


Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Friday - 28 January 1972

Page 2

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


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Called Tom Korologos, White House staff, to say that the Director's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday had gone smoothly and the only question regarding the reorganization of the intelligence community had come from Senator Stuart Symington who was apparently pacified by the Director's answer.

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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Thursday - 27 January 1972

Page 3

25X1  
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6. [redacted] Accompanied the Director and Messrs. Duckett, Bruce Clarke, Carver [redacted] to a briefing of the full Senate Armed Services Committee. See Memo for Record.

25X1  
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7. [redacted] During a break in the Armed Services briefing, Senator William Saxbe asked the Director about a recent crisis in Afganistan agriculture resulting from a prolonged drought. After checking with [redacted] by phone, I explained the details of this situation to Senator Saxbe.

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[redacted]

JOHN M. MAURY  
Legislative Counsel

Distribution:  
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O/DDCI

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[redacted]

Mr. Houston

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Item 3 - Mr. [redacted]

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
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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Wednesday - 26 January 1972

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


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


Checked with Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, on final arrangements for the Director's briefing of the full Committee tomorrow at 10 a. m.

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Talked to Jack Ticer, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, who asked for information on which members of their staff had attended previous briefings by the Director. After checking the files, we provided this information. Mr. Ticer assured me there was no intention of ~~25X10~~ a transcript of the Director's testimony tomorrow.

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
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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 20 January 1972

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[Redacted] Met with Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate

Armed Services Committee, and gave him a paper on comparative pay-scales of regular and irregular forces in Laos. Also discussed the Director's upcoming briefing. See Memo for the Record.

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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Wednesday - 19 January 1972

Page 2

25X1

5. [redacted] Talked to Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, who said he had shown Senator Stennis the President's memorandum to the community and personal letter to the Director regarding the reorganization of the intelligence community. I asked whether he raised with the Senator the question of whether they should be shown to Senator Symington. Braswell said he had not but was sure whatever the Director decided would be all right with the Senator. I suggested the Director might like to have a private meeting with the Senator prior to his appearance before the Committee on 27 January. Braswell suggested I arrange this directly with the Senator's office.

After checking with the Director I called Mildred Ward, in the Senator's office, who said she would try to work out a meeting between the Director and the Senator, probably Monday or Tuesday.

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6. [redacted] We were informed by Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, that Chairman Hebert agreed with the suggestion of Chairman Nedzi, of the Intelligence Subcommittee, that it would be a good idea to have the Director appear in open session regarding classification and security of Government documents. After consulting with the Director I explained to Slatinshek the very serious problems such a suggestion created. Slatinshek said he appreciated these problems, but argued that Nedzi and Hebert felt under very heavy pressure from Committee members and others to conduct open hearings on the subject, and believed the Director uniquely qualified to appear. Slatinshek said that if this pressure was not turned aside by the kind of "controlled" hearing they proposed it might break out in uncontrolled form elsewhere and cause serious problems for us all. We ended up agreeing that an early personal meeting between the Director and the Chairman would be desirable.

After checking with the Director I called Chairman Nedzi and made a date for the Director to meet with the Chairman at 10:30 on Friday morning, 21 January, in room 2418 Rayburn Building.

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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Monday - 17 January 1972


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1.  Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, called to say he had talked to Chairman Stennis on Friday night and the Chairman said he would like to schedule the Director's world wrapup briefing of the full Armed Services Committee on Thursday, 27 January. Braswell said the Chairman felt the Director should plan to spend both morning and afternoon with the Committee.

In response to my question as to whether the Chairman wanted any coverage of the intelligence community changes in this session, Braswell said the Chairman wanted this billed strictly as a world wrapup briefing without any advance reference to discussion of the community changes. He added, however, that it was quite likely the subject could come up during this meeting and went on to say that if it did this might make an additional session on the subject unnecessary.

After assuring that this time was satisfactory with the Director, I confirmed the briefing date with Braswell.

