

VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF

Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP73B00296R00020001-6

DATE: 28 Sept 71

TO: The Director

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

1. Per our conversation attached is the checklist of estimates produced since 1947 or, actually, since 1950 (there having been no estimates as such in 1947, 48 or 49).

2. As we commented, the numbering system gets slightly snarled in 1953 because two papers (11 and 12 in the attached) were superseded or redesignated. On numbers, you might also note that there are three ORE papers in 1950 which are listed separately from the NIEs/SNIEs whose series also begins in 1950.

[Redacted Signature]

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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S-E-C-R-E-T

Pre-1950 "Estimates"

1947 - Negative

1948 - Negative

1949 - Negative

1950

1. ORE 92-49: The Crisis in Indochina, 10 Feb 1950
2. ORE 29-50: Consequences to the US of Communist Domination of Mainland Southeast Asia, 13 Oct 1950
3. ORE 50-50: Prospects for the Defense of Indochina Against a Chinese Communist Invasion (and) Supplement: Prospects for Chinese Communist Action in Indochina During 1950, 7 Sept 1950

S-E-C-R-E-T

Listing of NIEs and SNIEs on Indochina and Related Subjects since 1950

1950

1. NIE No. 5: Indochina: Current Situation and Probable Developments" 29 December 1950

1951

2. NIE 20: Resistance of Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to Communist Pressures in the Event of a Communist Victory in Indochina in 1951", 20 March 1951
3. NIE 35: Probable Developments in Indochina During the Remainder of 1951", 7 August 1951

1952

4. NIE 35/1: Probable Developments in Indochina Through Mid-1952, 3 March 1952
5. SNIE 22: Consequences of Certain Possible US Courses of Action with Respect to Indochina, Burma, or Thailand, 4 March 1952
6. SNIE 27: Probable Effects of Various Possible Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China" 4 June 1952
7. NIE 35/2: Probable Developments in Indochina Through mid-1952" 29 August 1952
8. NIE 47: Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia Through Mid-1953" 31 October 1952

1953

9. SNIE 45: Thailand's Ability to Withstand Communist Pressures or Attacks through Mid-1954" 2 June 1953
10. NIE 91: Probable Developments in Indochina, 4 June 1953
11. ~~NIE 96: Thailand's Ability to Withstand Communist Pressures or Attacks,~~ Superseded By SNIE 45
12. ~~NIE 98: Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through Mid-1955,~~ Redesignated ~~as~~ NIE 10-2-54
13. SNIE 52: Probable Consequences in Non-Communist Asia of Certain Possible Developments in Indochina Before Mid-1954, 16 Nov 1953
14. SNIE 53: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action in Indochina Through 1954, 18 Dec 1953

1954

15. NIE 10-3-54: Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through Mid-1955" 15 March 1954
16. NIE 63-54: Consequences Within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu, 30 April 1954
17. NIE 10-3-54: Communist Capabilities in Indochina, 1 June 1954
18. SNIE 63-2-54: The Effects of Certain Possible Developments on the Military Security and Political Stability of Laos and Cambodia Through 1954, 9 June 1954
19. SNIE 10-4-54: Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action with Respect to Indochina, 15 June 1954
20. NIE 63-3-54: Probable Military and Political Developments in Indochina Over the Next 30 Days, 21 May 1954
21. NIE 63-4-54: Probable Military and Political Developments in Indochina Over the Next 30 Days, 15 June 1954
22. NIE 63-5-54: Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina, 3 August 1954
23. SNIE 63-6-54: Current Trends in South Vietnam, 15 September 1954
24. NIE 63-7-54: Probable Developments in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia Through July 1956, 24 November 1954
25. NIE 10-7-54: Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through 1957, 23 November 1954

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1955

26. NIE 63.1-2-55: Possible Developments in South Vietnam
26 April 1955 (one copy only in ONE)
27. SNIE 63.1-2/1-55: The Current Saigon Crisis
2 May 1955 (one copy only in ONE)
28. NIE 63-1-55: Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956
19 July 1955 (One copy only in ONE)
29. NIE 63.3-55: Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956
26 July 1955 (one copy only in ONE)
30. NIE 63.2-55: Probable Developments in Cambodia to July
1956 16 August 1955 (one copy only)
31. SNIE 63.1-4-55: Consequences of Possible US Courses of
Action with Respect to Vietnam 13 September 1955 (one copy
only)
32. NIE 63.1-3-55: Probable Developments in Vietnam
to July 1956 11 October 1955 (one copy only)
33. NIE 63.3/1-55: Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956
20 December 1955 (one copy only)

