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SPECIAL SECTION

# The Big Questions of 1962

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As each year draws to a close, it is customary for men to look back on the year that has gone. NEWSWEEK prefers to look ahead—to the alarums and excursions, the tragedies and travesties, the rumors of war and the vistas of great achievement that are certain to make up a part of the human experience in the year that lies ahead.

What sort of year will it be? There are a million questions and few finite answers, and in asking the experts to delineate the shape of things to come, NEWSWEEK ranged the gamut from "Will Red China get the A-bomb?" (Answer: Not likely) to "Who will win the World Series?" (Obvious answer: The Yanks). In the end, the editors selected the fourteen questions in the left-hand column. Fourteen of its editors and bureau chiefs whose regular assignments are to cover such news offer their personal answers in the Special Section that follows.

CIA REF, P 44

## 1 Will There Be a War?



by Eldon Griffiths  
Senior Editor, International Affairs

New York

A little boy in Connecticut who had his eighth birthday last week took my hand and told me innocently: "This is my last birthday. The nuclear war will get me before I am 9."

The week before, a graduate student at Beloit College, Wis., asked with equal solemnity: "Is there nothing we can do to avoid a nuclear war?"

The greatest danger of such a war in 1962 lies in the possibility of a miscalculation by the leaders of the Communist world. This, in turn, raises the question of the Kremlin's strategic intentions in the year ahead, a fascinating subject that monopolizes the thinking of thousands of Kremlinologists in the West. These people base their forecasts, all of them necessarily tentative, on three main areas of military and political intelligence, and these are my impressions of their conclusions.

First, what is the record of recent Soviet aggressions? All told, there have been three—and only three—occasions when the Soviet Union launched attacks against other countries—against Finland (1939), Poland (1939), and Japan (1945). All three of these attacks were as sudden as they were cynical, but close study of the evidence leads to the conclusion that, in every case, the principal motivation of the Soviet action was pre-emptive. Thus in Finland and Poland, Stalin's major objective was to put the Red Army in a better defensive posture against the Nazi onslaught he suspected was coming. In the case of Japan, his aim was to insure that never again would Russia have a Japanese threat against its Siberian frontier.

The historic lesson from this record is that the Soviets are unlikely to launch an offensive war unless the Kremlin convinces itself that Russia is about to be attacked. There is no reason whatsoever for the Kremlin to make such a judgment in 1962, but it is possible that the lead Khrushchev to risk a

pre-emptive war. For this reason, if no other, I doubt if the U.S. will give the Germans nuclear arms.

The second area of intelligence that pertains to Russia's intentions is the deployment of Soviet armed forces. These are formidable indeed—a strategic striking force of 35-50 operational ICBM's, several hundred IRBM's, some 1,200 strategic bombers; an army of 2.2 million with more than 20,000 frontline tanks; and a navy second only to America's with nearly 500 submarines. The main concentrations of these forces are known to Western intelligence agencies, and the conclusion is that their deployment is mainly defensive. Most of the heavy bombers, for example, are at airfields in western Russia—not on the Arctic shores, where they would need to be located to attack America.

The third area of study is perhaps the trickiest of all. What advice is Khrushchev getting from his military, political, and ideological advisers on the subject of war?

The remarkable thing is not how little but how much intelligence material is now available in the West. The problem is how to evaluate it. Yet on one conclusion, the Kremlinologists are unanimous: Khrushchev, they believe, is convinced that Communism can win its struggle with the West without recourse to war.

Publicly, Khrushchev will continue to threaten atomic war against anyone who resists him. For Russian domestic consumption, he may also go on ranting that in a nuclear war, the capitalist world would die, whereas the Communist camp miraculously would be preserved. But in private conversations with many a Soviet official, I have gained a quite different impression. Khrushchev, they say, is perfectly well aware that a nuclear war to achieve world Communism is a contradiction in terms. The only thing he would achieve would be the instantaneous immolation of large parts of the existing Communist world.

### DARK FORCES AND DANGER

On the basis of these estimates of Soviet intentions, I doubt that the present leadership of the Soviet Union will start a nuclear war in 1962. Yet Khrushchev and his policies could conceivably be replaced—by major illness (he is rumored to have had a slight stroke); by a palace revolt in the Kremlin (unlikely but not impossible); above all, by a combination of the Old Stalinists who want revenge for Khrushchev's derogation of their onetime idol, the super Marxists, who denounce his "coexistence" as "too soft on capitalism," and the Red China lobby, which enjoys the powerful support of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Should Khrushchev be overthrown or his position be weakened by these dark forces, the danger of war in '62 materially would increase.

These forces could still push Russia into foreign adventures from which there might well be no escape short of major war. The obvious danger spots are Berlin, South Vietnam, and possibly Iran. Should the U.S., for example, commit large numbers of troops to the defense of South Vietnam, the Stalinists in the Kremlin could be counted on to pressure Khrushchev into supporting intervention by the Red Chinese. The same goes for Berlin. Khrushchev himself may be ready to negotiate, but here, as everywhere else, his enemies in the Kremlin leave him little room for maneuver.

What, then, are the chances of war in 1962?

My prediction is that a big war by conscious decision is unlikely, perhaps unthinkable. But small conflicts, e.g., in Vietnam, are likely to grow bigger, and there is a danger that they could suck in steadily larger forces from both sides in the cold war. If so, the cry for victory—in the United States as well as in the Communist camp—could escalate such local conflicts into a frontal collision. That is the danger that statesmanship must guard against in 1962.

## ② What Concerns America?



by Joseph Carter  
Senior Editor, National Affairs

New York

The mood was Christmas this week, all over the United States. In the below-freezing suburbs around Boston, the wreaths were going up on the front doors of the white clapboard Georgian houses; in shirt-sleeved Los Angeles, the strains of electronic Christmas carols echoed in the streets; in Atlanta, the stores were jammed with shoppers. For the vast majority of the nation's 185 million people this would be probably the merriest Christmas in years—yet they could still think seriously about the year ahead.

What did they see ahead? To find out, NEWSWEEK queried its bureaus and reporters across the land.

Again and again in 1961 this magazine ran articles reflecting the concern of the American people with the sweep of world events. Were Americans worried about Cuba? They were indeed. About Berlin? Of course. About the threats of Khrushchev? Still again, yes.

Thus, before our turn-of-the-year reports came in, I



Leo LaLonde

### The Kleppes of Bismarck: A bright future

had been mentally prepared to find that people would be filled with doubts, worries, misgivings.

