

12 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. You are seeing Hanson Baldwin at 12 noon on Thursday, August 14, 1958.

Attached hereto is a memorandum briefly summarizing 15 columns by Baldwin since July 1, 1958.

3. He was critical of the slowness and alleged inefficiency in getting troops to Lebanon. He was critical of the President for committing troops to Lebanon without broad enough consultation with his military advisers. He maintains the movement into Lebanon of U.S. troops strengthened Nasser but he does declare that it may have encouraged Turkey and Pakistan. In his July 16 column he mentions that "intelligence" officials in Washington and the U.N. never did believe that outside intervention was massive in a physical way but that after the Iraqi coup it could become so.

4. Baldwin still has good sources of information in the highest echelons of the Defense Department but he has lost many of his contacts who are Naval Academy graduates of his time, who have now retired or have left Washington. It is my opinion that Hanson has to dig harder every time he comes to Washington to get news. It is also of interest to note that he now no longer makes his own Washington appointments but they are made for him by the Washington office (Mrs. Jones or Mrs. Ihnat). I assume that Scotty Reston insisted on this.

STAT

STANLEY J. GROGAN  
Assistant to the Director

cc: DDCI (w/o attach.)

12 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. Hanson Baldwin's fifteen columns since July 1 deal with military matters, mainly new U.S. weapons and tactics (July 4, 8, 11, 28, August 11); and various aspects of the Iraq-Lebanon crisis (July 16, 18, 21, 24, 27, 31, August 1, 5, 6). There is also a discussion (July 13) of difficulties being encountered at the scientific disarmament conference in Geneva.
3. The military discussions concern missiles seen at the Army's White Sands July 1-2 demonstration, of which Baldwin was somewhat critical (July 4); the development of the Tactical Air Command at Langley Field (July 8); joint U.S.-Canadian air defense plans (July 11); new, powerful radar stations being built in Greenland and the Aleutians (July 28); launching of the Triton, biggest and fastest atomic submarine, whose capabilities are described in some detail (August 11).
4. Baldwin is critical of the Lebanon landings on such grounds as:  
(a) the U.S. military system did not demonstrate as much speed and efficiency as is needed for this type of military maneuver (e.g., July 27); (b) under the circumstances it was not possible to see how the action taken could end the crisis or when the crisis might end (e.g., July 16); (c) the President undertook the commitment without broad enough consultation with his military advisers (e.g., July 24); (d) the move probably strengthened rather than weakened Nasser (e.g., July 16). On the other hand, Baldwin seems to feel that the Lebanon action, by demonstrating that "peace at any price is not our policy," may have had a good effect in encouraging our allies in the Middle East, particularly Turkey and Pakistan (e.g., July 31).

5. The only reference to "intelligence" in these columns appears on July 16: "Outside intervention, which intelligence officers in Washington and the United Nations believe was never 'massive' in a physical sense, could now -- after the Iraq coup -- become so."

STAT



STANLEY J. GROGAN  
Assistant to the Director

cc: DDCI w/o attachments

# Superlative Submarine

## Launching of Triton on Aug. 19 to Add Biggest, Fastest Undersea Craft to Fleet

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The world's largest submarine, scheduled to be launched next week at Groton, Conn., will be a three-decked submersible cruiser, which will displace about 8,000 tons submerged.

The Triton, newest of the nation's nuclear-powered submarines, is the first to be powered with two reactors and is the

**News Analysis**

first nuclear-powered radar picket submarine. She will carry tremendous radar antennas and other electronic and communications equipment to provide early warning of impending enemy air or surface attacks. Her radar is operational, of course, only when she is surfaced. Since most of her useful work will be done on the surface, she is designed, unlike some of her predecessors, to be faster on the surface than when submerged.

The Triton's two reactors will give her a top speed that will approach the top speed of a carrier task force or a surface fleet. Surfaced she will probably make twenty-five to thirty knot; submerged her speed will be considerably less—possibly seventeen or eighteen knots.

Her great hull form is not streamlined for high speed under water. Also, the protuberances for housing the radar when submerged prevent the clean hull lines possible in smaller submarines.

The Triton will displace about 5,900 tons when surfaced and will be about 447 feet long.

### Powered by Water Reactor

The Triton will be powered by the same general type of pressurized water reactor that has become standard for all Navy ships. The reactors will differ very considerably in details, however, from the one in the Nautilus, the world's first, nuclear-powered submarine.

The Triton's reactors, like all those for submarines, will use enriched uranium. They are designated as submarine advanced reactors.

According to recent Congressional testimony by Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the reactors have been designed so that "we can remove individual fuel elements and, perhaps, replace them by a [ship] tender so that the [Triton] does not have to return to a Navy yard for that purpose."

Admiral Rickover said, however, that the life of the reactor core is long enough so that it probably could last for an entire war.

He pointed out in other testimony that the reactor cores for nuclear submarines were being improved steadily.

"On her first nuclear core, the Nautilus," he said, "was able to travel about 62,000 miles. But on her new core she will travel about 80 per cent

greater distance. We have made such tremendous improvements right now and we are still doing so, that between the first fueling and the second fueling, we have increased the cruising radius about 80 per cent, and we may go even further than that with future cores."

### 112,000 Mile Range

Therefore the Triton's cruising range without refueling will probably be at least 112,000 miles. It seems probable, too, that her 145-man crew, probably the largest submarine crew yet on record, will be able to break the thirty-one-day record of complete submergence held by

some of her nuclear predecessors. Reports that Admiral Rickover verified in recent Congressional testimony showed that "the Navy is developing a machine to make oxygen from sea water." In the future this would make possible almost indefinite submergence.

However, the Triton's principal reason for existence, as an electronic sentinel for the fleet or for the North American continent, requires surface cruising. Her huge bulk requires two reactors, instead of one, to provide the horsepower needed to keep up with surface fleet speeds.

But her ability to submerge and to cruise totally submerged for long periods may enable her to live in areas where no surface radar picket ship could survive.

She could approach, for instance, a dangerous "sentinel" position off any enemy coast completely submerged, surface to utilize her radar, and then submerge again if danger approached.

The Triton, the first of her kind, may remain unique. She is extremely expensive, costing more than \$100,000,000.

Also, her great size, essential to house two nuclear reactors and her extensive radar equipment, is a disadvantage to a submarine. A large submersible provides a better sonar target. Further, she will probably be noisier under the water than smaller submarines.

More important, the development of nuclear reactors and of radar is proceeding so rapidly that it may be possible in the future to "package" a radar picket submarine with the same capabilities as those of the Triton in a considerably smaller hull.

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### Several Superlatives

The Triton claims superlatives in speed, length, displacement and other vital statistics as compared with other large submarines of the past. The Triton's 5,900 tons surfaced, 8,000 tons submerged and 447-foot length compare as follows with other huge submersibles:

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Name	Launched	Sunk	Length	Displacement Surfaced Submerged
U. S. S. Nautilus	1954		320 feet	about 2,400 tons
U. S. S. Argonaut	1957	1963	381 "	2,710 4,000
I-400 (Japanese)	1944	1944	402 "	5,700
Surcouf (French)	1929	1942	342 "	2,880 4,300

\*Captured and later destroyed.

The Triton is the eighth in the nation's construction program of nuclear-powered submarines. A total of thirty-three has been authorized as follows:

In Commission:	
Nautilus	High speed nuclear prototype
Seawolf	High speed nuclear prototype
Skate	First "production" attack type
Launched:	
Skipjack	Fast attack type with streamlined Albacore hull
Swordfish	Attack type
Barge	Attack type
Swordfish (1)	Attack type
Triton (2)	Radar picket

(1) To be launched Aug. 18; (2) To be launched Aug. 19.

Under construction or approved for are twenty-five submarines. They include nine fast attack submarines with streamlined hulls.

# The Middle East—II

## Access to Military Bases Is Called A Key U. S. Interest in the Region

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The geographic and strategic interests of the United States require access for its forces to air bases and facilities in Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Libya.

