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## Indonesia's Sukarno Adds More Trappings Of Red Dictatorship

### He Tightens Curbs on Press, Political Parties but Much Of Army Is Anti-Communist

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JAKARTA — Sick joke, Indonesian style: "One thing about Moechtar Lubis, you can always find him at home."

The unfortunate Mr. Lubis, you see, has been under house arrest for nearly four years, a victim of President Sukarno's "guided democracy." The handsome six-footer, who has taken up oil painting and woodworking in his enforced seclusion, used to run the prominent Indonesia Raya, a newspaper which reflected Mr. Lubis' views once too often in scathing attacks on the Indonesian president.

Never tried, the former editor now appears to face diminishing prospects for freedom. President Sukarno's rule of this richly endowed, tropical island republic of 98 million inhabitants has now taken on the trappings of a totalitarian Communist state, though with the fangs filed down a bit.

The 58-year-old chief executive governs with a combination of semi-mystic ideology, his own enormous personal magnetism, and his conviction that any deviation from his personal socialist concept of running the nation is "un-Indonesian" and dangerously subversive.

#### Two Legislative Bodies

Witness these developments of the past year: President Sukarno dissolved the elected parliament and created two new legislative bodies whose members are all appointed by the president. One is the 283-delegate "Mutual Help" parliament, installed in June; the other is the Peoples' Consultative Congress of 610 seats which convened this month. Both contain not only carefully selected members of friendly political parties, including the Communists, but also representatives of "functional groups": The Indonesian army, labor, farmers, the Moslem clergy, artists and women's organizations. They're expected to rubber-stamp policies laid down by the cabinet.

In mid-August, the president ordered the dissolution of the prominent opposition Masjumi (Moslem) Party and the small Indonesian Socialist Party on the grounds that both had helped fan the unsuccessful 1958 military revolt in Sumatra against the Jakarta government. The rebellion still sputters on in central Sumatra and the Celebes in the form of weak guerrilla activity, keeping a large segment of the loyalist Indonesian army tied down.

On September 13, Mr. Sukarno announced a ban on all political activities "by individuals or groups" effective until November 30. After that date, political meetings or rallies will require specific government approval. Formation of new political parties has been prohibited since July 5, 1959.

And on November 1, the government issued new regulations to put Indonesia's press under firm state control. Henceforth, articles critical of Sukarno and his policies are forbidden. A cabinet-level committee has the right to suspend publication of any paper that shuns government "guidance."

Not surprisingly, President Sukarno describes his "guided democracy" as "somewhat the same" as the government structure of Communist China and the Soviet Union. The attractive feature of these countries, he says, is the single party, whose function is "to imbue

all activities, everything, with spirit, with enthusiasm."

The developments in Indonesia are important to U.S. businessmen, who had an estimated \$163 million invested in Indonesia at the beginning of this year. The American taxpayer has a stake, too. In the period from December, 1949, when Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, to last June 30, net U.S. grants, credits and other aid to the new nation totaled about \$250 million, including \$40 million in the year ended June 30. These net figures take into account payments made by Indonesia on some U.S. loans.

#### An Instrument of Policy

The Indonesian president is now busy organizing the National Front Party to fulfill a Communist-like role as an instrument of government policy. Specifically exempt from the current restraints on political activities, the National Front is being assembled from members of the ruling Nationalist Party (Mr. Sukarno's closest supporter), the politically fuzzy Nahdatul Ulama Party, and a sympathetic cross-section of occupational groups.

The Indonesian leader also likens what he calls the continuing Indonesian revolution to the Communist concept of constant revolution in building a Red society. The process here, states an Indonesian government communique issued a few weeks ago, involves "eradicating all foreign concepts such as liberalism and opposition, so as to arrive at a just and prosperous society which is founded on the Political Manifesto, and USDEK."

The former, often simply called Manipol, a government spokesman informs one, is the president's speech last year announcing the reinstatement of the dictatorial 1945 constitution and the abolition of the elected parliament. USDEK is an abbreviation standing for the 1945 constitution, Indonesian socialism, guided democracy, guided economy and the Indonesian "identity." It's all wrapped around the symbolic five principles of Pantja Sila as formulated by President Sukarno: Belief in the one Moslem god and in humanity, nationalism, sovereignty of the people and social justice. A vigorous program of popular indoctrination in Manipol and USDEK has been launched through schools and government organs.

Even at President Sukarno's big receptions in his white palace, where sparrows soar between crystal chandeliers and the air is heavy with the aroma of spicy Indonesian cigarettes, this vaporous doctrine is the subject of an occasional, behind-the-hand snicker. Outside, criticism is more pointed. "When you look at the way Sukarno is running the country you know it's all nothing but words," snaps a youthful Indonesian insurance man.