No such thing.

They are concerned, yes, with Katanga and the Congo, with Berlin, with the role of the U.N.—but there is no fear. The striking thing now is the near-unanimity of the confidence with which Americans face the future.

In Bismarck, N.D., in the shadow of the skyscraper capitol lives the Kleppe family: Father Tom S. Kleppe, 42-year-old veteran of World War II and president of the Gold Seal Co.; his wife, Glen; their children Janis, 16 (Bismarck High School junior), Tommy, 14, and Jane, 7.

"There is no limit, virtually, to what we can do in America," Kleppe said. "Our standard of living is already the highest in history and it will go higher."

And his wife went on:

"I think about the future of my children, and I'm not afraid. I think living will be more exciting for our children, perhaps, than it has been for us."

In a pleasant suburb northeast of Atlanta, live the Wallaces—40-year-old Robert B. Wallace Jr., publications director of the Georgia Institute of Technology, his slender and articulate wife, Jane, and their three daughters (Nancy, 14, Jinx, 12—so named because she was born on Friday the thirteenth—and Marilu, 10).

Bob Wallace said:

"We have more creature

comforts than any group in history. The economy is strong; it will never collapse again as in 1929. The government won't let it. And I believe each generation should be better than the last."

In Wellesley, Mass., live the Waites. Thirty-one-year-old Charles Prescott Waite (an ancestor, Col. William Prescott, commanded American forces at Bunker Hill) works for the American Research and Development Corp., a major publicly owned venture-capital company. His wife, Catherine, is 29; their children are Charles Jr., 6, David, 4, and Catherine, 2.

"I can't imagine the day this country won't be at the top of the heap," said Mrs. Waite.

"I have confidence in the future," added her husband. "But I know we will have to work very hard to achieve what I hope to achieve."

### RELIGION, PRAYERS, AND PEACE

The reports from around the nation emphasized the country's interest in religion, perhaps especially pronounced at this season. In the home of Lloyd and Wylma Nelson in suburban Seattle, when the family sat down to dinner (the Nelsons have two sons, Jeffrey, 14, and Marvin, 11), no one reached for food immediately. Jeffrey picked up a pamphlet, "The Upper Room," a daily devotional guide, and began to read: "Prayer. Our Father, forgive us for thinking of Christmas as an event in the past only. May we experience the coming of Thy Son into our hearts. So grant us the peace and joy of Christmas anew and now—today. In Christ's name, amen."

The prayer reflected another major concern of Americans: Whether there will be another war. And again there was virtual unanimity. Most Americans interviewed said positively that there would not be another war. A few thought one might be started—but only accidentally.

Ruth Crutcher of Dallas, Texas, was typical. Wife of Harry Crutcher Jr., who is vice president of the Mercantile National Bank, major general commanding the Texas Air National Guard, and a panel speaker for the National Conference of Christians and Jews, Mrs. Crutcher said:

"I am disturbed, but I think there is no immediate danger. I have no feeling that a major war will occur." Her son Michael, 15, a sophomore at Jesuit High School, added: "I don't believe we are going to have a war." Crutcher himself said: "The United States is much stronger than most people realize. If not, Russia would have made more inroads in the world."

And as a corollary to America's conviction that there will be no major war, there is also no great drive to build fallout shelters, despite all the publicity.

"We are not going to build a shelter," said Don Mann,

### The Crutchers of Dallas: No war fears



The Manns of Detroit: No shelter for them

31-year-old Amherst graduate and member of the product-planning staff of Chrysler Corp. in Detroit. "But I know a fellow who has mortgaged his soul to build one. It has bank-vault-type doors, and two 10-gauge shotguns, to hold off his neighbors! Imagine! Two shotguns!"

Another point that came clear in NEWSWEEK's reports from around the U.S. was the emphasis that Americans—many of whom were so strongly isolationist less than a generation ago—now give to foreign problems.

Richard K. Arnold, a partner in a public-relations firm in San Francisco, lives with his wife, Mary Louise, and 12-year-old son Willie in an ultra-modern home in Palo Alto. "I can't help but feel that our relations with Russia will continue to show improvement," he said. "I have no sympathies with Red China, but I don't think the free world should sit by and see her people starve. It would be wonderful to ship grain, people-to-people . . . I believe in the Golden Rule—in my house, and in my government."

### DOMESTIC WORRIES, TOO

The problems of the world aside, the people of America are also concerned, as they move toward 1962, about domestic issues. In some of the depressed areas of New England and West Virginia, it's jobs; it's segregation in the South (though by and large, the feelings are optimistic); it's farm prices in the Midwest; the water problem in the Far West. If they have kids of draft age, the big question is: When will they be called?

It's New Year's football games, if they live near a bowl.

And, of course—being humans—Americans like to bother themselves with the amorphous and insoluble problems that all mankind has been bothering itself with ever since the Garden of Eden.

Is the next generation going to hell? Undoubtedly.

Mother after mother (and father after father) said:

"I don't know what they're coming to. They are given so much more freedom than we ever had. But all this steady dating. And these new dances—the twist. It's positively indecent."

Is the whole world going to hell in a hand basket? Undoubtedly. Everyone wants something for nothing—from more pay for less work

(according to one school of thought reflected in the reports)—to business executives who want to rig prices (according to other comments in the same reports).

But this was trivia. The nation never was bigger, never surer of itself. It was going to more museums, reading more books, listening to more music on hi-fi sets.

Above all, as the American people looked to 1962 they saw themselves a people unafraid.

### ③ What Has JFK Learned?



by Benjamin Bradlee  
*Washington Bureau Chief*

Washington

The memories of this fast first year of the New Frontier sing their siren song to the historian in every Washington reporter. Sorting them out is like choosing Christmas cards.

JFK, outdoorsman—coattails flying, big cigar clenched in his teeth, riding a horse across the Virginia countryside with unexpected nonchalance and competence.

JFK, harassed—at the telephone, silent except for the characteristic clicking of a fingernail against a tooth, listening to the first report from brother Bobby about racial violence in Alabama, and the trusting question: “Are you going to have to use marshals?”

JFK, humorist—earnestly telling a group of Texans who strongly opposed his election, “I want you to know that Lyndon Johnson has played a vital role in every decision of this Administration,” and then with a wry smile . . . “except Cuba.”

