON. Yes; we have made, particularly in the last 4 or 5 years we have made a lot of efforts particularly at the high school level. We have developed a program of high schools that are taught in Lao. When I first arrived in Laos, there was only one high school in the country in Vientiane, and it produced about 90 graduates a year, and this school was taught in French. I mean the language of instruction was French.

Now very few kids have the opportunity and background really to learn French well enough in the elementary school to progress satisfactorily in high school in French. So the United States Government has assisted the Lao Government in developing a system of Lao high schools where things are taught in Lao.

Most of the technical aspects of this have been done by a contract with the University of Hawaii, and I think they have done an excellent job. I think it is one of the most significant programs that we have had there. But now there are either 4 or 5 Lao high schools now, and everyone is just tickled to death with this program and particularly the Lao are.

Mr. WHITE. How about higher education?

Dr. WELDON. There is nothing higher than high school in Laos, right now, except in the field of medicine and law and administration. There is a small school of law and administration, and there is a small medical school, but there is nothing that resembles a college or a university in the country.

Anyone that continues on above the lycee or high school level has to go out of the country except in these two rather small fields.

Mr. DAVIS. Excuse me, Counsel. You said when you arrived in 1963 there were six Lao doctors; correct?

Dr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. What is that number today?

Dr. WELDON. At the present time I think we have 38. It's either 38 or 39.

Mr. DAVIS. How many doctors from the United States were there when you arrived?

Dr. WELDON. There was one doctor with the Dooley Foundation, and my wife and I, and I believe that was all.

Mr. DAVIS. How about today?

Dr. WELDON. There are two additional doctors on my staff; there is myself and three others. That is it on the American side.

Mr. DAVIS. So the increase in the medical services has been strictly on Lao; correct?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir. Now there are other third-country nationals in medicine there, particularly from the Philippines. There are at the present time, I believe, 24 Philippine doctors that are working with the Lao people. I made one mistake, Mr. Davis, there are usually two or three American doctors in the Embassy who take care of the American community.

Mr. DAVIS. But to work with the Lao people and the refugees mainly?

Dr. WELDON. There are only four of us.

Mr. DAVIS. This would be under AID, right?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir; there are no other American doctors in the country right now, just the four that work with AID.

Mr. DAVIS. You say the higher education consisted of medicine and law and administration. What has been our contribution in the medical field there? Have you all been assisting in the teaching?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir. One of the programs that I first tried to develop there was—when I say “medical school,” this also includes the school of nursing, and we, the United States has supported the development of a nursing school. This was strictly a United States project. I thought this was the area where we had the most critical need, even more so than doctors at that time, but today there is not a Lao R.N. Next June we will graduate our first Lao R.N., you know, an accredited person with a diploma. But this is a program we developed.

Now we will give them quite a bit of assistance in the medical school, but most of the development of the medical school has been by the French, most of the assistance that has gone into it has been by the French, and I have deliberately stayed away from it. We have enough problems as it is. If they will do something, we are tickled to death for them to do it. We have worked in a cooperative fashion with the French, and if things bog down, we try to be of help, and so forth.

Mr. DAVIS. Has there been an effort to disturb this by the communists?

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)

Dr. WELDON. No, I would say not. I can't think of anything; no.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. WHITE. Of course, the nursing school there is somewhat removed physically from the communist area of influence, isn't it, Dr. Weldon?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, this is in the capital city of Vientiane.

Mr. WHITE. In the creation of the nursing school and establishing a nursing course, did you have any psychological elements of tradition to overcome with the women of Laos?

Dr. WELDON. I am talking about the more formal aspects of training. Now we have done a lot of impromptu training; I don't know exactly how many. But out in the countryside through the medical programs we are trying to develop in a country that has no medical resources, we have trained at least 2,000 people as types of nurses and medics and everything else. We have had a lot of problems in training because many of the people that we had to work with didn't speak Lao. About 60 percent of the people in Laos are not Lao ethnically, they are not Lao type people, they are the so-called ethnic minorities like the Meo, the Lao Tung, the Tai, the Lue, all sorts of people there; and a lot of these people, their first language is not Lao, and a lot of the girls can't speak Lao. So, when we first started the program, trying to develop some sort of medical attention out in the countryside, the first problem we had was teaching these kids how to speak Lao so we could have a common language to communicate in.

This was quite a job. Now, also, all of the folk medicine is male oriented, unfortunately, in Laos. We had a very difficult time getting the first girls into the nursing program. The people by tradition and culture didn't feel this was a suitable pursuit for a girl. I really sweated blood to get the first seven little girls into the program.

After we got the first seven into the program, and they performed so well, the people began to realize that maybe this is a good thing, and the thing just snowballed after that, and now we have absolutely no trouble getting girls. There are always a lot more kids that want to get into the medical training programs than we have the capacity to take care of.

Mr. WHITE. Since your arrival in Laos, you have established a number of hospitals, haven't you, Doctor?

Dr. WELDON. Oh, yes, hospitals and dispensaries; at the present time we operate about 230 outpatient facilities all over the country. This varies actually from day to day almost, from the military situation. We will have two or three places overrun this week and build two or three more somewhere else.

Right now we have about 230 simple outpatient dispensaries that we are running in the country, and these outpatient facilities take care of about 3 million patient visits a year; that does not mean patients now, but patient visits a year. But I am sure that since I have been in Laos we have built over a thousand dispensaries in different places, and they have been overrun by the enemy, some have abandoned them, you know, as populations have shifted, and so forth.

Hospitals. I would have to stop and think, really; hospitals, we have probably 12 or 14 major hospitals overrun by the enemy since I have been there.

Mr. WHITE. What has happened to those hospitals after they have been overrun?

Dr. WELDON. Most of them have been destroyed. I can't think of any that have been overrun that are in use now. Now, don't misunderstand me now, a lot of this has been subsequent to the fighting that went on in the area. In some instances the hospitals have been deliberately destroyed by the enemy, but most of them have just been a casualty of the war, if you know what I mean: I mean there was fighting in that area and they happened to get destroyed just like any other building happened to get destroyed.

Mr. WHITE. Do the North Vietnamese communists have the capability of continuing the operation of these hospitals after they have overrun the area?

Dr. WELDON. I don't know whether they have the capability or not; that is a difficult question to answer, but they are not, I mean, as I say, they have not continued to operate these places.

Mr. WHITE. I am sure that you have had many visits from the American press and the world press. Have reporters that have visited over there evidenced an interest in the achievements of our mission in Laos?

Dr. WELDON. Oh, yes, yes. Just in my own office there is hardly a week or hardly a day that goes by that there is not some contact with the press that are interested in the various aspects of what we are doing there, and so forth.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Chairman, unless you have a line of questioning that I am interrupting here, I have a question for Dr. Weldon.

