

THE NEW YORK TIMES

DATE 19 MAY 71 PAGE

U.S. Expects Soviet to Test Large New Missiles Soon

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 18—Administration officials have disclosed that the Soviet Union is pressing ahead so rapidly with its new missile program that test firings are expected within the next few months.

Two launching silos for the big SS-9 intercontinental missiles at the Tyuratam test center, east of the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan in central Asia, are being rapidly rebuilt to the same dimensions as the new, larger silos that have been appearing all over western Russia since December, these officials said.

There are now more than 60 such silos, they said, as against 10 discovered early this year and 40 reported by the Administration officials last month. "If this pace continues much longer, we'll have to call it a crash program," one official declared.

The first tests, expected this summer, should provide data answering many of the questions and clarifying much of the speculation among experts here over the new program, analysts said.

Most Government analysts believe that the new silos will house either an improved version of the SS-9 missile or an entirely new and larger missile. In either case the missiles are expected to carry three or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, commonly called MIRV warheads.

But despite general concern over the pace of the new effort, several officials noted hopefully that Soviet diplomats had hinted recently at the possibility that, as the new silos were fitted with improved operational missiles, older missiles might be dismantled.

Up to now the Russians have

Continued on Page 16, Column 1

kept in service their older missiles as well as older radar installations, antiaircraft artillery and other systems, as they added new models.

Reassuring Replies Given

Informants said that when the Russians were asked about the new silos at the Vienna talks on limitation of strategic armaments, they urged the Americans not to worry. Soviet delegates repeatedly said that the silos were part of a "modernization" program similar to the United States' modernization of its Minuteman and Polaris missiles.

About a year ago, the United States started long-planned programs to substitute Minuteman-3 missiles for the 550 older Minuteman-1's, and to substitute more advanced Poseidon missiles for each of the 16 Polaris missiles on 31 of the Navy's

41 Polaris submarines. The Minuteman-3 carries three MIRV warheads and the Poseidon carries from 10 to 14 MIRV's. About 450 single-warhead Minuteman-2 missiles will be retained.

The Russians, Administration sources say, did not go so far as to state that older missiles would be retired as new missiles became operational.

And now, when the United States and the Soviet Union are attempting to negotiate a possible numerical limitation on strategic weapons, some officials here are skeptical that Moscow would weaken its bargaining position by voluntarily dismantling some of its older missiles.

If the Soviet Union should do so, however, this would be considered a very promising sign, suggesting that the Moscow leadership believes it is approaching a sufficiency of land-based missiles and might therefore be more receptive to a missile freeze.

'There's Still Time'

"We wouldn't expect them to tear down the old before the new are in and operational, anyway," one official said. "There's still time, and we're watching closely."

Analysts point out that the Soviet Union has about 220 SS-7 and SS-8 intercontinental missiles that were deployed about a decade ago. These are considered relatively obsolete and the most likely to be retired if such a course is chosen.

Even if the Russians do not remove some of the older missiles, officials agree, this would not preclude a missile freeze.

There is precedent, these spokesmen contend, for the Russians to dig silos for new missiles even before the missiles have been tested. Several years ago when they started to deploy the SS-11 intercontinental missile, of which they now have about 800, they prepared silos at both operational and test sites simultaneously. As soon as the tests were completed, they started deploying operational missiles, thus saving considerable time.

Officials believe this same policy is being followed in the case of the new silos. "It shows a lot of confidence on their part that the system will work," one weapons specialist commented.

One element of the new silo construction effort that puzzles analysts here is that excavations are showing up not only at SS-9 and SS-11 missile complexes in the Ural Mountain region, but also in an area of southwest Russia in which the Russians have stationed about 700 missiles in the 1,000 to 2,000-mile medium and intermediate range, and aimed at Western Europe.

China Seen as Potential Target

About a year ago the Russians began putting about 100 SS-11 missiles into this area. It is now believed that these missiles are able to hit either targets in Western Europe or more distant targets in China and the United States.

But since there are already so many missiles aimed at Western Europe, and because the new silos would house missiles whose warheads are probably larger than needed for European targets, some analysts suggest that the Russians simply want to take greater advantage of existing communications, radar, storage and related facilities for the new installations, thus achieving considerable financial savings.

Other analysts speculate that the new locations, well west of the Urals, are a defensive measure, intended to place these missiles at greater distance from missiles being developed by the Chinese Communist regime.

Analysts estimate that the new Soviet missile will be able to carry either three 5-megaton warheads or six 2-megaton warheads. A megaton is equivalent to one million tons of TNT. This is the same estimate that is made for the SS-9 missile, of which the Russians have almost 300.

Officials here say there is some evidence the Russians may have started to replace the single 25-megaton warhead on some SS-9's with a three-part multiple warhead.

The chief cause of American concern over the larger Soviet missiles is that, if fitted with accurate MIRV warheads, they could pose a threat to the United States's 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan-2 land-based missiles in a first strike.

Experts See Nuclear Arsenals in Balance

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 20 —

As the United States and the Soviet Union seek to halt some elements of the arms race, their respective nuclear arsenals are viewed by most American analysts as being in rough balance.

The Soviet Union has more and bigger land-based intercontinental missiles. The United States has more long-range bombers and submarine-based missiles.

The Soviet Union has installed some antiballistic missiles around Moscow, while the United States has only begun preliminary work toward defensive deployments around two Minuteman complexes in the Northwest.

But the United States be-

lieves that it enjoys a clear lead in missile accuracy and reliability, in multiple warhead technology and in defensive weaponry.

One driving factor behind the Nixon Administration's move to achieve a partial arms-limitation agreement, some officials say, is a strong desire to stop the build-up of large Soviet missiles, which potentially threaten to make the Minuteman force vulnerable to a first strike.

Next Phase Scheduled

In the next phase of negotiations, which will take place in Helsinki in July, the United States plans to seek an agreement that would forbid construction by the Russians of additional land-based intercontinental missiles and would permit a small-scale American

effort to defend some Minuteman complexes.

If achieved, this agreement would ease immediate concerns about the Minuteman officials say, while efforts continue toward a more comprehensive second-stage agreement that would include missile submarines, long-range bombers and, conceivably, American fighter-bombers in Europe and Soviet medium-range missiles aimed at Western Europe.

However, the United States has made it plain that it would prefer to deal with the question of European-based nuclear delivery systems in talks that would include members of the Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

A major factor that lent some urgency to the Adminis-

tration's effort to end the impasse on strategic weapons talks, officials say, was the surprisingly rapid construction over the last six months of more than 60 larger missiles silos in the Soviet Union.

Minuteman Danger Cited

Since American analysts believe that these silos will house an improved or a new missile carrying three or more multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, they argued that the 1,000-missile Minutemen force would be in increased danger unless new Soviet construction could be halted.

Their argument was based on the premise that the Russians would also place three-part MIRV warheads on the nearly 300 big SS-9 missiles in their force. There is some evidence, not yet conclusive, that his process may have begun.

In March, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird provided Congress with an assessment of where the arms balance would stand by the middle of this year.

Mr. Laird said that by mid-year the Soviet Union would have 1,500 intercontinental missiles and the United States 1,054; the Soviet Union would have 400 submarine-based missiles and the United States 656; the Soviet Union would have 175 to 195 long-range bombers and the United States 569.

The Defense Secretary indicated, however, that the United States would markedly lead the Soviet Union in the total number of nuclear warheads and bombs with 4,600, compared with 2,000 for the Russians. Two or more weapons carried by each of the American B-52's make up a large share of this numerical advantage, officials explained.

64 Galosh Missiles

On missile defense, the Russians have 64 Galosh antiballistic missiles deployed on the outskirts of Moscow. Though the United States has not yet deployed its Spartan and Sprint defensive missiles, it has built radar and computer facilities for such antiballistic missiles at Minuteman installations at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota and Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.


Russian missiles, and particularly the SS-9 and the missile for the new larger silos, are estimated to be capable of carrying either three warheads of five megatons each or six warheads of two megatons each. A megaton is equivalent to one million tons of TNT.

By comparison, the Minuteman-3 carries two or three warheads of 160 kilotons and the Poseidon missile carries 10 to 14 warheads of 40 kilotons each. A kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT.

While the United States MIRV's are probably accurate enough to hit Soviet missile silos, there is a question as to whether they are powerful enough to destroy such targets. And while the Russian MIRV's are thought to be large enough, they are not considered accurate enough. But the Soviet Union will presumably improve accuracy in time, and the United States would not be

barred from making its MIRV's more powerful.

These developments, officials say, could set the stage for an agreement intended to reduce the fear of a first strike by substantially reducing the number of missiles possessed by each side.



The New York Times May 21, 1971

C.I.A. SAID TO DOUBT PENTAGON'S VIEW ON MISSILE THREAT

Senate G.O.P. Sources Say
Agency Thinks Soviet Silos
Are for Existing Arms

PROTECTIVE STEP SEEN

Moscow Is Believed to Be
'Hardening' Installations
for Its SS-11's

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 25

Senate Republican sources reported today that the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that at least two-thirds of the large new silo holes recently detected in the Soviet Union were intended for the relatively small SS-11 intercontinental missile and not for a large new weapon as the Defense Department has suggested.

This assessment casts a different light on Moscow's strategic intentions at a crucial time in the negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve some limitation on defensive and offensive strategic weapons.

It now appears to some arms control specialists that the Soviet Union, rather than seeking to achieve a first-strike capability against the United States with large new missiles, is following the American course of trying to protect its missiles against attack with "hardened" silos.

60 New Silos Detected

Some 60 large new missile silos in the Soviet Union have been detected in recent months by means of reconnaissance satellites. The C.I.A. was said to have concluded that at least two-thirds were intended for the SS-11 intercontinental missile, which is comparable to the Minuteman ICBM of the United States.

Some non-Governmental sources with access to Central Intelligence Agency information said that all but 15 of the new holes were situated in existing SS-11 missile fields.

The Senate Republican sources said they had been informed of the C.I.A. assessment by non-Governmental arms control experts who earlier had been briefed by the intelligence agency. These sources declined to be identified by name.

The Defense Department declined today to comment on the reported C.I.A. assessment because, as a department spokesman put it, "We would not have any comment on a speculative report like that."

But the spokesman said the department still held to the interpretation that the Soviet Union was deploying a modified version of its large SS-9 intercontinental missile or an

Continued on Page 4, Column 3

entirely new missile system. Much of the concern and speculation over the intended purpose for the new silos has sprung from their unusual size.