JFK, amused—laughing his quick responsive laugh at the cracks of his longtime political friend Dave Powers, now the White House doorkeeper. (Samples: To Harold Macmillan on his second visit to the White House: “This place

Silhouetted against a spotlight, a confident President  
Newsweek—Vytas Valaitis



doesn't seem the same without you, Prime Minister.” To some friends down from Boston: “Best White House I ever was in.”)

JFK, historian—to a would-be biographer of his first term: “Hey, I've got a great title—‘The First Hurrah.’”

JFK, teasing—stabbing his fingers at one of his closest associates, and saying, “If you guys don't stop bum-rapping [so-and-so] to every reporter in town, so help me I'll appoint him to the Supreme Court.”

But these are just background memories for a biographer. The historian will look deeper and find three key memories that left their mark on President Kennedy during the first year of his first term—Cuba, Vienna, and Trenton, N.J., each equally important in its way, each pointing to paths he will tread in 1962.

Cuba was the great mistake and, Mr. Kennedy is convinced, the great lesson of 1961. Simply expressed, the lesson is this: Just because the best people around say it's so doesn't make it so. To friends, Mr. Kennedy has often evoked the haunting image of polling brains assembled in the White House on the eve of Cuba . . . members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top CIA leadership (“And I didn't appoint any of them”), plus those he did appoint, and their overwhelming opinions to go forward. There won't be another Cuba. And the decisions of 1962 will be made on the President's judgment, no one else's.

Vienna was the great disappointment of 1961, with the emergence of a Khrushchev far more belligerent, intransigent, and hostile than the Khrushchev Mr. Kennedy had hoped to tackle. For weeks afterward, the President carried the transcript of their conversations with him wherever he went. Over and over again he read the minutes of the last meeting—to himself and to visitors, ending up with his last words to Khrushchev on the last rumpiled page—“It's going to be a long, cold winter.” But long before winter arrived, Vienna changed the President as it changed the life of every American, not from soft-boiled to hard-boiled (to anyone who knows him the image of a soft-boiled Kennedy is as incongruous as a limbless tree), but from optimism to realism, short haul to long haul. And perhaps even more important, areas of responsibility inside the New Frontier became sharply drawn, and Mr. Kennedy himself concentrated monolithically on the major problems dumped on him by Khrushchev at Vienna—Berlin and Southeast Asia.

#### 'GNAT'S-EYELASH' SYNDROME

More than he let anyone know, the President was haunted by his small majority in 1960, which he himself describes as a “gnat's eyelash.” In Trenton, N.J., early last month, Mr. Kennedy joyously and formally exorcised the “gnat's-eyelash” syndrome with a fighting political speech, his first as President. With his popularity at a whopping 77 per cent, he was ready to go to bat for a Democratic candidate (Judge Richard Hughes) in direct competition with former President Eisenhower, who had campaigned for Hughes' opponent. After the Hughes victory, Mr. Kennedy said: “We buried the Eisenhower problem.”

But Democrats who hope for a partisan President in 1962 à la Harry Truman will be disappointed by Mr. Kennedy. “That's not my style,” he said last week. He still needs Republican support to pass tariff reform, tax reform, and medical care for the aged, and he knows it. New Jersey proves that Eisenhower can't hurt, the President feels, but “he sure can help us, and I hope he does.”

On the eve of his second year in office, President Kennedy is philosophical about his high level of popularity. “Those things run in cycles,” he says. “We've had some winners lately—the Adzhubei interview was good, the iso-

little better, and our own people have dug in at their jobs —McNamara for instance. How could anyone master that job in less than ten months? He's terrific. And don't forget, Congress isn't in session, and we haven't been hearing much from some of our 'friends' up there."

The President is riding into 1962 with an unmistakable confidence in himself and his Administration. He can do things next year he was reluctant to try this year. He can call Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle on the telephone, for instance. (He spoke to both in one afternoon last week.) With more confidence in his team, he can concentrate more time and energy on the urgent problems. And with that Gallup poll in his hip pocket, he's going to be a hard man to cross.



Pictorial Parade

### Romney: A political star rising?

## 4 Whither Politics?



by James M. Cannon  
Senior Editor

Washington

The Chairman of the Republican Party was in shirt-sleeves when I came out of the snow and into his stately brick home in Bethesda, Md. As William Miller extended his hand in welcome, I looked for signs that running the Republican Party was taking its toll.

Last June, on the eve of his election as National Chairman, he was scrappy and optimistic. He still is. But in six months his black hair has begun to gray at the temples and he has lost about 8 pounds. It is not surprising. Since June, in his drive to organize and unify his party, Miller has flown about 37,000 miles, and—through regional meetings—met with the party leaders of all 50 states.

Miller, politician to the bone, needed no prompting to talk about his favorite subject. I suggested that we are all looking for answers to two central political questions:

1—Which Republican will emerge in November as the party's next Presidential nominee?

2—Can the Democrats hold control of the U.S. House of Representatives?

"Yes," said Miller, lighting the first in a chain of cigarettes, "but I would add a third. Off-year elections will also test confidence in the Kennedy Administration."

A vote of confidence is not all that the Democrats have to gain or lose this year. They have 259 House seats, the Republicans 174 (four are vacant). If the Republicans should gain control of the House in the 88th Congress (mathematically, they cannot win Senate control), the Republican majority would pounce like bloodthirsty Apaches on the wagon train of New Frontier legislation. For two years they could also rake the Administration in a crossfire of Congressional investigations.

Nobody is more aware of this than Democratic Chairman John Bailey. Four days before my long talk with Miller, I had lunch with the articulate and candid Bailey. Raising his brandy-on-the-rocks as though in toast, John said firmly: "Look, if we can hold on to the House seats that we have, it will be a victory. Only once in 50 years—and that was in 1934—has the party in power failed to lose seats in an off-year election."

If the pros are concentrating on this year's Congressional races, the public will be concentrating on the identity of the Republican nominee in '64; and the answer to that may come from one, or all, of three gubernatorial races:

►New York: Though political hangouts are buzzing with speculation about the long-term consequences of Gov.



Newsweek—Vytautas Valaitis

Nixon



Newsweek

Rockefeller

can still win a second term handily. The biggest threat would be New York City's Mayor Robert Wagner, but Wagner shows no enthusiasm for taking on the shining knight whose armor is but slightly battered. Many believe that Rockefeller's impending divorce kills his Presidential chances. The governor, now planning to politick harder than ever, doesn't seem to be among them.

