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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL


Friday - 16 July 1971

25X1

1. [redacted] Called Walt Rostow in Texas, in response to his call to the Director, and provided him with information on certain Agency congressional briefings relating to [redacted] the North Vietnamese during the spring and summer of 1964. Rostow said this was exactly the information he wanted and was most appreciative.

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3. [redacted] Attended a meeting in the State Department to discuss how to handle Senator Symington's 7 July letter to the Secretary of State [redacted]

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[redacted] See Memo for

Record for details.

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4. [redacted] Mr. Wymberley DeR Coerr, Deputy to Ray Cline, INR, State Department, called to say he was preparing some views for the Department on the Cooper and Church bills and wanted to coordinate with us on the approach to be taken. We expect they will be placed on the agenda for LIG discussion, but it was agreed we would keep in touch as we prepare responses on these measures.

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3 JUL 1971

CIA Warns Nixon of Red Peace Plan

BY THE STAFF

York Times News Service

The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the new Viet Cong peace proposal is aimed at embarrassing the United States "both at home and overseas" and encouraging the opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam, officials say.

Other negative comments on the plan were contained in a detailed analysis submitted to Nixon and other top administration officials last Friday, a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Viet Cong delegate, offered her proposals at the Paris talks.

The agency's evaluation, according to senior administration officials, was one of several top-level studies of the Communist plan on which Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers based their decision to instruct the U.S. delegation in Paris to seek further clarifications yesterday from the Communist side in "restricted sessions," or private talks.

The evaluation and parallel studies prepared in recent days by the State and Defense departments and the National Security Council staff have expressed numerous serious reservations about the Viet Cong plan.

But all the studies also found new elements in the plan.

The CIA paper, for example, noted that "it softens" the Communist position on the American prisoners of war and presents "two new nuances" on the South Vietnamese political settlement. For this reason, senior officials said, the administration chose to seek to engage in what officials here termed "meaningful negotiations."

Senior officials emphasized that they did not consider the fact that the Communists had not responded immediately to the proposal for "restricted" sessions, made in Paris by Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, the chief U.S. negotiator, as an outright rejection.

They said that "something resembling a negotiating process may be in the making."

At San Clemente, Calif., where Nixon and Rogers yesterday conferred for the third time this

week on strategy in the Paris talks, a White House spokesman, Gerald L. Warren, said that Bruce was attempting to start "meaningful negotiations."

The State Department press officer, Charles W. Bray III, said: "We regret that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong did not respond affirmatively to this suggestion, but continue to hope that they will do so."

Highly placed officials indicated their belief that the President would refrain from publicly expressing his views on the developments in the talks until the situation becomes "much clearer" through public or private exchanges in Paris.

They said that only after such clarifications would Nixon address the nation on the state of the negotiations. They recalled that last year he waited nearly three weeks after the Communists presented their peace plan on Sept. 17 before making his counterproposal on Oct. 7.

"At this stage, we are not prepared to reject or to accept anything as a package," a senior official said. "We are looking and we are probing because this is the business of diplomacy."

The negotiating situation will be reviewed again when Henry Kissinger joins Nixon and Rogers in San Clemente early next week. The next scheduled session of the Paris talks is Thursday.

Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, visited Saigon last weekend and is to confer with Bruce in Paris this weekend.

Helms Joins in Talks

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency — which was reported to have drafted the first analysis of the Viet Cong plan — participated in the discussions on the U.S. response to the Communist proposals after he flew to San Clemente with the President and Rogers Tuesday.

Officials familiar with various administration evaluations of the Viet Cong plan said the CIA analysis was "perhaps the most pessimistic — but also the most realistic — of the lot."

its over-all conclusion, contained in the first paragraph of the document, said:

"The Viet Cong's new seven-point proposal softens the Communists' position on the prisoner-of-war release but retains and amplifies a very tough line on United States disengagement from the war. In addition, it repackages Hanoi's demands for a political settlement in South Vietnam in a superficially more attractive form."

The analysis recognized, however, that "there are two new nuances in the Communist position on a political settlement in South Vietnam."

What Reds Offered

The principal features of the Viet Cong plan were the Communist readiness to start releasing U.S. prisoners of war as American troops begin withdrawing from Vietnam after a date "in 1971" is set by Washington, and the dropping of the Communists' long-standing insistence on a coalition regime in Saigon as the condition for a political settlement.