This may not be strictly a "vital" interest; that is, one without which the United States cannot live as a nation. But in the context of the Middle East and its importance to the West,

a strong Turkey, supported by airfields available for American use in Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Libya, is well-nigh indispensable.

Turkey is the right flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. She is the strongest military power in the Middle East. She lies squarely athwart the route of any Soviet drive from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and flanks any Soviet push through Iran or Iraq toward the Persian Gulf. Its 400,000-man army represents a factor that Moscow's planners must neutralize.

But Turkey, without economic and military aid from the United States and support in the air and at sea, in time of war, can never realize her strategic potential. With Turkey as a strong ally, and with United States access to other bases the eastern Mediterranean becomes a gateway to southern Russia, outflanking the eastern European Communist countries.

With such land-based support the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean could

probably live long enough in time of war to accomplish its mission. Without this support the eastern Mediterranean might well become a closed area. The elimination of United States bases in the area would probably mean the end of the free use of the eastern Mediterranean by United States military power.

In addition to this major interest, the air base at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia is important to the United States as a staging and military air transport facility.

There are, then, only a few really vital American interests in the Middle East—the prevention of the domination of the area by communism; continued access to the oil and communications of the area; continued utilization of the eastern Mediterranean, which means access to bases in Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Libya.

In a physical and geographic sense these are really all that can be termed vital, though the United States has political, economic and moral commitments that inevitably will influence its actions in the area. But an examination of its vital interests should help to establish a series of priorities for any Middle Eastern policy; in fact it should provide the general guide lines for the proper formulation of sound policy.

*This is the second of two articles on the Middle East crisis.*

NEW YORK TIMES

# The Middle East—I

## Lull in Tension Provides Opportunity For U.S. to Define Its Aims in Area

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The election in Lebanon and the recognition by Western Governments of the revolutionary regime in Iraq have provided a temporary measure of stability in the Middle East, a region that is inherently unstable. But it is a lull, not an end, we have passed through the eye of the storm but more winds will blow.

The decrease in tension and the delay in the proposed summit conference give the United States another opportunity to define more precisely and tangibly than it has done before, its "vital" strategic objectives or interests in the area.

The United States has many interests, and it has made many military, political, economic and moral commitments or obligations, not all of them wise in the Middle East. But most of them are not "vital," that is, of such great strategic importance that their preservation and protection is essential to the continued life or well-being of the United States.

A definition of what is really of primary strategic importance to the United States should be a necessary preface to the formulation of a Middle Eastern policy, to any statement of the United States' long-term objectives, and to any consideration of short-term measures.

### Objectives Discussed

Vital strategic interests or objectives, considered in the broadest long-term geopolitical terms, can and nearly always do include military and geographic interests, economic political and sometimes psychological considerations.

Viewed in these broad terms the first and foremost vital objective of the United States in the Middle East is a negative one, the denial of the area to communism. In practical strategic terms this means these things: (a) that none of the countries of the area from Turkey to Pakistan and southward to Egypt and Saudi Arabia shall be Communist satellites; (b) that there shall be no Soviet-owned and operated military bases or facilities within the area; (c) that the Soviet Union shall not physically conquer and rule the area.

From a strategic point of view actual Soviet physical domination of the area, that is, a capability by the Soviet Union of utilizing the Middle East for its own purposes and a denial of the West's access to it, except on Soviet terms, would be disastrous. For it would mean Communist conquest of a geographic nexus of the sea and air routes, the Red Sea and Arabian Sea and

communications between three continents. Soviet domination of the Middle East would imply sooner or later the fulfillment of a centuries-old Russian dream—the acquisition of a warm-water port and Russian debouchment to the Persian Gulf-Red Sea-Arabian Sea area.

The outfringing of the Indian Continent, Soviet control of the Eastern Mediterranean area, Control of the Suez Canal and the water gateways, pipelines and airfields, so important to international commerce, Control of the oil of the Middle East

Communist foothold in Africa, and probable eventual Communist political and economic conquest of Africa's undeveloped resources and isolation of Western Europe.

### Access to Oil Needed

The second vital objective of the United States in the Middle East is long-term (peacetime) access to the oil and to the communications (Suez Canal, pipelines, ports and airports) of the area. Neither the oil nor the communications are vital to the West in time of war, as World War II and the Suez crisis demonstrated. The United States could, indeed, live and remain a great nation without the oil of the Middle East and without utilizing its communications crossroads.

But the nations of Western Europe, Britain in particular, would be materially weakened economically by denial of access to the oil of the area and by loss of the revenues incident to the exploitation of the tremendous reserves.

Any actions causing a major price rise and major loss of oil revenue to the West, such as nationalization, would also handicap, though by no means cripple, the Western European economy, and would thus influence Europe's military strength.

Closing of the Suez Canal and of the commercial airports in the Middle East to Western traffic, or the imposition of very high tolls, would, in the same way, adversely affect Western European economies and might force a diversion to longer routes of sea and air traffic from Europe to the Far East.

Thus, while Middle Eastern oil and communications cannot be termed directly vital to the United States, they are probably vital, from a long-term point of view, to the United States' allies in Western Europe. Hence if the United States wishes to maintain a strong geographic nexus of the sea and air routes, the Red Sea and Arabian Sea and

News Analysis

# The New Pact—II

## More Than U. S. Defense Pledge Needed To Make Baghdad Alliance Effective

By MANSON W. BALDWIN

The United States has committed itself to "full partnership" in the new Baghdad Pact. It has demonstrated, by the landing of armed forces in Lebanon, its interest in the Middle East and its determination to resist aggression. But this is not enough to breathe

life into a moribund alliance, unless additional actions are taken. On paper, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, the Middle Eastern members of the new Baghdad Pact, have formidable military forces.

Turkey has about 400,000 to 500,000 men in her army, organized in about twenty-two divisions, supported by 200 to 300 jet aircraft. She has a Navy of about twelve submarines and about a dozen destroyers.

Iran's armed forces, including the gendarmerie, total about 140,000 to 150,000 men; there are ten divisions and about seven brigades.

Pakistan's army is almost 200,000 strong, plus more than 60,000 state and security troops, organized in about eight divisions, with cadres of three more. The Pakistani Army is supported by F-86 Sabrejet fighter planes supplied by the United States.

### No Atomic Weapons

All these nations are weak in the air. None have atomic weapons or missiles. Most of them lack modern tanks and the newest anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Communications conditions are difficult and the equipment inadequate.

Iran, which has the longest frontier with the Soviet Union, has virtually no radar warning system, and the radar installations in both Turkey and Pakistan are inadequate.

Iraq, the fourth Middle Eastern, and the only Arab member of the original pact has just undergone a military coup that probably meant her eventual elimination from the alliance.

There have been some suggestions that the new Iraqi Government was not anti-Western and would not commit the country to federation with President Gamal Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic, formed by the Union of Egypt and Syria. Whether, or not this is true, it is clear that Iraq, as a

member of the pact in the future, would add as many weaknesses as strengths.

Any government in Iraq that was not pro-Nasser would certainly be subject to the "subversion or indirect aggression" that the United States is now pledged to oppose.

### Economic Problems Are Great

The military weaknesses of the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact are less important in any comprehensive assessment than the major economic problems of both Turkey and Pakistan, the unstable political situation in Pakistan, and the generally backward and feudalistic structure of society in all these countries.

The defense of these nations against "indirect aggression" depends for its success upon the creation of conditions of economic, political and social stability within each country. Only on this foundation can a strong military system be erected, and only such conditions will insure these nations against the virus of communism or extreme nationalism, or against the kind of coup that upset the old regime in Iraq.

If the new Baghdad Pact is to have such meaning, the United States and Britain must provide major military aid to strengthen the Middle Eastern members against direct aggression, and major economic aid to strengthen them against indirect aggression.