1956

34. NIE 63-56: Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam
Through mid-1957 17 July 1956 (one copy only)

1957

35. NIE 63.2-57: The Prospects for North Vietnam 14 May 1957
(one copy only)
36. NIE 68-57: Probable Developments in Laos over the next few
Months 20 August 1957 (one copy only)

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1958

(no Estimates on these areas were published in 1958)

1959

37. NIE 68-59: The Outlook for Laos 19 May 1959 (one copy only)
38. NIE 63-59: Prospects for North and South Vietnam 26 May 1959 (one copy available)
39. NIE 67-59: Cambodia's International Orientation 26 May 1959 (one copy available)
40. SNIE 68-2-59: The Situation in Laos 18 September 1959 (one copy only)

1960

41. SNIE 63.1-60: Short-Term Trends in South Vietnam 23 August 1960 (one copy available)
42. SNIE 68-60: The Situation and Short-Term Outlook in Laos 6 December 1960 (one copy available)
43. SNIE 68-2-60: Probable Communist Intentions in Laos 29 December 1960 (one copy available)

1961

44. SNIE 58-61: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action with Respect to Laos 21 Feb 1961 (one copy)
45. NIE 50-61: Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia 28 March 1961
46. SNIE 10-2-61: Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeast Asia 27 June 1961 (only one copy available)
47. SNIE 58-2-61: Probable Reactions to Certain Courses of Action Concerning Laos 5 July 1961 (one copy available)
48. NIE 14.3/53-61: Prospects for North and South Vietnam 15 August 1961 (one copy available)

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49. SNIE 58-3-61: The Situation and Short-Run Outlook in Laos 28 September 1961 (one copy available)
50. SNIE 53-2-61: Bloc Support of the Communist Effort Against the Government of Vietnam 5 October 1961 (one copy available)
51. SNIE 10-3-61: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain SEATO Undertakings in South Vietnam 10 October 1961 (one copy available)
52. SNIE 10-4-61: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions in South Vietnam 7 November 1961 (one copy available)

1962

53. SNIE 58-62: Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing Forces in Laos 11 Jan 1962
54. SNIE 58/1-62: Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing Forces in Laos 31 January 1962
55. SNIE 10-62: Communist Objectives, Capabilities and Intentions in Southeast Asia 21 Feb 1962 (only one copy)
56. SNIE 58-2-62: Consequences of Certain US Courses in Laos 11 April 1962
57. SNIE 58-3-62: Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha 9 May 1962
58. SNIE 58-4-62: The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos 14 May 1962
59. SNIE 58-5-62: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Actions With Respect to Laos 31 May 1962
60. SNIE 58-5/1-62: Communist Reactions to Additional US Courses of Action in Laos and North Vietnam 12 June 1962

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61. SNIE 58-6-62: Short-Run Outlook for the Laotian Coalition Government 26 September 1962

1963

62. NIE 53-63: Prospects in South Vietnam (one copy only) 17 ~~Sept~~^{APRIL} 1963
63. SNIE 58-63: Communist REactions to US Actions Taken with Regard to Laos 18 June 1963
64. SNIE 14.3-63: The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on North Vietnam and its Policies 26 June 1963
65. SNIE 53-2-63: The Situation in South Vietnam 10 July 1963 (only one copy)

1964

66. SNIE 50-64: Short-Term Prospects in Southeast Asia 12 Feb 1964
67. SNIE 14.3-64: The Outlook for North Vietnam 4 March 1964 (one copy only)
68. SNIE 50-3-64: Probable Consequences of Certain US Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos 25 May 1964
69. SNIE 53-64: Chances for a Stable Government in South Vietnam 8 Septeaber 1964 (oney copy only)
70. SNIE 53-2-64: The Situation in South Vietnam 1 October 1964
71. SNIE 10-3-64: Probable Communist REactions to Certain Possible US/GVN Courses of Action 9 October 1964

