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As requested, the Hanson Baldwin columns
on the Middle East, plus the only other one
which has appeared since his return.

STANLEY J. GROGAN

5 January 1957
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Egypt's New Army Found to Be Strong; With Morale High

By HANSON W. BALDWIN
Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Oct. 28—Egypt, storm center of the Middle East and kingpin of the Arab states, has created stronger and more up-to-date armed forces than at any time in her recent history.

The dependency of King Farouk's day, when Egypt and the other Arab countries suffered defeat and frustration in the war against Israel, has gone.

It is no longer true that the Egyptian officer's rank can be measured by his girth. Physical fitness is stressed. Morale in the armed services appears to be good. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's revolution has fostered in the armed forces a rebirth of nationalist patriotism and energy.

The Egyptian Army, Navy and Air Force are still suffering from technical indigestion in their attempts to assimilate quickly the large amounts of Soviet equipment sent to Egypt in the last fourteen months under terms of last year's Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal.

The country's tank force has expanded by 100 per cent. The Soviet-contributed elements of the Egyptian Navy are alone stronger than the entire fleet was a year ago. The Air Force

for the first time has, some relatively modern jet fighters and bombers.

Many Problems Created

Consequently, the Egyptians are facing huge problems in training, supply, maintenance, communications and command, and their armed forces are not yet capable of handling their new weapons at high effectiveness.

These are the principal conclusions drawn by this correspondent after what was probably the most extensive series of visits to Egyptian armed forces and installations permitted to any foreigner since Soviet arms started to be delivered to Egypt. Egyptian Army and National Guard units in the Gaza Strip and in the vicinity of Rafaah, El Arish, Abu Awadgila and Quslma in the Sinai region were inspected.

The correspondent was also permitted to land at Fayid Airfield and to witness Egyptian pilots flying MIG-15 jet fighters at Abu Suweir Airfield near Ismaia. The Egyptian Military Academy Armored School also was observed.

Photographs including pictures of Soviet equipment were permitted to be taken during the visits and were developed and censored by the Egyptian armed forces. The photographic censorship was fairly stringent, particularly of the Sinai pictures. But it must be remembered that Egypt still considers herself in a state of armed truce with Israel and her maximum strength has been mobilized and on the alert since the Suez Canal crisis began.

Intensive Training Seen

The visits revealed a hard and intensive training program by all elements of the Egyptian armed forces, particularly the Army, which is by far Egypt's most important service. They revealed elaborate defensive preparations and sizable concentrations opposite the Israeli border in Sinai.

The Egyptian forces are under the unified command of 38-year-old Maj. Gen. Abdel Hakim Amer, a close associate of President Nasser, who is both Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of all armed forces.

In normal times Egypt spends less than 30 per cent of her annual budget for the armed forces. General Amer said last week in an interview, but since the mobilization incident to the Suez crisis much more is being spent. He declined to disclose the exact strength of the armed forces, but put the grand total of the Egyptian Army, Navy, Air Force and the National Guard and the so-called Liberation Army at 500,000.

The part-time and lightly trained men of the National Guard and the Liberation Army represent by far the largest proportion of the 500,000. The regular forces, including all reserve units and National Guard units now serving on active duty, probably number between 120,000 and 150,000, but their size is increasing.

The estimated value at bargain rates of the arms furnished to Egypt by the Soviet bloc has now reached \$250,000,000 to \$300,000,000.

Reds' Ships Deliver Arms

About fifteen ships flying the flags of Communist countries discharged cargoes including arms in Egyptian ports in September. Some reports which the Egyptians deny, indicate these ships also brought personnel, possibly Communist technicians and advisers.

The first shipments received by Egypt were chiefly of weapons and combat equipment, including jet aircraft, tanks and guns. But the Egyptian forces, once quite deficient in transportation and supply items and communications equipment, also have had large numbers of Soviet trucks, armored personnel carriers, radios and other items for some months.

By nearly any yardstick, the original estimates of the dimensions of the arms deal appear to have been exceeded, and arms and equipment from Communist countries are still being delivered.

As a matter of fact, arms are both entering and leaving Egypt. The country is acting as a middleman or clearance house in arms traffic between the Communist countries and some Arab and African states. A shipment of Egyptian arms arrived in the Sudan about a week ago. It apparently included some old armored vehicles, which have been replaced in Egypt by Soviet medium tanks and other equipment.

Other countries receiving arms from Egypt include Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, possibly Yemen, and almost certainly the Arab nationalists who are fighting the French in Algeria.

EGYPTIAN FORCES TAXED BY GROWTH

Weapons' Diversity and Lack of Qualified Leaders Found Army's Main Problem

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

CAIRO, OCT 28—The Egyptian Army is by far the largest and most important of the country's armed services.

There are no official figures on its exact strength. It has a small but enthusiastic force of parachute troopers organized in companies and battalions. Except for the armored division, which uses the United States combat command system of organization, the Army's tactical organization generally follows British lines.

The problems of this new and expanding army are many.

Since the infantry of the Egyptian Army in the past has been deficient, Maj. Gen. Abdel Hakim Amer, Commander in Chief of the armed services, has emphasized infantry training.

It has been and still is difficult for Egypt to produce enough officers and noncommissioned officers to command the new army. The duration of the course at the Egyptian Military Academy has been reduced from three years to eighteen months. Even so, there is a scarcity of well-trained junior officers.

Conscription for three years in the regular forces, followed by about seven years in the reserves, is theoretically universal, but actually highly selective.

Illiteracy Rate High

Disease is so rampant and the illiteracy rate so high in Egypt that it is difficult to obtain enough recruits who are physically and psychologically fit. Even selective recruiting cannot eliminate illiteracy. The illiteracy rate was about 70 per cent among enlisted men in one division observed by this correspondent during an extensive series of visits to Egyptian armed forces and installations.

Diversity of equipment and arms is another major problem, particularly from the maintenance point of view. This correspondent saw or was told about the following varieties:

Italian automatic pistols; Belgian submachine guns and rocket launchers; Belgian Soviet and Egyptian 7.92-mm. rifles; Soviet self-propelled 100-mm. guns; British self-propelled 17-pounders; Soviet, British, French and United States tanks; Soviet anti-tank guns; Swiss anti-aircraft guns; Spanish light machine guns; Soviet, British and French

field artillery; United States jeeps and trucks; Soviet trucks, and British and Soviet personnel carriers.

The difficulties of ammunition supply and repair for so many diverse calibers and types of arms and equipment are obvious. In fact, one of the weak points of the Egyptian Army is its technical services, particularly communications and transport. Command seems to be somewhat rigidly over-centralized at the top and the Army does not yet appear to have the command and staff experience and technical and supply services adequate to enable it to fight a mobile war for other than a very brief period.

Jet Planes Unfamiliar

The Egyptians do not appear as yet to have fully mastered their new jet fighters and bombers.

An unknown number of MIG-17 jet fighters apparently have been sold to Egypt by the Soviet Union or its satellites.

These planes are considerably faster and more maneuverable than the earlier MIG-15, which has been in Egypt in some quantities during the last year.

There have been several reports that MIG-17's were included in last year's Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms agreement, but no official confirmation has been possible. During his inspections of Egyptian military installations, this correspondent heard several references to the MIG-17, including one outright assertion by a competent source that Egypt had received some of these new jets. However, the reports were impossible to verify and only MIG-15's were observed.

Israelis Getting F-86's

The MIG-17 has five degrees more wing sweepback than the MIG-15, and is probably much superior to the Israelis' French Mystère fighter. It is probably maneuverable at high altitudes, though less effective at low altitudes than the Canadian version of the United States F-86 Sabre jet that the Israelis are now procuring.

Despite its new jet planes, the Egyptian Air Force does not seem to be in as good shape as the Army. Its radar is none too good and it faces great difficulties in training technicians and pilots.

The jet aircraft, several modern naval vessels and sizable amounts of army equipment included in a long list of weapons and equipment still being furnished to Egypt by the Soviet Union are of considerable collective importance in the balance of power in the Middle East.

Of the naval vessels, the most important are two destroyers and several submarines. The destroyers are modern ships of the formidable Soviet Skory class. They steamed into Alexandria harbor several months ago flying the Polish flag, but are now manned by Egyptian crews.

The Navy has had a rebirth under President Gamal Abdel Nasser's revolutionary movement. Like the Air Force, it consists mostly of volunteers. It has two British Zambesi-class destroyers as well as the Soviet vessel Rear Admiral Soliman. Egypt's Navy Chief of Staff would like a small land-based Naval Air Force and a small marine force.

NEW YORK TIMES

NOV 1 1950

CYPRUS DESCRIBES RAIDING IN EGYPT

British Canberra Jet Pilot
Tells of the Attack

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Oct. 31—After a day of ominous silence in Cyprus, the first communiqué of what a headquarters spokesman called "a war" was made public at 6.30, local time, tonight. [11:30 A. M., Wednesday, New York time].

"An offensive by bomber aircraft under Allied Command is at this moment being launched against military targets in Egypt," it used, the planes were British Canberra jet medium bombers based on Cyprus.

The "Allied Command" referred to is a special British-French Command established in Cyprus to direct the Egyptian operations it is not to be confused with the British Middle East land and air commands that have their headquarters in Cyprus.

Gen. Sir Charles Keightley is British Army Commander in Chief, Middle East, and Air Marshal H. L. Patch is Commander in Chief, Middle East, air force. After the brief communiqué had

been issued correspondents here who are now under full wartime restrictions were taken to an airfield in Cyprus where they watched Canberras landing and taking off. The fast jet medium bombers with their crews of three made the flight from Cyprus to the nearest Egyptian points in about thirty minutes.

Newsmen were permitted to interview, under the careful restrictions of security officers, one crew that had just returned from bombing an Egyptian airfield.

Flight Lieut. John Slater, a 34-year-old World War II veteran from Lincolnshire, the pilot, acted as spokesman. He said his ship was over his target, an Egyptian airfield east of the Nile Delta, at 6:05:30 P. M. when it was fully dark.

His plane was first to bomb this target. The lights of Cairo and other towns near by were on, he said, as his plane made its approach, but "they turned them off quick" after the bombs started to fall.

Lieutenant Slater said he encountered only "light flak" that he defined as anti-aircraft fire effective to an altitude of about 8,000 feet.

Ground Fire 'Off'

Lieutenant Slater was not permitted to state the altitude of his bomb run, but one of his remarks indicated he was not flying above the range of the Egyptians' anti-aircraft guns.

However, the ground fire was "wild in direction; it was way off," he said.

Lieutenant Slater said he dropped his bombs on the airfield assigned as his target with "good" results. Egyptian aircraft were parked on the field, he stated, but he was not permitted to tell the press whether these had been destroyed, Lieutenant Slater said. He had been instructed to avoid bombing inhabited areas.

When reporters left the airfield after 9 P. M., Canberras were still landing and taking off, an indication that the air offensive was continuing.

Targets for such an offensive presumably would be Egyptian airfields where jet aircraft were stationed. There are only about six or eight of these.

ALLIED PILOTS WIN SUEZ AIR CONTROL

Second British-French Aim,
International Canal Rule,
Is Still in Doubt

By HANSON BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Nov. 1

Today's communiqués by the Allied (British-French) forces and a statement by the Allied Commander in Chief indicated that the purposes of the air attacks on Egypt were twofold.

One purpose was military—complete elimination of the Egyptian Air Force. The second was political: to force the Egyptians to agree, in the words of Gen. Sir Charles Keightley, Allied chief, to "temporary international control of the canal area."

The day's results indicated that the first objective was being rapidly achieved. If the Egyptian Air Force was ever a serious military factor prior to last night's attacks, its remnants were certainly of little importance by sundown tonight.

Medium-level night attacks by Canberra bombers based on Cyprus were followed today by low-level attacks by French and British planes based on carriers off the Egyptian coast.

No Allied Planes Lost

Today's raids were by carrier-based aircraft. Canberras joined in again in daylight attacks. Almaza and Inchass airfields near Cairo and Abu Suweir and Kabrit in the canal zone, which were attacked last night, were bombed again today in follow-up raids and five other fields were attacked.

When Allied communiqué No. 4 was issued at 4:30 P. M. not a single Allied aircraft had been lost. Some ineffective interception attempts by Egyptian jet fighters were made and last night there was some "desultory" anti-aircraft fire from light guns.

The raids were directed against airfields, not against cities, an Allied spokesman emphasized. The Egyptian reports that Cairo was bombed last night were denied here. Almaza, one of the fields bombed, is on the outskirts of Cairo, near Heliopolis. Part of its periphery is bounded by a built-up area that includes several Government buildings and military structures.

