

A REPLY TO
THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW:
"INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY"

This past summer I read a report put out by the "Members of Congress for Peace through Law". It proposed a number of far-reaching changes in the scope and conduct of U.S. intelligence. Among these were proposals to cut back drastically the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence services and to establish a new Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence.

On August the 13th, 1970, a concurrent resolution to establish such a committee was referred to the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives.

When I first read the report, I was not inclined to take it very seriously. It deals with important issues, but its assertions and recommendations are not based on a grasp of the facts. In fact, it is shot through with misinformation. But the introduction in the House of a resolution to establish a watch-dog committee, to be added to the fifteen committees now dealing with U.S. intelligence matters, led me to reconsider. I think that it is important to answer the charges made by the Members of Congress for Peace through Law not because they are new but because they are very old. They have

been repeated so many times, in places ranging from the floor of this Senate to the pages of Pravda, that we are in danger of being numbed into credulity. The time has come to set the record straight, once and for all.

It is particularly important that we understand the facts ~~because~~ about our intelligence program and the services that carry it out because grave misunderstanding and action based on it can only be disastrous. If the recommendations of this paper were put into effect, U.S. intelligence would be crippled. I do not know if any other country in the world has ever considered fastening upon itself the shackles that this report urges, but I do know that no country has ever done so.

The members of Congress who sponsored this report are hard-working men. They may not have had the time to examine its language closely or to ponder its consequences. As for the authors of the paper, they are not named, and I do not know who they are. I raise no question of their integrity or sincerity.

But the fact remains that the views expressed are those of intellectual isolationism. The authors have closed their eyes and made the rest of the world go away. The real world, however, is still very much with us. It includes strong enemy forces. Yet the report shows no awareness that Communist countries exist. It recommends, for example, that U.S. covert action programs be drastically curtailed and that our intelligence services sever all

intelligence association with other agencies of the government and with American business. If we are short-sighted enough, we can indeed forbid all intelligence access to these broad areas. But we cannot forbid that same access to the intelligence services of the Communist world. Are we really prepared to create for them--in academia, government, and commerce--vacuums in which they can operate unobserved and unchecked?

Consider how the USSR handles such matters. All Soviet visitors going abroad--trade delegations, sports teams, cultural groups, students, scientists, artists, and even religious bodies--are carefully screened in advance by the major Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, and by security police. Intelligence and counter-intelligence officers are hidden in their ranks. Members of these groups are drilled in what to say and do. No Soviet citizen whom the authorities consider a liability to communism is permitted foreign travel. All of them serve the authorities according to the KGB's estimate of their best talents. The sole Soviet travel agency, INTURIST, is under KGB control and staffed by KGB selections.

I am certainly not suggesting that we emulate them. But I certainly am suggesting that blindfolding our intelligence services, our eyes, is not the way for us to protect our freedoms, freedoms that the Communist World lacks and seeks not to gain for itself but to destroy.

There are other compelling reasons for defending and strengthening American intelligence today. If we succeed in moving, as President Nixon phrased it, toward "an era of negotiation, rather than confrontation", the role of intelligence will not dwindle. It must, and will, grow. The reason is simple. No agreement between the superpowers will prove workable unless each is sure that the other is honoring the terms of the agreement. Each will maintain to the full its ability to detect violations. National security depends upon verification, and verification depends upon good intelligence. Every kind of international accommodation requires intelligence support at some stage.

Thus we could not hope to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms through the SALT talks if the means to monitor did not exist. It is confidence in its national intelligence capabilities which makes any government willing to risk limitations on its deployment of strategic arms. The greater the capability, the less is the risk, and the broader is the area of potential agreement. The same formula applies to Vietnam and the Middle East.

The superpowers also share a common interest in defusing other threats to peace. For example, the situation in Korea could rapidly grow ominous if the intelligence capabilities of the great powers did not permit them to head off a crisis in time.

Intelligence is not a hindrance to international cooperation. It is one of its foundation stones.

A third reason why intelligence needs our support today is the growth of Soviet military power. The operational force supporting Soviet ICBM's now totals about 1,250 launchers. They have nearly completed development of a multiple warhead system. They have been operating ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic since mid-1969. Last summer they began testing a new, submarine-launched missile with a minimum range of 3,000 miles. In brief, this is not a time to know less about our adversaries.

One of the statements made in the report of the Members of Congress for Peace through Law is so illogical that simply quoting it suffices. Arguing that CIA distorts its reports to the President for its own devious reasons, the paper says, "The problem here is that new intelligence data presented to the President may often be inconsistent with previously submitted data, but the reason may be to bear out the old data." That's a real mind-bender: to prove you were right in the first place, contradict yourself.

Other arguments, however, are more dangerous because less patently unsound. Here are some of them:

The results of satellite and technical collection are increasing in quality and value, particularly with regard to military intelligence. "Human

Let's look a little closer at the human versus the technical source. First, technical sources can tell us only what forces and weapons the enemy has now, what his present capabilities are. They cannot tell us his intentions--whether and when he's going to use those forces. Human sources can and do provide us with information about hostile intent and thus give us the lead time that is indispensable for the development of countermeasures.

And compare costs. The expense of technical collection is soaring, especially in research and development, as the equipment grows more complex. The facts given us by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky about Soviet weaponry would have cost us many millions of dollars if collected by technical means--if in fact that kind of collection had been possible. Colonel Penkovsky provided microfilm of some 10,000 pages of highly classified Soviet documents. Yet the total cost of that operation was less than \$20,000 a year.

The Soviets understand these facts well. They put substantial sums into scientific research, but ever since Klaus Fuchs we have all known that they also value highly the power of the agent.

Of the various kinds of human sources, two are of paramount importance: the penetration agent and the defector. Such sources are the key to the final evaluation of information gained by electronics, communications intelligence, aerial photography, and the like. The

inviolability of our security depends upon the inviolability of theirs. We must give unstinted protection to such men as Colonel Piotr Popov, whose dangerous work for the West began in Vienna in 1954 and ended with his execution in the USSR in 1959; Pyotr Deryabin, who also defected in Vienna in 1954; Yuriy Rastvorov; Raino Hayhanen, who exposed Colonel Rudolf Abel in 1957; Lazlo Szabo, who asked for political asylum in London in 1965 and appeared on 17 March 1966 before the CIA Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and Erno Bernat, who made an important contribution to internal security after his defection in 1966.

