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5 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Fred Blumenthal, Washington correspondent of PARADE, telephoned to tell us that your story and color photograph for the cover of PARADE will appear in the issue of July 3 in what will be known as a patriotic issue. I think we are fortunate in getting in on the long Fourth of July holiday when families—and this reaches 12 million families—will have an opportunity to read the article and see what the DCI looks like. Mr. Blumenthal said that one picture, which they will use, came out very well. He asks if they could receive the copy by Monday, 9 May. He makes the request because of the pressure of time, but he doesn't want you to think they are pressing. I told him that you were still working on the piece but I thought maybe it would be ready by Monday, and I would get it to him as soon as you finish writing it.

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STARKEY J. GROGAN

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26 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Reminder of 3:00 P.M., Thursday, appointment for color photograph for Parade Sunday supplement.

Parade is sending its color photographer, Dave Preston, from New York City, to get a cover picture of you in your office at 3:00 P.M., Thursday, as per our agreement.

Fred Blumenthal of the Washington Bureau of Parade will accompany Preston.

You have the copy for the article.

STANLEY J. GROGAN

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9 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Fred Blumenthal, PARADE, spent a few hours with me yesterday, going over their ideas for a story to go with your color picture on a forthcoming PARADE, times for May. What they want is a "by Line" story by you, of 1,000 to 1,500 words, preferably om intelligence or something allied thereto.

Excerpts could be made from the speech you made before the Virginia Chamber of Commerce on April 9, 1954 that would, I think, make good reading under your by line and would meet their needs. The attached statement is what I would recommend.

PARADE would like an appointment within the next few weeks to have their photographer come down from New York and make a color picture in your office.

STANLEY J. GROGAN

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SHOGESTED ARTICLE

FOR "PARABLES"

These who are directing our fereign policy these days have a double problem.

They need to know the facts bearing on our international relations and then they must decide what to do about them.

Until the Communists introduced the idea of building a kind of Chinese Wall around their domains, it wasn't so difficult to get a reasonable idea as to the facts in a given situation. Constally we can get, through normal and evert means, a fair idea of the power potential of the various countries of the world and their intentions and policies can be deduced within a reasonable margin of error.

Today, however, there is a wast area of the globe -- the entire Soviet and satellite world, including Communist China -- which is, in part, a no-man's-land of knowledge.

The Communist world deliberately plans it so. They want to keep us in ignorance of their plans and of their timing and of their power to carry out their plans. Meanwhile we in the free world continue along, with the full light of publicity on what we are doing and of course our major plans in the intermational field generally require advance approval of the Congress in one form or another.

In a free society this is more or less inevitable and I would not suggest that we can or should change it even though it puts us at a disadvantage vis-a-vis a possible antagonist. Sometimes, however, it seems to me that in the field of technical developments we tell the world, and hence the Communists, more than we need to. This seems to go with our national temperament. Our people like to share with others the satisfaction of our accomplishments, sometimes without realizing how quickly this knowledge can be turned against us.

One of the main objectives of the Cembral Intelligence Agency is to try to get at the facts about the Seviet orbit -- the name we generally use to cover the Communist dominated area that extends from the Elbe River in the heart of Germany to the Telles Sea and deep into Indochina in the Far East.

I do not propose to disclose where in this quest for knowledge we are having successes and where we are running up against a wall of uncertainty. To do so would servely help the Soviet to close off existing sources of information. I can say, however, that in this work we have some across some facts that lead so to believe that here in the W.S.A. we have some popular misconceptions about this Soviet orbit.

Even a monolithic state like the Soviet Union has its strasses and strains.

The Soviet people have not become such complete automatons that the Kremlin can safely act in complete disregard of their human needs.

A second misconception, as I see it, lies in our appraisal of the capabilities of the Soviet people individually and collectively. I believe we have a feeling that the Soviet brain is somehow inferior to our own and that in many fields they cannot do the things that we can do.

In all totalitarian systems the damial of freedom, and of private initiative and the curb on individual resourcefulness have serious consequences. But don't make any mistake about this. Those who succeed in the ruthless power struggle that exists in the Soviet Union are persons to be reckoned with. However cynical and corrupt they may be, when they get to the top in that "dog eat dog" system they are men of outstanding force and ability.

When the Soviet State determines to tackle a particular objective, take

for example in the field of industrial production or of scientific development,

and lays down the ground rules for the work to be done, Soviet scientists and

technicians have proved to be surprisingly efficient in getting results. Of

course in some fields they have prefited by aid received from foreign scientists,

particularly Garman; from empionage; and sometimes from protetypes obtained from abrend.

It is high time we should disabuse ourselves of the notice that the Soviet are only goed as chees players, as susicians, or in the ballet, spart of course from their demonstrated courage and tenseity as soldiers when defending their own country. We have now had it clearly demonstrated that they have high shillty in the field of atomic energy, electronics, in aircraft engine design and construction. Here and in several other fields they have at times surprised the rest of the world.

In my own work, I find it far safer to assume that in technical tasks the trained Seviet cities can do what we can do. And when we find certain areas in the field of science and development where we are really shead of them, we can put that down as a happy plus -- but we do not need to tell the Russians where this is.

The disturbing thing about the Soviet effort is that their scientific and productive schievements are almost exclusively directed toward developing engines of destruction for military purposes. We, on the other hand, devote the major share of our inventiveness and of our production to improving the

way of life of the ordinary human being by making better automobiles, refrigerators, television and the like. Here, the Soviet are quite prepared to let us
do the pioneering with the idea that they can always copy our products and then,
of course, claim the credit for the invention.

