

# RED CHINA SPEAKS

*"Political power comes out of a barrel of a gun"*  
—Mao-tse Tung



**Communist China's  
Attitude on the Current  
"Debate" in its Own Words**

*Published in the public interest by:*  
**THE COMMITTEE of ONE MILLION**  
*(Against the Admission of Communist  
China to the United Nations)*

## *"What Does U.S. Big Debate On Red China Signify?"*

*Full text of an editorial in the People's Daily published  
in Peiping on April 9, 1966.*

The so-called China question has become the focus of attention in the U.S. in the past two months. U.S. scholars and idea men in the service of the ruling classes, and responsible officials, have put forth their views in a great debate on China policy.

Beginning from the latter part of January, the House Far East and West Pacific Sub-Committee held a number of public hearings on China policy. From the beginning of March, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee invited a number of "experts on the China question" to give testimony. Discussions on the "China question" have also been held in American universities, "learned societies" and other "non-governmental" bodies, and among religionists. The U.S. President and some high officials have also spoken on China policy on many occasions.

This is a continuation of the debate on the Vietnam question some time ago.

The consequences arising from the constant escalation of the war of aggression in Vietnam by the Johnson administration are the immediate cause for the discussion on the "China question." This aggressive adventure has not only met with strong opposition from the American people but also aroused anxiety among certain sections of the U.S. ruling circles. They fear that this would lead to a "clash with China" and that such a "clash" will be for the U.S. "the worst possible catastrophe that could develop in the rest of this century."

There is a more profound reason why the China policy is so widely discussed in the United States. The U.S.

imperialist policy of hostility towards China has failed to prevent China from advancing by leaps and bounds along the path of socialist revolution and socialist construction and to check the ever expanding influence of the Chinese revolution.

The anti-China betrayal of the revisionist Soviet leadership does not help the United States at all. China, which holds high the banner of anti-imperialism, has become the greatest insurmountable obstacle to the execution of the counter-revolutionary global strategy of U.S. imperialism. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy said on February 21 that the foreign policy aims of China and the U.S. are "totally antithetic" and there is "a very fundamental conflict" between them. He admitted that "Communist China is without doubt the most serious and perplexing problem that confronts our foreign policy today."

It can thus be seen that the present debate reflects not the "powerfulness" of the U.S. but its weakness and defeat and its helplessness and dilemma in face of the great Chinese people. Some influential Americans criticised U.S.-China policy as "in a fundamental sense unsuccessful" and "long since out of date". They called for a "fundamental review of our China policy." It is against such a background that the Johnson administration wants to make use of the debate as a smokescreen to sidetrack the strong dissatisfaction at home and abroad with the U.S. anti-China policy and to cover up the continuance of the policy of hostility and aggression against China.

The debate shows that the difference between these idea men is about what counter-revolutionary method should be adopted. They are at one in persisting in the policy of hostility and aggression towards China. That is why none of them could put forth a feasible formula. After repeated deliberations and consideration, the experts ended in agreeing to the continuation and stepping up of the "containment" policy. They added the phrase "without isolation" after the word "containment", hence the so-called formula "containment without isolation."

Let's see what kind of stuff this formula is.

The "containment" policy is the core of the U.S. China policy. *Newsweek* of March 7 said, "the necessity for containment of China has become an axiom of U.S. foreign policy." Since taking office, the Johnson administration has pushed this policy a step forward. It has openly declared that China is the principal enemy of the United States, and has shifted the focus of its global strategy from Europe to Asia. Besides building up more vigorously the "crescent defense line" stretching from South Korea to Thailand, it pins its hopes more and more on collusion with the Khrushchev revisionists, Japanese militarists and Indian reactionaries to "contain" China. William Bundy said in his February 21 speech that the "containment" of China "is the essence of what we are trying to do."

There is also an aim in the U.S. policy of "containment" which cannot be made public. By raising the anti-China black banner, the U.S. wants further to tighten its control over the countries around China, suppress the revolutionary movements in these countries and turn them into U.S. military bases.