1965

72. SNIE 53-65: Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam
4 Feb 1965
73. SNIE 10-65: Communist Military Capabilities and Near-Term
Intentions in Laos and South Vietnam 4 February 1965
74. SNIE 10-3-65: Communist Reactions to Possible US Actions
11 Feb 1965
75. SNIE 10-3/1-65: Communist Reactions to Possible US Courses
of Action Against North Vietnam 18 Feb 1965
76. SNIE 10-4-65: Probable Communist Reactions to Deployment of an
ROK Combat Division for Base Security Duty in South Vietnam
19 March 1965
77. SNIE 10-5-65: Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions
28 April 1965
78. SNIE 10-6-65: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US
Actions 2 June 1965
79. SNIE 10-6/1-65: Probable Reactions to Certain US Courses
of Action 4 June 1965
80. SNIE 10-7-65: Implications of A Certain US Course of Action
4 June 1965
81. SNIE 10-9-65: Communist and Free World Reactions to a
Possible US Course of Action 23 July 1965
82. SNIE 58-65: Short-Term Prospects for Laos 5 Aug 1965
(one copy only)
83. SNIE 10-10-65: Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action
in Southeast Asia 10 September 1965
84. SNIE 10-11-65: Probable Communist R^hactions to a US
Course of Action 22 September 1965
85. SNIE 10-12-65: Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course
of Action 10 December 1965 (one copy only)

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1966

86. SNIE 10-1-66: Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam 4 February 1966
87. SNIE 10-3-66: Probable REactions to a Possible Course of Action in South Vietnam 19 May 1966
88. NIE 14.3-66: North Vietnamese Military Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam 7 July 1966
89. NIE 57-66: Sihanouk's Cambodia 6 October 1966 (one copy only)
90. NIE 53-66: Problems of Political Development in South Vietnam Over the Next Year or So 15 December 1966

1967

91. SNIE 10-67: Reactions to a Possible US Action 5 Jan 1967
92. SNIE 57-67: Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort 19 January 1967
93. SNIE 11-11-67: Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War 4 May 1967
94. NIE 58-67: Short-Term Political Prospects for Laos 18 May 1967
95. SNIE 10-1-67: Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action 13 July 1967
96. SNIE 14.3-1-67: Problems of Viet Cong Recruitment and Morale 3 August 1967
97. SNIE 14.3-67: Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam 13 November 1967 (1 copy)
98. SNIE 57/1-67: Significance of Cambodia to The Vietnamese Communist War Effort 14 December 1967

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1968

99. SNIE 58-68: Communist Intentions in Laos
21 March 1968
100. SNIE 53-68: The Vietnam Situation 6 June 1968
101. SNIE 14.3-68: Detection of Infiltration During a Cease-
fire in Vietnam, 25 July 1968
102. SNIE 58-1-68: Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Laos
Over the Next Year, 31 October 1968
103. NIE 50-68: Southeast Asia After Vietnam
14 November 1968

1969

104. SNIE 14-69: The Pacification Effort in Vietnam
16 January 1969
105. SNIE 14.3-69: Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists
for Fighting in South Vietnam, 17 July 1969

1970

106. SNIE 14.3-70: The Outlook from Hanoi: Factors Affecting North
Vietnam's Policy on the War in Vietnam, 5 February 1970
107. SNIE 58-70: The Communist View of the Situation in Laos,
5 February 1970
108. SNIE 13-9-70: Chinese Reactions to Possible Developments
in Indochina, 28 May 1970 (one copy)
109. SNIE 13-10-70: Chinese Reactions to Certain Courses of
Action in Indochina, 11 June 1970
110. SNIE 57-70: The Outlook for Cambodia, 6 August 1970

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1971

111. SNIE 13-10-71: Communist China's Reactions to Developments in Laos, 18 february 1971
112. NIE 53-71: South Vietnam: Problems and Prospects, 29 April 1971

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MONDAY A.M.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1971

No. 30

United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations

Statement by Senator J. W. Fulbright on the
Release of a Report by the General Accounting Office
on its Problems on Access to Information

Early this year the Committee on Foreign Relations asked the General Accounting Office to compile a list of recent instances where it had been denied access to information on matters involving government programs abroad. Of the eight overseas reviews cited in the report, five were conducted at the request of the Committee and three were initiated by GAO.