We need such men. To win them to our cause and gain their invaluable help, we must be able to defend them and they must be convinced that we can and will protect them. They know better than others that the Soviet and Bloc intelligence services continue to maintain departments trained and equipped for terror, kidnapping, hijacking, and assassination. If they doubt the security of our environment, they will not enter it. The key potential defector is privy to the counter-intelligence reporting of his present Communist service and thus is keenly aware of the insecurities of the West. He is also an avid reader of the Western press and an expert in spotting leaks. It would be instructive to hear the comments of such a man on the proposals put forth by the Members of Congress for Peace through Law.

Perhaps the authors of the paper felt constrained to take this line because if the importance of human sources is accepted, then

we must also accept our moral and legal responsibility to protect those sources. If we could get the information we need from technical devices only, then we could be less concerned about protecting them than we have to be about protecting human lives. But in fact the quantity and quality of vital data provided by human sources is growing, not shrinking. Therefore the Director of Central Intelligence must give full weight to his responsibility under the National Security Act ". . . for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." This responsibility persists beyond revelation to original recipients, in Congress or elsewhere. It embraces the full protection of the source. The device of the closed or executive session cannot be relied upon to provide that protection. For example, on 17 July 1970 the New York Times printed an article called, "The U. S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or Its Parts." Here is a quotation from it:

"Reliable sources reported that a somber appraisal of Israel's nuclear program was conveyed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Richard Helms. . . at a closed-door hearing on July 7."

In its entirety this article comes perilously close to jeopardizing important sources. Let no one charge that I am assailing the freedom of the press. What I am pointing out is that it is the job of the government to keep secret matters secret.

I touched earlier upon a charge levelled in this paper against CIA, the accusation that the Agency distorts its reports to the President for its own purposes. The paper asserts that ". . . the President does not always receive an unbiased interpretation of the facts germane to a decision on national security. As stated earlier, this problem stems in part from the CIA functioning as a body protecting its own credibility."

The Central Intelligence Agency and the other U.S. services report on a world of swift change. Doctoring the facts about today in order to align them with yesterday's would not make intelligence reporting believable. It would simply create a credibility gap.

But the paper persists. "By determining what information the President will see, the intelligence officer plays an integral role in policy making." The intelligence officer does not make policy, nor does he try to con the President. He doesn't want to, and he couldn't if he did. All the U.S. services contribute to national estimates, and all have access to them. Thus the Director of Central Intelligence, the heads of all the intelligence services of the United States, key personnel in all of those departments and agencies, and hundreds of other professionals who have access to finished intelligence reports would have to be party to the plot. I am reminded of the flood of crackpot charges that swept through the press, as though from a burst sewer main, after President Kennedy's assassination. These stories

conjured up a similar conspiracy which involved President Johnson, the Supreme Court, the Warren Commission, the CIA, the FBI, and the Dallas police, as well as assorted and mysterious groups of refugee Cubans.

Foolish as such paranoiac claims are, they are also dangerous, especially when issued in the names of American Congressmen. I think that the author or authors of this document have a clear moral obligation to identify themselves and to furnish proof that our intelligence services are misleading the President of the United States. If they do not have facts to support this canard, they ought to say so publicly and apologize.

A final example. The paper asserts that there is "some overlap of jurisdiction" between the FBI and CIA. The fact is that there is no such overlap. The National Security Act, which created CIA, specified that it would have ". . . no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions. . . ." I am confident that Messrs. Helms and Hoover would be delighted to have the author or authors present their facts--or retract this vague charge if they can't.

And now, a look at the eight recommendations made in this paper.

"1. There should be a drastic curtailment of covert action programs. Where appropriate, these programs should be continued overtly by the Department of State, Department of Commerce, AID."

Covert action is action not attributable to the U.S. Government. It is not employed to attain objectives which can be reached by overt means. For example, any U.S. government needs ties abroad both with parties or groups in power and with parties or groups out of power. Without the latter, we should suffer an endless series of rude shocks. Would the writers of this paper have our State Department or Department of Commerce maintain such connections, overtly or covertly?

Underlying this recommendation there is or seems to be a notion that covert action programs are un-American, a sordid business. But if the writers really think that covert action is un-American, then what do they think Ben Franklin was doing in Paris and London?

In recommending drastic curtailment of covert action operations, which are conducted at the behest and under the control of the President and his designees, the writers of this paper seem to be unaware that such operations have already been cut back severely. In recent years, and especially since the Katzenbach report of 1967, CIA has adopted operational guidelines which have the effect of restricting covert action chiefly to individuals rather than organizations. Moreover, CIA is itself on the look-out for ways to turn over CIA-sponsored covert programs to overt U.S. Government agencies and to sources of private funds. One prerequisite is a favorable political climate in recipient countries and the willingness of the recipients to acknowledge an open connection with the U.S. Government.

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200210002-5

covert action funded by U.S. money is greatest, the risk of open acknowledgement is unacceptable to the recipient. Another pre-requisite is experience in this field. The State Department, the Department of Commerce, and AID all have major responsibilities quite different from covert action. Burdening them with this kind of task would compel them to assign it a lower level of attention, incompatible both with its importance and with the need to acquire expertise.

Geography and history have combined to spare us until recently from having to carry out an extensive covert action program. The pressures of the future, however, may well be stronger. Even now we must have a covert action capability for the following minimal needs:

- (1) To avoid a tense overt confrontation with a hostile power. To illustrate: the U-2 operations showed that the Soviets can maintain a high level of tolerance for annoyance and frustration if their prestige is not openly challenged.

- (2) To protect friendly governments and leaders abroad who want to cooperate with us but fear swift retaliation by the Communist powers if their help must be publicized.

(3) To protect covert action agents in both the free and dictatorial worlds against detection and reprisal.

(4) To deny the adversary exclusive control of covert action assets and to keep an eye on his covert work against us.

In short, before we cut back CIA's covert activities or assign them to other elements of the government, we had better be clear about the consequences. This is particularly true of any course of action that the Communist Bloc has repeatedly urged upon us.

"2. The intelligence community should end the use of legitimate U.S. business and government agencies for operational cover overseas and domestically."