According to data obtained by the satellites, the holes were larger than those that had previously been dug for the SS-9, a large intercontinental missile that Defense Department officials have suggested the Soviet Union may be deploying as a "first strike" weapon against the United States's Minuteman force. This in turn gave rise to official speculation that the Soviet Union was planning to deploy an improved version of the SS-9 or perhaps an even larger, more powerful weapon.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, who first disclosed the detection of the new silo holes on a national television program March 7, said at the time that "the Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advanced generation of offensive systems." The Washington Democrat, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, described the development as "ominous indeed."

The Defense Department took a somewhat more cautious interpretation, saying that it had detected new ICBM construction but was not sure what the Soviet Union's intentions were.

But in a television appearance on March 10, Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense, said that the silo construction "confirms the fact that the Soviet Union is going forward with construction of a large missile system."

"We cannot tell at this time whether it is a modified version of the SS-9 . . . or whether it is an entirely new missile system," he said.

Secretary Gives Warning

Then, in a speech April 22 before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Mr. Laird said the United States had fresh intelligence information "confirming the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program."

He warned that if this Soviet missile build-up continued, the Defense Department might find it necessary to seek a supplementary appropriation for more strategic weapons.

Last week, Administration officials were reported to have said that the Soviet Union was pressing ahead with its new missile program so rapidly that test firings of an improved SS-9 or an entirely new and larger missile were expected by this summer.

On the basis of new intelligence information, the C.I.A. was said today to have concluded that the larger holes could be explained not by a Soviet move to a larger missile but by an engineering step intended to protect the existing Soviet missile force.

According to the intelligence agency's analysis, the larger holes can be explained as an effort to "harden the silos, by emplacement of a concrete shell around them, to protect the weapons against the blast effects of a nuclear explosion. The larger hole is required to accommodate the concrete liners, according to the C.I.A. analysis.

Old Missile Fields Utilized

It was said that the first evidence that the Soviet Union might be "hardening" its missile sites rather than developing a new missile system appeared in the fact that the new holes were detected primarily in existing SS-11 missile fields.

If the Soviet Union was deploying a new weapon, it presumably would not situate the new missile emplacements among older missiles, according to the C.I.A. view.

The conclusive piece of evidence was said to have been received early last week when reconnaissance satellite pictures were received showing silo liners arriving at the missile holes. The photographs were said to have indicated that the liners at neither the SS-11 nor the SS-9 sites were big

issues, and those at the SS-9 sites did not seem intended for weapons of altered design.

The United States started hardening its Minuteman silos some years ago as it saw the Soviet Union expanding its ICBM forces, and then began "superhardening" them as the Soviet Union began deploying the SS-9 missile.

Some arms control specialists now maintain that the Soviet Union now is turning to hardening its SS-11 and SS-9 missiles as it sees the United States deploying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, or multiple warheads, known as MIRV's, which potentially could acquire the accuracy to strike precisely at Soviet missile sites.

This was a point made today before the Senate Appropriations Committee by Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., a former official of the C.I.A. and the

Disarmament and Arms Control Agency, now chairman of the Strategic Weapons Committee of the Federation of American Scientists.

A hardening of the Soviet missile sites, he observed "would not contribute to a first-strike capability and, if anything, would be an indication that a first strike was not a critical Soviet policy objective."

If it now turns out that the Soviet Union is only hardening the SS-9 and SS-11 missile silos, he said, "We must ask ourselves how many times we are going to allow the 'weaponers' to come before the Congress and the people shouting 'missile gap,' when in reality they are only creating another 'credibility gap.'"

New Soviet Silo Building Seen As Protection for Two Missiles

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon said yesterday that the new, large missile silos being built in the Soviet Union now appear to be designed for two different kinds of ICBMs, but conceded that more than half of the new holes may be for the relatively small and less threatening SS-11 ICBM.

Defense officials said that new intelligence gathered since late last month indicated that the silo building program—which touched off scares here of a new arms race—may be meant in part to provide better protection for Russian missiles, both the SS-11s and the huge SS-9s, against U.S. attack rather than as a big expansion of the Soviet SS-9 force.

However, Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim made it clear that the Pentagon's "best judgment remains that either new missiles or modifications of existing missiles" will go into the "two separate systems of silo improvement."

Privately, Defense officials say they believe the most likely prospect now is that the Soviets will combine their silo hardening effort with installation of improved versions of both missiles, rather than with any completely new ICBM even bigger and more ominous than the existing SS-9.

Of some 60 new ICBM silos that U.S. spy satellites have spotted since this February, well-informed defense officials say that 20 to 25 are under construction in missile fields normally associated with existing SS-9 bases and 35 to 40 at SS-11 bases. No missiles have actually been installed in any of the new holes so far, the officials say.

Friedheim yesterday explained that the original detection of the new silos showed "diameters large enough to encompass any missile in the Soviet inventory."

Disclosure of the new silos was first made publicly on March 7 by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), and was later confirmed by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.

While the Pentagon has said all along that it was not sure if the holes were for a completely new missile or for a modification of the existing SS-9, the impression was generally created that whatever it was, it was very big. It is the SS-9, equipped with multiple warheads, which the Pentagon has portrayed as the major threat to knocking out U.S. Minuteman ICBMs in a surprise attack.

There was no official indication given until yesterday that the new holes might be for protecting small ICBMs as well.

The SS-11 carries a much smaller warhead than the SS-9 and is not viewed as a first strike weapon.

Friedheim said that while it was still unclear what Soviet intentions were "new information now available to us leads us to conclude the Soviets may be involved in two separate silo improvement programs" rather than just one.

The new evidence, other sources say, was photos of different size protective concrete liners for the missile silos which reduce their inside diameters and of different base layouts used for the two missiles.

Friedheim said that in the past the Russians have installed SS-11 ICBMs into what heretofore have been bases used exclusively for shorter range missile.

Privately, Defense officials conceded that the latest developments, if they do not change, are less provocative than a big Soviet drive to add still larger missiles. Splitting the new silos between SS-9s and SS-11s also seems to fit in with U.S. objectives at the strategic arms limitation talks.

Washington hopes to hold Proxmire accused both Laird and Jackson of whipping up "a series of scare 'em stories" based on the "wholly unproved assumption that these holes were all designed for the huge new 25-megaton SS-9 missiles."

The Soviets now have almost 288 SS-9s on the firing line and presumably will add 20 to 25 more in the new silos.

Friedheim denied there had been disagreement between the CIA and the Pentagon over assessing the meaning of the silo construction program in recent weeks.

Nevertheless, Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) yesterday called the episode the "the shortest missile gap in history."

"The lesson is clear," Proxmire contended. "The practice of selective disclosure of partially analyzed intelligence data by the Pentagon and its allies should stop. Congress and the American public must not be swept off their feet by leaks designed merely to propagandize for a bigger and fatter military budget."

Pentagon Says the Soviet May Have 2 New ICBM's

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 26—Defense Department officials said today that the 60 new missile silos detected in the Soviet Union recently might be intended for two new types of intercontinental missiles rather than one, as suggested earlier.

But a Pentagon official conceded that there was still sufficient uncertainty about this that a quite different assessment advanced yesterday could not be excluded. This assessment was that the Russians, rather than seeking to deploy new types of weapons, were actually fashioning larger silos reinforced with concrete and other features to increase the silos' ability to withstand nuclear attack.

The Pentagon officials were reacting to reports by Senate Republican sources yesterday that the Central Intelligence

Agency had concluded that two-thirds of the large new silo holes were intended for the relatively small SS-11 intercontinental missile and not for a large new weapon, as the Defense Department had suggested previously.

While this latest suggestion about the new silos left a number of questions unanswered, officials in various Government agencies insisted that this seeming confusion accurately reflected the wide areas of uncertainty that exist within the intelligence community.

The Central Intelligence Agency declined to comment on reports that it differed with the Pentagon's interpretation, but officials at the Defense Department and other agencies said there was no basic disagreement between the two.

In the public record, Jerry Goldhamer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said it is not agreed throughout the Government that the new silos are of two sizes, but that the largest Soviet missile, the SS-9, could fit into either one.

Other sources explained that the idea of two different improved or all-new missiles arose in large part from the fact that Russia was rapidly rebuilding launching silos for both the large SS-9 and the smaller SS-11 missile at the Tyuratam missile test center near the Aral Sea.

The two types of rebuilt silos at the test center, they say, appear to conform precisely to the new silos being constructed at operational SS-9 and SS-11 missile complexes in the Ural Mountains.

Qualified sources explained that when the new holes first started appearing last December, they were measured at being slightly under 30 feet in diameter, somewhat larger than holes for the SS-9 silo.

"It was not a question of this spring, Pentagon and other officials speculated that these silos might be for 'hardened' or reinforced silos, an

improved SS-9 or an entirely new missile. Pentagon officials stressed the latter two possibilities in most public and private statements.

Some Holes Are Larger

The new holes appeared at five of the six SS-9 complexes and at several SS-11 complexes. Within recent weeks, it was discovered that some of the holes, at both types of complexes, were two or three feet narrower than the others.

Then, more recently, intelligence reports showed that concrete liners placed inside these holes left inner cores of two different sizes. The difference between the two, sources say, is four feet.

The SS-9 has a diameter of about 10 feet, small enough to fit into either of the two silo types, officials say. The SS-11 has a diameter of roughly 6 feet.

Officials now note that from reconnaissance satellite altitudes of roughly 100 miles, it was difficult at first to discern the slight differences between the two types of excavations. The insertion of concrete missile liners, however, made clear, they said that two types of silos were involved.

But officials concede that if the majority of the new silos are designed for smaller SS-11 type missiles, this would be considered a lot less menacing than if all were used for very large missiles of the SS-9 type.

The SS-9, they explain, carries a nuclear warhead of 25 megatons and could carry three warheads of five megatons each, or six of two megatons each. A megaton is equivalent to a million tons of TNT.

If equipped with such large multiple warheads with accuracies approaching a quarter of a mile, analysts say, the

SS-9 missile is considered a potential threat to destroy the 1,000 American Minuteman missiles in a first strike.

The Soviet Union is said to have just under 300 of the SS-9 missiles.

The SS-11, by way of contrast, carries a single warhead of roughly one megaton, officials note, and is not considered as much of a threat to the Minuteman. It could not carry very large multiple warheads, they conclude. The Russians reportedly have about 800 SS-11's.