►California: Richard Nixon is the choice now over both Goodwin Knight in the primary, and against Democratic Gov. Pat Brown. Therein lies his danger. Nixon campaigns best when behind; and his commanding lead may lure him to Dewey-eyed complacency and a soft campaign. In estimating California, remember that Democrats have a tremendous lead in registration (4,295,530 to 2,926,408).

►Michigan: George Romney, the silver-haired, jut-jawed, 54-year-old president of American Motors, can have the Republican gubernatorial nomination for the asking. Romney has formidable political assets: A successful business career, commanding platform personality, impeccable background (he preaches in his Mormon church every Sunday), a "sincere" TV image, an attractive, civic-minded wife, and appeal that crosses party lines. If Romney runs and wins big, his supporters will boom him as another "Wendell Willkie" for 1964.

While Presidential possibilities are always good for endless speculation, there are other races and other faces to watch. Among them:

►Connecticut: "I am pulled both ways," Abraham Ribicoff told me as he sat in the tall, blue leather chair that was his as Connecticut's governor. Ribicoff would relish the run for senator against Prescott Bush. However, as HEW Secretary, Ribicoff also feels obligated to stay on and help push through Congress President Kennedy's programs for health, education, and welfare. If he does run for the Senate, Ribicoff told me, he will pledge to serve the full term—and this would eliminate his chance to become a Kennedy appointee to the Supreme Court. Abe Ribicoff loves the campaign podium and self-earned political power, back to Connecticut and

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run for the Senate—unless Mr. Kennedy himself says no.

►**Massachusetts:** The race for the Democratic nomination for senator between the President's brother, Ted Kennedy, and Edward McCormack, nephew of the House Speaker-to-be, is a tossup now. It may be settled in private by John Kennedy, or in a bloody primary. If the winner escapes with few scars, he can, in this heavily Democratic state, probably beat George Lodge, the most likely Republican nominee.

►**Ohio:** The formidable and well-heeled (\$3 million yearly) Republican organization is out for a sweep; and unless the Democrats pull off a political miracle, Republican State Auditor James A. Rhodes will be Ohio's next governor—even if Gov. Michael DiSalle runs again.

►**Pennsylvania:** Republicans appear to be on the upsurge, and may knock off liberal Democratic Sen. Joseph Clark.

►**Arkansas:** Gov. Orval Faubus is trying to decide if he is big enough to knock Democratic Sen. William Fulbright out of the Senate. The betting is that Faubus might, but segregationist Rep. Dale Alford could not.

As the political season warms with the weather, interests will center on Kentucky (Sen. Thruston Morton defending, probably against Wilson Wyatt), South Carolina (Sen. Olin Johnston defending, probably against Gov. Fritz Hollings), Nebraska (Democratic Gov. Frank Morrison against former Interior Secretary Fred Seaton), Maryland, Colorado, Maine, Oregon, Utah.

Who will walk off with the big victories in 1962? Not even the pollsters know now. But we can be sure that in 1962, as it has been since the Republic's founding, politics may not always be enlightening, but it will be entertaining.

## 5 What Will Congress Do?



by Samuel Shaffer  
Chief Congressional Correspondent

Washington

Sen. Paul Douglas had just finished an 85-speech speaking tour in Illinois, but his eyes lit up as he told how popular the young President was—a popularity, he insisted, that extended to his program too.

"I had to interrupt my tour," he said, "to meet with a group of grain-storage dealers. I wasn't happy at the prospect; they're always complaining about Democratic farm programs. You know what they told me? 'We like the farm program. What can we do to support it?'"

Kenneth Harding, the shrewd and affable executive director of the Democratic Congressional campaign committee, who maintains closer contact with House Democrats than any other single person in Washington, had this report from the grass roots: "The President's popularity is fabulous. He couldn't hope for a better personal climate for the next session."

The 87th Congress reconvenes for its second session at noon on Jan. 10. The faces will be the same, but the outlook of the members will be profoundly changed from the last session by the solidly based and still mounting popularity of the President. Former doubts about chances for enactment of tax reforms, medical care for the aged, and reciprocal-trade-agreements legislation are not wholly resolved, but they have diminished.

The Republicans agree on the score of Mr. Kennedy's popularity, but express doubt that it can be translated in terms of legislation. Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona told me during a brief stopover at the Capital this week: "I

larity across the country. But I don't think his popularity will help him pass the big controversial bills."

This, I believe, is the outlook for the big issues:

►A new liberal tariff law should pass, perhaps giving JFK authority for sweeping reductions.

►Tax reforms will include credit for new machinery and plants; withholding of dividend and interest payments.

►Medical care for the aged under social security remains in doubt. But win or lose, the President believes the issue could tip the 1962 elections to the Democrats.

►Federal school aid looks dead because of the religious and racial issues involved.

Whatever doubts are expressed stem from the situation in the House, where the death of former Speaker Sam Rayburn is a setback to the Administration.

But Rayburn's probable successor, John McCormack, told me: "I'm pretty optimistic. We should do all right on the trade and tax bills and should get some kind of medical-care bill onto the House floor. Once there, it'll pass."

## 6 Will Russia Get Tougher?



by Whitman Bassow  
Moscow Bureau Chief

Moscow

"The party should tell us the whole truth about Stalin," I heard an eager youth shout in Red Square the day Stalin's body was removed from its showcase tomb.

"*Pravilno, pravilno* [right]," echoed his listeners. As I heard the serious-faced men and women speak out as Russians rarely have—critically, doubtfully, demandingly—I sensed an undercurrent of restlessness, a vague dissatisfaction with the way things are going.

I heard it again one snowy evening on broad Leninsky Prospekt. Peering out from under a black fur hat a middle-aged man quietly told his companions: "What can they do now? I sat [in prison] for eleven years and I'm not afraid. And anyway, those days are finished."

Encouraged by Khrushchev's destruction of the Stalin



Bastian—San Francisco Chronicle

legend, the Russian people, in my judgment, are beginning to play a role in Soviet politics. A small role perhaps and one that can be choked off at any time, but one that Khrushchev, for his own purposes, is apt to respect. And if the Russian people's wishes have any weight at all, that weight will be thrown on the side of peace—which could mean moderation abroad, and a better life at home.

More important than the Russian people's desire for a lessening of cold-war tensions are the facts of Western power. Soviet leaders are well aware of the current American buildup and they believe Mr. Kennedy means business on Berlin. The growing split in the Communist bloc may also reduce the Kremlin's desire for an all-out break with the West.

