

care now. Scholarships, totaling \$29 million, would be provided for low-income medical and dental students. A similar amount would be budgeted for training physicians' assistants. Medical schools would be eligible for \$93 million in grants for expansion. A commission would be set up to study the high cost of malpractice insurance.

Mr. Nixon said that nationalization of health insurance inevitably would lead to federal personnel approving local hospital budgets and setting local physicians fees. He said the better way—"more practical, more effective, less expensive and less dangerous"—is to reform and renew the present health system.

Many Americans will agree. But there is strong support also for nationalization. The Kennedy-Griffiths plan was drafted by the AFL-CIO and the Committee of 100 for National Health Insurance created by the late Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers Union. A long debate is likely in Congress before an adequate solution is reached to the mounting problem of financing the Nation's health care. The Administration's plan appears at first glance to be adequate.

#### THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, an editorial published in the Atlanta Constitution following the American Bar Association's vote on the Genocide Convention is an example of the many fine editorials and stories on this important human rights covenant.

Following World War II, the entire world was shocked by the exposure of the Nazi extermination of over 6 million Jews. Consequently, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide in 1948.

The Constitution asked why America stands apart from 75 other nations in the world which have ratified the Genocide Convention. The paper pointed out that the human rights treaties of the U.N. would not supersede our own Constitution and that both the President and the Attorney General have urged the Senate to approve the convention.

The paper further stated that the claim that the United States would be charged with genocide by many foreign nations is based on false assumptions:

It seems to suggest that genocide is a terrible crime unless Americans are committing it.

But all rational Americans know that America does not intend to, nor does it commit, genocide anywhere in the world. Unfounded charges can be made at any time, anywhere, regardless of whether or not we adopt the Genocide Convention. I have been at a loss to understand how our not signing the convention would protect us from unfounded allegations by other nations or people.

The time has come to ratify the Genocide Convention. I urge the Senate to act now.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 25, 1970]

#### THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Genocide is an ugly word defined as "the deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial, political or cultural group."

The word came into common usage after World War II when Nazi extermination of some six million Jews and gypsies staggered the conscience of mankind. In 1948 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This made mass murder of a people a matter of international concern. The United States signed the convention but has never ratified it, and it has no effect in our country.

Surely Americans are not indifferent to the deliberate mass slaughter of innocents.

Then why haven't we taken a stand with 74 other nations by ratifying the convention?

For a long time it was held that treaties of this sort would supersede our Constitution or interfere with sovereignty. But President Nixon, backed by the Secretary of State Rogers and Attorney General Mitchell, says there is no constitutional obstacle and has urged the Senate to approve the Convention.

One influential organization has opposed ratification from the beginning. The American Bar Association, meeting in Atlanta, has once again gone on record as opposed to ratification, though the vote was close—130 to 126. They argue that Americans could be tried in foreign courts, or that our troops in Vietnam might be accused and tried on charges of genocide.

This attitude, we'd guess, is greatly appreciated by those employed in the propaganda bureaus of America's enemies. It seems to suggest that genocide is a terrible crime unless Americans are committing it. One delegate said quite bluntly that genocide in war is no crime and added: "I wouldn't be in this country if it weren't for genocide. It was either the white man or the Indian and the Indian went down the drain." This memorable quotation is probably framed on the office walls in Hanoi and Moscow right now.

Rational Americans know well enough that we intend no genocide in Vietnam or anywhere. But we're being accused of it. This is unjust, but perhaps it is behind the President's desire to place the nation firmly on record. "I believe we should delay no longer," he told the Senate, "in taking the final convincing step which would reaffirm that the United States remains as strongly opposed to the crime of genocide as ever."

The enormity of the crime, it seems to us, makes the objections look like petty quibbling over technicalities. We support the President wholeheartedly.

#### THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN LAOS

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, this week the London Economist magazine reviewed the effect of South Vietnam's expedition in southern Laos with the clarity of thought, and dispassion of intent for which that journal has long been noted.

The Economist says the South Vietnamese in Laos have probably won a year's quiescence in the war, and that the operation has succeeded in at least two very important things.

First, it demonstrated that—

The North Vietnamese have been unable to prevent the invading force from coming and sitting in their own back yard. They tried to prevent it. The number of North

Vietnamese troops in the area between Khe Sanh and Tchepone was doubled after the invasion began, to the equivalent of four or five divisions, and it is pretty clear that General Giap meant to fight a decisive battle to keep open his supply routes to the south. But the actions in the second and third weeks of the operation showed him that, for all his two-to-one superiority in numbers in the area as a whole, he could not concentrate enough men to win a clear-cut victory at any given point without exposing them to devastating losses from air attack.

Second, said the Economist—

The other thing the South Vietnamese have achieved, and which has been made possible by their ability to stay one jump ahead of Giap's men, is to have deprived the communist forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam of a substantial proportion of the supplies they were counting on being able to use between now and May, 1972.

Mr. President, in the belief that frequently we here at home do not see the forest for the trees, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "What It Has Bought," published in the Economist of March 20, 1971, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### WHAT IT HAS BOUGHT

It is six weeks on Monday since the South Vietnamese went into Laos: six weeks more, and the monsoon will be starting, the gullies of the Annamite chain of hills will be disappearing under anything up to eight feet of water and it will be God, not man, who is cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail. It has not been easy to tell what has been going on in southern Laos these past six weeks. For once the non-communist side of the war has been fought under wraps: the reporters and the cameramen have been escorted to what it was convenient for them to see, the spokesmen have told as much as they wanted to, and each hillside tussle has duly become either a triumph or a rout. Perhaps this is how wars have to be fought. But enough has happened now for the shape of the campaign to be reasonably plain. Even if the South Vietnamese come back out of Laos fairly soon—and provided they come out in reasonably good order—the operation has had a major effect. It has made it clearer how this war is likeliest to end: not with a peace, but a pacification. It should also have helped Mr. Nixon to make up his mind how many Americans—above all, how many American helicopters and bombers—he will have to try to persuade the American electorate to let him keep in the war in the months immediately before the presidential election in November next year.