Such aid must be provided on a far larger scale than the programs of the past, or the pact will remain of limited usefulness.


### Pledge is Effective

Whether such positive action is taken or not, the implicit pledge of defense against aggression now given by the United States to the Baghdad Pact members does act in restraint of aggression, particularly against direct aggression.

But the danger is that unless the Middle Eastern members of the Pact are strengthened with Western aid, that unless the United States shows strong, immediate and tangible evidence of supporting the pact, Washington's pledge of defense may be tested, particularly by "indirect aggression."

Furthermore, the pledge may have to be honored, as it was in Lebanon, under conditions of emergency and at the eleventh hour.

News Analysis



# The New Pact—I

## Legal Baghdad Commitment Pledges U. S. to an Immense Military Task

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The Baghdad Pact's new streamlined look—minus Baghdad—adds a legal and written commitment for the United States to a tacit and moral one.

Washington, which proposed the original Baghdad Pact but never, until this week, really joined it as a "full partner," is now pledged to another im-

mense military task. The new commitment, confirmed in London by Secretary of State Dulles is the defense against direct or indirect aggression of a 3,000-mile frontier of mountain and desert extending from the Turkish Caucasus to Pakistan's Khyber Pass.

From a military point of view the new commitment, if it is to have any more meaning than the old one, requires some explicit actions on Washington's part.

One of these actions already has been taken. The landing of United States Marines and Army paratroopers in Lebanon was intended, as Secretary Dulles has noted, to show to our friends in the world that the United States was prepared to back them up against aggression despite the risk of war.

Our demonstration of our willingness to use force in the Middle East was particularly important to Turkey, faced after the Iraq coup, with strategic isolation.

### Effect on Pact Nations

Turkey, Iran and Pakistan—all of them Moslem nations, but none of them Arabic; all on or close to Soviet frontiers—approved the Lebanese landings. Thus in these countries at least our willingness to use military force had a positive effect.

Our Lebanese action also has won the restrained approval of the Premier of Libya, Tunisia and the Sudan, all of them worried by the threat to their rule of the ambitions of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic.

These endorsements, however, are those of the Governments in power. In some of these countries they cannot be considered representative of public opinion, which has been stirred by President Nasser's Pan-Arab, Pan-Moslem appeal.

The Lebanese landings also have a broader and more important meaning, which is undoubtedly being studied by other countries in the world, friendly, neutral and antagonistic. For our willingness to use military force anywhere had been in some doubt. We had been, until Lebanon, the captive of our own creation.

### Diplomacy Was Hobbled

The specter of atomic war had made such an impression on world public opinion, exploited as it was by Soviet propaganda, that it had inhibited our diplomacy and limited our actions. Our alliances and our commitment to the United Nations had also hobbled swift or even bold reaction. We were on the political and psychological defensive, even though our overall military strength was superior to that of the Soviet Union.

And, it was often charged that Washington had not maintained enough military power to react without the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, our limited war power was inadequate.

The Lebanese landing has had at least one positive result. It has shown, as Mr. Dulles emphasized so forcefully in London at the Baghdad Pact meeting, that the United States is not "afraid" of the Soviet Union, that it will honor its commitments to its friends and that we still retain a capability, even though it is not a large one, for limited action without involving the very thing we have been trying to prevent—a nuclear war.

The Lebanon landing, no matter what other criticisms can be made of it, demonstrated that peace at any price was not our policy. Washington has clearly indicated that there are interests or commitments or obligations for which we will fight; the specter of war cannot frighten us into passive acquiescence to the gradual conquest of the world by communism.

Thus despite the probable defection of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact and the need, frankly faced at London, for "substantive alterations" in the pact and its organization, the new pact starts life with physical evidence of determination by the United States to resist aggression against its allies.

News Analysis



# Missile Warning System

## New, Powerful Radar Stations Being Built in Greenland and the Aleutians

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Long-range detection and tracking of aircraft and missiles have been made possible by new developments in radar and in supporting equipment.

Two high-priority projects—huge ballistic-missile early warning radar stations—are now well started near Thule, Greenland, and in the Aleutian Islands. These tremendous and costly projects, with antennas as large as football fields and great power, are designed to give early warning of the launching of Soviet ballistic missiles. They will have detection ranges of 3,500 miles or more. The station in the Aleutians has sufficient range to cover the impact areas of the Soviet long-range missile ranges in the Arctic and in the Sea of Okhotsk.

News Analysis

### Stations Do 2 Jobs

Each of these stations will have two types of radar. One will be for surveillance or warning, the other will provide a rough or approximate track of the missile for a part of its trajectory.

The surveillance radar will be similar, although using different antennas, to the huge United States Air Force-operated radar in Turkey and one in Laredo, Tex. The Turkish radar has been able to detect many of the test launchings of Soviet missiles.

The tracking radar will be patterned after the so-called Millstone Hill device of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratories near Lexington, Mass. This radar, with an eighty-four-foot parabolic antenna, uses about 100,000 watts of power. It has tracked missiles more than 1,000 miles away.

### Two Others Being Built

In addition to the radar installations under way in Greenland and the Aleutians, two others, somewhat similar, are being built.

One will be at Prince Albert in northern Saskatchewan, according to Aviation Week. It will be used by Canadian scientists for research purposes, but may eventually be integrated into the continent's early warning system. The other is in Trinidad, where it will be used in connection with the missile range at Cape Canaveral, Fla.

These and other new radar set-ups have increased their detection ranges by utilizing diverse frequencies by careful de-

sign of huge antenna and by "brute force" techniques—the use of tremendous power to beam electronic impulses to the target and to measure the reflected "echo."

The higher speeds of modern aircraft require detection at greater distances to permit interception. But at the same time, as Leonard M. Barker noted in an article in the May issue of the magazine *Astronautics*, "modern jet aircraft present effective radar reflection areas of about one-tenth that of their propeller-driven counterparts."

### Can Be 'Seen' Further

"Ballistic missiles," he noted, "only magnify these problems of the radar designer."

On the other hand, because ballistic missiles rise far above the earth's curvature the straight-line "eye" of radar can "see" them farther than it can a low-flying plane.

In addition to the use of active radar—the beaming of electronic impulses to a target and the measurement of the reflected echo—passive radar, or the recording and measurement of electronic emanations from outside sources, offers possibilities of expanding scope for detection and tracking.

A relatively new discovery, mentioned recently in guarded terms by Dr. Herbert York, chief scientist of the Advanced Research Projects Agency to the House Appropriations Committee, gives promise of usefulness when developed, to the nation's missile defense program.

The hot exhaust gases, ejected at terrific speed from a ballistic missile during the first stage of its flight and high-speed passage of a missile through the atmosphere apparently ionize, or electrify, surrounding air particles. The missile, in other words, leaves an electronic trail that has been detected on radar screens hundreds of miles away.

The re-entry into the atmosphere of a missile fired from Cape Canaveral also has been detected and tracked by the use of infrared equipment.

These and other methods of ballistic missile detection and tracking are now under intensive examination. It seems probable that future developments will enable radar situated in the United States to detect the launchings of ballistic missiles in the Soviet Union.

# Concern Over Defense

## Weaknesses in Landings in Lebanon And Senate Unit's Alarm Are Cited

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The Senate Appropriations panel for success, in part, upon Committee expressed concern about the United States defense position last week in unmistakable terms.

It not only criticized the optimism of the Administration but it also provided some \$1,200,000,000 more than President Eisenhower had requested for the armed services for the next twelve months. Some criticisms were overdrawn and some of the added funds may have been voted on the "it's-better-to-be-safe-than-sorry" principle.

Nevertheless the committee views were based solidly on an uneasy sense of weaknesses some of which were evident during the recent landings of our armed forces in Lebanon.

Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy cited "the speed of our former reaction to situations of tension" as justification for his view that our air transport capabilities are adequate.