Dr. WELDON. The Laos area is part of what is known as the Golden Triangle for poppy growth as a source of narcotics. To what extent are the poppies grown in the communist-controlled area and to what extent are the poppies grown in the noncommunist-controlled areas?

Dr. WELDON. Let's speak of Laos. When you say the Golden Triangle now, this implies to me parts of at least three countries.

Mr. SCHMITZ. That is right; it's an area of Southeast Asia, but including Laos.

Dr. WELDON. It includes, in my definition, a very small proportion of Laos. When I arrived in Laos actually there were considerable areas in the northern part of the country that were devoted to the cultivation of the poppies. A lot of it was consumed locally, certainly a lot of it was exported. I don't know what the total production was in the country, but the estimates we made shortly after we arrived there was about a hundred tons a year.

Mr. SCHMITZ. How much was that?

Dr. WELDON. About a hundred tons a year. These were just rough calculations we made, and I don't really know how accurate this was. But I think it is probably of the proper magnitude.

Now, the opium, as you may know, is a very sensitive crop, and it takes a very specific type of soil and climatic conditions. Now, the part of Laos that was growing poppies has practically all been taken over by the communists. The best poppy-growing areas were in the northern part of the country, and this is the part that is primarily, that primarily fell to the communists. So there is not very much opium grown in Laos right now, not any change, really, except that they have just lost the places where opium can be grown.

Mr. SCHMITZ. When you say there is not much grown in Laos now because the communists took over, you mean the communists stopped growing it?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. It takes a tremendous amount of labor to grow and harvest opium, and the people have left these areas when the communists occupied them, and people fled in front of them, and there are no people there to grow the opium.

Mr. SCHMITZ. You know they are not growing it any more back there?

Dr. WELDON. This is pretty much true, yes. Now I am talking about Laos, Mr. Schmitz. It's my impression that most of the opium that is being, that crosses the Golden Triangle is not really grown in the Golden Triangle; it's grown in northern Burma. This is the big producer now. It comes down through the Golden Triangle, and probably quite a bit of it is processed in the Golden Triangle.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Do you know how much of it is going into China for processing?

Dr. WELDON. I don't know, but we don't have any information; I have no information that would indicate to me that any of it is going into China.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I do.

Dr. WELDON. Well, I don't. I am just saying that I don't.

Mr. SCHMITZ. You have no information on the poppies grown in China, either?

Dr. WELDON. No, sir.

Mr. SCHMITZ. But in northern Burma—

Dr. WELDON. And still some in Laos, but not very much in Laos. As I say, mainly it's because we just lost the country that grows poppies. But my calculations now, and I am not very expert in this field, believe me, but my own calculations are that probably last year there were maybe 20 tons of opium grown in Laos and with the very large numbers of addicts that we have, particularly among the hill tribes. I think that probably the great proportion of it was consumed locally.

Mr. SCHMITZ. The hill tribes didn't leave?

Dr. WELDON. Sir?

Mr. SCHMITZ. You said the hill tribes—

Dr. WELDON. They have left, but they are still in other areas. They are still growing some opium, but it is hardly 20 percent of what it was at the time that I arrived in 1963.

Mr. DAVIS. Twenty percent grown or 20 percent exported?

Dr. WELDON. Twenty percent grown. Like I say, our calculations were that there were about a hundred tons a year grown or produced in Laos when I arrived. The estimates we made last year were about 20 tons.

Mr. SCHMITZ. How do you base your estimate after the communist takeover?

Dr. WELDON. The 20 tons I am talking about are grown in government-controlled areas. Mr. Schmitz. Now, the only information that we have about the communist areas are the occasional person who comes out of the communist areas and our overflights by aircraft.

Mr. SCHMITZ. What is the estimate now, what are the intelligence estimates of what is grown in the communist area right now?

Dr. WELDON. I can only give you my own impression from talking to people that have come out from the communist areas recently, and I don't think there is very much being grown in northern Laos in the areas that are occupied by the communists.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Why do you think that?

Dr. WELDON. Well, first of all, overflying, I don't see it on the ground, this is the main thing; and, secondly, again I don't think that they have sufficient people there to produce opium.

Mr. SCHMITZ. What about the communist troops?

Dr. WELDON. I guess they could.

Mr. SCHMITZ. They do in China. In other words, your only reason that you don't think they are growing poppies is that, the basis that they don't have the people to do it, so, therefore, you come to the conclusion that they are not?

Dr. WELDON. No, I am coming to the conclusion primarily from the fact that the people coming out from these areas come in and tell us that opium is not being grown. Secondly—

Mr. SCHMITZ. Do they tell you why it is not being grown, because of lack of people?

Dr. WELDON. Lack of people and also some interdiction, or just a general policy, on the part of the Pathet Lao to interdict the growing of opium.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Is this their policy?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHMITZ. That is an official policy?

Dr. WELDON. It seems to me, that is what we gather from the people who come out.

Mr. SCHMITZ. It seems to be an official policy of the Pathet Lao. Do you have any evidence other than the people coming out saying that?

The reason I am probing here is because this is a great controversy between our officials here, and of course you are—but I have seen evidence coming out of Red China that the Red Chinese are having as an official program, the growing of poppies. I talked to one girl that escaped from China, through the Yunnan Province, who saw Chinese troops cultivating the fields.

Now you say, and we keep getting it from our Government here, that it is the official policy of Red China not to grow it, yet the evidence seems to be it is the official policy to grow it.

Dr. WELDON. No, sir; I am talking about Laos.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I am wondering what the evidence is that the Pathet Lao have as their official policy the interdiction of growing of poppies. I don't like to take that at face value. There is nothing personal here, but I have heard it too often here in Washington that the Red Chinese have the official policy not to grow it, and the evidence is too overwhelming otherwise.

Dr. WELDON. To answer the question of whether it is an official policy or not, this is the only information I have, to talk to a person that has come out of an area that is controlled by the communists. Now the local communist official, you know, that was under the administrative person on the communist side that he was responsible to, has told him that he is not to grow opium. Now, whether this represents an official policy or not, I don't know, but it would seem to me that it would.

Mr. SCHMITZ. It would be an official policy that he is not to grow it. If the troops are cultivating it in Red China, maybe they don't want him to grow it; they want the troops to grow it.

Dr. WELDON. I don't know. But practically all of the people that we have talked to in the last year, particularly that have come out of northern Laos in the areas where they used to grow opium, these people tell us that they have been forbidden from growing opium, and this has been one reason, it has not been a very significant reason, but it has been one reason that has been expressed to us by these people for their leaving the communist areas.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Because they had their livelihood taken away?

Dr. WELDON. Not so much livelihood as the fact that they had addicts in the family, and they could not get opium, the members of the family that smoked opium.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Can you tell me the dates when the communists took over the opium-growing areas, primarily?