When asked about the new silos at arms control talks in Vienna recently, Soviet officials reportedly told American officials not to worry, saying the silos merely represented a

"modernization" program similar to the United States modernization of the Minuteman-3.

The United States for about a year has been replacing early model Minuteman-1 missiles with the Minuteman-3, carrying two or three warheads of about 160 kilotons each. A kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT. One hundred silos have been equipped with the Minuteman-3, in a program calling for 550 such missiles.

In the course of rebuilding the old Minuteman silos, the United States has been adding more concrete and improved suspension systems to increase, by a factor of three, the ability of the new missiles to withstand a nearby hit.

Intelligence:

I Spy, You Spy, But What Do We See?

WASHINGTON—Eleven years ago it was the "missile gap," and before that there was the "bomber gap." Two years ago there was the "first-strike threat" of large Soviet SS-9 missiles. And now there is the "big hole" threat.

Through all those Soviet threats—each one of which at the time was more presumed than real—runs a common American strand. On the basis of disturbing yet inconclusive intelligence information, the Administration

—and the Defense Department in particular—drew ominous conclusions about Soviet strategic intentions and urged a new round of weapons build-up by the United States.

The latest case in point involved the big missile silo holes that American reconnaissance satellites began detecting in the Soviet Union, starting last December. As yet, they are just holes, admittedly larger than those the Soviets have dug before, but that did not stop the Defense Department and its Congressional allies from drawing conclusions about the missiles the Soviet Union intended to put in the silos.

Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, who first disclosed the detection of the large new holes on a national television program, warned that the "Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advanced generation of offensive systems." Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, on another television show, followed up by stating that the silo construction "confirms the fact that the Soviet Union is going forward with the construction of a large missile system." Coupled with these statements were warnings that the strategic balance might be tipping in favor of Moscow.

In last week, through Republican sources in the Senate, it came out that the Central Intelligence Agency believed that at least two-thirds of the 60 silo holes detected so far were for the Soviet SS-11. This is a relatively small intercontinental missile comparable to the United States Air Force's Minuteman, and the Defense Department has acknowledged that it is too small to present a first-strike threat to the American retaliatory force. The size of the holes, the C.I.A. surmised, could be explained by the possibility that the Soviet Union was "hardening" its missile silos against attack, just as the United States has been doing for its Minutemen.

After that disclosure, the Defense Department began retreating. The new holes, it conceded, could be for "hardening" with concrete liners. But still, the Pentagon said, they were big enough to hold two new types of missiles, or perhaps improved models of the SS-11 and SS-9. At any rate, the Defense Department admitted, the intelligence information was too inconclusive to draw definitive judgments. That was a far cry from the impression created earlier by the Defense Department, that the Soviet Union was deploying an improved version of the SS-9 or perhaps even a larger new missile aimed at a first-strike capability.

"We have just witnessed the shortest missile gap in history,"

proclaimed Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, the Pentagon's gadfly. "In a month, without the United States lifting a finger or spending a dime, this missile gap was closed. The 'scare-em' technique boomeranged."

Perhaps, as suggested by Senator Proxmire, there was just an element of politics in the selective disclosure of intelligence information about the big holes. Every spring, just as regularly as the cherry blossoms bloom on the Tidal Basin, there crop up dire new warnings about Soviet weapons with a timing that just happens to coincide with Congressional consideration of the defense budget.

The problem, however, goes deeper than political use of intelligence information, which is probably inevitable when that information has to be translated into policy and appropriations by the politicians in the Executive

the difficulty, as the Nixon Administration is coming to realize, lies in the disjointed way that intelligence is gathered and analyzed.

In principle, the C.I.A. was set up after World War II as a non-policy-making agency that could provide unbiased intelligence analysis. Its director, presently Richard M. Helms, was to be the President's principal intelligence adviser. But in practice, intelligence was never completely centralized, and the C.I.A. directors have discovered that it is impossible to divorce analysis of intelligence from policy.

The Central Intelligence Director, for example, has virtually no authority over the 3,000-man Defense Intelligence Agency, which helps explain why the C.I.A. and the Defense Department could reach such differing interpretations over the big holes.

Even if intelligence operations should be further centralized—perhaps at the White House level, as is now being considered by the Nixon Administration—the problem would not be completely solved. The underlying difficulty is that intelligence is not a game of certainties but of conjectures. As in the case of the big holes, certain conjectures must be drawn on the basis of limited, circumstantial facts, and inevitably the conclusions tend to reflect the philosophical outlook and responsibilities of the policymaker.

With a responsibility for national security, the Defense Secretary has a natural tendency to choose the most pessimistic among the range of conjectures reached from agreed-upon but limited intelligence facts. That is what Mr. Laird did when he projected two years ago that the Soviet Union would deploy 500 SS-9's by 1975, and what he did

when he saw the pictures of the big holes.

The difficulty is that this kind of approach can lead to a self-fulfilling form of "worst case" analysis, in which the worst that is assumed about Soviet intentions comes true because of the American reaction — or vice versa. Thus, the United States sees a "missile gap" and starts rapidly deploying them on land and on sea. The Soviet Union then starts deploying missiles at a great rate until it has more land-based missiles than the United States, which starts talk of another missile gap when those big holes are spotted.

Testifying last week before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., former Deputy Director for Research of the C.I.A., said that if it now turns out that the Soviet Union is putting SS-11's in the big holes "then we must ask ourselves how many times are we going to allow the 'weaponers' to come before Congress, shouting 'missile gap' and 'technology gap,' when in reality they are only creating another 'credibility gap,' through selective disclosure of partially analyzed intelligence, in order to panic the country into expensive weapons programs."

That question is now beginning to be asked in Congress, which is far less gullible and more sophisticated than it was a decade ago, when it was willing to assume the unproved worst about Soviet intentions. Perhaps there is also a change in attitude down at the White House, where the President is willing to accept the possibility of an agreement limiting defensive ABM systems despite all the Pentagon talk about those Soviet offensive missiles. This change of attitude can probably be more important than any reorganization of intelligence agencies in preventing the Executive Branch and Congress from seeing missiles in holes where none yet exist.

—JOHN W. FINNEY

CHINA'S ICBM TEST SAID TO BE CLOSER

Analysts Expect Firing Into
Indian Ocean—Work on
Solid Fuel Reported

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 30 — China, whose long-range missile program has lagged behind American predictions, appears on the verge of two important breakthroughs, in the view of some analysts here.

China is rapidly getting into position to test-fire its first liquid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile beyond its borders, probably into the Indian Ocean, they say.

In addition, China has built a solid-fuel production plant and is developing a solid-fuel ICBM, the analysts say.

The preparations for the launch beyond China's borders include the outfitting of a special tracking ship and the extension of missile range tracking stations in Sinkiang Province. But political considerations, the analysts say, may cause the Chinese to defer such testing for several months.

A senior weapons expert says that it is far from clear whether China will follow the pattern of the United States and the Soviet Union and first deploy liquid-fuel ICBM's before moving to solid-fuel weapons, or will start with the more stable solid-fuel system.

It is estimated that it will probably take at least three years, after initial tests, for China to move to its first group of operational ICBM's. The technology of solid fuels as well as liquid fuels should be mastered by that time, the weapons specialist suggested.

Most analysts agree that China is capable of launching an intercontinental missile any time it chooses. Some intelligence experts believe China has already done so, although on a shorter course.

Late last year, they say, China fired a three-stage missile from a new launch site in northeast Manchuria into western Sinkiang Province, over a 2,200 mile course. Some analysts, on the basis of the size

of the stages as seen in reconnaissance photos and other evidence, calculated that the missile could have been fired at least 3,500 miles, which would have carried it out over India into the Indian Ocean.

In arms-control talks, the United States and Russia have defined an ICBM as any ballistic missile that can travel over 3,000 miles.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told Congress in March about the probability of China's capacity to launch such a missile when he said: "The start of testing has not yet been confirmed, but a reduced range test of an ICBM may have occurred late in 1970."

Analysts say the 2,200-mile shot was believed to have been made with a liquid-fuel missile similar to the rockets that China used to orbit a 381-pound satellite in April, 1970, and a 486-pound satellite in March.

The first out-of-country tests are expected to range between 3,500 and 4,500 miles. The Indian Ocean is considered the most likely landing point, but some analysts say that a test-firing into the Pacific Ocean is not ruled out.

For several months China has been equipping the 12,000-ton freighter Hsian Yang Hung in a shipyard near Canton with space tracking and telemetry

devices, sources say. One analyst says the work has been completed and that the vessel sailed into the Indian Ocean recently on a cruise to familiarize the crew with the ship and her special gear.

Analysts point out that the United States and the Soviet Union normally employ several telemetry ships to monitor their own and each other's missile shots. The job can be done—but not as well—with one such vessel, they say.

Officials suggest that both the Soviet Union and the United States will probably send more telemetry ships to monitor the Chinese tests than China will have available.

But many analysts say that Peking is so anxious to get admitted to the United Nations this fall that it is likely to defer its first ICBM test until after that issue has been resolved.

A minority view is that Peking will go ahead and test an ICBM as soon as it feels technologically ready. Politically, analysts say, this could convince some countries that a nation moving into superpower weapons status ought not be excluded from the world body.

China is not believed to have tested a solid-fuel missile, but analysts say that the building of a production facility shows China is serious about this effort. All of America's

land and submarine-based ICBM's are powered by solid fuel, with the exception of 54 old Titan 12 missiles. The Soviet Union has been working on solid fuel development but to date has deployed only about 100 SS-13 weapons using this propellant.

Analysts say China has successfully tested three-megaton thermo-nuclear devices believed to be destined for its ICBM. The current estimate is that China could have a force of 10 to 25 such missiles with a 6,000

mile range by the mid-1970's.

Defensively, analysts say the force might be sufficient from China's viewpoint to deter an attack by either Russia or the United States by threatening to retaliate against major population centers. Offensively, if China should be engaged in a struggle in the Far East in which either of the superpowers were tempted to intervene, the analysts say Peking might warn that it would consider resorting to a first strike aimed at Russian or American cities.

Study Finds SS-9 Warheads Lack Accuracy

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

A new study sponsored by the Pentagon and CIA estimates that multiple warheads flight-tested thus far with the giant Soviet SS-9 intercontinental missiles are not accurate enough to knock out U.S. Minutemen ICBMs in a surprise attack, according to informed government sources.

Furthermore, the study is said to estimate that the warhead accuracy probably cannot be improved enough with the techniques now being used to achieve a first-strike capability.

The study, which was completed in April, was carried out for the government by TRW Inc., a large defense contractor in California with an excellent technical reputation.