#### A Mid-Day Break

Sukarno's influence ranges far and wide. Because downtown Jakarta appeared too deserted in the evening, he ordered stores to remain open until eight o'clock, taking a four-hour mid-day break. Couples out dancing at the fashionable, open-air Wisma Nusantara feel a gentle tap on the shoulder from the manager if they swing into a jitterbug break; the president finds such frivolous dancing distasteful.

Despite the chief executive's open admiration for the structure of the Communist state, his relations with the Communist bloc are anything but warm. Mr. Sukarno summarily ordered the deportation of tens of thousands of Chinese residents who controlled retailing in rural areas. Red China's outraged official protests and propaganda blasts were ignored by Indonesian officials who carried out their plan to the letter. Relations between the two countries sank to a low early this year when the Red Chinese consul in east Borneo was put briefly under house arrest for obstructing the deportation. Only in recent weeks has Peiping softened its radio attacks on Indonesia.

Last spring, Soviet Premier Khrushchev

toured neutralist Indonesia, exhibiting open scorn for Indonesian handicrafts and culture alike. The proud Indonesians made not the slightest effort to ingratiate themselves with the Soviet premier—but still won a \$250 million Russian economic credit.

But President Sukarno's relations with the Indonesian Communist Party have been conspicuously close. The party has been careful to support unwaveringly all Sukarno policies, which has often placed the Reds in the position of presidential allies. Though officials of the banned Masjumi and Socialist parties speak bravely of continuing their struggle against the present government underground, it's apparent that the Communist Party, headed by English-speaking D. N. Aidit, is the best organized to exploit the political bans over the long haul. And after November 30 it will be allowed once more to function as a legal party, with roughly a 25% representation in legislative bodies.

#### Economic Stagnation

On the Communists' side is the fact that President Sukarno's preoccupation with strengthening central political power and implanting socialism has led the economy, rich in rubber, oil, copra and mineral resources, to stagnation and a standard of living lower than before World War II. It's true, though, that economics in a backward land like Indonesia often is a minor factor in politics.

More important, much of Lt. General Abdul Haris Nasution's 200,000-man Indonesian army is strongly anti-Communist and views with considerable misgivings President Sukarno's constant flirtation with the Reds. Says a high-ranking member of the defunct Socialist Party: "The president considered us far more dangerous than the Communists, something the army could never understand."

This politician, like some others, sees a showdown ahead between Sukarno and the army over Communist influence. Though it's said that Gen. Nasution himself, a career officer, is loyal to the president and finds the idea of active opposition distasteful, other army officers are impatient for a change. One possibility: A coup by junior commanders.

Sukarno's suspicion that his grip on Indonesia may be slipping could easily account for the trend toward totalitarian control. He found tangible evidence of top-level army dissent at a significant mid-September conference with regional commanders and the 38-man cabinet.

#### Commanders Crack Down

Alarmed at the presidential order dissolving the Masjumi and Socialist Parties, army commanders in south Borneo, south Sumatra and the southern Celebes Islands took it upon themselves to crack down on Communist Party activities in their regions in August and September. At the September conference, they demanded that the president uphold their actions. Sukarno responded with the ban on all political activities. But under army pressure, Red boss Aidit was called in for intensive interrogation and the party's official organ, Harian Rakjat, has been alternately suspended and reinstated over the past few weeks.

For years now, Mr. Sukarno has been able to hold a delicate balance of power between the Communists and the Indonesian army. And he remains the only real unifying force in the nation. During his frequent overseas trips, Jakarta politicians take to acrid squabbling among themselves; only Sukarno can tame them, which he does on his return, to everyone's obvious relief. "Sukarno's strength lies in the weakness of his opponents," observes a prominent anti-Sukarno politician.

"Sukarno has always believed God intended him for power," comments a Western diplomat here. "So he's convinced that anyone opposing him is opposing Indonesia. And the many Indonesians who regard him as their one and only leader aren't at all sure he's wrong."

Yet it remains to be seen whether the gentle Indonesian people will tolerate their spiritual leader's deepening plunge into undisguised totalitarian rule.

Japan Times  
Oct 26 1960

### Background of Elections

### Background of Elections

# Japan's Voting Rate

# Party Preferences

## Turnout Big—Political Consciousness Low

## Choice Depends on Education, Age

Back-stage campaigning for the coming House of Representatives election scheduled for Nov. 20 have already entered the final stretch. Prospective candidates for the election have been conducting such drives for the past five months because the election was anticipated just when the former Kishi regime collapsed last July. For this, the coming election has been called a "marathon election." The following is the first of a series of articles to appear on the subject of the "Background of Japanese Elections."—Editor

not a low rate. It was also disclosed that those who are well conscious of their role as voters also show a high rate.