There have long been prohibitions against the use by U.S. intelligence of certain segments of American life; examples are the Peace Corps, officials and employees of major foundations, Fulbright scholars, and many others. More recently, in 1967, we virtually declared the whole of the academic world off-limits. The tightest of restrictions apply to many other categories. If we now deny this Agency all diplomatic and military cover--something that no other government has done--and all commercial cover to boot, just what is left?

I repeat, the United States exists in this world, not the next. This world requires us to protect the security of this country through the prudent use of both covert and clandestine operations. The basic requirement of a clandestine operation, unsurprisingly, is that it be clandestine: not unattributable but in fact hidden. Unless there's a new kind of vanishing cream on the market, our operatives abroad have to be there in some capacity. Is it seriously proposed that they hang out a CIA shingle, so that our enemies can spot them and their agents without difficulty? Could we expect other governments to take us seriously or foreign intelligence services to work together with us if we said that the first principle of a secret service is that it should not be secret?

Operational personnel who need it--especially those in hostile areas--should not be stripped of the protection of a diplomatic passport and exposed to arrest.

All operational personnel need fast access to secure communications facilities and safe storage for classified documents. They also need normal association with their colleagues in the State Department and elsewhere, for on-the-spot coordination.

Like governmental cover, commercial cover has been used by all great powers for centuries. To forbid all such cover is to forbid all secrecy in the conduct of our affairs. Furthermore, no one is forcing American industry to cooperate with intelligence. Why should we require the intelligence services to reject voluntary assistance that is vital to their mission? To put this matter in clearer perspective,

sent to Colonel Elias Dayton on 26 July 1777. "The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged-- all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue."

"3. Clearer lines of responsibility must be drawn between CIA, DIA, and NSA. Duplication and unhealthy competitiveness must be eliminated."

The lines of responsibility are completely clear. They are established in a law, the National Security Act. They are extended through a series of directives from the National Security Council, directives that set forth the primary responsibility of CIA for the coordination of national (in contrast with departmental) intelligence. The most important of CIA's responsibilities under law is that of correlating, evaluating, and disseminating information that affects the national security. Guidance and coordination ^{are} ~~is~~ also provided by the United States Intelligence Board, chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. I feel sure that he, like the heads of the other two agencies named, would be glad to receive from the authors of this paper, or from any other source, information about specific and significant examples of duplication and unhealthy competitiveness.

"4. Information obtained by satellites in earth resources, fisheries, forestry, and crop management fields should be declassified and shared with competent scientists world-wide."

Are the authors unaware of such programs as Nimbus, Tiros, ESSA (Environmental Science Services Administration), and ATS (Application Technological Satellite)? They contribute to weather forecasting, meteorology, oceanography, studies of sea patterns, storm surveillance, wind data, ice mapping, etc. Photography contributing to studies of earth resources and land use has been released from manned satellite programs, Gemini and Apollo.

There are minor inhibitions resulting from the sensitivities of foreign governments and the need to protect new, advanced techniques. These scarcely merit mention in comparison with the abundant information from space programs released by the United States.

"5. Since inter-service parochialisms distort the estimative process and lead to unnecessary weapon procurement all military services should be required to cite only the majority position on NIEs before Congress, rather than their service footnote."

First, the assumption. A primary reason for the centralization of the intelligence community through such bodies as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency was to eliminate service parochialism. But alleged parochialism and alleged attempts to get unneeded weapons are not at all the same thing

as national estimates. Intelligence estimating cannot be wholly accurate. It is a process of highly educated guessing, and it sometimes happens that that majority position turns out to be wrong. In any event, Congress, like the Executive Branch, is entitled to hear the considered intelligence judgments of individual services whether these represent a majority or a minority. To choke off dissent would be to do exactly what the writers of this report have falsely accused the evaluators of doing. It would amount to suppressing facts and views in favor of a pre-selected position. I should certainly not want to be the representative of the Executive Branch who was charged with telling, say, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee: "You may hear from CIA, but henceforth you will not be allowed to listen to testimony from the Army, Navy, or Air Force."

"6. The Board of National Estimates should include representatives from a non-intelligence, non-government source."

Perhaps it would be foolhardy to expect this kind of report to result from research in depth, but what's wrong with just raking the topsoil a little? The Board of National Estimates does include non-intelligence, non-government members, two of them--and each spends three to four months a year on the Board. It also has a panel of some fifteen consultants, drawn mainly from university faculties. They meet twice a year to comment on finished estimates and advise on future submissions. Most members of the Board have substantial backgrounds in non-governmental work.

This feckless recommendation resulted from a needless ignorance. A simple inquiry would have produced these facts. There is

of the intelligence community are leaving Congress out in the cold or, at least, are keeping us inadequately informed. I want to make it completely clear that it is Congress itself which has determined which committees shall be briefed by the Director of Central Intelligence and by CIA. There are presently fifteen committees that are so briefed.

1. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Director of Central Intelligence customarily briefs this committee biannually on atomic energy programs in the Soviet Union, Communist China, and elsewhere. CIA representatives are in close touch with the Staff of the Joint Committee and provide briefings for the Chairman and staff members.

2. Joint Economic Committee. CIA maintains liaison contact.

3. Senate Armed Services Committee, and

4. House Armed Services Committee. The Director appears regularly before the CIA Subcommittees of both of these committees for an average of four to six briefings each year. The topics are world developments, CIA programs, and such other subjects as the committees themselves select.

5. Senate Appropriations Committee, and
6. House Appropriations Committee. The budget of CIA is reviewed in detail by the CIA Subcommittees of both these bodies. The Chairman of the full committees also chair the sub-committees, as is also true of the Armed Services Committees. Moreover, the Director annually briefs the Defense Subcommittees of these bodies on the Soviet threat.

7. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
8. House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Director appears before both of these bodies at their request to give them briefings on subjects of interest to them. The Senate Committee has requested such appearances much more often than its opposite number.

9. Senate Judiciary Committee, and
10. House Judiciary Committee. CIA provides information to the Immigration Subcommittees of both bodies.

11. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, and

12. House Internal Security Committee. CIA

security information and, as appropriate, access to intelligence defectors.

13. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Senate Committee on Government Operations. CIA provides the subcommittee with information bearing on national security and with intelligence and security data about the organization and functions of foreign governments.

14. Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, and

15. House Science and Astronautics Committee. CIA briefs the Chairmen and designated staff members of both on Soviet scientific and space programs.