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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 13 January 1972

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Informed Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, of the above, explaining that we were following well-established ground rules under which we would be of course prepared to brief Senator Symington himself, as a member of our oversight Committee, on the matters in question but could not discuss them with staff investigators of the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Braswell said he thought our position was reasonable and clear and saw no need to alert Senator Stennis.

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
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Tuesday - 11 January 1972

Page 2

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 Met with Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, and briefed him on latest information regarding Soviet ICBM silos and our intelligence coverage of the recent India/Pakistan crisis.

I told Mr. Braswell we foresaw problems if the Chairman decided to combine hearings on the nomination of a new DDCI and the significance of the reorganization of the intelligence community. Braswell said he fully agreed. I suggested he might pass our concern to Chairman Stennis and suggest that before the Chairman made a final decision on such hearings he consult the Director. Braswell said he would definitely do so.

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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Monday - 10 January 1972

Page 2


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3. [redacted] Met with Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, and gave him copies of papers dealing with the community "reorganization," explaining that we had at last succeeded in getting authority to show them to our Committee chairmen and staff chiefs. See Memo for the Record.

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I mentioned to Braswell our situation regarding Senator Fulbright's request for National Estimates dealing with Southeast Asia since 1950. Braswell had no comment other than to remark that he thought we had no alternative other than to handle the matter as we were.

Braswell confirmed that the Chairman, with whom he had just had an hour's telephone conversation, planned an intelligence briefing for the full Armed Services Committee during the week of 24 January 1972. He said that in addition the Chairman planned to hold hearings on the reorganization of the intelligence community simultaneously with the confirmation hearings of the new DDCI as soon as the latter's nomination was received.



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JOHN M. MAURY  
Legislative Counsel

cc:

ER O/DDCI Ex/Dir [redacted]

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[redacted] Mr. Houston [redacted]

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Item 5 - OP

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OLC 72-0032

10 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Edward Braswell, Chief Counsel,  
Senate Armed Services Committee, Re Reorganization  
of the Intelligence Community


1. Today I showed Mr. Braswell a copy of the 5 November 1971 Presidential memo on the reorganization of the intelligence community and a copy of the President's letter to the Director of 1 November 1971. Mr. Braswell's immediate reaction was to point out the first paragraph on page 3 of the President's memo, instructing the Director to delegate authority to the DDCI for the plans, programs and day-to-day operations of the CIA. Mr. Braswell said this was exactly what Senators Stennis, Symington and others were concerned about, and was completely inconsistent with the oral assurances which I had given to the effect the Director would retain his authority and responsibility for the overall direction of the Agency. I said it was too soon to know exactly how the new arrangements would shake down, but I was morally certain that so long as Mr. Helms was Director, he would not relinquish the reins over the Agency which he had grown up with and which he knew like the back of his hand. I said I saw no problem in Mr. Helms carrying on both responsibilities, since in fact he had already had most of the responsibilities for the community called for in the new directive, but simply lacked the authority to carry them out. I argued that if anything the new directive might clarify these responsibilities thereby making them less rather than more burdensome. Mr. Braswell said "we will just have to see."

2. Mr. Braswell said that in view of the provisions of the above quoted paragraph we could expect the new DDCI to get a very intensive grilling at the time of his confirmation, and the relative authority of the Director and the DDCI under the reorganization plan would be thoroughly examined.

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Original - Subject  
1 - Chrono  
1 - O&M DDCI

  
JOHN M. MAURY  
Legislative Counsel

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
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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Friday - 7 January 1972

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
Met with Mr. Steven Markowitz, Legislative Assistant to Representative Bob Eckhardt (D., Texas), concerning the letter of 22 December from Mr. Gordon Jennings concerning the Director of Central Intelligence and left with him a biographic sketch of the Director, a copy of the report of the Senate Armed Services confirmation hearings dated 23 June 1966, and the CIA unclassified pamphlet. Mr. Markowitz was most appreciative.