### Little Supporting Evidence

But the Lebanese experience offers little evidence to support Mr. McElroy's optimism, in the opinion of other military observers.

Our forces made unopposed landings in Lebanon at the invitation of the Lebanese Government. One battalion of marines was fortunately near by—the others farther away. None of them had helicopters; the initial landings had to be made in amphibious craft. Only one Army airborne battalion of about 1,000 to 1,200 men was flown—in the initial increment—from Germany to Adana, Turkey, and thence after a deliberate delay, to Beirut. A good airfield was available for the transports in Beirut. In addition to this airborne element—some 800 marines were flown as individual replacements—not as a combat unit—from this country to Beirut.

The numbers of men and the amount of equipment transported to Beirut in the initial increment were far too small and the time required was far too long, some observers believe. If the United States had faced fairly determined opposition the small units sent might have been defeated in detail.

Airborne operations must be

shock effect, mass and speed. Yet today, the air transport available is not sufficient to move any sizable numbers of airborne troops and still carry out the other emergency airlift tasks required. This was demonstrated by our experience in Lebanon.

The relatively slow and small air-shuttle operation from Germany to Beirut was hampered, in part, because some of our air transports had to be diverted to start a fuel airlift from Saudi Arabia to Jordan. Others were required by the Strategic Air Command, others by the Tactical Air Command. The Navy used some. Others had to be held in reserve for possible use in case an emergency developed elsewhere in the world. There was not too much left over for the Army.

In addition to its concern about our airlift weaknesses, the Senate committee apparently felt that the United States Army needed more modern equipment quickly.

United States weapons now ready for production or in advanced stages of development, may well be equal or superior in quality to Soviet weapons—but the Army budget has not included sufficient funds to expedite production and to get these new weapons into hands of troops.

### Basic Problem Broader

These and other weaknesses motivated the actions taken by the Senate committee last week.

But the basic problem is a broader one.

William C. Foster, who was co-chairman of the Gaither Committee, which studied our defense posture, and who has held other important defense jobs, traces this problem in the current number of the General Electric Defense Quarterly, published tomorrow.

He points out that Russia has been closing the gap technologically and has been matching our total over-all defense effort, even though its gross national product represents only about 40 per cent of our gross national product.

About 10 per cent of our total goes into defense, as compared to Russia's 25 per cent. If we put just 10 per cent more of our effort into defense production—still leaving 80 per cent for consumer goods, services, and

all our present high standards of living, the Russians, to match us would have to take away from their people one-third of the already sparse good things of life they have," Mr. Foster declared.

This is the kernel of our long-term defense problem, which neither the Executive nor the Legislative Branches of the Government have resolutely faced.

News Analysis

# The New Pentagon Bill

## Legislation and Lebanon Decision Seen Enhancing Dangerous Trend

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The Defense Department reorganizational bill passed in the House of Representatives last week, just after the United States had assumed the risk of major war in the Middle East. The bill, although it reports some of the President's most emphasized requests, endorses a dangerous trend well illustrated by the decision to intervene in Lebanon.

That trend is toward the development of a party-line strategy, upon military decisions based upon the advice of one or a few men, rather than upon strategy formulated by many and decisions based upon careful canvassing of all available military advice.

Prior to his decision to intervene in Lebanon, President Eisenhower consulted at the White House Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Gen. Nathan F. Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Service Chiefs Not Consulted**  
So far as is known the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not personally consulted either as a body or as individuals, even though both responsibility and authority are coupled in the service chiefs and even though they know better than any other person the capabilities and the limitations of their services.

The Lebanon intervention like any other major military action for the United States may take a long time to plan, but the risk of war, the risk must be faced, and the time to live in a nation that calls itself great should not be faced in a hasty way.

The Executive Branch of Government, in consultation with a possible with the Legislative Branch, is particularly important in the carrying out of military decisions. The responsible heads of each of the services be asked for their advice, individually and collectively.

There are two reasons for this. One is that one or a few men may be wrong in their assessment of a military situation; a minority viewpoint may be right.

This was true of the position taken by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, then Army Chief of Staff, at the time of the Dien Bien Phu battle in Indochina.

**Minority View Won Out**  
If General Ridgway had not had the courage of his convictions and the right to take his case personally to the President, the United States might well have been involved in a drawn-out major war in Indochina, with no end in sight. In this case, General Ridgway's minority view prevailed for the nation.

There is another reason why all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than the chairman alone should be consulted in key military questions. These members are bound to have varying capabilities, and varying personalities.

Sometimes in a democracy, such as our, a chairman plus service and national politics may elevate to the top of his service or to the position of chairman a man undistinguished either for strength of character or professional wisdom. But it is very unlikely that all four service heads and the chairman would simultaneously be "yes men" or "stuffed shirts."

There is strategic wisdom in numbers. The demand, reiterated again and again since the war, for a single military voice, a single military party line from the Pentagon could represent one of the most dangerous possible developments.

Yet the Pentagon reorganization bill continues de facto as well as de jure a trend toward centralization within the Pentagon, and within the Executive Branch.

### Party Line Is Seen

The President's own strong preference for a "single voice" from the Pentagon, plus the emphasis given by this bill to a long-term trend in this direction, will inevitably contribute to the development of a military party line. This need not necessarily result, but it will take stout men of moral courage, in and out of uniform, to stand up and be counted.

The reorganization bill, which continues the trend toward centralization of power over the military within the Executive Branch of government, should not be interpreted as an attempt at encroachments of Executive upon legislative authority. Three key provisions, upon which the President bitterly opposed, retain some major Congressional grants of power over the military services.

The reorganization bill, in itself, is far less important than the attention paid to it. It contains a few positive achievements; the unified commands for instance, are better defined.

But it will work no miracles; it will save no money, and it will result in little, if any, increase in either combat readiness or administrative efficiency. It does nothing to reduce the swollen civilian bureaucracy in the Pentagon, nor does it diminish the influence of politics in the services. And sooner or later there will be more demand for more sweeping

# Middle East Tension

## Focus Shifts From Military Actions To Diplomatic Front Over Week-End

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

World tension arising from the Middle East crisis eased over the week-end as the focus was shifted from military to diplomatic actions.

There were no reports and no indications of general mobilization by any power or of any extraordinary civil defense measures. Many nations, including the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and the Middle Eastern countries concerned, have alerted all their regular forces and have taken other emergency measures, but no actions indicative of the belief that even a large-scale limited war was likely have been reported.

Troop movements and dispositions to and throughout the Middle East area continued, but at a slowed pace.

In Lebanon, the United States has concentrated between 7,800 and 8,900 marines and army paratroopers. The crews of the United States ships anchored in Beirut harbor bring this total to 10,000 to 12,000 men. Off shore lies the bulk of the United States Sixth Fleet, manned by about 30,000 more sailors and marines.

### Strike Force at Adana

At the great airbase in Adana, Turkey, is a composite air strike force, the Air Force's Tactical Air Command. This force, the Ninth Air Force, under Major Gen. Henry Vice, includes North America F-100's, F-4's, F-105's, F-106's, F-107's and F-108's fighters, B-57 bombers and Douglas B-66 bombers and tactical reconnaissance aircraft.

Probably also includes some B-52's, B-59 tankers for refueling purposes and some C-119's, C-130's, Hercules and other transport aircraft.

This force can use other nuclear or conventional weapons. In cooperation with Royal Air Force units at Cyprus and Amman, Jordan, it is well placed to support British-American forces in Lebanon and Jordan and the 200-odd carrier-based aircraft of the Sixth Fleet.

A second airborne group of about 1,800 men apparently has been designated for or is en route to Adana from West Germany. It is drawn from the Twenty-fourth Division, the only division of its kind in the United States Army. This division, now organized as all the rest of Army divisions now are, is a combined or five-sided division, part airborne, part armor,

The Eleventh Airborne Division in Germany was deactivated some time ago. Beginning July 1, two of its airborne battle groups joined three infantry battle groups to form the new Twenty-fourth Division.

