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June 26, 1970

STAT



This came in the mail. Thought you might be interested.

Very truly yours,

BRIAN HESSLER
Administrative Assistant

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A PATRIOTIC
VOICE OF FREEDOM

LIFE LINES

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Castro's

Cuba's Spy Network



Spooks

Orlando Castro Hidalgo, 32, was born in Cuba's Oriente Province. When Fidel Castro captured the attention of hopeful Cubans as a colorful rebel leader opposing Batista, Orlando Castro (no relation to Fidel) joined the rebel army. After Batista fled, Orlando Castro was recruited into the intelligence organization known as the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) which has agents throughout Latin America. DGI has since grown to the point of placing agents in European countries and even in Stockholm.

Orlando was sent to Paris to handle the day-to-day flow of agents passing through from capitals all over the world as they practiced their trade—gathering information from contacts from Africa to Peru.

He defected to the United States when he requested asylum March 31, 1969, at the American Embassy in Luxembourg. He was summoned to testify before the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on Internal Security Oct. 16, 1969.

"I disassociated myself from the Cuban revolution because it delivered Cuba as a colony of the Soviet Union. I saw an economy floundering, maintained only by the tremendous sacrifice and long hours of labor of the average Cuban who wanted a better life for his children. I saw a people deceived."

In his testimony, printed in the Subcommittee report, *Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean, Part 20*, Orlando revealed the DGI's heavy-handed influence in guerrilla activity in

Latin America and the "new tactics" governing guerrilla warfare since Che Guevara's misadventure and death in Bolivia.

One of the best examples of DGI guerrilla-oriented operations was to exfiltrate Col. Francisco Caamano Deno from Europe to Cuba in October 1967.

Caamano was the president of the Red-backed government in the Dominican Republic following the Dominican revolution of April 1965. In October 1967, Caamano disappeared from his military attache post in London.* He disappeared because he went to Cuba with the help of the DGI.

What happened was this. He disappeared from The Hague where he was visiting the night of October 24, 1967. He came to Paris the next day where Orlando Castro saw him. Orlando's role was to watch Caamano walk down the street to make sure that he wasn't followed. When he saw that he was not, he waved to another operative who was waiting in a nearby cafe and who telephoned ahead to an important DGI officer known by the pseudonym, Armando, who was waiting a few blocks away.

Armando had come from Havana to Paris especially to direct the Caamano operation. He was accompanied by Julian Lopez Diaz, the Dominican Republic desk officer of the DGI, and both of them had entered France with false passports and went to Geneva a few days before Caamano arrived in Paris, returning in time for

*Leftwing and rightwing figures had been shuffled out of the Dominican Republic in an effort to remove "disturbing influences" after U.S. troops landed in Santo Domingo in April 1965.

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Caamano's arrival in Geneva was an en route stop for Caamano and Armando who left Paris by train on October 26th. Orlando knew about the operation, because he had to fly to Prague on October 27 to deliver Armando a passport which he had forgotten and left in Paris. Armando, who used two false passports in this operation, needed the forgotten one to get from Prague to Havana.

It is interesting to note that during this operation Caamano wore a toupee and had shaved his mustache. This whole operation as well as subsequent activities of Caamano was known as "Operacion Estrella."

The most important thing Orlando remembers about Julian Lopez is that he ran a very bad operation in Mexico which led to the Mexican authorities forcing him to leave the country in 1966. Julian Lopez was supporting the shipment of arms to revolutionaries in Guatemala across the Mexican-Guatemalan border. The Mexican authorities discovered this and arrested Julian Lopez who was carrying thousands of dollars at the time. Orlando is hazy about this venture, but was told by DGI colleagues never to discuss the operation in front of Julian Lopez or to mention it to him. Apparently Julian Lopez became nearly hysterical anytime the operation was mentioned.

Orlando says DGI support of revolutions is shown by past activities in Venezuela. He became aware of some of these operations while in Paris. During the first three months of 1969, he knew of 15 Venezuelans who came through Paris from Caracas on their way to guerrilla training in Cuba, but personally participated in operations with nine of them. He helped members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba return via Paris from a tour of duty with the Venezuelan guerrillas. He arranged lodging, got money to buy tickets to fly to Prague and obtained Czechoslovakian visas to Prague. All the Cubans were traveling on false Venezuelan passports.

Orlando discussed strategy in Venezuela with Orestes Guerra Matos, Central Committee member, other Cubans and Venezuelans. Guerra told Orlando that Venezuela's pacification program was death to the guer-

rilla movement in Venezuela because the guerrillas were exhausted and discouraged by lack of success. He expected the Venezuelans to quit, and only the Cubans could maintain the guerrilla struggle. Guerra said that it was necessary to start guerrilla actions, in order to provoke Caldera's government into repressive measures. Only in this manner could the Venezuelan guerrillas be forced to continue the struggle.

Guerra and others commented critically on a split in the Venezuelan guerrillas. They said that Douglas Bravo was not a real revolutionary and they even suspected that he used Cuban-supplied money to buy a factory and an apartment house. They also said that Luben Petkoff, a former aide of Bravo, was now fighting under Cuban leadership. They mentioned that Petkoff wasn't that good a soldier but at least he followed Cuban leadership. The leader of the Venezuelan guerrillas who followed the Cuban line was a Cuban known by the pseudonym of "Antonio."

"Antonio" arrived at the Machurucuto landing in May of 1967 and had earned the respect of Venezuelan guerrillas because of his "combative spirit" and leadership qualities.

(A number of Cuban guerrillas were landed by sea at Machurucuto, Venezuela, in May 1967. Some of the Cubans were killed at that time and some escaped into the mountains. The ship which landed the guerrillas was the Cuban fishing vessel, *Sierra*. It is still an active ship of the Cuban fishing fleet.)