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
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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Friday - 7 January 1972

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Called Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel,

Senate Armed Services Committee, to say that Jim Kendall, of the Committee staff, had called our office requesting more details on the reorganization of the intelligence community. I told Braswell of a couple of classified papers on the subject which I would like to show him in strict confidence at the first opportunity and get his views about showing them to Kendall, who I understood was pulling together material on the reorganization for Chairman Stennis. Braswell agreed we would get together the first of the week.

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cc:  
ER O/DDCI  
Ex/Dir

JOHN M. MAURY  
Legislative Counsel

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Mr. Houston

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Item 4 -  
Items 5 -  
Item 9 -


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
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Friday - 7 January 1972

Page 2

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Met with Mr. Herb Atkinson, Clerk, Senate Armed Services Committee, and provided him with literature and other information on "shredders" which can be used in the destruction of some of the Committee's classified material. I also gave him a copy of the new China atlas for the Committee's use.

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
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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Wednesday - 5 January 1972

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Accompanied Messrs. David Brandwein, C/FMSAC, [redacted] to a meeting with Mr. Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee. In response to his earlier requests, Brandwein briefed Braswell on Soviet anti-satellite satellites and McCarthy briefed him on [redacted] irregular troops in Laos. Braswell also took this opportunity to get an updated briefing from [redacted] on the general situation in Laos. We mentioned the pressure this was generating with regard to the various statutory limitations imposed on programs in Laos and while Braswell agreed this was a problem he gave the impression there would be very little "give" in the Congress in this area.

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I also left with Braswell a duplicate copy of the material which we had previously given Jim Kendall, Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee staff, on the recent changes in the intelligence community structure.

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# CIA Base in Laos Is a Ghost Town

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 1—A badly demoralized army of Meo tribesmen waits at the CIA base of Long Cheng, 96 miles north of here, for Communist forces to make their next move.

Long Cheng is a virtual ghost town; after its 30,000 civilian residents fled following the loss of the Plain of Jars to Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces last month. Long Cheng is locked away deep in the mountains, most of which are now held by hostile forces poised to attack the base. Air America planes still come and go endlessly through the day, but the soldiers remain. They, too, want to leave.

U.S. source confirmed that the United States has no intention of supporting future attempts by Gen. Vang Pao to recapture the plain. There were also strong indications that the United States would write Long Cheng off if it falls before the rainy season, which begins in four months.

"The end of defending Laos is in sight," one U.S. source said.

## Army Can't Hold

Lt. Nhuan, 25, a Lao officer who joined Gen. Vang Pao's army a year ago when he could find no decent work in Vientiane, said the Meo army would not hold if heavily hit by the enemy.

"We are afraid, very afraid now," he said.

Nhuan is a veteran of the Plain of Jars retreat, as well as its capture earlier this year by Vang Pao's forces.

In the past two years he has come to know the CIA-supported Meo army in the flush of success and in bitter, frightening defeat. He rambled on about the rush of artillery and soldiers that crushed the Laotians on the 30-square mile plain.

Nhuan did not look for scapegoats, just said they were overwhelmed. He did confirm what is being whispered in American circles in Vientiane, that Meo senior officers were celebrating the Meo new year at Long Cheng, away from their troops on the plain, when the attack came. Nhuan said he and other junior officers and sergeants were in command.

Nhuan also noted that money problems contributed to the low morale. Thai troops get three and four times as much money as Meo troops, and are paid directly by the Americans. Meo and Lao soldiers have not been paid by their Meo officers for two or three months, which Nhuan said produced bitter tensions.

But it was not just that, Nhuan said. He spoke in

awe of a tank rumbling to within 40 yards of his unit and pumping round after round into their position.

## Walked Three Days

Nhuan said they left the plain Dec. 18, at least a day earlier than U.S. sources in Vientiane announced, walking three days to Ban Na, 15 miles north of Long Cheng.