Informed officials say there is no evidence that the Soviets have flight-tested any new kind of multiple warhead for the SS-9 beyond those discussed in the study.

While some additional tests of the big missile are expected later this year, officials say they are uncertain whether these flights will reveal a new and more accurate version of the SS-9 or will merely be tests of existing missiles launched from protective silos the Soviets are building.

In any event, some government weapons analysts view the new study as lessening still further Pentagon fears that by 1975 the Soviets could deal a surprise knock-out to all but a handful of America's 1,000-missile Minuteman force.

Last year, TRW made a similar technical assessment of the SS-9 for the Pentagon. In that study, officials say the firm gave a "lukewarm" endorsement, based on earlier SS-9 testing, to the idea that the Soviet triplet warheads could be of the MIRV type in which each of the three warheads can be sent to a separate Minuteman silo with enough accuracy to knock it out.

The new study, officials say, reverses that earlier opinion that MIRVs were involved.

Weapons experts in a number of government agencies, including the Pentagon, estimate that it would take the Soviets two to three more years to perfect and begin deployment of a more accurate MIRV. It would then take several more years to equip the entire force of SS-9s, which now numbers about 288.

Agreement Sought

The Pentagon has estimated that the Soviets would need some 450 such MIRV-equipped missiles to wipe out the Minuteman force. At the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, the United States is trying to work out an agreement that would limit the SS-9s to about 300.

The new study also appears to contradict recent Pentagon estimates that the Soviets will have a MIRV "capability" in 1972. However, some officials say it is true that the current Soviet multiple warhead system could be viewed as a MIRV, except that it is not a very good one.

The Soviets are said to use a system of small rails inside the nose cone of the SS-9 to launch the three warheads to separate targets that are reasonably close together. By varying the time each warhead moves down these rails, the missiles can be made to land in a pattern that has, in tests, resembled the layout of Minuteman silos.

This, at first, led some analysts to believe that the Soviets were developing a MIRV to attack Minuteman in a surprise first strike.

Now, however, it has apparently been concluded that the technique is both inaccurate and also inflexible because the Minuteman patterns vary widely.

The U.S. MIRV now being deployed on the Minuteman and Poseidon submarines is more sophisticated, using a so-called "space bus" with its own guidance system to target each warhead accurately in the bus to a widely separated target before it is launched.

Less Powerful Weapons

The U.S. MIRVs, however, are only a fraction as powerful as the huge Soviet weapons, and the Pentagon has declared that this lack of nuclear punch also means that Minutemen are no threat to Soviet missiles buried in underground silos.

On Capitol Hill yesterday, the SS-9 also figured in sharp questioning of high-ranking Pentagon officials by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.)

Symington, at an open session of a Senate Foreign relations subcommittee on dis-

armament, claimed that Pentagon witnesses were saying different things about a possible U.S.-Soviet agreement at SALT than had the chief U.S. negotiator, Gerard Smith, before the same committee in a closed hearing on Tuesday.

Appearing at yesterday's session was Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. John S. Foster Jr., the Pentagon's chief scientist.

Both officials, under questioning, said that any SALT agreement must include simultaneous limitation on offensive missiles as well as ABM defense systems.

"Your position," Symington

said to Foster, "is not the same as Smith's." "Symington said he understood Smith to say in closed session that the hoped for SALT agreement would provide for an ABM agreement while talks continue on the offensive weapons question. Foster said it was his understanding that "any controls would go in simultaneously."

Symington pressed Foster to say if Smith's interpretation was "right or wrong" Foster hesitated, then said he did not feel it was helpful "to get engaged in semantics."

Foster said he did not think there were any differences in his understanding of the

hoped for agreement and Smith's, although defense officials later conceded privately that it was not yet clear if the Soviets completely understood or agree to U.S. goals on limiting offensive missiles.

After Moorer mentioned the SS-9 threat against the "survivability of our ICBMs," Symington, who is also a member of the Armed Services Committee — including the CIA subcommittee — said he did not agree with "the assessment that the SS-9 was accurate enough for a first strike."

CIA - DEFENSE
STUDY ON
ACCURACY OF
SS-9

Russian Missile Spread Exceeds U.S. Estimate

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer

The Soviet Union is moving ahead more rapidly than had been expected in construction of silos for what appears to be two new generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles, Pentagon sources said today.

The existence of the new silos — some of them apparently designed for a missile at least as large, or larger, than the 25 megaton SS-9 — was first revealed in early March by Senator Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash.

In a Senate hearing on April 19, he said the deployment rate might approach the 70 silos this year.

But Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of Defense Research and Engineering, replied: ". . . in principle, I think one could not say that it is not possible for them to deploy 70 of these new large ICBM silos this year. However, it would be a very high rate of starts.

70 Sites Seen Possible

It now appears, according to Pentagon sources, that the number of silos to be placed under construction by the Soviets between fall of 1970, when work apparently started, until the fall of this year will be close to the high figure of 70 cited by Jackson.

But the Soviets, at the same time, have apparently ended their planned deployment of the SS-9 missile and its little brother, the SS-11, which is a weapon of about one megaton, roughly the size of the American Minuteman.

The total number of Soviet ICBM's deployed at mid-year is believed to be about 1,550. This force is made up of slightly less than 300 SS-9's, a total of more than 900 SS-11's and SSS-13's and between 300-400 older missiles.

So far, Pentagon sources said, no missiles have been seen in association with the new silos and tests that have been observed have not dispelled the mystery surrounding the new

holes in the ground. They appear to be of two sizes, one capable of taking the SS-9 or even a larger missile and one capable of handling a missile of about the size of the smaller SS-11.

Fast Work Pace

Pentagon sources, who declined to discuss the new missile figures for attribution, said the figure of 1,550 missiles actually deployed is slightly above what had been expected earlier this year. But this only reflects a somewhat faster pace of work rather than new starts.

The unexpectedly rapid pace of deployment of the new silos, on the other hand, indicates a continuing buildup rather than simply completion of work already under way.

Some new silo construction has been detected since the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks resumed in Helsinki, Finland on July 8. But Pentagon sources said it could not be said with certainty that the construction had actually begun after that date.

In previous years, information on the progress of Soviet missile development has been made public periodically in Congressional testimony, speeches and press conferences. But no formal statement by the government on current Soviet missile progress is expected to be made until the annual defense report to Congress in January of next year.

By that time, the SALT negotiations may have resulted in agreement and, if not, decisions on how to react to the Soviet developments will have been made.

The Soviet Union now has about 500 more land-based ICBM's than the United States. The U.S. is well ahead of the Soviets, however, in adding multiple warheads — designed to penetrate a defensive system — to its missiles.

The U.S. is also still ahead in the number of missiles carried by submarines and in the number of strategic bombers.

Chinese Deploying A-Missiles

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

New evidence gathered by U.S. intelligence indicates that Communist China has begun to deploy a small number of nuclear-tipped, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), according to informed government sources.

The missiles have an estimated range of about 1,000 miles, far too short to threaten U.S. territory, but enough to reach some military installations and one or two large cities in the Soviet Union as well as other targets in Asia, including Japan and Taiwan.

Deployment of operational MRBMs by the Chinese has been anticipated for some time at the Pentagon, but evidence that emplacement had actually started was only recently obtained.

The number of operational missiles spotted so far by U.S. reconnaissance satellites is said to be quite small—fewer than 20.

Defense Department officials say they are reluctant to draw any conclusions—based on this small initial deployment—regarding how many of these missiles the Chinese will eventually field. Officials say they still believe that Peking is placing more emphasis on development of an intermediate-range ballistic missile, one that would have a range about twice that of the MRBMs now being deployed.

A missile able to fly 2,000 miles would enable China to situate these weapons well back from its own borders, providing some safety against attack if their locations were not pinpointed by an enemy. Such rockets would also be able to reach many more of the Soviet Union's heartland cities, adding to their deterrent effect.

MISSILE, From A1

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird estimated in March that the Chinese would have "a modest number" of both types of missiles by mid-1972.

The Chinese nuclear arsenal, which also includes a number of light and medium jet bombers, is still miniscule compared with that of the Soviet Union. As some defense analysts view things, however, the Chinese are approaching a point where the Soviets could no longer be certain they would escape nuclear retaliation entirely if they staged a surprise attack on China.

While U.S. officials stress that they view such a conflict as highly unlikely, the Soviet press did carry hints of a preemptive nuclear strike against China and its nuclear facilities during the heated border dispute between the two nations in the late summer of 1969.

Aside from its fledgling missile force, the Chinese have about 150 20-year-old light bombers supplied by the Soviets before relations between the two countries soured in 1960, and more than 30 of the more modern TU-16 medium bombers which can reach targets 1,500 miles away. The Chinese began procuring them on their own last year.

According to some defense officials the Chinese are also said to be reasonably good at concealing the whereabouts of the small force of nuclear weapons.

The Pentagon first predicted deployment of Chinese medium-range missiles back in 1967, but numerous technical

problems and internal upheavals in China delayed their emplacement for several more years. Some officials hint, however, that the vastness of the country and the fact that the Chinese do not always deploy their weapons where U.S. or Soviet planners might expect them to, also caused problems and delay for U.S. photo intelligence analysts trying to find the missiles.

In addition to the nuclear weapons developments, officials also say that both the Soviet Union and China are continuing a slow but steady buildup of their conventional fighting forces along and near their 4200-mile border.

Officials say the Russians now have about 40 divisions at or near the border, but that a number of these are not at full strength.

Most recent efforts at strengthening this force, officials say, have been aimed at adding supplies and supporting equipment rather than bringing in still more fighting troops. The Soviets in the border area are highly dependent on rail links to move supplies, and those lines are considered to be vulnerable to attack.

The Chinese are also said to have recently redeployed armies closer to the border and farther toward the north and north central regions of the country. However, the Chinese tend not to concentrate major forces right near the border, officials say.

Despite the continuing buildup, U.S. officials believe the chances for an outbreak of hostilities between the two nations remain slight.

ABM

1/1/71

Russians Building New Missile Silos As Limit Is Sought

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The number of new underground missile silos now known to be under construction in the Soviet Union has risen to nearly 80, according to highly placed U.S. officials.

Work on about six and possibly a few more of these ICBM silos, it is estimated, was started after the dramatic

joint announcement by President Nixon and the Soviet leadership on May 20 that the two countries would seek an initial agreement this year on limiting the arms race by putting restrictions on both offensive and defense nuclear weapons.

