

92d Congress }
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

GREECE: FEBRUARY 1971

A STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF

THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



March 4, 1971

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1971

56-939 O

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(II)

CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of transmittal.....	v
I. The Political Situation.....	1
II. The Economic Situation.....	9
III. The U.S. Military Assistance Program.....	11
IV. The Embassy and the Regime.....	13
V. Concluding Comments.....	15

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

FEBRUARY 26, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On January 25 you asked us to visit Greece and to report back to the Committee "on the situation in that country, the considerations affecting the need for furnishing military assistance to Greece and the status of and prospects regarding U.S.-Greek relations." By letter you informed Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Mr. Helms of our trip and its purposes, and you asked them each to arrange for us to be briefed in Washington before our departure which was done. The Department of State cabled the Embassy in Athens quoting your letter and asking the Embassy to arrange briefings and "appointments with appropriate Greek officials."

One of us (Mr. Lowenstein) spent a day and a half in Brussels on the way to Athens examining the question of the importance of Greece to the alliance. He saw Ambassador Ellsworth and various members of the U.S. Mission to NATO; General Goodpaster, the Supreme Allied Commander, and Admiral Henderson, Chairman of the Military Committee; and a number of other Ambassadors to NATO.

We both arrived in Athens on January 31 and left one week later. In Athens, we talked to Ambassador Tasca, members of the Embassy staff, Major General Hightower, Chief of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group Greece (JUSMAGG) and members of his staff. We met with the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Education, the Under Secretary to the Prime Minister, who is the official spokesman of the government, the President of the Council of State, which is the supreme administrative court of Greece, and the Governor of the Bank of Greece. We also met with a number of political leaders active in previous governments including former Prime Ministers Kanellopoulos and Stephanopoulos, former Foreign Minister Averoff, former Ministers Mavros and Markezinis, and the President of the last parliament, Dimitrius Papaspyrou. The appointments with those in the Greek Government were arranged by the Embassy. Most of the others we arranged ourselves. In addition, we saw several experienced foreign observers and Greek private citizens.

When we arrived in Athens we were told by the Embassy that, on its own initiative, the Foreign Ministry had informed the Embassy that the Prime Minister (who is also Foreign Minister and Defense Minister) and the Chief of Staff were considering seeing us. Several times during the course of our week in Athens we said to the Embassy that while we did not want to appear presumptuous we were anxious to see whoever in the government would be willing to see us so that we would have the fullest possible exposure to the Greek Government's point of view. The Embassy's response was that appointments

with the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff were pending. But on the next to last day of our visit, the Embassy informed us that they had been told that appointments with the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff were "not possible." The Minister of Justice, who had fixed an appointment on the next to last day of our visit, called an Embassy officer the night before to say that he was too busy.

For much of the last three days at least, and perhaps for more of the time, we were followed by plain clothes police both in cars and on foot. We found ourselves followed when we were in taxis as well as in Embassy cars. We were followed even when going from the hotel to the Embassy. On the last day, a police car followed us to the airport and one of the plain clothes police then entered the airport building and, while pretending to read his newspaper, watched as we cleared through passport control.

When we presented our classified report to the Committee in Executive Session on February 18, we were asked to prepare an unclassified report. That report, in which we have followed our usual practice of avoiding direct attribution, follows.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES G. LOWENSTEIN.
RICHARD M. MOOSE.

Greece: February 1971

I. THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Asked to describe the present political situation in Greece, one high ranking Greek official said to us: "Greece today may have the attributes of a political dictatorship but the tendency is not to reinforce these attributes." He went on to point out that since World War II there have been 42 changes of government and that over the years since World War I there have been coups, attempted coups, dictatorships, democracies with a King, democracies without a King and a civil war. The Embassy made the same argument somewhat differently, emphasizing that there have been 45 changes of government in the past 30 years and ten military governments since 1909. The point of these statements, of course, is that one should not speak of the present situation in Greece, or of the future, without bearing in mind the country's turbulent political past.

Other observers commented to us that in order to achieve the totals cited above for the period since World War II, it is necessary to count as changes every transition to and from caretaker government in connection with parliamentary elections. They note that these totals also give disproportionate weight to the five-year period immediately following World War II and obscure the fact that between 1952 and 1965 only three individuals served as Prime Ministers heading a parliamentary government, as distinct from a caretaker government, and the further fact that one of these Prime Ministers—Mr. Karamanlis—was in office continuously for eight years.

* * *

The present Prime Minister often refers in his speeches to the chaotic situation which led the group of military officers who constituted themselves the "Revolutionary Council" to take over power in April 1967, although it is said on good authority that he and others had begun preparing for such a move at least as early as 1956. At the same time, he continues to emphasize the transitional nature of his government and his desire to return to parliamentary democracy.

That transitional government has, however, now been in power for almost four years. The constitution has not yet been implemented in most important respects. Martial law remains in effect for political offenses, and as a result civilians are still being arrested for political offenses by military police. If they are charged or tried at all, it is before courts martial. The Prime Minister referred in a press interview, early in 1970, to the efficacy of the "shadow of martial law," tacit admission of its deliberate use as a tool of intimidation. What talk there has been by government leaders of elections has been to the effect that they will not take place in the foreseeable future, although in a recent statement the Prime Minister issued a veiled

threat to his colleagues in the regime that, in effect, if they did not fall into line under his leadership, elections might be held sooner than they might wish.