The rest of the division also has been alerted and is available for movement to the Middle East if needed. But there was no indication that the infantry components would actually be moved from West Germany.

More ships were also en route to join the Sixth Fleet. All of this force is under the command of Admiral James L. Holloway Jr., who flies his flag in Beirut harbor from the U. S. S. Taconic. Admiral Holloway, whose normal headquarters as Commander-in-Chief of the United States naval forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, is in London, moved part of his staff with him when the Lebanese emergency started. He now is not only "CINCPAC" (Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean) but he is also CINCSPCOM (Commander-in-Chief of Specified Command, Middle East), a command activated for the first time for this emergency.

In the second capacity, Admiral Holloway commands all United States forces of all services in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, including the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and a Middle East naval command in the Persian Gulf area. At present the Middle East command consists of the aircraft tender Greenwich Bay, as flagship of Rear Admiral H. M. Briggs, and two destroyers, the Holder and Meredith, but it is probably being reinforced.

### Officers With Holloway

Admiral Holloway's staff consists of forty officers and eighty-nine enlisted men—most of them, so far, Navy or Marines. He took with him from London to Lebanon the following officers, all naval officers, unless specified:

Captain W. T. Easton, a tinian, Chief of Staff; Capt. G. F. Garrison, assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Capt. J. Williams, Jr., assistant Chief of Staff for Operations; Capt. J. D. Geiwick, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics; Comdr. John D. Peabody, public information officer; and Col. E. W. Bexfield, United States Air Force, Chief of Staff.

The size of the forces in the Eastern Mediterranean obviously is much larger than needed for what appear to be the United States limited and somewhat uncertain objectives in Lebanon. A task force has been sent to do a job in order to be ready for any eventuality.

The first phase of United States intervention is over. The marines have taken control of the principal air and sea gateways into Lebanon and have cordoned off Beirut to the north and south.

But their presence, so far, has seemed to have little effect, upon the rebellion in Lebanon, or upon the sluggish fighting spirit of the Lebanese Army. Brig. Gen. Fuad Shehab, the Lebanese Chief of Staff, has continued his kid-glove treatment of the rebels.

The United States forces in and near Lebanon are big enough to handle any immediate eventuality, but the unanswered question is: where do we go from here?

# Intervention in Jordan

## Study of British Move as a Part Of West's Build-Up for Long Crisis

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Western intervention in the Middle East was extended to Jordan yesterday as troops, ships and planes of many nations converged on the Eastern Mediterranean.

The United States build-up in Lebanon and off its coasts continued, with most of the United States Sixth Fleet now concentrated with reach of Lebanon.

News Analysis

And Soviet Union troops, ships and planes were in motion near the Turkish and Iranian frontiers in somewhat flamboyantly announced maneuvers.

All these operations so far can be classed as precautionary. They represent the first chapter of what may become a long-drawn-out crisis in the Middle East, which may be slow in developing to its fullest gravity and slow in settlement.

The British move into Jordan, long expected, started with the air landing of advance units of a "Red Devil" parachute brigade at Amman.

The troopers were flown from Cyprus, but the air transport plans encountered an apparently unforeseen problem when Israeli, which is on the most direct route from Cyprus to Jordan, protested the violation of her air space by British aircraft.

The hitch seems to have forces, and probably no more than 800 to 1,500 men had landed in the first twelve hours. The British have immediately available in Cyprus, however, a parachute brigade and the First Guards Brigade, totaling about 5,000 men, and most of them should be in Jordan soon.

### Hussein's Forces Weighed

These forces will be in the loyal elements of King Hussein's small army. The principal combat element of this army is composed of one division—the former Arab Legion—about 18,000 strong. It is bolstered by about forty-four National Guard battalions, each 600 to 700 strong.

But the reliability of the Guard battalions, composed in considerable part of Palestinian refugees, and the reliability of some elements of the regular army, is questionable. King Hussein's position was precarious indeed before British troops arrived.

Now this erosion has been temporarily stopped. The question opened by the British move into Jordan, like that of the United States into Lebanon, is what next? Both moves were intended to check the tide of Arab nationalism, which was imperiling the two little countries after the pro-Nasser coup in Iraq.

Some reports from Lebanon have indicated that King Hussein, now strengthened by British troops, entertains ambitions of reversing the revolt in Iraq. London was silent on this point, but yesterday's events made such a move less and less likely.

The Iraqi rebels appeared to be firmly in power in Baghdad, although there were no definitive reports about Iraqi troop units in other parts of the country. The Iraqi Army is well equipped and, if it is loyal to the new Baghdad regime, it would considerably outnumber both King Hussein's available forces and the immediately available British reinforcements. The erosion in Jordan has been temporarily stopped, therefore, but the Iraq coup, so far, has been confirmed.

### Build-Up for Emergency

The situation in Lebanon was as expected, relatively quiet. The United States build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean region was obviously intended to cope with any developing emergencies. The build-up—given the situation actually confronted in which landings were made without opposition—was rapid enough, but if Soviet or other good troops had raced the Americans to the Lebanese beaches it would not, by any means, have been fast enough.

Two marine battalions of about 3,600 men were ashore in the first two days; another was near by, and an Army airborne battalion of 1,600 men was in staging areas in Adana, Turkey, ready to move as directed.

Other considerably large units were alerted, ready to move, or moving. These Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine movements have two principal purposes. One, obviously, is to be prepared for any unforeseen developments within the Middle East. The other and the broader purpose—the alerting of all United States forces everywhere—is one now common in the atomic age to every plerogency.

If the United States hopes to keep the use of a modern military force limited it must, paradoxically, be prepared to strike any potential enemy with unlimited, i. e. nuclear, force. The United States can set, define and guard the limitations of a non-nuclear engagement by keeping poised the threat of a nuclear one.

But there were no real indications yesterday of any imminent danger of the broadening of the conflict in the Middle East. The Soviet troop movements are part of a war of nerves which, together with Soviet threats and intensive Soviet propaganda, are likely to comprise Moscow's immediate answer to the West's intervention.

There is no end to the sight and many dangers lie ahead.

# The Marines' Landing

## Review of Possible Repercussions To President's Action on Lebanon

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The landing of United States Marines in Lebanon yesterday will ultimately help to produce what it is intended to prevent.

This is the tragic irony of our Lebanese intervention, which is reminiscent of the abortive British-French attack on Port Said almost two years ago. The Marines were ashore last night and, as usual, had the situation well in hand. But the trail led no one to know where.

The same fundamental problem that contributed to the British-French fiasco in the Suez attack now confronts the United States. Our ultimate objective in the Middle East has become obscured and confused.

The immediate objective of the 1,800 men of the Second Battalion of the Second Marine Regiment that made the initial landings was simple and clear. It was a tactical military objective: control of the Beirut airport, the only really modern airport in Lebanon.

From this field Marine and naval aircraft can provide any necessary air support for our ground troops. The field will also be useful, if needed, as the terminus of an airlift from Europe.

In mid-May, during the early stages of the Lebanese crisis, a number of giant transport aircraft, Douglas C-124 Globemasters, were flown from Donaldson Air Force Base in South Carolina to Germany to augment the smaller Fairchild C-119's and the Lockheed C-130's available in the theater.

At that time, it was planned to airlift two airborne battle groups, about 3,100 to 3,500 men, of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division in Germany to Lebanon to reinforce the Marines with the Sixth Fleet.

Various other battle groups drawn from the Seventh Army in Germany, including tank, artillery and mortar units, were assembled and made ready for transport to Lebanon.

### Organizations Still Ready

The troops were never sent, but the same organization is ready today, and the mid-May crisis showed that the United States could airlift a total of two or three battle groups from Germany to the Middle East in about twelve hours.

The Marine battalion that waded ashore south of Beirut yesterday is therefore the spearhead of what can be an ultimate, probably, will be a far larger force.

