

Hits Ike Admission of U-2 Order

Ex-Official C It Mistake in Policy

BY WALTER TROHAN
(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

Washington, July 26—Former President Eisenhower's decision to shoulder responsibility for the U-2 spy plane flight over Russia in May, 1960, was described today as one of the greatest diplomatic and political mistakes in American history.

This is the considered opinion of Andrew Berding, former assistant secretary of state for public affairs in the Eisenhower administration, in his book, "Foreign Affairs and You," published today by Doubleday & Co.

By way of contrast, Berding finds President Kennedy's assumption of the blame for the fiasco of the American sponsored invasion of Cuba admirable, altho it was a major disaster for the United States in world opinion.

Cites Russian Response

He said President Kennedy's "honest public recognition [of the disaster] smooths some of its sharper edges," adding that "humility by the mighty shines with double brightness."

Berding does not demonstrate that the U-2 responsibility was not Eisenhower's, but argues that he should not have assumed it personally because it gave Russian Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev an excuse for calling off the American President's projected return visit to Russia.

"Here, I believe, we had the greatest opportunity since the bolshevik revolution of 1917 to



Andrew Berding

get across to the soviet peoples a concept of American thinking and the American way of life," Berding said.

"Other Pretexts Possible"

"For one thing, we had the dynamic capacity of the President to project himself to crowds. Millions of Russians would have seen and heard him, would have been charmed by him, hundreds would have talked to him personally. Mr. Khrushchev could not have prevented great ovations by the soviet peoples."

Berding acknowledged that Khrushchev might have seized upon some other pretext to keep Eisenhower from going to Russia and making speeches in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, as was planned. He doubts that even Khrushchev would have dared the unfavorable world reaction that would have followed cancellation on a slight pretext.

As it was, the torpedoing of the Paris summit conference and the cancellation of his Russian visit was, in Berding's opinion, "a personal tragedy" for Eisenhower—a man of war who was at heart a man of peace which "threw a dark shadow over the remaining months of his administration."

Doesn't Lay Blame

Berding does not fix responsibility for the Presidential decision other than to say it was a combination of White House and state department viewpoints. He also acknowledges it was forced, in considerable part, by inept state department and other official statements after the U-2 was shot down over Russia.

"If that decision had not been made there would have been a summit conference, the President would have gone to the Soviet Union and on to Japan, receiving from millions of people a reverberant ovation as a man of peace," Berding said.

"The declining months of his administration would have wafted by in an aura of good

it might later be—and the United States high in the opinion of the world. In that political euphoria generated by President Eisenhower, the American people might well have called upon his principal lieutenant [Richard M. Nixon] to continue the trend."

Expects More Summits

Berding holds summit conferences are not the best methods of conducting foreign affairs, but believes they are here to stay and that they will become more frequent, rather than less, because of greater speed and comfort in travel. He also believes that diplomacy will become more and more personalized, with growing exchanges between chiefs of state and foreign ministers.

Berding defends the state department and its methods. He acknowledges that too many officials and government agencies—about 45—were involved in the formulation of American foreign policy. He details formulation of some policies, discussing the beneficial and the faulty.

Berding urged taking "the long, calm view" of foreign policy, and predicted that the struggle with the communist elite in Moscow and Peiping might last half a century.