Spokesmen insist that only the airfields were targets. The results were said to be good in "effectiveness and accuracy." Thus, it seems clear that the first objective of the Allied forces in what so far has been a one-sided battle is being accomplished and that virtual air domination has been won.

But the second objective, forcing the Egyptians to agree to temporary international control of the canal, is still uncertain. An Egyptian attempt to block the canal and the reactions of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, as monitored here, indicate continued determination to resist.

The Lake Timsah blockship was an old LST that had been ready for this purpose for some time. It was anchored off Ismailia outside the buoyed canal channel, which runs through Lake Timsah.

Naval airmen reported it was being towed into a position to block the channel. After two attacks it was sunk. A communiqué stated: "It is believed clear of the channel outside the directional buoys."

Other Blockships Ready

The Egyptians are believed to have other blockships ready at the Suez and Port Said ends of the canal. Moreover, they could blow up the railroad bridge across the canal at Qantara. If they did this, however, they would isolate their forces fighting the Israelis in the Sinai Peninsula.

General Keightley today explained his mission briefly to newspaper correspondents, but permitted no questions that he felt "would be inappropriate at this early stage of the operations."

He declared that "my task as Commander in Chief is, as Sir Anthony Eden has stated in Parliament, to secure compliance with the demands of the Allied Governments for the safety of the Suez Canal." The general added that his aim was "to achieve my military object with the minimum casualties to civilian life and property and indeed the minimum casualties to the Egyptian nation, both civilian and military."

"We have of course at our disposal strength to deal very severe blows, but I hope it will not be necessary," he continued. "It also seems to me that it must be to Egypt's interest to have the threat of war removed as quickly as possible so that shipping stopped by the Egyptian-Israeli war can be started again."

The Commander in Chief introduced Admiral Pierre Barjot, deputy commander of the newly formed Allied forces. General Keightley said Admiral Barjot "arrived yesterday from his command of the French Fleet at Toulon."

Port Said Is Quiet Under Truce; British-French Build-Up Goes On

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

PORT SAID, Egypt, Nov. 8 — This crossroads city, battered and scarred from its two days of war, was quiet today as all military operations marked time.

The unofficial but tacit truce that started at 2 A. M. yesterday was continuing, broken only by intermittent sniper fire, clean-up operations in Port Said, detonations from burning ammunition stores and one brief patrol clash on the Suez Canal road.

The British-French troop build-up in Port Said went on. But the spearhead on the canal road was still halted at Kilometer 38, a point about twenty-four miles south of here. This point is three miles north of Qantara and about twenty miles north of Ismailia.

No attempt was being made to push southward, even though a small Egyptian build-up in the Bund area north of Qantara had been reported.

The parachute regiment is on the canal road north of Qantara. Israeli forces have been reported on the east bank of the canal, but French troops assigned to the parachute command are expected to cover this flank.

Egyptian forces opposite the parachute command on the 100-yard front are estimated at about one company in strength, supported by few tanks.

Meanwhile, British-French patrols here with tanks probed through rubble, some of it ten to fifteen feet high in the old part of town.

With both Port Said and Port Fuad, on the east bank of the canal, firmly under British-French control yesterday, shopkeepers opened again, and Arabs in their robe-like galabias again roamed the streets.

No complete count of casualties was available. But, it was thought, there were perhaps 1,000 Egyptian military and civilian casualties, with fifteen British dead and eighty-five wounded.

Buildings along the waterfront and in the old Arab quarter of Port Said were pocked with shell, mortar or rocket fire, and the wreckage of some structures was being slowly consumed yesterday by flames. A thick pall of smoke from burning oil tanks hung over the city, and debris and shattered glass littered streets.

Helicopters Evacuate Wounded

British-French LST's (Landing Ships, Tanks) and troopships were moored to buoys in the outer harbor or were nosed up to jetties. The British carrier Theseus and French hospital ship Marseillaise were also moored in the outer harbor.

Helicopters, which ferried Royal Marine commandos from ship to shore Tuesday, were landing yesterday just behind the statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal, to evacuate the wounded.

But de Lesseps' outstretched hand pointed no longer to the clear cleft between the continents but to a harbor cluttered with at least five scuttled ships. These are the dredger Peluse, the Paul Solente, said to be the largest dredger in the world, an old LST, a tug bottom up and another wreck.

The cork was firmly in the Mediterranean end of the Suez bottle, and there were other wrecks at Suez, at the southern end, and near Ismailia, in the center. There were no official estimates of the length of time required to clear the canal. Official judgments here varied from two weeks to many months.

The Casino Palace Hotel, long a waterfront landmark of Port Said and architecturally a structure straight out of the Victorian age, was being used as advanced surgical center.

There were shell holes in its roof and walls, and its famous veranda, where many generations of British officers have sipped their pink gins, was littered with glass, debris, broken palm fronds.

The British-French operation against Egypt, which started for this correspondent at Limassol, Cyprus, early Sunday, involved convoys from Cyprus, Malta and direct from England.

The number of troops has not been officially announced, but ground forces alone probably number between 78,000 and 100,000 British and French.

All forces are under the joint British-French command headed by Gen. Sir Charles Keightley. The task force for land, sea and air are headed by British officers with French deputies.

The principal naval units include the French battleship Jean Bart and cruiser Georges Leygues, the British carriers Ocean and Theseus and many destroyers, minesweepers and landing craft.

Land units include the French Tenth Parachute Division, the British Sixteenth Independent Parachute Brigade, the Royal Marine Commando Brigade and Third Division.

Convoys Left Cyprus Sunday

The convoys, which consisted of many kinds of ships hastily assembled—British troopships, coastal vessels, LST's and liners left Cyprus Sunday night. Each ship was crammed with troops.

The British troopship Empire Ken, to which this writer was assigned, had about 1,200 troops aboard. She normally carries a maximum of about 900.

The whole operation was obviously closely influenced by political considerations. In fact, early Sunday morning Antony Head, British Minister of Defense flew out from London to Cyprus for a last-minute conference with General Keightley.

The original plan, which called for simultaneous airborne and seaborne landings in the Port Said-Port Fuad area about dawn Tuesday, was altered. Airborne assault units were sent in a day ahead of schedule, at dawn Monday.

Two French battalions were dropped, one Monday morning, the other in the afternoon, to seize bridges across the Basin de Raccordement, a small canal from the Suez Canal to Lake Menzala. These bridges control all railroad and road traffic south out of Port Said.

The French drop also was intended to seize the water filtration plant just south of the bridges and to prevent blockage of the water supply for Port Said's 100,000 inhabitants.

The British Third Parachute Regiment, equivalent in size to a United States battalion of about 750 men, dropped on the Port Said airfield at dawn Monday. Except for air support and air drops, these troops, commanded by Lieut. Col. Paul E. Crook, were on their own from dawn Monday to dawn Tuesday, when seaborne elements of the task forces started to come ashore.

Thus, against a first-rate army the British and French would have been taking a grave chance. But the Egyptians were not up to it. They put up a brisk fight, but the British-French parachute troops were never imperiled.

Convoys Merged at Sea

Meanwhile, convoys from Cyprus and Malta merged at sea, and well before dawn Tuesday about fifty transports and landing craft moved into shoal water off the northern end of the Suez Canal. They anchored well out as assault troops were ferried ashore.

The French were responsible for the Port Fuad side of the operation, the British for Port Said. Tough Royal Marine commandos with their green berets were ferried ashore in helicopters and in landing craft. They moved in with gunfire support from naval vessels and air support from planes.

Many of them landed on gently sloping Port Said beaches used as a summer resort by many Egyptians. Rows of somewhat dilapidated beach houses on

talifts line the beaches; behind them is modern Port Said, with new schools and apartment buildings, and in the rear the older Arab part of town.

Egyptian resistance to many observers seemed surprisingly heavy, although the battle for Port Said was in no way a major battle except in the size of allied forces used. There was a relatively small Egyptian Army contingent here, but some of them had mortars, light field guns and machine guns. They used them but not too effectively.

Regular Egyptian Army units were strengthened by the irregular forces of the Egyptian National Liberation Army, many of them without uniforms. Street fighting was quite brisk Tuesday morning. It was continuing in late afternoon as the Empire Ken moved in from her anchorage offshore, where she had dropped anchor Tuesday morning with other ships in the convoy.

Troopships and landing ships moved in to harbor as far as possible before they were stopped by blockships, which had been sunk just off the United States Consulate.

The Empire Ken moored to buoys off the de Lesseps jetty near the Casino Palace Hotel.

As the sun went down some British units were still having tough little localized battles. A thundering burst of mortar fire, intermittent chatter from Bren guns, the occasional crack of a sniper's rifle, the deeper voice of field or tank guns plus the clatter of tank tracks blended in a cacophony of war.

Rocket Attack Asked

Just before sunset, British troops called for a rocketed strike against a target near Navy House on the canal. Fleet air arm fighters loosed their rockets with a whooshing roar and followed up with strafing.

As the sun set through a pall of smoke, Port Said looked as if it were dying. There was sporadic firing during the night. But yesterday, except for brief flurries, the town was quiet. This was possibly caused in part by the tacit cease-fire, which seemed to be unofficial but on an "if-you-don't-fire-at-us-we-won't-fire-at-you" basis.

One of the first sights this correspondent saw when the troopship Empire Ken pulled into berth Tuesday was the United States flag flying over the United States Consulate on Soltan Hussein Street on the waterfront. Consul Anthony Cuomo and his staff of four, plus the seven or eight other Americans who had sought shelter in the Consulate, were all uninjured.

The Consul acted as a transmitting agency for administrative messages dealing with water and the like between the Egyptians and British Tuesday and yesterday.


A total of fifteen or sixteen ships, including the loaded Soviet oil tanker Poti, have been trapped in the Suez Canal since Oct. 31, when the Egyptians started to scuttle ships at both ends and in the middle.

photos
OVER

Battered Port Said as the British Reoccupied It



Fires started by Anglo-French attack on Suez Canal's northern terminus still smolder



CEASE-FIRE AREA: Comparative quiet returned to the Port Said region (1). British forces halted an advance southward along the Suez Canal just north of Kantara (2).

NOV 13 1950

PORT SAID FACING VARIED PROBLEMS

Drinking Water, Electricity
and Municipal Labor Are
the City's Chief Needs

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

PORT SAID, Egypt, Nov. 12 — Water, electricity and a labor force were Port Said's principal problems today a week after the British assault.

The level of the Sweet Water Canal, which branches off the Nile at Cairo and supplies the whole Suez Canal zone with its only source of fresh water, has dropped at the Port Said end since British and French paratroopers landed from the skies.

Col. George Evans, British civil affairs officer for Port Said, said yesterday it was "quite possible the Egyptians may be blocking it."

On the other hand, he said, there might be a number of other reasons for the fall in the water level. Egyptian fellahs (peasants) may have taken advantage of the confusion of war to draw off more water than normal to irrigate their fields. War damage may have partly blocked the canal.

Canal Bank Caved In

This correspondent has seen a partly caved-in bank of the Sweet Water Canal between here and El Cap, the forward British position on the Ismailia road, and has noted various obstructions in the canal. Broken mains may also account in part for the reduction of water pressure.

In any case, Port Said still has water rationing. The water is turned off completely for many hours during the day. This is done partly to avoid overloading the city's damaged sewage system. Water rationing may become more severe if the level of the Sweet Water Canal continues to fall.

But even if the source of fresh water should dry up altogether, the British and French are prepared to supply fresh water—perhaps two gallons daily—to all troops and inhabitants of the Port Said-Port Fuad area from maritime water tankers standing by off the harbor.

The civilian population of the two cities prior to the Allied assault was 250,000. How many have fled is unknown, but the population is smaller today perhaps by 5,000 to 20,000.

Electricity Is Scarce

In addition to the water problem, electricity is still troublesome. Much of the city, including the principal Egyptian hospital, is still without light and a curfew still is in effect. Yesterday Egyptian laborers began

work on broken power and telephone lines, but so far not all the municipal employes have returned to their jobs.

This slowness may be due partly to fear. Egyptian underground and terroristic methods were used against Egyptians who worked with or cooperated with the British during the later years of the British occupation of the Canal Zone. These methods may have been revived.

The British believe underground cells were left behind when Port Said was conquered. They said they expected an effort would be made to intimidate Egyptian workers. One Egyptian who had returned to work was murdered two nights ago, though it is impossible to say whether the murder was the result of political terrorism or a personal vendetta.

