

15 December 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Hanson Baldwin, NEW YORK TIMES, had lunch with the Director in the South Building at 1:00 PM and I was present. Baldwin asked Mr. McCone what his plans were regarding the Agency. Mr. McCone replied that he had not settled yet on his plans because of the sad incident which occurred when he lost his wife, Rosemary. Baldwin, after expressing his regret, then stated that he believed Adlai Stevenson seems to have strong influence with the President, which Baldwin thinks, is most unfortunate, and that Stevenson lives in a world of morality quite distinct from the world as it is. Baldwin said he wished Mr. Stevenson would take a more realistic look at the world, and later he told me he wished the President would take a more realistic look at Mr. Stevenson.

2. Baldwin asked Mr. McCone where the centers of authority exist in Washington. Mr. McCone said he had not been back here long enough to determine where the centers lie but he thought that from the early days of the new Administration they seem now to be settling down to using some of the established methods and means, such as the Planning Staff of the National Security Council.

3. Baldwin said he had been to the Pentagon and talked to people there, including Roswell Gilpatric, for whom he has great respect and whom he thinks is a balance wheel to McNamara. Baldwin believes McNamara has a wonderful mind but makes decisions too quickly and then won't change. He said the press was so delighted yesterday with Gilpatric when he said that maybe he had made a mistake in going along with the recall of the Reserves and National Guardsmen in the Berlin crisis. Baldwin said that actually the mistake had been made by McNamara and that he, Baldwin, had advised McNamara against doing this sometime ago. Baldwin said McNamara's 120 questions to the military during a period of

crisis had everybody working overtime and it certainly did not create goodwill.

4. He said he, Baldwin, ran in the NEW YORK TIMES Gen. Earl Partridge's report that there be a single chief of staff, which would mean a single commander for all the military forces. He had stated in his article that this was from a document labeled SECRET. Baldwin maintained it should not have been classified at all. Mr. McCone said that that is one of the things that he will watch in CIA because it is so easy to over-classify a document. Baldwin said his point was ^{that} some of these things were classified merely because they do not want the press to get them.

5. Baldwin asked the Director if the Russians in recent tests tested an anti-missile missile. Mr. McCone said there is no hard evidence to indicate that such a test was made. Baldwin asked if we think the Russians have an anti-missile missile. The Director said no.

6. Baldwin asked why the U.S. during the moratorium did not prepare for tests. Mr. McCone said that he thought Baldwin had a good question. He remarked that President Eisenhower appeared to have the opinion that the Russians would cheat during the moratorium and that there had been a quantum gain in the past three years on the part of the Russians which would be a very serious thing if three years from now they again had a quantum gain while the U.S. failed to resume testing. Baldwin stated that Adlai Stevenson and Mr. Wiesner both opposed resuming atmospheric testing. Mr. McCone doubted that Wiesner had made such a statement, but Baldwin said he had made the statement to John Finney, of the NEW YORK TIMES.

7. There was a brief mention of the Cuban invasion attempt. Mr. McCone in answering a question said that not only CIA, which had some blame, but other parts of the Government were involved in the Cuban incident.


8. There followed some discussion as to whether valuable results might be

obtained if there were an evaluation board to estimate the probability of success of invasions like the Cuban one, just as there is now a board to evaluate intelligence estimates. Mr. McCone said business does such estimating and that he thought there might be some merit in such an undertaking. Baldwin said he doubted this, but they both agreed it was an interesting idea.

9. Baldwin said he was mystified by the U.S. policy toward the Congo and he blamed Adlai Stevenson for our position. He asked if the DCI considered the situation serious. The DCI said it was very serious and could develop into a dangerous situation for the United States.

10. At about 2:15 PM I drove Baldwin to the airfield.

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~~STANLEY J. GROGAN~~
Assistant to the DCI

cc: DDCI