Dr. WELDON. It has been a gradual thing starting in about 1965, and moving southward, you know, as the fortunes of war, they have come south and probably it culminated this year. As far as I am concerned, the last really significant opium-growing area in Laos, this is the area somewhat in between Vientiane—

Mr. SCHMITZ. Perhaps you could show it on the map behind you there, the general area.

Dr. WELDON. Here is Vientiane, the capital city, here. Here is Yunnan and Luang Prabang, the royal capital, and most of the opium in Laos is grown in an area across the top of the country right through here [indicating], the extreme northern part of the country.

As they have taken this area, they have taken the places where opium used to be grown. The last place that was left in Laos that was really a significant producing area was a place we call Kheo Ka Cham, which is right up in this area, southeast of Luang Prabang. This area was occupied by the communists this year.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Are you familiar with General Vang Pao?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir, I know him very well.

Mr. SCHMITZ. What area does he control?

Dr. WELDON. General Vang Pao is the military commander of Region 2, and Region 2 primarily composes the provinces of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua in this area in here.

Mr. SCHMITZ. That is south of the opium-growing area?

Dr. WELDON. If you define Region 2 in the strict sense, it includes a lot of the opium-growing area, and that is south of it. But the northern part of Region 2 is all controlled by the enemy now.

Mr. SCHMITZ. So that the enemy controls the opium-growing part of the general's district?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Then the press reports that he is growing opium in his district are rather inaccurate?

Dr. WELDON. There is opium grown in Region 2; there is opium grown in Region 2 where General Vang Pao is the commander, but it is a minuscule amount.

Mr. DAVIS. Also, Dr. Weldon, wouldn't you say it would be difficult?

Dr. WELDON. Believe me, General Vang Pao is having enough trouble to grow rice to keep his people alive; he is not very interested in opium right now. There is no commercial opium grown in Region 2.

There is a family that has addicts and they have a little patch of opium, trying to grow some on one of those bare hills out there just to support a habit, but it is a minuscule amount and, believe me, General Vang Pao is not involved in the growing of opium.

I have practically slept with General Vang Pao for the last 9 years, working with his people in Region 2, and I know this man, we are like brothers, and this doesn't happen.

I wish I could give you more concrete reasons, but it is just not so. General Vang Pao is not involved in the damned opium business. There isn't any opium being grown up in Region 2, except a little raunchy patch in the ground that is really not very suitable for it, some family, you know, that has people addicted trying to get a little opium to support the habit.

Mr. SCHMITZ. And you would say at this date, today, what would you say, 90 to 95 percent of the Laotian opium-growing areas are under communist control?

Dr. WELDON. I would say a good 90 percent now, with the loss of Kheo Ka Cham. We may take Kheo Ka Cham back. We have reoccupied most of that area, so if we do in fact take over Kheo Ka Cham again this year, we will probably be back with maybe 15 to 20 percent. But probably, at this moment, 90 percent of the opium-growing area is in enemy hands.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I may be facetious, but maybe they are worried about their competition.

Mr. WHITE. Dr. Weldon, are there any legitimate uses for opium in Laos and similar primitive societies?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir. The Lao use opium just like we did some time ago, particularly. You have got to remember, as I have indicated, there is not very good medical care there and particularly in the more remote areas, and if you are hurting morphine will certainly relieve pain, and this is a very legitimate use for it. Also, if you have a severe case of diarrhea and that is all you have got, it is a very effective anti-diarrhetic. And even, you know, particularly in the old people that have a lot of chronic illness, opium is a very good symptomatic. We use analgesics, of course, in medicine to a large extent, and the Lao have used them in the medical sense for centuries.

Mr. WHITE. During your stay in Laos, Doctor, have you had an opportunity to take photographs which would be illustrative of the communist commitment to force and violence there?

Dr. WELDON. I think that we have some of these. Of course, I am on home leave and I did not anticipate that I would be talking to this committee, and I have nothing like that with me. But I think that we probably have some photographs which illustrate this type of thing.

When I get back I will be glad to look over this stuff that we do have available and, if you would like, I can send you this sort of thing.

Mr. WHITE. Could you also identify these in writing, of course?

Dr. WELDON. Certainly.

Mr. WHITE. Would the Chair direct that these photographs be entered in the record when and if we receive them from Dr. Weldon?¹

Mr. DAVIS. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. WHITE. Dr. Weldon, I invite your attention to our Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2. Exhibit No. 1 is denominated, "FACTS/PHOTOGRAPHS, USAID Operations at LS-272"; Exhibit No. 2 is denominated, "FACTS/PHOTOGRAPHS, Refugee Relief—Vientiane Plain."

Now I ask you if you recognize these two documents and if you are familiar with the contents of them, the photographs as well as the factual contents of the documents?

(At this point Mr. Preyer entered the hearing room.)

Dr. WELDON. Yes, I am acquainted with these two documents.

Mr. WHITE. Do these accurately reflect, to the extent that they purport to, our efforts in Vietnam, the refugee problems, the medical problems, and the construction efforts that have been made there to the extent that they purport to?

Dr. WELDON. You said Vietnam. It would be Laos, of course.

Mr. WHITE. I beg your pardon, Laos.

Dr. WELDON. Yes, they do.

Mr. WHITE. We would like to offer these for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DAVIS. Are there any objections? Without objection, they will be entered in the record.

(Documents marked Committee Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. See appendix I, pages 7805-7816.)

¹The photographs were not obtainable and therefore cannot be included in the hearing record.

Mr. WHITE. A while ago we were speaking of representatives of the press visiting Laos, Dr. Weldon, and some of the things that they inquired about, including atrocities that were committed in Laos, and if so, whose?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir. Particularly in the last 2 years there has been a lot of interest by the press, you know, as far as atrocities in the country, particularly with injury to civilians, but the interest has primarily been in what atrocities the Americans have committed. I hate to say it, but I can't recall a time when any of the press has discussed with me the subjects that we have this morning, what atrocities the communists have committed. They don't seem to happen to be particularly interested in this subject.

Maybe this is not quite fair to the press, but I am constantly asked about civilian casualties that we have created by bombing, and all of this type of thing, but no one has ever asked me about atrocities or casualties of the enemy's, that the enemy has created. I tried to bring this subject up with them on occasion.

Mr. WHITE. That is very interesting. Have you had an opportunity to see any Chinese military personnel in Laos, particularly northern Laos, of course?

Dr. WELDON. No, sir. I have never seen any.

Mr. WHITE. Are there any Chinese operations in northern Laos?

Dr. WELDON. Yes, sir, particularly the road that is being built in northern Laos. The road system that is being built out from Yunnan through the northern part of the country, the first phase of it was to build it from coming out of Yunnan into Muang Sing, Nam Tha, and into Muang Sai.