Other cases of threats have been reported and in some instances these may have been sufficient to cause Egyptians to leave their jobs. The Cairo radio is abetting this campaign with threats and inflammatory statements.

Nevertheless, the Majority of Egyptians appear to be eager to get back to work. The old Universal Suez Canal Company has re-established its headquarters here in the canal company building, which also is occupied by the British II Corps and Allied Force Headquarters. Some Egyptians were reported to be working for the old canal company; others were returning to work around the docks as stevedores.

City Not Typical of Nation

Port Said always has been more of an international port than a typical Egyptian city; it differs markedly from the Nile delta villages. Therefore the attitudes here may not reflect the attitudes of other Egyptians.

However, it already is clear that there is likely to be a strong undercurrent of hostility and resistance beneath the surface docility. The mud villages along the canal between here and the British forward position near El Cap are almost completely deserted.

An interesting fact is the attitude of eighty-three Egyptian military prisoners of war who are held here by the British. They are "not talking." The prisoners, who include a brigadier and two colonels, are abiding rigidly by the Geneva Convention. In reply to questions they have given the British only their names, ranks and serial numbers.

Cockpit of History

A Report Recalling Paths of Conquest That Cross Area U.N. Force Will Patrol

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times

PORT SAID, Egypt, Nov. 15—The vanguard of a United Nations police force flew today into an area which has known little peace for 3,000 years.

A small contingent of Danish and Norwegian soldiers wearing United Nations armbands were flown from Naples to Egypt. They were bound for Abu Suweir, a field built by the British years ago and bombed by them during the assault on Egypt. Not far away, at Tel el Kebir, lie the bodies of Britons killed in a half-forgotten battle of another century.

The United Nations police force is moving into this cockpit of history, a crossroads of empire where clashing civilizations for centuries past have struggled for dominance. The protagonists are different, but the scene is much the same and the struggle of man against man, idea against idea, nation against nation, continues.

This is the first cold reality the United Nations must face. The events of the last two weeks have solved none of the basic political problems of the Middle East. A battle has been halted—arrested in mid-course—but nothing has been fundamentally changed, only hatreds have been exacerbated. The United Nations police force moves into an area seething with struggle.

Tremendous Task Seen

As seen from Port Said, where the Union Jack of Britain and the Tricolor of France fly over about a third of the Suez Canal, the force faces a tremendous task. Lieut. Gen. Sir Hugh Stockwell, British-French task force commander here, has received virtually no official information about the objectives, composition or intentions of the United Nations force.

The field receiving the first contingents is on the Ismailia-Cairo road about twenty-eight airline miles southwest of British advanced position near El Cap.

Thus the United Nations force is entirely behind Egyptian lines so far, not between allied and Egyptian forces. There are United Nations liaison officers here at General Stockwell's headquarters, but virtually no communications and few directives.

The first question that concerns the allies is the objectives of the United Nations force. Is it to provide an international guard for the entire Suez Canal? Is it also to patrol the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian-Israeli frontier? Will it actually take over control of Port Said from the British and French troops now here? Who will be responsible for clearance of the Suez

Canal? And—the key question—who will operate it once it is cleared?

The answers to these questions should determine the size, strength and composition of the international force. But the fear here is that the force will be given responsibility without power, that this region will have the form of United Nations supervision but not the substance.

Strength Held Inadequate

The strength figures of the force that have been publicly discussed—2,500 to 5,000 men—are viewed here as ridiculous if real military control of the canal and of the Egyptian-Israeli frontier is the objective. A force of such a size would be outnumbered by the Egyptian Army alone by perhaps twenty to one.

When the British occupied the entire canal zone, they were forced to maintain here an army about 80,000 strong yet they were faced not with actual war, as is the case today, but only with terrorist, underground and sabotage activities.

A minimum of four regimental combat teams—about 20,000 to 25,000 men—in the canal zone and strong mobile forces in Sinai would be essential to provide real security for this area. If the United Nations force

limits its activities to Ismailia and expects the British and French to move out of the Port Said area, there will be all sorts of complications.

For the British believe actual military supervision on the spot will be necessary not only to provide security for the more than 100 miles of the Suez Canal but also to prevent reprisals by Egypt against foreigners once the British troops move out.

Certainly there is no indication today that the allied task force is preparing to evacuate. Assault troops are being replaced, but more and more support units—engineers, quartermasters and so on—are coming ashore and allied forces are settling down for a lengthy stay.

Difficult Negotiations

Thus long and difficult negotiations are still ahead before any United Nations police force can be expected to be effective.

The longer the negotiations last, the longer it will take to clear the canal. The clearance operations, it is now generally conceded, will be a task measured in months.

No one, probably not even the Egyptians, knows exactly how many obstructions block the canal. But there are twenty wrecks here in Port Said alone.

In the last few days wire sweeps have dragged the canal bottom to a point about twenty-two miles south of the Port Said entrance.

These sweeping operations have revealed small wrecks sunk well below the surface at fairly frequent intervals. The number of blockships and obstructions sunk at Suez is not accurately known, but many additional ones not revealed by aerial photographs are probably there.

If the canal is to be cleared for shipping as quickly as possible, salvage and clearance work should start from both ends and from the middle—not just from the Port Said end. There is a limited amount of the special heavy lifting equipment, pontoons and salvage vessels needed for clearance work. Some of it should be starting around the Cape of Good Hope now if the canal is to be cleared for heavy ships in six months to a year.

Moreover, the longer the clearance is delayed and the present situation continues, the longer the opportunity for Egyptians to sink more ships and the greater the degree of silt. Most Suez Canal dredgers, which must work constantly to keep the channel clear of sand and Nile Delta silt, are scuttled. No dredging has been done, and none can be done until the canal is cleared and dredgers provided.

Finally, there is the unsettled question of who will operate the canal. If the Egyptians are barred from doing so, any international canal authority may have to import labor to replace Egyptians who may refuse to work for a foreign canal authority.

The Egyptians, apparently expect to continue operating the canal. Even since the British-French assault on Port Said some foreign canal pilots have been paid even though they are idle.

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CLEARING SUEZ CANAL IS A FORMIDABLE TASK

It May Take Six Months to a Year After Political Terms Are Settled

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

PORT SAID, Egypt, Nov. 17—Skin divers were busy in Port Said harbor this week and salvage fleets were approaching the Suez Canal from both north and south as the immense task of clearing one of the world's most important waterways started.

But the task of clearance, which may require a minimum of six months, perhaps one year, had scarcely started. And it could not begin with full vigor until:

(1) The political-military situation had been clarified and free access for the length of canal was possible;

(2) A decision had been made as to just what nation or organization would supervise the work.

The present situation here is almost unprecedented. The British Union Jack and French Tricolor fly over the northern, twenty-four miles of the Suez Canal. The Egyptians control the rest.

The British-French military position is one of the strangest. All their great effort from Britain, France, North Africa, Malta and Cyprus focusses to a platoon front 300 to 400 yards wide at Kilometer 38, a few miles south of the Suez Canal station at El Kap. There, on the only firm ground in the region, the Royal West Kents face 500 to 600 yards away the position of about one battalion of Egyptians.

Stopped Tight

The big ditch is stopped up tight, with scuttled ships, cranes, barges, dredges, pontoons and miscellaneous craft at both ends and along much of its length. Cairo ordered the scuttling of the ships in the canal after the British-French bombing of Egypt started, at least at the Port Said end, Oct. 31.

Clearance officials have said the blockage job was not very skillfully done, but it is clear the Egyptians did far more extensive scuttling than had been expected, and the officials' cautious estimates of the time required to clear the wrecks have been described as only as a "longish time" or in "months." From what this correspondent has seen at the Port Said end,

he believes the clearance task will require six months to a year, depending upon the time required for a solution to political



problems, the forces used and other now unknown factors.

A big barrier of about twenty blockships sunk in an area of about one and a half miles from the Central Mole to Abba Himm Basin—thirteen visible above the surface and seven completely submerged—completely blocks the canal and two-thirds of the Port Said Harbor to ships above seventeen-foot draft. A seventeen-foot to 100-foot-wide channel around the wrecks into the inner harbor has been charted, buoyed and LST-type vessels have negotiated this somewhat tortuous passage.

Clear Passage

From Port Said to the British position at Kilometer 38 there are no major obstructions. There have been reports, which could not be officially verified, that some small craft had been sunk in this stretch and would have to be removed to permit safe passage of deep-laden tankers, but there is certainly no major obstruction.

The railroad bridge at El Firiat has been blown up and lies

under water; a small sunken floating crane has been twisted away from the channel bank and partially lifted, and other preliminary work done. A fleet of twenty-five to thirty British or British-chartered vessels, including two 1,200-ton lifting craft and salvage pontoons, is en route here from bases at Malta.

Not too much is known here about the Suez end; a positive count indicates three vessels—one old Egyptian frigate and two merchantmen—scuttled there. But there may be many more under water.

In addition to the huge physical task of raising or removing all these hulks, there is a major job of rehabilitation, repair, dredging and maintenance. The Egyptians' wrath seems to have been vented largely against the old Suez Canal Company, which President Gamal Abdel Nasser told this correspondent a few weeks ago was "a state within a state." Nearly all ships sunk in the canal were the property of the Suez Canal Company, which President Nasser nationalized and called the Egyptian Suez Canal Administration.

The company had twelve dredgers. Some of them were constantly working while others underwent maintenance. Between them they scooped up 3,000,000 cubic meters of silt each year to keep the Suez Canal open and the channel at a constant depth.

Sabotaged Equipment

The silting problem, particularly on the Mediterranean end, where the Nile deposits great quantities of sand and mud, is a major one, and it becomes worse during the sandstorm season starting in February. Hence the maintenance problem is great. Yet all twelve dredgers have been scuttled; three privately owned ones here, still in good shape, had been used by private contractors to improve the canal. They are idle now and their crews have been evacuated.

Moreover, the canal company shops at Port Fuad, essential to maintenance of much of the canal equipment, were sabotaged; the machines will require spare parts and rebuilding.

Despite these gloomy facts, all salvage officers here say they are "optimistic" that the canal is not hopelessly blocked and that clearance is not a "ghastly" undertaking. Five British salvage vessels are in Port Said now, the wrecks have been buoyed, surveyed and examined

under water; a small sunken floating crane has been twisted away from the channel bank and partially lifted, and other preliminary work done.

A fleet of twenty-five to thirty British or British-chartered vessels, including two 1,200-ton lifting craft and salvage pontoons, is en route here from bases at Malta.

The Salvage Plans

The organization for the salvage and clearance is also uncertain. The actual work here in Port Said is being directed by naval force commander.

However, there is another salvage and clearance organization that so far has been inoperative, except for general planning and some surveys. This organization, which is supposed to be responsible for clearing the whole canal, is under French Rear Admiral Jean Champion, who has a British naval captain as his deputy. Both organizations utilize the officials, books and records of the old Suez Canal Company to aid them.

There is a possibility that the United Nations may assume direction of the entire salvage effort. Apparently Dutch and other concerns have been approached tentatively through the United Nations, but nothing positive is known here. If the United Nations assumes the task, possibly some of the ships now under the British Admiralty might be absorbed in the new organization.

It is clear that many of the world's specialized salvage and lifting vessels will be required for the Suez job, regardless of nationalities. It is also clear that the speed with which the work is done will depend primarily upon a solution of the present political and military situation, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the final clearance organization. At the moment, as seen from here, both seem to depend upon the United Nations.

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PORT SAID FACING MILITARY CONTROL

Allies Drafting a Modified
Form to Enable Stores
to Reopen Safely

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

PORT SAID, Egypt, Nov. 18—

A proclamation that would provide a "modified form of military control" for the Port Said-Port Fuad area was being formulated today by British and French authorities.

Col. George Evans, British civil affairs officer here, described the pending measure as "only that amount of military control of the town's government required to insure security of the armed forces."

He said Lieut. Gen. Sir Hugh Stockwell, allied commander here, had asked the allied commander in chief in Cyprus for further powers than he now possessed. This, he said, was a result of greater difficulties in obtaining Egyptian cooperation than had been expected.

He said a campaign of intimidation continued and the few shops in the area had reopened. He added, however, that he had been unable to obtain any confirmation of reports of murders or physical assaults; threats to shopkeepers by undetermined individuals had apparently sufficed.

Another obstacle in restoring Port Said to some semblance of

normalcy has been an Egyptian military regulation, issued a few weeks prior to the British-French invasion, warning that no one must have any dealing with the British or French. The British believe a proclamation providing punishment for intimidation would encourage shopkeepers to reopen and laborers to return to their jobs.

