

Mr. ALLOTT. Now, Mr. President, I am ready, if the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the committee, is ready, and I am perfectly willing to ask for a quorum call to be taken out of both sides. I want to be sure that we have a recorded vote on this matter, and when we have enough Senators in the Chamber, we can ask for yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have previously been ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. If they have been ordered, Mr. President, I think we should have a short quorum call. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. If it is agreeable to the chairman of the committee, the manager of the bill, I am willing to yield back the remainder of my time, if he is willing to yield back his, and we can then proceed, the yeas and nays having been ordered, to vote on amendment No. 430.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if there is no one who wishes time, I am ready to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). All remaining time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment No. 430 of the Senator from Colorado, as modified. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBI-

COFF), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) is absent on official business.

The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) are detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 65, nays 4, as follows:

[No. 247 Leg.]

YEAS—65

Alken	Fannin	Nelson
Allen	Fong	Packwood
Allott	Gambrell	Pastore
Anderson	Goldwater	Pearson
Baker	Gurney	Pell
Bayh	Hansen	Proxmire
Beall	Harris	Randolph
Bentsen	Hatfield	Roth
Bible	Hruska	Saxbe
Boggs	Hughes	Schweiker
Brooke	Inouye	Scott
Buckley	Jackson	Spong
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Stafford
Case	Jordan, Idaho	Stennis
Chiles	Mansfield	Stevens
Cook	Mathias	Symington
Cooper	McClellan	Taft
Cranston	McGovern	Thurmond
Curtis	Metcalf	Tunney
Dominick	Miller	Williams
Ellender	Moss	Young
Ervin	Muskie	

NAYS—4

Fulbright	Smith	Stevenson
Kennedy		

NOT VOTING—31

Bellmon	Gravel	Mondale
Bennett	Griffin	Montoya
Brock	Hart	Mundt
Burdick	Hartke	Percy
Byrd, W. Va.	Hollings	Ribicoff
Cannon	Humphrey	Sparkman
Church	Javits	Talmadge
Cotton	Long	Tower
Dole	Magnuson	Weicker
Eagleton	McGee	
Eastland	McIntyre	

So Mr. ALLOTT's amendment (No. 430) was agreed to.

Mr. DOLE subsequently said: Mr. President, this morning I was unavoidably detained in returning to Washington from Kansas and narrowly missed the rollcall on the amendment sponsored by the distinguished senior Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT). Had I been present it would have been my privilege to join with the overwhelming majority of my colleagues in approving the Senator from Colorado's proposal to provide substantial pay increases to members of the armed services. Having voted in favor of

the earlier, Senate-passed version of the pay increase, I was gratified that Senate approval of this measure was achieved today.

It is important to keep in mind that raising military pay scales is a matter of high national priority for two very crucial reasons. First, by increasing the pay of our men and women in uniform we fulfill an obligation to recognize and reward the contributions they are making to the maintenance of our national defense. In many cases their pay is woefully inadequate and totally unjustified in terms of the responsibilities they bear and the obligations they owe to themselves and their families. And second, by putting military pay in closer competition with civilian wages we take a significant step toward ending the draft and creating an all-volunteer military force. For, only by making a military career attractive and secure monetarily, can we hope to draw to it the type of individuals needed to fulfill the requirements of modern national defense.

I commend the Senator from Colorado for his leadership in seeking to upgrade the pay scales of the Armed Forces and for his longstanding concern and devotion to the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States so proudly and with such great distinction to themselves and their Nation.

ORDER FOR STAR PRINT OF S. 2620

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a star print be ordered for S. 2620, the East-West Trade Exchange Act of 1971, introduced by the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) on Thursday, September 30, 1971. Due to an inadvertence, an incorrect text was attached when the bill was introduced for referral.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 434

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). Pursuant to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of amendment No. 434 by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) proposes amendment No. 434 as follows:

At the end of the bill add a new section as follows:

"Sec. 505. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be

appropriated by this or any other Act may be obligated or expended in any amount in excess of \$200,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation, project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972.

"(b) In computing the \$200,000,000 limitation on obligation and expenditure authority under subsection (a) of this section in fiscal year 1972, there shall be included in the computation the value of any goods, supplies, materials, or equipment provided to, for, or on behalf of Laos in such fiscal year by gift, donation, loan, lease, or otherwise. For the purpose of this subsection, "value" means the fair market value of any goods, supplies, materials, or equipment provided to, for, or on behalf of Laos, but in no case less than 33 1/3 per centum of the amount the United States paid at the time such goods, supplies, materials, or equipment were acquired by the United States.

"(c) No funds may be obligated or expended for any of the purposes described in subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos in any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1972, unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act. In no case shall funds in any amount in excess of the amount specifically authorized by law for any fiscal year be obligated or expended for any such purpose during such fiscal year.

"(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of this section shall not apply with respect to the obligation or expenditure of funds to carry out combat air operations over the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails in southern Laos, and over areas immediately adjacent to such trails, by United States military forces.

"(e) After the date of enactment of this Act, whenever any request is made to the Congress for the appropriation of funds for use in, for, or on behalf of Laos for any fiscal year, the President shall furnish a written report to the Congress explaining the purpose for which such funds are to be used in such fiscal year.

"(f) The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1971, a written report showing the total amount of funds expended in, for, or on behalf of Laos during the preceding quarter by the United States Government, and shall include in such report a general breakdown of the total amount expended, describing the different purposes for which such funds were expended and the total amount expended for such purpose."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time on the amendment is limited to 5 hours. Who yields time?

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that James Lowenstein, Richard Moose, and Katherine Nelson, staff assistants of the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) be granted the privilege of the floor during the debate on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the amendment was agreed to be reconsidered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move to lay the motion on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Another amendment is pending at the moment, and it will take unanimous consent to reconsider.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Colorado? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Is there a motion to table?

Mr. PASTORE. I so move.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONTROL OF THE COST OF THE SECRET WAR IN LAOS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, today I would propose for the Senate's consideration a revised version of an amendment to the military procurement authorization bill which I proposed originally during consideration of the bill by the Armed Services Committee.

This amendment, with one exception, would establish a ceiling of \$200 million on U.S. expenditures in Laos during the fiscal year 1972 for economic aid, military assistance, and all other U.S. activities. That exception would be costs connected with combat air operations by U.S. forces over the Ho Chi Minh trail area in Southern Laos.

We now know that for at least 10 years the U.S. Government has been conducting a war in Laos. I might add, inasmuch as the Secretary of Defense testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that he was not conducting military operations in Laos, it is clear that the functioning of this war has been directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. We have been using funds provided by American taxpayers and appropriated by the Congress without the authorization of the Congress; and largely without the knowledge—therefore obviously without the consent—of either the Congress or the American people.

During these 10 years the cost and the scope of that war have expanded steadily behind a screen of official secrecy.

In recent months some of the facts regarding the participation of this Na-

tion in this war in Laos have been revealed. Those facts prove conclusively that there has been a continuing and growing American involvement.

The only conclusion that can be drawn would appear to be that if there is to be any limit on the increasing cost and scope of our involvement in Laos, it will have to be obtained through the Congress by means of its constitutional right to appropriate, with understanding, the funds necessary to conduct war.

It is now clear that for years the Congress has been appropriating money in the blind to finance this Laotian war. We have not had knowledge of how much money was actually being spent; nor have we had knowledge of how any money spent was expended.

The purpose of the amendment which I offer today is to place the Congress in a position to exercise its constitutional responsibilities with regard to U.S. activities in Laos; an objective which can only be achieved provided the Congress places some overall ceiling on the amount of money that can be spent in Laos and also takes steps to know, both before and after the fact, the nature of our activities in Laos.

Until now, there has been no ceiling whatever on the amounts this Nation could spend in this war; indeed, there has been little information available about what our representatives have been doing. As a result, the costs of this undeclared Laotian war to the American taxpayer have risen steadily as our involvement in Laos—both our direct involvement and our indirect involvement through the use of Thai troops—has steadily deepened.

I believe that many in this chamber will be surprised, even now, to learn the degree of the rise in the costs and our activities, year by year.

The figures on the cost of the military assistance program that were obtained by the staff of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad from our officials in Laos do provide one index.

In 1963, the year in which the military assistance program began, the staff was told that the cost—the amount actually spent—was \$11.9 million.

During the following year, 1964, the cost rose to \$21.4 million.

In 1965, that cost reached \$40.8 million; in 1966, \$59.7 million, and in 1967, \$80.8 million.

By the fiscal year 1971 the cost had risen to \$162.2 million.

Finally, for fiscal year 1972, while the executive branch has asked for \$138.5 million in new obligational authority, the Armed Services Committee has been told that the program cost—that is the amount which actually will be spent—will be \$221.2 million.

In other words, the cost of military assistance to Laos doubled between the fiscal year 1963 and fiscal year 1965, doubled again between 1965 and 1967; and in the current year, if some limitation is not imposed, it will be almost three times as large as it was in the fiscal year 1967; and nearly 20 times as large as it was when it all began in secrecy 9 years ago.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may ask a question?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. I would like to ask the distinguished Senator from Missouri whether this limitation would in any way impede or contribute to the danger of our troops that are being withdrawn from Vietnam. The argument would be made and I wonder what the Senator's reaction would be to that question.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say to my able friend from Rhode Island that we have been careful to exclude the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in order that we would not be justifiably criticized for doing anything to affect the withdrawal of our troops from Vietnam. The position taken by the administration in this matter is that any limitation of any kind on what we are doing over there is wrong.

I worry about this a great deal. The Prime Minister of Laos, who is currently in town, asked the People's Republic of China to build roads in northern Laos for him, and they are now doing so. Therefore, in areas adjacent to where our bombers and fighters are operating in northern Laos, we are running the danger of hitting some of those thousands of Red Chinese in northern Laos.

Our operations in northern Laos have little to do with the operations going on in southern Laos, hundreds of miles away and, therefore, are separate from our operations in South Vietnam.

Few, if any, Members of this body could have been aware of the steadily mounting cost of our military program in Laos, because before this year the actual costs of the total program had never been assembled and presented to the Congress; or even to the Armed Services Committee.

The actual costs were, of course, readily available to the executive branch had they chosen to share them with the Congress. Instead they presented only estimates of obligations against single year authorizations.

Each year for the past few years the Senate Armed Services Committee has been asked to recommend to the Senate the authorization of specific amounts for military assistance to Laos; and the committee has regularly complied, apparently in the belief that the amounts of new obligational authority requested constituted at least a rough index of the size of the program involved.

We now know just how wrong that assumption was. In presenting its justification for authorizations to support free world forces in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand in the fiscal year 1970, the Defense Department told the Armed Services Committee that it needed \$74.2 million for military assistance to Laos; but the recently declassified figure for the actual cost of the Laos military assistance program was \$146.4 million.

For the fiscal year 1971, \$117.3 million was sought; but the actual costs that year were \$162.2 million.

On May 6 of this year Defense Department witnesses discussed the Lao military assistance program before the

Armed Services Committee in terms of a new authorization of \$125.8 million. At roughly the same time, two members of the staff of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Foreign Relations Committee were in Vientiane; and there learned that the estimate of the 1972 military assistance program actually being planned for Laos was nothing like the \$125.8 million, but actually was \$252.1 million, just twice the amount described to the Armed Services Committee.

Prior to this year, the only figures available to Senators, even on a classified basis, for the cost of the U.S. Laotian operations were the amounts of the classified requests for new obligational military assistance authority and the public figure for the AID program. The total of these two figures revealed a cost much greater than anything the public could have known, but this amount was still only a portion of what was actually being spent in Laos.

In the fiscal year 1971, for example, as noted above, \$117 million in new obligational authority was requested for military aid and \$52 million for economic aid, for a total of \$169 million. Following the secret session of the Senate, in which I discussed the report of our subcommittee staff, the Secretary of State acknowledged in a press conference on June 15 that the total of U.S. expenditures in Laos, excluding U.S. Air Force operations in both northern Laos and the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, was not in the realm of \$169 million, but was actually more than double that, "in the neighborhood of \$350 million." That was twice the amount previously given on a classified basis to the few Members of the Senate.

Although, as mentioned, the Secretary did not give figures for the cost of air operations in either northern Laos or the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee on this year's defense authorization bill, it was revealed that U.S. expenditures in Laos will actually total \$490.2 million in this fiscal year. That figure includes \$143.4 million for U.S. air support excluding the Ho Chi Minh Trail area.

It is clear, therefore, that the Senate has been kept in the shadows as far as actually knowing how much we are spending in Laos is concerned. It is clear also that the public has been kept completely in the dark.

Prior to this year the only figure the public knew was the annual cost of the economic assistance program, which has been running at about \$52 million a year since the fiscal year 1969.

Think of that, Mr. President. We live in a democracy where the people have the right to know. Actually, we have spent over \$1.5 billion in Laos, if we count the bombings of the Ho Chi Minh Trails; yet the only figure the American people knew about was \$52 million.

Those few members of the press and public who have followed this subject closely might have learned from reading the published hearings of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and

Commitments Abroad that military assistance costs in Laos for fiscal year 1970 were estimated by Defense officials at about \$90 million. It subsequently developed that they were \$146.4 million; and there were no official figures generally available to the Congress or the public for total U.S. expenditures in any previous fiscal year prior to the Secretary of State's admission, which he made last June 15, that costs for the last fiscal year in that little country, and exclusive of any air operations, were "in the neighborhood of \$350 million."

Not only was the cost of our Lao operations concealed before this spring, but the scope and character of the war—and the details of our participation in it—were not acknowledged until recently.

In a statement on March 6, 1970, President Nixon provided the American people with what he described as a "precise description of our current activities in Laos." According to the President, the pertinent facts were:

First, The United States was providing regular and irregular Lao forces with equipment, training, and logistics support.

Second, The United States was conducting air operations to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, reconnaissance flights in northern Laos; and, on request from the Lao Government, combat support missions for Lao forces.

While this description of our activities in Laos went beyond previous acknowledgments of such activities, it glossed over the following details which subsequently came to light through the work of our Commitments Subcommittee:

First, Most of the war in Laos is coordinated through and by the American Embassy in Vientiane.

Second, The United States trains, arms, and feeds the Lao Army and Air Force.

Third, The United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency, trains, advises, pays, supports, and coordinates an irregular army, elements of which are deployed in four of the five military regions in Laos.

Fourth, The United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency, and in cooperation with the Thai Government, trains, pays, supports, and coordinates a growing force of Thai soldiers in Laos.

Fifth, In addition to interdiction operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the U.S. Air Force flies hundreds of combat air missions throughout Laos in close support of Lao regular and irregular ground combat forces. These missions are also coordinated by the American Embassy in Vientiane. Included in this American air effort are strikes by B-52 bombers in northern Laos, far from the Ho Chi Minh Trail area.

There is considerable doubt in my own mind whether the Congress, if presented with a straightforward proposal to spend half a billion dollars to carry on such activities, would have agreed to do so; but insofar as we can determine, no congressional committee, before this year, was ever given any comprehensive picture of our operations in Laos. The two committees of the Senate most directly involved, the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, have been given only

a partial and, therefore, misleading, picture of what has been going on in that country.

The history of Thai forces in Laos provides an excellent example. It is a history replete with missing pages—written in large part in invisible ink.

During the last session of the Congress, a law was passed prohibiting U.S. support for Vietnamese or other free world forces—this is the law—"in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos." The intent of the sponsors of this legislation is beyond question. One of their specific purposes was to preclude U.S. financing of Thai forces to fight in Laos.

Despite the passage of this law, it has now become public information that there are thousands of Thai fighting in Laos. The executive branch now acknowledges the presence of these forces, although claiming they are all "volunteers" serving under Lao military command.

The Department of State has also recently acknowledged, in a letter which I will ask be printed in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks, that most of these Thai have served in the Thai Army; that the units in question are formed in Thailand and include volunteer officers and NCO's who have severed their connections with the Thai armed forces; that there are Thai officers, including a general, stationed in Thailand who perform liaison functions with the Lao government; and that the Thai units in Laos include an "artillery capability composed of individuals with previous artillery experience."