It is against this background that recent U.S. official statements seem incomprehensible to many Greeks, foreign observers and even some officials in the Executive Branch. When the United States announced on September 22, 1970, the lifting of the selective embargo on the delivery of heavy military equipment to Greece, imposed immediately after the coup in April 1967 and maintained since then except for a brief period in the fall of 1968 after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the announcement stated that the decision to resume the shipment of suspended items rested "entirely" on considerations relating to the strategic advantages to the NATO alliance and the United States which were of great importance to the West. But the announcement went on to say: "The trend toward a constitutional order is established . . . Major sections of the constitution have been implemented . . . The Government of Greece has stated that it intends to establish parliamentary democracy . . ."

As for the importance of the strategic advantages to NATO and the United States, both NATO authorities and U.S. officials do indeed look on Greece as a valuable and important ally. They refer to its vital strategic position on the eastern flank of the alliance, its willingness to increase defense expenditures, the fact that it has the longest term of military service of any NATO country, the excellence of its armed forces, their fighting spirit, Greece's attachment to the west and abhorrence of communism and the common boundary that Greece shares with three communist countries—Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

For the United States, still other important factors were pointed out to us. In a Mediterranean increasingly inhospitable to the United States, and in which there is a growing Soviet naval presence, Greece provides an unrestricted port of call and supply for the Sixth Fleet as well as valuable communications sites. (Last fall, during the Jordanian crisis, there were several hundred ship visits during a three month period at a time when political conditions in Turkey permitted only a few ship visits, and we were told in Athens that there is an average of about 2,000 U.S. fleet personnel ashore per day in Greek ports.)

In addition, Greece affords important operational and logistics military facilities which, in view of current anti-Americanism in Turkey, would be of great potential value in the event of direct U.S. involvement in the Middle East. During the recent Middle East crisis, Greece permitted the United States to evacuate 150 Americans from Jordan and also allowed us to airlift mobile hospitals to Jordan through Greek airfields. In this connection, however, some question whether Greece's willingness to allow its territory to be used in connection with possible direct U.S. involvement in the Middle East can be taken for granted. They note that while providing a safe haven for American civilians does not jeopardize Greek interests in the Arab world, any proposal to use bases in Greece as a staging area for direct intervention could involve risks which no Greek government might consider worth taking. They refer, for example, to the presence of some 25,000 to 50,000 Greek nationals in Arab countries and to Greece's interest in those countries as an outlet for exports. As an illustration of Greek sensitivity to such considerations, it was pointed

out to us that although Greek-Israeli relations are friendly, and there is a Greek representative with the personal rank of Ambassador in Israel, out of deference to Arab countries Greece does not maintain an Embassy in Israel.

As for the second part of the aforementioned Department of State announcement, the Greek Government has indeed stated that it "intends to establish parliamentary democracy" (perhaps a better term would have been to reestablish parliamentary democracy) but it certainly has never stated *when* it will actually do so. Even in the October 1969 statement of the late Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis to the Council of Europe, the nearest approach so far to setting a timetable for implementing the constitution, Pipinelis refused to fix a date for elections. A high Greek official told us that five conditions would have to be fulfilled before a "healthy" parliamentary system could be established. These conditions, which have been set forth in various public statements over the last few months but which have no basis in the constitution, were that Greece must move to a developed state economically with a per capita national income of about \$1,050 a year (the present level is about \$700 and the official estimated that it would take "two to three years" for it to rise about 50%, although others estimate that this will require at least five to seven years), a fairer distribution of wealth, a reorganization of the machinery of government, the necessary conditions for a healthy "new political life" for which there must be new kinds of political parties and a better press, and reform of Greece's system of education. When all five of these goals are realized, he said, then there could be a return to parliamentary government without danger.

Over the past year and a half, the government has issued a number of statements promising full implementation of the constitution and the lifting of martial law and has then withdrawn those promises or undercut them by its actions. On August 25, 1969 the Greek Government submitted a note to the Council of Europe stating that the laws envisaged by the constitution would enter into effect by December 1970. In his statement to the Council of Europe in October 1969, Mr. Pipinelis repeated the assurance that the entire constitution would be implemented by the end of 1970. In a speech on December 15, 1969, the Prime Minister said, in a somewhat more qualified manner, that "the passage of institutional laws will be completed" in 1970 (and, incidentally, also said in the same speech: "We are not . . . about to proceed to elections"). But on December 19, 1970 the Prime Minister said flatly that there would be "no change in the coming year" in the constitutional field.

Thus, for the moment at least, further progress on the most significant aspects of the constitution is frozen. Eight of the twelve constitutional articles which were suspended upon promulgation of that document will, according to the Prime Minister, remain suspended through 1971. These are Article 12, relating to the trial of civilians by civilian courts; Article 14, relating to freedom of the press; Article 25, relating to the role of the Council of State and the Parliament in decreeing a state of seige; Article 58, relating to political parties; Article 60, relating to parliamentary elections; Article 111, relating to trial by jury and to trial of press offenses by regular courts; Article 112, relating to the non-trial of civilians by courts-martial; and Article 121, relating

to the election of municipal and community authorities. It is argued by some critics of the regime that, in fact, 65 of the 138 articles of the constitution are not being applied at present, in part in some cases and in full in others, either because they are still specifically suspended, or because the necessary enabling or institutional legislation has not been put into effect, or because they depend for full implementation on other articles that are not presently operative.