Meanwhile, Port Said held Christian church services in many places today. Water was more strictly rationed than yesterday, but this was not because of any serious drop in the level of the Sweetwater Canal.

Small Break in Canal

The break in the canal bank made by the Egyptians south of El Cap was minor and the level of the canal that is the sole fresh water supply to this area dropped only slightly. The filtration beds and tanks, however, have been unable to keep up with the full demand of Port Said since the assault because of broken water mains and other damage. The rationing will give the supply a chance to catch up with the demand. It is expected that by Wednesday the storage tanks will be full again. In the meantime the water situation is not serious.

TERRORISTS SPUR CYPRUS CAMPAIGN

November Murder Toll Hits
Peak—No End of Fight Seen
Despite British Claims

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Nov. 22—The fighting in Egypt has been stilled by a cease-fire, but on this embattled island bombs were still being deactivated, guns were still being fired and men were still stalking other men.

One town, Limassol, was gripped in a partial general strike in protest against the strict curfew and the imposition by the British of a collective fine of £35,000 [\$72,800].

British security guards and patrols were vigilant at all major military and civil installations. Military vehicles moved through the streets, with soldiers with rifles or Sten guns at the ready, and with truck tailboards lowered so that any tossed bomb could be kicked out.

November has produced the worst compilation of fatal statistics since the National Organization of Cypriote Fighters, otherwise known as E. O. K. A., began its campaign of murder and intimidation on April 1, 1955. So far twenty-two Britons, military and civilian, have been

murdered this month and fourteen Greek civilians and one Turk have died violently.

Since April 1 1955 to last Tuesday morning, 202 persons have been deliberately killed and 441 wounded in the struggle between the Cypriote underground and the British.

Twelve other persons have been killed and sixty-six wounded accidentally when exploding bombs or mines, or wildly fired shots, took toll of innocent bystanders.

No End in Sight

The British have suffered far more casualties in the battle for Cyprus than in the battle for Port Said and no quick end of terrorism appears to be in sight.

Yet both the Governor, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, who has universal respect even from his underground enemies, and his Chief of Staff in the war against E. O. K. A., Brig. George Baker, profess optimism. They say that the strength of E. O. K. A.'s "hard core" is gradually being worn down and that the flow of information to the British is continuing despite a recent increase in murders.

Terrorism has increased in diversity, in ruthlessness and in technical ingenuity, yet these very facts are interpreted by the British leaders as signs of desperation on the part of E. O. K. A.

Murder is no longer so selective, the British say. The terrorists now appear to be killing any Briton it can merely because he is British and Greek Cypriotes are assassinated whether or not they have been British informers

but solely because promiscuous murder spreads fear.

There are believed to be two, and possibly three, major reasons for the recent increase in terrorist activities. The first was British preoccupation with the Egyptian operations.

The second reason for the recent increase in incidents is clearly the imminence of debate on the Cyprus issue in the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The E. O. K. A. leadership pays close attention to political considerations and it has obviously stepped up the tempo of its underground campaign at this time to impress the General Assembly.

Shift Seen in Leadership

A third reason for increase in murders and less selectivity in the choice of victims may be some shift of power in E. O. K. A.'s leadership. Col. George Grivas, known as Dighe-nis or "the leader," has headed E. O. K. A. since its inception. He has exercised strong, centralized control and stern discipline in the past and it is alleged that he, personally, has selected E. O. K. A.'s murder victims.

There have been recent unverifiable reports that Colonel Grivas, who is 58 years old and has had several narrow escapes from British patrols, has been ill. Some rumors even suggest that he is dead. These are not accepted by the British authorities.

Nevertheless, there is a belief that Grivas either no longer is able to control E. O. K. A. with the same authority as in the past or that his mantle of lead-

ership is now shared by others. One of these who may now be exercising greater authority than in the past is Gregoris Afxentiou. Another, who is believed to supply many of the technical brains and who is an expert on explosives, is Georghiou Karademias, a Greek national and former Greek army officer.

Recent assassination patterns seem to indicate a far more indiscriminate approach. A British doctor, who had devoted the better part of his life to Cypriotes and was completely divorced from the political picture here, was one of the November victims slain in his hospital.

A young British newspaperman was killed in the old walled town of Nicosia. A Greek taxicab driver, who had been to the police station four times to see about his license, was apparently murdered on suspicion.

The methods of killing have been at once familiar and new. An electrically detonated mine in a tree overhanging a road was exploded while an army vehicle was passing underneath. It killed one man. An army sergeant was shot in the back, the favorite method of the assassins, while walking down a Limassol street.

Bombs, mines, ambushes and shotgun blasts claimed other lives, some of them innocent Greek Cypriote civilians.

The British are answering these attacks with more and more stern measures. British troops, in search parties and patrols, have demonstrated on the whole and with some few exceptions remarkable restraint and discipline in the face of great provocation.

FURTHER FIGHTING IN EGYPT DOUBTED

On-the-Spot Study Reveals
Inaccuracies in Accounts
of Port Said Battle

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Nov. 24—

This island headquarters was still on the alert today, but informed observers believed the chances were 5 to 1 against a resumption of hostilities in Egypt.

Parachute troops that have returned here from the battle of Port Said have been rested and regrouped and are ready for action again. Airfields are still busy; harbors are crowded.

But for most part this is a period of what Americans call "Monday morning quarterbacking" or post mortems. It also is the time for some much-needed correctives.

Censorship and the "fog of war" have tended to create some unfounded impressions that may become history. This dispatch is an attempt to record some facts that apparently have been unrecorded and to put in perspective other events.

First and most important for the record: This correspondent believes there is indubitable evidence of close French-Israeli political and military cooperation prior to and during the Egyptian operations. Reports have persisted in this island that Israeli liaison officers were assigned here prior to the attack on Egypt, and newsmen returning from Israel have reported seeing French pilots there and aircraft with French markings.

Keightley Denies Liaison

However, Gen. Sir Charles Keightley, British-French commander in chief, declared in an interview yesterday that "we had absolutely no liaison with the Israelis at any level in any way," adding, "that goes for the French, too."

He was told that observers here in Cyprus had reported seeing Israeli liaison officers. He reiterated that he was "quite certain there was no liaison with military forces at any level."

General Keightley said he was "quite sure aircraft with French markings were seen" in Israel as the French, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, had been delivering aircraft to Israel.

The best that can be said now of the reports is that there is little evidence to suggest that any direct French military assistance during the actual fighting played a really significant role in Israel's victories in the Sinai Peninsula.

Reports of French air drops to Israeli ground troops and of French air support for Israeli

forces must be placed in perspective against the background of the great technical, tactical and command superiority of the Israeli forces over those of Egypt. Part of this superiority, of course, was due to fact that the Egyptian forces had been thinned out and the strength on the Israeli border greatly reduced the fear of a British-French attack.

In any case there is very considerable evidence of much more extensive French military aid to Israel in the last few months prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Egypt than had been publicly known.

Another circumstance that has been but little reported was the role of the United States Sixth Fleet during the British-French assault on Egypt. The United States Sixth Fleet is the most powerful naval force in the Mediterranean. Its exact orders during the days of the crisis have not been disclosed except that Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, told all United States naval units all over the world to "take no guff from anybody."

There was considerable concern among the British forces about the whereabouts and intentions of the Sixth Fleet during the approach of British and French convoys to the Egyptian coast. This concern was often expressed lightly—but the jovial expression hid honest worry—for no one knew what Washington's policy was.

U. S. Warships in Area

Some of the concern was about the United States submarines. It was thought they might cruise submerged to observe the British-French convoys and might be mistaken for Soviet submarines or for submarines scheduled to be delivered to Egypt by Poland. Actually, the United States submarines cruised on the surface; there was no need for this concern.

However, elements of the Sixth Fleet were between the approaching British convoys and the Egyptian coast. At the time of the evacuation of United States Navy citizens from Alexandria and elsewhere, so some of its ships were disposed squarely across the routes from Cyprus and Malta to Egypt.

In one instance a United States aircraft carrier actually penetrated a small destroyer of the British planes were screened around the British carrier, and both ships were launching planes at the same time. There were exchanges of messages. The texts of which probably will long be buried in Navy signal logs.

Two unfounded impressions have been propagated about the scuttled ships that now block-drowned when attempting to the Suez Canal. The Cairo radio world that British bombers sank these ships. This is, of course, false.

Fleet air arm fighter bombers did attack old Egyptian L. S. T. 110 (landing ship tanks) Akka loaded with concrete while she was being towed in Lake Timsah to

a blocking position. The objective of this attack was to prevent the blocking of the canal, not to block it. The attack damaged the Akka but subsequently she was towed into the canal channel south of Timsah and scuttled by the Egyptians.

All of the other fifty-odd blocks in the canal, including two destroyed bridges, were caused by the Egyptians. But all evidence available to this correspondent suggests that none of the ships was sunk or bridges destroyed after the cease-fire as some British reports have indicated.

Certainly all of the twenty ships scuttled at Port Said were sunk by the Egyptians after the British bombing started Oct. 31 and prior to the British-French assault on Port Said Nov. 4. The United States Consulate on waterfront watched ships being scuttled. The L. S. T. Akka was scuttled south of Lake Timsah Nov. 1.

Another unfounded impression concerns the actual fighting itself. The Egyptians said British Sixteenth Independent Parachute Brigade was "annihilated." Even Lt. Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Foreign Minister, appears to have told newsmen that shooting was still continuing in Port Said. Actually the town is quiet, though sullen, there has not been any shooting except a little sniping since Nov. 6.

'Annihilated' Unit Intact

This correspondent visited the Sixteenth Parachute Brigade headquarters this week here in Cyprus and was personally testifying that the brigade is intact, strong and ready for a frolic or a fray.

Actually the British losses were light and most were suffered by the Royal Marines who had some vigorous street fighting in Port Said and who also suffered losses from their own supporting fire. Final official figures for the British-French casualties in Port Said and Port Fuad area are thirty-two dead, one missing and 129 wounded. These figures include Army, Navy, Air Force and marine casualties for both the British and the French. French losses were ten dead, one missing and thirty-three wounded; the rest of the casualties were British.

Eight British aircraft and two French aircraft were lost. Five of the British planes were downed by the Egyptian. The best estimates of Egyptian casualties this correspondent has been able to obtain are somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 military and civilian killed and wounded plus an unknown number of civilian refugees.

The Cairo radio world that British bombers sank these ships. This is, of course, false. Egyptian estimates are far higher than this, but they are unreliable. British estimates of Egyptian casualties still total plus 400 military casualties.

General Keightley gave these figures again yesterday in an

ment was made as honestly and as accurately as we could make it; so far we cannot change it.

Thus the Port Said-Port Fuad battle was not a great battle and the success of the British assault was never in doubt. There was no fighting for Port Fuad and Port Said was firmly in British hands in two days.

On the other hand, the reverse side of this unfounded impression, which is now fashionable in some quarters, is that the Egyptians did not fight at all. The Egyptian will to resist cannot be compared with that of the Hungarians, Germans, Russians, British or others. If one-tenth of the persons who received arms in Port Said had used them, the British task would have been far more difficult.

Resistance Was Sporadic

Resistance was sporadic and some officers and men ran away or changed into civilian clothes and hid themselves in the teeming Arab quarter of Port Said.

But the Egyptian resistance has to be compared with the Egyptian past and by this standard the Egyptians fought much better than expected. Most British fighting men with whom this correspondent talked—especially the Royal Marine commandos and British parachute troops—praised the Egyptians' courage and said they had been surprised at the tenacity of the defense.

Any impression that the Egyptians were a "pushover" is untrue, as burned-out blocks of Port Said can witness. Lieut. Gen. Sir Hugh Stockwell, British-French commander in Port Said, declared that the Egyptians had fought "jolly well; they fought very toughly—a good deal tougher than we anticipated."

They were generally unskilled and did not know how to use effectively their supplies of modern arms.

Leaders Called 'Jolly Bad'

General Keightley put it in a slightly different way. He said: "The reason we smashed him as we did was not, because the Egyptian did not fight. The Egyptian soldiers fought jolly well. But their main direction of the war and, I expect, their leadership throughout was jolly bad."

NEW PHASE LOOMS IN CYPRUS HISTORY

Governor Harding's Visit to
London May Result in
Change in Basic Laws

By HANSON W. BALDWIN
Special to The New York Times.

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Nov. 26—The visit this week to London by Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Governor of Cyprus, may portend a new chapter in the island's bloody history.

Governor Harding is expected to discuss a new constitution that would give the Cypriotes limited self-determination. Conferences in London probably will determine future British tactics in presentation of the projected constitution to the Cypriotes.