At no point in the State Department letter is the claim made that the Thai in question are ethnic Lao. Nor is it explained why some of these Thai have said, in various interviews with journalists—where we get most of our new information—that they are regular Thai army troops who were asked to accept special assignment in Laos for extra pay.

The administration has now acknowledged publicly that the cost of this extra pay, as is true of the other expenses involved in this program of Thai forces being sent to Laos, are borne by the United States.

Up to now, however, the administration has refused to make public any additional details as to the specific numbers of Thais now involved, or the number it is planned to have involved in the future. Nor has it said any more about the arrangements for recruiting, organizing, directing and financing these forces.

Nevertheless, the executive branch is now asking the Congress, in this bill to authorize additional funds so as to continue, even expand, this program of Thai forces in Laos; in fact, based on what we can learn, three times as many additional Thais are to be financed for fighting in Laos, which will require three times as much U.S. money in the fiscal year 1972 as was used for this purpose in the fiscal year 1971.

In an article in the September 23 issue of the Washington Evening Star, written from Vientiane by Tammy Arbuckle, he reports that—

American official sources confirmed that 12,000 Thais will be available to meet the ex-

pected dry season offensive by the North Vietnamese early next month.

Mr. Arbuckle notes that—

This will more than double the current force of between 5,000 and 6,000 Thai army troops deployed in Laos.

Mr. President, I am a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and I heard the debate in that committee. We passed this legislation through that committee, which was ultimately made law, passed by both Houses and signed by the President, and I know that what we were doing there was an effort to prevent such activities as Thai troops fighting in Laos.

In addition to the highly dubious legality of our paying for these Thai soldiers in the face of the legislation passed last year, there are the policy risks entailed by drawing the Thais, to whom we have a defense commitment under SEATO, into more direct conflict with the North Vietnamese.

There would also seem to be something grossly out of line about the costs to the American taxpayer of these Thai mercenaries. While I am not at liberty to make public the exact figures involved, I can tell the Senate, on the basis of testimony by the U.S. Ambassador in Laos before the Foreign Relations Committee, that the proposed expenditures for supplying Thai soldiers to fight in Laos in fiscal year 1972 are 25 percent higher than the proposed military assistance program for the Royal Lao Army itself—30 percent higher than the cost of the Lao irregulars—and this despite the fact that the number of Thai soldiers involved is far less than a quarter and less than half the strength of the total strength of the Lao Army the Lao irregulars.

This brief review of the major facts which underlie current U.S. operations in Laos should be sufficient to demonstrate why the time has come for the Congress to place at least some restraints upon the conduct of this undeclared and uncontrolled war.

The amendment which I offer, therefore, would place a limit of \$200 million on all U.S. expenditures in Laos, exclusive, I emphasize, of the air operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trails area. This amount is sufficient to cover all amounts which the executive branch requested and justified at the outset of the Armed Services Committee's consideration of this bill this year.

Since the time when the committee initially considered the Southeast Asia portion of the military procurement authorization bill, for this fiscal year, the administration has agreed that the cost of U.S. operations in Laos in the coming year—again exclusive of air operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trails area—is nearly \$500 million—\$490.2 million to be exact—of which \$221.2 million will be expended for the military assistance program. Note that in May the estimated amount of new money need for the fiscal year 1972 military assistance program in Laos, as presented to the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, was \$125.8 million.

I believe it entirely fair to assume that this new figure for the cost of our Lao operations would not have come to light

if members of the staff of the commitments subcommittee had not made an extended actual visit to the area in question. Following a report of their findings to a secret session of the Senate on June 6, with subsequent inquiries by Armed Services and Foreign Relations for additional details of expenditures in Laos, executive branch witnesses again appeared before the Armed Services Committee on July 22; and at that meeting, the true dimensions of the Laos program began to emerge for the first time.

The justification then presented for an expenditure of \$490.2 million was essentially the same as that offered in May. No different explanation was offered to justify an increase in the military assistance program to \$221.2 million than that presented in May when the program was being described in terms of \$125.8 million.

Year after year the Defense Department has had enough excess money and material available to support a program much larger than that authorized—sometimes twice as large. Similarly, there was no explanation, whatever, offered as to how the anticipated costs of the Thai mercenaries—a category of expenditure not even mentioned in the earlier session—had been computed.

It was acknowledged that the per man cost of the Thai was somewhat higher than that of the Lao irregulars, but there was no emphasis of the fact the real ratio is 33 percent more money for less than half as many Thai troops as Lao irregular troops, both of which groups we finance and train. This fact did not become clear until administration witnesses testified before the Foreign Relations Committee later on the same day.

There are many other gaps in this effort to justify a half a billion dollars for Laos, exclusive of the trails. To the best of my knowledge, at no point have the costs of the CIA operations in Laos been explained as a separate item to any congressional committee. Neither has the nature of U.S. air operations in northern Laos ever been fully described to any committee.

As noted earlier, the President has referred to combat support missions which have been flown at the request of the Royal Lao Government. The fact is that the U.S. Air Force is engaged in an around-the-clock campaign of intensive combat operations of all sorts throughout Laos, ranging from the stationing of forward air controllers and aircraft to B-52 strikes in the northern portion of Laos, hundreds of miles from the Ho Chi Minh Trails, and far closer to the boundary of the People's Republic of China.

In short, none of the above activities has as yet been described to Congress in sufficient detail—nor has the derivation of the costs of these activities yet been explained in a manner which would support any such appropriation. In effect, all that Congress has been told is that the United States is conducting many more programs in Laos than were known before; therefore, twice as much money is required.

This new information which has come to light, coupled with the now universally admitted serious economic problems we face here at home, makes me even

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less willing than before to continue expenditures in Laos at this steadily higher level. I believe that any American policy in Laos which costs more than \$200 million to support is too expensive, or too dangerous, or both.

This belief is reinforced by the acknowledgement of administration witnesses before Armed Services that, notwithstanding all we are currently doing in Laos—there could not be a more important point—the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao presently have the capability, if they so chose, at any time to complete their takeover of Laos.

In the face of this admitted fact, the waste and futility of this effort becomes all too apparent.

Surely, Congress has the right to receive from the executive branch justification for specific additional authorization requests, plus an explanation of the reasons why such additional authority is needed. Section (e) of my amendment would establish a requirement for a written explanation of the purposes for which any future funds for Laos are requested.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the text of the amendment.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SEC. 505. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be obligated or expended in any amount in excess of \$200,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation, project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972.

(b) In computing the \$200,000,000 limitation on obligation and expenditure authority under subsection (a) of this section in fiscal year 1972, there shall be included in the computation the value of any goods, supplies, materials, or equipment provided to, for, or on behalf of Laos in such fiscal year by gift, donation, loan, lease, or otherwise. For the purpose of this subsection, "value" means the fair market value of any goods, supplies, materials, or equipment provided to, for, or on behalf of Laos, but in no case less than 33 1/3 per centum of the amount the United States paid at the time such goods, supplies, materials, or equipment were acquired by the United States.

(c) No funds may be obligated or expended for any of the purposes described in subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos in any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1972, unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act. In no case shall funds in any amount in excess of the amount specifically authorized by law for any fiscal year be obligated or expended for any such purpose during such fiscal year.

(d) The provisions of subsection (a) and (c) of this section shall not apply with respect to the obligation or expenditure of funds to carry out combat air operations over the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails in southern Laos, and over areas immediately adjacent to such trails, by United States military forces.

(e) After the date of enactment of this Act, whenever any request is made to the Congress for the appropriation of funds for use in, for, or on behalf of Laos for any fiscal

year, the President shall furnish a written report to the Congress explaining the purpose for which such funds are to be used in such fiscal year.

(f) The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1971, a written report showing the total amount of funds expended in, for, or on behalf of Laos, during the preceding quarter by the United States Government, and shall include in such report a general breakdown of the total amount expended, describing the different purposes for which such funds were expended and the total amount expended for such purpose.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In addition to establishing a requirement for written explanations in connection with any future fund requests for Laos, section (c) of the amendment would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for any purpose after the date of enactment of the amendment unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law.

As noted earlier, in the past the amounts of money specifically identified in requests to Congress as being for use in Laos have constituted only a portion of the total cost of U.S. operations in that country. The purpose of section (c) of the amendment is to insure that Congress knows when it is authorizing or appropriating money for this country; and, conversely, to prevent the diversion to Laos of funds appropriated for other purposes.

Mr. President, what is wrong with that? What is wrong with our being told as to what they did with the money requested, particularly if they did not do with it what was asked for when it was authorized and appropriated? In my opinion, that could well be the basic thrust of my remarks.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, so that I may ask three or four questions to clarify the amendment somewhat?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am happy to yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator's amendment affect the expenditures now being carried out by the CIA in Laos?

Mr. SYMINGTON. That would be covered by the amendment.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator think that would affect the operations of the CIA?

Mr. SYMINGTON. In Laos?

Mr. AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as the Secretary of Defense testified that he was conducting no military operations in Laos, the only conclusion I can draw from that, based on my experience, is that the Central Intelligence Agency is conducting these operations under the direction of the State Department, and funds for such operations are included in this ceiling.

Mr. AIKEN. I understand that a great many more Laotians now live in Thailand than remain in their home country and that considerable recruiting is done in Thailand for the purpose of strengthening the comparatively weak forces they have at home. Would this amendment also apply to the recruiting now done in Thailand if such recruits were paid by the United States?

Mr. SYMINGTON. The word "ethnic"

is the only way, I say to my able friend, that the administration can justify what it is doing on any basis. Otherwise, it is clearly breaking the law.

I would say if there were people who had lived in Thailand for a period of years and the United States claimed that, because their grandfather or their great-grandfather originally came from Laos, we could, therefore, under the law, pay, train, and finance them to fight in Laos, that interpretation of the law is certainly in violation of the interest of the Congress.

Mr. AIKEN. I understand that about three or four times more Laotians are now living in Thailand than the number living in Laos, and the Laotian Army depends on them for the Laotian forces to maintain their numbers—I do not know for sure though.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I believe that the figures the Senator presents are correct.

Mr. AIKEN. How would this amendment affect the air cover which is now provided for the Laotians in the Plain of Jarres, which I believe is considered a crucial area in that country?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, before answering that, I would like to mention that at no time has the executive branch ever contended to me or to the subcommittee that the so-called volunteers are ethnic Lao; and, based on other testimony we have received, I think that might be difficult for them.

Mr. AIKEN. They are Laotian in the same sense that a third or fourth generation European living in America now is loyal to the old country, their great-grandfather's country. Is that correct?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I believe so.

In the statements by the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before the Armed Services Committee, there was considerable discussion of the Thai forces in Laos, about how they are all volunteers—that was the big word—and how they have severed their connection with the Thai Armed Forces. But there was no mention whatever of the fact that they are ethnic Lao. I think if the Senator looks at the record, he will see that because what they have done is pretty clear, they have constantly raised new justification for it.

Mr. AIKEN. Frankly, I do not know, and that is why I raised the question. I also asked about the air cover for the Plain of Jarres, which is considered a crucial area in defense of the whole country.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I think that any support that Vang Pao can get he will welcome. Therefore, any support we give—including in the Plain of Jarres—would be better for him. I do not think it would have much to do with the question of whether the country will exist as a country under the present government, because, as mentioned, we have had testimony that any time the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao under Souvanna Phong, want to take the country over, they can do so.

Mr. AIKEN. The reason I asked is that there seems to be some apprehension that they would take the country over quickly if Laos lost the protection of our Air Force over the Plain of Jarres.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I think we have a great deal of apprehension about what would happen in South Vietnam, what would happen in Cambodia, and what would happen in Laos. There is no doubt that pretty soon we would have the same story told to us about Burma and Thailand.

May I say to my good friend that this amendment does not cut out air support in northern Laos, but merely puts a limit on what we can spend. So what the amendment does is to force a little discrimination with respect to how the money will be used; and to provide the Congress with knowledge to that end. I know the Senator from Vermont would agree with me that we should have knowledge of what we appropriate.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator is saying that if we should spend \$20 million or \$30 million to complete a hydroelectric plant, that same money could not be spent for any other purpose.

Mr. SYMINGTON. A hydroelectric plant in Laos?

Mr. AIKEN. Yes. I think there is one there.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Money spent for that plant would fall under the limitation. One of the reasons I am keen for the amendment is that we need a little money back in my State.

Mr. AIKEN. The next question is, if the Government of Laos should fall to the enemy, with the North Vietnamese leading the enemy forces, what does the Senator think would be the result on our position in South Vietnam? Would it make our withdrawal more likely, less likely, or what?

Mr. SYMINGTON. When we get into the question of what government we support, which is the question that comes up in so many countries where we invest American taxpayers' money, we run into a problem of decision as to what would be the reasons. I personally heard the Prime Minister of Laos in Washington some months ago, stating frankly that when he first thought he had trouble, he applied to the North Vietnamese for arms. He said that that was rejected, so he left it there; but the presumption was that if the United States did not continue to support him in the way he felt was right, he would apply to them again for arms. As the able Senator knows, it is difficult in a country like this, which is a tribal country with a king we do not hear much about, to really know what is going on. We know, as an example, that the present prime minister has asked the People's Republic of China to build roads in his country and that there are thousands and thousands of Chinese now quite close to the capital of Laos. Because of all these factors, therefore, I honestly cannot answer a question like that.

Mr. AIKEN. One last question and this is the last one. The Peoples Republic of China is supporting the North Vietnamese at this time, and we are told that Russia is also giving them support—I do not know how much from each country—but except for the support from Russia and China, it is likely that the North Vietnamese could actually threaten to take over Laos itself, assuming that we withdraw all our military strength

from South Vietnam. Does the Senator from Missouri believe that Russia and China would withdraw much of their support from those forces which are harassing Laos at the present time?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, Mr. President, based on the briefings which cannot be discussed on the floor of the Senate today, and at which the able Senator from Vermont and I have been present, I would say that problems between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are such that whatever one of the two countries did with respect to Laos, the chances are the second country would take a directly reverse position.

Mr. AIKEN. It would appear to me, however, that if we withdraw, the pressure on Laos from the Pathet Lao, supported by Russia, and China, or both, would be somewhat reduced, would it not?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Would the Senator please repeat that.

Mr. AIKEN. It appears to me that if we should withdraw from South Vietnam, the pressure—the support, rather, that Russia and China are giving the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, would be somewhat—if not wholly reduced—at least substantially reduced. Am I thinking in the right direction?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I do not think there is any question about that. I would think, if we left South Vietnam, the chances are a good many to one, that President Thieu would go with us. Thus I think that the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front and the South Vietnamese would, in a period of weeks, if not days, take over South Vietnam and get rid of the present government.

Mr. AIKEN. Does it appear to the Senator from Missouri that our unfortunate venture in Indochina, South Vietnam particularly, is largely responsible for the very great difficulties that Laos and Cambodia find themselves in now?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I think that is a logical conclusion.

Mr. AIKEN. That is my last question.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the able senior Senator from Vermont, and may I present to him and to the Senate that there is no one in this body for whom I have greater respect. As is seen clearly in the testimony on the pending legislation before the Armed Services Committee, the administration contends that it cannot be bound within a fixed budget for Laos; and the preference of the executive branch to have no budgetary restrictions or limitations is understandable. That position is tantamount, however, to saying that the authority to appropriate, given to the Congress by the Constitution, nevertheless should not be taken seriously.

Section (f) of the present amendment would require quarterly reports to the Congress showing the total amount of funds expended in, for, or on behalf of Laos.

In the past, the Department of Defense has furnished quarterly reports of obligations against those funds authorized under the Defense procurement bill for the support of free world forces in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand; and although frankly we had not realized it before this year, the latter reports repre-

sented a far from complete picture of the cost of military assistance to Laos. This experience furnishes evidence that a more complete and detailed accounting by the executive branch is essential if the Congress is to have any assurance that it knows what is going on; and that is the purpose of section (f).

As noted earlier, the present amendment excludes any obligations and expenditures incident to U.S. air operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trail area because it is maintained by the administration that these operations are essential to the safety of American troops in South Vietnam and also to the successful implementation of the Vietnamization program.