* * *

Putting an article of the constitution into effect involves a complicated legal procedure. In brief, some articles must be implemented through enabling legislation or institutional laws. These laws are first published in the official gazette and may or may not be referred for further study. In any event, they do not take effect until the Prime Minister so decrees.

Fifteen institutional laws to implement the constitution that the government has promised at various times would be enacted and put into effect by decree by the end of 1970 were, in fact, gazetted on January 5 of this year. The Prime Minister then decreed that six of them were to take effect immediately, the dates later this year on which four would take effect were given and five—among which were the most significant of the fifteen—were simply gazetted without specific dates being mentioned. These five relate to the state of seige, the regency, political parties, the Constitutional Court and the functions of the Commissioner of Parliament.

Government statements with regard to institutional laws do not include any mention of articles of the constitution relating to elections and the creation of parliament. These articles of the constitution apparently simply remain suspended.

The regime has created a "Consultative Committee on Legislation," referred to in Athens as the "miniparliament." The decree establishing the Consultative Committee provides that it may debate and comment on draft laws, but it does not give the Consultative Committee the power to initiate or enact legislation. Forty-six of the fifty-six members of the body were chosen by 1200 government appointed electors from among 92 persons nominated by local officials and the executive committees of trade unions and professional associations (membership in such executive committees is controlled by the regime). The remaining ten members of the Consultative Committee were appointed outright by the regime. In statements intended for consumption abroad, the regime tends to portray the Consultative Committee as the forerunner of a true parliament. One opposition figure characterized it, however, as "worse than a farce."

* * *

The most discussed provision of the Constitution is Article Ten which relates to due process. The Greek Code of Penal Procedure is controlled by, and ultimately flows from, articles in the constitution which detail the procedures that must be followed in arrests, the issuance of warrants, search and seizure and pretrial detention.

Article Ten specifically states that with the exception of persons caught in the act of committing an offense, no one shall be arrested or imprisoned without a judicial warrant which must be served at the time of arrest or remand in custody pending trial, that the person arrested must be brought before the competent examining magistrate

not later than 24 hours from the time of the arrest, that within three days of the time of presentation the examining magistrate is obliged either to release the person arrested or to deliver a warrant for his imprisonment, and that the maximum term of custody pending trial cannot exceed one year for criminal charges and six months for misdemeanor charges. The Greek Code of Penal Procedure also provides that arrests cannot be carried out at night in a house unless the occupant of the house requests it, or a person in the house is in the act of committing a felony or misdemeanor, or a gathering is being held in the house for the purpose of gambling or immoral activities or the house is open to the public at night.

The Prime Minister has stated, however, most recently in his December 19, 1970 speech, that crimes "concerning the integrity or security or constitutional order of the country" have been left under the jurisdiction of military tribunals. The regime itself is apparently the sole judge of what constitutes a crime against the state.

We were assured by several leading Greek lawyers that under no provision of either civil or military law can the period in which someone detained is held incommunicado exceed 20 days. Yet according to many reports that we heard from the wives of persons now detained, from their attorneys and from their friends, some people are still being picked up without warrants by the military police and are then removed to police stations or detained elsewhere incommunicado for periods considerably in excess of 20 days.

Of course, the question of how Article Ten and martial law can exist side by side is a difficult one to explain. Indeed, no one, including the government officials with whom we spoke, offered an explanation based on law. The government asserts simply that martial law takes precedence over Article Ten and that all the arrests that have been made are according to proper legal procedure.

* * *

In the early days of the regime, over 6,000 alleged communists and known communists were rounded up and detained. U.S. and Greek officials say that by April 1970 all but 1,200 of these had been released. We were told that there are now somewhere between 335 and 355 in detention. The Prime Minister has said in a public speech that within the first four months of 1971 all of these detainees, most of whom are on the island of Leros and have been there since immediately after the coup, will be released "provided the internal security situation develops as expected."

These detainees are known as *Kratoumeni*. There are two other categories of prisoners. Those in internal exile, who have been sent to remote islands and villages, are known as *Ektopismeni*. They are considered to have passed through the judicial system, although apparently no specific charges have been made against them. This group, now about 60, includes former members of parliament, high ranking military officers and civilians. The Prime Minister has said that he will release them, too, within the first four months of 1971 if security conditions permit.

The third group are known as *Fylakismeni*. They are prisoners convicted and sentenced who are now serving terms for political crimes the regime has charged were clearly felonious in intent. We heard various estimates of the number of those in this category ranging from 340 to 380.

Arrests, it should be noted, are still continuing, although when the government or the Embassy refers to the release of detainees no mention is made of these new additions to the number of those being held. The new wave of arrests apparently began in November. Estimates we heard of those arrested ranged from 40 to 180. The government links these arrests to the setting off of a small bomb on October 3 in the garden adjacent to the Prime Minister's office at the time Secretary of Defense Laird was with the Prime Minister and the explosion of a bomb on November 28 at President Truman's statue at downtown Athens.