There are several ways in which the constitution might be sponsored. Governor Harding might bring it back with him and offer it to the Cypriotes without preliminary negotiations. This is unlikely. Most observers here believe that if he did so it would be rejected or that no positive response will be forthcoming. A more likely course is a period of quiet British-Greek and British-Turkish negotiation. A way for this may already be in preparation.

The crown colony's population is about four-fifths Greek in origin and one-fifth Turkish. The majority resolutely opposes the majority's demand for union with Greece.

Makarios' Approval Needed

Observers here believe a new constitution stands little chance of final acceptance unless two conditions are fulfilled: A period of careful preparatory negotiations and explanations with Greece, Turkey and the Cypriotes must precede its presentation to the public; Archbishop Makarios must be brought from exile in

the Seychelles Island to London for discussion of the constitution.

There is no likelihood that Archbishop Makarios, religious and political leader of the Greek Cypriotes, will be brought back in the first phase of the discussions. It is more likely that fairly long negotiations will take place and that the Archbishop may be called in some months hence.

It may be difficult for the British to deal with the man they arrested and exiled and accused of complicity with the Cypriote right-wing terrorist organization, O. K. A. But the British may have no choice, for Archbishop Makarios in exile is probably more influential today than when he was physically here. Moreover, there is seemingly no one here who will step forward to take his place.

If Governor Harding's visit should be a turning point, it will be a development long hoped for here. This island is turning more and more into an armed camp and many persons have become wearier with abnormal living.

A considerable group of responsible Cypriotes probably would accept the British offer of limited freedom to determine their political future if they were free to express themselves. But they are inhibited by fear and by absence of the traditional leader, Archbishop Makarios.

Hence there has been a deadlock with only two signs of improvement. One is the weariness of so much sudden death in the small-scale war. The other is an unacknowledged but tacit change in emphasis, by E. O. K. A. and by Greece, from their former demands for union with Greece to full self-determination for Cyprus.

Meanwhile, the last few days show some slight improvement in the campaign of terrorism that has made November the worst month since E. D. K. A. started its campaign of murder and intimidation twenty months ago.

The Government has answered November's offensive by the Cy-

priote underground with harsh repressive measures in the last week. These measures, taken in sum, are so sweeping that Cyprus is living under what appears to be just short of martial law.

The curfew from dusk to dawn affects nearly all the people in every major town in the island. Sudden searches of persons and homes are commonplace. Sections of towns are cordoned off by barbed wire; every person in the closed-off area is questioned and searched and not allowed to leave until he has been stamped on the hand with an identifying mark. New police permits for private cars are necessary.

Governor Harding extended the mandatory death penalty last week for a variety of offenses, including manufacturing and carrying of arms or explosives and, in some circumstances, for consorting with armed persons. New restrictions on the freedom of the press also have been imposed in recent days.

Last week a British lieutenant colonel arbitrarily refused to allow Cypriote and British reporters to photograph Cypriotes being searched by British soldiers. The new press regulations already have elicited a protest to the Colonial Office in London.

Thus Governor Harding's mission to London has come at a crucial time. The feeling here is that any new chapter it may open could hardly be worse than the present one.

Harding Reaches London

Special to The New York Times.

LONDON, Nov. 26—Governor Harding arrived today by plane to discuss with the Colonial Secretary and other ministers proposals for a new constitution for Cyprus. In an interview he said the terrorists were losing ground.

Priest Ordered Detained

NICOSIA, Nov. 26 (Reuters)—A priest and five other inhabitants of a village in Cyprus have been ordered detained by British security forces.

A Confused Invasion

An Assessment of Mistakes of the British and French in Their Campaign in Egypt

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times.

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 9—The British-French campaign against Egypt is likely to become a famous case study in the world's military staff colleges.

In the six and a half days of actual hostilities, most of the rules in the book were broken. The vital military principle of the objective became obscured. At least two intelligence appraisals proved erroneous.

And at the very time when, despite these mistakes, the operation was on the verge of limited success, it was halted in mid-course by factors that had been insufficiently weighted: political pressure and world public opinion.

Planning for the Egyptian operation started soon after the Universal Suez Canal Company was nationalized by President Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt.

The physical objective should have been seizure and domination of the Suez Canal area by means that would have minimized canal damage and blockage. But what might have been a clear-cut military objective was immediately obscured by a broader objective, the British-French determination to get rid of President Nasser.

An Overriding Requirement

There was a long delay after Egypt seized control of the Suez Canal, because neither the British nor the French were prepared for military action in the Middle East. And as weeks passed and preparations were completed, one overriding requirement was imposed on the military commanders: Egyptian and British and French casualties must be minimized.

During the first part of the planning a ten-day bombing campaign against Egypt was considered as a means of achieving the elimination of President Nasser. The theory was that the Egyptians could not stand bombing and that an attack from the air alone would spark a revolt against the Egyptian President.

But immediately restrictions were placed on bombing, as obviously they would have had to be. No cities or civilians could be deliberately bombed; bombing must be selective even in the case of military targets. Eventually the ten-day bombing plan was discarded and the plan that was actually used, a compromise, was evolved.

The plan was supposed to have three phases. There would be a two-day bombing campaign in which Egyptian airfields and aircraft would be the primary

targets. This would be followed by an air campaign to interdict the ground battlefield at Port Said and to destroy as much as possible of the Egyptian armored and mobile ground forces.

Both of these phases were to be conducted without bombing civilians or cities. The second phase was to be accompanied by a psychological warfare campaign.

Cairo's Voice of the Arabs was bombed and for a time broadcasts to Egypt and the Arab world were reduced, while

the British intensified their broadcasts from Cyprus and dropped leaflets to the Egyptians, saying that President Nasser, not the Egyptians, was the enemy. Originally this phase was to continue for three and a half days more; actually, the parachute troops' landing was advanced a day and the second phase lasted two and a half days.

The third phase was to be the actual landing at Port Said if necessary. The British and French were all prepared for the landing but hoped strongly that President Nasser would be overthrown by the bombing alone.

The unhappy compromise of the final plan was based in part on two misconceptions. The strength of President Nasser and his hold on Egypt were underestimated. The strength of the Egyptian Air Force was overestimated.

The magic word MIG's seem to have influenced British French thinking. Egyptians had Soviet-built MIG-15 swept-wing jet fighters and IL-28 jet bombers. No airborne operations or amphibious landings were possible without prohibitive casualties if the enemy had jet aircraft, it was thought. So relatively long preparatory bombing was thought necessary.

Objective 'Fuzzed Up'

In the meantime, the objective had become "fuzzed up." The objective of overthrowing President Nasser, if possible by selective bombing and psychological warfare, with minimal casualties, clashed with the purely military objective of seizing the Suez Canal with as little damage as possible.

Then Prime Minister Eden added still a third objective—an ostensible one, at least—to separate the Israeli and Egyptian forces and push them back ten miles on either side of the canal until both had accepted a ceasefire. The multiple political, psychological and military objec-

tives became inextricably confused; the result was no clear-cut purpose or at least no objective that military force could achieve, given the limitations imposed on it.

The plan actually carried out could have led to seizure of the canal. But a long four-and-a-half-day preparatory bombing before the first landing gave the Egyptians plenty of time to block the Suez Canal, which is Britain's economic lifeline.

ARMED YOUTH ADD TO SYRIAN PUZZLE

Thousands Now Own Small
Weapons After Heavy Dose
of Leftist Indoctrination

By HANSON W. BALDWIN
Special to The New York Times.

DAMASCUS, Syria, Dec. 7—Groups of young students in khaki overalls, armed with short barreled Czechoslovak submachineguns, may hold the future of Syria in their hands.

About 3,000 of them paraded in Damascus yesterday and were addressed by President Shukri el-Kuwatly. They are an index of the new-found importance of quasimilitary national liberation movements to Arab politics and military fortunes.

Potentially one of the most dangerous trends in the complex and completely fluid Syrian situation is the arming of large numbers of hastily trained persons. The heavy arms of Soviet types that have been delivered to Syria by Czechoslovakia are not yet disproportionate in number to the size of the Syrian Army. But many thousands of rifles, submachineguns and grenades have been delivered far in excess of the Army's requirements.

Syrians say—and some experienced observers agree—that almost 100,000 persons are now enrolled in the new version of the popular resistance organization, which corresponds roughly to Egypt's National Liberation Army. These "week-end warriors" receive fifteen days of training, a rifle or submachinegun and fifty rounds of ammunition, which they will keep for the duration of the present emergency.

The Popular Resistance Organization was started here soon after Egypt formed her part-time National Liberation Army. It proved at first to be an unpopular organization. Very few Syrians joined it.

Move Started in Summer

Last summer a new quasimilitary organization called "The Young Vallants" was started. About 6,000 persons took three weeks of military training with a heavy dose of Left-Wing ideological indoctrination. But not until the British-French attack on Egypt began did the military organization of the Syrians become of large-scale importance.

Then appeal for part-time service was addressed primarily to the youth, especially to students, who desponded enthusiastically. Each volunteer gets four hours of intensive training each day for two weeks in marching, marksmanship the use of grenades and tactics useful in street fighting. When they finish their course a few who have shown particular aptitude are encouraged to join the Syrian Army Commandos, the crack unit of Syria.

Most go back to full-time studies or work but retain their

weapons. Theoretically, these weapons will be turned in when and if the present emergency in Syria, which started with the Israeli attack on Egypt is declared at an end.

Syria is not now a great arsenal and base for Soviet military power. Foreign authorities do not believe there are any large number of Soviet bloc military technicians or advisers here. Syrian officials say there are none now, but concede there have been in the past no more than nine at any time.

But the fluidity and potential danger of the Syrian situation is not primarily due to the acquisition of Soviet-type military equipment. There has been some penetration by Communists at all levels.

Reds' Embassies Enlarged

Soviet and Soviet bloc embassies and legations here have increased noticeably in size in the past six months. There are Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Chinese Communist and other commercial economic or other groups here. In one month—September—one airline brought thirty persons from Communist bloc countries to Damascus.

Soviet motion pictures are shown here in increasing numbers. Free scholarships are offered to Syrian youths for study in the Soviet Union. Architectural students have been invited to East Germany for study.

Of the twenty-seven daily newspapers in Damascus, a city of 400,000, nine are strongly pro-Soviet, while others are sympathetic to communism.

It was increasingly difficult for Right-wing and moderate papers to operate prior to the start of the present emergency in late October. Since then news censorship and slanted news have reduced the mention of Hungary to a minimum, and have convinced the Syrians that the Israelis did not defeat Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula, that the casualties of the British at Port Said were very large and that the French battleship Jean Bart was sunk there by a Syrian fleet.

About 80 to 90 per cent of the public credit for stopping the Egyptian fighting has gone to the Soviet Union, and the credit to the United States, though private feelings are a little more favorable to the United States. Broadcasts over the radio follow almost entirely the Egyptian line and praise the Soviet Union.

cept for the Latakia harbor, have been stopped. And Khalil Kaldo, Economics Minister, one of the two extreme Left Wing members of the Cabinet of Premier Sabri el-Assali, controls all export and import licenses and he is working closely with the army in giving priority to military needs.

On top of all this is superimposed what is best described as a completely fluid political situation. The conservative parties are split and have played into the hands of the Left Wingers. Effective power in Syria has been in the hands of the military since 1949 and is more than ever so now with martial law in effect.

Seven Deputies Now in Jail

Democratic processes are a facade. Seven deputies of the Syrian Parliament are in jail, two are refugees in Lebanon and six are in hiding.

Principal power appears to be wielded by a group of young intensely nationalistic army officers. These officers do not appear to be so much pro-Soviet as anti-Israel and pro-Egypt.

They are led by Lieut. Col. Abdul Hamnid Serraj, 31 years old. Colonel Serraj is head of the Syrian Army Daudème Bureau of Intelligence section and as such he probably holds the balance of power. Colonel Serraj appears to exercise his authority by veto.

It would be wrong to classify him as a dictator with supreme power. He leads the intensely nationalistic, intensely anti-Israel young officer faction. He also is an intense admirer of Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt.

Soviet Help Seems Indirect

Khalid Bekdash, Communist leader here, apparently exercises his influence at street levels. Just how the Soviet Union exerts its influence is not known publicly. It probably is done indirectly. For the moment Egyptian and Soviet short-term objective in Syria appear to be the same and the Soviet Union may be content to let Egypt take it in pressing them.