Successive administrations have been able to pursue these policies and programs in Laos because there have been virtually no public or congressional restraints upon that policy. The absence of any restraints has been due, in large part, to the fact that for some 10 years neither the public nor the Congress has known anything about what was going on.

In other words they are operating without the approval and without the knowledge of Congress; and this despite the clause which specifically states our rights when it comes to participation in foreign policy decisions. What is the purpose of our being here if when we send out able members of the various committee staffs of the Congress, we find out there are different sets of facts from those given by the Executive when we were asked to first authorize and then appropriate the money.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to the able chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Senator asked concerning our relevance and why we are here. I suggest that we do play a role, because our being here makes most of the people of the country think we have a role. It gives a kind of facade behind which the executive branch can do as it pleases without taking responsibility for it.

The Senator from Missouri and I have a responsibility. We try to make the executive take some responsibility. However, the executive does not even write any more letters. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State rarely answer a letter inside of 3 or 4 months, and that is usually to say why they cannot supply the information to the Senate.

As the Senator well knows, at the beginning of September when we pressed hard enough to get answers relevant to the matter of foreign aid, the administration refused the information and pleaded executive privilege. That is the first time they did it so formally. They do not have to do it by delay. They just do not come.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from Arkansas is primarily responsible for their taking executive privilege because for the first time we said, "If you don't take executive privilege, you won't get the money." So, that was a banner day for Congress.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator for his many accomplishments. He has done so much to get information to the committee. And he has done so much to bring into the public domain what information has been found.

On the pending amendment, I will wait until the Senator completes his statement which is nearly completed before I ask further questions.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the able Senator from Arkansas. I will not be much longer.

Mr. President, we now know far more than before about what is going on in Laos, therefore are in a better position to reach judgments about the future course of U.S. policy. We have also discovered just how much we did not know, and accordingly have a clearer idea about what information we need to have in the future if we are to exercise our constitutional responsibilities. The amendment which I offer is a vehicle for assuring a continuing flow of information to the Congress with respect to our Laos operations.

No war should be planned and conducted without the knowledge and authorization of Congress, especially when one considers the risks such wars may entail in terms of the involvement of other nations.

The purpose of this amendment is not to put an immediate end to the war in Laos. Desirable as that objective would be, it is not a realistic possibility at the present time. But the amendment does represent an opportunity and a challenge to the Senate to both accept and exercise its full responsibilities in the constitutional process.

Surely the Congress should not appropriate money without knowledge of the purposes for which it is being used; and now that we do know what has been happening in the past, I believe we should bear our full share of responsibility for what will follow in the future.

I ask unanimous consent that the following material be printed in the RECORD at this point: My letter of August 10 to Secretary Rogers; the article in the August 9 Washington Post by D. E. Ronk entitled, "CIA Backed Thais in Laos Say They Are Regular Army;" Mr. Abshire's reply of September 24; also the article in the September 23 issue of the Evening Star by Tammy Arbuckle entitled, "Thai Combat Troops for Laos Expected To Double by March."

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**CIA-BACKED THAIS IN LAOS SAY THEY ARE REGULAR ARMY**  
(By D. E. Ronk)

VIENTIANE, Laos.—Thai soldiers serving with the CIA-supported irregular forces in Laos say they are regular army troops of Thailand, asked to accept special assignment in all Thai battalions.

Their assertion contradicts a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report made public last week. The report, prepared by Committee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose referred to Thai troops in Laos as "irregulars."

Heavily censored in most of its references to Thais serving in Laos, the report said the Thai fighting men "are recruited for service in Laos from outside the regular Thai army."

Speaking to a reporter, several Thai soldiers said they were asked to accept an assignment in Laos after the advantages of such service were explained. They have the option of refusing, they said.

According to the Lowenstein-Moose report, "the CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

Their units are formed in Thailand with Thai commissioned and non-commissioned officers and are given special training for Laos.

They arrive in Laos aboard CIA-supported Air America planes from Udorn airbase in Northern Thailand. All orders, from the battalion level down, are issued by Thais, the soldiers said. Only at the very top, with Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo commander of Laos Military Region Two, and the CIA's Armeé Clandestine, is there interference with the Thai chain of command, they said.

Vang Pao does not command the Thais, they said, but consults with Thai officers and the CIA "case officers" who actually make the decisions.

The Thai soldiers agree with press reports that there is at least one Thai general in Laos, using the code name Nai Caw. This is the equivalent of John Doe. The Thai troops say he is a lieutenant general.

Code names are frequently used by and for Thai troops in Laos. Reliable sources in Thailand say that until recently all wounded Thais treated in the U.S. hospital at Udorn Airbase were listed as John Doe One, Two, Three, etc. to hide their national origins.

At present the troops say, there are 10 or 12 Thai battalions in Laos, or about 4,800 men. Two Thai battalions are at Pakse, in southern Laos, and "about ten" in northern Laos, with headquarters at Long Cheng, the soldiers said.

Reliable sources in Bangkok say, moreover, that another Thai artillery battery has either just entered Laos or shortly will, accompanied by an American major. The U.S. officer is to advise them on the operation of unfamiliar equipment, believed to be aiming devices.

Official U.S. sources deny knowledge of such a unit, that an American officer has been given such an assignment, and that a new American officer has arrived or is expected, even on temporary duty.

The Bangkok sources say the officer will be traveling on a civilian passport and in civilian clothing.

A Thai soldier now stationed in Pakse outlined the sequence of events in his assignment to Laos. Returning to Thailand from duty in South Vietnam, he said, he was sent for advance training in Thailand following a 30-day leave. He was told the training was for assignment to Cambodia, he said.

Following the training, he was told his assignment was changed to Laos, but that he could refuse to go and remain in Thailand.

After the pros and cons were explained he decided to accept and became a volunteer.

Following formation of a special battalion," he was sent to Udorn, then to Long Cheng. At Long Cheng, the unit was engaged in defense of that headquarters. The Thais fought in one "heavy" battle in a sector called "Skyline" by U.S. personnel.

Shortly before the fall of the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos to North Vietnamese forces last May the Thai battalion was flown to Ubon Air Base in Thailand then to Pakse, where they were airlifted to the

vicinity of Ba Houei Sai, on the Bolovens Plateau.

As a result of the Hanoi offensive, they withdrew to Pakse. The soldiers said they are not deeply involved in the current counter offensive to recapture the Bolovens, though some of them are used as forward air guides, relaying bombing targets from ground to air.

Recent visitors to Pakse say the Thai soldiers are very much in evidence in hotels and bars. They do not wear Thai army markings on their uniforms and the soldiers say they carry no identification, on orders from their officers.

AUGUST 10, 1971.

HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Washington Post of August 9 contains an article from Vientiane, Laos by Mr. E. E. Ronk which includes several statements dealing with Thai troops in Laos. Mr. Ronk notes in his story that statements made by Thai soldiers in Laos contradict the recent report of the staff of the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad concerning Laos. Because the information in the staff report concerning Thai troops was based on information provided by United States officials I would appreciate receiving your comments on the substance and the details of the following portions of Mr. Ronk's story:

1. "Thai soldiers serving with the CIA supported irregular forces in Laos say they are regular army troops of Thailand, asked to accept special assignment in all Thai battalions."
2. "Their units are formed in Thailand with Thai commissioned and non-commissioned officers . . ."
3. "All orders from battalion level down, are issued by Thais . . ."
4. "Vang Pao does not command the Thais . . . but consults with Thai officers and the CIA case officers . . ."
5. "The Thai soldiers agree with press reports that there is at least one Thai general in Laos, using the name Nai Caw."
6. "Reliable sources in Thailand say that until recently all wounded Thais treated in the U.S. hospital at Udorn Airbase were listed as John Doe One, Two, Three, etc. to hide their national origins."
7. "Reliable sources in Bangkok say, moreover, that another Thai artillery battery has either just entered Laos or shortly will, accompanied by an American major."
8. "A Thai soldier now stationed in Pakse outlined the sequence of events in his assignment to Laos. Returning to Thailand from duty in South Vietnam, he said, he was sent for advance training in Thailand following a 30 day leave. He was told the training was for assignment to Cambodia," he said.
9. "Following the training, he was told his assignment was changed to Laos, but that he could refuse to go and remain in Thailand."
10. ". . . some of (the Thai soldiers) are used as forward airguides, relaying bombing targets from ground to air."
11. ". . . the (Thai) soldiers say they carry no identification, on orders from their officers."

I am confident that you share my desire that the official record dealing with the facts of the nature, composition and command arrangements of Thai forces in Laos should be as accurate as possible. With this end in mind, I look forward to receiving your comments on Mr. Ronk's story.

Sincerely,  
STUART SYMINGTON,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security, Agreements and Commitments Abroad.

SEPTEMBER 24, 1971.

HON. STUART SYMINGTON,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security  
Agreements and Commitments Abroad,  
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.  
Senate

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply further to your letter of August 10, 1971, citing a newspaper article concerning Thai volunteers in Laos, and to your followup letter of September 22.

On the basis of information available to us here the following comments are made on the article:

The Thai forces in Laos are composed exclusively of volunteers, most of whom have served in the Thai Army, but have been discharged. The voluntary character of this program is illustrated by the fact that Thai personnel are free to leave their units in Laos and return to Thailand before their contract period ends without penalty or punishment by Thai authorities. Many have in fact done so, as noted in the article.

In view of its importance to the security of Thailand, the Thai volunteer program in Laos has the approval and support of the Thai government. Cooperation between the Lao and Thai governments has facilitated the formation of Thai volunteer units in Thailand, thus obviating many of the problems that would develop if the Thai units had to be organized from scratch after the individual Thai volunteers arrived in Laos. These units are fully staffed—to include volunteer officers and volunteer NCO's who have severed their connections with the Thai Armed Forces.

General Vang Pao controls the use of Thai volunteers in Military Region II. Like any effective military commander, Vang Pao consults with a number of individuals. Among these are Thai military officers stationed nearby in Thailand who perform liaison functions with the Lao government. One of these is a Thai general officer. Vang Pao also consults with the CIA officers advising his forces, but it is he who makes the military decisions involving the Thai volunteer units.

There are no Thai generals stationed in Laos.

Thai volunteers were treated on an emergency basis at the U.S. hospital at Udorn but this service has been discontinued.

The Thai volunteer units in Laos include a modest and rather thinly spread artillery capability composed of individuals with previous artillery experience. There are no American military personnel with any of the Thai volunteer units.

It is true that all of the Thai in the Lao irregular program are under no legal military or other enforceable obligation to serve in Laos or to remain in the program for any specified length of time.

It is also true that some of the Thai volunteers like their Lao counterparts are used as forward airguides, relaying bombing targets from ground to air. I am not familiar with the identification procedures used by the Thai volunteers in Laos but it would not be surprising, in view of the Thai and Lao desire to keep the Thai volunteer program as low profile as possible, if the volunteers did not carry ID cards.

I hope the above information will be helpful to you and the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,  
Assistant Secretary for Congressional  
Relations.

[From the Evening Star, Sept. 23, 1971]

THAI COMBAT TROOPS FOR LAOS EXPECTED TO  
DOUBLE BY MARCH

(By Tammy Arbuckle)

VIENTIANE.—Twelve thousand Thai troops will be available for combat in Laos by March 1, high-ranking Lao military sources say. This will more than double the current force

of between 5,000 and 6,000 Thai army troops deployed in Laos.

American official sources confirmed that 12,000 Thais will be available to meet the expected dry season offensive by the North Vietnamese early next year, but they said that "all of these Thais will not be in Laos at the same time. Units will be rotated to Thailand for rest and rehabilitation."

The additional troops will come from Thailand's Black Leopard Division which is withdrawing from South Vietnam. Headquarters will be at Kanchanaburi, northwest of Bangkok and many hundreds of miles from Thailand's border.

The Bangkok Post, an English language daily, has quoted government sources as saying the new troops will be used as a guerrilla force within Thailand to counter the Communist insurgency problem in Thailand.

Lao military sources said there would be an announcement telling of the formation of the Thai guerrilla force to fight in Thailand, but that the troops actually are destined to fight in Laos.

Thus American officials handling funds would be able to disburse money to the Thais, although they would be paying for troops in Laos.

The reason for this is that administration officials are trying to get around the congressional ban on the use of Defense Department funds to pay for mercenaries in Laos. As part of this, U.S. government officials here and in Washington describe the Thais as "volunteers" and ethnic Lao from northeast Thailand.

In reality, however, the Thais serving in Laos are regular members of the royal Thai army who volunteered to serve in Laos for extra pay.

Eight Thai soldiers who were interviewed confirmed the arrangement. Three of the soldiers came from Bangkok or its sister city, Thonburi, one was from Nonthaburi and the others were from north or northeast Thailand.

The Thais have their own command system and have almost nothing to do with the royal Lao army. The only Lao military decision which affects them is by a Lao regional commander who may ask American officials to deploy the Thais in a certain place as part of an over-all Lao army operation.

U.S. administrators have claimed the Thais are part of the royal Lao army, but none of the eight Thais spoken to considered themselves as such. American officials attempting to circumvent the congressional restriction deserve some sympathy, for their problem is a difficult one.

The Thais are essential to the survival of the royal Lao forces against the North Vietnamese. The Lao army is sadly depleted, with its casualties running at 10 men killed in action a day.

This year the Thais have been involved in most major action in Laos. They fought at Houei Sai on the Bolovens Plateau when it fell. They took part in the Plain of Jars operation, helping the Lao recapture the area. Thai artillerymen are manning firebase Lion on the plain now.

The Thais also took the responsibility for clearing out a new enemy position at Pak Song last week, freeing sufficient Lao troops for a helicopter lift to take Pak Song from the east.

The high Lao casualties at Pak Song (1,262, including 212 killed and 295 missing out of a force of fewer than 3,000) make it likely that Thais will be needed in the southern Laos Bolovens Plateau.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time for the

quorum call not be charged against my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 248 Leg.]		
Allen	Hansen	Mathias
Bentsen	Harris	Metcalf
Boggs	Hruska	Miller
Chiles	Hughes	Moss
Curtis	Jackson	Packwood
Ervin	Jordan, N.C.	Roth
Fannin	Magnuson	Stennis
Fulbright	Mansfield	Symington

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to request the presence of absent Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After some delay, the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

Alken	Dominick	Pearson
Allott	Ellender	Pell
Anderson	Fong	Proxmire
Baker	Gambrell	Randolph
Bayh	Goldwater	Saxbe
Beall	Gurney	Schweiker
Bible	Hart	Scott
Brock	Hatfield	Smith
Brooke	Humphrey	Spong
Buckley	Inouye	Stafford
Burdick	Jordan, Idaho	Stevens
Byrd, Va.	Kennedy	Stevenson
Case	McClellan	Taft
Cook	McGovern	Thurmond
Cooper	Mondale	Tunney
Cotton	Muskie	Welcker
Cranston	Nelson	Williams
Dole	Pastore	Young

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BEALL). A quorum is present.

Who yields time?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) agreed to yield me 10 minutes on his time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa may proceed.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) in this effort to put a \$200 million ceiling on American expenditures in Laos. We should all be grateful for the persistence which he has shown in prying the facts about our involvement there from our secrecy-ridden Government and then in bringing these facts before the Senate and the American people.

In an important sense, the principle of establishing some ceiling is even more urgent than the precise figure. If the Congress is to exercise its duty of authorizing and appropriating funds, we must know how much is being spent and for what purposes. The burden of developing and justifying programs falls on the executive branch, but the Congress can and should decide how much may be spent and under what restrictions.

Gradually, in recent years, the Congress has done what successive administrations failed to do: Put limits on the



conflict in Southeast Asia. First, we forbade extension of U.S. ground combat operations into Laos and Thailand. Then we set clear limits to the war in Cambodia. For several years, we have imposed a ceiling on the amount of money which could be spent for support of South Vietnamese and other forces in South Vietnam.

Amendment 434 is the next step in this process—and it is a necessary step if we are to prevent the shifting into neighboring countries of the tragic violence which has scarred Vietnam. If we really believe in “winding down the war,” as virtually every Member of this body favors, then we must cap the volcano in Laos.