The South Vietnamese army has not done the most it may have hoped to do. It has not beaten the North Vietnamese in a set-piece action, and thereby turned the tables in the battle for morale. It got beaten itself at Landing Zone Ranger, and only just came out on top at Hill 34, which seems to have been a turning-point of the operation. It knows that it could not have fought this campaign without the help of American air power, and the battered helicopters hauled out of the Laotian hills are evidence that American air power has had a rough time against the other side's anti-aircraft guns. It is quite possible that the North Vietnamese will still be able to catch, and hammer, some South Vietnamese units before they pull back over the border as the rains

And, from a peak of 8½ or 9 percent last summer, rates on conventional home loans have dropped to 7 percent in some cities and 6¼ percent in a scattered few, the swiftest decline in decades.

As Time magazine noted this week, this decline in interest rates has had the double effect of reducing the buyer's monthly payments and enabling people with lower incomes to qualify for mortgages under the usual standards demanded by lenders.

Finally, the Federal Housing Administration gave the market a lift by cutting the ceiling on its home loans from 7½ percent to 7 percent.

Thus to President Nixon, and to his entire housing team, I think we owe a hearty "well done."

#### PRISONERS OF WAR STATEMENT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, having joined in supporting the congressional resolution which led to the President's designation of this week as "National Week of Concern for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action," I should like to reiterate at this time, along with Americans everywhere, my personal concern for American prisoners of war in Vietnam.

I urge once again the Government of North Vietnam to observe the minimum standard of treatment for prisoners of war as it agreed upon with 124 other governments in the Geneva Convention of 1949. And I urge our own Government to disengage completely from Vietnam by the end of this year so that we can obtain the early release of our servicemen and civilians, now being held in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese Government and the National Liberation Front have offered to negotiate the release of these prisoner-hostages once we submit a timetable for the complete withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. I strongly request that the administration consider this offer seriously before rejecting it as a tactical diversion by the other side.

Until these American citizens are properly cared for according to the minimum standards set by international law and released in a timely fashion, we must all work toward the rapid achievement of these demands. Only through concerted energies can we emphasize the strength of our demands to the North Vietnamese Government and the National Liberation Front as well as to the administration.

In that regard I ask unanimous consent that the statement issued by the Student Association for Freedom of Prisoners of War together with the signatures from leaders throughout the country be printed in the RECORD. This association has worked unceasingly to bring this issue before the public conscience, and I commend the work it has done and will continue to do. It has organized bipartisan support from students and other solicitous citizens and public representatives. For that reason it merits the support of this entire body.

There being no objection, the statement and signatures were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

We, the public representatives of the United States of America, differing in our political persuasions and our opinions concerning the conduct and management of the Southeast Asian war by this Government, call upon the leaders of the Communist Forces in that area of the world to respond to our plea for the humane treatment of the United States military personnel and the civilians that those Forces hold as prisoners.

We ask that they not examine this plea for either superficial or hidden motives, for we assure them that we speak from our hearts, without regard to any political label or coloring.

We speak on behalf of the families of the nearly 1,600 American servicemen and the 18 civilians who await word of the welfare, or indeed the existence, of their husbands, sons, brothers and fathers missing in action or captured in Southeast Asia.

Under both Democratic and Republican Administrations, the United States Government has brought the plea for humane treatment under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the attention of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and to the other Communist Forces in Southeast Asia.

A minimum degree of humanity on the part of the said Forces would require them to fulfill their obligations under the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, by identifying each serviceman that they now hold or have held prisoner; a decent respect for the opinion of mankind should compel them to do so.

We further call upon said Forces to assure this nation and to assure the world that they will begin to comply with all provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, by which all parties to the conflict in Southeast Asia are bound. We ask nothing more than these prisoners' rights as soldiers and men, as set down in the long history of civilized mankind, and in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

The children in our States who are denied fathers, the wives who are denied husbands, the parents who are denied sons, the brothers who are denied brothers, and prisoners of war who are denied life in its most primitive meaning, deserve this simple courtesy and basic right required by international law and protocol.

In the name of simple and basic humanity, we request the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and all other Communist Forces in Southeast Asia to begin immediate and meaningful negotiations for the release of all prisoners of war, especially the sick and wounded.

The following is a list of those United States Senators who have signed the statement on prisoners of war being circulated by this organization:

AS OF 12 P.M., MARCH 25, 1971

Senator Allen, Senator Allott, Senator Beall, Senator Bellmon, Senator Bennett, Senator Bible, Senator Boggs, Senator Brock.

Senator Brooke, Senator Burdick, Senator Byrd of Virginia, Senator Cannon, Senator Chiles, Senator Cook, Senator Cooper.

Senator Dominick, Senator Ellender, Senator Fannin, Senator Gambrell, Senator Goldwater, Senator Griffin, Senator Gurney, Senator Hansen.

Senator Harris, Senator Humphrey, Senator Inouye, Senator Jackson, Senator Jordan of North Carolina, Senator Jordan of Indiana.

Senator McGee, Senator McIntyre, Senator Metcalf, Senator Miller, Senator Mondale, Senator Montoya, Senator Moss.

Senator Muskie, Senator Nelson, Senator Packwood, Senator Pastore, Senator Pearson, Senator Prouty, Senator Routh.

Senator Saxbe, Senator Sparkman, Senator

Stevens, Senator Stevenson, Senator Thurmond, Senator Welcker, Senator Young.

Every Governor has signed this statement. Six hundred forty-three Mayors and forty-seven State Attorneys General, and numerous other public servants on the state, local, and municipal level have added their signatures to the statement.