It should be noted that the policy announced by the Prime Minister of releasing detainees and those in domestic exile on remote islands will have the effect of freeing all known to have, or suspected to have, communist convictions. But it will leave in prison, or in an indefinite status awaiting trial, non-communist regime opponents—that is, those who are center or conservative.

Often when the number of prisoners, detainees and those in exile is discussed by the Embassy or by government officials it is contended that the numbers involved are lower than under any previous government. Even opposition sources in Athens say that when Karamanlis became Prime Minister in October 1955, there were 4,338 political prisoners sentenced by ordinary or military courts (most of whom had been imprisoned as a result of antigovernment actions during the occupation and civil war) and 833 deportees. They contend, however, that by the time Prime Minister Karamanlis left power there were only 959 political prisoners and no deportees and that in the course of the following four years all but 17 of the political prisoners were released.

One cannot talk of prisoners in Greece without referring to the emotionally charged and heavily publicized question of torture. We felt that there was little we could do to gather direct evidence on this question during our brief stay in Athens. Suffice it to say, then, that on the one hand government spokesmen continue to deny that any tortures have taken place. On the other hand, we talked to former prisoners who said that they had been "tortured" and to wives of other prisoners who said their husbands had been "tortured," although these tortures were never described and we did not feel we could ask for particulars. Sometimes wives talked about the torture of solitary confinement, and other times it seemed to us that the word "torture" was used as a synonym for such brutality as severe beating. It seems clear, however, that there have been cases of "falanga" or bastinado.

The general feeling among Western observers is that there is less torture today than there was before, and perhaps even none at all now, although there were reports during the time of our visit that some of the students recently arrested who are still being held incommunicado were being tortured. Most observers believe it likely, nevertheless, that prisoners are still being mishandled and even brutally treated in police stations. As the agreement between the government of Greece and the International Red Cross, which expired in November of last year, was not renewed by the Government, there is no way to check on such questions. (One of the explanations offered on this point was that the regime may now have less need to resort to torture because people think they may be tortured.)

* * *

Since the present regime took power, it has never put its popularity to a free vote, and there seems no way of measuring accurately the extent of its popular support. It is generally accepted among political observers in Athens, however, that the regime is supported by the business community, including the foreign business community (which is actively courted by the regime and obviously prefers a stable political situation—"an oasis of tranquility" as one put it—with no labor unrest, continuing economic growth and favorable terms offered by the government); much of the army (which has been the recipient of salary and pension increases from the regime); and many members of the church hierarchy (church salaries have also been increased). Some say the peasants are more favorably inclined to the regime than opposed to it because the government has brought more roads and electricity to the countryside. Some say the reverse. Some say the peasantry is politically apathetic. The regime is said to be opposed by most intellectuals, the professional class, civil servants and students. Those who contend that more people are opposed to the regime than in favor of it argue that were this not the case it would not be necessary for the regime, after almost four years in power, to continue martial law in force and that if the regime did enjoy popular support it would have held elections by now if for no other reason than to improve its image abroad.

There are at least five major resistance organizations in Greece, some more active than others. They are PAM, an organization of the extreme left, many members of which, including the nominal leader of the organization, Mikis Theodorakis, are communists; PAK, the Pan Hellenic Liberation Movement which is led by Andreas Papan-dreou; Democratic Defense, a centrist group; the Free Greeks, an organization composed principally of former army officers loyal to the King; and the Righas Ferraios, a student group. All are dedicated to the overthrow of the present regime, and some are even willing to use violent means.

As far as legitimate political activity is concerned—if indeed such can be said to exist at all—leading personalities of the former center and right parties—many of whom have been in detention or prison at some time since the present regime came to power—continue to speak out to visitors and some occasionally issue messages to the foreign press. They are extremely careful in their activities, however, acutely aware that they are continually under the "shadow" of martial law. The left has been quiet, some believe because they feel that a natural polarization will result and, in the long run, play into their hands.

* * *

The status of the press is difficult to define—it is neither free nor completely under government control. There is no longer pre-censorship, but the subjects prohibited under the constitution and the new press law are so broad and vaguely defined that the press is reluctant to take chances, particularly in view of the fate of those who have. The Prime Minister said in his April 10, 1970 press conference that offenses described by Article 52 of the new press law—that is, publishing "texts, pictures or illustrations which may revive political passion"—would come before military tribunals. Other offenses come before civilian courts but, under Article 34 of the press law,

those who can be punished for acts committed by the press are "the author of the publication, and regardless of responsibility the Publisher and the Managing Editor . . ."

Furthermore, the press is subjected to indirect measures of control. Article 20 of the press law imposes a penalty on newspapers of large circulation (and it is the opposition newspapers that have the largest circulations) by providing that publications with a circulation of 25,000 or less can be printed on newsprint imported duty free while those with a circulation of between 25,000 and 50,000 receive a discount of 50%, those whose circulation is between 60,000 and 75,000 a discount of 25%, those whose circulation is between 75,000 and 100,000 a discount of 10% and those with a circulation of more than 100,000 copies a discount of 5%. The regime is also said to interfere with the distribution of opposition papers outside of Athens and to penalize offending papers by withdrawing government advertising. Finally, the fact that heavy sentences, ranging up to five years, were given the publishers and others on the staff of *Ethnos*, an anti-government newspaper, in April 1970 for publishing an interview which referred to the need for a "national government" to deal with the Cyprus crisis has had an intimidating effect.