The administration argues that a ceiling would somehow “cut the ground” out from under our friends in Laos, I do not follow that logic. Is there any evidence, for example, that our \$2.5 billion limitation on overall military aid to Indochina has made the South Vietnamese less willing or able to fight? If conditions change, and there is persuasive new evidence of need, surely the Congress can add to the \$200 million figure established by this amendment.

One of the most attractive features of the Symington amendment is that it sets a total, all-inclusive limit to U.S. expenditures in Laos. The only exception is for the cost of bombing along the Ho Chi Minh trails, which the State Department admits is related to the conflict in South Vietnam and is separate and distinct from the other war in Laos. This amendment reaches across the many separate and even secret bills and line items which have hitherto prevented the Congress from assessing the totality of our involvement in Laos.

Until a few months ago, the Congress did not even have a full and accurate picture of U.S. expenditures in Laos. If one looks at the budget submission for total economic and military assistance for Laos planned for fiscal year 1972, the figure is a seemingly modest \$178 million. As recently as June 7, when this body met in secret session, the admitted cost of our economic and military assistance was put at \$284 million. Barely a week later, Secretary of State Rogers announced that the total for U.S. expenditures in Laos, exclusive of bombing, was \$350 million. Thus, in fact, the American people have been paying over twice as much to support the war in Laos as they had initially been led to believe.

Even these costs are rising. In July, Secretary of Defense Laird said that planned expenditures for fiscal year 1972 would reach the staggering level of \$490 million. In other words, we will be spending 40 percent more this year than last. And the total cost will be more than twice the gross national product of that poor country.

I am pleased that the administration is now more open about the costs of our involvement in Laos. I am still waiting, however, for a persuasive justification of the need for such increased expenditures. In military aid alone, the U.S. Government plans to spend nearly three times as much in 1972 as it did in 1969.

When we consider what we are really

buying with these expenditures, I believe that few people will see the need for such increases. In fact, one might well conclude that we are pouring money into a futile and destructive effort.

In a nation where perhaps one-third of the people have been refugees at some time in recent years, the overwhelming desire is for peace. Our own Ambassador told the Armed Services Committee last July that “the Lao have been bled white by this war.”

The truth of this statement can be seen in the casualty figures. Our people are upset, and justifiably so, when American deaths are 29 per week, as they were last week. Yet in Laos, with only one-one-hundredth our population, the death toll on the Royal Government side averages out to about 70 per week, according to calculations based upon the Moos-Lowenstein report. In other words, the Lao casualty rate is the equivalent of 1,000 Americans dying every day.

We must put a halt to this killing. Even though we may think we have the best of motives, I do not believe that the United States should be financing suicide.

Much of our aid has gone for the tough, patriotic Meo tribesmen. But a decade of vicious war, prolonged by strong U.S. support, has seen that tribe lose a huge percentage of its population—perhaps one-fourth. Reports from Laos now say that 12- and 13-year-old boys have been pressed into service. At least one report last month said that rice supplies were being withheld from Meo who refused to send their sons to fight.

To keep the war effort going, the United States is financing Thai soldiers who fight alongside the Lao. Although the administration claims that these troops are not regular Thai military personnel, Ambassador Godley admitted that assistance has been sought from the Thai Government “in facilitating the volunteering” of its people. By paying for these foreign troops, we are perpetuating the historic struggle between Thailand and Vietnam for dominant influence in Laos.

Besides financing protracted conflict, our funds also support the logistics of the Lao military, yet persistent reports from journalists and knowledgeable officials contend that much of the opium and its derivatives, which ultimately is the heroin consumed by U.S. forces in Vietnam, travels through Laos on the planes and trucks which America pays for. This is a question that has neither been adequately pursued nor answered by our Government.

There must be some limit to this conflict. If the President is unwilling to draw the line, then I believe it is time that the Congress must.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Virginia yield me 5 minutes?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, having visited Laos and South Vietnam quite a few times and having witnessed the operations over there, I am more than a little bit aware of what is going on.

I am quite disturbed by this amendment and the effect it could have. We have to keep in mind, Mr. President, that we have been unmercifully bombing part of Laos for the past 10 years. It is a very important part of the South Vietnam operation. Without that bombing and without tactical air attacks on the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, the enemy never could have been contained by the South Vietnamese or by us.

I have felt all along that we certainly owe something to that country for the destruction we have wrought in the eastern part of it. The help we have been giving Laos in a military way, I think, is a method of repaying it for the debt we owe by reason of using their country to fight a war involving other countries. I would have to see this combination upset.

I think if the amendment were agreed to, we could almost judge the time that Laos would fall as a country to either Red China or North Vietnam. And, I have to add, this would be just the beginning of the failures over there, because Thailand would be next. The Red Chinese have now completed a road to the Burmese border. And certainly they have not built that road just for an exercise in highway construction.

I think their ultimate aim—as I have felt for a long time—is the domination of Southeast Asia and then the domination of all of Asia.

If we allow this to happen, I think we can very safely foresee the beginning of another world war, because Red China with domination over Asia will then be a serious threat to Russia on Russia's southern border. We, by that time, would have vacated the world leadership spot, which we seem to be in a great hurry to do. The world leadership would start us on another war. And the conflict would start between Red China and their then acquired land and the Soviet Union who would resist this effort.

Mr. President, I would hate to see the amendment agreed to. I know that it is a very attractive one. I know that it means the saving of money. However, the saving of money and the saving of a country and the saving of our country from participation in a third world war, I think, is an entirely different subject.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I strongly support Senator SYMINGTON's amendment to the military procurement authorization bill establishing a \$200 million ceiling in fiscal year 1972 on U.S. expenditures in Laos for economic aid, military assistance, and all other U.S. activities. This ceiling would not apply to costs connected with U.S. combat air operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trail area in southern Laos.

More than any Member of the Senate, Senator SYMINGTON has tried to alert the Congress and the American public to the “secret war” in Laos and America's increasing involvement in that war. We are still a long way from knowing the full

truth about America's participation in that war; but what we have learned is a result of Senator SYMINGTON's persistent efforts to get at the truth. I believe that his work in trying to curtail this uncontrolled and uncontrolled war will be regarded as one of the major contributions in the distinguished career of our colleague from Missouri.

For years, Congress has appropriated funds to finance this Laotian war without knowing how much money was being spent on how this money was being used.

Because of Senator SYMINGTON's investigation, we now know that our military assistance program to Laos has skyrocketed from \$11.9 million in 1963 to the \$221.2 million requested for fiscal year 1972.

And this \$220 million is only part of the story. According to Senator SYMINGTON, the administration had admitted that the cost of all U.S. operations in Laos in fiscal 1972—exclusive of operations over the Ho Chi Minh trails area—is approximately \$490 million.

These figures were only made available this year. Thus, a program we knew virtually nothing about has been vastly expanded over the past several years.

In part, this increase is a result of the United States subsidizing the use of thousands of Thai mercenaries in Laos—a fact which I revealed on January 19, 1971. In using U.S. Government funds to pay for these Thai troops, the executive branch ignores Congress prohibition of U.S. support for Vietnamese or other free world forces "in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

While we have learned somewhat more about our involvement in Laos, neither the cost of CIA operations in that country nor the nature of U.S. air operations in Northern Laos have been fully described to any congressional committee.

We do know that the U.S. Air Force is engaged in an around-the-clock bombing in Laos—hundreds of miles from the Ho Chi Minh trails. While the full impact of this bombing is not yet clear, there are ample news stories documenting the destruction and devastation of Laotian villages and the suffering of the Laotian people.

Without any real understanding or approval by the Congress or the American public, U.S. military forces are deeply involved in still another Asian war. After our Vietnam experience, we are entitled to ask "Where does it all stop?"

The limited assistance to South Vietnam led to American "advisers" and the bombing of the North.

We know where those so-called limited commitments took us.

Is there any reason to believe that our limited commitment to Laos will not take us down the same path—will not lead us to an ever-increasing involvement in that war?

Since our commitment to Laos continues to escalate, it is imperative that Senator SYMINGTON's amendment be adopted. For if this amendment becomes law, the Congress will make it clear to the executive branch that Laos will not

become another Vietnam—and that the United States will not be dragged into another Southeast Asian quagmire.

As Senator SYMINGTON has pointed out, this amendment will not put an immediate end to the war in Laos. But it will prevent the executive branch from unilaterally expanding U.S. involvement in that war—without the knowledge and approval of the Congress.

In addition to limiting U.S. expenditures in Laos, the amendment would require the executive branch to submit a written explanation describing the purposes of any future funding requests for Laos. And the amendment would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for any purpose in Laos unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law.

For too long now, the Congress—and particularly the Senate—has abdicated its constitutional powers. We have authorized and appropriated funds in the dark—without even the most minimal knowledge of how these funds were being used.

America's involvement in Laos—perhaps more than any other event—has clearly demonstrated the atrophy of congressional power.

This amendment offers us the opportunity to accept and exercise our constitutional responsibilities.

In meeting our responsibilities, we may prevent another tragedy in Indochina.

Mr. DOLE, Mr. President, I rise to urge that this body reject the original amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Missouri. This amendment, if passed, would have the effect of undermining the chances for a careful withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. It would also contribute to the political deterioration of the Laotian Government at a time when its stability and endurance could lead to enhanced prospects for political negotiation in Indochina as a whole. The Senator from Kansas believes that the pending amendment would thereby constitute a double disservice to the interests of the United States as we seek to both stabilize and disengage ourselves from Southeast Asia.

The original amendment to the Defense Procurement Act would set a ceiling of \$200 million on all U.S. assistance to Laos, both economic and military, with the exception of U.S. air interdiction efforts against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The restriction would cover (a) AID, (b) MASF\* for the Royal Lao Army, (c) the Lao irregular program, (d) support for Thai volunteers in the irregular forces in Laos, (e) U.S. air activities in support of Lao regular and irregular forces, and (f) U.S. support for ground actions—for example, by GVN forces—in the trail area. The administration believes that such an amendment would not contribute to the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia.

#### NIXON DOCTRINE

The Nixon doctrine provides for the replacement of U.S. direct participation in Asian defense by greater indigenous efforts with U.S. support. It has been deemed advisable to reduce the numbers

\*U.S. Military Assistance Funding.

of American soldiers as Southeast Asians themselves acquire the capability to defend themselves effectively against external aggression. It is therefore clear that under the Nixon doctrine the costs of U.S. assistance to foreign governments may have to increase as American forces are withdrawn; it would be unreasonable to attempt to reduce both the American participation and American material support for Asia's defense. For example, an important part of our efforts to increase the capability of the Lao to permit them gradually to replace U.S. efforts in the area is building up the Lao air force. This would entail an increase in ordnance expenditures significantly as an item in the MASF program for Laos. An element of the Nixon doctrine is U.S. support for regional cooperation in defense. One example of assistance to regional cooperation is U.S. support for Thai volunteers serving in irregular forces in Laos under the command of the Royal Lao Government.

The original Symington amendment would directly reduce our ability to act without delay and as required to respond to surges in North Vietnamese attacks in Laos. The ceiling proposed is quite inadequate to continue essential ongoing operations in Laos which facilitate our general objectives in Southeast Asia, including Vietnamization and withdrawal of U.S. forces. The administration has accepted overall limitation on MASF funds for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Imposition of a subceiling for Laos alone would limit dangerously U.S. ability to respond to North Vietnamese actions there. As President Nixon noted in his October 7 peace proposal, the current struggle in Indochina is basically indivisible. As reductions are made in other areas, particularly South Vietnam, it may become necessary to maintain expenditures in Laos. In any event, any amendment whose limitations include expenses for U.S. air support for Lao regular and irregular forces would be difficult to implement. Although it is possible to devise a rough estimate for the costs of an average sortie and to multiply this estimate against the total number of sorties which are considered to have been in support of Lao forces rather than interdiction efforts against the trail, it would be in practice difficult to devise bookkeeping which could satisfy the Congress that the intent of this amendment was being observed. In any case, a ceiling of \$200 million which would include U.S. air operations—except against the Ho Chi Minh Trail—would be highly unrealistic. As Secretary Rogers has noted, the value of support in Laos for fiscal year 1971 is \$350 million, exclusive of all U.S. air operations. If the level of North Vietnamese activities is not reduced through some agreement or at least a local cease-fire, the arbitrary cut in Lao effectiveness through such a drastic cut in U.S. assistance could almost inevitably result in a political as well as military collapse in Laos.

#### EFFORT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT IN LAOS

We are encouraging the Royal Laotian Government's current efforts to explore actively with the Lao Communists the possibility of arriving at some form of a

settlement which would permit the reduction of the level of hostilities in North Laos. There are indications that the Government of North Vietnam now recognizes that there are mutual advantages in a local cease-fire. If progress can be made on this front, it should be possible gradually to reduce U.S. support for activities in Laos—outside the trail area—to a level which could be within a \$200 million ceiling. However, if such a congressional limitation were passed while the negotiations are underway, it would be clearly seen by the enemy as having drastically reduced the ability of the Royal Laotian Government to defend itself, and hence the Communists would considerably harden their negotiating position to the detriment of the Royal Laotian Government. The Royal Laotian Government would be unable to exact concessions from the Government of North Vietnam in return for reductions in U.S. military support—such as a bombing halt and withdrawal of Thai volunteers. An unfavorable settlement would have serious consequences for the ability of other friendly governments in the area to resist North Vietnamese expansionism, and could affect Vietnamization and thus the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

#### LAOS—CRUCIAL NEGOTIATING PERIOD

Since March 1970 Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has been actively engaging in internal talks with the Lao Communists. The talks have proven to be a useful way of defining the basic positions of each side and of furthering contacts which, at an appropriate point, might assist in arriving at a settlement in at least North Laos. In addition, such a settlement could spread to other areas of Laos, and the form of political accommodations might be precedence for settlements elsewhere in Indochina. It is important that the Lao prime minister and other non-Communists be in a position to hold out for a settlement which does not compromise basic Lao national interests—nor those of Thailand, South Vietnam or Cambodia. For the example of Berlin shows that continued firmness may indeed encourage the Communists to abandon extreme positions which they have insisted on, sometimes for years, and enter into serious negotiations.

The coming year will be a crucial one for Indochina. Even without formal progress in the Paris talks, it is obvious that other changes in Indochina will have an impact upon the development of a solution there. The President's trip to Peking, the continuing progress of successful Vietnamization and withdrawal of U.S. forces, the increased competence and capability of the Cambodian Government, and the increasing Thai efforts to deal with their concern about threats to their own security, all will have an important effect upon Laos. In view of the Communists continued assurances of support for the Geneva agreements of 1962 and its internal arrangements, the principal elements for a possible Lao solution acceptable to both the Communists and to the non-Communists are available. The North Vietnamese desire to reach an overall settlement in the area. Such a settlement could begin with progress in

Laos and create movement toward an Indochina solution.

Delicate political negotiations leading to shifts and maneuvers will take place during the crucial year of 1972. It would seem highly inadvisable for this body to take unilateral military steps which would disrupt the negotiating position of the Royal Lao government or undermine that government's very stability. Drastic cuts in U.S. support or the elimination of U.S. support for Thai assistance with volunteers could undermine totally the Royal Lao government's defensive position during the coming dry season. If Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma were faced with military disaster, he could well decide to resign. Souvanna is the symbol of Lao neutralism and would be indispensable to any attempt to return to the framework of the Geneva agreements. He will also be a crucial figure in efforts to move toward a solution of the conflict on the Indochinese Peninsula. His disappearance from the scene could only reduce drastically the chances for a settlement of the conflict in Laos which in turn could complicate the solution of the rest of the conflict in Indochina.

The Senator from Kansas urges that this body reject the pending amendment which can only serve to undermine our goals of withdrawing from Southeast Asia and of creating a viable political situation as we do so. The amendment would be a critical blow against the Nixon doctrine and against the interests of the United States.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arkansas whatever time he desires.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the principle of the amendment of the Senator from Missouri, I support.

The distinguished Senator from Missouri has done more work, I think, in trying to enlighten, and in enlightening, the Senate, the committee, and the public about the war in Laos which this and the predecessor administration has gone to such length to keep secret from the Congress and the public. He deserves great credit.