One October evening, I watched Khrushchev bid farewell to Chou En-lai at Vnukovo Airport. They shook hands and smiled, but their smiles were chillier than the wind that swept the field. It may be a long time before these two giants of the Communist bloc clasp hands again, for Chou, in cold fury, had walked out of the Party Congress after Khrushchev attacked Red China's Stalinist vassal, Albania.

The quarrel between Moscow and Peking was further dramatized on the evening of Nov. 29 when, by ironic coincidence, both the Yugoslav and Albanian embassies gave receptions in honor of their national day. I spotted a number of top Soviet officials at the Yugoslav party but the Chinese were conspicuous by their absence. Alone in a corner of the banquet hall stood a junior Chinese diplomat. I asked him if Ambassador Liu Hsiao would attend; he replied, in English, "Oh no, he very sick."

Halfway across Moscow, in the three-story Albanian Embassy, Chargé d'Affaires G. Mazi was receiving his guests—among them two low-ranking Soviet officials. The only full ambassador to appear from the Communist bloc was Red China's Liu Hsiao, whose health had miraculously improved. With him were at least 30 embassy officials in their traditional black tunics.

Next year will probably see a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, unless Peking is prepared to scuttle its Albanian ally. But this is hardly likely, for reasons of ideology, politics, and pride. The Chinese dragon will retain its clawhold on the Adriatic.

Over-all, I still expect Russia, though not China, to become less tough in 1962. In particular, I suspect that there may be a compromise over Berlin—if only because Khrushchev could badly use an agreement with the U.S. so as to show his critics within the bloc, in China, and at home that his policy of peaceful coexistence is paying off.

But just because Khrushchev may seem less tough does not mean that tensions will ease. The cold war will go on; we can only hope that it doesn't turn hot.



Axel Grosser from Monkmeier

### Through the Berlin wall: Little hope over there

thought to myself as I walked. Yet here it is, and sadly I have to agree with those Germans and Western officials who expect little change in Berlin, either for better or worse, during the next year.

There will be new scares and harassments from the Communist side in 1962. The powerful Communist searchlights will continue to probe through the mist scudding around the wall at night, looking for escapees. Almost every day, somewhere along the wall, there will be a burst of machine-gun fire, or an angry exchange with water cannon and tear-gas grenades by the police of East and West Berlin.

A few refugees will trickle through. Others will die trying, like the young Austrian student machine-gunned to death last week while helping a fellow student's mother over the wall. The spirit of Christmas 1961 was marked for West Berliners by the wooden cross with the crown of barbed-wire thorns placed where he fell beside the wall. I expect Christmas 1962 to be marked in a similar way.

West Berliners, however, have learned to live with the wall. They have become used to making the abnormal normal, the unendurable endurable. The fashionable sidewalk cafés along Kurfürstendamm are still jammed at teatime with overfurred, overlarded ladies who wolf down enormous quantities of *schlag* and trade gossip just as though there were no wall. For these people, the wall is simply *drüben*—over there.

Some people—particularly professional men like doctors and lawyers—are quietly leaving for West Germany, and so is some capital. The exodus is apt to increase in 1962. But the vast majority of Berliners will stick it out in the New Year. They have nowhere else to go.

If there is courage—and fatalism—on the Western side of the wall, *drüben*, there is little hope left. East Germany's chronic food shortages seem to be getting worse rather than better. Currently there's a salt shortage despite the large salt mines in the East Zone, and even

## 7 Will the Wall Come Down?



by Dwight Martin  
Berlin Bureau Chief

### Berlin

I walked along the Berlin wall one foggy night last week and nothing impressed me so much as the sense of permanency about it. This dreadful concrete-block and barbed-wire scar, which so dramatically emphasizes Berlin's plight as the core of the Central European problem today, is evidently here to stay—unless the West goes to war to knock it down.

potatoes are rationed. I talked with a youth who came out through the Berlin sewer system (1,500 fled in November). "Nobody really works any more in my factory," he said. "Nobody gives a damn."


Driving back to West Berlin after a tour through the East, I was recently stopped by two young *Vopos* (People's Police). They examined my passport, then asked: "How is it in the West?"

"Still about the same," I said.

The older one quickly glanced at him, then he grinned and said: "Keep it that way. We'll be seeing you soon."

But I doubt if the East Germans will risk an open revolt in 1962. Walter Ulbricht still is firmly in the saddle and the Red Army in East Germany still has 22 divisions.

## 8 Will Europe Unite?



by **Arnaud de Borchgrave**  
*Chief European Correspondent*

Paris

It was snowing hard on the Franco-German frontier when an apple-cheeked young French customs inspector flagged me to a stop and dutifully told me to open the trunk of my car. Why, I wondered, would a 21-year-old European pick the customs service as a career nowadays? Isn't the Common Market supposed to make Europe's frontiers gradually disappear?

"I looked into that very carefully," the customs man said, "and I'm reasonably sure of spending the next 40 years in the customs service. We graduated 950 cadets from customs school this year, more than ever before."

The New Year will certainly see great progress toward the economic unification of Western Europe. A great historical movement is under way—nurtured by modern technology and industry's need for bigger markets; compelled by Soviet pressure and the need for mutual defense; accelerated by the sharing of Frenchmen and Germans, Italians, Dutch and Britons in the same football matches seen over Eurovision, and the same desire to forget the agonies of World War II.

The big impetus will come from Britain's determination to join the Common Market. If the British succeed—

no foregone conclusion—the Scandinavians will follow, and the new Europe will represent a market of 300 millions. It will exceed the U.S. in annual output of steel, and eventually of cars, with an over-all gross national product 30 per cent bigger than Russia's. (For comparative output of Europe, America, and Russia, see chart.)

Yet 1962 will by no means see a smooth and orderly flow toward European union. On the contrary, there may be growing resentments against the Common Market on the part of many European workers. One Italian workman got angry when I asked him how the Common Market had improved his lot. "There's no freedom of movement for workers," he retorted. "I had to fight like a lion to get from Italy to France. As for lower prices, everything I buy for my family keeps going up." They look on the Common Market as a creation of big business rather than the nucleus of a united Europe.

Just one opinion? Perhaps. But I've heard similar views from dozens of ordinary Europeans—from a hard-bitten subway worker at the Porte Maillot, from a tax assessor in Brussels, from a restaurant owner in The Hague.