Behind the initial battalion landing teams are two other battalions with the Sixth Fleet, a total of more than 5,000 Marines, who can be augmented, if necessary, by bluejacketed landing parties.

The rest of the Second Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, N. C., about 14,000 men, could be transported by sea to Lebanon within two to four weeks. Probably two Army divisions of 11,000 to 15,000 men each could be diverted from the Seventh Army in Germany by air and sea to the Middle East in a shorter period. These would be replaced in Germany by divisions from the United States.

The second objective of the initial landing forces, after the Beirut airport and its vicinity is secured, must be the establishment of a secure beachhead, and of a port. Security of communications and supply lines is the first requirement of a landing party. This objective, too, is military and clear-cut, and can be easily attained.

### More Difficult Objective

But the political purpose for which the Marines are in Lebanon poses a more difficult and less easily realizable military objective. The President defined this purpose in general terms as "to protect American lives and to help maintain security and to evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity and independence of Lebanon."

The first part of this mission should be accomplished without major difficulty. Americans already have been warned to leave Lebanon and some have left; the bulk of the remainder are in Beirut and probably can be evacuated quickly.

But the maintenance of security in Lebanon postulates a somewhat amorphous military objective, the attainment of which will be influenced by three principal existing factors and the possible development of a fourth factor.

The existing factors are the actions of the rebel forces; the actions of the Lebanese Army; and the aid supplied the rebels from outside Lebanon.

The rebels themselves are the least important of these factors; they are capable of guerrilla war and small engagements but not of organized military action against the Marines. The equivocal actions of the Lebanese Army, which has never utilized its full strength against the rebels, could be a more serious factor. About

percent of the army is Moslem; the rest might defect or Brigadier General Fuad Snehab, the Chief of Staff, might choose to maintain his present kid-glove approach to the rebels.

Outside intervention, which intelligence officers in Washington and the United Nations believe was never "massive" in a physical sense, could now—after the Iraqi coup—become so.

### Soviet Union's Reaction

And the fourth potential factor is, of course, what the Soviet Union will do. It could choose the same tactics utilized in Korea; it could send "volunteers," "advisers" or armed aid to Iraq and Syria and to the rebels in Lebanon.

The maintenance of security in Lebanon, easy at first, might well become difficult later, particularly if the Marines are spread out along the Lebanese frontiers to halt external intervention.

The third part of the President's objective—to show United States concern "for the integrity and independence of Lebanon"—is likewise difficult to define in military terms. The landing yesterday certainly demonstrated that concern to one portion of the Lebanese population and to the government in power. But it also demonstrated to the very sizeable opposition within Lebanon a readiness by Washington to use military force to maintain in power a regime that has lost much of its popular support.

Moreover, in an ultimate sense, it postulates that most dangerous of all military objectives, an unlimited and undefined one. The Marines can, of course, maintain the existing Lebanese Government in power; they can prevent massive intervention from across the frontiers. But their mere presence in Lebanon will be to Arab nationalists like a red rag to a bull. It will do more than any other event since the Port Said attack to knit together Arab nationalists throughout the Middle East and to inflame them.

### What About Jordan?

And what about Jordan—weak and in danger since the Baghdad coup? What about Iraq herself? Can we ultimately insure Lebanese and Jordanian "independence" with Iraq, Syria and Egypt in one camp? Can we prevent sabotage of the oil pipe lines or destruction of the pump lines or the seizure of the pumping stations, refineries, and wells in the area?

Viewed in these terms the mission of the Marines in Lebanon becomes vague and unlimited. The President states that the Marines would remain in Lebanon only until the United Nations took effective action to "preserve the independence and integrity" of the country.

But the paradox posed is that even if a United Nations force takes over in Lebanon it will find that the forces of Arab nationalism, symbolized by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, will be ultimately strengthened—not weakened—by the United States action.

News Analysis

# GENEVA TALKS TOUCH ONLY, ON FRINGE ISSUES

## Real Progress on Disarmament Requires Basic Soviet Shift

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The familiar carrot-and-stick techniques of Communism formed a somber background last week for the technical talks at Geneva on the detection of atomic tests.

Premier Khrushchev, like "Big Brother" in George Orwell's 1984, introduced once again the processes of "new-speak" and "double-think" into the difficult and halting attempt to limit arms and noble war.

Three times, most recently last week, Moscow has demanded that the United States—before the conclusion of the Geneva meeting—should sign a blank check and agree to the suspension of nuclear tests. But the talks have continued, and Mr. Khrushchev has broadened the horizon by suddenly discovering as his own President Eisenhower's proposal for inspection against surprise attacks.

But as the carrot of hope was dangled before the West, the Communist stick beat an implacable propaganda tattoo of intransigence and invective. Trades against the heresy of "revisionism," threats that Tito would follow the Hungarian Nagy to the grave, the continued imprisonment of nine American Army men in East Germany as political hostages and a vituperative address by Khrushchev himself in East Berlin, provided an unhealthy climate for discussion.

### Meetings at Geneva

Despite this drumfire of hostility and propaganda, Soviet, bloc and Western scientists continued to discuss at Geneva the means of detecting nuclear tests. The meetings, held in secret, have been strictly technical and preliminary. They resulted last week in a minor and inexact agreement, which simply represented a statement of fact—that acoustic detection by microbarographs, which measure shock waves of an explosion, should be used in any system of detection.

The Geneva meeting continued with a discussion of other methods of detection. At least three others—electromagnetic,

seismic and the measurement of radioactivity—must be included in any reasonably effective detection system. But the scientists are still on the first phase of their discussions—there is no indication they have even considered as yet the basic problem of how many detecting stations would be needed and where they should be located.

The other road toward limitation of armaments, opened by Khrushchev's sudden suggestion that talks be started to explore technical means of preventing surprise attack, is as yet purely a tentative one. Washington, with reservations is planning to accept the proposal.

### Ill-Defined Roads

Both roads toward limitations of armament are, so far, very ill-defined; in fact most of the proposals that have been made are somewhat vague and shadowy and require a great deal of examination, discussion and amplification before even their technical—much less their political—practicality can be determined.

Given the international political and psychological atmosphere that existed last week, the talks so far have an inevitable air of unreality about them. Many American observers, with good reason, believe them to be a politically and psychologically necessary exercise in frustration and futility which is not likely to yield any very spectacular results in actual arms limitations.

There are, of course, advantages and disadvantages for the United States as well as for Russia in the stoppage of tests, but it is quite clear that once stopped there would be a considerable incubus of guilt attached to the side that resumed tests first—unless it could be clearly proved by an inspection system that the other side had broken its agreement and started testing surreptitiously. The cessation of testing can represent a dangerous road for the United States if it should lead to nuclear disarmament without parallel safeguards upon conventional armament. So it

Russia's tremendous advantage in land power and her great number of submarines might make it possible for nuclear weapons were rolled out—for her to overrun Western Europe and sever the ocean supply lines of the West without the danger of devastation to Soviet Russia.

### Hopes for West

An attempt to provide an inspection system to guard against surprise attack offers, however, more hope of pragmatic results for the West than the stoppage of nuclear tests. The basic defense policy of the United States is the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent in order to discourage aggression. But the deterrent—in order to be a deterrent—must be of such a nature that no surprise attack by Russia could destroy our capability of massive nuclear retaliation. The maintenance of such a deterrent—in the face of the threat of surprise attack—is a far more complex and expensive problem than the mere maintenance on dispersed sites of X number of bombers or missiles.

Hence any reduction in the danger of surprise attack—if it was a real reduction and not a mere paper agreement—would ease that large part of our military problem which must be concerned with protection against nuclear attack by piloted planes, missiles or other means. It might provide additional safeguards, too, against the minimal dangers of surprise attack by conventional forces, but these dangers are, in any case, far less important since it would be extremely difficult to launch a massive ground-air-sea attack without prior tell-tale preparations and mobilization.