But these more formal relationships are only part of the story. The log of CIA's Office of the Legislative Counsel shows that during 1969 it had about 1,400 personal contacts with Congressmen or members of their staffs, about five per day for every work day of the year. It made and received countless phone calls to and from the Hill. It arranged for written replies to about one thousand congressional queries. It arranged for 23 briefings of congressional committees and provided or made arrangements for 65 additional briefings of individual members of Congress.

In the light of such a record, it seems plausible that the errors and misapprehensions in which this paper abounds resulted not from any refusal by the Director or the Central Intelligence Agency to cooperate but from the failure of the writers to ask for the facts.

"7. The number of personnel working in covert action and human resource programs should be cut back drastically."

I noted earlier that the U.S. covert action program has already been cut back and explained why we cannot afford to cut it any more. "Human resource programs" is apparently bureaucratized for intelligence operations employing agents. These have been increasing and should continue to increase, unless we intend to give the Soviets, the Bloc, and the Chinese a free hand.

Do those who make this recommendation know what they are talking about? If any Congressional body has a real need to know, the CIA will tell us--with appropriate safeguards--how many of its personnel in the U.S. and abroad are engaged in covert action programs and in operations involving agents. It would be the total of all operational personnel. Under the same conditions it would tell us how many agents it has. But I very much doubt that the writers of this paper have that information. If not, how can they tell whether cuts are needed at all, let alone drastic cuts?

Finally, the paper recommends the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence. Its functions "could range from reviewing intelligence data to serving as an official liaison for Congress with the National Security Council." The paper continues, "Considering the mounting criticism of CIA activities in the last decade, a Congressional watchdog committee could add insurance that intelligence operations do not interfere or undermine non-strategic interest activities such as foreign aid and educational programs abroad." If the proposed committee functioned properly, "the danger of an intelligence officer becoming a policy maker could be minimized." The writers add that they do not seek to manage CIA or the other services: "Lack of experience in this area and the complexity of the organization render such a task impossible." Thus the proposed committee would not manage our intelligence services; it would just make them inoperative. The concern is not with administration but with "the objectivity of the information presented to the President." By broadening the national assessment, the new committee "would not only strengthen our foreign policy, but would also enable us to formulate a more realistic appraisal of our defense postures and strategic concerns."

This recommendation and its accompanying admissions that a Congressional committee can't run CIA and that in some areas CIA

" . . . has performed its tasks with an extraordinary amount of expertise" convey an unpersuasive air of candor and openness, like W. C. Fields looking naive.

If this were just a proposal to add a sixteenth Congressional committee to CIA's list, and if the new committee could maintain the level of security called for when human life and liberty are at stake, I should still oppose it as superfluous; but I should not be making this speech. The recommendation, however, calls for a watchdog committee--and does so as blandly as though a number of Congressmen had not made similar recommendations for such a committee in the past.

Here I should like to stress that in opposing the establishment of another committee concerned with U.S. intelligence affairs, I speak only for myself. The directors of the Central Intelligence Agency have consistently maintained that Congress has the right to appoint as many watch-dog committees as it wants. My own view happens to be that we have already stretched security to the breaking point.

The paper says that there has been mounting criticism of CIA for a decade. It's true that the criticism of CIA by the Soviet-controlled media has grown shriller over the years, a fact which seems to me to speak well for the effectiveness of the Agency. A magazine called Ramparts has specialized in scurrilously

false accusations against it. Various Congressmen have questioned its motives, as I shall refrain from questioning theirs. The U.S. press and other media have sometimes shown an understandable pleasure in lampooning the paradox of a secret service in an open society.

As for genuine public concern or animosity, if it is directed toward the Central Intelligence Agency--and I most sincerely doubt that it is--then in my opinion it is misdirected. It would be like hating doctors because sickness exists. We should reserve our animosity for those forces that have compelled an increasing American involvement in espionage ever since World War II and have forced us to hurry to match their far older expertise.

The Soviet intelligence services are well into their third generation. The KGB alone employs within the boundaries of the USSR 300,000 at the national level and some 600,000 at local levels. It has 10,000 abroad. The 25 services of the European Communist Bloc extend its capabilities and respond to its guidance. A vast but uncounted number of experts in clandestine and covert operations frequently make trips into the Free World, and to these must be added all the so-called "illegals" like Colonel Abel.

In the face of their numbers and their skills, do we really want to turn the clock back, except for technical advances, to the days before Pearl Harbor? Since the end of last year the Soviets have had more intelligence specialists in Latin America than we have, and the discrepancy is growing. Instead of hastening that kind of trend, I think we ought to stop it.

Intelligence services are primarily the instruments of the Executive Branch, not the Legislative. If the President were receiving distorted reports, he would be the first to know it. Plainly, he does not see exactly eye-to-eye with the framers of this paper. When he visited CIA headquarters in March 1969, President Nixon observed, ". . . I understand that when President Truman in 1964 sent a message to the CIA, he put an inscription on it which, as I recall, went something like this: To the CIA, an organization which is an absolute necessity to any President of the United States, From one who knows.

"I know. And I appreciate what you do."

Perhaps the time will come when the Communist World will put away both the sword and the stiletto, although thus far they've been swinging twice as hard with one whenever they've slackened off with the other. But we must not rationalize our wish for a peaceful and open world into a belief that they are about to grant it to us.

The leaders of the Communist world remain committed to their doctrine of irreconcilable hostility and to the conviction that their system will and must prevail. U.S. intelligence remains our first line of defense against this dogmatism and its consequences. It is also our best insurance for world peace. For even if the Communists remain reluctant to rely upon nuclear or other military power, the threat of war through miscalculation remains. The Communist leaders are isolated from our kind of reality. Misreading our history and our ideology, they are also prone to misunderstand our intentions and our actions. And because of the intellectual isolationism that they have imposed upon themselves--and that we must avoid most scrupulously--we too stand in danger of miscalculation. Our only remedy is solid intelligence that keeps our policy-makers informed about what the Communists are doing and about how they are likely to interpret and react to our own undertakings.