The men who talk most fervently about uniting Europe are the men who have devoted their professional careers to it, like pipe-sucking Etienne Hirsch, head of Euratom (the European atomic agency). Only recently Hirsch was declaiming that Euratom is a splendid example of a supranational institution that functions smoothly without any interference from its six member governments. Less than a week later, Charles de Gaulle ordered Hirsch removed from his supranational job, and replaced him with Pierre Chatenet, a nationally minded former Interior Minister who abhors the whole idea of a federal Europe.

De Gaulle is only one of the major obstacles to the creation of a united Europe. Other Europeans are divided on what kind of Europe they want—the federalists want a completely united Europe; confederalists want much looser ties; nationalists distrust the whole project. Then there are pan-Atlantic visionaries who want to include the U.S. in a gigantic Atlantic Common Market.

This is a vision that one day may come to pass. But in 1962, the best that can be hoped for is a gradual lowering of tariffs among all the Atlantic nations, including the U.S., and progress toward the completion of Britain's negotiations for membership in the Common Market. If and when Britain joins, the Common Market will become a looser—if stronger—grouping. This alone insures, as I see the year ahead, that at Christmastime 1962 the young customs officer still will be stopping every car.

Newsweek—Mackay

## Production Race: Europe Is Catching Up



## 9 Next in Southeast Asia?



by Robert S. Elegant  
*Southeast Asia Correspondent*

Hong Kong

There is no doubt in my mind that the West can hold Southeast Asia—but only on one possibly alarming condition: That the U.S. makes the necessary effort and is willing to run the risk of war with Communist China.

Mao Tse-tung and North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh held an important strategy meeting last November. Their conclusions virtually guarantee that Communist guerrilla pressure on Southeast Asia will intensify in 1962. And unfortunately, the countries under attack—today South Vietnam, tomorrow perhaps Thailand or Cambodia—lack the will to fight and the political resources to survive without U.S. help.

As far back as last January, I was convinced that Laos would be lost unless the U.S. intervened militarily. I had driven north from Vientiane across a drought-blasted landscape of twisted, bare trees and villages of poor, stilt-legged houses, to a road junction called Phonkone. There lay the headquarters of Col. Kouprasith Abhay, commander of the pro-Western forces pursuing rebel Capt. Kong Le. Just across the River Lik in the highlands was the rebel-held village of Ban Hin Heup, but in spite of the tough appearance of Kouprasith's royal troops—with their cartridge belts and machine-gun-mounted jeeps—they had been stalled at Phonkone for three weeks. "Do you wonder why I am still here?" asked the colonel sheepishly. "The terrain across the river is very difficult."

I later learned that his 800-man battalion had been held at bay by only 30 snipers.


Kong Le, without a fight, went on to take the vital Plaine des Jarres, win half of Laos, and decisively swing the military balance away from the pro-Western Royal Laotian Army. As a result, a "neutral" coalition government—almost certainly dominated by the Communists—will be formed early next year.

The Communists have now moved the focus of their attack to South Vietnam. But while President Ngo Dinh Diem watches the Communist guerrilla power grow, his own is crumbling fast—largely because Diem is determined not to change his ways. He is contemptuous of American advice, especially after the U.S. role in Laos. The last time I saw him, he pointed angrily to some red hatching on his map and said: "What I can't forgive is your letting the Pathet Lao take Tchepone in southern Laos after the cease-fire. Tchepone—the main route for Communist infiltration into my country."

Diem is not alone in criticizing U.S. "irresolution" in Southeast Asia. Marshal Sarit Thanarat of Thailand, for instance, charges Washington with "talking tough and acting weakly." Just last month, one of the three men who make Thailand's foreign policy said to me: "No small Asian country can do anything to stem the Communist tide. Nor can SEATO, because America has failed to provide leadership."

The same man went on to put the Southeast Asian challenge of 1962 in the same way I have heard it expressed from Singapore to Manila: "If America shows the resolution, her allies will follow. If not, we all perish."

The fateful question remains: What will Red China do if the United States commits its own troops to hold



Newsweek—Mar 11

likely because the Chinese economy simply cannot support a major military operation. Nor will Russia support Peking if the risk is nuclear war. But if the U.S. delays too long, China may acquire its own nuclear weapons and a modern economy. Now—not next year—is the time for Americans to realize that half measures will no longer suffice to hold Southeast Asia.

## 10 Africa: Chaos or Order?



by John P. Nugent  
*Nairobi Bureau Chief*

Elisabethville

For much of Africa, 1962 will be 365 long days of living between hope and violence.

You can feel the hope pulsating across the continent—in the voices of thousands gathered to demand "liberty" and "justice" for all; in the open-air schoolhouses, sprouting up in the bush, where millions of naked youngsters chant the litany of Africa's newest religion—A . . . B . . . C . . . But alongside the hopes there are hatreds, not only of black versus white, but of black versus black.

As the tensions of Africa rise, many of its people will continue to live in fear of unexpected attacks like the one in which three other correspondents and I barely escaped with our lives last September. We were driving through seemingly deserted streets in a Baluba refugee camp in the Congo when suddenly we were surrounded by a screaming horde of tattered youths. They hacked at the metal body of our car with their vicious panga knives. One of my colleagues was badly slashed, but I was lucky: Only a few glass splinters in my eyes.

These were people theoretically under United Nations protection. Yet their hatred of the white man—any white man—seemed a basic drive in their lives. And it is this hatred that the 6 million white men still living in Negro Africa may have to face up to in 1962.

South Africa is the likeliest site of racial violence in 1962. But there the whites will win—temporarily. The Afrikaner police are prepared to shoot to kill. Rhodesia may lack push too hard," says a



Associated Press

### Congo tribesmen: Hatred contends with hope

Salisbury businessman, "we will cut them all down." The leader of Southern Rhodesia's 3 million Africans, Joshua Nkomo, is no less adamant. "1962 is the year of action," he says. "We plan to take over the government."

Alongside the white-black battle is the battle of the black versus black. Its objective is political supremacy, and the struggle is already under way in a score of lands. The Congo is the prime example—and even a U.N. victory against Moise Tshombe of Katanga is unlikely to resolve its problems. Instead of open warfare between the U.N. and Katanga, there is apt to be a guerrilla war between the Lunda tribe (which supports Tshombe) and the Leopoldville government (which is mainly supported by the Baluba tribe). This struggle may well spread into Kasai and Kivu and into Portuguese Angola, where the battle of black and white already is under way.