#### THE PRESIDENT'S COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PROPOSALS

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, an editorial published in the Portland Oregonian lauds the President's comprehensive health proposals stating that other proposals based on a national health insurance would inevitably lead to more Federal control over State and local governments.

Under the President's bold health-care plan the Federal Government would play a comparatively minor role with private insurance companies and the health industry.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the Oregonian editorial of February 19, 1971, entitled "Reformed Health Care."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Portland (Oreg.) Oregonian, Feb. 19, 1971]

#### REFORMED HEALTH CARE

President Nixon's health care program, proposed in a message to Congress Thursday, would cover virtually all Americans, as would other plans under consideration by Congress. But in contrast to some proposals, such as Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's and Rep. Martha W. Griffiths' Human Security Program, the federal government would play a comparatively minor role in cooperation with private insurance companies and the health professions.

Cost of the Kennedy-Griffiths national health insurance has been estimated at from \$53 billion to \$77 billion a year, financed from increased Social Security taxes and from federal general revenues. Mr. Nixon made no over-all estimate of the cost of his plan, but individual items added up to \$2.8 billion.

Under the Administration plan, employers would be required to provide comprehensive private insurance for employees by July 1, 1973. The employer would pay 65 per cent of the premium cost at the start and 75 per cent after 2½ years. Employees would pay the remainder. Full hospitalization, surgical and medical care, laboratory services, maternity and well-child care would be covered.

The government would subsidize family health-care for families earning less than \$5,000 a year under a proposal to eliminate most of the present Medicaid program. Families earning less than \$3,000 would pay no premiums and those earning between \$3,000 and \$5,000 would pay on a sliding scale. The \$5.30 monthly contribution now paid by the elderly for supplemental Medicare coverage would be eliminated.

A nationwide network of health maintenance organizations would be encouraged by Federal financial aid. The President said such organizations would reverse the present "illogical incentive" whereby doctors and hospitals are paid in relation to how long a patient is ill. Under his plan, he said, income would grow in relation to how long the patient is well.

A doctor corps would be established at a cost of \$10 million to provide care in rural areas and ghettos where there is inadequate

approach. This has not been the stroll across the Ho Chi Minh trails that some of South Vietnam's generals seem to have thought it would be. But neither has it been the flop that so many hand-wringers expected.

The operation has done two things, and these two things are very important. The first is to have demonstrated that the North Vietnamese have been unable to prevent the invading force from coming and sitting in their own back yard. They tried to prevent it. The number of North Vietnamese troops in the area between Khe Sanh and Tchepone was doubled after the invasion began, to the equivalent of four or five divisions, and it is pretty clear that General Giap meant to fight a decisive battle to keep open his supply route to the south. But the actions in the second and third weeks of the operation showed him that, for all his two-to-one superiority in numbers in the area as a whole, he could not concentrate enough men to win a clear-cut victory at any given point without exposing them to devastating losses from air attack. The South Vietnamese were able to move into one section of the trails after another—first east of Tchepone, then around Tchepone itself, and then to the south of it—spend a week or so in blowing up the dumps they found there and blocking the routes to south-bound traffic, and then flit away by helicopter to the next landing-place before Giap's plodding infantry could stop them. It has been an expensive way of doing things, in shot-down helicopters and spiked and abandoned guns. But it has put the squeeze on the trails.

And that is what counts. The other thing the South Vietnamese have achieved, and which has been made possible by their ability to stay one jump ahead of Giap's men, is to have deprived the communist forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam of a substantial proportion of the supplies they were counting on being able to use between now and May, 1972. The trails of the Ho Chi Minh route, running like capillary veins along the limb of the Annamite hills, are the second of Hanoi's two means of keeping the war in the south going. The first was the Sihanoukville route, run by Chinese ships to the port of Sihanoukville and from there by Chinese-owned lorries trucking the guns and ammunition to the South Vietnamese border, and financed through the Bank of China in Hongkong. That route was closed when General Lon Nol threw Prince Sihanouk out of power a year ago this week and when the Americans sent their troops into Cambodia to prevent the North Vietnamese from putting him back again.

Now the Laos operation has cut across the best part of the Ho Chi Minh route. It is around Tchepone that the tracks wind under the thickest canopy of trees; ten miles west of that eroded town the last ridge of the hills falls away into relatively open country where the trucks cannot hide from the bombers. The South Vietnamese have found, and destroyed, some of the supplies that had been hidden away along the trails; they have obliged the North Vietnamese to use up other dumps in fighting them; above all, they seem to have stopped about half the south-bound traffic just by being there. The fact that the total amount of traffic on the trails has been cut by less than half is simply a result of the reinforcements that have been pouring down from the north into the fighting zone—and have got not farther.

What this will mean for the war in the south, which is the heart of the matter, had better be judged when the monsoon ends in September or October. The optimists in Washington are saying that by then the communist divisions in Cambodia will have been reduced to tattered bands of men trying to stay alive in the jungle. The optimists about Indochina do not find many people to believe them nowadays. But there are sensible men

who think that the trail-cutting operations may already have made it impossible for the communists to launch any major attacks in Cambodia or South Vietnam either during the coming wet season or during most of the dry season that follows it, which goes on until May, 1972; and who believe that a smaller raid on the trails during that dry season might be enough to keep them quiet from then until the beginning of 1973. If these guesses turn out to be right—and if nothing goes bloodily wrong in Laos in the next six weeks—this fighting may have justified the number of men who have died in it. It will have bought a year, and maybe more, of relative quiescence: a year or more in which the armies of Cambodia and South Vietnam will get more arms and better training, and after which it will be that much harder for General Giap to order another attempt to turn the tide.