What then is "without isolation" all about? A. Doak Barnett, acting director of Columbia University's East Asian Institute, said as the first witness at the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee hearing on March 8 that while sticking to its military "containment" of China, the U.S. should aim at "maximum contacts with and maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international community." This idea was very favorably received in American political quarters. U.S. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey said in a speech on March 19, "we must achieve the containment of Asian communism without isolating the Chinese people." The idea of "dual approach" advanced by Professor Donald Zagoria, another Columbia University "expert on China", amounts to the same thing.

In reality, the "containment without isolation" formula is a manifestation of the U.S. imperialist counter-revolutionary dual tactics on China policy. In short, this means on the one hand continued aggression against and encirclement of China, containment and isolation of China, while on the other, indulging in the vain hope to bring about "peaceful evolution" in China so that revolutionary China will degenerate gradually. "Containment" is the main thing in the dual tactics.

Commenting on this formula, the *Christian Science Monitor* said on March 6 that the U.S. policy of "containing" China militarily "has not changed. On the contrary, it has stiffened as a result of the war in Vietnam." But the Johnson government wanted this policy "applied together with a long-range political policy" to "lead them (Chinese Communists) down the path that the Russians followed between Stalin and Brezhnev, away from violence and toward an enforced responsibility." This reveals the counter-revolutionary character of the policy of "containment without isolation."

But U.S. imperialism has found a wrong target. The Chinese people have long seen through the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism. Whether by its "tough" tactics or by its "soft" tactics or by the simultaneous application of both tactics, U.S. imperial-

ism cannot hope to browbeat or deceive the Chinese people. Even the U.S. ruling circles themselves are not sure whether or not these tactics will bear fruit. William Bundy said on March 16 that insofar as the policy of "containment without isolation" was concerned, the United States had been acting on it for sometime. But he admitted that there was no indication that China would change its policy.

Helplessly and hopelessly, Harvard Professor John K. Fairbank, the so-called veteran "China specialist", and others again put forward the long discredited "two Chinas" formula. Some others proposed that "unconditional discussions" be held and "diplomatic relations" established with China before the future of Taiwan is discussed. But even Dean Rusk him-

self had to admit that as far as the "two Chinas" proposal was concerned, "it was useless" because China had rejected it.

U.S. imperialism's persistent hostility towards the Chinese people is determined by its reactionary and aggressive nature. There is nothing strange about it. What is strange is that U.S. imperialism even hopes to find a "way out" of the blind alley of its China policy. The great debate in the United States over Washington's China policy shows once again that it is mere illusion. Look, how many politicians, "scholars" and "specialists" took part in these discussions. But nothing fruitful has come out of them. Nor will there be any result if more discussions are held. Gentlemen in Washington, there is nothing you can do about it!

*Members of the 89th Congress who have endorsed the Committee of One Million's Declaration against any concessions to Communist China: the admission of Communist China to the U. N.; United States diplomatic recognition of the Peiping regime; trade relations between the United States and Communist China; any policy of accommodation which might be interpreted as U. S. acquiescence in, or approval of, Communist China's aggression, direct or indirect, against her neighbors.*

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Committee of One Million at the above address.

## About this pamphlet . . .

Early in 1966, the Committee of One Million published a pamphlet entitled "RED CHINA SPEAKS: An Examination Of Communist China's Attitudes On War And Peace In Its Own Words". The publication quoted a number of official statements made by the Peiping regime as an indication of the futility of attempting to deal with Communist China in a rational and civilized manner.

Notwithstanding the attitude of Red China's leaders, there have been increasing efforts during the past months — well-publicized and well-financed — to change present American policy toward Communist China: withdrawal of United States opposition to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations; unilateral American action which would lead to full diplomatic recognition of Peiping; dropping all barriers to trade and other "exchanges" with Red China. This growing campaign is being carried on in the face of Communist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia and *at the same time as young Americans are being shot down by Chinese Communist bullets in Vietnam!*

Each day, newspapers report on some new statement urging unilateral American concessions to Communist China. These emanate from various academic groups, religious bodies, editorialists, organizations concerned with foreign affairs and "civil rights," and from a few Senators and Congressmen. This minority point of view — rehashing old and defunct ideas — is presented as part of a great American "debate" on United States-China policy.

Unhappily for those who urge changes in present American policy, the Chinese Communists simply refuse to cooperate. Americans have been hearing the arguments of those who would offer practically unlimited concessions to Communist China. It is important that Americans also know the attitude of the Chinese Communists.