I know that I have spoken at length. Perhaps you feel that I've used a huge swatter on a very small fly. But I want to deal with more than this paper, its illogic, contradictions, and distortions. My concern is with the continuing campaign to denigrate U.S. intelligence. I do not for a moment suppose that the writers of this paper are deliberately serving Soviet purposes. But neither do I suppose for a moment that the Soviets would not enthusiastically second their

recommendations. Cut-backs have already been made in our military and intelligence services. But they were made prudently, regretfully, and for reasons of fiscal necessity. They were made with the understanding that we are calling upon the armed forces and intelligence to do even more, and with less. They were not made with any intent to cut back functions or capabilities.

I suggest that we declare a moratorium on CIA, that we help them get on with their job, and that we get on with ours.

I thank you.

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The members of Congress who sponsored this report are hard-working men. They may not have had the time to examine its language closely or to ponder its consequences. As for the authors of the paper, they are not named, and I do not know who they are. I raise no question of their integrity or sincerity.

But the fact remains that the views expressed are those of intellectual isolationism. The authors have closed their eyes and made the rest of the world go away. The real world, however, is still very much with us. It includes strong enemy forces. Yet the report shows no awareness that Communist countries exist. It recommends, for example, that U.S. covert action programs be drastically curtailed and that our intelligence services cover all

intelligence association with other agencies of the government and with American business. If we are short-sighted enough, we can indeed forbid all intelligence access to these broad areas. But we cannot forbid that same access to the intelligence services of the Communist world. Are we really prepared to create for them--in academia, government, and commerce--vacuums in which they can operate unobserved and unchecked?

Consider how the USSR handles such matters. All Soviet visitors going abroad--trade delegations, sports teams, cultural groups, students, scientists, artists, and even religious bodies--are carefully screened in advance by the major Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, and by security police. Intelligence and counter-intelligence officers are hidden in their ranks. Members of these groups are drilled in what to say and do. No Soviet citizen whom the authorities consider a liability to communism is permitted foreign travel. All of them serve the authorities according to the KGB's estimate of their best talents. The sole Soviet travel agency, INTURIST, is under KGB control and staffed by KGB selections.

I am certainly not suggesting that we emulate them. But I certainly am suggesting that blindfolding our intelligence services, our eyes, is not the way for us to protect our freedoms, freedoms that the Communist World lacks and seeks not to gain for itself but to destroy.

There are other compelling reasons for defending and strengthening American intelligence today. If we succeed in moving, as President Nixon phrased it, toward "an era of negotiation, rather than confrontation", the role of intelligence will not dwindle. It must, and will, grow. The reason is simple. No agreement between the superpowers will prove workable unless each is sure that the other is honoring the terms of the agreement. Each will maintain to the full its ability to detect violations. National security depends upon verification, and verification depends upon good intelligence. Every kind of international accommodation requires intelligence support at some stage.

Thus we could not hope to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms through the SALT talks if the means to monitor did not exist. It is confidence in its national intelligence capabilities which makes any government willing to risk limitations on its deployment of strategic arms. The greater the capability, the less is the risk, and the broader is the area of potential agreement. The same formula applies to Vietnam and the Middle East.

The superpowers also share a common interest in defusing other threats to peace. For example, the situation in Korea could rapidly grow ominous if the intelligence capabilities of the great powers did not permit them to head off a crisis in time.

Intelligence is not a hindrance to international cooperation. It is one of its foundation stones.

A third reason why intelligence needs our support today is the growth of Soviet military power. The operational force supporting Soviet ICBM's now totals about 1,250 launchers. They have nearly completed development of a multiple warhead system. They have been operating ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic since mid-1969. Last summer they began testing a new, submarine-launched missile with a minimum range of 3,000 miles. In brief, this is not a time to know less about our adversaries.

One of the statements made in the report of the Members of Congress for Peace through Law is so illogical that simply quoting it suffices. Arguing that CIA distorts its reports to the President for its own devious reasons, the paper says, "The problem here is that new intelligence data presented to the President may often be inconsistent with previously submitted data, but the reason may be to bear out the old data." That's a real mind-bender: to prove you were right in the first place, contradict yourself.

Other arguments, however, are more dangerous because less patently unsound. Here are some of them:

The results of satellite and technical collection are increasing in quality and value, particularly with regard to military intelligence. "Human resources overall have declined in importance."

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Let's look a little closer at the human versus the technical source. First, technical sources can tell us only what forces and weapons the enemy has now, what his present capabilities are. They cannot tell us his intentions--whether and when he's going to use those forces. Human sources can and do provide us with information about hostile intent and thus give us the lead time that is indispensable for the development of countermeasures.

And compare costs. The expense of technical collection is soaring, especially in research and development, as the equipment grows more complex. The facts given us by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky about Soviet weaponry would have cost us many millions of dollars if collected by technical means--if in fact that kind of collection had been possible. Colonel Penkovsky provided microfilm of some 10,000 pages of highly classified Soviet documents. Yet the total cost of that operation was less than \$20,000 a year.

The Soviets understand these facts well. They put substantial sums into scientific research, but ever since Klaus Fuchs we have all known that they also value highly the power of the agent.

Of the various kinds of human sources, two are of paramount importance: the penetration agent and the defector. Such sources are the key to the final evaluation of information gained by electronics, communications intelligence, aerial photography, and the like. The

inviolability of our security depends upon the inviolability of theirs. We must give unstinted protection to such men as Colonel Piotr Popov, whose dangerous work for the West began in Vienna in 1954 and ended with his execution in the USSR in 1959; Pyotr Deryabin, who also defected in Vienna in 1954; Yuriy Rastvorov; Raino Hayhanen, who exposed Colonel Rudolf Abel in 1957; Lazlo Szabo, who asked for political asylum in London in 1965 and appeared on 17 March 1966 before the CIA Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and Erno Bernat, who made an important contribution to internal security after his defection in 1966.

We need such men. To win them to our cause and gain their invaluable help, we must be able to defend them and they must be convinced that we can and will protect them. They know better than others that the Soviet and Bloc intelligence services continue to maintain departments trained and equipped for terror, kidnapping, hijacking, and assassination. If they doubt the security of our environment, they will not enter it. The key potential defector is privy to the counter-intelligence reporting of his present Communist service and thus is keenly aware of the insecurities of the West. He is also an avid reader of the Western press and an expert in spotting leaks. It would be instructive to hear the comments of such a man on the proposals put forth by the Members of Congress for Peace through Law.