If this is how it goes, there are two lots of people who will have to draw their consequences from it: the men who run the war in Hanoi, and in Washington. The North Vietnamese have already seen the centre of the war move twice in the past year. Last year it moved westwards from South Vietnam into Cambodia. This year it has moved northwards from Cambodia into southern Laos. One effect of this is that, although a larger part of Cambodia and Laos is now involved in the war, the total proportion of the land area of Indochina in which a significant amount of fighting is taking place is probably smaller than it used to be, and most of this is sparsely populated back-country; in this sense there has actually been a de-escalation of the war.

But there has also been an effect on Hanoi's calculations. The communists have lately been telling a lot of their men in South Vietnam to come back above ground: to hide their guns, apply for identity cards, and blend into the normal life of the country for the time being. This is part of the strategy of lying low in South Vietnam which they fell back on last year. But until now the low-level strategy has been backed up by the belief that the North Vietnamese regiments in Cambodia might be able to start attacking across the border again before long. If that possibility has to be deferred for another year, and perhaps for longer than that, the communists' low-level strategy will have become a very long-term business indeed. Of course, the North Vietnamese are not likely to call the war off by a public admission of defeat, as the Greek communists did in 1949. But the longer the Vietcong have to get along without the support of North Vietnam's regulars, the more the struggle will become a political contest combined with a certain amount of terrorism and only the occasional guerrilla action. It will be a job for the intelligence men and the police—and the politicians—more than for the army.

The Laos campaign also has its lesson for Mr. Nixon. It is that he has to balance the political necessity to go on withdrawing troops from Vietnam against the fact that the South Vietnamese army will plainly go on needing a certain amount of American help to prevent things coming unstuck again next year or in 1973. It is true that by this time next year the South Vietnamese will have got more helicopters of their own—600 against about 350 now—and more fighter-bombers and more artillery. It is true that there may not have to be another operation on the scale of those in Cambodia and Laos before Mr. Nixon faces his fight for re-election next year. But it is going to be important that Mr. Nixon should leave just enough units in Vietnam to make it possible for the South Vietnamese to enforce the past year's change in the state of the war. He knows that the war is now deeply unpopular in America. His own policy of Vietnamisation is partly to blame for that: the Americans,

having thought they were getting out, still see their helicopters being shot down on television. But he also knows that his policy requires him to provide South Vietnam with enough help to make the difference.

#### CLEANING UP POLLUTION

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, we are treated to countless words and catchy phrases about cleaning up pollution. It is my pleasure today to speak briefly about two organizations which are doing something about it.

The first is the Governor's Council to Keep Nebraska Beautiful. This group is promoting an intensive statewide anti-pollution effort during the month of April, which it is calling Nebraska Environmental Action Month.

This fine organization is headed by Mrs. Les Anderson, Omaha, who has been very active in fighting pollution—long before it became the popular thing to do.

Mrs. Anderson and her committee have organized a full-scale promotional effort dedicated to securing participation of all Nebraskans in this first comprehensive statewide effort. They have enlisted the help of these individuals and groups: Garden clubs, county extension agents, the clergy, mayors, industrial editors, school principals, and neighborhood improvement groups.

To all of these groups and individuals, Mrs. Anderson's committee has dispatched fact sheets and suggested programs and projects which they can undertake in order to make a constructive contribution to the month's activities.

Mrs. Anderson meanwhile happens to be cochairman of another committee, called the Environmental Control Committee of Downtown Omaha, Inc.

The committee held its first awards luncheon recently and honored several Omaha businesses for their efforts to improve the Omaha environment.

Awards went to these firms.

The Northern Natural Gas Co. for building a plant which heats 34 downtown buildings, cools 12, and reduces pollution by eliminating the need for individual systems.

The Union Pacific Railroad for installing an industrial waste treatment plant.

Safeway Stores for eliminating the use of incinerators and using more ecologically beneficial methods of disposing of solid wastes.

The Omaha Public Power District for early and continuing efforts to abate air pollution.

Mrs. Anderson's comments at the awards luncheon are well worth repeating. She said in part:

American industry is spending over \$3 billion a year to clean up the environment, and additional billions to develop products that will keep it clean.

The real danger today is not from the free enterprise establishment that has made ours the most prosperous, the most powerful, and the most charitable nation on earth. The danger today resides in the disaster lobby—those crepe hangers for personal gain or (those who) out of sheer ignorance are undermining the American system and threatening the lives and fortunes of the American people.

March 25, 1971

This awards luncheon prompted the Omaha World Herald to publish an editorial on her comments and those of James Malkowski, her fellow cochairman.

The World Herald voices a common-sense approach—one I like very much—when it refers to pollution as “a problem that is serious but not as hopeless as it is sometimes made out to be.”

I ask unanimous consent that the complete text of the World Herald editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**SOME GOOD NEWS ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT**  
Ready for some upbeat talk, about the environment?

Listen to James Malkowski. As naturalist, forester, ecologist and intensely concerned citizen, he was fighting pollution in this community long before it was the popular thing to do.

On Tuesday, as cochairman of the Environmental Control Committee of Downtown Omaha, Inc., he was passing out awards for business and industrial achievement in cleaning up our surroundings.

He reminded his audience that he had helped to define what was “environmentally degrading” in our way of life and had never spared business and industry. But Tuesday he was helping to honor the Northern Natural Gas Co. and the Omaha Public Power District. Why? In his words:

“These awards do not in any way accept or condone the practices of any business and industry, including any here today, which result in avoidable environmental degradation. Present problems, however serious as they are, do not negate the legitimate efforts to keep our air, water, food, and water, cleaner.

“On the contrary, I believe we should laud, loudly and clearly, the true efforts that are being made by everyone, including business and industry, to keep and improve our environmental quality. This is what we are doing here today.”

Or listen to Mrs. Les Anderson, the other cochairman and head of Keep Nebraska Beautiful and Keep Omaha Beautiful. She was honoring the other two winners, the Union Pacific Railroad and Safeway Stores.