But after analyzing the plan, the CIA offered this assessment of the Communist motives in presenting their July 1 proposals:

"The Communists doubtless hope that their initiative on the prisoners — coupled as it is with a restatement of their basic position on United States withdrawals — will make things awkward for the United States government both at home and overseas."

"They may also believe that their political proposals will appeal to many in the United States who are looking for a face-saving way out of the war."

"They probably are also hoping that the new proposal will fuel worries in Saigon about Washington's longer-term support."

"The new formula for a political settlement in South Vietnam, by its fuzziness and air of reasonableness, is designed both to encourage individuals in South Vietnam whose support of the war is wavering and to give some ammunition to those who are already working to build an anti-Thieu, anti-war constituency."

Elections in October

This aspect of the analysis was known to be in line with the belief in other administration quarters that the Communist peace plan was launched, at least in part, to influence the outcome of the October elections in South Vietnam—when President Thieu will seek re-election.

In this context, the analysis noted that "among other things the Communists seem intent on creating the impression that the election of Big Minh could prove an initial step toward peace."

"Big Minh," is Gen. Duong Van Minh, a potential but undeclared presidential candidate upon whom Hanoi and the Viet Cong had looked with favor in the past.

1st 'New Nuance' Eyed

The analysis said that the Viet Cong plan's first "new nuance" was that instead of demanding a coalition regime, it "simply demands that the United States cease backing the bellicose group headed by Thieu."

The other nuance, it said, is that the Communists no longer ask a "three-segment" regime, including Communists, but a broad "government of national concord" to be negotiated by the Viet Cong with a "post-Thieu administration."

Previously North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leaders had insisted that not only Thieu, but Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, as well, would be unacceptable in a post-war government.

"For years Communist delegates at the Paris peace talks have been calling for removal of the 'Thieu-Ky-Khien clique,' one diplomatic informant told the Associated Press. "They practically pronounced 'Thieu-Ky-Khien' as one word. Now they've begun speaking only of Thieu."

Le Duc Tho, senior North Vietnamese representative in Paris, gave an interview to the New York Times and hammered away at Thieu—and Thieu only.

9 JUL 1971

C.I.A. Says Plan Seeks to Embarrass U.S.

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 8—The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the new Vietcong peace proposal is aimed at embarrassing the United States "both at home and overseas" and encouraging the opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam.

Other negative comments on the plan were contained in a detailed analysis submitted to Mr. Nixon and other top Administration officials last Friday a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Vietcong delegate, offered her proposals at the Paris talks.

The agency's evaluation, according to senior Administration officials, was one of several top-level studies of the Communist plan on which President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers based their decision to instruct the United States delegation in Paris to seek further clarifications today from the Communist side in "restricted sessions," or private talks.

Reservations Expressed

The evaluation as well as the parallel studies prepared in recent days by the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council staff have expressed numerous serious reservations about the Vietcong plan.

But all the studies also found new elements in the plan. The C.I.A. paper, for example, noted that "it softens" the Communist position on the American prisoners of war and presents "two new nuances" on the South Vietnamese political settlement. For this reason, senior officials said, the Administration chose to seek to engage in what officials here termed "meaningful negotiations."

Senior officials emphasized that they did not consider the fact that the Communists had not responded immediately to the proposal for "restricted" sessions, made today in Paris by David K. E. Bruce, the chief United States negotiator, as an outright rejection.

They said that "something resembling a negotiating process may be in the making."

At San Clemente, Calif., where President Nixon and Mr. Rogers conferred for the third time this week on strategy in the Paris talks, a White House spokesman, Gerald L. Warren, said that Mr. Bruce was attempting to start "meaningful negotiations."

The State Department press officer, Charles W. Bray 3d, said here about the Bruce proposal that "we regret that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong did not respond affirmatively to this suggestion but continue to hope that they will do so."

Nixon Expected to Wait

Highly-placed officials indicated their belief that President Nixon would refrain from publicly expressing his views on the developments in the talks until the situation became "much clearer" through public or private exchanges in Paris.

They said that only after such clarifications would Mr. Nixon address the nation on the state of the negotiations. They recalled that last year he had waited nearly three weeks after the Communists presented their peace plan on Sept. 17 before making his counterproposal on Oct. 7.