The radio and television networks, being state owned, are completely controlled by the government. Thus the paradoxical situation exists of the United States using Voice of America transmitters in Greece to broadcast about democracy to communist countries, transmitting these broadcasts from installations located in a country where the radio is completely controlled by a regime which has no elected parliament and denies many fundamental civil liberties.

On the other hand, the press apparently feels that it can reprint official documents of foreign governments without punishment. The entire record of the Symington Subcommittee hearings on Greece was published, for example. And there is no restriction on the sale of foreign newspapers and periodicals. All can be found at newsstands in Athens.

* * *

Political observers in Athens say that the leadership of the regime is not monolithic in its views. It is said that four or five members of the inner council of about 15 are unwilling to go even as far as the Prime Minister in returning to parliamentary democracy, and some argue therefore that the most likely alternative to the present regime is a government even less willing to return to a democratic order. There are also reports that there is a small group of younger Army officers who look to Colonel Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, as their example. Highly nationalistic and chauvinistic, they are said to favor authoritarianism at home and a policy of complete independence from all blocs.

Among the opposition politicians of the center and right, there are a few who believe that they could, under certain conditions, work with the regime, acting as a bridge between the present military government and a civilian government. Others in the opposition feel that a political government cannot evolve from the present military government and that there must be a transitional stage with a government of mixed character under the King.

The regime seems to have a firm hold on the administration of the country. While mayors and village presidents were formerly elected,

they are now appointed by the government, and many of them are ex-officers. Similarly, there are military officers attached to every government ministry, in many cases in the post of secretary general, and to university faculties.

* * *

Greeks have, of course, been generally pro-American, but now there are reports of growing anti-Americanism, reports which the Embassy seems inclined to discount. On the one hand, the regime seeks to exploit national resentment of outside interference, just as Andreas Papandreou sought to exploit it in the period immediately before the coup. On the other hand, those who are opposed to the present regime blame the United States for strengthening the government's hand by appearing to support it. (As an example, we were shown a student flyer which said that the Embassy "should stop talking about this country on which Americans have imposed the most corrupt, the most immoral and the most backward form of government so that Greece does not become a European state but an American Protectorate.")

Among opposition leaders—most of whom have the reputation of having been strongly pro-American—there is a feeling that the United States has betrayed its true friends and natural allies in the Greek population, selling out these friendships for immediate strategic advantages. Opposition leaders feel that they have been purposely ignored by the Embassy and some, if not all, are obviously becoming progressively disenchanted with the U.S. role in Greece. They point out the existence of what appears to them to be a vicious circle: the Greek people believe the United States supports the regime, and therefore consider opposing it futile, while the United States interprets absence of outward opposition as evidence of support for the regime. None of those who took this view advocated direct intervention to depose the regime. Instead, they suggested that the United States could afford to put some distance between itself and the regime by means such as restricting the exchange of high-level visits, limiting public appearances by U.S. officials in Greece with leaders of the regime, and characterizing the regime's failure to live up to its promises more realistically in U.S. official statements.

II. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

In almost lyrical terms, the Embassy's unclassified analysis of the Greek economy, which is given to visiting American businessmen, begins by stating: "The Greeks have a word—*apithanos*—magic—which might well be used to describe how Greece through August 1970 was able to raise GNP at constant prices by 7½ percent while holding the rise in the consumer price index to 2.8 percent. . . ." The paper goes on to say that "Greece's economic performance has continued to sparkle" and adds that "the steady progress of one of America's closest allies in twenty years from a backward, agricultural country to a more prosperous, partially industrialized one, is bound to strengthen our political and economic position in this critical part of the world."

The Embassy analysis also notes that since 1953 U.S. investors have provided some 40 percent—the largest single share—of foreign capital; that over one-quarter of Greece's foreign tourists and 60 percent of its tourist earnings are from America; that the United States

has traditionally been the second largest supplier of imports to Greece; and that, in sum, "the United States is far and away the most important source of foreign exchange for Greece."

The following favorable economic factors are cited:

(a) The GNP at 1958 prices rose by 7.1 percent in 1970, according to the Bank of Greece, thus returning to the high rate of growth which began years before the coup but was interrupted in 1967 and 1968.

(b) Manufacturing output rose 10.3 percent in the first nine months of 1970, again according to the Bank of Greece.

(c) Agricultural production rose 7.5 percent over 1969, according to the Embassy.

(d) The average level of consumer prices rose 3.1 percent between January and October 1970, compared to the same period in 1969—a lower rate of increase than any other European country, according to the Bank of Greece.

On the other hand, it is also noted that:

(a) There are inflationary forces present as a result of a 15 percent increase in imports in 1970, a 9 percent rise in industrial wages and a 5 percent rise in pensions of public employees and low unemployment. As a result, the money supply was up last year by 16 percent.