She said she was proud of business sponsorship that had made many beautification programs possible, proud of her country, its system and of the overall improvement in the quality of life. Said Mrs. Anderson:

“What was it (life) really like 150 years ago? For one thing it was brief. Life expectancy was 38 years for males. . . . The work week was 72 hours. . . . The average pay \$300. The women had it worse. Housewives worked 98 hours a week.”

Food was monotonous and scarce. In summer people sweltered and in winter they froze, and—

“Whatever American business has done to bring us out of that paradise of 150 years ago, I say let's give them a grateful pat on the back.”

The danger, as she see it, lies not in American industry, but in what she called the “Disaster Lobby,” made up of crepe hangers who for personal gain or out of ignorance undermine the American system.

Jim Malkowski and Mrs. Anderson may not have precisely the same view of America.

But they do agree that some Americans, including a number of forward looking business firms, are doing their part to make the country cleaner and to keep it beautiful.

And that's our cheering word about a problem that is serious but not as hopeless as it is sometimes made out to be.

### THE SELLING OF THE PENTAGON

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, there has been much controversy lately concerning the documentary “The Selling of the Pentagon.” Some serious charges have been raised concerning this matter which should be satisfactorily answered. I have recently read an article published in Air Force Space Digest, written by its senior editor, Claude Witze. I should like to bring this article to the attention of the Senate. It contains some more serious allegations that the originators of the documentary should answer to maintain their credibility.

I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled “The Wayward Press—Tube Division,” be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Air Force Space Digest, Mar. 15, 1971]

#### THE WAYWARD PRESS (TUBE DIV.)

(NOTE.—Following is the complete text of the column “Airpower in the News,” by Senior Editor Claude Witze, as it will appear in the forthcoming April 1971 issue of AIR FORCE Magazine, the publication of the Air Force Association.)

The winter issue of the Columbia Journalism Review, a quarterly published at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, is devoted almost entirely to a study of how the press has performed in covering the war in Vietnam. The only possible conclusion a reader of these eight essays can reach is that the press has done a deplorable job. No matter what epithets you might want to hurl at the political administrations in Washington and Saigon, at the military hierarchy, at the military-industrial complex, and at the doves or the hawks, even more heated epithets could justifiably be thrown at the purveyors of ink and electronic signals.

There is one examination of television's performance, written by Fred W. Friendly, a former president of CBS News, who indulges in a bit of self-flagellation, confessing that the “news media, and particularly broadcast journalism” must share the responsibility for public misunderstanding of the situation in Indochina. Speaking of the years when he, Friendly, was the man in charge at CBS, he says, “The mistakes we made in 1964 and 1965 almost outran those of the statesmen.”

One thing missing from Mr. Friendly's recitation is any suggestion that the television medium lends itself in a peculiar way to distortion of fact. This reporter has nearly forty years of experience on newspapers and magazines, including more than a decade operating from the copy desk of a metropolitan daily. Television news was born and brought up within that same forty-year period. I have watched it closely and confess that I never was impressed by its impact until Lee Harvey Oswald was murdered on camera. No newspaper or magazine ever will duplicate that 1963 performance in Dallas. Yet, if I saw it today, I would demand confirmation that the event took place at all and that what we saw on the tube was not a clever compilation of film clips, snipped from a wide variety of source material and glued together to make a visual product that could be marketed to some huckster of toothpaste or gasoline, and then turn out to be a winner of the Peabody Award.

In support of this professional skepticism, we have the performance of Mr. Friendly's own CBS on February 23. The program was billed as a “News Special” and was called “The Selling of the Pentagon.” It ran for

one hour, with commercials, and featured a recitation of the script by CBS's charismatic Roger Mudd. Mr. Mudd did not write the script; he was burdened with it. The show's producer works in New York. He is reported to be thirty-four-years-old Peter Davis, who says he and his staff spent ten months working on this “documentary.” Mr. Davis does not appear to make any claim to objectivity in his work. He is making a charge: that the Department of Defense spends a vast amount of money on propaganda designed to win public approval of its programs. Armed with cameras, scissors, and cement, he proceeded to make his case.

This magazine has neither the space nor the desire to do a detailed critique of “The Selling of the Pentagon,” but we have examined enough of it to demonstrate that it leaves CBS with a credibility gap wider than the canyons at Rockefeller Center. Here is an example:

At one point, early in the script, Mr. Mudd, the narrator, transitions to a new sequence in Mr. Davis' portrayal with a paragraph of four sentences. We will examine the sentences one at a time:

Mudd, “The Pentagon has a team of colonels touring the country to lecture on foreign policy.”

The team to which he refers comes from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), with headquarters here in Washington. There are four colonels on the team—two from the Army and one each from the Air Force and the Marine Corps. There is also a Navy captain, and, totally ignored by CBS, a foreign-service officer from the State Department. They are not “touring the country.” They have a briefing on national-security policy that is given seven times a year, no more and no less. ICAF is not mentioned in the CBS script, and there is no reference to the mission of the college. A TV cameraman who visited the school could easily take a picture in the lobby of a wall inscription that says:

“Our liberties rest with our people, upon the scope and depth of their understanding of the nation's spiritual, political, military, and economic realities. It is the high mission of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to develop such understanding among our people and their military and civilian leaders.”

The quote is attributed to Dwight D. Eisenhower, who spoke those words at the dedication of the college in 1960. He understood the requirement, perhaps more clearly than any other man in our history.

The ICAF national-security policy briefing is designed for the education of Reserve officers from all branches of the armed forces, not primarily for the general public. The reason the team, including the State Department officer, gives it in seven locations each year is to reduce travel expenses by eliminating the necessity for Reserve officers to visit the college. None of his was explained by CBS.