Economic Position in Peril

To these facts should be added a potentially unfavorable economic situation. Syria has been self-supporting in the past, apparently she has paid for part of her Czechoslovak arms purchases with money transferred to her by the Iraq Petroleum Company for pipeline rentals and royalties in the last year.

But Syria's military budget for 1956 represents about 60 per cent of her total budget and may go to a much higher percentage in 1957.

Annual oil revenues of \$18,000,000 for the pipeline transit rights have ceased since the pumping stations of the Iraq Petroleum Company were destroyed. Much of the wheat and some of the cotton crop, usually exported chiefly to France, still is unsold.

Most development projects, ex-

IRAQI INSISTENT ISRAEL MUST GO

Foreign Minister Says State
Would Be Lasting Danger
to Mideast Stability

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Special to The New York Times

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 12—

The mere presence of Israel always will be a danger to stability in the Middle East. Burhaddin Bashayam, Iraq's Foreign Minister, said yesterday.

The Foreign Minister discussed problems of arms in an interview. He said he thought Israel no longer should be a state.

"The Jews should go to the countries they came from and all Arab refugees should return to their own lands," he said.

"A new Arab state should be created in Palestine with no expansionist tendencies."

Mr. Bashayam declared that until some months ago—even after the Bandung conference of African and Asian nations—Iraq and other Arab states had felt the United Nations 1947 resolutions represented an acceptable framework for a solution of the Israeli problem. But since Israel's attack on Egypt such a solution would not be acceptable to Arabs he thought.

He said the Jews had shown they were a "menace to the peace of the Middle East." Israel was created by the United Nations, "this mistake must be remedied by the United Nations, this mistake must be remedied by the United Nations," he remarked.

Attitude of U. S. Praised

Mr. Bashayam said prestige of Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, had increased as a result of the British-French attack on Egypt and British and French influence in the area had diminished greatly. But the United States has a special position as a result of its policy, he added. It should join the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible and strengthen the pact and Arab powers,

psychologically, militarily and economically, he said.

He added that both the pace and volume of United States military aid to Iraq should be increased. Present members of the Baghdad Pact in addition to Iraq are Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

Maj. Gen. Khazi al Daghistani, deputy chief of staff of the Iraqi Army, emphasized the importance of this rearmament in an interview. General Daghistani said the present Iraqi Army of three divisions and an armored group totalling 50,000 to 60,000 men should be expanded to at least five infantry divisions and one armored division, with the necessary air support, of 110,000 men.

This correspondent saw some activities of the Iraqi Army near Baghdad yesterday. It has some clear cut advantages compared to other Arab armies. Its arms and equipment are far less diversified than those of other Middle Eastern armies; it uses chiefly British and United States equipment, some of it purchased with United States funds. It appears to be far less immersed in politics than most Arab armies.

Iraq Protests to Egypt

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 12 (Reuters)—Burhanuddin Bashayam, Iraqi Foreign Minister, sent a note to Egypt today protesting against recent Egyptian criticism of Iraq.

The note said a statement made by Wing Commander Ali Sabri, chief political adviser to President Nasser, charging that Iraq had permitted British planes to refuel in Iraq and to carry British troops injured during the fighting in Egypt to Iraqi hospitals, was "completely untrue and unfounded."

"Iraq's attitude toward Egypt was one of full support," the note said.

DEC 25 1950

SOVIET IS INTENSIFYING ITS MIDDLE EAST DRIVE

All Ways Known to Communists Are Used to Win Arab Nationalists

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The liquidation of the Port In Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Said operation last week, coupled with the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinal and intensification of the Middle East's war of words, presaged new Russian attempts to fill the vacuum of power in the area.

Moscow's objectives in the Middle East are essentially the same as those of imperial Russia, with additions. The traditional drive toward the warm-water ports of the Persian Gulf a motivating factor in Russia's foreign policy in the days of the Czars, is now expressed in two goals:

- (1) The elimination of Western influence from the Middle East and the extension of Russian influence.
 - (2) Denial of the oil of the Middle East to the West.
- To accomplish these objectives Soviet Russia is above all exploiting the tide of Arab nationalism which is sweeping the Middle East and which is symbolized by Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt. The Arabs, their days of greatness behind them, are struggling with the chains of feudalism and may be awakening after dormant centuries.

'CAULDRON BUBBLE'



Bimrose in The Portland Oregonian

Since the Sinal campaign and the Anglo-French attack upon Port Said the revulsion against British and French influence has been pronounced and sometimes violent. Except in Iraq and in the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, British and French influence has been almost eliminated. Yet the principal focus of the two dominant emotions of the area—hate and fear—is Israel, which has been equated since the Suez operation with Britain and France.

Russian Aid to Arabs

Soviet Russia's principal means of penetrating the Middle East has been her frank espousal of the cause of Arab nationalism. Moscow is trying to ride the crest of the Arab tide, to exploit hate and fear and unrest. She has sided with the Arabs against Israel and this is the major reason for Soviet popularity in the area. Moscow's warnings during the days of the Port Said crisis are given greater credit by the Arabs for the cessation of hostilities than United States or United Nations intervention. Unfortunately for the West the short-term aims of Arab nationalism—Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, oil nationalization, and the reduction of Western influence—coincide with the short-term objectives of the Communists.

The Soviet pro-Arab policy is the biggest single weapon in the Communist campaign of Middle East infiltration. But this policy is supported by a variety of means. A psychological and propaganda campaign, triggered in part from Tashkent, where a powerful transmitter beams the Communist line to the Middle East, is a potent weapon. Arabs tend in many ways to live in a dream world and the big lie makes a big impression in the Middle East.

Communist propaganda is forwarded on all fronts. Soviet and Iron Curtain embassies maintain journalistic and cultural contacts with the local Arabic

press and a liberal with print- ing subsidies or direct subsidies to newspapers.

Soviet economic policies support the Soviet political objectives.

Extensive Military Aid

Military aid, extensively given at marked-down prices to Egypt and Syria, is another method of infiltration. Soviet military aid programs serve a quadruple purpose. They tend to create tension in the area and worry Israel; they strengthen Arab nationalism; they tend to make the Arab economy more dependent upon Soviet Russia and they open the way for follow-up infiltration by Communist technicians, military advisers, pilots and engineers.

In addition to these measures, Soviet Russia uses the familiar methods of political organization and indoctrination. Communist parties as such are outlawed in Arab countries but there are a number of avowed Communist leaders—like Khalid Bagdash of Syria, who was trained in Moscow—who maintain the closest possible liaison with both Moscow and Communist China. These men organize where possible at the grass-roots and they are often aided, if unknowingly, by crypto-Communists, by parties like the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist party and by left-wing Cabinet members.

All of these methods of infiltration are being developed in the Middle East. They have met much success in two countries—Egypt and Syria—and these countries, in turn, are strongly influencing Jordan in particular, and to a lesser extent Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

More Arms for Arabs

The Syrian people are convinced by censorship and slanted news and propaganda—as are most of the Egyptians—that there was no defeat of the Egyptian Army in Sinal, that the French battleship Jean Bart was sunk at Port Said, that the British suffered great casualties there.

The steps taken and methods used to combat Soviet Russian communism in the Middle East are psychological and cultural, military and economic, and political. The Baghdad Pact countries have a counter-subversion group and Arab leaders at a recent meeting warned against subversion in veiled but unmistakable terms. But the chief counterpoise to Soviet Russia's drive for dominant Middle Eastern influence in the past has been Britain—and now Britain's influence has probably been fatally weakened.

The United States has used diplomatic persuasion, political pronouncements warning against aggression, economic power ex-



White in The Akron Beacon-Journal
"Price tag."

pressed through Point Four and other aid, and limited military help to counter Soviet influence. The United States Information Service has sponsored various measures — libraries, releases, films, etc., which help to counter similar Soviet projects. The United States, utilizing both public and private effort, has also sponsored various educational projects and visits of Arab specialists to the United States. But above all, the recent United States action in helping to halt the Israeli-British-French attacks on Egypt has created for the United States a higher measure of goodwill in the Arab states than at any time in the past decade. But a vacuum of power still exists in the Middle East; Soviet infiltration efforts are being increased and the crest of the wave which the United States is now riding has a deep trough behind it.

U. S. Policy

The formulation of a firm and definite United States policy in the area is the first requirement if Soviet infiltration is to be defeated. Today we have no such policy; we have been trying to straddle the fence of Arab-Israeli differences, to support the Baghdad Pact without joining it, to placate Egypt and Syria without alienating England and France, to remain friends with all without offense to any. So far we have saddled the United Nations with responsibility instead of assuming it ourselves.

Yet a firm settlement of some political problems—refugees, the Gaza Strip, Sinal, the Gulf of Aqaba, the Suez Canal, the Baghdad Pact — accompanied perhaps by a massive economic development program, may be the only hope of meeting the Soviet challenge.

The Mideast Crisis—I

Review of Factors Underlying Region's Ferment After the Recent Invasions

This is the first of three articles by the military editor of The New York Times based on visits to the principal countries of the Middle East at the height of the Suez Canal crisis.

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

President Eisenhower's White House conference with Congressional leaders yesterday opened a critical year in the Middle East. The conference was held just two months after the British-French and Israeli attacks on Egypt.

Arab nationalism has been strengthened by the campaigns in the Sinai Peninsula and at Port Said. The prestige of Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, is probably at a new high with the Arab street mobs, by which Arab governments are so often made or broken.

The Suez Canal, lifeline of nations, has not been dredged since the British and French bombing of Egypt started on Oct. 31. It is silted up at the rate of 8,830,000 cubic feet a month. All the dredgers formerly used in canal maintenance were sunk by the Egyptians. Most of half a hundred wrecks and obstructions are still uncleared.

No work has been started to replace the oil pumping stations in the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline across Syria. The stations were blown up by the Syrian Army after the British-French invasion of Egypt.

Tentative estimates indicate replacement of the complicated machinery and restoration of the full flow will require ten to twelve months after political problems have been resolved and Syria permits the start of repair work.

But so far no major Middle Eastern problems have been resolved. Rivalries and factions, plots and counterplots, rend the Arab world despite the strong emotional desire for Arab unity, an Arab federation of some sort.

Former alignments are changing, old loyalties dying. But there has been one net gain: the fighting in Egypt focused the world's attention on an area of tremendous strategic importance hitherto little known to many Americans, an area that contains more than two-thirds of the free world's oil reserves.

And Washington now has started to formulate a more positive and vigorous policy.

Any balance sheet of the fighting in Egypt would have to stress the increased prestige of President Nasser. This correspondent in recent visits to Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Israel and, before the fighting, to Egypt, asked Arabs, Israelis, Americans, Britons and others about President Nasser's standing. There was almost unanimous agreement that to date it had been enhanced with the Arab masses. There were reservations about the future.

"All the returns are not in," some observers said. Some believe the Egyptian President's prestige has been impaired with some of the more informed and responsible Arab governments but not with the masses.

A few of these leaders and some educated Arabs, it was reasoned, knew the facts about the disproportionate Egyptian losses in the short fighting against the Israelis, British and French. They were worried, it was said, by President Nasser's increasing popularity in their own countries, by the Middle East's economic losses from the canal blockage and oil line sabotage and by the prospect of general war.

Israeli Viewpoint Expressed

The Israeli viewpoint was expressed to this correspondent recently by Premier David Ben-Gurion and Maj. Gen. Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff. Both declared that the fighting showed that the "unity of the Arab peoples was a legend," that despite various treaties of assistance, no Arab country came to Egypt's assistance during the fighting.

President Nasser's pretenses as a military leader were demonstrated to be hollow, they declared.

"For a year or perhaps two we can work in peace," Mr. Ben-Gurion said.

"I think we have given them a lesson," General Dayan declared, "and we have shown all the Arab countries that a solution of the Israeli problem cannot be found through fighting; we have taken it out of their heads that they can drive Israel into the sea."

But there was little evidence in the Arab countries visited by

this correspondent that a lesson had been learned. The few Arabs who know the facts of Sinai and Port Said—and except for those who participated in the fighting they are few indeed—are swayed in any case by President Nasser's appeal to "the street," with all the political power in the Arab world that is thus implied.

And there is an Iron Curtain of the mind in the Arab world. Cairo's Voice of the Arabs and the Damascus radio, aided by Soviet propaganda broadcasts from Tashkent blanket the Arab world. Black is made white and the man in the street believes that black is white.

Only Nuri Rivals Nasser

To the Arabs the Sinai campaign and the Port Said defense were glorious "victories" against far stronger forces. Tremendous "losses," the Arab radio declares, were inflicted upon the aggressors. The French battleship Jean Bart was "sunk" off Port Said (actually she was not scratched and did not fire a gun). The British deliberately "bombed" many Egyptian cities. Even many of the small Arab middle class and some of the wealthy who were formerly opposed to President Nasser admire him now. Did he not twist the British lion's tail?