After two weeks, Nhuan said he cannot remember seeing a single dead North Vietnamese, but added that only 18 of about 500 Thai artillery and infantrymen on Fire Support Base King Kong overlooking his own position made it to Ban Na with them when they retreated.

"Now everyone is waiting to leave Long Cheng," Nhuan said.

North and east of the base, and already within the outer defense perimeter, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao commanders are grouping men, materiel and artillery. It is just a matter of time, before they attack, informed sources said.

U.S. planners have not relinquished hope for Long Cheng, but they hastened to add the question: "How important is Long Cheng, anyway?"

"The mountains up there are big. There is lots of room to go and no sense in being tied to one location," a CIA planner said.

A qualified U.S. government source said: "Long Cheng can be held even at this point, so long as no one makes a big mistake when the crunch comes."

## Temporary Move

Nhuan said he believed their next location would be at Ban Son, about 20 miles southeast of Long Cheng. He said the Americans took their equipment to Ban Son, but other sources said that was only a temporary emergency move.

Nhuan noted that following the retreat from the plain, Meo troops found that North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao commanders, had in what seemed almost like an afterthought, moved into small but critical positions both north and east of Long Cheng, pushing the Meo army closer to headquarters.

It was not an afterthought, but, as U.S. planners said, a coordinated effort to outflank the retreating Meo-Thai forces. The Communists also moved small commando units to within three miles of the base itself for harassment and reconnaissance.

The loss of two hills overlooking the base has put defense of Long Cheng in a "grave" condition, military observers said.



# SOVIET GAIN SEEN IN SATELLITE TEST

## Cosmos Shows Capability of Felling Orbital Craft

CAPE KENNEDY, Fla., Jan. 1 (AP) — On Dec. 3 the Soviet satellite Cosmos 462 was launched from the Tyuratam rocket base. Within hours it zipped close to Cosmos 459, launched four days earlier, and exploded into 13 pieces. Both satellites were destroyed 150 miles above the earth.

Western experts concluded that the Soviet Union had the capability of blasting from the skies American reconnaissance satellites, most of which operate 100 to 150 miles up.

In two similar tests earlier in the year, Cosmos interceptors blew up close to target spacecraft flying at higher altitudes, 360 and 550 miles, on paths similar to those flown by United States military communications and navigation satellites.

The test Dec. 3 demonstrated that the Russians had apparently perfected interception at the lower altitude. This is more difficult because, the nearer the earth, the faster the target moves in relation to a ground location.

### One of Many

A satellite interceptor is just one of many unmanned space systems the Soviet Union is developing under the Cosmos label.

It began using this general term for all its satellites in 1962, following the initial Sputniks, as a means of shielding exactly what it was doing in space. It reports only the barest details: the orbital figures, the time taken for the first revolution and the angle equator.

Most of the early Cosmos flights tested military systems such as reconnaissance, communications and navigation. Others made scientific observations and checked out equipment for weather and commercial communications satellites and for later manned flights and unmanned missions to the moon and the planets.

More recently, the Soviet Union has identified certain scientific payloads as Interkosmos, weather satellites as Meteor and commercial communications satellites as Molniya or Lightning. In each case other Communist-bloc nations are involved in either developing or using the payloads.

Manned missions are conducted in the Soyuz-Salyut programs, moon flights are in the Lune program, and planetary missions are named for the target planet.

### Most Are Military

But all other launchings remain under the Cosmos label. Most are military, but there also are scientific and test satellites.

A few years ago it was difficult for outsiders to determine the role of each Cosmos. But with improved tracking and intelligence, American experts can now identify the individual mission by analyzing the orbital path, the launching site—the Soviet Union has three—the altitude, the length of time in orbit and other signs.

When the Cosmos 462 interceptor was launched, for example, a United States reconnaissance satellite spotted the exhaust of the rising rocket and relayed the information instantly to ground stations, which began tracking the payload when it achieved orbit. Within minutes after it had exploded near its target, the trackers knew that it had blown into exactly 13 pieces.