As to the GAO's basic right to access to Executive Branch materials the report stated:

"We believe the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as reinforced by recent expressions of intent by congressional committees, leaves no doubt but that Congress and GAO are expected to have access to all records, documents, or papers necessary to effectively evaluate the various programs of the Executive Branch."

The report listed the following types of information which the GAO considered necessary to carry out its responsibilities to Congress which "have not been provided promptly or refused outright:"

1. future planning information and documents, both formal and informal;
2. internal working papers and staff recommendations relating to programs planned or in process;

3. negotiation documents, papers, memorandums, and working papers, before, during and after negotiations, regardless of whether or not the information is considered sensitive;
4. management reports including recommendations or conclusions reached, whether approved or unapproved by higher authority, field trip reports, observations, and records of conversations pertinent to the matters under review;
5. access to records, documents or papers originated or directly related to foreign governments but in the possession of United States agencies, when they relate to programs in which the United States has a direct interest; and
6. access to all United States supported bases and installations regardless of the geographical location.

The report emphasizes that outright denials of information are rare but that delays and referral of requests to "higher authority" which result in "de facto denial of records" is the standard tactic. "Normally the regulations and directives (regarding GAO access to information)," the report said, "do not state that GAO cannot be furnished the information, but rather that their personnel in the field cannot furnish the information unless authorization is received from higher authority; this normally means officials of the Departments in Washington."

As an example, the report cited a directive of the U.S. European Command Headquarters listing material which chiefs of military aid missions could not release to the GAO without "approval from higher authority." Prominent on the list was "The Military Assistance Five-Year Plan for a particular country...", the type of plan which the Department of Defense recently told the Committee did not exist.

The report contains the following example of the delaying tactics used by the Departments of State and Defense:

"In connection with our current review of utilization of excess defense articles in MAP, we requested a country-to-country agreement between the United States and Australia on March 31, 1971. The agreement involves the overseas procurement transaction for the acquisition of trucks and trailers in Australia for delivery to Cambodia. The purpose for the request was to enable us to ascertain why the arrangement was made in lieu of alternatives available and whether, in fact, the agreement was a form of consideration to the Australian Government for their participation in the support of our efforts in Vietnam.

"We first made our request for the agreement to the Department of State on March 31, 1971. On the same date the Department of State informed us that the agreement was dated March 4, 1971, and that they believed the document was unclassified but that our request should be channeled to the Department of Defense, rather than to them. Upon addressing our request to the Department of Defense on April 6, 1971, they referred us back to the State Department because State clearance was necessary for release of the agreement. The Department of State advised us on the same day that they were unable to release the document until they acquired clearance from the Australian Government through the Australian Embassy. On April 14, 1971, the State Department advised us that the Department of Defense had sought this clearance from the Embassy, however, on the same date, we received a denial from the Department of Defense of any such communication with the Australian Embassy. On April 15, 1971, the State Department informed us that the Department of Defense had received the Australian Government's clearance but

that the Department of Defense must first present a written request for State Department clearance. On the same date, April 15, the Department of Defense told us the Australian clearance was still pending. Four days later, the Department of Defense told us that more internal coordination was necessary before a release was possible. In a follow-up concerning the status of our request, on April 28, 1971, the Department of Defense official whom we had contacted stated he had forgotten our request.

"Finally, on May 5, 1971, DOD provided the agreement as requested. The agreement provided to GAO was classified although the agreement on file in the legal section of DOD was not so classified. In our opinion, the material included in the agreement does not appear to be of such a nature that the interests of the United States would be adversely affected if its contents were released to the public."

I believe the GAO has rendered a significant service to Congress and the general public in bringing together these examples of how Executive Branch agencies have hampered its effectiveness in insuring that the public's tax monies are spent as Congress intended. The report shows that Congress' watchdog on the Treasury has been defanged in investigating programs involving the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars. The legislative process is a travesty as long as Congress votes in the dark on these vast foreign programs. Congress should not appropriate the public's money without having adequate information on which to base its decisions. Congress must act to end this arrogance by the Executive Branch. Passage of my bill, S. 1125, laying down guidelines for Congressional access to Executive Branch personnel and information, would be a good first step and I am pleased that the GAO has given it such a strong endorsement.