President Nasser is rivaled as an Arab leader only by Premier Nuri As-Said of Iraq, Lieut. Col. Abdel Hamid Serraj, so-called "strong man of Syria," and Premier Suleiman Nabulsi of Jordan are both admirers and followers of Nasser.

Most other Arab leaders are more cautious. None except Premier As-Said can be classed as a strong, forthright Nasser opponent.

General As-Said, twelve times Premier of Iraq and strongly supported by the British, suffers now from their support. He has weathered the recent street riots in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf and elsewhere led by students, Communists and Nasser sympathizers. He will face another crisis when he reopens the schools, and still another when Parliament reconvenes. He may well weather these, he will do so, indeed, as long as the Iraqi Army sees no alternative to him.

But he is losing the war of words; the Baghdad radio is outshouted by Cairo and Damascus. Baghdad's propaganda answers have shown recently a kind of desperation. The Premier has tried, with only partial success, to jam the Damascus radio. He has hired for the Iraqi radio Yunus al-Bahri, who broadcast propaganda for Nazi Germany in 1941-42.

The Egyptian President's hold upon "the street" in Iraq is strong and seems to be increasing, and even some Iraqi Army officers are influenced by his views.

More Important Factors

There are in the Middle East some fundamental factors even more important than President

Nasser that will long influence the development of the area.

One is Arab nationalism, which the Egyptian President symbolizes and encourages but does not control. This factor was described by an American observer as the "Arab tide." The waves that make up this tide, he said, are political and economic revolution, a cultural renaissance, an anti-colonialism, anti-Western feeling and a desire for unity.

The Arabs, "asleep for 700 years, are now ripping through the centuries pretty fast," he said.

A second major factor, which coincides with the rise of Arab nationalism, is the decline of British and French power in the area. British and French influence have been dealt an almost fatal blow, not only by the abortive attack on the Suez Canal but also by the association of Britain and France with Israel. "Collusion," no matter how much denied, is a fact in the Arab mind, and Britain and France are now damned in the Middle East as allies of hated Israel.

Britain, it is true, still retains influence in Iraq and strong footholds in the independent sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, but all of these are now subject to challenge.

A third key factor is Communist infiltration of the area. Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf area has been a geopolitical factor since the days of the czars. This interest is now being forwarded primarily by Communist espousal of Arab nationalism. Moscow's support of the Arabs against Israel has helped the Communist cause more in the Arab countries than any other single policy.

This, and arms aid, limited economic help, military and technical assistance, cultural missions, effective propaganda, the usual machinations of indigenous Communists and capitalization upon the mistakes of the West have helped greatly in spreading Communist influence.

Unfortunately, the short-term aims of Arab nationalism, the control of their own resources and the reduction of Western influence, coincide with the short-term aims of communism, the ousting of the West and the denial of the Middle East's oil to the West.


Finally, hate and fear color the situation. There is little realism; the Arab and, to a considerably lesser extent, the Israeli both live in a dream world of their own creation. Logic rarely rules; passions govern.

Both Israeli and Arab accuse each other of precisely the same transgressions.

Many Israelis now admit that their thinking before the Sinai attack was colored by a "Warsaw ghetto" type of feeling. There was no factual military indication of any imminent Egyptian attack, but Egypt's defense arrangements with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia made,

OVER

The Middle East: Key Personalities in Its Future



The New York Times
By Gertrude Samuels

David Ben-Gurion, Premier of Israel. He says that the recent fighting has shown that the "unity of the Arab peoples was a legend."

Associated Press

President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, an obscure army officer only four years ago, has attained a peak of prestige, especially in his appeal to "the street," which carries great political power in the Arab world. He is shown here during a visit to an Egyptian village.

Israel feel, as one observer expressed it, that "the hoop was compressing the barrel," and that a preventive war must be fought.

These are the principal factors that make any over-all "solution" that would be acceptable to the Middle East and satisfactory to the West extremely difficult if not impossible. There is a host of subsidiary problems, however, and these cry for quick answers. They include the clearance, maintenance, improvement, administration and control of the Suez Canal; control of the Strait of Tiran leading to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Elath; the Gaza Strip; the future of Arab refugees; the restoration of oil flow through the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipelines and the possible development of other pipelines.

Above all there is the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between Israel—its population still expanding by immigration, its recent victories frustrated—and the Arab states, suffering under a deep sense of inferiority.

The great question mark in the Middle East is who will take the leadership in solving these problems—the United Nations, the United States or the Soviet Union.

The Mideast Crisis—II

An Analysis of External and Internal Military Factors in Nations of the Area

This is the second of three articles by the military editor of The New York Times based on visits to the principal countries of the Middle East at the height of the Suez crisis.

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The British-French and Israeli attacks on Egypt have strengthened Communist influence in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union is given credit in the Arab world, as much as, or more than, the United States for the cease-fire in Sinai and the Suez Canal zone. The attacks have fanned the flames of Arab nationalism, weakened Western influence and helped the Soviet Union in its attempts to fill the vacuum of power in the area.

Sizable numbers of Soviet-bloc personnel have flown into Egypt in the last six weeks. Syria is still receiving deliveries of arms from Czechoslovakia. Both Egypt and Syria have received oil deliveries from the Soviet Union recently. Egypt is expecting the delivery of one or two submarines from Poland.

Syria and Egypt are the present centers of Communist efforts in the Middle East. Both of them have been infiltrated to a greater degree than any other Middle Eastern country.

Arms Overstressed

Yet it would be false to characterize either Egypt or Syria as a Communist satellite or as a military base ready for use by Soviet armed forces. Exaggerated attention has been focused on the Soviet arms delivered to both countries. The quantity, quality and potential of these arms and the readiness of Egypt and Syria as military bases have been overstressed by France, Britain and Israel.

Egypt has good airfields built by the British, some of which have been damaged by British bombs. But she does not have refueling and maintenance facilities adequate to support extensive air operations. Syria has about two airfields barely adequate for use by modern jets. Before any sizable numbers of Soviet planes could operate from Syria, an extensive airfield and port construction program would be necessary.

Neither Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, nor Lieut. Col. Abdel Hamid Sarraj, so-called strong man of Syria, is a Communist. There are Communists or crypto-Communists in prominent positions in both Egypt and Syria. But the leaders of these countries are fervent nationalists who probably have two pre-eminent passions, the exaltation of Arab nationalism and the defeat of Israel.

Outside Power Analyzed

Soviet military power in the Middle East cannot yet be applied, therefore, except from bases within the Soviet bloc. This is not true of Communist political, psychological and economic power, which has infiltrated heavily into Egypt and Syria and to a lesser extent into Jordan and Iraq.

British power, though fast declining, still has bases in the region. The value of Cyprus, where 9,000 to 10,000 British troops are tied down in internal security duty, has been reduced by extensive terrorist activity and by the lack of an adequate port. But Cyprus is strategically useful, particularly as an air base. The British also utilize for the moment bases at Mafraq and Aqaba in Jordan. They have the right under certain conditions to utilize two Iraqi fields for staging and training aircraft, and they have airfields and ports around Arabia.

French power in the Middle East is now virtually nonexistent. Military academies of several Arab states are training selected Algerians as officers for the guerrilla army that is fighting the French in Algeria.

Turkey holds the strategic Dardanelles and the mountain barriers that protect the Middle East against land invasions. She looks askance at increasing Communist influence in Syria, for Turkey realizes that she cannot tolerate a Communist power to her south as well as to the north.

United States military power in the area is represented mainly by the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and one or more small surface ships in the Persian Gulf area. The Sixth Fleet, equipped with atomic weapons, is capable of smashing attack and of effective blockade. But it has only one reinforced Marine battalion landing team, about 1,000 men, and is not equipped to intervene in land wars.

The indigenous strength of the Middle East area is more important economically than militarily. It has huge oil resources but the armed forces of the area are relatively weak and, except for the Israelis, only partly trained. Here are thumbnail sketches of the more important states:

EGYPT

Egypt is the kingpin of the Arab world. Despite huge losses

during the brief fighting, estimated by the Israelis at 85 per cent of Egypt's jet aircraft and one-quarter to one-third of her army. Cairo still commands the largest Arab army, perhaps 100,000 strong. About three divisions, one or them armored, are still intact and there is plenty of equipment.

Possibly eighteen to thirty jet aircraft—IL-28 bombers and MIG-15 fighters—were flown out of Egypt to safety, chiefly to Jiddah in Saudi Arabia. Negotiations with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union to replace destroyed or captured equipment may be expected.

President Nasser's attempts to infuse new blood into the officer corps and new spirit into the nation were barely beginning when war came. In time some of this "new spirit" may take hold.

SYRIA

Political control in Syria rests with the Army. Thirty-one-year-old Colonel Sarraj, who heads the intelligence section, of the general staff, leads a young officer faction that is probably the most important power source in Syria.

During a recent visit to Syria this correspondent interviewed the Syrian Army Commander in Chief, Maj. Gen. Tewfik Nizam-al-Din. Colonel Sarraj sat in on the interview and did not hesitate to correct or contradict his chief.

Civil government, democratic processes, and even the moral superiority of military rank have little importance in present-day Syria. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the xenophobic young officer faction is the only important political power source. Colonel Sarraj does not hold absolute power. His influence is exercised largely by veto; he is not a dictator.

Syria's unstable political and economic situation militates against her military effectiveness. Her army, expanded from 70,000 to almost 85,000 in one year, is organized in six regular infantry brigades (equivalent to the United States regiment), two others at reduced strength and armored units comprising about 175 tanks.

Weapons of a Soviet type are still being delivered, but in early December the total represented less than 50 per cent of all Syrian Army equipment.

Such weapons include 120 T-34 tanks, fifty to sixty SU-100 self-propelled guns; fifty-two 122-mm. howitzers; thirty-two 122-mm. guns, at least three 152-mm. guns; more than thirty 85-mm. anti-aircraft guns; more than thirty six-wheeled armored personnel carriers and at least 20,000 rifles and 20,000 sub-machine guns.

The Syrian air force is weak. Its most modern planes are fourteen British Meteors but some Syrian MIG-15's may have been destroyed in Egypt by British and French bombing.

IRAQ

Nuri as-Said, Premier of Iraq, 21-year-old King Feisal and his uncle, the former regent are the stabilizing factors in a country that is a keystone of the Baghdad Pact, rather friendly to the West and yet swept by Arab nationalism.

The future course of Iraq is uncertain. Heavy reductions of oil revenues resulting from the destruction of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pumping stations in Syria, violent and effective attacks upon Premier Nuri and the Baghdad Pact by the Tashkent, Cairo and Damascus radios, some Communist infiltration, the restlessness of the Kurdish tribes and above all anti-Western Arab nationalism add up to a picture of political volatility.

The Army of 50,000 to 60,000 men, organized in two desert divisions and one mountain unit and an embryo armored force, follows a British pattern and uses British and American equipment. Iraq has about 180 aircraft, fewer than 100 of them combat planes. She is purchasing a squadron of Hawker Hunter jets, from Britain and wants modern United States jets.

JORDAN

Jordan appears to be a country in dissolution. It has been said that the only true Jordanian is 22-year-old King Hussein. The loyalties of the rest of the country are diffuse. Power rests primarily upon a triumvirate, the King, who frequently seeks the Queen Mother's advice; Maj. Gen. Aly Abu Nuwar, commander of the Jordanian Army, and Premier Suleiman Nabulsi, who rose to power as leader of the street mobs of Amman.

The Jordanians have committed themselves to "terminating" as soon as possible the British treaty, with its subsidy. They hope to substitute financial support from other Arab countries.

Jordan's armed forces consist of one division, about 18,000 strong; the Arab Legion and forty-four battalions of National Guard. Each National Guard battalion has an average paper strength of 650 men, but many are considerably under strength.

SAUDI-ARABIA

Saudi Arabia is a feudalistic, oil-rich country with little military strength. Egyptian influence is strong in the schools, in the regular Army and with the masses. King Saud has been worried by President Nasser's appeal to the Saudi Arabians and he has attempted to counter the Egyptian influence in the regular army by strengthening his ties to the tribal levies.


The United States has predominant influence in this area and uses an important air base at Dhahran. The lease has expired and negotiations for a new lease have bogged down. The Saudis have asked a rental of \$300,000,000 for a six-year period, \$3,000,000 in cash and ninety North American F-86 Sabre Jet aircraft.