Perhaps the authors of the paper felt constrained to take this

we must also accept our moral and legal responsibility to protect those sources. If we could get the information we need from technical devices only, then we could be less concerned about protecting them than we have to be about protecting human lives. But in fact the quantity and quality of vital data provided by human sources is growing, not shrinking. Therefore the Director of Central Intelligence must give full weight to his responsibility under the National Security Act ". . .for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." This responsibility persists beyond revelation to original recipients, in Congress or elsewhere. It embraces the full protection of the source. The device of the closed or executive session cannot be relied upon to provide that protection. For example, on 17 July 1970 the New York Times printed an article called, "The U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A Bomb or Its Parts." Here is a quotation from it:

"Reliable sources reported that a somber appraisal of Israel's nuclear program was conveyed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Richard Helms. . .at a closed-door hearing on July 17."

In its entirety this article comes perilously close to jeopardizing important sources. Let no one charge that I am assailing the freedom of the press. What I am pointing out is that it is the job of the government

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I touched earlier upon a charge levelled in this paper against CIA, the accusation that the Agency distorts its reports to the President for its own purposes. The paper asserts that ". . . the President does not always receive an unbiased interpretation of the facts germane to a decision on national security. As stated earlier, this problem stems in part from the CIA functioning as a body protecting its own credibility."

The Central Intelligence Agency and the other U.S. services report on a world of swift change. Doctoring the facts about today in order to align them with yesterday's would not make intelligence reporting believable. It would simply create a credibility gap.

But the paper persists. "By determining what information the President will see, the intelligence officer plays an integral role in policy making." The intelligence officer does not make policy, nor does he try to con the President. He doesn't want to, and he couldn't if he did. All the U.S. services contribute to national estimates, and all have access to them. Thus the Director of Central Intelligence, the heads of all the intelligence services of the United States, key personnel in all of those departments and agencies, and hundreds of other professionals who have access to finished intelligence reports would have to be party to the plot. I am reminded of the flood of crackpot charges that swept through the press, as though from a burst sewer main, after President Kennedy's assassination. These stories

conjured up a similar conspiracy which involved President Johnson, the Supreme Court, the Warren Commission, the CIA, the FBI, and the Dallas police, as well as assorted and mysterious groups of refugee Cubans.

Foolish as such paranoiac claims are, they are also dangerous, especially when issued in the names of American Congressmen. I think that the author or authors of this document have a clear moral obligation to identify themselves and to furnish proof that our intelligence services are misleading the President of the United States. If they do not have facts to support this canard, they ought to say so publicly and apologize.

A final example. The paper asserts that there is "some overlap of jurisdiction" between the FBI and CIA. The fact is that there is no such overlap. The National Security Act, which created CIA, specified that it would have ". . . no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions. . . ." I am confident that Messrs. Helms and Hoover would be delighted to have the author or authors present their facts--or retract this vague charge if they can't.

And now, a look at the eight recommendations made in this paper.

"1. There should be a drastic curtailment of covert action programs. Where appropriate, these programs should be continued overtly by the Department of State, Department of Commerce, AID."

Covert action is action not attributable to the U.S. Government. It is not employed to attain objectives which can be reached by overt means. For example, any U.S. government needs ties abroad both with parties or groups in power and with parties or groups out of power. Without the latter, we should suffer an endless series of rude shocks. Would the writers of this paper have our State Department or Department of Commerce maintain such connections, overtly or covertly?

Underlying this recommendation there is or seems to be a notion that covert action programs are un-American, a sordid business. But if the writers really think that covert action is un-American, then what do they think Ben Franklin was doing in Paris and London?

In recommending drastic curtailment of covert action operations, which are conducted at the behest and under the control of the President and his designees, the writers of this paper seem to be unaware that such operations have already been cut back severely. In recent years, and especially since the Katzenbach report of 1967, CIA has adopted operational guidelines which have the effect of restricting covert action chiefly to individuals rather than organizations. Moreover, CIA is itself on the look-out for ways to turn over CIA-sponsored covert programs to overt U.S. Government agencies and to sources of private funds. One prerequisite is a favorable political climate in recipient countries and the willingness of the recipients to acknowledge an open connection with the U.S. Government. Frequently where the need for

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covert action funded by U.S. money is greatest, the risk of open acknowledgement is unacceptable to the recipient. Another prerequisite is experience in this field. The State Department, the Department of Commerce, and AID all have major responsibilities quite different from covert action. Burdening them with this kind of task would compel them to assign it a lower level of attention, incompatible both with its importance and with the need to acquire expertise.

Geography and history have combined to spare us until recently from having to carry out an extensive covert action program. The pressures of the future, however, may well be stronger. Even now we must have a covert action capability for the following minimal needs:

(1) To avoid a tense overt confrontation with a hostile power. To illustrate: the U-2 operations showed that the Soviets can maintain a high level of tolerance for annoyance and frustration if their prestige is not openly challenged.

(2) To protect friendly governments and leaders abroad who want to cooperate with us but fear swift retaliation by the Communist powers if their help must be publicized.

(3) To protect covert action agents in both the free and dictatorial worlds against detection and reprisal.

(4) To deny the adversary exclusive control of covert action assets and to keep an eye on his covert work against us.

In short, before we cut back CIA's covert activities or assign them to other elements of the government, we had better be clear about the consequences. This is particularly true of any course of action that the Communist Bloc has repeatedly urged upon us.

"2. The intelligence community should end the use of legitimate U.S. business and government agencies for operational cover overseas and domestically."

There have long been prohibitions against the use by U.S. intelligence of certain segments of American life; examples are the Peace Corps, officials and employees of major foundations, Fulbright scholars, and many others. More recently, in 1967, we virtually declared the whole of the academic world off-limits. The tightest of restrictions apply to many other categories. If we now deny this Agency all diplomatic and military cover--something that no other government has done--and all commercial cover to boot, just what is left?

I repeat, the United States exists in this world, not the next. This world requires us to protect the security of this country through the prudent use of both covert and clandestine operations. The basic requirement of a clandestine operation, unsurprisingly, is that it be clandestine: not unattributable but in fact hidden. Unless there's a new kind of vanishing cream on the market, our operatives abroad have to be there in some capacity. Is it seriously proposed that they hang out a CIA shingle, so that our enemies can spot them and their agents without difficulty? Could we expect other governments to take us seriously or foreign intelligence services to work together with us if we said that the first principle of a secret service is that it should not be secret?