The road comes out of China up in this area and then swings to the east toward Muang Sai in here, and then down to Pak Beng on the Mekong down in this area. At the same time the North Vietnamese have been building a road out of Dien Bien Phu to connect into Muang Sai from this side. The road that the Chinese and the part that the Chinese are working on now from Muang Sai down to Pak Beng, they have just about completed it to the Mekong.

Mr. WHITE. Do you know what the purpose of this road net may be?

Dr. WELDON. I have my opinions. I don't know why they are building it, but I have my opinions. I don't really know why they are building it.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Dr. Weldon, could we have your opinion on it?

Dr. WELDON. I am convinced that the Chinese communists intend dominating all that part of the world, the Malay and the Indochina peninsulas.

Mr. SCHMITZ. So this is a road for violence?

Dr. WELDON. This is my opinion, they have only built it for one damned reason, to build it for the next phase.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I have just heard about it, and that is the obvious thing that pops into my head.

Dr. WELDON. It is pretty sparsely settled country, particularly right now. There is not much in the way of attraction to build a major highway down there, other than the rest of Southeast Asia.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

Dr. Weldon, first of all let me thank you for appearing before this committee, for your enlightening testimony, some of which we realize was very hard on you because of your close relationship with these people.

At this time, Mr. Preyer of North Carolina, do you have any questions?

Mr. PREYER. Thank you. Dr. Weldon, I regret that I missed some of your testimony and perhaps you covered this in it. I was a member of the health subcommittee last summer that visited the Golden Triangle area in northern Thailand. Of course we did not get over into Burma or Laos, and we were there primarily looking into the drug traffic situation. But we found considerable concern and considerable activity in Thailand about the insurgents who were coming over the border into Thailand. I don't know if you touched on this in your testimony or not. I wondered if you had any comments to make on that subject and if you could identify who the insurgents are and if you have any thoughts about what their objectives are in that land.

Dr. WELDON. I have had some contact with this, Mr. Preyer. Having worked up in that area of Laos a lot over the years, we have run into various groups out in Burma and northern Thailand.

There are probably three or four different factions that are involved in this. There are remnants of the old KMT, of course, the Chinese Nationalists that are left up there, there are probably 3,000 or so of them still operating in that area, and they are primarily involved in the opium and gold trade. They control it to a considerable extent, the movement particularly through that area.

Mr. PREYER. They are primarily involved in protecting the drug traffic but are not involved in trying to overthrow the Thai Government?

Dr. WELDON. It is hard to say, but they don't seem to be involved politically. If they are involved politically, they are probably more sympathetic to the anticommunist side than they are to the communist side.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. PREYER. Surely.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Where do these insurgents get the gold and the narcotics from? They are insurgents, but they are controlling the traffic. Who are they trafficking from and who are they trafficking to?

It seems incredible to me that insurgents, the remnants of the KMT, have gold and they are trafficking in gold. That does not sound very insurgent to me.

Dr. WELDON. As I say, there are several people involved that usually come under this term, several groups of people. One of them is the KMT, up there.

Mr. SCHMITZ. What I am pointing out is that you commented that they are trafficking in gold and narcotics, and mostly in the transportation thereof. Who are they transporting from and who are they transporting to?

Dr. WELDON. Primarily from the Shan States down into the Golden Triangle where it is then turned over to whatever the international buyers are, whoever the international buyers are. I am not sure who is buying the opium from them, for instance.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Do we have the same definition of an insurgent?

Dr. WELDON. These people are all so involved in insurgents' activities up in that area because they are trying to protect their own interests there.

As I say, there are three or four people, as far as I am concerned, three or four groups of people, that fall into this category. The other, and probably most significant group of people in that area are the minority non-Burmese groups who are in rebellion against the Burmese Government. These are composed of Shan, Koran, Chin, variation of the ethnic minorities in that area.

Mr. SCHMITZ. If the gentleman would yield further, before you move to another area, I have this stuck in my mind about insurgents trafficking in gold.

If they are in charge of the traffic, it is traffic from someone to someone else. Where do the insurgents pick up the gold?

Dr. WELDON. Part of this is produced up in that area; there is gold produced in areas up there.

Mr. SCHMITZ. And the remnants of the Kuomintang army control the area?

Dr. WELDON. They don't control the area, but they do control the transportation and the contacts with the outside, apparently.

Mr. PREYER. If I might comment on that; the information that we got up there was very much what Dr. Weldon is saying, that the KMT, the remnants of that, are not insurgents in the sense that we perhaps formally think of it in trying to overthrow the Thai Government. What they are doing is serving as bodyguards in bringing the opium out of the Golden Triangle area where it is grown, down into Thailand where it has been routed out by the rest of the world. So they are against the Thai Government insofar as the Thai Government is trying to stamp out opium growing up there in northern Thailand.

They are not trying to overthrow the Thai Government, but they are not anxious for the Thai Government to stop opium growing. So they sometimes make common cause with these other groups who do want to go beyond just keeping opium in there, they want to overthrow the Thai Government.

Where their funds come from, I don't know about the gold, but our information is the farmers in that area of northern Thailand, and just over the border in Burma and Laos, grow opium there and sell it to mainly Chinese merchants who take it out. Therefore, they get their pay from the merchants.

Mr. SCHMITZ. In our jargon they would be soldiers of fortune, and they were left there and they didn't make it to Taiwan, so they have become hired bodyguards in which their loyalties are to themselves. I suppose.

Mr. PREYER. And some have intermarried, I understand.

Dr. WELDON. It is pretty hard to separate the thing out. Certainly there is a lot of self-interest, and they have to support themselves, but there is also probably some political relationship back in Nationalist China, too.

Mr. SCHMITZ. This is why I am wondering where the gold comes in here. You struck a chord there. Are they taking this gold out to Nationalist China, is that what they are doing?

Dr. WELDON. Maybe the gold trade is not that significant. The main thing is opium, of course, but there is a lot of gold that goes back and forth in that area, mainly because it is a medium of exchange.

You have to have money to carry on this business and it is a pretty lucrative business. The only currency that can be used is gold. They won't accept anything else.

Mr. SCHMITZ. What do they do with the gold after they get paid in gold?

Dr. WELDON. Just like we use dollars, but in that area the medium of exchange is gold. They just don't have any trust in any other kind of currency. All business is done in gold.

Mr. SCHMITZ. So this is tied in with the narcotics traffic as a medium of exchange?

Dr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Where are they picking up the narcotics?

Dr. WELDON. In the Shan States, primarily. This map doesn't go up that far, but primarily up in this area over here.

Mr. SCHMITZ. That is in Thailand?

Dr. WELDON. Burma. Certainly the major production is in Burma right now.

Mr. SCHMITZ. And you mentioned the KMT insurgents as being another group. These are the people growing the opium, and so forth?