"At this stage, we are not prepared to reject or to accept anything as a package," a senior official said. "We are looking and we are probing because this is the business of diplomacy."

Other officials said that the negotiating situation would be reviewed again when Henry A.

Kissinger joins Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers in San Clemente on Sunday. The next scheduled session of the Paris talks is next Thursday.

Mr. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, visited Saigon last weekend and is to confer with Mr. Bruce in Paris on Saturday.

Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, whose agency was reported to have drafted the first analysis of the Vietcong plan, participated in the discussions on the United States response to the Communist proposals after he flew to San Clemente with President Nixon and Mr. Rogers last Tuesday.

Officials familiar with various Administration evaluations of the Vietcong plan said that the C. I. A. analysis was "perhaps the most pessimistic—but also the most realistic—of the lot."

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addition, it repackages Hanoi's demands for a political settlement in South Vietnam in a superficially more attractive form."

New Nuances Recognized

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The principal features of Mrs. Binh's plan were the Communist readiness to start releasing United States war prisoners as American troops begin withdrawing from Vietnam after a date "in 1971" is set by Washington, and the dropping of the Communists' long-standing insistence on a coalition regime in Saigon as the condition for a political settlement.

But after analyzing the plan, the C. I. A. offered this assessment of the Communist motives in presenting their July 1 proposals:

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"The new formula for a political settlement in South Vietnam, by its fuzziness and air of reasonableness, is designed both to encourage individuals in South Vietnam whose support of the war is wavering and to give some ammunition to those who are already working to build an anti-Thieu, anti-war constituency."

Coincidence of Beliefs

This aspect of the analysis was known to coincide with the belief in other Administration quarters that the Communist peace plan was launched, at least in part, to influence the outcome of the October elections in South Vietnam, where President Nguyen Van Thieu is seeking re-election.

In this context, the analysis noted that "among other things the Communists seem intent on creating the impression that the election of Big Minh could prove an initial step toward peace."

"Big Minh" is Gen. Duong Van Minh, a potential but undeclared presidential candidate

upon whom Hanoi and the Vietcong had looked with favor in the past.

The analysis said that the Vietcong plan's first "new nuance" was that instead of demanding a coalition regime in Hanoi, it "simply demands that the United States 'cease backing the bellicose group' headed by Thieu."

The other nuance, it said, is that the Communists no longer ask a "three-segment" regime, including Communists, but a broad "government of national concord" to be negotiated by the Vietcong with a "post-Thieu administration."

"The Communists seem to be trying to leave the impression that the form of government is open to negotiation," the document said. "Moreover, the language of this section—and indeed much of the statement—is cast to convey an image of

conciliation and reasonableness without committing Hanoi to anything specific."

The analysts also warned against pitfalls in the Communist proposal for releasing the American prisoners in exchange for the withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam under a set deadline. This has appeared to be the most attractive aspect of Mrs. Binh's peace package.

But the analysis said that while "the formulation on the prisoner-release question is new," the Communist demand on total United States military disengagement "is as firm as ever."

"Moreover, by including for the first time civilian as well as military prisoners, the Communists are opening the whole thorny problem of the Communist civilian cadre who are now held by Saigon," it said.

WASHINGTON POST

9 APR 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**Intelligence Ills Have Fatal Results****By Jack Anderson**

FAULTY INTELLIGENCE and military leaks have caused heavy casualties, contributed to the Mylai massacre and triggered other tragedies in Indochina.

Because intelligence reports are highly classified, the mistakes have been swept under the secrecy label. The public is entitled to know, however, about the terrible cost of intelligence errors.

By monitoring enemy radio transmissions, for example, the Defense Intelligence Agency learned that Hanoi had advance knowledge of both the Cambodian and Laos invasions.

Intercepted enemy messages, called "gamma controlled items," revealed that the Vietcong had overheard two U.S. officers discuss the Cambodian invasion plan. The eavesdroppers learned enough to alert Communist forces in Cambodia.

Before the Laos invasion, allied commandos made repeated, hit-and-run raids against the Ho Chi Minh infiltration routes. It became evident in the fall of 1970, however, that these surprise raids, planned under the secret code name "Prairie Fire," were no longer surprising anyone.

Raiders Ambushed

Someone began tipping off the enemy exactly where and when to expect the raids, with disastrous results for the raid-

ers. More than once, helicopters had to be rushed in to rescue the so-called MACSOG teams from ambush.