OVER

Key Personalities in the Policies of Jordan



Premier Suleiman Nabulsi at his office in Amman. He rose to power as the leader of the street mobs in that city.



The New York Times (by Maxon W. Salsbery)
Maj. Gen. Aly Abu Nawar,
commander of the army.

LEBANON

Lebanon is a nation where a Christian minority holds an uneasy dominance over a Moslem majority that has been infected at some levels by Egyptian agitation and Arab nationalism. Lebanon now has a strong pro-Western Government and would like nothing better than to trade in peace. But her sensitivity to events in the Arab world is shown by a severe and unreasoning censorship.

Her border with Israel long has been quiet except for occasional incursions by Syrian fedayeen (guerrilla) raiders. Lebanon has a small army of about 8,500 men organized in battalions.

ISRAEL

Premier David Ben-Gurion is firmly in power for the moment after the Israeli victory in Sinai. The armed forces are by far the most powerful in the Middle East. Israel can mobilize 800,000 people in a few days.

The Army operates chiefly in brigade groups (regimental combat teams) though it has the structure for at least seven divisions—five infantry and two armored infantry. An Air Force of several hundred planes, including about fifty to seventy-five jets, is the best in the Middle East and Israel's small Navy is superior to that of any other Middle Eastern country.

The Mideast Crisis—III

A Review of Region's Basic Conflicts And Possible Constructive U.S. Steps

This is the last of three articles by the military editor of *The New York Times* based on visits to the principal countries of the Middle East at the height of the Suez crisis.

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The next chapter in the history of the Middle East is certain to be bright with the wealth of oil, dark with the abundance of misery.

The slow evolution of a United States policy for the Middle East, a policy long overdue, is a hopeful sign. But no conceivable policy will provide a magic wand. The problems of the area are immense, complex and interlocking and many of them defy solution by rational processes.

Formal military force alone cannot resolve these problems, as was shown at the time of the fighting in the Sinai Peninsula and Port Said.

Israel has been, since 1949, the strongest indigenous military force in the area. She is stronger today, as compared with the Arab states, than ever before, despite the supply of Soviet equipment to Egypt and Syria during the last year. The Soviet Union has cast its lot squarely with the Arab states, however, and particularly with Egypt and Syria.

The use of local force in the Middle East, or anywhere in the world, faces two inhibitions: the threat of Soviet intervention and the fear of nuclear war.

Role of Arab Nationalism

Moreover, there is another counter to Israeli military power more important than the developing but still incompletely trained Arab armies. It includes the "national liberation" armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, the street mobs, the National Guard, the fervent nationalists, the fedayeen (guerrilla) raiders—the Arab nationalism, which will pull down the pillars of its own temple in order to crush an enemy.

Most of the Arabs can revert, if necessary, to a date-and-camel economy; in fact, most of them have never risen above this level. But at the same time they hold Western Europe's principal sources of oil in fief.

Britain and Israel can win in open battle, as Sinai and Port Said demonstrated, but neither Britain nor Israel can adopt a date-and-camel economy. Neither nation can stand the slow attrition of guerrilla warfare, underground terrorism of the type that played a part in the decimation of the British to hand over the Suez Canal zone, indefinite fedayeen raids, economic boycotts and blockade, sabotage of pipelines, nationalization of oil refineries and holdings.

The Arabs are becoming more and more skilled in this type of warfare, and Arab nationalism is providing the spirit to animate it.

Auxiliary Forces Developed

Jordan has built up a National Guard more than 20,000 strong. Its members have little training but are fairly well armed with light weapons. Syria has given some rudimentary basic training to perhaps 90,000 persons and has issued Czechoslovak submachine guns and rifles to thousands of students. Egypt's National Liberation Army, though poorly trained, provided a spark of fanaticism in the defense of Port Said.

These semi-military forces add up, in effect, to armed street mobs and guerrilla armies. They already are of internal political importance in a number of Arab states. With better leadership and improved organization they could be an important military factor in any future war.

Three great outside forces can now exert possible leadership in the Middle East. One is the United Nations. Another is the United States. The third is the Soviet Union.

Communist ambitions in the area are squarely opposed to those of the United States. The principal Soviet aim is to "crack open the oil axis," as one observer put it—to utilize Arab nationalism to deprive the West of Middle Eastern oil supplies. The first Soviet objective is Iraq, and if Iraq should turn toward the Communists the results would be felt all around the oil-rich Persian Gulf. If Soviet leadership prevails in the area, Moscow will have won a strategic victory comparable in importance to the communization of China.

The United Nations has demonstrated that it has real power to act strongly in major crises only when the United States and the Soviet Union are on the same side. These two nations cannot be on the same side in the Middle East, except in occasional short-term objectives such as the cease-fire in Sinai and Suez, because their long-term objectives clash.

In the long run there will be no substitute for United States leadership vigorously applied in the Middle East, outside as well as through the United Nations. Today, the time is ripe for that leadership. The United States is riding the crest of the wave in the area, but a trough lies not far far behind.

In local terms, the struggle for Arab leadership in the Middle East lies between President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Premier Nuri as-Said of Iraq, with the long-term odds on President Nasser's side.

Or, more correctly, the odds today are on the side of Arab nationalism. President Nasser might be overthrown by a combination of economic pressure, which is now becoming severe in Egypt, and the volatility of Arab politics. But the Arab nationalism he symbolizes will continue.

Various courses of action in the area are possible.

One, strongly urged by Tel Aviv, is all-out support of Israel. But this would create more problems than it would solve. The very fact of Israel's existence is in itself the major reason for friction in the Middle East.

If the United States should side completely with Israel against the Arabs, it would repeat the same mistake that Britain and France made in their attack at Suez. The complete identification of the United States with Israeli interests would reduce this country's prestige and influence in the Arab world from Morocco to Iraq.

Israeli Resources Limited

Moreover, this would mean siding against nations that are rich in oil, which is essential to the Western European members of the Atlantic pact, and supporting a nation poor in resources and dependent primarily upon outside aid for continued economic viability.

If Washington chose this course, it would sharpen the great power division in the Middle East. The United States would have to be prepared to use military force to guard oil installations and thousands of miles of pipelines and to occupy the Suez Canal.

All-out support of Arab threats against Israel is also impossible for a variety of reasons. Israel's existence is a fact, even if the Arabs refuse to recognize it. Complete support of the Arabs would make a final United States split with France and Britain almost inevitable.

It follows, therefore, that the fundamental problem is to try to find a solution, even if only a transitory one, of the Arab-Israeli feud.

It also follows that United States policy in the Middle East is bound to be fundamentally a straddling policy, one of compromise, much harder to implement than the forthright Soviet policy of pro-Arabism.

Preliminary Steps Listed

But some things can be done within these limitations. Limited mutual disarmament in the Middle East; neutralized frontiers imposed and enforced by permanent United Nations forces; internationalization of the Strait of Tiran leading to the Gulf of Aqaba and the southern tip of Israel; settlement of the status of the Suez Canal; a new approach to the Arab refugee problem; United Nations trusteeship of the Gaza strip—all these would help.

But these problems cannot be resolved without definite and tangible concessions on both sides. Unfortunately, neither is-

OVER



P. I. P.

ISRAEL'S MILITARY POWER is stronger today, in relation to the Arab states, than ever before. The counterbalance of this strength, however, is the ability of the Arabs to revert, if necessary, to a date-and-camel economy, something Israel is unable to do.

ernment, one that may veer to the left.

A third approach to the Middle East is economic rather than political. Washington is considering today what some have called a "Mid-East Marshall Plan," though not on the same scale or proportions as aid to Western Europe. The economic approach for such things as flood control, irrigation, dams, health and educational measures, offers some promise. So do military expenditures for such purely defensive measures as radar warning lines across Iran and Iraq and selective training of Arab officers in United States military schools.

A guarantee against aggression and agreement by Congress to support the President in the use of force in the Middle East would also provide greater security against the use of formal organized force by the Soviet Union, though it would have little influence against infiltration and subversion. And a considerably expanded informational program might help in time to weaken the "iron curtain" of the mind that imprisons many Arabs.

But none of these approaches alone will suffice and all of them together cannot be expected to cure, only to ameliorate. All of them, political, military, economic and psychological measures, may be necessary, though none of them will be completely effective.

rael nor the Arab states is in a mood for compromise now. If there is to be any improvement in the Arab-Israel situation, the United States will have to use great pressure combined with the most skillful possible diplomacy.

The split in the Arab world, with President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Premier Nuri al-Said of Iraq the principal protagonists, presents another pres-

ing and perhaps imminent problem.

The United States proposed and has supported, but never has joined, the Baghdad Pact, whose members are Britain, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan. The British believe that unless the United States formally joins soon, the pact will wither and die and Iraq, at least, and possibly Pakistan, will turn away from the West.

Some United States diplomats

oppose this view, asserting that if the United States joined the Baghdad Pact it would "become a tail to the British kite" in Middle Eastern policy and much Arab opinion, freezing the present division of the Arab world.

On the other hand, if the United States does not join the pact, it seems probable that Gen. al-Said will eventually resign as Premier and may be succeeded by an unstable Iraqi Gov-

Test for the Airborne

Analysis of New 5-Sided Army Division And an Exercise to Study Its Make-Up

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Fort Bragg, N. C., is the scene this week of another definitive test in the evolution of the modern Army.

An exercise dubbed Operation Market II will put in the field for the first time one of the Army's new airborne combat groups or battle groups.

The exercise will involve air transportation between Fort Campbell, Ky., and Fort Bragg; parachute drops and air landing operations, helicopter lift and helicopter patrol and scouting, and offensive and defensive ground operations.

The unit participating will be the 187th Airborne Infantry Combat Group, one of five similar groups of the reconstituted 101st Airborne Division. The 101st Division has been for more than a year a "guinea-pig" division, with radically altered tables of organization and equipment.

It has been trying out and testing in progressive exercises the Army's new five-sided divisional organization. The Fort Bragg exercises will demonstrate the battlefield potential of the new combat group organization.

Organizational Problem

The small, pentagonal divisional structure already has been tested sufficiently to warrant an Army commitment to reorganize its present triangular divisions, both airborne and infantry, along the new lines. But many details of the reorganized division are still in doubt. The Fort Bragg exercise will help to formalize and complete the new organization of the airborne division, and will serve as a guide to the new infantry division.

The 101st Airborne Division now numbers about 11,500 men, about 5,600 men fewer than the conventional triangular airborne division that the new organization will replace. The regiment, as such, has been abolished, and so has the battalion. Instead of three regiments of infantry there are now five combat groups in the new division, each roughly equivalent to a small regiment or a large battalion.

This pattern of organization is somewhat similar to that adapted by the French for their new airborne division—one of which, at reduced strength, was employed in the recent Port Fuad-Port Said operation in Egypt.

The French, however, use the equivalent of six combat groups in their new division instead of four five, and each of their units has an internal organization that

differs widely from the United States groups now under test.

Each United States airborne combat group has a five-sided structure internally. It has five infantry companies, averaging 242 officers and men each, a headquarters and service company and a heavy mortar battery. The combat group at full strength totals 1,573.

Each of the new infantry combat groups will normally have attached to its artillery, engineer and other units to enable it to fight as a combat team. All of these attachments—which include one battery of five 105mm. howitzers, an engineer platoon and other small units—increase the total by 219 officers and men.

The 105mm. howitzers and 90mm. assault guns provide the combat groups with conventional fire support. The new airborne divisional artillery includes an Honest John rocket battery. This rocket can utilize either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Thus the new five-sided airborne division will have either atomic or non-atomic capabilities—hence one of its designations—Pentana (five-sided atomic-non-atomic).

The future infantry division will have a similar structure but somewhat more weapons and men; its strength will be about 2,000 more than the airborne division—or about 13,755 men.

'Lean and Mean'

This new five-sided division, which Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff likes to call the "Pentomic division," is undoubtedly "lean and mean," as it has been described. All of the airborne division's equipment is transportable by air. It is more mobile strategically. Its nuclear capability gives it much greater fire power. It has a "higher percentage of foxhole strength" or combat infantrymen.

But it suffers from some severe weaknesses—some of which could be almost crippling in a non-atomic war, such as Korea or Port Said. The new five-sided division has far less staying power than the old. It quite possibly has less tactical mobility. Its most powerful weapon—the Honest John—can be transported only by a big C-124 type aircraft.

The new airborne division has no tanks. And its conventional field artillery fire support is somewhat limited. Most important, the country does not maintain sufficient military air transport to make the new division's potential strategic mobility an actuality.