Dr. WELDON. Some of these people, a lot of these people, are involved in growing opium, but also they happen to be the dissident groups in these areas that are in rebellion against the central Burmese Government.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Where are the people trafficking in narcotics getting the narcotics from?

Dr. WELDON. From Burma, in the Shan area.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Who is growing it?

Dr. WELDON. The Shan.

Mr. SCHMITZ. The insurgents or noninsurgents?

Dr. WELDON. I don't think you can sort them out. The total number of insurgents, if you are talking about people carrying rifles, and so on, there are only a few thousand.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Do the insurgents control the area in these Shan provinces?

Dr. WELDON. They probably do. The political factions in Burma are so fragmented that it is pretty hard to answer your question. There is a lot of in-fighting.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Where are they getting their weapons?

Dr. WELDON. There is another question. I am not sure where they are getting them.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Red China?

Dr. WELDON. No, I don't think so.

Mr. SCHMITZ. My information is that they are getting their weapons from Red China.

Dr. WELDON. This could be true.

Mr. SCHMITZ. If this is true, I will check that out. But, then it is alleged that these remnants of the Nationalist Chinese groups who are sympathetic to Nationalist China are trading the narcotics and getting dough for it out of there; that doesn't make sense.

What does make sense is that there seems to be a reluctance on the part of everyone, a great willingness to believe that the Nationalist Chinese are somehow engaged in narcotics traffic but the Red Chinese are pure as the driven snow in narcotics traffic.

Dr. WELDON. That is just the impression I get working out of there. I have not been able, and believe me this has been of considerable interest, but in my endeavors in living out there I have not found anything that indicated to me that the Chinese communists are involved in international traffic.

Mr. SCHMITZ. What if I introduce you to the girl who escaped and saw the Chinese troops cultivating the fields?

Dr. WELDON. I would believe her. I am telling you in my experience I have not had this experience; I am not saying that it is not true. Mr. Schmitz, I have been asked a question and I am saying I do not have any experience or knowledge that indicates such to me.

Mr. SCHMITZ. But you don't have any knowledge that it is not happening either?

Dr. WELDON. Of course not. I don't know what is going on there.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I don't mean to be especially rough here, it is just that you are a Government official, and I have just come to the conclusion that Government officials are presently briefed to stay away from that one area.

Dr. WELDON. I can assure you that I have not been briefed on anything. I had no idea of coming before this committee.

Mr. PREYER. If the gentleman will yield, I will just say that our experience going to the Golden Triangle is very much like Dr. Weldon's and we talked not just to American officials there but to the Thai border police patrol people, and they say they simply see no evidence of the Chinese communists encouraging this opium trade at all.

That isn't to say, as Dr. Weldon has been fair in saying, that is not saying that may not happen, but so far no one seems to see any evidence of it there, including the Thais.

Dr. WELDON. I am only giving you the negative evidence. I do not know what is going on over there and you could well be right. But in the 9 years that I have been there, I have not gained any knowledge which supports this premise.

Mr. SCHMITZ. I am not making any point, except I would like to make one point here at this time, that your experience is from the noncommunist-occupied areas?

Dr. WELDON. Absolutely.

Mr. SCHMITZ. So your knowledge of the areas that the communists occupy is obviously more limited than your knowledge of the area that they don't?

Dr. WELDON. My knowledge of what is happening in China is nil; the only knowledge that I have with the communist areas are just portions of those in Laos where we have some people filtering out and I have the opportunity to talk to them. But I haven't talked to anybody out of China.

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to ask if I could submit information with regard to the Red Chinese involvement in the insurgent group in Burma in this area. I think it is a significant point I am making because the confusing aspect of so-called former KMT troops sympathetic to Nationalist China, being used as bodyguards in the transportation of narcotics out of an area controlled by insurgents, if those insurgents are in turn under the control of the Red Chinese there is something wrong here, unless those former KMT troops are now just soldiers of fortune. The government of free China has not controlled them for over 20 years.

I would like permission to put this information I referred to about the Red Chinese arms being supplied to these insurgents in Burma in the record at this point. I think it is significant there, it is important to my line of questioning. Either this area is not controlled by the Red Chinese or Red Chinese subsidized or supported insurgents or these KMT troops are not sympathetic to Nationalist China and are simply soldiers of fortune working for, in this case, the Red Chinese, and I think it is completely different from the Red Chinese affiliates, insurgents in north Burma.

Mr. DAVIS. Without objection.

(For statement of Congressman John G. Schmitz entitled "Communist Involvement in the Golden Triangle Opium Traffic," see appendix II, page 7817.)

Mr. PREYER. Our information there, speaking again in this Golden Triangle opium-growing area, was that nobody controls those areas; that is one reason it is so difficult to do anything about the opium traffic. Burma can't control its part of the territory, Laos doesn't control it, Thailand can't control it, yet these are all farmers—we flew over the fields and you could see them—that are very primitive people. And I am sure they don't have any kind of ideology, in that some of them grow this stuff and pack it out of these fields on their backs and they will sell it to the first middleman and then exchange. They get rice and gold or brass armbands to decorate themselves with and they use those to trade for wives, that kind of thing. This is the level of the economy of the people that grow these things. It is wild country, and nobody controls it.

Dr. WELDON. I have not had the opportunity to finish what I was going to say about that people that were up there and you asked me who were these people. Now, we have identified the KMT and we have identified the insurgents that are in Burma.

Now, these people are primarily in an insurgency movement against the Burmese Government. Now, the other group that is operating in that area are insurgents which are in Thailand and Laos which are controlled by the communists, and they are primarily being supported and supplied by the North Vietnamese, even though they are working up in the northern part of Thailand.

These are the groups that are involved up there, and the insurgents that are in Thailand and northern Thailand are not the same people as the insurgents that are up in Burma in rebellion against the Burmese Government. Do I make myself clear?

Mr. SCHMITZ. You say there are two types of—excuse me.

Mr. PREYER. I was just wondering, the insurgents, then, that are imposing a threat to Thailand, these are North Vietnamese-sponsored insurgents?

Dr. WELDON. North Vietnamese-sponsored, yes. They are primarily Thai and Lao in that area, I mean ethnic; they are all Thai citizens, but ethnically they are Thai and Lao.

Mr. PREYER. So their equipment probably comes through North Vietnam and, therefore, China and Russia?

Dr. WELDON. Yes. But then the opium-growing area, the place where it is being grown now, is primarily in Burma, in the Shan areas. This is an insurgent area. These people are ethnic minorities in Burma who

are under the insurgency movement against their own government in Rangoon and are not related to what is going on down in Thailand.

Mr. SCHMITZ. They could be related in this regard, that they are both getting guns from the same common source?

Dr. WELDON. That is possible, yes.

Mr. SCHMITZ. That is simply the point I would like to submit.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Preyer, do you have any further questions?