I agree with the principle in this amendment that attempts to limit our involvement in Laos. When I finish my prepared remarks, I wish to elaborate upon that idea.

Mr. President, the amendment offered by the Senator from Missouri puts a limitation—where there has been no limitation—on our steadily increasing involvement in Laos and which requires—where there has been no requirement—that the Congress be kept informed of the purposes for which public moneys are being spent in Laos. The amendment has been proposed by the Senator who, perhaps more than any other, has demonstrated a consistent concern with regard to the war in Laos and a persistent determination to find out what was going on in that country and to insure that the American people, whose tax moneys pay for the war, are made privy to as much of this information as possible. Without his efforts, in the last few years through the Subcommittee on U.S. Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad, we in the Senate would still be in the position of approving the expenditure in Laos of far more money than we thought we had appropriated for military activities of which we were barely aware.

One reason the war in Laos remained unnoticed for so long, and unexamined after it had been noticed, was that it has been and still is overshadowed by the war in Vietnam. The situation in Laos, like that in Cambodia, is, of course, intimately related to the war in Vietnam. In these other two countries of Indochina we see reflected the false hopes and mistaken judgments that led us into the quagmire of Indochina in the first place and that continue to keep us there. I find it cause for serious concern, for example, that since the policy known as Vietnamization began, Cambodia has become engulfed in war and is now virtually entirely dependent upon the United States both militarily and economically. The costs to the American taxpayer of our involvement in Cambodia are increasing rapidly, and the outlook for the immediate future is that these costs will continue to increase.

In Laos, too, our costs have never been greater. Yet the situation of the Royal Lao Government has never been weaker. I gather that the most that can be hoped for militarily is that the Royal Lao Government can maintain its hold on the one-third of its territory that remains under Government control, and even this objective will require a continued heavy American investment and an increasing Thai involvement for which the United States must pay.

The Senate has been tardy, if not derelict, as far as the war in Laos is concerned. Until recently we could plead ignorance, although ignorance of a war is no more valid an excuse for avoiding the consequences than is ignorance of the law. Now, however, due principally to the efforts of the senior Senator from Missouri and his subcommittee, we no longer have that excuse. Yet the war continues without any real authorization by the Congress except in the annual appropriations we have voted, appropriations which mask the scope and details of our involvement and which do not represent an accurate measure of the expenditures involved. We are now considering the latest of these appropriations but we are doing so, for the first time, with sufficient information to enable us to debate and decide whether we wish to exercise some control over what has been essentially an uncontrolled war.

It seems that the only way in which we will be able to exercise some control over, and impose some limitations on, our activities in Laos is through the appropriations process. We tried last year by legislation to prevent our underwriting third country participation in the war in Laos because it was our judgment that this was not a wise course of action for the United States. That legislation was not respected. It was circumvented by the executive branch through the device of calling the Thai forces that were sent into Laos, and who were paid by the U.S. "local forces" in Laos. It is now contended that they are "local forces"

because they had severed their connections with regular Thai military and had "volunteered" for service in Laos. We learn from the press, however, that this is not what the volunteers themselves think they have done. They still appear to believe that they remain in the regular Thai army.

The cost of this program of underwriting Thai forces to fight in Laos will increase in this fiscal year. The program began because there was no longer sufficient Lao manpower to defend what remained of the territory under Royal Lao Government control, as Ambassador Godley made clear in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee. If the fighting in Laos continues, and there is no prospect that it will not, Lao manpower will be further depleted and even more Thai may be needed at even higher costs to American taxpayers. That is precisely the situation the Senate attempted, through legislation last year, to prevent.

We have not used the appropriation process before to attempt to control our involvement in Laos. Before the staff of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad submitted their report on Laos to the subcommittee, we did not even know the rough order of magnitude of U.S. spending in Laos, for that figure had never before been announced. Now we do know, and the costs in this fiscal year will be almost half a billion dollars, not including the cost of bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Surely these costs are too high. Even administration witnesses before the Armed Services Committee admitted that if the North Vietnamese wished to devote sufficient resources, they could take Laos any time they wished to. Thus, in the long run it would make little difference whether we were to appropriate \$100 million or \$200 million or a billion for, as the subcommittee staff report on Laos stated:

Perhaps the only real protection the Laos have is whatever limits the North Vietnamese wish to place on themselves.

Large amounts of American economic and military assistance, and an intimate American involvement in military operations in that country, have not brought peace to Laos. There are now twice as many North Vietnamese forces in Laos as there were three and a half years ago. The bloodshed and destruction continue, exacting a terrible price from the Lao people.

I believe that the emphasis must shift in Laos from military confrontation to political accommodation and that this shift will not take place as long as we continue to underwrite the war without limitation. It is, of course, not only in Laos that there must be a shift in emphasis but within this government as well and that shift, it appears, can only be achieved if we in the Congress force it.

There is no evidence that the United States has ever seriously considered a negotiated settlement in Laos. The Pentagon papers indicate that in the past the United States deliberately undercut efforts to attain such a settlement. The negotiating alternative has never been taken seriously because the executive

branch has never been constrained in any way in prosecuting the war in Laos. The public did not know how extensive the American involvement in the war was, and the Congress had no idea of the costs involved.

In addition to reversing the trend of American expenditures, and forcing a shift in emphasis from the military to the political sphere, the amendment proposed by the senior Senator from Missouri would impose certain requirements on the executive branch to keep the Congress informed. I believe those requirements are of utmost importance. Without them, there is every indication that the executive branch will continue to keep the Senate in the dark. As those who attended the secret session of the Senate on June 7 will remember, the senior Senator from Missouri pointed out, at the beginning of that session, that on January 27 of this year I wrote the Secretary of Defense asking for statistical information relating to the military situation in Laos and Cambodia similar to that information regularly supplied to the committee with regard to Vietnam. Mr. G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, replied on April 14 and said that he was unable to comply with my request because—

It would not be at all appropriate to discuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch highly sensitive information on military combat operations of the kind which your questions would elicit if answers were to be provided.

I then wrote Mr. Nutter on April 20 and asked whether he could provide the committee with a list of the items requested which he considered to be in the category of "highly sensitive information on military combat operations" which it would not be "appropriate to discuss or disclose outside the executive branch."

He replied on May 5, and said in his letter:

The information required to respond to questions concerning the size and combat readiness of indigenous armed forces, their air and ground combat operations, the enemy forces they encounter and the casualties they inflict and sustain, etc., is normally provided through U.S. military personnel acting in a military advisory assistance role who accompany the host country forces on combat operations. However, the Geneva Accords, the so-called Cooper-Church Amendment and certain other restrictions imposed by the Congress in enacting the Defense Authorization Bill have, in combination, prohibited by law the presence of U.S. military advisory in Laos and Cambodia which, in turn, effectively precludes reliable reporting to the Department of Defense of information of that nature.

I then wrote to Mr. Nutter again on August 9, renewing my request on Laos on a monthly basis. I said in my letter that since the exchange of correspondence had begun, two members of the subcommittee staff had visited Laos and had obtained answers to virtually all of the questions regarding the situation in Laos which I had asked. I also noted that their report had now been declassified and published, after review by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, and that it thus did not seem to me any longer

credible to claim that he could not provide answers to these questions on the ground that it would not be "appropriate" to discuss or disclose this information outside the executive branch or that the information was not available because we did not have U.S. military personnel Laos "acting in a military advisory assistance role who accompany the host country forces on combat operations."

As I said, my most recent letter to Mr. Nutter on this subject was dated August 9. Today is October 4. I have not yet received a reply to my letter. Apparently, the Department of Defense cannot decide how to respond to, or perhaps it should be said how to avoid meeting, a simple request to be provided with an undating of information which the committee staff has already been able to obtain on its own. If that is the kind of cooperation that we can expect to receive, it seems to me that we must compel the executive branch by law, as would the amendment before us, to provide the kind of information which they are obviously unwilling to provide otherwise.

I ask unanimous consent that my exchange of correspondence with the Department of Defense on this subject be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, but to leave the question of information and to return to the question of controlling the war, if this amendment is adopted the options of the executive branch in Laos will be limited to those which the Congress has decided we can afford. This amendment represents the first application of precise fiscal controls to the war in Laos. It is, of course, opposed by the Defense Department which argues that a budgetary ceiling is unthinkable as well as unworkable and, for that reason, has not been imposed before.

It is a new departure for the Congress to attempt to impose fiscal controls on our activities in Laos. But this is a practice which the Congress follows, and the executive branch is compelled to observe, in all of our domestic programs. We regularly decide how much we can afford to spend on the war against poverty and in the war against crime. If we can place limits on how much we can spend and for what purposes on problems such as these, which are of such enormous consequence to us at home, what earthly argument can there be for not placing similar limitations on the war in Laos.

Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator from Missouri provides for a substantial reduction in the amount which the administration proposes to spend and no doubt will spend. It is true that I and some of my colleagues have almost been reduced to the situation where it makes no difference what is put into the law, the administration will not abide by it. We had a restriction on the employment of Thai troops in Laos, but the Executive did so any way. This being a political question, I do not see how it could be brought into the courts. If we passed a clear expression, even over a presidential veto, that there should be no bombarding in the north, I am sure

the Executive would continue to bomb and call them protective reaction strikes.

I do not know how to deal with a Government in which there is no respect between the legislative and the executive branches, when there is no respect with regard to waging war and the law. With regard to the Cooper-Church amendment, the executive ignored the restrictions on limiting the number of Americans in Cambodia.

I hold in my hand an article with a Phnom Penh dateline; which was published in The New York Times on September 20, 1971. I ask unanimous consent that the entire article may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**MILITARY GAINS GROUND IN U.S. EMBASSY IN CAMBODIA**

(By Craig R. Whitney)

PNOMPENH, CAMBODIA, Sept. 17—United States Embassy officials who wanted to keep the supporting American military presence here down to a bare handful have lost some ground that they considered important.

These Americans, led by Jonathan F. Ladd, the embassy political-military counselor and former commander of United States Army Special Forces in Vietnam, have been outmaneuvered, and now, according to diplomatic sources, have less influence in the embassy than the 50-man Military Equipment Delivery Team headed by Brig. Gen. Theodore C. Mataxis.

General Mataxis, who used to spend a couple of days a week in Phnompenh and the rest in Saigon, has now moved to Phnompenh with his staff and has more than doubled the size of the Phnompenh contingent of the team. When it moved to Cambodia in January he had 16 men. In May it was expanded to 23.

There are also 63 other men attached to the team but based in South Vietnam, where Cambodian soldiers get their basic equipment—field radios, M-16 rifles, and uniforms—by the Americans. The total of 113 men in Phnompenh and Saigon has been the same since May.

Helped by the equipment, the Cambodian Army has been winning back some territory lost to the enemy.

American military advisers were prohibited in Cambodia by Congress last year. According to a United States official in Phnompenh, the members of military equipment delivery teams are not advisers, and are not engaged in training Cambodian troops. "They perform a certain logistic advisory function, seeing that the right equipment gets to the right units and is used properly," the official said.

**FACT SHEET ISSUED**

A Department of Defense fact sheet issued in Saigon today and in Washington yesterday emphasized that the team is "operating with the Congressionally approved military bodia" and said that it was deliberately organized with a lower number of personnel than would eventually be needed.

In addition to the team's members there are 25 servicemen in the office of the American military attaché, Col. Harry Q. Amos.

So far that is all, but one disgruntled advocate of a smaller American establishment here said the other day, "the next thing they'll want is M.P.'s, then a PX, then a moviehouse, and next thing you know there will be a thousand men here."

Authoritative American sources here say that is not likely, but the pressure is on the embassy for still more staff members. The team, while operating under the supervision of Ambassador Emory C. Swank, comes under

the commander in chief of the Pacific in Hawaii.

The American military aid program last year consisted of \$180-million, which included both the expenses of training and equipping Cambodian troops in South Vietnam and delivering other equipment to Cambodia.

This year's request by the Administration is for \$200-million, 60 per cent of which goes toward ammunition.

"The guidance from Washington is to help them maintain a light infantry force, modestly supported by artillery and air," one aide said. "In other words, not to make them a goddam conquering army."

The Cambodians have been given six helicopters and six T-28 propeller-driven bombers. They also get air support from American jets based in Vietnam and Thailand. The money for those air strikes is not accountable to the military assistance program here.

According to official sources, the team members make field trips in unmarked American helicopters that come from Vietnam but only to inspect the military equipment and how it is used. Before each trip Ambassador Swank is informed, the sources say.

The four officers on Colonel Amos's staff also make field trips to gather information, the sources said. Colonel Amos does not wear a uniform in Phnompenh but in his second floor office last week several majors in combat green uniforms came in to make reports.

"Those guys have to grit their teeth when they can't advise," one civilian observer said. "Now they've got a flag officer here, next they'll want a major general, then a lieutenant general, and it'll end up being MAACC," or Military Assistance Command Cambodia.

So far, however, the Cambodians have not asked for that, and Ambassador Swank an advocate of the low profile for the American presence here is likely to hold the day—at least for now.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the point is that the military team in Cambodia has just recently been doubled. I will read part of the article:

United States Embassy officials who wanted to keep the supporting American military presence here down to a bare handful have lost some ground that they considered important.

These Americans, led by Jonathan F. Ladd, the embassy political-military counselor and former commander of United States Army Special Forces in Vietnam, have been outmaneuvered, and now, according to diplomatic sources, have less influence in the embassy than the 50-man Military Equipment Delivery Team headed by Brig. Gen. Theodore C. Mataxis.

General Mataxis, who used to spend a couple of days a week in Phnompenh and the rest in Saigon, has now moved to Phnompenh with his staff and has more than doubled the size of the Phnompenh contingent of the team. When it moved to Cambodia in January he had 16 men. In May it was expanded to 23.

There are also 63 other men attached to the team but based in South Vietnam.

The fact is that I realize as a Senator we have to keep up the appearance of dealing with these laws trying to restrict them, even though the executive department refuses to take them seriously and abide by them.

I have mixed feelings about the amendment I shall support the \$200 million limitation. I shall not, however, support the amendment which gives the administration the equivalent of the \$490 million, or the \$350 million, exclusive of bombing. This would be no restriction on the amount; but I predict the other portions of the amendment requiring reports, and so forth, they will pay no attention to.

The basic law on foreign aid today requires the Executive to submit all relevant documents on foreign aid. It says so in the law in very broad language. It could not be any broader. So when we ask for the documents, the President refuses to send them to us on the ground that they are internal working documents and claims Executive privilege. I do not agree that such privilege is applicable to matters of this kind. I think it is an absolute distortion of the whole concept. I do not think there is any legal basis for it. It is a clear violation of the clear requirements of the law.

Now the Senator from Missouri puts in this requirement, and I am for that, of course, because, as a Senator, I have to proceed as if this were still a law-abiding country and that people abide by the law, even though I strongly suspect that some will not do so if it is inconvenient to them, just as they have not abided by the law in the case of the Cooper-Church amendments, and the amendment limiting use of Thai troops, or requirements for furnishing information to the Senate on foreign aid.

The real reason why this executive has such contempt for the Congress and the law is that it believes it controls the Congress. With the Democrats split about 50-50 and the Republicans standing close together, the administration thinks anything it considers important will pass, anyway; so why should it respect a body which has no role? I can understand that. I, nevertheless, believe that, in the long run, when this war is over, this country will return to its senses and we will then have an opportunity to resurrect the basic principles of law on which this country was founded.

But as long as the war is going on, I realize that the administration does not have to pay attention to those in Congress or the Senate who disagree with its views, because the administration has the votes, and it does not make any difference what they think about the providence of the war in Laos or Cambodia. Just as was true of the preceding administration, as long as the administration has the votes it will do as it pleases.

I want to read one other paragraph from this article:

In addition to the team's members there are 25 servicemen in the office of the American military attaché, Col. Harry Q. Amos.

So far that is all, but one disgruntled advocate of a smaller American establishment here said the other day, "the next thing they'll want M.P.'s, then a PX, then a moviehouse, and next thing you know there will be a thousand men here."