The survey also indicated that higher voting rates were registered in urban centers than rural communities. This can be interpreted to mean that people with high political consciousness generally live in urban districts.

If highly political-conscious persons really live in urban centers and those who are not live in the country, a strange conclusion can be drawn, that in Japan the voters are not very politically minded but their voting rate is high.

This is because people in rural areas are more easily rounded up for voting than those in urban centers.

The people in rural communities generally remain "feudalistic" and "obedient" to authority as well as being cooperative in "no-abstention drives" of local bosses. They are, moreover, liable to take joint action as suggested by the fact that their ballots center mainly on a single candidate and their voting rate is high.

The Japanese system of voting, needless to say, is based on the "secret balloting" method. People in the country, however, if solicited by a specific candidate to vote for him after having been given a monetary gift or entertained, generally become inclined to vote for him.

Such a trend, however, is gradually losing ground. An old saying still proves true, however, that the Tories gain when the weather is fine and the renovationists gain when it rains. This means that people in rural communities tend to abstain from voting when it rains or blows and the Tories who generally have their constituencies in such areas suffer more or less from it.

Election strategists for the Tories, therefore, must be good weather forecasters. They must at the same time be farm experts.

For the Tory election strategists, an election during the busy farming season must be avoided at all costs if they want a good turnout of voters and more voters for the conservatives.

The coming Lower House election was originally scheduled for Sunday, Nov. 27, but it was later advanced to Sunday, Nov. 20. The Government's action incurred stiff objection of the conservative forces in western Japan because the election date falls on the rice-harvesting period in that district.

Thus, in Japan the degree of the people's political consciousness and the voting rate do not stay on properly related levels.

This is the second of a series on the background of Japanese elections.—Editor

Figures of the Statistical Research Institute show that voters' preferences of political parties depend largely on their age and education. This suggests that the choice of parties changes according to increasing of age. The following are the results of the checkup made by the same institute in November 1958 and November 1959.

Rate of party preference by age and education			
Education	Age	Liberal-Democratic Party	Socialist Party
Elementary & junior	20-29	42%	58%
	30-39	39%	61%
	40 up	72%	28%
High school graduates	20-29	38%	62%
	30-39	44%	56%
	40 up	62%	38%
College graduates	20-29	33%	67%
	30-39	69%	31%
	40 up	75%	25%

According to the above table, those who have received college education are largely sympathetic to the progressive parties during their 20s but as they grow older they begin to support the conservative party.

Voters with less education, too, support the progressive parties in their youth but they differ from college graduates in that their switch to the conservatives takes place at an older age. If any generalization may be made, it is that there is a swing of votes to the conservative party with the advancing age of the voters.

The institute estimates that an average, well-educated man undergoes this "conversion" at the age of 35 years. In the case of women of similar educational background, the age is between 25-30.

According to the institute's statistics on voters' turnout, the lowest is recorded by those in the 25-29 age bracket followed:

by the 20-24 group. Voters who show the deepest interest are between 35 and 40.

Occupation-wise, factory workers and clerks show the lowest interest, whereas those engaged in specialized work and sales show higher interest.

From the above figures and facts, we may derive the conclusion that conservative inclined voters turn out in larger numbers than progressive party supporters. It was believed

that the younger generation and factory workers were more enthusiastic about politics than the older generation and store workers. But as the fact stands, it poses a great problem for the progressive parties in collecting more votes.

Another point that should be noted is that urban dwellers whose turnout is lower than that of the rural population, constitute a large number of "floating votes."

By dividing these votes equally among the candidates the actual number of votes to be garnered by each candidate can be estimated, the institute says. There seems to be a law that floating votes are shared equally among the different candidates. This, in turn, means that the relatively well-educated population of urban areas are surprisingly "flexible" in their political inclinations.

In the preceding installment of this series, we noted that the high turnout of the rural population is accounted for by the fact that farmers and fishermen are "mobilized" to the polls.

But now we must admit that the middle class city residents, too, are quite indifferent to elections. It seems that we have a long way to go to get the Japanese public interested in politics—an important requirement for maintaining a parliamentary system of government.

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## Japanese, Soviets Condemn Treaty

MOSCOW (UPI)—Delegations of Afro-Asian solidarity committees of Japan and the Soviet Union have issued a joint statement condemning the Japanese-American military treaty, Tass reported Friday.

Tass said the Japanese delegation was headed by Taketo Makinouchi.

The greater the effort to increase the voting rate, the lower becomes the rate of voluntary voting. Drives against abstentions or the "rounding up" of voters seem to hamper the normal turnout of voters.

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