The South Vietnamese invasion to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trails, similarly, was anticipated by the North Vietnamese. Intelligence estimates placed only 1½ divisions in the area. These were expected to fade back, avoiding any concentrations that could be blasted from the air.

Instead, the South Vietnamese ran into four divisions, which defied withering air attacks to drive the invaders out of Laos. The Communists also threw more tanks into the battle than the intelligence experts had thought in the area.

In earlier columns, we also detailed how Hanoi has been alerted in advance of B-52 raids. Plans for the raids, obtained from GIs for stashes of marijuana or caps of heroin, had been delivered to a Soviet trawler off Okinawa's Minatogawa Point. The trawler's high-powered transmitters would radio the information to Hanoi in time for the North Vietnamese to move their trucks off the Ho Chi Minh trails before the big bombers arrived.

It's also no secret that the Mylai massacre was the direct result of faulty intelligence. The attackers were told that the whole area was infested with Vietcong, that two Vietcong companies and a field headquarters were located in Mylai and that the villagers would be away.

The tragic result was that three companies, including Lt. William Calley Jr. and his men, surged into Mylai with guns blazing. They didn't stop when the expected Vietcong turned out to be unarmed villagers.

Unpublicized Massacre

Intelligence goofs have been responsible for other, unpublicized massacres. U.S. pilots, guided by wrong intelligence, have bombed and strafed friendly Montagnard villages. We will document these charges in future columns.

Of course, the celebrated Sontay raid, which sent daring Americans into the outskirts of Hanoi to rescue war prisoners, was a dangerous wild goose chase thanks to poor intelligence.

Brig. Gen. Leroy Manor, who directed the operation, admitted to the press afterward that the American prisoners had been gone from the camp for "several weeks." His secret message to the Pentagon, stamped "FLASH-PRECEDENT," reported that the camp hadn't been occupied for "three or four months."

The price for these intelligence goofs has been paid in blood. Should those who were responsible be allowed to remain in their shadowy world safe from public exposure?

Footnote: Intelligence reports, based on captured documents and intercepted messages, led to the Laos invasion. The reports claimed that

Hanoi planned to drive across South Vietnam to the sea in August, thereby disrupting South Vietnamese elections and turning the American withdrawal into a retreat. The assault upon the Ho Chi Minh trail complex was ordered largely to head off this anticipated offensive.

But unhappily, the latest intelligence reports show that the truck traffic down the Ho Chi Minh trails has picked up dramatically since the South Vietnamese pullout. Truck sightings have been running as high as 1,000 to 1,200 a day. This means the North Vietnamese are making a mighty effort to replace the supplies that the invasion force destroyed. The August offensive, if the original reports were correct, may still be possible.

Diplomatic Grapevine

U.S. intelligence officers say the Chinese party organizers have run up against a wall of apathy among the Chinese people on communism, just as the Russian people are turning off on the same subject.

Rumors have been whipping through Karachi that the Central Intelligence Agency is behind the rebellion in East Pakistan. The whispers charge that the U.S. seeks to establish a more friendly, independent government in East Pakistan. The rumors undoubtedly will be believed although they are absolutely false.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Jack Anderson Reports

STATION WTOP Radio
Syndicated

DATE March 27, 1971

6:40 PM

CITY Washington, DC

CIA MONEY BEHIND PROJECT

JACK ANDERSON: The United States has taken pains to keep out of South Vietnamese politics. We can report, however, that CIA money has been secretly channeled into South Vietnam to build up a political organization in the countryside that counteracts the Viet Cong political apparatus.

Some of its ^{money} month is funneled through the AFL-CIO to South Vietnam's Confederation of Labor.

The South Vietnamese labor organization has used the money to build up an anti-communist farmer-labor party.

An AFL-CIO spokesman denied that its contributions came from the CIA but acknowledged that the money is being used to build an anti-communist political system in South Vietnam.

Competent sources tell us, however, that CIA money is behind the project.

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41 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017, 697-5100

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF.