Mr. PREYER. No, I thank you for your interesting testimony.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you have any further questions?

Mr. SCHMITZ. Not at this point.

Mr. DAVIS. Dr. Weldon, again, thank you for giving up this time on your leave. Thank you for your testimony and the answers to the questions.

If there is no further business, the committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., Thursday, July 20, 1972, the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX I

COMMITTEE EXHIBIT No. 1

[Testimony of Charles Louis Weldon—7/20/72]



FACTS

USAID OPERATIONS AT LS-272

PHOTOGRAPHS

Sixty miles north of Vientiane on a plateau near the village of Ban Xon, a complex of wooden buildings along the airstrip designated LS-272 is the control center for refugee supply operations in Xieng Khouang Province. In this mountainous region of forests, there are at present 119,322 refugees or 49 percent of the refugee population of Laos. Most of these refugees are Meo who for more than a decade have been pushed into an ever-diminishing land area as the war in Laos has increased in scope and intensity. Over 110,000 now inhabit a stretch of land that extends 80 miles east from LS-272 in the Muong Cha valley to the village of Muong Nam southeast of the Plain of Jars. Over 8,800 refugees are located in three isolated enclaves north of the Plain of Jars. The mountains in the region rise 3,000 to 6,000 ft in a series of sharp crested ridges; in this range, Phou Bia, the highest mountain in Laos, rises to 9,242 ft immediately south of the Plain of Jars.

Their villages are built on the slope or summit of the mountains. If they remain long enough in one place or if the land is arable, they plant upland rice on the hill sides. These conditions seldom prevail. Over 80 percent of the refugees depend on outside help for food. If the terrain permits, they clear an airstrip near the village where a Porter (a small STOL aircraft) or a helicopter can land. If the terrain does not permit, they clear a space on the hillside where food for the village is airdropped from Porter or C-46 aircraft. At any one time, over 65 percent of the total number of refugees in Xieng Khouang Province depend on the airdrop for food.


LS-272 was established in March 1970 after the fall of Sam Thong which, until that time, had functioned as the supply center for refugee operations in Xieng Khouang Province. The site was a public works construction camp located 44 km from Route 13 on the Houei Pamone road



COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 1 - Continued



Loading rice on an H-34 helicopter.



Porter takeoff for rice drop. A Porter carries 10 rice bags of 40 kg each which are dropped from the aircraft trapdoor.



which was to link Route 13 with Sam Thong. Refugee movements into the area began in January 1970 when 8,000 people were evacuated by air from Houa Phan Province near Sam Neua. The fall of Sam Thong and the drive against Long Tieng pushed the major portion of the population of southern Xieng Khouang Province into the area that they now occupy.

A stream in which children play separates LS-272 from Ban Xon, a village of 214 people. The roar of aircraft is constant. On the 3,040 ft gravel runway, aircraft land and take off at intervals measured in minutes. As many as 900 landings in one day are recorded.

The USAID complex consists of a rice warehouse, a medical supply warehouse, a 200-bed field hospital, an air operations office, and a trailer which is the USAID office. Here, schedules for air delivery of food to refugee groups scattered on remote hilltops are coordinated from messages which arrive by "jungle telegraph" or modern telecommunications. At 54 sites, delivery is by airdrop; at 42 sites, there are short, crude landing strips where cargo can be air-landed. During April 1972, the delivery of 1,872 MT of commodities was coordinated out of LS-272. These commodities consist of rice, salt,

Refugees waiting for space on an aircraft going to their village.

COMMITTEE EXHIBIT No. 1 - *Continued*

canned meat, PL-480 corn meal, cooking oil, corn soya milk (CSM), and wheat soya blend (WSB) noodles manufactured in Vientiane. Commodities have totalled as high as 4,325 MT a month during periods of conflict and refugee movement.

Ban Na Sou hospital treats both refugees and military casualties. Patient load varies from dry season to wet season and with the degree of conflict in the area. Since March 1970 when the field hospital was set up in temporary buildings used by the road construction crew, 31,300 people have been treated at Ban Na Sou.

Currently, LS-272 supports 71 field dispensaries in Xieng Khouang Province. Their number varies with security conditions. Since March 1970, these field dispensaries have recorded over 3,000,000 patient visits.

There are an estimated 50,000 children of school age among the refugees in Xieng Khouang Province. In the area that LS-272 supports, 308 temporary classrooms and 66 permanent classrooms have been constructed. At its highest point, enrollment totals 17,000 pupils, a number which drops as low as 6,000 during the dry season because of security conditions.

A Meo refugee brings his child to the outpatient clinic.



Family ward of hospital.



ABOVE: Emergency room.
BELOW: Hospital complex.



COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 1 - Continued



ABOVE
A large warehouse adjacent to the airstrip provides storage space and packing area for medical supplies which are transported to almost 100 Meo and Lao medics stationed in small dispensaries throughout the area.

Market in Ban Koua Lak Nam Meuy (Village of the Iron Bridge over the Meuy River), a town built by the refugees a mile from LS-272.

Expenditures for LS-272 are incurred under two broad categories: Cost of commodities and the air and surface transport of these commodities and cost of medical care and educational facilities for the refugees in Xieng Khouang Province.

REFUGEE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
March 1970 - April 1972
\$ Thousand

Commodities	
Rice	\$ 4,860
Salt	149
Canned meat	2,932
Vegetable seeds	91
Tools	69
Clothing	13
Bedding	74
PL-480 foodstuffs, cloth	380
Air transport	
Commodities	8,965
Medical supplies	1,717
Surface transport	
Commodities ^{a/}	344 ^{a/}
Hospital construction	64
Hospital	
Medical supplies and equipment ^{b/}	556
Dispensaries	
Medical supplies and equipment	1,219
Classroom construction	30
Total	<u>21,463</u>

^{a/} Rice, salt, beef, medical supplies, PL-480 foodstuffs and cloth, POL. 18,130 MT were transported by truck from Vientiane to LS-272 at a cost of Kip 82,675,600 converted at Kip 240 = \$1, the official exchange rate until April 1972 when the unified conversion rate of Kip 605 = \$1 was established.

^{b/} Includes equipment at original installation at Sam Thong.