U.S. officials remain optimistic that such an agreement will be reached. But, they add, the dimensions of the Soviet silo construction program — as it continues to be unfolded by U.S. picture-taking reconnaissance satellites — is causing increasing concern within the administration and among U.S. negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT) talks at Helsinki.

The main U.S. goal at SALT is to freeze the number of nuclear-tipped ICBMs in each nation's arsenal at a level that would make a surprise attack unlikely.

If such a freeze is negotiated, officials explain that it will probably be tied to some future cutoff date beyond which neither nation could add any more land-based ICBMs to its force.

The fact that the Russians now have about 80 new silos in various stages of construction — and possibly more as yet undetected — is making the setting of that cutoff date increasingly important from the U.S. viewpoint.

The question is how many of these silos — particularly those designed to hold the mammoth SS-9 type ICBM — the United States is willing to see completed before an agreement is no longer considered safe and acceptable to the United States.

Despite the fact that more new silo construction keeps showing up on satellite pictures, U.S. officials said that the impact on U.S. security and on the SALT talks is not as ominous as the numbers alone might indicate — at least at this time.

One factor is that late in May, when the count of new silos had reached about 60, the Pentagon confirmed a press report which revealed that two-thirds of the new silos were probably for the much smaller Soviet SS-11 ICBM, rather than the SS-9. The SS-11 of which the Soviets already have about 900, is considered to be not nearly accurate or powerful enough to knock out U.S. land-based Minuteman ICBMs. This two-thirds ratio has not changed since May.

Major Objective

A major U.S. objective since the SALT talks began in 1969 has been to keep the number of the more threatening SS-9s from going much beyond 300. Officials say this is still the goal. The Russians now have about 288 of these big missiles, having halted construction on 8 silos late last year, apparently to wait for the more modern ones now being built.

Based upon the number of new silos spotted thus far and the ratios cited, about 24 to 30 of the new holes could be for SS-9-type missiles. Thus, while limiting the number of these silos to be completed will not be a major U.S. negotiating point by the U.S., the totals are still not much beyond 300.

Thus far, no missiles have been installed in any of the new silos, officials say, and there is still no sign that any large new ICBM or greatly improved version of the SS-9 has been flight tested. The existing version of the SS-9 and versions carrying three multiple warheads tested thus far are not considered to be accurate enough to knock out the U.S. Minuteman force, as was once feared.

Should the Soviets eventually develop a much more accurate multi-headed version of the SS-9 or a new missile, then the number of these weapons in their inventory becomes extremely important if the 1,000-missile U.S. Minuteman force is not to be truly threatened.

More Confident

Officials say with increased — though not complete — confidence that the silo construction program appears to be an effort by the Russians to build better, more protective silos for their missiles, either current or modified versions, rather than one designed for a completely new class of offensive weapons.

Building better protection for ICBMs is, in general, viewed as less provocative than simply building more ICBMs of the type that would normally be used only in a first strike or surprise attack.

The U.S. is taking similar measures to build more blast resistant silos for 550 of the 1,000-missile Minuteman force. The U.S. is also rapidly re-equipping the hundreds of the single-warhead Minutemen with two to three warheads each, a move which a number of arms control advocates believe provoked the new Soviet building program.

The new Soviet silo effort is believed to have got underway last winter, but it was first detected by the U.S. early this year.

Revealed by Jackson

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), who first broke the news that the Soviets were building huge new ICBM silos on TV early in March, has since estimated that the Soviets could have 70 silos by this fall. Officials explain the fact that they already have about 80 by saying that earlier complete satellite coverage and without knowing how much had already been done.

Also, some Pentagon sources say that for some time, the U.S. didn't think to look in the SS-11 bases to see if new silos were also being built there.

New Soviet tests of defensive weapons are also causing concern to U.S. officials, though not as much as the ICBM silo problems.

Testing Stepped Up

Officials say that in the past six months, the Soviets have stepped up testing of new ABM radars and two new ABM interceptor missiles at the Soviet test complex at Sary Shagan in south central Russia.

Of the new missiles being tested, informants say one is longer-range than the current Soviet Galosh ABM missile now deployed around Moscow. The other is shorter-range than Galosh but does not appear to be the speedy type of Sprint missile which the U.S. Safeguard ABM system will use to try to catch any incoming ICBMs that get past the longer-range Spartan interceptors. The potential use of the shorter-range Russian ABM remains a puzzle to U.S. experts.

ABM

Soviets Test Near-Orbital Rocket Again

The Pentagon announced yesterday that the Soviet Union made another test firing Sunday of its Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, a long-range nuclear-tipped rocket that rises to the fringe of space but is brought back to earth just before completing one orbit.

Since 1966, the Russians have made at least 17 tests of the FOBS, and U.S. intelligence experts now consider the weapon to be an operational part of the Soviet arsenal.

The test last Sunday—called Cosmos 433—was launched from the Soviet missile center at Tyuratam, and landed just north of the Caspian Sea after a 90-minute flight that took the missile over China, South America and Africa. The flight was the first this year and is viewed by weapons analysts as a training exercise for crews.

Pentagon officials say the FOBS could carry a single warhead of 3 megatons or larger, but the weapon is viewed as less accurate and powerful than an ICBM and has thus not appealed to U.S. planners as worth developing.

Because FOBS does not complete an entire orbit, the weapon does not technically violate the treaty banning weapons orbiting in space. A number of U.S. officials, however, view the technique as violating the spirit of the treaty.

Handwritten initials or signature on the right margin.

ALM



George C. Wilson

Laird's Time for Alarm

DEFENSE SECRETARY Melvin R. Laird at his press conference yesterday gave substance to the Pentagon wise crack of the day before that "Laird will have trouble saying the Russians are coming now that Nixon is going."

The reference, of course, was to President Nixon's announcement on Tuesday that he will go to Moscow next May to enhance "the prospects of world peace." Once his boss had said that, Laird could not complain very loudly about Soviet advances in weaponry.

The defense secretary

while visibly exercising restraint in what he said at his press conference, did manage to make headlines by declaring the Soviets will catch up with the United States in missile submarines in 1973 instead of 1975. But here, too, Laird has a problem.

Back in the McNamara years, the catechism of the arms theologians was that the sooner the Soviets put their nuclear-tipped missiles underground or under the sea in submarines—the better. Missiles lying out in the open, went the argument, were so vulnerable that Moscow in a crisis would be tempted to fire them before they could be knocked out by Washington.

Our Polaris submarines, the arms specialists said, were a stabilizing force because they could not be destroyed in a surprise attack and thus would not be fired impulsively—only in a calculated response to a first strike by the other side. Also, missiles fired from submarines do not have pickel-barrel accuracy and thus could not destroy ICBMs buried underground. Submarines, then, have been portrayed for a long time as "second-strike" weapons.

THEORETICALLY, news that the Soviet Union is following the United States in building a second-strike missile submarine force should be comforting to those trying to walk the world back from an Armageddon of nuclear incineration.

Yet, Laird at his press conference yesterday did not talk that way at all. He said the American people would not tolerate the Soviet Union ringing this country with missile-carrying submarines the same way the United States has ringed the Soviets. He made the points that Soviet Russia is a closed society, the United States an open one and that there would be "political" problems from a big Soviet submarine force.

It was a confusing explanation—one that seemed to conflict with the carefully stated case of the past for second-strike weapons. His concern about the Soviet submarine buildup begins to make sense only when it is examined in the context of

the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

President Nixon expressed hope Tuesday that the United States and Soviet Union through SALT will have reached agreement before the May summit meeting on limiting offensive ICBMs and defensive antiballistic-missile (ABM) systems. There is a good chance, however, that submarines will not be included in the agreement.

As matters stand now, the Soviet Union under such an agreement would have more ICBMs at the ready than the United States. The Soviets have passed the United States in numbers. Nobody expects Russia to throw away ICBMs to make things even with the United States. That is why Laird and others in the Nixon administration use the term "sufficiency" when talking about ICBMs, not "superiority."

MR. NIXON'S strategists believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Congress would accept a missile gap as long as it is demonstrated that the United States has all the nuclear killing power it needs and that building more ICBMs would not provide any additional security. A mutual freeze on ABM construction also is seen saleable politically.

But would the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Congress accept—on top of a missile gap—a ring of Soviet missile submarines around the United States? That is one of the big unknowns as Laird and others assess the politics of SALT.

Therefore, even though it does not make strategic sense to scream about the Soviet submarine buildup—given their second strike character—it may make political sense to try to talk Russia out of going ahead full speed with submarine construction.

Thus the politics of SALT, budget problems and the fear of many admirals, generals and politicians that Mr. Nixon is giving away too much in strategic weaponry make this the season for sounding the alarm about Soviet submarines and other strategic weaponry—Moscow trip or not.

Laird Warns of a Soviet Missile Buildup Far Exceeding His Earlier Estimates

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 13—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird expressed concern today over what he said was a continuing Soviet buildup of land-based and sea-based missiles. This buildup, which he said is already "far outdistancing" the estimates he offered Congress seven months ago.

While the United States still enjoys a lead in the quality of its strategic weapons, he said, there is no assurance that the Russians may not overtake this advantage.

He stressed the potential political problem if the Russians were in position one day to ring the United States with a larger force of missile submarines than the United States.

In a 40-minute news conference at the Pentagon, Mr. Laird disclosed plans for a visit to South Vietnam in early November to provide President Nixon with an appraisal of the military situation before the next troop withdrawal announcement. Accompanying the secretary will be Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Laird confirmed a report that the Soviet Union is expected to match the United States' strength by deploying 41 Polaris-type missile submarines by 1973.

Other sources have recently said that the Russians now have 23 Y-class missile submarines in operation, 5 or 6 afloat and being fitted out, and 13 to 15 under construction. Thus by late 1972 or 1973, barring a halt or slowdown in the construction effort, the Russians would match the size of the American Polaris fleet of operational submarines.



The New York Times

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird tells of plans.

Mr. Laird said he was chary of citing numbers of new Soviet weapons at this point lest critics accuse the Administration of trying to influence Congress in voting funds for the Defense Department. He promised to go into greater detail in his defense report next year.

The Laird visit to South Vietnam, as in the case of some earlier ones, is to provide the President with a last-minute report on how many American troops may be safely withdrawn, defense sources said. The Secretary noted there are now about 210,000 troops in South Vietnam, down from a high of 543,400 in 1969. The number is scheduled to go down to 184,000 by Dec. 1.