PROGRAM NEWSRADIO 88 STATION WCBS

DATE MARCH 18, 1971 4:20 PM CITY NEW YORK

SPECTRUM ON THE CIA AND THE MAO TRIBES

MURRY KEMPTON: Before they were picked up as a bargain by the Central Intelligence Agency the Mao tribes lived in the mountains near the border between northern Laos and North Vietnam. They were just what most mountaineers are thought to be -- proud, stubborn and suspicious of lowlanders, and they disliked what we call the Democrats of Laos almost as much as they did the Communists of North Vietnam.

In 1963 our CIA's comparison shoppers recognized the convenience of the Mao as a human wall against North Vietnam. As one sorrowful witness to their subsequent fate said later, you can always get a Mao to fight. The CIA trained, equipped and sent them to war. By 1969 their commander felt forced to tell the American Embassy that his troops were so bloodied by then that he'd have to withdraw them from the front and move all the Mao to northwest Laos.

The CIA answered if they would stay and hold their line we would reward them with air support. We kept that promise so well that the Mao took the offensive, and they were beaten again by an infusion of North Vietnamese troops and they have been wandering ever since.

A year or so ago Ronald Rickenbach, an American refugee relief officer, reported to a Senate committee that the Mao are now all destitute as a result of the battles we encouraged them to fight. They fought because we armed them, and we had no moral right to encourage the Mao into protracted battle against such overwhelming odds.

This week Henry Cahem(?) of the New York Times reminded us again of the troubling continued existence of the Mao. There are 100,000 of them wandering about northern Laos, and there are no more mountains left there for them. Every year since 1967 25,000 of the young males have been killed in battle, a death

-2-

rate in action which is annually over five per cent of their whole population. Even their CIA sponsors now can see that they are exhausted and of no further use as commodities on the war market. Our allies in the Laotian government are indifferent to their fate.

Americans, of course, are rather more sentimental, and the CIA is casting about for a solution. The only available one seems to be to move the Mao into an area under the control of Pathet-Lao(?), the native Communist rebels, where perhaps it is hoped they can find some accomodation. Having aroused the Mao to wear themselves out in the struggle against Communism we can only advise them now to find ways to get along with Communists. Since they are of no more use to us, they will just have to make what accomodations they can.

This is Murry Kempton for Spectrum.

SECRET

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Tuesday - 2 February 1971

25X1

1. [redacted] Discussed with Darrell St. Claire, Chief Clerk in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate, the members and organization of certain committees in the new Congress and certain problems regarding some of the personalities involved.

25X1

2. [redacted] Briefed Ralph Preston, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee, on recent Soviet naval developments.

Preston said that in view of the new rules laid down by the Democratic caucus, the group handling Agency affairs would probably no longer refer to itself as a "subcommittee" but would probably be spoken of only as "the group" or something of the sort. He said he foresaw no changes in the membership or procedures.

25X1

3. [redacted] Briefed Russ Blandford, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, on recent developments regarding the Soviet navy.

Blandford said no decision has yet been made on how the Committee will handle Agency matters.

25X1

4. [redacted] Met with Representative William E. Minshall (R., Ohio), of the House Appropriations Committee, whom I briefed on recent developments including Soviet naval activity in Cuba and in the Atlantic, developments regarding advanced Soviet aircraft, changes in the Soviet Military Districts in Central Asia and the Far East and the general situation in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Minshall said that, although Secretary Laird had tried to explain to him what actually happened in connection with the Son Tay raid, he was still confused. I told him about the very limited role of the Agency, and said I couldn't throw much light on any other aspects of the operation. He said he understood from Laird that Agency reports had indicated the presence of American prisoners at the camp just six weeks before the raid.

[redacted]

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SECRET

Dec. 18, 1970

Pg. 3010

Congress and the Indochina War: 1970 Chronology

Feb. 2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee made public a report, "Vietnam: December 1969," criticizing the Administration's Vietnamization policy. (*Weekly Report p. 336*)

Feb. 18. The President issued a 40,000-word message to Congress, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace." (*Text and summary, Weekly Report p. 509*)

Feb. 25, 26, 27. House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense heard a report on the Vietnamization progress from Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird. (*Weekly Report p. 684*)

March 6. President Nixon lifted the official lid of secrecy on U.S. military involvement in Laos with a 3,000-word statement which drew sharp comment from members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (*Weekly Report p. 761*)

April 12. After a delay of more than five months, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee released a censored transcript of closed hearings held in October 1969 on U.S. military involvement in Laos. (*Fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1243*)