[June, 1972]

COMMITTEE EXHIBIT No. 2

[Testimony of Charles Louis Weldon - 7/20/72]



FACTS

REFUGEE RELIEF - VIENTIANE PLAIN
A Project of the USAID Mission to Laos

PHOTOGRAPHS

REFUGEES

OF

THE

VIENTIANE

PLAIN



COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 2 - *Continued*

On land set aside by the Royal Lao Government for the resettlement of refugees on the Vientiane Plain, the dark green of forests changes to the red earth of new roads that cut across the plain and the mosaic of rice fields and villages. Among the villages, many are new. The thatch of the roof is the color of straw; the houses are pale stripped bamboo, not yet weathered to the gray of the older villages. For about 30 miles east of the city of Vientiane and 60 miles north to the mountains that mark the boundary of the plain, the new villages appear at intervals, their geometric pattern in sharp contrast to the older settlements. Near each of the villages, the land is black where the grass and underbrush have been burned to clear a field for planting rice. The new villages are the first of those planned for the permanent resettlement of 27,000 refugees under conditions that will give them the opportunity to become self-supporting and to develop stable village economies. The Royal Lao Government has set aside 10 areas, a total of 79,000 hectares (195,062 acres) on the Vientiane Plain for this purpose.

Flight from the Plain of Jars begins with a run for the C-130 in the airlift which evacuated 15,000 people to the Vientiane Plain in February 1970.



In February 1970, 15,000 refugees from the Plain of Jars arrived on the Vientiane Plain. They occupied 17 temporary villages which the people who lived on the Vientiane Plain had built in preparation for their arrival. In March, their number increased to 24,000 as a result of the military action that followed the evacuation of the Plain of Jars. This period of temporary relocation was one of emergency relief for the survival of the refugees in an environment in which land had to be cleared before rice was planted, houses built for shelter, dispensaries for medical care, classrooms for children, wells drilled for water, and roads constructed to reach the refugee villages. By July 1970, there were 4,500 refugee families, 27,000 people, living in 27 villages on the Vientiane Plain.

The permanent resettlement of these refugees is a project of the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Royal Lao Government with assistance from USAID; it is planned to extend over a three-year period. The project is multiple in scope. It has required temporary relocation and emergency relief for the refugees. For their re-

Refugees disembark from the C-130 at Wattay Airport, Vientiane, as the aircraft waits with idling engines to resume airlift operations.



COMMITTEE EXHIBIT No. 2—Continued

settlement, it requires classifying agricultural land, surveying that land for village sites and rice fields, clearing land with heavy equipment and by hand, drilling wells, and constructing roads, houses, dispensaries and schools.

There are few large tracts of fertile land on the Vientiane Plain that are not already settled. Even on the fertile alluvial plain that borders the Mekong River, plots of relatively infertile land occur. The annual flooding of the Mekong destroys the rice crop if the waters reach high-flood level. To the north, tracts of infertile land are more frequent.

As the Royal Lao Government reserved an area for the resettlement of refugees, USAID sent in a land classification team to determine its agricultural potential. The team traveled by helicopter, a means of transportation that permitted 30 to 35 soil borings each day over an area of 1,200 hectares (2,963 acres) and which accelerated the land classification process. In April 1972, the team completed classification of the 79,000 hectares of land that make up the 10 areas reserved for the resettlement of refugees.

The temporary village of Ban Thin on the Nam Ngum River.



Refugees board trucks that will take them to the Vientiane Plain.

At their relocation sites, the refugees receive PL-480 commodities, household utensils, and farm tools.



COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 2.—Continued



Tractor-dozing moving earth during construction of culverts for flapgates.




One-way flapgates allow rainwater runoff and prevent inundation by the flooding Mekong River. The top of the structure is part of the roadway.



As most good lands are already under cultivation by indigenous farmers, the alternative is land reclamation. In Reserve Area 5, the Dong Kalum floodplain, which is one of the most fertile areas in Laos, stretches for about 12 miles along the Mekong River. Here, five flood gates and 13 miles of road dikes have been constructed to protect the 60 percent of the land that in the past has not been farmed because of flooding. This reclamation project has provided farm land for 3,000 refugees and will protect the land cultivated by over 6,000 indigenous farmers.

As the Royal Lao Government completes the legal and administrative work required to reserve land for refugees, survey teams stake out the boundaries of the reserved areas. The areas are numbered Area 1 through Area 10 in the order in which the Ministry of Social Welfare requested approval to establish them. A village for 70 families covers an area of 20 hectares (49 acres). The survey teams stake out the village streets, homes and garden plots, and an average 2-hectare (5-acre) plot of farmland for each refugee family. Within the village, each family receives the land which the village chief in the tradition of the Lao village designates for the family.

One of the 24 wells drilled on the Vientiane Plain since permanent resettlement of the refugees began.




COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 2—Continued

As land development within an area begins, USAID and the Ministry of Social Welfare move in heavy equipment to clear land and build roads, chain saws to fell trees, and tractors to plow land. A division of labor builds a refugee village: on the one hand, the technicians who operate modern construction equipment; on the other, the refugees, who clear the land of roots and stumps, gather construction material in the forest, build their houses, schools, and dispensaries, construct paddy dikes, and plant their rice fields. In 7 of the 10 areas, over 2,000 refugee families, 19,000 people, now live in 58 villages on land that less than two years ago was forest and thick underbrush.

In many of these villages, people, who before their arrival on the Vientiane Plain were engaged for most part in subsistence agriculture, now acquire a minimal income through small enterprises. They cut and sell firewood; they weave and sell straw mats. Those who found bamboo on their land make and sell bamboo shingles for roofs and sidings of houses. In the Dong Kalume area, where USAID has introduced a sericulture project, 500 refugee families in 13 villages participate in the enterprise.

A Ministry of Social Welfare tractor plows land for planting rice.



Some of the heavy equipment used for road construction on the Plain.



A refugee shapes poles for his house which will stand 5 feet above ground. BELOW: The permanent resettlement village of Vang Pheuang.



COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 2—Continued



PL-480 flour for refugees is bagged at the USAID warehouse in Vientiane.

PL-480 flour and wheat-soya blend (WSB) made into dry noodles at a plant in Vientiane.

Refugee families at Ban Tha Ngou receive PL-480 cornmeal.

Expenditures for refugee resettlement on the Savanase Plain fall into two broad categories:

(1) commodities for refugee support during temporary relocation and initial phase of resettlement;

(2) personnel and equipment for surveying and clearing farm and village sites, drilling wells, and constructing roads, and construction materials for housing, schools and dispensaries.

The table lists the commodities provided under the first category and their cost.

RELOCATION & FOOD SUBSIDY COSTS

February 1970 - March 1972

\$ Thousand

Commodity	Cost
Rice	576
Salt	6
PL-480 food b ¹	249
Noodles	193
PL-480 cloth	6
PL-480 seed	13
Vegetable seed	8
Iron nails	3
Plastic sheets	
for shelter material	30
Hand tools	14
Mosquito nets	4
Blankets	13
Sleeping mats	5
Household utensils	27
Total	\$ 1,135

¹ Cornmeal, nonfat dried milk, vegetable oil, wheat flour, bulgur, wheat soya blend (WSB), corn soya milk (CSM).

² Manufactured in Vientiane from PL-480 flour and WSB.

COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 2 - Continued

Expenditures in the second category cover the cost of permanent resettlement from August 1970 (when this phase of the project began) through April 1972. Dollar expenditures total \$600,000 which cover the cost of heavy equipment used in clearing land and constructing roads and the purchase of commodities not locally available. Local currency expenditures total Kip 89,000,000 or \$ 370,833 which cover personnel costs and the purchase of local commodities.^{1/} These funds have been used

To construct 90 km (55.9 mi) of road of which 21 km (13 mi) are built to serve as dikes to protect the Dong Kalume flood plain;

To clear 23 village sites of 20 hectares (49 acres) each;

To drill 24 wells;

To provide construction materials for 2,200 permanent houses;

To provide construction materials for 18 permanent classrooms;

To construct 5 floodgates of reinforced concrete and 20 steel culverts on the Dong Kalume flood plain;

Costs to date of relocation, food subsidy, and permanent resettlement of 27,000 refugees averages out to \$ 78 per person.

The permanent resettlement of these refugees on the Vientiane Plain is beginning to prove a substantial economic asset to the area by bringing into production previously unproductive land and resources. The long-run potential is even greater.

^{1/} Kip 240 = \$1.00, the official exchange rate until the unified conversion rate of Kip 600 = \$1.00 was established in April 1972.




Making and selling woven bamboo mats, used for sidings of houses, provides income for some refugees.



Collecting and selling firewood is another source of income. **BELOW:** Weaving colorful borders for skirts in the traditional manner.



COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 2. - Continued



APPENDIX II

[Testimony of Charles Louis Weldon—7/20/72]

COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE OPIUM TRAFFIC

A Statement of Congressman John G. Schmitz

We have heard repeated over and over again that the Chinese communists are not involved in the opium traffic. Red China, we are told, is not producing opium. It is all coming from the Golden Triangle, the border areas of Laos, Thailand, and Burma. Dr. Weldon testified today that the opium-growing areas of Laos have been in communist hands for a number of years.

The opium-producing area of Thailand is precisely the area of operation of the communist insurrectionaries supplied and supported by Red China. The Red Chinese supply the arms as well as the propaganda radio called "Voice of the People of Thailand." In a broadcast on May 18 that radio announced that "The Thai people, under the leadership of the Thai Communist Party, will keep the flames of people's war burning vigorously and fight shoulder to shoulder with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia so as to wipe out the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys and ultimately liberate the motherland and the people."

These Red Chinese-supported forces are operating in the Thai-Laos border areas of the Golden Triangle. On June 21, 1972, the Bangkok newspaper *The Nation* reported, "The government has proclaimed large communist-infested areas in seven districts of Chiang Rai and Phitsanuloke provinces in the north off-limits for residents. The order, signed by Under Secretary of State of the Interior Ministry Puang Suwammarat, said the reason behind the prohibition is to facilitate anti-insurgency campaigns. No person will be allowed in the prohibited areas. Nor can local residents who are to be evacuated, remain there. The prohibition order was signed on June 8 and published in the ROYAL GAZETTE. It said the instruction is effective immediately. Most of the prohibited areas are hilly areas where insurgents are believed to have built up strongholds. Some of them are supply lines of insurgents crossing over from Laos."

The situation in Burma is similar. The Red Chinese Government is supporting communist rebels in the areas that constitute the Burmese part of the Golden Triangle. (The official Department of Defense "Area Handbook for Burma," dated 1971, states, "After mid-1967 the communist rebels became a source of grave concern to the government because of mounting evidence that they were supported by Communist China. Their activities were extensive, especially in upper Shan State, where they set up the Northeast Command. They received material assistance from Communist China, and some of them, apparently recruited from both sides of the frontier, also received training in Communist China. From 1968 through 1970 there were frequent reports of clashes between Burmese security forces and the communist rebels in the frontier areas. Thus in March 1968 General Ne Win remarked publicly that his army had much difficulty in fighting these communist insurgents because of the proximity of disturbed areas to the border. He stated, 'We have to be very careful lest our bullets go into the other country.' " (page 186)

The same official U.S. Government report reveals that communist China was also aiding Kachin and Karen insurrectionists. (page 195)

Red China maintains a clandestine radio called the "Voice of the People of Burma." The female voice on this radio has been identified as the girl who makes the Burmese broadcasts for Radio Peking. On August 31, 1971, this communist radio claimed that, "the People's Army and people have studied and propagated Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought as well as the teaching of the Burmese Communist Party."

On July 11, 1972, the same radio reported military activities of a joint army of the Burma Communist Party and the Karen National Unity Party.

With Red Chinese armed insurrectionaries operating throughout the Golden Triangle, it is obvious that any opium from this area or any heroin derived from Golden Triangle opium is under the control of Red China.

(7817)

I N D E X

INDIVIDUALS

B

Bouchard ----- 7776
 Buell, Edgar M.----- 7761-7778 (testimony), 7784

D

Dooley, Thomas----- 7776, 7785, 7786
 Dulles, Allen----- 7787

K

Kong Le----- 7782

M

Mao Tse-tung----- 7771
 Martin ----- 7784

N

Ne Win----- 7817

P

Puang Suwannarat----- 7817

S

Schmitz, John G----- 7817
 Snively, Hans----- 7785
 Souphanouvong ----- 7767

V

Vang Pao----- 7763, 7764, 7769-7771, 7775, 7796

W

Weldon, Charles Louis----- 7765, 7776, 7779-7804 (testimony), 7817
 Weldon, Mrs. Charles Louis----- 7765, 7776

ORGANIZATIONS

A

AID. (See U.S. Government, State, Department of, Agency for International Development.)

C

Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) (KMT)----- 7799-7803
 Christian Alliance----- 7776
 Communist Party, Burma----- 7817
 Communist Party, Thailand----- 7817

D

Dooley Foundation----- 7790

I

I

I.V.S. (See International Volunteers for Service.)	
International Red Cross	7786
International Volunteers for Service (I.V.S.)	7762

K

KMT. (See Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang).)	
Karen National Unity Party (Burma)	7817
Kuomintang. (See Chinese Nationalist Party.)	

L

Laos, Government of	7784, 7810-7812
Ministry of Social Welfare	7810, 7812, 7813

O

Operation Brotherhood	7776
-----------------------	------

P

Philippine Brotherhood	7776
------------------------	------

R

Radio Peking	7817
--------------	------

U

U.S. Government	7790
State, Department of:	
Agency for International Development (AID)	7762, 7776, 7780, 7791, 7805, 7806, 7809, 7811, 7813, 7814
University of Hawaii	7790

V

Voice of the People of Burma (radio)	7817
Voice of the People of Thailand (radio)	7817

W

World Vision	7776
--------------	------

PUBLICATIONS

Area Handbook for Burma	7817
Facts/Photographs	7805-7816
Nation, The (newspaper)	7817