Meanwhile, the black dictators can be expected to stamp on the still feeble seedlings of democratic rule. In Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah already wallows in self-glorification, and his example appeals to many of the weak nations left behind by the French Community.

In 1962, all these African struggles are apt to produce more chaos than orderly development. Yet the chaos, perhaps, can be contained. For important as it is, Africa is not yet powerful. It still is the object of other people's policies, not the creator of its own.

grower worked himself into a purple rage over the Alliance for Progress. "What's all this garbage about 'controlled revolution'?" he demanded. "What difference does it make whether a revolution is 'controlled'? The result is the same: We lose everything." He was drinking an imported German beer as he spoke. The price: Sixty cents a bottle, exactly a day's pay for each of his workers.

In Tegucigalpa, Honduras, an opposition leader told me that building roads could lead only to Communism. "You claim our Indians lead miserable lives up in the mountains. Maybe so. But they don't know it. Now they'll come down to Tegucigalpa, look in shopwindows, and get discontented."

A pediatrician friend of mine in San José, Costa Rica, posed the problem best. "Throughout history," he explained, "a handful of people have lived in luxury in Latin America, the great masses in poverty. It was a fact of life which everyone accepted. Now, suddenly, all over the world, the poor have become tired of being poor."

Millions of Latin Americans are discontented now, and their ranks are growing. In 1962, more and more of them will look to Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro for an escape from hopeless poverty. In Tegucigalpa, I saw an elevator boy reading a Communist newspaper. In Costa Rica, a gas-station attendant wearing a Fidelista cap and beard spat at our car as it pulled out.

Not all Latins look to Castro; he has a new rival. President John F. Kennedy's visit to Colombia and Venezuela was designed to project his Alliance for Progress program which already has captured the imagination of many workers and peasants. Mr. Kennedy's popularity stems from his youth and vitality, his Catholicism, from his promise to aid only governments that make social and economic reforms. In Latin America, reform means one thing: Land for the landless. And the *campesinos* want land.

If the Alliance makes progress, the United States won't have to fear Communism or Fidelismo in Latin America.

The choice between order and progress or chaos and Communism will mainly depend in 1962 on how tough Washington is. If the U.S. can persuade—or force—Latin America to make reforms it will cut the ground out from under the Fidelistas. Otherwise, in a year or two or three, the Fidelistas will be crying: "Reform has failed; the only way out is revolution."

This could prove, I am afraid, an irresistible argument.

### Castro: The shadow of poverty

Newsweek—Vytautas Valaitis



## ① More Castros?



by Harold Lavine  
Chief Latin America Correspondent

Mexico City

From the Rio Grande to Cape Horn, the shadow of Fidel Castro has cast the whole future of Latin America into doubt. As 1961 draws to a close, the shadow is receding slightly, for there is a light now shining from Washington—the Alliance for Progress. Yet the outlook for 1962 remains gloomy. Here are some of the experiences that make me think so.

At a dinner party in lofty Bogotá, Colombia, a lawyer's wife said archly: "Of course, we're a privileged class—and we intend to retain our privileges."

In San Salvador, capital city of El Salvador, a coffee-

## 12 Will the U.N. Survive?



by Robert Massie  
Chief U.N. Correspondent

### United Nations

"My God!" said a Western European delegate in the U.N. lounge last week. "The U.N. effort in the Congo has bankrupted the United Nations, killed a Secretary-General, split the Western Alliance, and set whites and blacks to fighting in the heart of Africa, and you ask me where the U.N. is going! I'd say, it's going to hell."

There are a lot of similarly gloomy thoughts about the United Nations these days, but my view of the U.N.'s prospects for 1962 is a bit more cheerful. Only the Communists seriously want to see the U.N. destroyed. An overwhelming majority of its 104 members want the U.N. to grow in power and influence. "The U.N. is absolutely essential to us. We cannot allow its destruction in this way," a Nigerian delegate told me. "The U.N. is the principal forum of our foreign policy," an Indian pointed out. And even a Yugoslav declared: "We are against the troika idea categorically."

A second reason for my confidence in the U.N.'s future is the personality of the new Secretary-General, U Thant. When the name of this obscure Burmese was first mentioned as a candidate to fill Dag Hammarskjöld's shoes, a high Secretariat official confided: "I don't think he's tough enough for the job." But in office, U Thant has proved very tough indeed. Shortly after Soviet delegate Valerian A. Zorin vetoed a U.S. proposal that the U.N. retrain the Congolese Army, Thant declared that he would go ahead and do it anyway. And early this month, when fighting again broke out in Katanga, the mild, Buddhist Secretary-General authorized "whatever force is necessary."

Whether U Thant—and the U.N.—will weather 1962 depends largely on what happens in the Congo. My guess is that, with the continued urging of the U.S. and the small nations, Katanga will be pressured into some kind of political arrangement with the Leopoldville government. Then it will become the urgent task of U.S. delegates to demand that the U.N. deal with equal firmness with the leftist regime of Antoine Gizenga.

Even sooner, the U.N. must find some money. Only sixteen of its 104 members have so far fully paid their bills, and by Jan. 1, the U.N. will be \$107 million in the red. Of this, a whopping \$41 million is owed by Soviet Russia. In a showdown, however, the U.S. probably will continue to pay the bulk of the U.N.'s costs, if only because, as one U.S. delegate put it: "We can't afford not to have the U.N."

The coming year will certainly see a tide of anti-U.N. feeling rising from many sources. As Red China approaches the U.N.'s doorway, the clamor in the U.S. can reach alarming proportions in 1962—an election year. As U Thant's temporary term of office nears an end a year from now, the Kremlin can be expected to launch another offensive in favor of a troika. There will also be a number of proposals for U.N. reform, emanating from those who feel that no system is right in which Gabon (population: 425,000) has an equal vote with the United States.

Yet bumbling, irritating, and irresponsible as it can be, the U.N. will be around for many a year to come. President Kennedy last month called it an organization which the U.S. "can neither abandon nor control"; U Thant recently said "it is still the best hope for getting out of our intolerably dangerous thermonuclear jungle."

I think the world accepts these views.