Mudd, “We found them [the ICAF team] in Peoria, Ill., where they were invited to speak to a mixed audience of civilians and military Reservists.”

Here we have a use of the word “found” that would not be permitted by a competent newspaper copy editor. CBS was told that Peoria was on the schedule, and the CBS camera crew spent three days at the seminar in that city with the concurrence and cooperation of the Defense Department, the ICAF, and the Peoria Association of Commerce. Before departing, CBS was given full information on the curriculum, the scheduling, the military and civilian participation, the costs, and the funding. The Association of Commerce was the sponsor, in this case, and was permitted to establish the rules under which civilians were admitted. Their seminar, billed in Peoria as the “World

E 4804

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

May 20, 1971

## THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN LAOS

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 20, 1971

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, recent reports from one of our colleagues concerning the refugee situation in Laos were highly disturbing. The general impression one got from the media reporting of his statements on the refugee situation in Laos was that allied bombing operations were responsible for the dislocation of substantial numbers of Laotians and was, in fact, the principle cause of the refugee problem existing in Laos.

It seemed strange to me that this should be the case in Laos when the major cause of refugees in South Vietnam was Communist terrorism. When it was brought to my attention that our colleague had seen three USIS reports concerning the generation of refugees in Laos I asked the U.S. Information Agency if they would be good enough to supply me with copies of the reports which had been made available to my colleague so that I could make my own assessment.

I insert in the Record at this point the material which the USIA sent in response to my inquiry. The three surveys on the refugee problem in Laos are highly interesting and recommended reading for all those who wish to truly understand the refugee situation in that nation.

The material follows:

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,  
Washington, D.C., May 18, 1971.

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ,  
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. SCHMITZ: In response to your letter of April 27 to Mr. Shakespeare, I have enclosed exact copies of the Laotian refugee survey reports given to Congressman McCloskey in Vientiane. You may be interested to know that copies have also been given to the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and will presumably form a part of the record of the recent Subcommittee hearings.

The surveys in question were conducted by USIS in Laos at the request of the Ambassador and were intended for the internal use of the Embassy. In evaluating the results, it may help you to know that this was a purely informal inquiry into refugee attitudes and opinions. Since the USIS officers involved are not professional researchers, it was not possible to use scientific sampling techniques in selecting the interviewees.

If I may be of further assistance in this matter, I hope you will not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely,

CHARLES D. ABLARD,  
General Counsel and Congressional Liaison.

ATTACHED DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE USIS  
LAOS REFUGEE ATTITUDE SURVEY

The Laos refugee survey produced two separate reports, one on interviews conducted in the Vientiane Plain area (Attachment No. 2) and the other on interviews with refugees in camps in the Ban Xon area (Attachment No. 3). The summary prepared for the Kennedy Sub-Committee (Attachment No. 1) covers only the Ban Xon interviews, but mentions the Vientiane Plain interviews in the introduction.

It is the summary (Attachment No. 1) that was inadvertently released to Congressman McCloskey in Washington. However, he

had access to all three documents while he was in Vientiane.

SURVEY OF REFUGEES FROM THE PLAIN OF  
JARS—SUMMARY—No. 1

In late June and early July of 1970, USIS/Vientiane American and local staff under the guidance of the Embassy Political Section conducted interviews with about 215 refugees from the Plain of Jars area of Laos on the conditions of life in the wartime Pathet Lao zone and their reasons for leaving it. (The results of an earlier survey on Plain of Jars refugees (March 1970) and a July survey of non-Plain of Jars refugees are not included in the material presented below. Both were less complete, detailed and conclusive than the survey whose results are presented; their only substantial difference was their indication of higher levels of antipathy to the Pathet Lao.) The refugees were then living in twenty settlements in the Vientiane valley. Physical obstacles such as bad weather and bad roads limited the scope of the interviewer's findings. Elaborate statistical sampling methods were not applied to the selection of interviewees, who nonetheless seem fairly typically distributed and generally representative of the population of their area in age, sex, education, occupation, and villages of origin. By comparison to the general group of refugees, these people had lived with the Pathet Lao longer than the average time. In comparison to the general population of the Pathet Lao zone, ethnic Lao, as opposed to hill peoples, predominate untypically in the Plain of Jars population.

RESPONDENT'S BACKGROUND

The great majority of the respondents left their homes in 1969, and more than 80% said they had moved one or more times before their move from the Plain of Jars to Vientiane province. Seventy-seven percent said their children were with them; 20% said their children were with the Pathet Lao. Many had had children in Pathet Lao schools; the parents appreciated the schools when they were local (three quarters of the cases), but disliked it if the children were required to leave home for schooling.

REACTION TO LIFE WITH THE PATHET LAO

"Unity" (cooperative farming and communal arrangements for looking after children) (21%) and "morality" (17%) were positive aspects of the refugees' experience with the Pathet Lao; forced portage (40%) (which 65% of the respondents had performed) and taxation (35%) were the negative aspects most frequently mentioned.

BOMBING

Ninety-seven percent of the people said that they had seen a bombing attack. About one third had seen bombing as early as 1964, and a great majority had seen attacks frequently or many times.

The Pathet Lao, 75% of the refugees responded, had taught them to dig bunkers to avoid bombing attacks. When bombs dropped, all the villagers reported taking refuge either in a bunker inside the village (28%), in a bunker outside the village (41%), or in the woods (31%). Somewhat fewer than two-thirds of those who answered this question had seen someone killed. Usually a small number of deaths had been observed; 32% had seen only one person killed by a bomb. This applied to troops as well. Only 18% of the respondents had actually seen Lao/Viet troops killed by bombing, and 25% had heard rumors of such deaths. Isolated atypical answers to these questions were also received; one man said he had seen 112 persons killed, other individuals spoke of strikes that had killed 80, 20, 30 and 20 Pathet Lao troops respectively.