As we review Seviet achievement in the field of science and technology and the amphasis they are placing on getting their ablest young people into scientific work, we have no real basis for complemency or for assuming an air of superiority. If we do, we are in for a sad awakening. You may be surprised to hear that available statistics indicate that Soviet advanced educational institutions are now turning out more graduates in scientific fields than we are here in the Smited States.

If possibly Soviet progress in science and technology has been over discounted, on the other hand, there has been a tendency to minimise their problems in another field where normally one would expect them to be strong, namely, in the field of agriculture.

As we look at the map and see the great reaches of the Seviet orbit and further take into account that they can appropriate, at will, the product of the normally agricultural satellite states such as Poland, Rossania and Hungary,

we would naturally assume that food in the Soviet orbit should be the least of their worrise, except possibly in China which has personnial agricultural problems. Such is not the case. Teday, agriculture is an over all headache in the Communist World.

According to the Communists: own admissions, it appears that the only area in the field of agriculture where a real increase is to be noted is in "red tape."

The Central Committee of the Communist Party admits that bereaucratic practices in the handling of agricultural problems have developed to a point where main attention is "concentrated on compiling various directives, resolutions, letters, and so forth."

Even the Communist newspaper, "Fravda", complained that district farm offices were literally immedated with all kinds of paper. One regional executive complained that hours were meeded daily to read the government directives and the rest of the time was taken up with a series of unnecessary conferences.

The Soviet leaders have admitted quite frankly the serious nature of their agricultural problems.

Pirst -- the USSR is not richly endowed with agricultural resources. The land area where both elimate and soil are at all favorable for farming is small

relative to the pepulation, and most of it is in use. Hence, expansion of output requires more intensive cultivation.

Second -- in pursuit of industrialisation, Soviet economic policy has starved agriculture of capital and drained it of labor. This drain of labor has been largely make labor. On the Soviet farms today about 60 percent of the work is done by women. The balance of the workers are old men, war cripples, and children. You boys over 16 are seen on the farms.

Third -- the record of Soviet planning of agricultural production has been consistently unimpressive. Agricultural goals set by the Five Year Plans regularly proved excessive and stop-gap emergency measures generally failed to achieve the results demanded. The efficial reaction to these failures was to attain output plans by demanding greater shares of output from the farmers.

With farm incomes already low, these measures did much to increase the demoralization of the Soviet countryside.

The attempt to eliminate private property in the Soviet's productive wealth has not resulted in socialized property but in property in the hands of the dictatorship. As a result, the leading members of the Communist party central the sees of productive wealth, direct the process of impostment to suit themselves,

decide how large a part of the national income the masses will receive, and are in a position to see to it that their own economic welfare remains at a level satisfactory to them. The gulf between the incomes of the elite in the Soviet Union and the ordinary werkers is appalling.

If we feel that we here in the United States have our problems because of farm surpluses, we might well pender with some satisfaction the consequences of the Seviet agricultural system with a crippling bureaugracy and critical farm shortages. At least we need to have no misconception about the fruits of Communism in agriculture.

I would mention one further misconception about the Soviet world that I believe is shared by many. Here I am glad to report that the evidence indicates that any apprehensions are not well founded.

Many people seem discouraged at the fact that totalitarian has lasted so long in the Seviet Enion. They tell us that in a totalitarian state as new generations some along with no experience of the meaning of freedom, the yearning for it may just die away.

This idea is beend on the thought that the lave of liberty might some largely from enjoying the fruits of it or from observing the experience of one's

meighbor who lived in liberty. There seemed to be some reason to doubt whether there was here an inherent attribute of men and women apart from past experience, knowledge or upbringing.

Buring recent years in my present work I have had a good deal of experience, direct or indirect, with persons who have sought saylum in the West from the conditions of human slavery that exist behind the Iron Curtain. I have had contact with young people who have fled to free countries and who had never knewn any form of life except Communist tetalitarianism. Let somehow they have had a yearning for something better and had experienced a feeling of basic revolt against what they had been taught and against the manner of life they had been forced to live. The two young Pelish fliers who brought their planes to freedem not so long ago are good examples of this. They have taught the Seviet and the satellites that it is not safe to expose any of their peoples to the breath of freedem.

This has created a basic problem for the Soviet in handling their military, their diplomatic and their security service personnel, some of whom must come in touch with the free world to earry out their official duties.

At least here is one misconception about the Communist world of which we

can all disabuse our minds: If we press forward with a wigorous defense of the liberties for which this country and the free world stand, we have no need to fear that we are in a losing race against the totalitarian way of life.

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9 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Fred Blumenthal. PARADE Magazine, followed up today his request of several months ago that they give you the cover and you write a brief statement for them. I told him that I had brought the matter to your attention and I thought he had an idea there, but that we must still keep it on the ice because you were unable to discuss it and told me that we would look into the matter again in March.

He stated that he would call me or I would call him on your final decision, and again urged me to try to get you to do it, stating that his wife had worked with Vandenberg, Hillenkoetter, and Smith, and they were in agreement that such a picture and article would be very useful in humanizing CIA to the American people.

He also stated that in an issue two weeks from now the cover will be John Foster Dulles, coming out about the time of the anniversary of his birth.

STANLEY J. GROGAN