That is exactly what happened in Vietnam. The President committed himself in the last election to get our troops out of Vietnam. What he appears to be doing now is gradually, but too gradually, much too slowly, moving soldiers, although he held that up until that election yesterday. That was a very enlightening election. One cartoon said, "One man, one vote. What could be more democratic?"

That is what it was—it was a very democratic election—one man, one vote. Mr. Thieu did not get as many votes as Hitler did. Hitler got 99 percent of the votes. The president of South Vietnam

got 89 percent, I believe, so he is 10 percent off Hitler's record. But I say with a tone of sarcasm it was a great election, and I suppose it is being celebrated both in Saigon and downtown as a great victory which has now given South Vietnam the opportunity for self-determination, which is the way the administration, I believe, has described it.

The President has never made a commitment, as far as I know, to get out of Cambodia or Laos. That is the reason they are doubling—and they are doubling—the size of our military contingent in Cambodia. I want to predict now that Cambodia will turn out to be more sensitive, in many respects, than Vietnam.

Mr. Sihanouk, both hereditary and elected ruler of Cambodia, resides in Peking today. There are many indications that the Chinese regard Cambodia more or less as a ward. One reason is Prince Sihanouk. There are other reasons. Cambodia has been under the influence of the Chinese in the past. The Cambodians have always regarded themselves as a people of superior culture to the people of Vietnam. They have great pride in the former kingdom of the Khmers which resulted in Angkor Wat, and so forth. They have a history somewhat different from that of Vietnam and I think a history of close association with the Chinese. The Chinese have regarded them as a tributary state but, nevertheless, have regarded them as a state for which they have a responsibility.

I think it is very dangerous for us to escalate the war in Cambodia, in some cases more dangerous, on ideological and psychological grounds, than in Laos. It is a great tragedy that we are escalating the extension of the war and the cost of the war in Laos as well as Cambodia. I understand they will be spending some \$200 million or more in Cambodia this year. We never know how much, because the actual amounts are never carried in a way that one can recognize them in the budget itself. There is so much that is secret. So much of it is spent through the CIA or some other activity of this kind and it is mixed up with the cost in Vietnam. Some of the Army men who are serving much of the time in Cambodia are based in Vietnam and no doubt they show up in the costs of Vietnam itself.

I shall support the amendment limiting aid to Laos to \$200 million. I am not sure, since the Senator has sent another amendment to the desk, if it increases it to the current amount. If so, I cannot vote for it. There is no point in my voting for an amount which means a great escalation. I do not want to vote for any amendment, because there are those who later will look at this Record and say "Look, you voted for authority for war in Laos." I do not want my vote to be interpreted as authority for war in Laos. Of course, in a technical sense, it could be that I voted for it. But this amendment should be viewed as an attempt to restrict, restrain, and prevent an escalation of the war in Laos.

That is exactly how the Tonkin Gulf resolution was presented to us. It was presented as a way to prevent a layer war in Southeast Asia. President Johnson and his advisers said—

If you will give us this quickly, it will show the solidarity of the Congress behind the President. This is the only way to discourage the North Vietnamese from escalating the war. This is the way to prevent a widening of the war. If you do not give us this authority, then the war will inevitably escalate because they will not have any fear or concern about what we will do in Southeast Asia. We have got to impress the Vietnamese with our determination and our strength, and this is the way to stop the war in Vietnam. This is the way to prevent the North Vietnamese from enlarging their activities.

That was the whole thrust of that program.

Of course, I have always been criticized, and still am—every day, practically, someone in this body or somewhere else who says:

Did you not vote for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution?

Well, they will say in this case:

Did you not vote for the authority for the Laotian war?

This measure is not intended as authority for the war. They are already spending this money. They are going to spend much more if they can. I have no confidence that they will pay any attention to restrictions in any way. Nevertheless, for the sake of appearance, I have to support an amendment to restrict not only the amount of money but the way they report it and their activities in addition to spending the money.

I know this is going to be considered a cynical speech—"You do not have any confidence in our system," and so forth. Well, it is not that I have no confidence in the system. In wartime our democratic procedures break down. They have always done so throughout history. We delegate power. This has been done. That is the way it goes.

I have no doubt that we could get this war over if we do not keep backing widening the war into Laos and Cambodia. If we can stop the war in Vietnam, I believe this country will return to a democratic, law-abiding community. But we cannot make much progress doing that until we get the war in Vietnam over, and the wars in Cambodia and Laos stopped also.

This amendment is an effort to stop the war, to restrict the war in Laos, not to authorize it. What has been going on there has not been authorized, not even acknowledged. The support of the Meo army has been primarily through the CIA, which they do not acknowledge. We all know it, but they do not admit it. It is like Radio Free Europe; the CIA paid for it, but they pretended the public paid for it.

Here the CIA has paid for the war and we have never acknowledged support for it publicly. The Senator from Missouri produced evidence in a hearing that is very persuasive to that effect, and no man in his right mind can say it is not public knowledge now. But I do not think there has ever been a law passed authorizing so much money for a war in Laos. If I am wrong, I am willing to stand corrected. I do not think there has been authorization to carry on a war in Laos.

Those wishing to make capital of it

could say this amendment is an authorization for the war in Laos, just as those who wish to take advantage of the technicality said the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was an authorization for the war in Vietnam, whereas its purpose was the prevention of a wider involvement in Southeast Asia.

But in order to get a \$200 million limitation, I said I would vote for the Senator's amendment; but I cannot vote for any larger sum than that.

[EXHIBIT 1]

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
January 27, 1971.

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD,  
Secretary of Defense,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations the Department of Defense has, for some time, been supplying it with monthly statistical data relating to the situation in Vietnam. This information has proved to be extremely valuable in following developments there.

The Committee is finding it increasingly difficult to keep abreast of the rapid developments in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam, and I believe that a monthly report containing data relating to those countries would be helpful. The Committee would, therefore, appreciate the Department's cooperation in supplying, on a monthly basis, the information requested on the enclosed list.

I, of course, have no objection to your making this information available to other interested congressional committees, as was done in the case of the Vietnam reports.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
Chairman.

[Enclosure]

MONTHLY DATA ON MILITARY OPERATIONS IN  
SOUTHEAST ASIA  
Cambodia

1. Size of Cambodian Armed Forces:
  - (a) Trained and Combat Ready;
  - (b) In training (specific location if outside Cambodia) or other;
  - (c) On duty outside Cambodia (other than training).
2. Number of friendly foreign troops in Cambodia:
  - (a) South Vietnamese;
  - (b) Other (specify).
3. Number of enemy troops in Cambodia:
  - (a) North Vietnamese/Viet Cong;
  - (b) Cambodian Communist;
  - (c) Engaged in combat operations:
    1. against Cambodian forces;
    2. against South Vietnam forces.
4. Combat air operations in Cambodia:
  - (a) Sorties flown by:
    1. U.S. planes;
    2. Sorties flown by Cambodian planes.
    3. Sorties flown by South Vietnamese planes;
    4. Sorties flown by Thais or other forces;
  - (b) Ordnance expended (bomb tonnage and other) by U.S. aircraft in Cambodia:
    1. B-52.
    2. other fixed wing aircraft;
    3. helicopter gunships, etc.
  5. Casualties (military):
    - (a) Enemy killed, wounded and captured;
    - (b) Cambodian killed, wounded and missing;
    - (c) South Vietnamese killed, wounded and missing;
    - (d) U.S. casualties or missing as a result of air or other operations.
6. Transport and Supply Operations:
  - (a) Number of flights flown by U.S. military transport aircraft to Cambodian airports;

- (b) Number of U.S. helicopter transport flights flown in Cambodia;
- (c) Number of air drop missions flown by U.S. aircraft in Cambodia;
- (d) Number of transport flights by U.S. non-military aircraft (Air America, etc.);
- (e) Number of transport flights by South Vietnamese or other aircraft;
- (f) Number of supply missions by South Vietnamese naval vessels;
- (g) Please provide copies of any contracts or agreements with foreign government or private entities relating to supply or transport operations in Cambodia, including data on amounts paid or reimbursed for such services and the sources of the funding.
7. Payments made by the United States to South Vietnam or other countries for operations in or services rendered in behalf of Cambodia:
- (a) Amounts or any such payments and the purpose;
- (b) Provide copies of any agreements entered into by the United States concerning payments to foreigners for services rendered in or in behalf of Cambodia and the source of the funding.
8. Number of U.S. personnel involved:
- (a) Number of U.S. personnel attached permanently or temporarily to the U.S. Embassy in Cambodia—civilian, military;
- (b) Number of visits in Cambodia by U.S. personnel in a TAD or other temporary status and total number of days of such duty by all personnel during the month;
- (c) Number of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam, Thailand, or Laos whose duties relate to operations in Cambodia, including training and logistics operations.
9. U.S. Naval operations:
- (a) Number and type of U.S. ships operating in or near Cambodian waters during the month engaged in operations relating to Cambodia;
- (b) Number of visits to Cambodian ports by U.S. naval vessels engaged in supply or transport operations.
10. Estimated number of U.S. prisoners held in Cambodia:
- Laos*
1. Number of United States personnel in Laos:
- (a) Civilian (government employees);
- (b) Military;
- (c) Personnel on temporary duty, civilian and military (total number of man-days);
- (d) Contractor employees (Air America, etc.).
2. Number of friendly military forces:
- (a) Regular Laotian Armed Forces;
- (b) Irregular Forces;
- (c) Thai Forces in Laos;
- (d) Other Forces in Laos (Cambodian, South Vietnamese, etc.).
3. Enemy forces in Laos:
- (a) Pathet Lao;
- (b) North Vietnamese;
- (c) Viet Cong.
4. Air Operations in Laos:
- (a) U.S. air sorties over Northern Laos and munitions expended;
1. B-52;
2. Other aircraft.
- (b) U.S. air sorties over Southern Laos and munitions expended;
1. B-52;
2. Other aircraft.
- (c) Air sorties by Laotian forces and munitions used.
5. Casualties—killed or wounded:
- (a) United States;
- (b) Laotian;
- (c) Other friendly;
- (d) Enemy.
6. Incursions into Laos from South Vietnam or Cambodia:
- (a) Purpose, date and number of U.S. and foreign personnel involved in each incursion;
7. Please provide copies of any contracts or agreements entered into during the month between the United States and other coun-

tries or private parties relating to military operations in Laos.

8. Estimated number of U.S. prisoners held in Laos:

*North Vietnam*

1. U.S. air operations over North Vietnam:
- (a) Number of reconnaissance flights flown;
- (b) Number of escort sorties flown;
- (c) Number of helicopters or other manned aircraft sorties flown.
- (d) Number of drone flights.
2. Enemy actions and U.S. losses:
- (a) Number of times U.S. aircraft were fired upon while over North Vietnam.
- (b) Number of times U.S. aircraft were fired upon from North Vietnam while over Laos;
- (c) Number of U.S. aircraft lost (by type) over North Vietnam due to enemy fire;
- (d) Number of U.S. aircraft lost over North Vietnam (by type) not as a result of enemy fire;
- (e) U.S. personnel losses.
3. Retaliatory action taken:
- (a) Number of times North Vietnam targets were attacked;
1. Number of aircraft involved in retaliatory actions;
2. Quantities of munitions used in retaliatory action.
4. Description of actions by South Vietnamese or other forces in North Vietnam.
5. Estimated number of U.S. prisoners held in North Vietnam.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,  
Washington, D.C., April 14, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Secretary Laird has asked me to respond to your letter of 27 January in which you requested that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations be furnished, on a continuing basis, a detailed monthly report on military operations in Southeast Asia.

I regret that we are unable to comply with your request in this instance. Deputy Secretary Packard's letter to Senator Symington of 11 June 1970, a copy of which Senator Symington forwarded to you, pointed out that it would not be at all appropriate to discuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch highly sensitive information on military combat operations of the kind which your questions would elicit if answers were to be provided.

Sincerely,

G. WARREN NUTTER.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1970.

HON. STUART SYMINGTON,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: I understand that when Generals Burchinal and Polk appeared as witnesses before your Subcommittee in late May, they were requested to make available to the Subcommittee copies of written instructions they had received both in connection with the European trip of staff members Pincus and Paul and with reference to their testimony before your Subcommittee.

I am sure you will appreciate that those instructions, by definition, were documents intended solely for internal use within the Department of Defense and I would hope that you would agree with me that such documents should not be distributed outside the Executive Branch.

From your personal experience as a former Secretary of the Air Force, you are well acquainted with the fact that, on the basis of custom, tradition, usage and precedent, the

Legislative and Executive Branches have come to accept and recognize that there are certain matters which, for varying reasons, are not normally discussed outside the Executive Branch. The instructions in question contained topics meeting that general description for the most part and included such items as military contingency plans, National Security Council documents, Inspector-General Reports of investigation, matters still in the planning, proposal stage upon which no decision has been reached, operational procedures and methods involving the risk of life or safety of military personnel and so forth.

Early in the Subcommittee hearings, a misunderstanding apparently developed in connection with the handling or manner of treatment of information on nuclear weapons, a misunderstanding which, as I understand it, has been resolved by the briefing given to the Senator Committee on Foreign Relations on 27 May 1970.

These categories of information are those which have become widely accepted and generally recognized as topics which in the national interest, should be strictly limited in either dissemination or discussion. Be assured that any prohibitions against discussing such topics apply to all testimony and were not, of course, restrictive solely to witnesses appearing before your Subcommittee.

Secretary Laird asked me to convey his apology for the delay in responding to your request, a delay which was occasioned by the urgency of preparing for his trip to Europe.

I trust that you will find this responsive to your Subcommittee's interest in this matter.

Sincerely,

DAVID PACKARD.

APRIL 20, 1971.

HON. G. WARREN NUTTER,  
Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. NUTTER: I wish to acknowledge your letter of April 10 in reply to the Committee's request for a monthly report on certain developments in Cambodia and Laos. You state that the information requested would involve "highly sensitive information on military combat operations" which would not be "appropriate to discuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch." Would you please provide the Committee with a list of the items requested which you consider to be in this category. In order to avoid further delay and without passing on the merits of the Department's position on those items, I would appreciate your providing the Committee with monthly reports on the other items not in this category.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,  
Washington, D.C., May 5, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 20, 1971, relative to our exchange of correspondence in connection with the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to be provided a monthly report on a continuing basis of certain military combat operations conducted by U.S. forces and the indigenous forces of the governments of Laos and Cambodia.

The information required to respond to questions concerning the size and combat readiness of indigenous armed forces, their air and ground combat operations, the enemy forces they encounter and the casualties they inflict and sustain, etc., is normally provided through U.S. military personnel acting

in a military advisory assistance role who accompany the host country forces on combat operations. However, the Geneva Accords, the so-called Cooper-Church Amendment and certain other restrictions imposed by the Congress in enacting the Defense Authorization Bill have, in combination, prohibited by law the presence of U.S. military advisory personnel in Laos and Cambodia which, in turn, effectively precludes reliable reporting to the Department of Defense of information of that nature.

Additionally, there are a number of other questions that were posed such as those relating to U.S. civilian personnel in Laos and Cambodia who are employed either by other U.S. Government agencies or by private contractors that do not fall under the cognizance of the Department of Defense.

Finally, the possibility that identical or similar missions are military operations may be required in the same general geographical area at some indefinite future date creates a sensitivity that precludes discussing, outside the Executive Branch, specific details with respect to cross border incursions by allied forces, intelligence gathering operations, frequency and area of coverage of reconnaissance and attack sorties, types of aircraft employed and types and tonnages of ordnance expended, etc.

Again, I regret that we are unable to respond to your Committee's request in this instance.

Sincerely,

G. WARREN NUTTER.

AUGUST 9, 1971.

Mr. C. WARREN NUTTER,

Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. NUTTER: On January 27, 1971, I wrote Secretary Laird, noting that the Department of Defense had been supplying the Committee for some time with monthly statistical data relating to the situation in Vietnam and asking for a monthly report relating to developments in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. You replied, for Secretary Laird, on April 14 and said that you were unable to comply with my request because "it would not be at all appropriate to discuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch highly sensitive information on military combat operations of the kind which your questions would elicit if answers were to be provided."