Newsweek—Vytas Valaitis

United Nations: Inadequate and essential

## 13 Will Tariff Walls Tumble?



by Clem Morgello  
Senior Editor, Business

New York

The President gave an immediate answer to the weighty tariff question last week when he sent two Administration trade experts scooting off to Brussels. In an ultramodern, nine-story building in the heart of that city, negotiators for the U.S. and the European Common Market were on the verge of a major agreement. ECM was offering to cut its import duties on American products by 20 per cent, virtually across the board; the U.S. was about to make major, though less extensive, cuts. If the deal goes through, it will exhaust the Administration's tariff-cutting powers. Mr. Kennedy will have to go to Congress for more authority, for the "new and bold" trade program he wants. At the moment, the fate of his program must be rated one of the political imponderables of 1962.

While a great many executives with whom I've talked are reserving judgment, most of those who have taken a stand are for the new and bold approach. But, says one supporter with foreboding, "it must be borne in mind that the opposition has been strangely inarticulate."

Sooner or later, the uncommitted will choose a side. They'll have to face up to one salient point which stands out in the growing stream of speeches and news items which pour across my desk: In a very real sense, the Great Debate transcends trade policy; it goes to the heart of the entire economy. If America opts for freer trade, the nation will paradoxically lose some of its freedom of action. More than ever, business, labor, and government will be subject to the harsh discipline of international competition. If domestic prices go up, no lowering of tariffs abroad will

help one whit; U.S. goods will be overpriced to begin with. Lower tariffs are a hazard as well as an opportunity.

Some of the toughest business minds in the country have weighed the problems and come out for freer trade. General Electric chairman Ralph J. Cordiner admits that GE would suffer "plenty" in a low-tariff world. But, he adds: "We'll take our chances." Movie-camera makers were forced to take their chances several years ago when import duties were slashed 40 per cent. The increased foreign competition which followed, notes Bell & Howell chairman Charles H. Percy, "brought out the best of creativity in our industry." Percy's Bell & Howell, for one, has enjoyed an uninterrupted growth of sales and earnings.

Despite America's demonstrated ability to compete (the U.S. will export about \$5 billion more than it imports this year), it is disturbing that many free-trade supporters speak out less clearly. When businessmen talk about keeping prices competitive, they zero in on wage levels; when labor speaks, it comes down hard on "top-heavy executive expenditures . . . inflated salaries, bonuses, stock options, expense accounts."

Along with passing the buck, there is also a lot of "yes, but." One big coal producer told me that his industry wants no tariff protection. "We can put our coal down in West Germany cheaper than coal can be mined in the Ruhr," he explains. "In the U.S., no foreign coal causes us concern." However, he adds: "The coal industry has strongly favored quota restrictions on imports of residual oil [which are cutting into coal markets on the East Coast]."

Even the Administration, while talking of freer trade, may slap an 8.5-cents-a-pound "equalization" fee on cotton-textile imports.

Mr. Kennedy is right in asking for a new and bold trade program. But if it is shot through with exceptions, it won't be new. It won't be bold. It will be meaningless.

## 14 Why Go to the Moon?



by Edwin Diamond  
*Space and the Atom Editor*


New York

At this moment in Washington, and, no doubt, in Moscow, blueprints have been drawn up for the most ambitious single endeavor in human history: The exploration of the moon. In aspiration, it surpasses the adventurous odyssey of Columbus. In size, it dwarfs the wartime enterprise that produced the atomic bomb. The A-project cost \$1 million a day over four years. The U.S. lunar project will spend \$10 million a day—over the next decade.

Outside the technical community, however, there is little appreciation of the grandeur of this program. Only children and science writers appear enthusiastic, perhaps because their taxes are minimal. Taxpayers—58 per cent in a Gallup survey—still ask: Is this trip necessary? And while others accept the space age, they usually do so for the wrong reasons.

The United States, and I would guess the Soviet Union,

are not going to the moon for reasons of military superiority. It is much easier to send a hydrogen warhead 5,000 miles across the ocean than it is to hurl one 230,000 miles through space. The drive is not for economic or scientific reasons, even though there are valuable mineral resources and geologic treasures to be mined on the moon. Nor is it all a big moondoggle, intended to provide status for a scientific caste like the Egyptian priests who presided at the ancient pyramids. Finally, the U.S. has not committed itself to the exploration of the moon in order to beat the Russians there. We have no guarantee that we will be first. In fact, it is certain that in the next year or two we will continue to trail behind Red man-in-space achievements. (For example, the January flight which is scheduled to send Lt. Col. John Glenn into orbit for three circuits of the earth will fall far short of the seventeen-orbit feat of cosmonaut Titov. Not until 1963 will a souped-up Mercury capsule duplicate Titov's flight.)



Astronaut Glenn: He accepts the challenge

### HISTORY AND DESTINY

While all these factors play some part in the thrust to the moon, the pre-eminent reason why the U.S. is going is that, stated in the simplest of terms, we must do so to remain a first-class nation. And precisely because the program is a matter of national pride, there is good reason to believe the U.S. can be first—despite the Soviet lead.

This is not mysticism. Organisms—from cells to societies—must respond to stimuli or atrophy. Arnold Toynbee argues that civilizations grow (the Greeks) or disintegrate (the Romans) depending on their

responses to challenges. But there is no need to go back in history to find examples of challenge and response. On the evening of Oct. 4, 1957, when the first sputnik streaked through the night skies, a new era was inaugurated. At the time, those of us who scan the heavens for portents were dazzled by the Red Star ascendant and the emergence of Russia in space. Today, perspectives have changed. If I read the signs correctly, Khrushchev performed an incalculable service—for Americans. In the 1960s, the U.S. will reaffirm its pre-eminence, not only in space but in most earth-bound sciences.

What happened in the wake of the sputnik challenge was simply this: The U.S. went into orbit. Social values, the schools, the governmental structure were subjected to scrutiny; the issues, if indeed not the outcome, of the 1960 Presidential campaign and election were sharply defined. The U.S. has successfully put up 62 satellites compared with thirteen for the Russians. And now this great nation is committed to going to the moon.

What if we hadn't responded? One scientist says: "We'd be four years closer to becoming a second-rate nation."

Many, of course, would question this statement. They hold that the U.S. can find other worthy challenges to meet here on earth. Most Americans, nuclear physicist Alvin Weinberg says, would rather belong to the society that first gave the world a cure for cancer than to the society that put the first astronaut on Mars. One reply would be that the U.S. is talented enough to do both. Another reply is that the exploration of the moon—as well as the conquest of disease, amelioration of poverty, and all the goals science now makes possible—is a challenge worthy of a prideful, humane, adventurous nation.