(b) Greece continues to have a chronic trade deficit which reached a level of \$1,003.8 million in the first eleven months of 1970, up from \$842.3 million in 1969. Invisibles produced a net surplus of \$613.1 million in this period so that the balance on current account for the period January through November 1970 was \$387.7 million. (The final figure for the year was \$406.8 million, we were told, compared to \$247.5 million in 1968). The trade deficit in 1970 was apparently worse than planned and had to be offset by borrowing from abroad in the amount of \$28 million between January and November 1970, although this amount was lower than the \$47.1 million borrowed from abroad in the first eleven months of 1969.

* * *

It is emphasized by NATO officials in Brussels, and pointed to with pride by JUSMAGG in Greece, that in 1969 Greece devoted 5.1 percent of its GNP to defense expenditures (this figure is estimated to be 6 percent in 1970). Greece is thus the third highest among NATO countries in terms of the percentage of GNP devoted to defense. Only the United States at 8.7 percent and Portugal at 6.2 percent are higher.

In 1966, before the present regime came to power, Greece contributed only 3.7 percent of its GNP to defense and was tied for sixth place, with the Netherlands, after the United States, Portugal, the UK, France, Germany and Turkey. In fact, between 1966 and 1969, the last year for which complete figures are available, only Greece showed a significant rise in the percentage of GNP devoted to defense, due in large part to increased pay and allowances. During this three-year period, the percentage rose from 8.5 percent to 8.7 percent for the United States, from 3.6 percent to 3.7 percent for Norway and from 4.7 percent to 4.9 percent for Turkey. In the case of Greece, the rise was from 3.7 percent to 5.1 percent.

The 1971 Greek budget presented on December 30, 1970, shows a surplus projected of \$143 million of revenues over expenditures, a surplus 16.3 percent greater than 1970. Expenditures in the sector of "defense and public security" (there is no breakdown in the budget between the two, and expenditures on internal security do not, of course, necessarily contribute to NATO defense purposes) will be up \$50 million (or 9.2 percent compared to a 10.8 percent rise in all budget expenditures) and will represent 32 percent of total regular budget expenditures. Of this \$50 million increase, \$13 million is earmarked for increased military pensions which are now 131 percent higher than they were in 1966. If the budget is implemented as planned, Greek defense and security expenditures will have more than doubled since 1966.

III. THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

In presenting the justification for the fiscal year 1971 Military Assistance Program for Greece to the Congress, the Department of Defense stated: "Greece has been dependent on U.S. military assistance programs to meet its military equipment requirements since 1957." That statement seems to be as true for the period during which the heavy arms embargo was in effect as for any other period since 1947. Indeed, despite the embargo, lifted briefly in the fall of 1968 after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Greece received even larger amounts of U.S. military assistance, taking all categories combined, during the three years and five months the embargo was in effect than in the equivalent period before the embargo was imposed.

Figures recently released by the Department of State for fiscal years 1968, 1969 and 1970 (a period that begins two months after the coup and ends two and a half months before the embargo was finally lifted) show military grant aid deliveries totaling \$131.4 million. In addition, the figures show that Greece received a total of \$169.7 million in delivered excess equipment, at acquisition value, and \$25.8 million under the Foreign Military Sales program in this period. Thus, the total military aid received in these three years was \$326.9 million.

This figure does not, of course, represent the total value of military assistance received while the embargo was in force because the period of fiscal years 1968, 1969 and 1970 is four and a half months shorter than the period in which the embargo applied. But the State Department figures do show that the average total military assistance in the three fiscal years preceding the embargo was about \$95.2 million a year while the average total program in the three fiscal years in which the embargo was in effect was about \$106.9 million a year. This rise was due to the fact that while grant aid deliveries generally declined during the embargo period, compared to the period before the embargo, deliveries of excess defense articles and Foreign Military Sales deliveries both rose sharply.

While these deliveries were being made, a large amount of embargoed material was accumulating. When the embargo was imposed, about \$60 million worth of grant aid was awaiting shipment to Greece. When the embargo was lifted, the total "in the pipeline," over and above the deliveries already cited, was \$42.8 million in excess articles

and \$67.8 million in undelivered Military Assistance Program materiel, according to the Defense Department. In addition, the loans of two submarines and six destroyers have been renewed for ten years.

The embargo of major weapons did not, of course, affect the regime's military capability internally. The United States continued to provide small arms, ammunition, communications equipment, and trucks which could be used by the Army for internal security purposes. Nevertheless, the embargo was not generally popular with opposition leaders in Greece because they felt that it did weaken the country's ability to defend itself. On the other hand, there was no pressure from NATO countries for lifting the embargo and apparently some surprise that the embargo was lifted when it was.

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The personnel directory of JUSMAGG shows a total of 72 U.S. military personnel, 38 U.S. civilians and 57 local employees. The civilians include 15 "technical representatives" from General Electric, Lockheed, RCA, Northrop, Hughes Aircraft, Pratt and Whitney, General Dynamics, Grumman and Curtis Wright whose salaries and expenses are paid by Military Assistance Program funds for "support of Air Force MAP materiel program," according to the Defense Department. The 73 U.S. military personnel are accompanied by 170 dependents and the civilians by 74 dependents. The announced total is thus 354 Americans.