Administration sources have been suggesting for several months that the President

would like to reduce this to 30,000 to 50,000 advisers and support forces by next summer. Whether such a force should include fighter-bomber squadrons, helicopter companies and artillery battalions is one of the major questions still to be decided, the sources say.

Expansion of Yard Reporter

While Mr. Laird dealt only with concerns about the Soviet Union's drawing a breast of the American Polaris submarine force, he is known to share with other officials an even greater worry. This is that a reported doubling of the production facilities at the principal Soviet missile submarine yard at Severodvinsk, on the White Sea, suggests a Soviet intention of outstripping the American missile submarine fleet over the next few years, unless an arms control agreement can be worked out to

be far superior to those of the Soviet Union.

On another subject, Mr. Laird said there was a "mistake in the field" on the handling of a letter written by S. Sgt. John Sexton Jr. after he was captured by the Vietcong. The letter was reproduced by the Vietcong and distributed as a propaganda leaflet. The Pentagon was not told that the letter was in

the sergeant's handwriting, Mr. Laird said, and as a result Sergeant Sexton's parents were merely told it was possible their son was a prisoner, but that he was still being carried as missing in action.

Mr. Laird said he had ordered all propaganda-leaflet files to be reviewed to see if there were other such cases. He said such mistakes should not be repeated.

prevent such a development.

The Russians are known to have balked at a United States proposal that an interim arms limitation agreement halt the production of missile submarines, in addition to land-based missiles.

The Soviet Union is reported to have more than 1,600 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in operation and under construction, against 1,054 for the United States. The Russians are said to have indicated some willingness to halt new construction of such missiles under a first-step agreement that would also attempt to limit the missiles on both sides.

Mr. Laird said the United States was still ahead in missile technology, but there was no reason the Soviet could not catch up. Apparently he was talking about American multiple warheads and missile-guidance systems, which are believed to

Laird Says Soviet Rushes Sub Fleet

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird warned yesterday that the Soviet Union's growing fleet of missile-firing submarines would match the size of the U.S. undersea missile force "at least one year" earlier than he had previously predicted.

Laird had estimated in his annual defense report to Congress in March that the Soviets would pull abreast of the 41-submarine U.S. Polaris-Poseidon fleet by 1974.

Laird also announced at a Pentagon news conference that he would visit Vietnam early next month, together with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, in advance of President Nixon's scheduled announcement in mid-November

on further U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam.

It will be Laird's fourth trip to the war zone. Both the defense chief and the President have sought to discourage speculation on what is coming next in Vietnam with Laird warning that reporters "may be surprised." Unofficial indications now are that U.S. forces will be down from the current 210,000 men to 30,000 to 50,000 men by mid-1972.

Yesterday, however, Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott said he believes the President's forthcoming statement will contain "decisive" changes in Vietnam policy well beyond routine troop withdrawal announcements.

Scott said it was his personal opinion that by next summer all American troops will be out with the exception of air support forces, and even those may be out if POWs have been freed.

Scott said he based his comments on "a feeling that I get in congressional leadership meetings," rather than on any inside information.

At the Pentagon, Laird laid heavy emphasis, as he has several times in recent months, on the continuing buildup of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, and on new submarine construction in particular.

Soviet land-based missiles already outnumber U.S. ICBMs by about 1,550 to 1,054. Suspicions that the Soviets may be attempting to gain numerical superiority in submarine-borne missiles, too, is causing concern among administration officials trying to work out an arms limitation agreement with Moscow.

Laird said the growing Soviet sub fleet was causing as much political as military concern.

"I believe that we would be placed at a very great political disadvantage if the Soviet Union were able to ring the U.S. with a vastly superior Polaris-type fleet off all our coasts and outdistance us by a large number of missiles."

Laird stressed that both the SALT talks, which will resume in Vienna, next month, and "the discussions that President Nixon will be having with the Soviet leadership are indeed very important."

In announcing Tuesday that he would visit Moscow in May to discuss a variety of subjects with Soviet leaders, President Nixon said that if a SALT agreement is not reached before then, the arms race would certainly be on his agenda. However, he also added that the question of SALT "may be behind us at that point."

The two superpowers have agreed to try to reach an agreement by the end of this year. However, several top-level planners have reported that the Soviets are reluctant to include submarines in any initial agreement. It is possible that Laird's remarks yesterday may mean that the President, in May, may be discussing a second-step agreement to cover missile-firing submarines.

Administration officials have said privately on several occasions that the President and Congress would face tough political problems here and abroad in backing any agreement that froze the United States into numerical inferiority in both land and sea-based missiles, even if the

difference in numbers did not mean much militarily because of the huge arsenals already on both sides.

Laird said that there "is no disagreement between the President and myself," when reporters suggested that the Pentagon seemed to be more alarmed about the Soviet buildup than the President.

Laird said the United States still has technological superiority over the Soviets in strategic weaponry, but that he wants it understood that the Soviets could catch up, and that when they do they might get the advantage because they are starting with more and bigger weapons—such as the huge SS-9 ICBM—to begin with.

Laird said he believed the American people would accept a position of strategic parity but not one of inferiority.

U.S. missile-firing submarines have been ringing the coasts of the Soviet Union for years, and the U.S. Polaris and Poseidon missiles can reach targets twice as distant as their Soviet counterparts.

The United States has also been adding multiple warheads to both land-based and sea-based missiles, while the Soviets have begun construction on more than 90 new ICBM silos since early this year.

ABM

Soviet Said to Test Satellites That Hunt And Destroy Others

LONDON, Oct. 23 (UPI)—The Soviet Union has been testing earth satellites that approach and destroy other spacecraft, the authoritative publication, Jane's All the World's Aircraft, said this week.

In its latest edition Jane's listed a series of launchings of Soviet spacecraft and satellites, describing some of them as "orbital intercept tests."

John W. R. Taylor, editor of the publication, said the Soviet satellite Cosmos 397, launched last Feb. 25, passed near Cosmos 394, launched 16 days earlier, "and was subsequently destroyed, in an explosion.

Cosmos 400, launched March 19, was "intercepted" by Cosmos 404 on April 3, the day it was launched, Mr. Taylor said.

In a preface Mr. Taylor said the United States maintained satellites in stationary positions over the mid-Pacific, including one with "a fantastic 11-ton reconnaissance camera," to monitor the launches of Soviet and Chinese long-range missiles.

"Little wonder that the U.S. Secretary of Defense is able to give such accurate assessments of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile deployment and new types of weapons that have been identified," he said.

Mr. Taylor said that national policies of "peace through fear" seemed to work and would continue as long as both sides knew enough about the other's destructive capability to be deterred from hasty military moves.

Despite "one and a half decades of Government indecision and wrong decision," Mr. Taylor said, "Britain still retains the most competent and comprehensive aircraft industry in Europe."

He was less optimistic about new developments on the part of the British air industry.

"Apart from the multirole combat aircraft and, of course, the Concorde, one looks in vain for much that it is new and challenging among British aircraft," Mr. Taylor said.

ABM

WASH POST

2000/09/08



Joseph Alsop

The Balance of Power

A SINGLE QUESTION is truly haunting at the close of a long and arduous journey to the Middle East and Asia. The question is whether the Soviet Union is still likely to respond to changes in the balance of power in the old way, like one of Pavlov's dogs salivating when the bell was rung.

It is a key question—in fact, the single key question of the moment—simply because the Soviets are making such enormous efforts to tilt the world balance of power in their favor. These efforts are being made in every area, notably including conventional naval power. But the simplest measure is the Soviet effort in the area of nuclear-strategic power.

The chief scientist of the Pentagon, Dr. John S. Foster, has been under bitter attack. Dr. Jeremy Stone and a good many other misguided American scientists have formed a powerful lobby primarily aimed, so far as one can see, to subordinating American strategic policy to Soviet strategic policy. Of this dubious scientific lobby, John Foster has been a prime target—as a dreadful pessimist, as an advocate of “the worst case,” as an habitual exaggerator of this country's perils.

IT IS INTERESTING, then, that Dr. Foster has now been proved dead wrong on the optimistic side. Last January, when the Soviets renewed active deployment of their giant counter-force weapons, the SS-9S, and other intercontinental missiles, Dr. Foster rather confidently predicted that the maximum number of missiles to be deployed this year might reach thirty-five.

By September, however, the last American reconnaissance satellite had found more than 95 new silos, dug to receive new missiles. These silos are divided into about 60 for advanced-model SS-11S (like our Minuteman, but more powerfully) about 30 advanced-model SS-9S (capable of taking out more targets than the early model); and six or seven outsize silos probably due to take a super-brute missile of an entirely new type.

Perhaps more ominously, testing of the advanced-model SS-9S and SS-11S, though not of the super-brutes, began

few weeks ago. One of the more curious features of this year's silo-digging program—in fact pointing to a crash program—was the Soviet failure to pre-test the new missiles that will go into the new silos. But that is ended now.

Both the advanced-model SS-9 and the advanced-model SS-11 have been recently tested, inside the Soviet Union and at relatively short range. Only long range tests will show with certainty what the detailed characteristics of these new missiles may be. But the initial results are disturbing, to say the least. Major improvements are indicated, with five huge warheads on the new SS-9, for instance.

IN ADDITION, there are two other quite novel elements in the pattern. First, new naval construction and launching facilities indicate one of two possibilities. Either the Soviets mean to have more of their Yankee-class nuclear submarines by 1973-74 than we have Polaris-Poseidon submarines. Or they mean to have large numbers of very fast attack submarines intended to checkmate our submarines of the Polaris-Poseidon class.

Secondly, the Soviets ran a major series of exercises this summer, in the interesting field of satellite-neutralization and/or satellite destruction. The least informed person knows that 95 per cent of America's information about Soviet weapons development and military deployment is owed to the U.S. reconnaissance satellites.

Neutralizing or destroying those satellites will be the exact equivalent of blinding this country in a crisis. It is important, then, that the recent exercises, which were elaborate and ambitious, have proved that the Soviets now have this capability of blinding us.

The weapon used was a non-nuclear missile with powerful apparatus for correcting its course in flight, and for target seeking at the climax. When “fixed” on its victim-satellite, it appears to do its job by ejecting large numbers of high velocity pellets of some sort. If the U.S. is one day blinded in this manner, one

can already foretell the response of Dr. Jeremy Stone and many other high level American thinkers.

To the returning traveller, all this gives food for thought for two rather simple reasons. In the Middle East, in Communist China, and one or two other places around the world, there are situations that must greatly tempt the Soviets if they feel ready to be brutal.