Another Russian space weapon the United States is watching with concern is the fractional orbital bombardment system, in which a satellite capable of carrying a nuclear bomb flies into orbit but returns to Russian soil before completing one orbit of the globe.

At least 15 tests have been conducted since 1967. Most of the early ones, which started with Cosmos 298, failed, but it is believed the Russians now have an operational system.

In case of war such a weapon could be launched into a 100-mile-high orbit in any direction and could live on an earth target with very little warning.

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# CIA Base in Laos Is a Ghost Town

By D. E. Ronk  
Special to The Washington Post

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Long Cheng is a virtual ghost town, after its 30,000 civilian residents fled following the loss of the Plain of Jars to Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces last month. Long Cheng is locked away deep in the mountains, most of which are now held by hostile forces poised to attack the base. Air America planes still come and go endlessly through the day, but the soldiers remain. They, too, want to leave.

U.S. source confirmed that the United States has no intention of supporting future attempts by Gen. Vang Pao to recapture the plain. There were also strong indications that the United States would write Long Cheng off if it falls before the rainy season, which begins in four months.

"The end to defending Long Cheng is final," one U.S. source said.

Army can't hold

Li Nhuon, 29, a Lao officer who joined Gen. Vang Pao's army a year ago when he could find no decent work in Vientiane, said the Meo army would not hold if heavily hit by the enemy.

"We are afraid, very afraid now," he said.

Nhuon is a veteran of the Plain of Jars retreat, as well as its capture earlier this year by Vang Pao's forces.

In the past two years he has come to know the CIA-supported Meo army in the flush of success and in bitter, frightening defeat. He rambled on about the rush of artillery and soldiers that crushed the Laotians on the 36-square mile plain

Nhuon did not look for scapegoats, just said they were overwhelmed. He did confirm what is being whispered in American circles in Vientiane, that Meo senior officers were celebrating the Meo new year at Long Cheng, away from their troops on the plain, when the attack came. Nhuon said he and other junior officers and sergeants were in command.

Nhuon also noted that money problems contributed to the low morale. That troops get three and four times as much money as Meo troops, and are paid directly by the Americans. Meo and Lao soldiers have not been paid by their Meo officers for two or three months, which Nhuon said produced bitter tensions.

But it was not just that, Nhuon said. He spoke in

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U.S. planners have not relinquished hope for Long Cheng, but they hastened to add the question: "How important is Long Cheng, anyway?"

"The mountains up there are big. There is lots of room to go and no sense in being tied to one location," a CIA planner said.

A qualified U.S. government source said: "Long Cheng can be held even at this point, so long as no one makes a big mistake when the crunch comes."

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It was not an afterthought, but, U.S. planners said, a coordinated effort to surround the retreating Meo and force the Communist to give up small commands that, to within three miles of the base itself, for harassment and reconnaissance.

The loss of two hills overlooking the base has put defense of Long Cheng in a "grave" condition, military observers say.

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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

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FROM:

[Redacted]

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

OLC [Redacted]

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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Wednesday - 5 January 1972

Page 2

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5. [redacted] Talked with Herb Atkinson, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, about his query regarding a "shredder" for classified material. Atkinson pointed out that the Committee is interested in a shredder only as an aid in preparing classified material (primarily executive session transcripts) for subsequent incineration. I told him I would check further on shredders and call him again.

[redacted]

25X1A

Acting Legislative Counsel

cc:  
ER  
O/DDCI

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[redacted]

Mr. Houston

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[redacted]

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Tuesday - 4 January 1972

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[redacted] Herb Atkinson, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, called to say the Committee was considering purchasing a "shredder" for handling classified papers. He said he would like any information which we could give him on such a machine, the approximate cost and where it could be purchased. I have checked with [redacted] Security, on this and will be back in touch with Atkinson.

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