But again as in the Geneva conversations—the safeguards against surprise attack will be no stronger than the inspection system that is devised. Inspection is the technical key to the limitation of armaments, but this poses its own paradox—the establishment of a foolproof inspection means quite clearly

tearing down the Iron Curtain, tearing down the Iron Curtain—and Khrushchev's angry remarks about inspection yesterday showed how far off such an agreement is.

Thus, the talks in progress at Geneva and those proposed are merely scratching the surface of the problem of the limitations of armaments. They are small parts of a jig-saw puzzle, and the arms limitation problem cannot be solved until all parts are studied and fitted together—the stoppage of nuclear production as well as the cessation of tests, conventional disarmament as well as nuclear disarmament.

### Value of Talks

The value of the Geneva talks is that they bring representatives of East and West face to face; they represent a start, no matter how small, on a gigantic problem. These talks and those which may follow on providing safeguards against surprise attacks could have some psychological and political benefits, represented by some easing of tension, better communications between East and West and a start toward a discussion of the world's basic political problems which are the underlying cause of world tension.

But there is little likelihood they will actually provide such benefits as long as Khrushchev continues to use every discussion as a propaganda forum, and to employ "new-speak" and "double-think."

# Defense Collaboration

## Review of Interdependence of U. S. And Canada in Air Protection Field

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The problems of continental defense were an important topic during the Canadian-United States discussions in Ottawa that ended yesterday.

The suggested establishment of a joint Cabinet committee on defense emphasizes the military interdependence of the two countries, just as the interlocking economic structure of Canada and the United States underscores the future indivisibility of the two nations. The military collaboration between the two countries is now most necessary and most intimate in the air defense field. A combined United States-Canadian North American Air Defense command has been established at Colorado Springs to coordinate in planning and in actual war operations the work of more than 200,000 Americans and Canadians, 2,000 aircraft and hundreds of anti-aircraft weapons, ships and radar warning stations.

Gen. Earle E. Partridge of the United States Air Force is the commander, and Air Marshal C. Roy Siemon of the Royal Canadian Air Force is his deputy. The Canadian Parliament has ratified, though with strict reservations, the participation of the Royal Canadian Air Force in this integrated command. But far more important, to date, than the size of the Canadian air contribution is the geographical importance of Canadian territory to mutual defense.

### Three Radar Chains

Three radar chains of vital importance in the protection of United States territory against attacks by piloted planes, extend across Canadian territory. A Distant Early Warning line of about fifty-eight radar stations extends from Alaska across the Canadian Arctic and Haffin Island approximately along the seventieth parallel to Greenland. This line is being extended around the Alaskan periphery and down the Aleutian chain of islands, and connecting radar covers both coasts of Canada.

The so-called DEW line (distant early warning) can pick up aircraft up to 50,000 to 60,000 feet in altitude and can track them but it does not have a ground control interception capability. That is, the DEW line stations cannot vector, or direct, fighter aircraft to intercept an enemy plane.

The DEW line is backed up by a Canadian radar chain

that extends across Canada at about latitude 55 degrees N. This line is essentially a radar fence, consisting chiefly of unmanned gap-filler radar stations that can warn of an aircraft penetration but cannot determine direction or speed.

The Pine Tree chain which lies both north and south of the United States-Canadian border, is a full-fledged warning, tracking and ground-control intercepting line, which can vector interceptors to their target.

All these chains, chiefly on Canadian soil, are backed by local, or spot, radars in the United States, radar picket ships at sea, airborne radar packets that patrol along both coasts and from Newfoundland to the Azores and from Midway to the Aleutians, and by radar stations aboard artificial islands off the northeast coast.

Thus, in the age of piloted aircraft, the United States is fundamentally dependent upon Canada, and upon sites on Canadian soil, for adequate warning of air attack.

But technological developments are lessening this geographical dependence. The missile is complementing and may eventually replace to a large extent the piloted plane in strategic bombardment and in air defense. Development of a missile warning radar system, therefore, has a high priority today.

### DEW Line Limitations

Radar beams normally follow a straight line-of-sight path. None of the world's operational bombers now have ceilings of more than 60,000 feet. Most of them have considerably less performance.

The DEW line stations now in operation would not normally pick up an enemy aircraft beyond the curvature of the horizon, which, depending upon the altitude of the target and the height of the radar above sea level, might be 100 to 300 miles. But ballistic missiles arch scores of miles above the earth. Their apogee may be 400 to 800 miles high. Missile warning radar stations, therefore, may have ranges of 3,500 miles or more. Therefore nowhere as many sites are necessary.

At present the United States is planning, or has started, construction of two missile warning radars, neither of which is on Canadian soil. One is near Thule, Greenland; the other at Shemya in the Aleutian Islands. Their warning beams will overlap and give protective coverage to the entire North American Continent. But these two stations, as now planned, re-

quire tremendous power and enormous antennas, and their total cost, an estimated \$500,000,000, the two exceeds the entire cost of the fifty-eight stations of the DEW line by about one-third.

A third missile warning station to cover the northeastern horizon may eventually be erected in or near the British Isles or in Iceland.

These new stations, plus other technological developments in radar that may take over the horizon detection possible, have reduced to some extent United States dependence upon Canadian geography. In a strict military sense it is, and always has been, quite clear that Canada is far more dependent upon the United States than vice-versa and this is more than ever true in the age of long-range radar.

But the mutual interdependence of the two countries—politically, economically, psychologically, culturally and strategically—is clear. A far better defense for both can be provided if there is a true unity of planning and of command.

News Analysis



# Changes in Air Tactics

## U. S. Command's Global Striking Power New Planes and Bases Help Improve

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

New types of supersonic aircraft, missiles, vertical and short-take-off systems and launching sites and bases with concrete and steel shelters are giving a new look to the Tactical Air Command.

The unit, commanded by Gen. O. P. Weyland, has its headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

For all these reasons the group of dedicated airmen at Langley Field, who have been fighting sometimes a lone fight for what they feel is an important defense force, believe that the Tactical Air Command is the rapier as compared with the Strategic Command's broadsword.

This year the tactical Command will be utilizing seven categories of aircraft and missiles, but developments may reduce these to about three. The present-day fighters are the North American F-100C SuperSabre and the Lockheed F-104C Starfighter. Fighter-bombers are North American F-100D and F-100F, the McDonnell F-101A Voodoo, and the Republic F-105B and F-105D Thunderchief. In light tactical bombers, Martin's version of the British Canberra, the B-57, is gradually being supplemented and replaced by the Douglas E-66.

For reconnaissance, photographic versions of the McDonnell F-101, and of the Douglas B-66 are being used. Two tactical winged missiles or pilotless aircraft—the Martin Matador TM-61C and the Martin Mace TM-76A—are in use.

### Advantages Claimed

The Tactical Air Command claims these advantages for its fast fighter-bombers, light bombers and tactical missiles.

- Quick reaction.
- Versatility of weapons—either atomic weapons of many varied yields from kilotons to megatons, or conventional weapons of many varied types.
- Delivery accuracies.
- Strategic mobility—the Tactical Command can put an air task force tailored to the need and self-sustaining for a fifteen to thirty-day period into any part of the world very quickly to fight any kind of war.

The Tactical Air Command believes that the development of modern techniques for length launching or vertical take-off and the construction of shelters of concrete and steel will enable it to preserve some of its own scattered planes from an initial enemy attack. These developments make it possible for the command to get there first, to fight and with the maximum effect.

It could be of great importance in a general war, particularly where a quick reaction force is considerably more mobile than mass. The Tactical

Command's planes are also far faster than the Strategic Command's bombers, and since they are smaller they are more difficult targets for enemy radar. Moreover, Tactical aircraft and crews are better fitted and trained for low-level attacks to escape the beams of enemy radar.

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For combat airlift the command uses the Fairchild C-123 Provider and the Lockheed C-130A Hercules. The air refueling tanker now in use is the Boeing KB-50J. Trends indicate that many of these present categories may merge.