And whenever the Soviets have thought they were acting within a favorable balance of power, they have always ended by seeking their national aims with considerable brutality. This is the Pavlov aspect. It makes an interesting calculation.

© 1971, The Los Angeles Times

ABM



Joseph Alsop

The Watersheds Paper

SOMETHING called "The Watersheds Paper" is circulating in the governmental inner circle; and it is causing talk. The paper's details are naturally not discoverable, but its main point is known. The point is that a watershed in world affairs has been passed, and a quite new situation has been created, because of the enormous increase of Soviet nuclear-strategic power.

The point is well taken, alas. Yet one can hardly imagine an official paper putting the problem bleakly enough to describe the real nature of this new world situation, even if a major watershed is beginning to be timidly and belatedly recognized.

The essence of the new situation is very simple, however. With their vastly increased nuclear-strategic power, the Soviets can comfortably think about doing all sorts of things that would have been quite unthinkable before. One such is the surgical nuclear strike, to destroy the Chinese Communist nuclear program, which the Soviets have in fact been actively and methodically preparing.

The illustration is particularly relevant, because the Soviet preparations above-mentioned have conspicuously included a huge, immensely costly build-up of conventional military power along the Sino-Soviet frontier. The two kinds of investment in power go hand in hand, in other words; and each serves the other.

NO SANE PERSON can suppose this country will do anything but wail and wring hands, if the Soviets eventually decide to make the unprovoked nuclear attack they have been getting ready for. That particular aspect of the new world situation will not be changed in the least by President Nixon.

As the Chinese also lack the means to defend themselves, what still seems unthinkable to most people in this flabby-minded country, is in truth an almost risk-free choice for the Soviets. The sole remaining question, in fact, is what the Soviet choice will be in the period before the Chinese gain

the power for a counter-strike.

It is vitally important to note, moreover, that the same rules apply in other areas more vital to U.S. interests than the Sino-Soviet border. Particularly at sea, the build-up of Soviet conventional power has been worldwide in its potential impact. And in the new world situation, the American "deterrent" cannot be rationally expected to "deter" anything at all, except (one hopes) a direct Soviet nuclear attack on this country.

Hence, lots of other formerly unthinkable things have become things the Soviets can quite comfortably think about. Here consider the troubled Middle East. Our State Department is overjoyed at the moment because the Soviets have become "our silent partners"—the phrase is actually used—in pressing for an interim agreement on the Suez front.

THE SOVIETS are undoubtedly exerting a strong negative pressure on Egypt's President Anwar El-Sadat, to prevent him from reopening hostilities with the Israelis. There is a real chance that this will end by Sadat's accepting terms for an interim agreement that the Israelis can also accept.

Suppose, then, that this is the outcome. Israel will still be very much there, as a permanent irritant to inflame the Arab world against the U.S. Meanwhile, however, the main result of

an interim agreement will be the reopening of the Suez Canal, about six months after the agreement has been reached.

When that happens, all the problems of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean will be automatically solved. At present, Soviet vessels in those waters are commanded from Vladivostok, halfway 'round the world, because that is their nearest port. With the canal reopened, the nearest port will be Odessa. And Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean will be predictably multiplied by ten.

MEANWHILE the Persian Gulf, where the world oil tap is conveniently located, is being left a political and military vacuum by the de-

parture of the British. No place on earth is more beautifully arranged for the practice of 19th century gunboat diplomacy. Ask yourself, then, what will happen if the Soviets do the unthinkable in the Persian Gulf—if they in fact end by resorting to gunboat diplomacy to gain control of the world oil-tap?

In the new world situation, the answer is that the U.S. will do nothing, once again, but wail and wring hands. So it seems a bit odd, to a returning traveler, that so many Americans also want to impair the world balance of power still further, by needlessly losing the war in Vietnam.

Los Angeles Times

Generals Say the Nation's Air Strength Is Declining

By DREW MIDDLETON

Air Force Commanders believe their service has entered a critical period in which American strategic and tactical air power is declining while that of the Soviet Union is expanding.

The three chief elements in the Air Force's problem, according to senior generals, are:

1. The Air Force's basic weapons systems, the B-52 bomber and the F-4 fighter-bomber, are nearing obsolescence and must be replaced, at high cost, by the B-1 and the F-15.

2. Intelligence gathered by satellites indicates that the Soviet Union has established a solid lead over the United States in land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, is building emplacements for larger missiles and has deployed the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, or FOBS, which enables Soviet commanders to bring their missiles down on a target from any direction. This makes it possible for the missile to escape many of the existing means of detection.

3. These developments are taking place against a national background of budgetary stringency.

Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, deplored what he termed "the lack of understanding [and] the indifference to the threat we face," and emphasized that the Air Force "must get the needed modernization" if the United States is to have a credible deterrent in this decade.

Soviet Build-Up Seen

The Air Force generals are aware of the Nixon Administration's commitment to the current talks on limiting strategic arms. And they say that they, too, hope that the talks will succeed. But their intelligence sources report a continuing build-up of Soviet nuclear weapons.

Air Force promotion of the new B-1 bomber has encountered opposition based on Russia's de-emphasis of the heavy bomber. The Soviet heavy bomber force consists of about 195 aircraft, Bears and Bisons, with 50 of the latter normally used as tankers. Bears regularly patrol in the North Atlantic. Prototypes of a new swing-wing, supersonic bomber, given the code name Backfire by the West, have also been seen.

According to a report last month by the Senate Armed Services Committee, "as yet there is no evidence that they [the Russians] have actually made a decision to produce and deploy [the Backfire]. However, if it so elects, the Soviet Union can certainly build and deploy this bomber and this would require a reassessment of our air defense requirements."

'Hardware' Problem

Every airman consulted, from generals at the Pentagon to mechanics at Da Nang in South Vietnam, emphasized that weapons and equipment, not morale, is the Air Force's first problem.

Last June 30, the Air Force had 125,000 officers and 625,000 enlisted men.

This all-volunteer force has benefited from the draft. The consensus is that half of the Air Force's enlistments are draft-induced, although some senior officers believe the figure may be closer to 70 per cent. The Air Force, like all the services, will face a problem if the draft is abandoned in favor of a volunteer army.

Gen. John D. Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, maintained that morale was good, a comment echoed by commanders, noncommissioned officers and airmen at bases in this country and abroad. General Ryan said that racial and drug problems in the Air Force were not as pronounced as in the Army because the Air Force "attracts a higher-quality man."

Modernization Needed

"The main problem is modernization," the general continued. "Over 50 per cent of our combat aircraft are 10 years old or more."

The Air Force now has about 3,675 combat planes—bombers, fighters and fighter-bombers, and interceptors.

The Strategic Air Command's manned nuclear bomber force is built around the B-52, of which about 490 are active. SAC received its first B-52 in June, 1955. The latest model, the B-52H, came off the production line in 1962.

The B-52H has a speed of 650 miles an hour, a range of more than 10,000 miles, a ceiling of more than 50,000 feet and a bomb load of more than 20,000 pounds. In Southeast Asia, B-52D's have been modified to carry 60,000 pounds of conventional bombs.

The Air Force also has 75 FB-111's, a medium-range bomber with a payload of 37,500 pounds and a speed of Mach 2.2, or 2.2 times the speed of sound. (At sea level and at 32 degrees Fahrenheit, sound travels at a speed of 1,088 feet a second.)

Newest Bomber

The FB-111, which came into service last year, is the newest Air Force bomber. The original F-111 model encountered grave difficulties, largely because of the mechanism controlling its swing wing. But this trouble has not affected the FB-111 model.

After a long period of testing, the aircraft proved "superior to what we expected," according to General Holloway. But the Air Force insists that the FB-111 cannot be considered a substitute for the B-1 because its range at low altitudes is limited and its capacity to accommodate advanced penetration aids is restricted.

Of the Air Force's 2,350 active fighters, slightly more than 1,000 are F-4's, which have a speed of Mach 2.4 and can be armed with bombs and missiles. But it was designed in the nineteen-fifties and went into service nine years ago. The Air Force considers the Soviet MIG-21J to be superior in speed, maneuverability and acceleration.

Other fighters include the A-1, the A-7, the F-5, the F-86, the F-100, the F-104, the F-105 and the F-111.

The Air Force's 430 active interceptors are F-101's, F-102's, F-104's and F-106's.

Three Basic Types

The Air Force deploys two of America's three basic types of strategic offensive forces: manned bombers and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Navy's ballistic missile (Polaris or Poseidon) submarines are the third missile system in what the Pentagon calls the triad.

The current level of the Minuteman force, 1,000 missiles, was reached in April, 1967. There are also 54 Titan missiles.

Modernization of the Minuteman has continued since October, 1965, when Minuteman 2 was accepted. Minuteman 3, which evolved from Minuteman 2, has a range of 8,000 miles and more penetration aids to counter an antimissile defense. It carries three MIRV (multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle) warheads of about 700 kilotons each. Each

kiloton is the equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT.

The Minuteman 1, which has been in service since 1962, is to be phased out. By the end of 1974, SAC will have a missile force of about 500 Minuteman 3's and 500 Minuteman 2's.

The Titan 2 has been operational since 1963. It carries a payload of five to 10 megatons—largest of the American intercontinental ballistic missiles—and has a range of 7,250 miles. The Air Force has three Titan 2 squadrons, consisting of 18 missiles each.

Brig. Gen. Harry N. Cordes, SAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, views the Soviet missile threat as a "mix" in which offensive and defensive weapons are blended to a degree unknown in the West. The offense is represented by an ICBM force of about 1,600 launchers. Dr. John S. Foster, the Defense Department's research chief, reported recently that the construction of new silos, or launching sites, has reached the same high rate at which SS-9 and SS-11 sites were built last year.

Early Missiles Retained

Since the early nineteen-sixties, the Russians have developed a large number of ballistic missile systems. Two of the earlier systems, the SS-7 and SS-8, were deployed in limited numbers. Although they have been overtaken by newer systems, they have been retained.

The SS-11 is one of the three ICBM systems now being deployed. There are more than 900 SS-11 launchers, more than for any other type. The SS-11 has a range of 6,500 miles and a warhead yield of one to two megatons.

The SS-13, code-named Savage, is the Soviet Union's first operational solid fuel propellant ICBM. It has a range of 5,000 miles and a yield of one megaton.