I then wrote you on April 20 and asked whether you could provide the Committee with a list of the items requested which you considered to be in the category of "highly sensitive information on military combat operations" which would not be "appropriate to discuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch."

You replied on May 5, saying in your letter:

"The information required to respond to questions concerning the size and combat readiness of indigenous armed forces, their air and ground combat operations, the enemy forces they encounter and the casualties they inflict and sustain, etc., is normally provided through U.S. military personnel acting in a military advisory assistance role who accompany the host country forces on combat operations. However, the Geneva Accords, the so-called Cooper-Church Amendment and certain other restrictions imposed by the Congress in enacting the Defense Authorization Bill have, in combination, prohibited by law the presence of U.S. military advisory in Laos and Cambodia which, in turn, effectively precludes reliable reporting to the Department of Defense of information of that nature."

I now renew my request for the information on Laos on a monthly basis requested in my original letter of January 27, 1971. Since our exchange of correspondence, two members of the Committee staff have visited Laos and they have obtained the answers to vir-

tually all of the questions regarding the situation in Laos in the enclosure to my letter of January 27. Furthermore, as you know, their report has now been declassified and published, after review by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Thus, it does not seem to me any longer credible to claim that you cannot provide answers to these questions on the ground that "it would not be at all appropriate to discuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch highly sensitive information on military combat operations of the kind which your questions would elicit if answers were to be provided." Nor, it seems to me, can you sustain the argument that "The information required to respond to questions concerning the size and combat readiness of indigenous armed forces, their air and ground combat operations, the enemy forces they encounter and the casualties they inflict and sustain, etc., is normally provided through U.S. military personnel acting in a military advisory assistance role who accompany the host country forces on combat operations."

Semantic arguments aside, the fact of the matter is that the information I have requested is available because it has been provided to members of the Committee staff. I would now like to receive this information on a monthly basis.

I am enclosing a copy of the questions I sent the Department of Defense regarding Laos as an enclosure to my letter of January 27.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
Chairman.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I congratulate the able Senator for the way he has presented his case. It is true that money has not been authorized, but it is also true that it has been appropriated.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. And spent. I agree with that.

Mr. SYMINGTON. It sort of makes one wonder what the system is. I respectfully commend the able Senator, for he is the one who has consistently, with great courage, pointed out the tragic mess that we have gotten ourselves into in Southeast Asia.

With respect to this amendment, to be frank, my thinking goes along the line, at this point, that it is better to have half a loaf than none at all.

I agree with the Senator that whether my amendment said \$200 million, or \$350 million, or \$490 million, sometime someone might get up and say, "You voted money for a war in Laos, and therefore, in effect, you were for the war in Laos."

On the other hand, the perfecting amendment, and on which I shall ask for a vote, if I may run through it a bit with the able chairman, would be as follows.

We say:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act

The word "obligated" is taken out for technical reasons.

may be expended in any amount in excess of \$350,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation, project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972.

One reason for the perfecting amendment is that under the continuing resolution and at this point in the fiscal year, a substantial part of this money has already been spent. Another thought is that, after discussing it with some of my colleagues, it is my opinion there would be no possibility of getting the controls which we do by this amendment if we did not raise that figure.

On page 2, we continue with the concept of eliminating the word "obligation." On page 3, lines 2 and 3, we strike out:

Over the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails in southern Laos, and over areas immediately adjacent to such trails,

And insert:

In or over Laos

Which would signify that we would place no restriction on bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trails or in Northern Laos.

Then subsection (e), which is very important to me as a member of the committees involved:

After the date of enactment of this Act, whenever any request is made to the Congress for the appropriation of funds for use in, for, or on behalf of Laos for any fiscal year, the President shall furnish a written report to the Congress explaining the purpose for which such funds are to be used in such fiscal year.

Then the next paragraph, and it is not long:

The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1971, a written report showing the total amount of funds expended in, for, or on behalf of Laos during the preceding quarter by the United States Government, and shall include in such report a general breakdown of the total amount expended, describing the different purposes for which such funds were expended and the total amount expended for such purpose.

My point is that if we tried to tie the executive branch to \$200 million—and I fully sympathize with the able chairman's position—the \$200 million figure could be a little unrealistic because of the amount of money that has already been spent. If we make the change about combat air operators over Laos, we would, in effect, be giving the administration more along the lines of what they asked for, but we would also be establishing, for the first time, controls on this unfortunate operation. Would not the able Senator agree with me on that?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would if I had any confidence that controls would be respected. Putting it all together, to give them all the money in return for the controls, which are certainly proper controls, would enable them to say they have a certain lawful authority if they spend more. It is a matter of degree, it is true. They will use about \$490 million, as the Senator knows, to effectuate present plans. They could go through the ceiling; it could be twice that, and the Senator has no way of stopping it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator implies that by taking the air out, exclusive of the trails, it would be \$490 million instead of \$200 million; but for the first time we would have direct controls.



Mr. FULBRIGHT. If you expect them to be observed.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If you do not believe that, you might as well not have any amendment at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator's purposes are good, and you never know what will happen. I said I would support the \$200 million. The only reason I support the \$200 million is because of the controls that the Senator has in there. But I do not want us to become more involved there. We are already in—

Mr. SYMINGTON. The only reason that I would change the \$200 million is that I have now found out there would be little or no chance of getting it through the Senate. If we could agree on the compromise figure, it would not only get through the Senate, but as a conferee I would hope we could uphold it in conference as a sound and constructive move.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would expect the greatest value of offering it is at least getting the expenditures on the record—in trying once more to draw to the attention of the country, the press, and the people—what is going on. I do not think most people have been aware of what has been going on. I do not think they approve it. Even Members of Congress certainly have not been aware of it until very recently, if at all.

So I think it serves a very good purpose to discuss this subject, whether or not this amendment is enacted, because I myself cannot imagine that the House of Representatives, with the attitude they have taken toward the war, would accept this amendment and when they are as determined as they have been on a very simple statement of policy such as the Mansfield amendment to the draft bill, and resist that, then you can imagine what they will do to something substantive dealing with money.

That is the explanation for my lack of enthusiasm for an amendment which is certainly justified on all grounds to be enacted as far as the restrictions go—on all grounds other than giving them a lot of money to carry on an unwanted war. The argument that this authorization is necessary for the protection of the withdrawal of our troops is absurd, however. It is about as absurd as the South Vietnamese elections yesterday.

One of the justifications for this activity was that it would help us get the troops out of Vietnam safely. If anybody believes that, he is liable to believe anything.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I suggest to the Senator from Arkansas that without the controls that are in here, even though the amendment is agreed to the way he wants it, if that were defeated—and I am afraid it would be—we would have no control over expenditures.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not want to discourage the Senator. I will support his first amendment, simply because it is a substantial reduction in the amount; and I think the one thing—the only thing—that the administration is likely to abide by is the lack of money.

I have never figured out how they are able to spend money that has neither been authorized nor appropriated. They

have ways of drawing on unexpended funds. I imagine there is at least \$50 billion of unexpended funds in the pipeline, as they call it, as reserve for the Pentagon.

So I would not be sure that even with a prohibition against the appropriation of any money, they could not find some in a very short time.

I wonder if the Senator would allow me to ask a question or two about Thai troops.

It was my amendment originally that I believe prohibited the hiring of Thais to fight in Laos. Can the Senator tell me why, with one-fourth as many Thai troops as there are in the Royal Lao Army, they cost 25 percent more? That would indicate that they pay two or three times as much to a Thai fighting in Laos as to a Lao fighting in Laos. Is that a fact?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Not only that; there is more to it than that. For example there are less than one-half as many Thais as there are Lao irregulars, but, the Thais cost 33-percent more. Therefore, there is a very great difference between what the Thais, who are subsidized to fight in Thailand, receive as against what we pay for the Laotian irregulars.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator will recall that I had another amendment which prohibited the practice of paying foreign troops brought into Vietnam the special allowances which at that time gave them more than was given to an American soldier. Does the Senator recall that?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes, I do.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In this case, because we had no war—acknowledged war—at that time in Laos, I assume they take the position that that restriction does not apply to Laos. Is that correct?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would think it did, yes. But it was my understanding that we were not going to support any Thais in either Laos or Cambodia, or any mercenaries in either Laos or Cambodia, and it was my understanding that that is what our amendment was designed to do, as I said on the floor earlier today.

On the other hand, the press is now reporting that it is planned to finance and train 12,000 Thai to fight in Laos, and I imagine the executive branch will continue to handle this matter just about the way they see fit. That is why I am particularly anxious for the distinguished chairman—who has done as much in this field as I have—to agree on modifying the money. I agree with him that we may be accused, somewhat, even if we vote for the money involved. But at least for the first time we would be setting some controls, so that the whole operation of the Senate will not be a farce, as it has been in the past; because no Member of the Senate, including myself, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, a member of the Armed Services Committee, and a member of the subcommittee on the CIA until recently has had the faintest knowledge of what was going on in Laos.

If it had not been for the able group of investigators who went to Laos, it is

very possible—in fact, I think, probable—that we would not yet know what we do now.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has said that although there is an existing provision of law prohibiting the hiring of mercenaries, they are hiring them. Why does the Senator think they will respect his restrictions any more than they respected that restriction?

Mr. SYMINGTON. It is a good question, and I would answer it in this way.

First, they claim—I do not justify the claim; I simply state their claim—that they are all volunteers, that they volunteered to go there. Inasmuch as we found out that many of them were regulars in the Thai military, including at least one general officer in Laos, and that they were given bonuses to go to Laos and their families were given privileges if they did go or were wounded, it is hard to follow that argument.

On the other hand, they also use the justification that they are ethnic Lao. The testimony is that twice as many Lao are actually living in Thailand as are living in Laos, and three times as many are living in Thailand as are controlled by the present government in Laos that we support.

These are the reasons they give to justify the Tai forces in Laos, despite the amendment that the able Senator from Arkansas succeeded in having adopted, for which I voted and which, to my mind, said they should not do what they are apparently doing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. So, the Senator thinks that for some reason they might respect his restrictions, although they have not respected that one?

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator is making a very tight argument. I would say that they have just as much chance of respecting the \$350 million amendment as they would the \$200 million amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would grant the Senator that.

Why do they feel that they have to hire Thais who are so expensive? Why can they not hire somebody else at half the price? That seems an exorbitant sum, if it is 3 or 4 times as much as they pay the Laotians.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I have always found that people in government are not as good traders as people in private business. Perhaps they could have made a better deal with the Thais.

This deal, to my mind, is not nearly as advantageous to the Thais as the deal was for the Filipinos who went into Vietnam under the previous administration, because they went in with heavy bonuses, plus the assurance that under no circumstances would they ever have to go into combat. At least, this is a better deal than the one that was made with the Philippines.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is damning with faint praise. Nobody I know of justifies the Philippine deal as other than a very crude shakedown.

Mr. SYMINGTON. It was a deal that was made secretly. The reason I am giving consideration to a perfecting amendment—in fact, I will offer one—is that at least we would get this matter out in

the open, and we do get into the question of expenditures, which brings in the very powerful Appropriations Committees in both Houses. I think that if we support it, there will be a good chance of getting it through conference with the House.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator not think that supporting one army would be more efficient than supporting three? We have the Thai, the Royal Lao-tion Army, and the Lao regulars. To have three different armies in Laos, all of them supported by the United States, seems to me to be very improvident. Can we not operate the way mergers are effected in the business field and merge them into one army and have only one officer corps and thereby save a great deal of money? Would that not be much wiser?

Mr. SYMINGTON. It would be much wiser, but it would be much more difficult. I recall that 10 years ago, when I was going through Thailand to get to Saigon, the Thais and the Cambodians were practically at war. These being tribal countries, I believe there would be great difficulty in having officers that could serve with all three armies.

The Senator's point is well taken, however, and I would hope that we could get better organized out there with these mercenaries.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think we ought to come home. I think that is the only answer.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would agree with that, but I thought the Senator was talking about troops from other countries.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was. I said that is what I would like to do.

Mr. President, I should like to close by citing a short article published in the Washington Post for September 1, 1971, headlined, "China Says U.S. Eyes Laos Move."

It reads:

China accused the United States today of plans to send more Thai troops into Laos to expand the war there.

An editorial in the Official Peking People's Daily said the United States showed its intention on Aug. 9 when it accused North Vietnam of a "massive" invasion of Laos.

"It is futile for the U.S. government to try and cover up its own aggression with the guise of an alleged 'invasion' of Laos by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," said the editorial. It charged that the United States is planning to send "still more Thai accomplice troops to Laos to expand the war of aggression there."

Mr. President, that shows that the Chinese have their eye on Laos and Cambodia.

I repeat, Cambodia is much more sensitive in the eyes of China than Laos. We are taking grave risks in escalating the war in Cambodia and Laos as we pull our troops out—very gradually—out of Vietnam.

Mr. SYMINGTON. May I ask a question of the able chairman?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, indeed.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does it not run through the Senator's mind that perhaps the basic plan, especially as we talk so much about getting out of Indochina, is to "hole up," we might say, on the South-east Asian mainland by establishing a

bastion in Thailand where we have superb fighter bases—six to be exact—and, in addition, one of the finest strategic bomber bases in the world, south of Bangkok; and might it not be that the great interest we have built up in Laos and Cambodia, at the same time we emphasize we are going out of South Vietnam as quickly as possible, is that we have the SEATO agreement with Thailand, and might that not be one of the reasons why we are operating the way we are?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It well might be, although the SEATO agreement would not require that we do anything with Thailand, but we can do what we like with Thailand as long as Thailand is agreeable. It would not exclude that at all. Cambodia is completely dependent upon us. We pay for everything. It is a pawn in our hands, whereas Thailand retains a government of its own and, except for our vast expenditures there, they could assert their independence again. Cambodia and Laos are, I think, in a much weaker position.

If we are concerned about the Laotian people, we could make a serious effort to bring about an agreement between Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao—they are led by half-brothers, as the Senator knows, they are close ethnically, as the Senator has said. But we have not made much of an effort to do that. I think it would be far wiser to do that than to continue to escalate the war and spend half a billion dollars this year in this poor little country. It is going to be an ever more burden on this country, as the Senator has said. Much more so than in times gone by, given our present financial situation. It seems incredible that we are called upon to continue this kind of expenditure in a little, mountainous country 10,000 miles away from us. It makes absolutely no sense from any point of view to spend \$490 million on such a futile undertaking.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I certainly agree with the Senator from Arkansas. One of my constituents wrote me recently, asking why I spend so much time on Laos, and I said the more time I spend on Laos and all these other overseas expenditures, and try to get them reduced, the more money will be available to do the things which are needed so desperately back in Missouri.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What we are doing is keeping the Laotian people involved in a war that is decimating them, making refugees out of them, and ruining their country for nothing that can possibly benefit them.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the distinguished Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. President, I send a perfecting amendment to the desk and ask that it be considered as an amendment to my present pending amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read the amendment as follows:

On page 1, line 3, strike out "obligated or".

On page 1, line 4, strike out "\$200,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$350,000,000".

On page 2, line 4, strike out "200,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$350,000,000".

On page 2, lines 4 and 5, strike out "obligation and".

On page 2, line 16, strike out "obligated or".

On page 2, line 23, strike out "obligated or".

On page 3, line 1, strike out "obligation or".

On page 3, lines 2, 3, and 4, strike out "over the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails in southern Laos, and over areas immediately adjacent of such trails," and insert in lieu thereof the following: "in or over Laos".

On page 3, line 20, strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof a comma and the following: "except that in the case of the first two quarters of the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1971, a single report may be submitted for both such quarters and such report may be computed on the basis of the most accurate estimates the Secretary of Defense can make taking into consideration all information available to him."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the amendment to the amendment?

There being no objection, the amendment to the amendment was considered and agreed to.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On the Senator's time?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as I said earlier the purpose of my original amendment was not to put an immediate end to the war in Laos. As desirable as that might be, it does not seem to be an immediate military or political possibility.

It is, however, possible for the Senate by its action today to place itself in the position to know what is going on in Laos, to know how much is being spent there and thereby in future years to play a more active role in the formulation of policy which may lead the United States out of the war in Laos and put an end to the fighting which has destroyed so much of that country and has decimated such a large portion of its population.