Seventy-five percent said their homes had been damaged by bombing. Most of these

attacks took place in 1969. 99% of the people said bombing made life difficult for them; two-thirds holding that it made earning more than a bare subsistence living impossible in its intense periods. 88% said they had built a shelter in the woods. 71% of those questioned said that United States aircraft did the bombing; 37% said it was the RLG. But 74% of the people said they understood that the air attacks were caused basically by the Pathet Lao's waging war. 23% said bombing was directed at the people as well as the Pathet Lao. 13% said that it was aimed at the people only. 6% said the Pathet Lao had stored ammunition in their villages, while 11% had heard of this practice in other villages. Respondents divided evenly, in saying that Pathet Lao troops were present or not present in the area of bombing. The refugees knew aircraft names (F-104, Skyraiders, T-28, F-4) and were remarkably articulate about types of aircraft.

REASONS FOR MOVING TO THE RLG ZONE

Forty-nine percent of the 226 who were asked the question said that fear of bombing was the reason they had sought refuge by moving away from home; 29% gave dislike of the Pathet Lao as the reason for leaving their home areas, while 15% said the arrival of the RLG and its allowing or encouraging them to move was the primary factor in deciding to leave. 57% said they would return to their villages if bombing stopped, but this seemed associated in their minds with a complete end to the war and the disappearance of the Pathet Lao. 96% said they would not return if the Pathet Lao were still in control of their homes.

CONCLUSIONS

The USIS officer who directed the interview concluded that it was the combination of three factors; the bombing, the portage, and the lack of restrictions imposed on those living with the RLG, which determined the refugees' decisions to move from the Pathet Lao Zone to the government area of Laos.

The attached report was prepared by Pradit Srisuryochandra, based on the survey he and Lt. Bansa Chounlametse (FAR Psywar) made of refugees in nine resettlement areas on the Vientiane Plain: Ban Vounkhon, Ban Veunkham, Ban Thang Mang, Ban Thinh, Ban Vieng Kham, Ban Hoo Deua, Ban Na Nga, Ban Nonsa and Ban Yik.

As Pradit correctly points out, the validity of the responses he got was affected by the short amount of time he had to spend with the interviewees. An apparent example of this is shown by the discrepancy between the fact that the respondents said approximately 20% of all the children in their villages were with the Lao-Viet but later, when asked if they know anyone serving in the Lao-Viet Army replied negatively. In addition to their reluctance to admit knowing anyone in the enemy forces, they were also evidently told that their children were being taken away to school, not the army. It would surely be easier to accommodate one's thoughts to a child being taken away from home to attend school than it would be to think of him being led away to fight.

Although not mentioned in his report, Pradit found that the refugees were relatively content with the amount of rice they are receiving. They also seemed satisfied with the basic supplies (blankets, cooking utensils, etc.) they have received. Some complained about a lack of medical treatment, saying that the mobile medical teams which have visited them have not brought adequate amounts of medicine with them. Pradit partially attributes this to the same feeling I have found with regard to villagers and medicine, when one person sees another receiving medicine they too want some. And the desire to have it is often not matched by a corresponding need. While this may not

NATO TROOP CUT LONG  
OVERDUE

HON. JOHN M. ASHBROOK

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 20, 1971

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I was extremely disappointed that the recent effort to cut back the number of U.S. troops in Europe failed to win approval in the other body. I believe, however, that the significant number of votes in favor of such a reduction in troop strength—more than one-third of the Senate supporting the proposed cut-back—serves notice on the administration of the strong sentiment in favor of turning over to our European allies greater responsibility for their own defense.

Maintaining 300,000 troops in Europe a quarter century after the end of World War II is not an easy proposition to explain or defend. In my view, this policy is indefensible. But the hysteria following the proposal to reduce our forces there illustrates again how difficult it is to change a policy that has achieved institutional status, even when the *raison d'être* upon which the policy is predicated may long since have ceased to exist.

The barrage of dire warnings unleashed by the White House and others concerning reduction of our military presence in Europe is unconvincing. Their hypothetical assumptions of disastrous consequences following such a reduction have no validity, in my opinion.

They argue that withdrawal of some of our forces would demoralize the Europeans, make them question the U.S. commitment to their defense and perhaps lead the Germans toward appeasement of the Soviet Union. Further, it is suggested that any significant reduction of our troop strength would leave Europe vulnerable to inevitable Soviet efforts to dominate the continent, that in any event, because of our NATO commitments we cannot make such a move unilaterally and that such a move would sabotage any effort to follow up on Soviet party chief Brezhnev's suggestion that a reduction of forces in Europe might be negotiated by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

Quite frankly, I find the timing argument specious. For those who oppose the cutback now, there will never be a propitious time. In my opinion, it is high time now that we take this step, and, in fact, I would not be opposed to reducing our troop strength by more than half—leaving only a token force there. It is ridiculous to have 300,000 military men—including 128 generals—200,000 dependents in Europe, contributing \$1.8 billion annually to the U.S. deficit in international payments. And it is significant that the chief underlying cause of the recent international monetary turmoil was the long-continued deficit in the U.S. balance of payments.

Have we not heard time and again that a cornerstone of the Nixon doctrine is to encourage other nations to take responsibility themselves, relying less on a unilateral assumption of responsibility

on our part? The United States has for too long borne a disproportionate share of the NATO burden, as we have in our many other international commitments. How long can the American Government tolerate the disparity between the share of its resources being committed to defense and the far smaller allocations by wealthy nations, such as West Germany and Japan?

And if a strong U.S. military presence is deemed essential to Europe's security, why does not the same thinking apply for Africa and South America, for example, both of which are far less stable militarily, politically, and economically?