JUSMAGG is, incidentally, excused from end-use reporting requirements because of "recent personnel reductions." We were told that this exemption applies in a number of other countries which receive U.S. military assistance.

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The foregoing personnel figures are, of course, limited to the military advisory mission. They do not include the approximately 7,000 other military personnel, and their dependents, based in Greece. To see what restrictions were imposed on us as representatives of this Committee, we asked what bases we could visit, other than the principal U.S. base at the Athens airport, and we also asked the Embassy for an updated list of U.S. bases and facilities in Greece. The Embassy said that it would have to ask for instructions on both questions. The reply given us the next day was that the Embassy was instructed not to provide us with a list of all U.S. bases and facilities in Greece, but that such a list would be provided in Washington by the Defense Department. As for visits, we were told that we could visit four bases. We were told that we could not visit a number of other bases including a base that had been visited two years ago by members of the Symington Subcommittee staff.

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It should be noted that the United States is the only NATO country now giving Greece military assistance. The only other sizeable military assistance program was that of West Germany, but that government continues its embargo on military assistance imposed soon after the regime assumed power. At the same time, NATO countries do not restrict their commercial sales to Greece. According to press reports, West Germany has sold Greece patrol aircraft and submarines and France has sold patrol boats and tanks.

The purchase of French arms is seen by some U.S. officials as ill-conceived because of the drain on Greece's foreign exchange reserves. But the Greek press refers to these foreign arms purchases, as did the Prime Minister in a recent speech, as proof of Greece's ability to provide itself with the weapons it needs. Most independent observers—and some U.S. officials—have concluded that the motivation for weapons purchases from France was primarily political, designed to put pressure on the United States to resume shipments of heavy arms. And indeed the prospect of Greece's buying arms from France, instead of receiving them as gifts from the United States, does seem to have given rise to some concern among American officials that the United States was in danger of losing a source of leverage that could be applied on the Greek Government and, as a result, to have had an influence on the American decision to lift the embargo.

IV. THE EMBASSY AND THE REGIME

"Is the Junta deceiving the Embassy, is the Embassy deceiving the State Department or is the State Department deceiving the Congress?", a prominent Greek critic of the regime—known to be pro-American—asked us. The question was repeated, in less well formulated fashion, countless times during our stay in Athens. Those who posed the question pointed not only to the statement that "the trend toward a constitutional order has been established" but also to the testimony of Executive Branch witnesses before Senator Symington's subcommittee last June, specifically the statements by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roger Davies that "we are informed that the entire constitution will be implemented by the end of the year" and that "it is my belief that the assurance we have received from Athens, that the constitution will be implemented in full by the end of the calendar year, will be carried out."

The Embassy appears to have operated on the assumption that the regime was sincere in its declared intention to return to parliamentary democracy and that the continuation of the arms embargo was harmful to the development of the kind of relationship which would permit the United States to exercise some persuasion on the Greek regime to restore civil liberties and parliamentary government. It appears to other observers with whom we talked, however, that the Embassy tends to read more into the regime's statements than the regime intends or than is warranted on the basis of the performance to date. Certainly, the general attitude of the Embassy is defensive about the regime—quick to praise during the period before the embargo was lifted but slow to criticize now that the embargo has been ended and the regime in default on its assurances.

Many in the Embassy tend to rationalize the actions of the regime in terms similar to those the regime itself uses. For example, the Embassy apparently believes that the proposed law on political parties is basically democratic and compatible with local conditions despite the fact that under Article 58 of the new constitution, which the new law would implement when put into force, the charter of every political party must be approved by the Constitutional Court which also can supervise the functioning of the parties and has the power to dissolve any party whose "aims or activities are manifestly or covertly opposed to the form of government . . ."

In this same connection, we noted that in Embassy meetings the coup and its aftermath was often referred to as the "revolution." Those Greeks opposed to the regime in Athens refer not to the "revolution" but to the "junta" or the "Colonels." Others, less partisan, refer to the "government," or the "leadership" or the "regime." It is only those who support the government who refer to the "revolution." The term is certainly not neutral.

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The Public Affairs Office of the Department of State, presumably on the basis of reporting from the Embassy in Athens, publishes an unclassified quick reference aid entitled "Greece: U.S. Policy." The latest version of that paper, published in January of this year, makes a number of statements that do not seem to be accurate.

It states that: "From a high of over 6,000 in 1967, there are now approximately 300 political prisoners. The Prime Minister has pledged to free all remaining political detainees by the end of April 1971 if security conditions permit." There are, of course, far more than 300 political prisoners if the numbers of those in exile (of which there are 60), detainees (of which there are about 345) and sentenced prisoners (of which there are about 350) are combined. The 6,000 figure refers, moreover, to those suspected of communist sympathies who were detained immediately after the coup. The Prime Minister's statement applied to the remaining detainees from among that group but not to those sentenced for political crimes, to say nothing of those arrested since November.

The State Department paper includes the remarkable sentence that "With minor exceptions, all institutional laws necessary to put into force the constitution were promulgated by the end of 1970 as pledged by the Greek Government." As we have noted in this report, the institutional laws not yet put into force are hardly minor since they relate to the state of seige, political parties, parliament and the constitutional court. Furthermore, the constitution is by no means yet in effect; elections have not been scheduled or even promised and martial law is still in effect superseding the guarantees of due process for which the constitution provides.