There has been a great deal of public speculation about changes in guerrilla strategy since the failure of the Cuban operation in Bolivia in 1967 and the death of "Che" Guevara. Orlando discussed the strategy with the central committee members who came through Paris and with Armando Lopez after his return from his important trip to Havana during the winter of 1968-69. Orlando prepared a summary of this strategy:

"The strategy of *fidelismo* for the export of the revolution to Latin America has not changed, but the tactics have. There has been a reduction in quantity, which



Don't Look Now Senores—your Cover is Broken!

Orlando. *It is interesting to note that all ambassadors to Africa are actually DGI officers. In fact, nearly all Cuban officials, if not all, in Africa are DGI officers under Ministry of Foreign Relations cover.*

Mr. Sourwine. *All the ambassadors in Africa?*

Orlando. *All the ambassadors in Africa are DGI officers except that of Syria, I believe. . . all ambassadors are center chiefs. I know that because they all passed through Paris.*

Mr. Sourwine. *Why Africa? Why are all the ambassadors actually DGI officers?*

Orlando. *Because the DGI is interested in fomenting revolutions in Africa, but Ministry of Foreign Relations has no interest in Africa because there are no commercial or diplomatic objectives in black Africa. . . .*

In Paris, the DGI recruited Francisco Ramos, the counselor, as a DGI collaborator. This recruitment was considered very important because it was the first one. . . Ramos' DGI pseudonym is "Flores" and he now owes his loyalty to the chief of center, not the ambassador, even though the ambassador doesn't know it.

Mr. Sourwine. *Anything you wish to add on the DGI in Europe?*

Orlando. *I know a few officers. The DGI chief of center in Vienna, Austria, is Armando Galan.*

Mr. Sourwine. *Why would the DGI want a center in Vienna?*

Orlando. *I really don't know except to repeat that the DGI is very ambitious. I hear they are going to open a DGI center in Stockholm even.*

Mr. Sourwine. *Mr. Tarabochia (Subcommittee Chief Investigator), do you know anything about that?*

Mr. Tarabochia. *Well, I think that has happened. The DGI officer in The Hague, Aldo Rodriguez Camps, was just transferred to Stockholm. Undoubtedly, he is opening up the espionage center in Stockholm. . . .*

Orlando. *The DGI has very large centers in Paris, Madrid, Rome, and Mexico City. There are one- or two-man posts in nearly all other countries where Cuba has any foreign policy objectives. London, Vienna, and African countries are some examples. Also, I was told that there are important DGI centers in Canada and New York. I was told that every officer assigned to the Cuban United Mission in New York, except the permanent representative (Alarcon), is a DGI officer. ***

they want to turn into quality. This is in regards to the number of guerrillas that will go to Cuba for training. Past mistakes and failures have made them meditate very much in this sense.

"Current and future guerrillas will be carefully and meticulously selected. What shall not be repeated in the future: anarchic and massive training of guerrillas; training of men who respond to guerrilla leaders who do not follow the Cuban line and disapprove sending Cubans to Latin America; training of guerrillas who follow Douglas Bravo's line; training of men who maintain a passive attitude, such as the ones who were trained

for Leonel Brizola, the former Brazilian governor; training of guerrillas who might be capable of disobeying *fidelismo*, such as Thiago de Mello, former Brazilian diplomat. From past experiences they will continue with the training of natives from every Latin-American country, but surely under the slogan of 'less quantity and more quality.'

"Cuban combatants will be sent only when a guerrilla has reached the advanced stage and when the natives themselves 'ask' for them. But if Fidel is interested in a specific country he will always find natives who will ask for the help of Cuban combatants,

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and it does not matter whether there are natives who reject the Cubans!

"The Cubans are under orders to stay no matter what, even in cases like Venezuela, where Douglas Bravo, the guerrilla leader, fears that the Cubans will try to direct the guerrilla and, therefore, has categorically stated that he does not accept the Cubans. In spite of that, the Cubans remain there under the command of a Cuban named Antonio. This is what Cuban *comandantes* of the Central Committee have said when they stopped in Paris after several years with the Venezuelan guerrillas.

"Cubans will go to the guerrillas as simple soldiers, without rank and without demanding 'political and military command,' for they are under instructions to control the guerrillas by their political and guerrilla warfare knowledge. This is how the leaders will emerge. Example, Antonio in Venezuela.

"They will not repeat the impositions of Che, who said in Bolivia: 'I am the political-military leader of the guerrillas.'

"They will not give an international character to the guerrillas until the unit has reached a solid, advanced stage. The natives themselves must be the first ones to ask for help from other revolutionary movements. Sure! The Cubans will create

the conditions themselves at the right time and whenever it is to their advantage.

"They are going to continue helping guerrilla movements in several countries, which will cause a division of forces. In this way there will be no possibility of destroying a successful but isolated revolution. Here they will follow Che's theory of creating 'one, two, many Vietnams.'

"Fundamentally, the revolution is made in the countryside and not in the city because the political-military command of the guerrillas has to be in the countryside. The political command in the city and the military command in the countryside is disastrous. According to Fidel, he is not opposed to urban guerrillas, but neither does he think that this is fundamental.

"Surely there is going to be a change in relations between Fidel and the old political parties. In his agreement with the Soviets he promised he would not publicly defame those parties. The Soviets warned Fidel that public criticism of the old Communist parties was creating anticommunism in Latin America; also, because they are well organized, they cannot be excluded from the struggle.

"Because this is a recent agreement it is impossible to know much about it, but the results will be seen in actual practice."**