The argument that we cannot reduce our troop strength unilaterally also does not hold water. Other NATO member countries unilaterally have either withdrawn completely or sharply cut back their forces in Europe. They did not consult with the United States despite the fact that we are carrying the lion's share of the burden.

I also see no merit in the suggestion that significant withdrawal of our forces would demoralize the Europeans. I have not seen much manifestation of gratitude from our European allies for all that we have done for them, and I believe retaining only a token force would serve the same purpose as the four American divisions plus support troops now in Europe.

On January 5, 1951, that most distinguished Ohioan and American, the late Senator Robert A. Taft, argued forcefully that American defense efforts ought to be matched by West Europeans. Two decades ago he predicted the inflation we are experiencing and the demoralization of troops with very little to do. The wisdom of his remarks at that time seems particularly relevant now. He said:

It seems to me that our battle against communism is in fact a world-wide battle and must be fought on the world stage. What I object to is undertaking to fight that battle primarily on the vast land areas of the continent of Europe or the continent of Asia where we are at the greatest disadvantage in a war with Russia. . . . We must not assume obligations by treaty or otherwise which require any extensive use of American land forces.

I agree with these prophetic remarks and apparently the majority of residents of the 17th District of Ohio also question the wisdom of maintaining a huge military force in Europe. In the recent opinion poll I conducted, nearly 60 percent of those responding favored "sharply reducing the number of our military personnel stationed in Europe."

The American military presence in Europe is too large and the allied contribution too small. No justification remains for not making substantial troop cuts now.

A TRIBUTE TO CHARLES J. BONAPARTE, FOUNDER OF THE FBI

HON. MARIO BIAGGI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 20, 1971

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, the contributions Americans of Italian descent have made to the cause of law enforcement in America are recorded in the his-

tory of our country dating as far back as the early period of its birth.

One significant episode of history that vividly testifies to the role played by Italian Americans in law and order will be commemorated in a ceremony to be held tomorrow afternoon which is to be presided over by Mr. John LaCorte, national director of the Italian Historical Society.

The ceremony will take place in the vestibule of the entrance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation offices in the Department of Justice Building on Constitution Avenue. It will pay tribute to the memory of Charles J. Bonaparte, who, as Attorney General in the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, formed the original investigative unit that gradually grew in size and responsibility and became our present Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Charles J. Bonaparte was born in Maryland in 1851 and traced his lineage to Italy. As Attorney General, his concern for decency and order and his incisive foresight caused him to establish an investigative unit within the Department of Justice whose purpose was to cope with the increasing turmoil and crime then plaguing the country.

Ever since its founding, the unit and its men, among whom served many outstanding agents and administrators of Italian background, have compiled an outstanding record that is indelibly etched in the annals of law enforcement and justice.

In 1961, in recognition of Charles J. Bonaparte's contribution to this country's internal security, John N. LaCorte presented a monument to the Government which was placed in the main entranceway to the Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters. Tomorrow, Mr. LaCorte, together with other dignitaries from the Department of Justice and this body, will lay a wreath at the monument in memory of Charles J. Bonaparte and the many other Americans of Italian descent who so valiantly served with the world's best national law enforcement agency.

I join Mr. LaCorte in this salute to the founder of the FBI and I hope that the men serving in the Bureau today look to its history for both inspiration and a prospective that will do honor not only to Charles Bonaparte, but to the very principle upon which America was built—that men of all nationalities join together "to form a more perfect Union."

TAKE PRIDE IN AMERICA

HON. CLARENCE E. MILLER

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 19, 1971

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, today we should take note of America's great accomplishments and in so doing renew our faith and confidence in ourselves as individuals and as a nation.

Twenty years ago 2.4 million people in the United States were enrolled in colleges and universities. Now, there are 6.7 million working for degrees and another 600,000 learning occupational skills.

STATINTL

# CIA Is Financing Thai Unit in Laos, Senate Aides Say

Two investigators for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have reported that the Central intelligence Agency is financing a 4,800-man army of Thais in support of the Laotian government.

A 1970 law prohibits U.S. payments to mercenaries in Laos except to protect American withdrawal.

The heavy U.S. involvement in Laos has been an open secret for some time. But the size of the Thai force was stated publicly yesterday by Sen. J. W. Fulbright, D-Ark., who is chairman of the committee. The report was presented in closed session by James G. Lowenstein and Richard Moose, former Foreign Service officers who resigned to become Senate investigators.

A committee member, Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., emerged from the meeting and told reporters that during a 12-day visit to Laos last month Lowenstein and Moose had confirmed Case's earlier disclosures concerning the Thai Army.

Case had taken his information from newspaper reports including a January dispatch by Tammy Arbuckle in The Star that detailed movements of the CIA-based Thai troops.

## Fulbright Tells Secret

No government official had ever publicly confirmed that, however. When a reporter asked Fulbright how many CIA-supported Thais are operating in Laos, Fulbright responded "about 4,800" before a staff member signalled him that the information remained classified.

Last year Congress passed a provision in the 1970 Defense Appropriations Act which bars payment of mercenaries in Laos and Cambodia, except to protect a safe and orderly American withdrawal or disengagement from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of U.S. prisoners of war.

Case said the Thai troops violate that provision, although, he said, the State Department contended that U.S. withdrawals would be jeopardized if the Laos government fell.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., said the confidential committee report indicated clearly that the State Department's response to committee inquiries has been "incomplete and in some cases inaccurate."

Case said he wrote to the State Department seeking information on the Thai troops after reading a lengthy article in the April 17 Christian Science Monitor by George W. Ashworth.

Ashworth quoted earlier reports by Arbuckle from Vientiane and battlefield areas in and around the Plain of Jars in Laos.

ane and battlefield areas in and around the Plain of Jars in Laos.

Ashworth estimated, from sources in Washington, that the U.S. was financing between 4,000 and 6,000 Thais in Laos.

CPYRGH  
T