April 30. President Nixon announced that American troops had been sent into battle in Cambodia. (*Weekly Report p. 1151*)

May 2. Senators George McGovern (D S.D.), Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa), Alan Cranston (D Calif.), Charles E. Goodell (R N.Y.) and Mark O. Hatfield (R Ore.) announced plans to offer an amendment to eliminate spending for military operations in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by the end of 1970. (*Weekly Report p. 1208*)

May 5. A May 1 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on a resolution (S Con Res 64) to repeal the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution was recommitted to the Committee. (*Weekly Report p. 1207*)

May 6. House passed a bill (HR 17123) authorizing \$20.2 million for military procurement and research in fiscal 1971 and rejected amendments that would have restricted use of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia. (*Weekly Report p. 1209*)

May 13. The Senate began debate on the Foreign Military Sales bill (HR 15628), the vehicle for an amendment offered by Senators Frank Church (D Idaho) and John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.) designed to prohibit U.S. military activities in Cambodia. (*Weekly Report p. 1272*)

June 6. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report, "Cambodia: May 1970," disputing the military reason given by President Nixon for ordering the intervention into Cambodia and indicating that the military gains were outweighed by the risks of a broadened war in Indochina. (*Weekly Report p. 1534*)

June 24. Senate adopted an amendment to repeal the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution. (*Weekly Report p. 1615*)

June 30. The Senate by a 58-37 roll-call vote passed a modified Cooper-Church amendment and the Foreign Military Sales Bill (HR 15628) after seven weeks of debate. (*Weekly Report p. 1671*)

President Nixon issued a statement on the 60-day U.S. operation in Cambodia stating it had been successfully concluded and that no American ground personnel would re-enter Cambodia in the future. (*Weekly Report p. 1673*)

July 6. A special House committee issued a report on "U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia" (H Rept 91-1276), after undertaking a two-week fact-finding mission to the region.

July 9. The House rejected a motion to instruct House conferees to agree to the Senate-passed Cooper-Church amendment. (*Weekly Report p. 1779*)

July 10. The Senate Adopted by a 57-5 roll-call vote a concurrent resolution (S Con Res 64) reaffirming the repeal of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution. (*Weekly Report p. 1777*)

Aug. 20, 21. The Senate approved amendments to the defense procurement bill (HR 17123) to deny U.S. allowances to allied troops in South Vietnam to be any higher than those paid to American troops and to forbid use of U.S. funds to pay foreign troops fighting for Cambodia and Laos. (*Weekly Report p. 2172*)

Sept. 1. The Senate defeated by a 39-55 roll-call vote the Hatfield-McGovern amendment to HR 17123 which would have imposed a deadline for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. (*Weekly Report p. 2170*)

Oct. 7. President Nixon in a televised speech proposed a cease-fire in Vietnam and widened peace talks to include nations not present at the Paris peace talks. (*Congressional reaction, Weekly Report p. 2195*)

Nov. 16. The House by a 288-39 roll-call vote passed a joint resolution (H J Res 1355) defining the war-making powers of the President. The bill then went to the Senate. (*Weekly Report p. 2817*)

Nov. 18. President Nixon sent a message to Congress requesting \$1 billion in supplementary foreign aid including \$65 million for Vietnamization and \$255 million in military and economic aid for Cambodia. (*Weekly Report p. 2834*)

Nov. 23. Debate over U.S. policy revived in the aftermath of an attempt to rescue American prisoners of war near Hanoi and large-scale air strikes over North Vietnam. (*Weekly Report p. 2874*)

Dec. 3. The Senate Appropriations Committee added a prohibition against the entry of U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia when it considered the \$66-billion fiscal 1971 defense appropriations bill (HR 19590). The Senate passed the bill Dec. 8. (*Weekly Report p. 2933*)

Dec. 7. The House approved a resolution (H Res 1282) commending the courage displayed by the official command, officers and men involved in the Nov. 21 attempt to rescue U.S. prisoners believed to be held captive near Hanoi. (*Weekly Report p. 2937*)

Dec. 9. The House Appropriations Committee reported HR 19928, a \$990 million supplemental foreign aid bill for fiscal 1971 including \$255 million for Cambodia. The House by a 249-102 vote passed a bill (HR 19911) authorizing \$550 million in foreign aid, including \$255 million for Cambodia. (*Weekly Report p. 2935*)