Having in mind as my primary objective the assertion of congressional authority over the conduct of the war in Laos, I have discussed my amendment with the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee and have found him receptive to the idea of the spending controls and reporting requirements set forth in my amendment.

Accordingly in the belief that the principles embodied in these controls will in the long run be more important than the amount of money involved—although I continue to believe that half a billion dollars of U.S. expenditures in Laos is far too much—I have sent to the desk a perfecting amendment which would increase the ceiling for U.S. expenditures

in Laos to \$350 million in fiscal year 1972. At the same time it will exclude from the operation of the ceiling the cost of all U.S. air activities in and over Laos.

I am pleased that the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee has indicated his willingness to support the revised amendment which provides as follows:

For the first time, a ceiling on U.S. expenditures in behalf of the Lao Government—section (a).

Requires that, in the future, any money requested for Laos must be identified and explained—section (c).

Precludes use in Laos of money authorized for other purposes—sections (c) and (e).

Requires the executive branch to submit quarterly reports on expenditures in Laos including description of purposes—section (f).

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, would the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am please to yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator from Missouri to comment on a statement he just made in which he said his amendment, as modified, would preclude use in Laos of money authorized for other purposes. It does not read that way in the original amendment. I wondered what modifications the Senator had made in the amendment.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. The amendment as modified would eliminate from the ceiling restriction all air activity in and over Laos. Therefore on the premise that the amount of money being spent this year outside of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the air is \$140 million, it would increase it actually from \$200 million in the original amendment to \$490 million.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, would the Senator point out what changes he has made on page 3 of the amendment to accomplish that?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I would be very glad to do so. Has the Senator from Colorado got a copy of the amendment?

At the top of page 3, we would eliminate the words "obligation or" which is a technical limitation that the entire staff recommends. Then, it would read:

With respect to the expenditure of funds to carry out combat air operations in and over Laos by U.S. military force.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator. That clarifies that point. The only problem I still have is that I find it difficult to reconcile this with the fact that a great number of us were critical when the previous administration was directing tactical operations when we were already in hostilities. I find it difficult to determine why 535 Members of the Congress should try to do it.

It is my understanding that the amendment, as modified, contains the amount of money for Laos that has been requested.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator is correct. I emphasize that, because we are compromising on a reduction of the money in order to get the controls that the dignity of the Senate requires.

I am confident that the able Senator from Colorado, with whom I have the honor to serve on the Armed Services Committee, does not like to authorize money when he does not know, as I have not known in the past, how that money is to be used.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator for his comments. I have some difficulty in interpreting the last statement because I know that the distinguished Senator from Missouri—as well as I—has been briefed on this matter on a great number of occasions, including times by the previous Ambassador when we were in Vientiane on a number of occasions. However, despite that fact, it seems to me the problem is whether we should try to exercise congressional control over the present activities or over some future activities.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say to the distinguished Senator that sections (e) and (f) justify the amendment. All of the sections of the amendment, I think, with the modifications, would give us better control.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, while I continue to believe that it would have been highly desirable to more severely limit the amount of money to be spent in this fiscal year, I believe that the amendment in its revised form constitutes a significant assertion of our rights and our responsibilities here in the Senate.

I am very pleased, but not surprised, to be joined in urgent adoption of the amendment as perfected by the able chairman of the Armed Services Committee. His role in overseeing the activities of the Department of Defense is one which should have earned him the admiration, if not the sympathy, of all the Members of this body.

His support is appreciated and in turn I will appreciate the support of all Members of this revised amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time?

Mr. STENNIS. On my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this entire subject matter pertaining to military aid and economic aid in Laos is a very involved and rather complicated matter, and the money has grown to rather large amounts. Before this amendment is voted on I hope there is some way yet to get this information before the membership of the Senate. I had been thinking I might ask for a closed session, primarily to get the membership into the Chamber, so we could talk about the high points, but I do not think it is necessary to have a closed session this afternoon.

The amendment has been offered by

the Senator from Missouri, who, I am glad to say, has done a great deal on this subject. I am pleased that he has. It is hard, difficult work, and he stayed with it. He has made more than one trip, to Laos and to other places in the area and he is entitled to credit on this subject matter.

Mr. President, we have had requests this year for items that go to make up these military programs, and also for economic aid in Laos. In a few minutes I will go into the figures. The original amendment of the Senator from Missouri limited these programs to \$200 million, excluding the cost of bombing on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The proposal in his modified amendment not only leaves out the cost of that part of the bombing, but also the costs for bombing and other air activities, in and over all of Laos. The air activities is not all bombing. Some of it is strafing and some of it is close air support. The cost of all that is excluded now.

For economic aid, we have the Agency for International Development—the AID program. That is listed here at \$50.5 million.

All of those programs outside the bombing and the other air activities add up to \$350 million. So the Senator has modified that provision which we limited to the total expenditures. This pertains to expenditures for fiscal year 1972.

I could not have supported the amendment at \$200 million under any circumstances. One reason was that almost that much already has been spent or will be spent under continuing resolutions.

By the time the appropriation bill leaves the President's desk almost one-half of the programed amount will have been spent under the continuing resolution. In conversation with the Senator from Missouri I brought up the question of these requested amounts, the question with reference to the committee's responsibility, and also the question of having these matters identified. I told the Senator if he saw fit to modify his amendment, putting it at \$350 million for the fiscal year 1972, that I could support it and that I would.

I do wholeheartedly support the modified amendment. I do think we have a control problem here. I think the President has a problem. I think this is the best way for us to get on, and I hope there will be a good strong vote here. I hope the Senate will pass this amendment which relates to expenditures and values of equipment that may be sent in or supplies that we have already used. It provides a total amount of \$350 million. At the same time it gives legislative recognition to the fact that these funds are needed and it gives us a start toward a consideration of this matter for next year.

We do have the unusual matters that come up. The Senator from Missouri and I, should there be an unusual development or added need before this bill leaves Congress, agree that it could be considered. That added figure could be considered in conference although I do not expect anything like that to happen. It is covered, anyway.

I think this has been a misunderstood matter. Incidentally, we have the money

totals that related to this amendment in the present form. Some of the information is classified. I cannot read it all. We had these figures this year in our files. We have made headway within the last 3 years in getting more and more accurate information with respect to the expenditures. It is a very difficult matter to keep up with these war expenditures. We have requested it and the utmost effort is being made to get these matters before Congress.

The total is about 20 percent above the amount for these items for fiscal year 1971, the fiscal year that closed June 30. The modified amendment carries a figure that is 20 percent above the figure for last year. It excludes bombing and air activity over the Ho Chi Minh Trail and over any part of Laos from any limitation. The original amendment excepted only that part relating to the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The modified amendment places a limitation on expenditures of \$350 million for fiscal year 1972 on all the various programs being carried on in Laos.

That word expenditure is there, and it is interpreted to include also the values of equipment and supplies that have already been used. We have a provision in the regulations that this material cannot be valued at a very small amount, but have to be valued at least one-third of initial cost.

Limitations are placed on expenditures for these programs as compared with the original amendment, which placed the limitations on both the obligations and expenditures.

Since almost half of the fiscal year 1972 will have elapsed by the time this bill becomes law and appropriations are actually made, language has been added which would require interim estimates being made.

All this means that if this amendment, in its modified form, is adopted, it will provide, in substance, for the same money, in terms of program, that has been requested by the administration.

Another point is as follows: This amendment does not add any power to our legislative control of these matters. We have had the power and legislative control. It does outline a method of operation that goes deeper into these matters and it sets a pattern for the committee to follow in the future.

Frankly, Mr. President, as chairman of the committee, I welcome a chance here to have such a pattern, a program, a method that can more clearly and more definitely go into these matters.

These funds, at the beginning, were emergency funds to meet specific situations, but this has now been going on a good while. I do not know whether this is classified, or what has come out, but this has gone on for many years, without anyone being at fault. Nothing wrong has been done. No law has been violated. But I think this amendment is a satisfactory way, since all these matters have been brought out, of settling it. It will be fair to the administration and to the legislative branch of the Government, and will not put any impediments that I can see in the path of those representing us in the war in Vietnam.

There is no doubt that the fighting in

Laos is part of the Indochina war. No one would be approving the \$350 million—the Senator from Missouri would not be offering it—he would not be approving it, I would not be, none of us would be, if this were not connected with the war in South Vietnam. I think it is a very important part of it.

I do not think that this provision will cripple anyone—the President, the administration, or the military. I think there is a better pattern of responsibility being exercised by us, a better pattern of accountability for the executive branch and the military. We have this example, and a road may be before us that will serve as a basis by which these matters will be handled.

There has been no contention about some of these measures being ill-conceived. Some persons do not approve of them, but no one says they are not relevant. No one asserts that they are too much, or some persons, as a matter of principle, perhaps will not want to vote for anything in that field.

I commend the Senator from Missouri for being willing to meet the situation. He is willing to vote for money that will meet this problem, and he is willing to espouse modifications in his own name. I commend him for it.

The Senator said time had made his proposed ceiling somewhat out of date, but even with a moderate increase I would have been compelled to ask Senators to oppose it. As I see it now, I am satisfied that this is the best approach, and I think it is the best solution. I know it is no crippling device on the President. I cannot see where it possibly would be. I believe it will be helpful to us in years to come, and I think we will look back on this with considerable satisfaction. We have found a way to work it out along this line.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 123 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. I do not think we will use that time, but I would like to reserve that time for any Senator who may want to speak.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I am ready to yield back the remainder of my time, but before doing so, I would like to make a couple of observations.

Mr. President, I have been asked, with regard to section (b) of the amendment, whether it is the intent of the sponsor to include within the ceiling the fair market value of any equipment or supplies sold for use in Laos. That is correct. Section (b) refers to transfer by gift, donation, loan, lease, or otherwise. Otherwise would certainly include sales.

I have also been asked a question regarding section (f) which requires re-

ports on funds expended. The question is would obligations and transfers of the nature described in section (b) of the amendment also have to be reflected in the quarterly reports.

The answer is yes, we believe they would. In this sense, section (f) must be read in conjunction with section (b).

I might add with regard to another question which has been raised, that although the revised amendment which excludes combat air operations from the provision of Section (c) which requires specific authorization, requests for funds for air operations in Laos must still be so identified pursuant to section (e) and expenditures for air combat operations must still be reported under section (f).

Mr. President, I should like to bring up one other point again to submit to the Senate: Inasmuch as the Secretary of Defense testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, in open session, that the Defense Department was conducting no military operations in Laos, that means that this operation is being conducted through the ambassador, by the Central Intelligence Agency, or, if it would be preferred, directly by the President, because the Central Intelligence Agency reports to the National Security Council, which is an advisory body to the President. Under those circumstances, it seems to me that was more properly should be handled by the Defense Department than by an agency such as the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have already been—

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am advised that the yeas and nays were ordered last week.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. STENNIS. I want to use 2 minutes.

Mr. President, I would like to make some other remarks about this money, but it involves classified material. I do not think it is necessary to make those remarks at this time. Therefore, I will forego doing so.

But for reasons I have already given, Mr. President, I think that this is a satisfactory disposition of the amendment as it is now modified with the budget amounts and I hope that it will get a good solid vote of the membership. I believe that it will be a framework for fuller understanding and consideration in the future, not only of the Armed Services Committee on this bill, but in the Appropriations Committee on other bills as well.

So, unless someone else wishes time to speak, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has now been yielded back.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as amended, of the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON).

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTROYA), are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), would each vote "yea".

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

If present and voting, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) would each vote "yea".

The result was announced—yeas 67, nays 11, as follows:

[No. 249 Leg.]

YEAS—67

Aiken	Gambrell	Pastore
Allen	Goldwater	Pearson
Allott	Gurney	Pell
Anderson	Hansen	Proxmire
Baker	Hart	Randolph
Bayh	Hollings	Roth
Beall	Hruska	Saxbe
Bennett	Hughes	Schwelker
Bentsen	Humphrey	Scott
Bible	Inouye	Spong
Boggs	Jordan, N.C.	Stafford
Burdick	Jordan, Idaho	Stennis
Byrd, Va.	Kennedy	Stevens
Case	Magnuson	Stevenson
Chiles	McClellan	Symington
Cotton	McGovern	Talmadge
Cranston	Metcalf	Thurmond
Curtis	Miller	Tunney
Dole	Mondale	Welcker
Eagleton	Moss	Williams
Ellender	Muskie	Young
Ervin	Nelson	
Fong	Packwood	

NAYS—11

Brock	Cooper	Mansfield
Brooke	Dominick	Smith
Buckley	Fulbright	Taft
Cook	Hatfield	

NOT VOTING—22

Bellmon	Harris	Montoya
Byrd, W. Va.	Hartke	Mundt
Cannon	Jackson	Percy
Church	Javits	Ribicoff
Eastland	Long	Sparkman
Fannin	Mathias	Tower
Gravel	McGee	
Griffin	McIntyre	

So Mr. SYMINGTON's amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move

to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is my understanding that there may be a few voice votes this afternoon, but there will be no more rollcall votes this afternoon.

PROGRAM

The schedule for tomorrow is as follows:

The Senate will convene at 9 a.m. Following the recognition of the joint leadership and the expiration of any 15-minute orders for speeches which may be entered in the meantime, the Senate will then consider amendment No. 433 by Mr. Gravel, with a limitation of 2 hours thereon; and a rollcall vote is expected.

Upon disposing of the Gravel amendment, the Senate will consider the Buckley amendments Nos. 447, 448, and 449, with regard to each of which there is a limitation of 1 hour; and there may be rollcall votes thereon.

Following the disposition of Senator Buckley's amendments, and he may or may not decide to call up all of the three amendments, the Senate will proceed to consider any amendments to the military procurement bill which may be called up.

No amendment has been clocked into the schedule for Tuesday afternoon but it is hoped that Senators who have amendments will call them up.

I note from the schedule that there is no time for the conduct of morning business. I ask the Chair if an order has been entered to that effect.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There has been.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Presiding Officer.

It is my understanding that the distinguished Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is the only Senator who has asked and been granted a special order for not to exceed 15 minutes tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

ORDER FOR STAR PRINT OF AMENDMENT NO. 419

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at the request of the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTROYA), I ask unanimous consent that the amendment of the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTROYA), amendment No. 419, be reprinted as a star print with some minor changes that reflect the fact that the October 3 presidential elections in South Vietnam have been completed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, October 4, 1971, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 2613) to extend for 1 month the Federal Water Pollution Act, as amended.

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The amendment was read as follows:

On page 8, line 8, strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof a colon and the following:

"Provided, That \$14,500,000 of funds available to the Air Force for aircraft procurement shall be available for the procurement of 30 armed STOL aircraft."

ARMED STOL AIRCRAFT

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, this amendment would provide authority for procurement of 30 armed STOL aircraft for operational testing by the Air Force. The amendment does not add any money for this purchase because prior year money is available for this purpose.

This program was submitted by the President on July 30, 1971 as an amendment to the fiscal year 1972 budget. The committee considered the program but declined to include it in the bill to permit further evaluation of the program. The Air Force has now determined that there are 1971 funds that can be reprogrammed to finance the program.

Mr. President, this is a new program, and my amendment is submitted to protect the integrity of the authorization process. This amendment has the support of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and I am informed that the reprogramming subcommittee has heard testimony and I believe the subcommittee will recommend approval of use of the 1971 funds.

Let me briefly describe the armed short take-off and landing aircraft concept. What the Air Force wants to do is to buy cheap, off-the-shelf aircraft and test these aircraft to see if they can be used in a limited interdiction role in South Vietnam.

It would be my hope that eventually this would be a breakthrough for a cheaper approach for a tactical airplane for our forces.

I want to emphasize that the 30 aircraft I am speaking of are for operational tests. Whether the program goes any further will depend on the tests. The aircraft are not for Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand—they are for testing in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, one of my concerns is that time is of the essence. The Air Force wants to test this concept during the next dry season. In order to meet their schedule, the go-ahead must be given now. It's not often we see a relatively inexpensive approach such as Air Force is proposing.

I urge acceptance of this amendment.