Operational personnel who need it--especially those in hostile areas--should not be stripped of the protection of a diplomatic passport and exposed to arrest.

All operational personnel need fast access to secure communications facilities and safe storage for classified documents. They also need normal association with their colleagues in the State Department and elsewhere, for on-the-spot coordination.

Like governmental cover, commercial cover has been used by all great powers for centuries. To forbid all such cover is to forbid all secrecy in the conduct of our affairs. Furthermore, no one is forcing American industry to cooperate with intelligence. Why should we require the intelligence services to reject voluntary assistance that is vital to their mission? To put this matter in clearer perspective,

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I should like to quote from a letter that General Washington

sent to Colonel Elias Dayton on 26 July 1777. "The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged-- all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue."

"3. Clearer lines of responsibility must be drawn between CIA, DIA, and NSA. Duplication and unhealthy competitiveness must be eliminated."

The lines of responsibility are completely clear. They are established in a law, the National Security Act. They are extended through a series of directives from the National Security Council, directives that set forth the primary responsibility of CIA for the coordination of national (in contrast with departmental) intelligence. The most important of CIA's responsibilities under law is that of correlating, evaluating, and disseminating information that affects the national security. Guidance and coordination ^{are} ~~is~~ also provided by the United States Intelligence Board, chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. I feel sure that he, like the heads of the other two agencies named, would be glad to receive from the authors of this paper, or from any other source, information about specific and significant examples of duplication and unhealthy competitiveness.

"4. Information obtained by satellites in earth resources, fisheries, forestry, and crop management fields should be declassified and shared with competent scientists world-wide."

Are the authors unaware of such programs as Nimbus, Tiros, ESSA (Environmental Science Services Administration), and ATS (Application Technological Satellite)? They contribute to weather forecasting, meteorology, oceanography, studies of sea patterns, storm surveillance, wind data, ice mapping, etc. Photography contributing to studies of earth resources and land use has been released from manned satellite programs, Gemini and Apollo.

There are minor inhibitions resulting from the sensitivities of foreign governments and the need to protect new, advanced techniques. These scarcely merit mention in comparison with the abundant information from space programs released by the United States.

"5. Since inter-service parochialisms distort the estimative process and lead to unnecessary weapon procurement all military services should be required to cite only the majority position on NIEs before Congress, rather than their service footnote."

First, the assumption. A primary reason for the centralization of the intelligence community through such bodies as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency was to eliminate service parochialism. But alleged parochialism

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and alleged attempts to get unneeded weapons are not at all the same thing

as national estimates. Intelligence estimating cannot be wholly accurate. It is a process of highly educated guessing, and it sometimes happens that that majority position turns out to be wrong. In any event, Congress, like the Executive Branch, is entitled to hear the considered intelligence judgments of individual services whether these represent a majority or a minority. To choke off dissent would be to do exactly what the writers of this report have falsely accused the evaluators of doing. It would amount to suppressing facts and views in favor of a pre-selected position. I should certainly not want to be the representative of the Executive Branch who was charged with telling, say, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee: "You may hear from CIA, but henceforth you will not be allowed to listen to testimony from the Army, Navy, or Air Force."

"6. The Board of National Estimates should include representatives from a non-intelligence, non-government source."

Perhaps it would be foolhardy to expect this kind of report to result from research in depth, but what's wrong with just raking the topsoil a little? The Board of National Estimates does include non-intelligence, non-government members, two of them--and each spends three to four months a year on the Board. It also has a panel of some fifteen consultants, drawn mainly from university faculties. They meet twice a year to comment on finished estimates and advise on future submissions. Most members of the Board have substantial backgrounds in non-governmental work.

This feckless recommendation resulted from a needless ignorance.

A simple inquiry would have produced these facts. There is

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in this paper an underlying motif that CIA and the rest

of the intelligence community are leaving Congress out in the cold or, at least, are keeping us inadequately informed. I want to make it completely clear that it is Congress itself which has determined which committees shall be briefed by the Director of Central Intelligence and by CIA. There are presently fifteen committees that are so briefed.

1. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Director of Central Intelligence customarily briefs this committee biannually on atomic energy programs in the Soviet Union, Communist China, and elsewhere. CIA representatives are in close touch with the Staff of the Joint Committee and provide briefings for the Chairman and staff members.

2. Joint Economic Committee. CIA maintains liaison contact.

3. Senate Armed Services Committee, and

4. House Armed Services Committee. The Director appears regularly before the CIA Subcommittees of both of these committees for an average of four to six briefings each year. The topics are world developments, CIA programs, and such other subjects as the committees themselves select.

5. Senate Appropriations Committee, and

6. House Appropriations Committee. The budget of CIA is reviewed in detail by the CIA Subcommittees of both these bodies. The Chairman of the full committees also chair the sub-committees, as is also true of the Armed Services Committees. Moreover, the Director annually briefs the Defense Subcommittees of these bodies on the Soviet threat.

7. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and

8. House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Director appears before both of these bodies at their request to give them briefings on subjects of interest to them. The Senate Committee has requested such appearances much more often than its opposite number.

9. Senate Judiciary Committee, and

10. House Judiciary Committee. CIA provides information to the Immigration Subcommittees of both bodies.

11. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, and

12. House Internal Security Committee. CIA
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cooperates with both groups, providing national

security information and, as appropriate, access to intelligence defectors.

13. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Senate Committee on Government Operations. CIA provides the subcommittee with information bearing on national security and with intelligence and security data about the organization and functions of foreign governments.

14. Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, and

15. House Science and Astronautics Committee.

CIA briefs the Chairmen and designated staff members of both on Soviet scientific and space programs.

But these more formal relationships are only part of the story.

The log of CIA's Office of the Legislative Counsel shows that during 1969 it had about 1,400 personal contacts with Congressmen or members of their staffs, about five per day for every work day of the year. It made and received countless phone calls to and from the Hill.

It arranged for written replies to about one thousand congressional queries. It arranged for 23 briefings of congressional committees and provided or made arrangements for 65 additional briefings of individual members of Congress.

In the light of such a record, it seems plausible that the errors and misapprehensions in which this paper abounds resulted not from any refusal by the Director or the Central Intelligence Agency to cooperate but from the failure of the writers to ask for the facts.

"7. The number of personnel working in covert action and human resource programs should be cut back drastically."