A future 25,000-pound aircraft with vertical take-off and landing capabilities and limited all weather capabilities and equipped with air-to-air missiles or air-to-surface missiles may take over part of both the day fighter and fighter-bomber role. Jet aircraft and tactical missiles, many of them now in production or under development by the Army, will assume many of the burdens of air defense and close support.

A 50,000 pound all-weather plane, with short take-off and landing capabilities, capable of reconnaissance and strike missions, and fitted to carry bombs or air-to-surface missiles may eventually replace the present day fighter and tactical missile categories. Ballistic missiles, probably

operated by the Army, will eventually replace the tactical winged missiles now in use. A plane of the C-130 type, grossing about 130,000 pounds, may become the work horse for the assault airlift mission. Floating wing tips, or a kind of towed coating gas tank, the use of high energy fuels and other technical developments may make the air refueling tanker unnecessary.

The Tactical Air Command believes that the piloted aircraft will still be essential for the foreseeable future, although the numbers will be reduced and some of the plane's missions will be taken over by missiles. The Army is prepared to assume with its own missiles more and more of the burdens of its own close support and air defense.

But the Tactical Air Command thinks the development of modern technology and of new types of aircraft and missiles will equip it as an air police force able to get to the scene of action first and equipped to attack targets at a maximum sortie rate and with optimum accuracy.

# Army's Missile Family

## Demonstration Emphasizes Progress But Many Problems Remain Unsolved

By HANSON W. BALDWIN  
Special to The New York Times

EL PASO, Tex., July 2—Four hundred Government officials, high-ranking officers, industry executives and newspaper representatives left El Paso today, convinced that the missile is here to stay.

A two-day demonstration at Fort Bliss and the White Sands Missile Range, which ended yesterday, revealed

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the new look of tomorrow's Army. The largest and probably the most smoothly executed "shoot" of its kind displayed for the public the United States Army's "family" of missiles.

Nine different types of missiles were fired—all of them successfully and with precision—and others were on exhibition. But despite the successful flights of the "birds" the two-day "shoot" indicated that the missile, as an operational field weapon for a modern army, was still more promise than reality.

During the demonstration anti-aircraft missiles shot drones out of the skies and surface-to-surface missiles struck within yards of their aiming points.

### Two Minor Failures

There were only two minor failures. A Nike Ajax anti-aircraft missile failed to fire but a substitute was immediately launched and a pilotless B-17 bomber cruising at 15,000 feet altitude went down in flames.

A new-type warhead on a Talos anti-aircraft missile failed to detonate and though the missile flew a normal path to intercept it, the drone forty miles from the launching site survived.

But the success, precision and apparent ease of the firings obscured a few basic facts.

First and most important, there are few operational missiles actually in production and use by the Army. The rest are still under development or evaluation. Some are years away from issue to troops and at least two are presently judged unsatisfactory and may never be standardized. These are the Little John and the Dart.

### Still Unreliable

Second, the missile is still a cantankerous, temperamental and none-too-reliable way of delivering firepower.

The missile shoot here was carefully rehearsed and all the "birds" were carefully groomed for their public debut.

The firings were conducted under ideal proving-ground conditions, which in no way resembled combat operations.

The targets shot down by the anti-aircraft missiles were slow-speed low-altitude drones; in fact, one of the problems of testing missiles is the lack of a supersonic drone target.

Third, most missiles are still bulky and cumbersome and require long preparation for launching. Their ground mobility and tactical flexibility are consequently limited, and maintenance problems are major.

### Inaccurate and Costly

Fourth, many missiles are so inaccurate, particularly the longer-range surface-to-surface weapons, and all of these are so expensive that their use can be justified only if a nuclear warhead is utilized. Thus, missiles carry built-in technical, political and psychological limitations that restrict their usefulness in brushfire, or small war, situations.

Following is the present status of the Army missile program, as revealed by officers and industry representatives during the two-day demonstration.

### JUPITER

This 1,500-mile intermediate-range ballistic missile, developed by the Army but operated by the Air Force, is in small-scale production and is still being tested. The first units are scheduled for deployment to Europe in December, but even if the schedule is met neither this missile nor the Air Force's Thor will be either very reliable or very accurate.

### REDSTONE

This liquid-propelled 200-mile ballistic missile is in production and is in limited cooperation with a British Army battalion now on its way to Europe.

This solid-propellant second-generation missile—smaller, much more mobile and simpler than the Redstone, and with ranges of 200 to 500 miles—is scheduled to supplement and replace the liquid-fuel rocket. Pershing is in its early stages of design and development and probably will not be ready for operational use until 1962, if then.

### CORPORAL

Six battalions of this ninety-mile liquid-propelled rocket are assigned to the United States Seventh Army in Germany and two battalions to northern Italy. The Corporal has been in operational use since late 1956.

### SERGEANT

This solid-propellant rocket, slated as the second-generation successor to the Corporal, is still under test and development and may be ready for issue to troops in 1960-61. It is expected to perform the same function as the Corporal although it is only thirty-two feet long, compared with the Corporal's forty-five. It will require only half the manpower and one-fifth the number of vehicles used in the Corporal system.

### HONEST JOHN

This 762-millimeter free-flight unguided artillery rocket has been in service in this country and overseas for some time. A specially modified "Chopper John" lightweight system is designed for helicopter airlift for short distances, but the rocket is too bulky and heavy for practical long-range airlift purposes and without a nuclear warhead it has little utility.

### LITTLE JOHN

This 318-millimeter rocket was intended to provide the mobility and airlift capability that the Honest John lacks, while preserving its range and power. But the uneven burning rate of the rocket's solid propellants have produced such inaccuracies that the Little John is being re-evaluated and further development may be dropped or the project sharply modified.

### LACROSSE

This short-range battlefield field artillery missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, is still under development. It may come into production and operational use in 1960 or later.

### DART

This wire-controlled anti-tank weapon, the outgrowth of a German World War II development, has a doubtful future. It is large, bulky and expensive as compared with a French version of the same weapon, the SS-10. The project is under evaluation and may be dropped.

### NIKE AJAX

This anti-aircraft weapon of twenty-five-mile slant range

and 60,000-foot altitude has been guarding American cities for some years.

### NIKE HERCULES

This twenty-seven-foot, 5,000-pound missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, is now on anti-aircraft sites in Chicago, New York and the Washington-Baltimore area. It will gradually replace or supplement the Nike Ajax. The Hercules has a range of about fifty to seventy-five miles and can fire to 100,000-foot altitudes. It is in production, but only a few production models have been fired and modifications are still being made.

### NIKE ZEUS

The anti-ballistic-missile version of the Nike family is in early stages of development. It will probably not be in operation until 1962-63 or later.

### HAWK

This short-range, sixteen-foot, 1,285-pound missile, primarily for use against low-flying aircraft, is in advanced stages of test and development. It may be in operational use by troops in 1959 or 1960.

### TALOS

A land-based version of the Navy's Ramjet anti-aircraft missile has been under test by the Army. The Army feels this weapon has about the same range and altitude characteristics as the Nike Hercules and the land-based version will probably, therefore, be eliminated.

All these missiles, displayed or discussed in the two-day demonstration here, proved, as did the presence of hundreds of representatives of the country's biggest industries, that missiles are now big business and, despite their limitations, are here to stay.

Major progress in the missile field has been made by the Army and the other services. The schedule at the White Sands missile range during May—500 missile missions, with 240 "hot" or actual firings—is an index of the almost frenetic pace of progress.

But two needed notes of caution were sounded during the demonstration. Dr. W. H. Pickering, director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology, declared that we "must not forget that Russia can probably match the missiles shown here, weapon for weapon and that we do not lead the rest of the world in missile technology."

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, warned that the "battle was not won by hardware." He said he did not believe that the new weapons replaced men, but rather, because of their complexity, they postulated new demands for better men.