The SS-9 is considered to be the most powerful Soviet ICBM system. Silos for more than 300 SS-9's have been completed or are under construction. The SS-9 can deliver a single 25 megaton warhead or, when fitted with MIRV, combinations of smaller megaton-range multiple warheads. The missile can carry three five-megaton warheads to a range of over 5,000 miles.

Avoiding the implications of the current talks on limiting strategic arms, the Air Force reports, "Although we are uncertain of their future force goals, based on the level of activity in recent years, the Soviets could achieve a force of well over 2,000 hardened ICBM's by 1975."

The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces also deploy about 700 medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles; 70 cover targets in China and Japan, and 630 cover targets in Western Europe.

The Russian defensive sys-

tem ranges from anti-aircraft artillery to antimissile missiles. Moscow is protected by 64 launchers firing the Galosh missile. There are indications that its antimissile defense will be strengthened by the introduction of the Tallin system, employing the SA-5 for use against high-flying aircraft and, probably, ballistic missile systems.

These and other defensive weapons are knit to new and more accurate radar systems. The Soviet Union also has a force of more than 3,000 fighter interceptors, three new types have come into service in the last five years.

Tactical Planes

Soviet air strength is not confined to missiles and bombers. A tactical air force of about 5,000 planes includes such high performance aircraft as the Mig-21J, the Yak-28P and the Yak-28, a supersonic light bomber.

Tactical and strategic commanders of the United States Air Force differ on many points, including the usefulness of high-performance aircraft in ground support. Tactical commanders also feel that their fighters and bombers can do the job assigned to strategic bombers if the tactical planes can fly from advanced bases. But the consensus is that the Air Force must have the B-1 and the F-15.

SATELLITES SPOT A SOVIET BUILD-UP FOR ATOMIC ARMS

Many Silos Reported as Well
as Increased Facilities to
Build Missile Vessels

SUBMARINE TALLY IS 41

U.S. Officials Cite Urgency
of Reaching an Agreement
on Weapons Control

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10—
Satellite photos of the Soviet
Union have uncovered evidence
of a substantial build-up of
more and better strategic nuclear
weapons.

The new information shows
that the Russians are continuing
to build two new classes of
silos, or emplacements, for large
missiles, are constructing yet
a third type of new silo, and
are doubling the production
facilities for Soviet missile sub-
marines.

Some officials in the State
and Defense Departments and
the White House say this
build-up increases the need to
secure at least a first-step arms
control agreement as soon as
possible.

Others throughout the Gov-
ernment privately stress that
unless this build-up is stopped
soon, the United States may
feel impelled to expand its own
nuclear arsenal to maintain a
balance of strategic power.

Reluctance on Details

A senior Pentagon official,
pressed for details on the ex-
tent and character of the Soviet
nuclear program, insisted that
the arms-control talks were at
such a delicate stage that the

Defense Department did not in-
tend to provide details of the
build-up until its next annual
report to Congress in February.

Other officials in various
Government departments were
sufficiently concerned, how-
ever, to sketch out some details
of the Soviet build-up.

The reconnaissance satellites
have found that the number of
silos of two different sizes gen-
erally believed designed for
improved or entirely new long-
range missiles now exceeds 90
—up from the 10 noted early
this year and 60 seen in mid-
summer. The smaller of these
silos is significantly larger
than the 10-foot diameter of the
Russian's largest operational
missile, the SS-9.

A third type of silo, larger
than the others, has been
sighted, with one each at sev-
eral missile complexes. Analysts
believe the new holes are
destined either for a special-
purpose new missile or a new

type of command and control
facility.

The Russians now have about
41 Y-class missile submarines
ready or under construction,
thus drawing abreast of the
American Polaris submarine
force. The new intelligence
findings indicate a doubling in
size of the principal Soviet
nuclear submarine construction
yard at Severodvinsk, on the
White Sea.

1,600 Reported Completed

The total number of Russian
Intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, completed or under con-
struction, is said to exceed
1,600, compared with 1,054 for
the United States. In addition
nearly 100 Soviet ICBM silos
at test and training centers
would be expected to be put
to use in a crisis; the United
States has only a handful of
such test silos.

The intelligence reports in-
dicate that the Russians are
working at what one senior
official calls an "incredibly in-
tense" pace in completing a
ring of antiballistic missile
sites around Moscow.

Publicly, the Administration,
through the President, has em-
phasized the hope for early
success in the talks to limit
strategic arms, which have
been on for two years.

On Sept. 25, President Nixon
called the prospects good.
Whether the two countries can
achieve an initial agreement
by year end, "no one can say
at this point," he declared. "We
have made progress. I believe
the goal will be achieved."

No Charge of Blackmail

He concluded: "Neither power
at this time could, if it
wanted to, gain that superior-
ity which would enable it to,
frankly, blackmail the other
one."

But privately, some senior
officials are less optimistic.
One official said:

"We have consistently un-
derestimated the numerical
goals of the Soviet missile
programs for 10 years. We
have also consistently assumed,
incorrectly I'm afraid, that
they bought our strategic con-
cept of deterrence.

"The obviously don't want
a nuclear war any more than
we. But they're building a suf-
ficient edge in nuclear strength,
and in conventional forces as
well, so they may have reason
to expect us to back down in
future confrontations, as we
made them do in the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962."

Aim Is Deterrence

The American strategy is
based on having a nuclear
force that can ride out a sur-
prise attack and retaliate
against the attacker's cities
rather than against his remain-
ing nuclear weapons. By main-
taining such an "assured de-
struction" capability, the strat-
egy seeks to deter nuclear war.

The arms-limitation talks are
aimed at curbing the number
of offensive and defensive nu-
clear weapons to the point
where neither side would feel
confident that it could destroy
the retaliatory capability of the
other in a surprise attack.

Administration officials differ
on the kind of missiles that are
to be deployed in the more than
90 new missile silos being built
at locations east and west of
the Ural Mountains.

The majority of analysts be-
lieve the Soviet Union would
not build the huge silos unless
it intended to install much im-
proved versions of the SS-9 and
SS-11 ICBM's or even new gen-
erations of improved accuracy, reliability and
warheads.

Security a Possible Purpose

A minority view holds that
the new silos are designed to
provide greater security against
attack.

Silos of both types have been
constructed at the Tyuratam
missile test center and test fir-
ings are expected soon. Data
from such tests should dispell
much of the mystery surround-
ing the new silos, analysts be-
lieve.

The third type of new silo,
about four feet wider than the
largest ever seen, has now been
spotted, with one each at sev-
eral complexes.

Analysts are mystified about
the purpose of these silos. Some
speculate that they could house
well protected command and
control centers from which Rus-
sian missile officers could com-
mand nearby ICBM's in a war.
Others believe the holes are de-
signed for a special purpose
missile that is being dispersed
to achieve greater protection
against concentrated attack.

Among the possibilities cited
are the following: missiles de-
signed to carry special com-
munications satellites to com-
municate with Russian missile
submarines just before or dur-
ing a nuclear war; big rockets
set off very large explosions
over the United States in an
attempt to black out its radar
and communications temporar-
ily or make it difficult to fire
ICBM's through large radioac-
tion cloud, and large missiles
to carry orbiting bombs in a
crisis to persuade the United
States to back down, much as
the forward flights of Ameri-
can B-52 bombers during the
Cuban missile confrontation
were designed to force the Rus-
sians to remove their missiles
from Cuba.

NEW YORK TIMES

SOVIET MAY HAVE NEW MISSILE IN '72

Penagon Aides Say Tests Appear Near Conclusion

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2—Pen-
tagon analysts say the Soviet
Union appears to be nearing
the successful conclusion of
tests of a new long-range sub-
marine missile and may deploy
the weapon next year.

The missile, called the Sawfly by Western analysts, has a range of up to 3,500 miles, approximately twice that of the best Soviet operational submarine missile. The best American submarine missile, the Poseidon, has a range of about 3,000 miles.

Analysts say there have been about 15 tests of the Sawfly since mid-1969, with a flurry of firings this fall. All but four of the tests were successful, sources say, and the failures came early in the program.

"We think they can and probably will deploy next year," one senior official said.

Most analysts believe the new missiles will first be carried by one of two existing types of Soviet submarines, the H-class or the Y-class. Later, it is expected they will be carried by a new submarine designed for them.

Earlier this week, the Defense Department awarded a contract to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to develop a longer-range submarine missile. Unofficial estimates are that it will have a range of about 4,000 miles. It will not be available, however, for several years.

The importance of longer range, analysts explained, is that it provides a larger area of ocean for submarine to hide in while still being able to reach its target.

Sources say there have been at least four Sawfly test firings since September. The missiles are launched from a naval missile testing center near the White Sea across the Soviet Union, landing in the Kamchatka Peninsula in Soviet Asia.

Sources say the Sawfly carries a "significantly larger" warhead than the Soviet SSN-6 missile, 16 of which are carried on each Y-class submarine. The SSN-6 is estimated to carry a warhead of from one to two megatons. A megaton is a measure of explosive force equal to a million tons of TNT.

Megaton Warhead for Poseidon

Most American Polaris missiles carry a one-megaton warhead. The Poseidon missile, which is being placed on 31 of the 41 Polaris submarines, carries from 10 to 14 warheads of about 40 kilotons each. A kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT.

Sources note that while the Soviet has been actively testing various multiple warheads on their missiles, none of these tests has been specifically associated with the Sawfly.

Some analysts are particularly concerned about the Soviet missile submarine program because the Russians now are credited with having at least 42 Y-class submarines afloat or under construction and are currently doubling the size of their construction facility at Severodvinsk, on the White Sea, where most of their missile submarines are built.

The United States is attempting, in arms-control negotiations, to persuade the Russians to stop building missile submarines as well as land-based missiles. So far, knowledgeable administration sources say, the Russians have been cool to including missile submarines in a strategic weapons freeze.

In addition to Y-class submarines, the Soviet Union also has about 10 H-class crafts, which carry three 600-mile missiles each.

There has been considerable speculation that the Russians might place the Sawfly first in the H-class submarine, because 600-mile missiles require the Russians to come too close to shore in order to hit inland targets. The closer the submarine comes to shore, the greater the chance of its discovery and destruction.

But just as the United States has started a program to place its advanced Poseidon missile on all but 10 of its 41 Polaris submarines, the Russians might want to modernize their Y-class fleet the same way, some analysts suggest.

In addition to missile submarines, the Soviet also has about 35 submarines that carry from six to eight cruise missiles, each with a 400-mile range. These are regarded as primarily designed for use against surface ships, rather than targets ashore.