Finally, on the question of torture, the paper states that during the operative period of the agreement between the Greek Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross, "no instances of torture of prisoners were confirmed by the Red Cross." The fact of the matter is that, as a matter of policy, the Red Cross never confirms or denies instances of torture or indeed ever issues public reports. Its reports were made to the Greek Government and were confidential. The implication of the statement quoted is that no torture has taken place when in fact it seems far more probable that some tortures have occurred.

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During our visit to Athens, we were struck by the fact that while the Embassy does not question the desirability of a return to parliamentary government in Greece, it not only rationalizes the lack of progress but often appears to be more concerned with the regime's

"image" than with the substance of its actions. Time and again we heard expressions of regret at the regime's poor sense of public relations.

As far as arrests under martial law are concerned, the Embassy stated to us that it assumed that the arrests were being carried out under the letter, if not the spirit, of the law. Yet no one in Athens was able to cite to us any provisions of the military or civilian penal code which permits holding persons in detention incommunicado for more than 20 days.

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We have already referred several times to the statement issued by the Department of State at the time the embargo on the shipment of heavy arms was lifted last September. A number of opposition leaders told us that they had not objected to the resumption of heavy arms aid on the ground that no patriotic Greek could oppose the provision of U.S. arms to help safeguard the security of their country. But they emphasized that they had regarded the kind of statement issued in connection with ending the embargo to be of primary importance. One opposition leader told us that the statement that was issued was "pure nonsense", and he asked: "In view of the actual trend of events in Greece, why did the United States become a lying witness in favor of the regime?" The strongly pro-Western former Foreign Minister Averoff gave us a copy of the statement he had issued on September 23 to foreign correspondents. In that statement, he said that he regretted the text of the announcement and that the assurance in the statement that conditions had been created for a return to normal democratic life signified "either that the responsible Americans are badly informed by their services or that they seek for Greece the masks of democracy in order to present those to their public opinion in order to calm it." His statement went on to say:

"The reality in Greece is that the situation has been improved, that we live under a dictatorship that is more lenient but that individual liberties have not been reestablished, that human dignity is trampled upon and that the conditions for a return to democracy have not been created. On the contrary, it appears that conditions are being created for a very long prolongation of the dictatorship under the comic masks of democracy. Not to recognize this reality, and to countenance the harmful hypocrisy, does not serve the prestige of the United States which until yesterday was respected and loved by the Greeks."

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V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Since the present Greek regime seized power, U.S. policy has had two declared objectives: to maintain Greek military cooperation with the United States and NATO, and to bring about the restoration of democratic institutions in Greece. Both objectives became enmeshed in the matter of the embargo on heavy arms.

The decision to lift the embargo was based on a judgment that continuing the embargo would, on the one hand, jeopardize military cooperation with Greece and diminish Greece's ability to defend itself against Communist aggression without, on the other hand, producing any further movement toward the restoration of democratic institutions. Furthermore, the Embassy had apparently persuaded itself that

significant progress had been made in returning to democratic order and that, on the basis of assurances given or assumed, even greater progress would be forthcoming by the end of 1970.

In the military sphere, it would appear that our declared policy objectives have been achieved. While there may be some question as to the realistic limits of Greek cooperation in the event of a crisis involving the United States in the Middle East, insofar as it has been tested, Greek cooperation on military matters has been satisfactory. It should be noted, however, that this cooperation continues to involve a *quid pro quo* in the form of a large U.S. military assistance program. By contrast, the declared policy objectives in the political sphere have not been achieved. The "trend toward a constitutional order" is at best ambiguous, and the confident predictions by American officials with regard to the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy have not been borne out by events.

To many with whom we talked, it does not appear that the United States has placed as much emphasis on pursuing its avowed political objectives as on pursuing its military objectives. Those who hold this view believe that the United States has sacrificed its interest in seeing a return to democratic institutions in order not to jeopardize continued access to military bases, access which they believe any Greek Government would grant. Others, putting aside considerations of principle and morality, fear that we are being shortsighted from a practical standpoint. They argue that the continued absence of meaningful progress toward restoring democratic processes works to our long-run disadvantage and that the emphasis the United States has placed on maintaining smooth relations with the regime has strengthened the position of the regime in Greece and at the same time has reduced the incentives for a return to democratic order.

Many observers--both Greek and American--pointed out to us that, rightly or wrongly, most Greeks believe that the United States supports the regime. Given the importance Greeks attach to American support, because of America's role in Greece since World War II and the respect for the power of the United States, this belief, quite apart from its accuracy or our intentions, constitutes the regime's greatest asset and at the same time provides the United States with its most effective potential leverage. As far as the pursuit of our declared objectives in the political sphere is concerned, however, this potential leverage does not seem to have been effectively applied. The policy of friendly persuasion has clearly failed. The regime has accepted the friendship, and the military assistance, but has ignored the persuasion. Indeed, the regime seems to have been able to exert more leverage on us with regard to military assistance than we have been willing to exert on the regime with regard to political reform. We see no evidence that this will not continue to be the case.

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