I noted earlier that the U.S. covert action program has already been cut back and explained why we cannot afford to cut it any more. "Human resource programs" is apparently bureaucratized for intelligence operations employing agents. These have been increasing and should continue to increase, unless we intend to give the Soviets, the Bloc, and the Chinese a free hand.

Do those who make this recommendation know what they are talking about? If any Congressional body has a real need to know, the CIA will tell us--with appropriate safeguards--how many of its personnel in the U.S. and abroad are engaged in covert action programs and in operations involving agents. It would be the total of all operational personnel. Under the same conditions it would tell us how many agents it has. But I very much doubt that the writers of this paper have that information. If not, how can they tell whether cuts are needed at all, let alone drastic cuts?

Finally, the paper recommends the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence. Its functions "could range from reviewing intelligence data to serving as an official liaison for Congress with the National Security Council." The paper continues, "Considering the mounting criticism of CIA activities in the last decade, a Congressional watchdog committee could add insurance that intelligence operations do not interfere or undermine non-strategic interest activities such as foreign aid and educational programs abroad." If the proposed committee functioned properly, "the danger of an intelligence officer becoming a policy maker could be minimized." The writers add that they do not seek to manage CIA or the other services: "Lack of experience in this area and the complexity of the organization render such a task impossible." Thus the proposed committee would not manage our intelligence services; it would just make them inoperative. The concern is not with administration but with "the objectivity of the information presented to the President." By broadening the national assessment, the new committee "would not only strengthen our foreign policy, but would also enable us to formulate a more realistic appraisal of our defense postures and strategic concerns."

This recommendation and its accompanying admissions that a Congressional committee can't run CIA and that in some areas CIA

"... has performed its tasks with an extraordinary amount of expertise" convey an unpersuasive air of candor and openness, like W. C. Fields looking naive.

If this were just a proposal to add a sixteenth Congressional committee to CIA's list, and if the new committee could maintain the level of security called for when human life and liberty are at stake, I should still oppose it as superfluous; but I should not be making this speech. The recommendation, however, calls for a watchdog committee--and does so as blandly as though a number of Congressmen had not made similar recommendations for such a committee in the past.

Here I should like to stress that in opposing the establishment of another committee concerned with U.S. intelligence affairs, I speak only for myself. The directors of the Central Intelligence Agency have consistently maintained that Congress has the right to appoint as many watch-dog committees as it wants. My own view happens to be that we have already stretched security to the breaking point.

The paper says that there has been mounting criticism of CIA for a decade. It's true that the criticism of CIA by the Soviet-controlled media has grown shriller over the years, a fact which seems to me to speak well for the effectiveness of the Agency. A magazine called Ramparts has specialized in scurrilously

false accusations against it. Various Congressmen have questioned its motives, as I shall refrain from questioning theirs. The U.S. press and other media have sometimes shown an understandable pleasure in lampooning the paradox of a secret service in an open society.

As for genuine public concern or animosity, if it is directed toward the Central Intelligence Agency--and I most sincerely doubt that it is--then in my opinion it is misdirected. It would be like hating doctors because sickness exists. We should reserve our animosity for those forces that have compelled an increasing American involvement in espionage ever since World War II and have forced us to hurry to match their far older expertise.

The Soviet intelligence services are well into their third generation. The KGB alone employs within the boundaries of the USSR 300,000 at the national level and some 600,000 at local levels. It has 10,000 abroad. The 25 services of the European Communist Bloc extend its capabilities and respond to its guidance. A vast but uncounted number of experts in clandestine and covert operations frequently make trips into the Free World, and to these must be added all the so-called "illegals" like Colonel Abel.

In the face of their numbers and their skills, do we really want to turn the clock back, except for technical advances, to the days before Pearl Harbor? Since the end of last year the Soviets have had more intelligence specialists in Latin America than we have, and the discrepancy is growing. Instead of hastening that kind of trend, I think we ought to stop it.

Intelligence services are primarily the instruments of the Executive Branch, not the Legislative. If the President were receiving distorted reports, he would be the first to know it. Plainly, he does not see exactly eye-to-eye with the framers of this paper. When he visited CIA headquarters in March 1969, President Nixon observed, ". . . I understand that when President Truman in 1964 sent a message to the CIA, he put an inscription on it which, as I recall, went something like this: To the CIA, an organization which is an absolute necessity to any President of the United States, From one who knows.

"I know. And I appreciate what you do."

Perhaps the time will come when the Communist World will put away both the sword and the stiletto, although thus far they've been swinging twice as hard with one whenever they've slackened off with the other. But we must not rationalize our wish for a peaceful and open world into a belief that they are about to grant it to us.

The leaders of the Communist world remain committed to their doctrine of irreconcilable hostility and to the conviction that their system will and must prevail. U.S. intelligence remains our first line of defense against this dogmatism and its consequences. It is also our best insurance for world peace. For even if the Communists remain reluctant to rely upon nuclear or other military power, the threat of war through miscalculation remains. The Communist leaders are isolated from our kind of reality. Misreading our history and our ideology, they are also prone to misunderstand our intentions and our actions. And because of the intellectual isolationism that they have imposed upon themselves--and that we must avoid most scrupulously--we too stand in danger of miscalculation. Our only remedy is solid intelligence that keeps our policy-makers informed about what the Communists are doing and about how they are likely to interpret and react to our own undertakings.

I know that I have spoken at length. Perhaps you feel that I've used a huge swatter on a very small fly. But I want to deal with more than this paper, its illogic, contradictions, and distortions. My concern is with the continuing campaign to denigrate U.S. intelligence. I do not for a moment suppose that the writers of this paper are deliberately serving Soviet purposes. But neither do I suppose for a moment that the Soviets would not enthusiastically second their

recommendations. Cut-backs have already been made in our military and intelligence services. But they were made prudently, regretfully, and for reasons of fiscal necessity. They were made with the understanding that we are calling upon the armed forces and intelligence to do even more, and with less. They were not made with any intent to cut back functions or capabilities.

I suggest that we declare a moratorium on CIA, that we help them get on with their job, and that we get on with ours.

I thank you.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

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FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.
			DATE 4 November 1970
TO: (building)	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED FORWARDED		
1. Legislative Counsel			It is suggested that this draft be released to the DCI, but it is noted that C/CI has not expressed any views about it.
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