What follows is the text of an editorial in the *People's Daily* (the official mouthpiece of the Peiping regime) which was published on April 9, 1966. In the article, the Chinese Communist regime replied in no uncertain terms to the current domestic debate on U.S.-China policy. It denounced the "containment without isolation" formula as "a manifestation of the U.S. imperialist counter-revolutionary dual tactics on China policy." Mentioning the House and Senate hearings and the academic discussions, it charged that the Johnson administration wanted to make use of the debate "as a smokescreen to sidetrack the strong dissatisfaction at home and abroad with the U.S. anti-China policy." It attacked everyone, including Prof. John K. Fairbank, who was described as "helplessly and hopelessly" promoting the long discredited "Two Chinas" policy. All these so-called "experts," it sniffed, were Washington's "idea men," seeking to perpetuate these "dual tactics."

The Committee of One Million is reprinting this editorial in full as a supplement to its earlier pamphlet and for the benefit of those Americans who seem convinced that the leaders of Communist China can somehow be made to behave in a responsible and peaceful manner.



# FOUR AGAINST

## The Red China Lobby

DAVID NELSON ROWE • WALTER H. JUDD • FRANZ MICHAEL • GEORGE E. TAYLOR

## Introduction

THE WAR in Vietnam has brought into sharper focus the perennial question of Communist China; the question, that is, of what should be done—if anything—about admission to the United Nations, diplomatic recognition, increased trade, cultural exchange.

In this connection, it is astonishing to note how little things have changed since the late 1940s when Mao Tse-tung & Co. were helped to power by the band of China experts in the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) and in the State Department.

Then they were saying that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers and that the element in China to be most concerned about was the "corrupt" Chiang Kai-shek and the warloads. Our China experts of the left-Liberal persuasion helped the Communists seize a continent.

Now they are concerned with legitimizing the Red China regime in the concert of nations. Their help is being extended precisely at the time when Communist China finds its fortunes at low ebb—at home and abroad, economically and diplomatically.

These friends and members of the Red China lobby point to the Soviet Union as a happy example of the co-existence spirit which the free world might expect from Communist China, if only the mainland regime were accorded the minimal international courtesies—diplomatic recognition, admission to the United Nations, expanded trade.

The final abandonment of Nationalist China which such a policy would entail creates no crisis of conscience among these self-described realists, for the main enemy in the Far East continues to be Chiang Kai-shek.

One of the ironies of the situation lies in the fact that the very people who in large measure are personally and historically responsible for the political disaster on the Chinese

mainland are today hailed as experts by the communications media, the universities and important members of the Congress.

Thus, despite the brilliant and scholarly exposure of the IPR and its collaborators by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee more than a decade ago, once again we hear the confident voices of such experts as Owen Lattimore, John K. Fairbank, John Stewart Service and Oliver Edmund Clubb. A sorry confirmation of Hegel's observation to the effect that the one thing we learn from history is that we do not learn from history!

The recent hearings by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee furnished a platform for many spokesmen for the Red China lobby, all of whom peddled the new line of "containment without isolation," the now fashionable euphemism for appeasement.

### The Opposition

Fortunately, the hearings also featured testimony by some spokesmen for a realistic approach to the China question. Among these, four in particular developed a vigorous and closely reasoned rebuttal to the vagaries of the Red China lobby. The four are: Professor David Nelson Rowe of Yale University, former Representative Walter H. Judd, Professor Franz Michael of Georgetown University and Professor George E. Taylor of the University of Washington.

—David Rowe is a professor in the Department of International Studies at Yale University. He was born in Nanking, China and worked with the OSS during World War II. He was a special assistant to the U.S. Ambassador to China. He taught at Taiwan University from 1954-1956; was a member of the international secretariat of the United Nations Found-

ing Conference in San Francisco in 1945. Among his books is *Modern China: A Brief History*.

—Walter Judd was a medical missionary in China from 1925 to 1938. He returned to the United States with his family in '38 and spent the next two years lecturing to church groups around the country on the dangers of Japanese imperialism. He was elected to the 78th Congress from the Fifth Congressional District in Minnesota and served through the 82nd Congress. He was a U.S. delegate to the 12th session of the UN General Assembly; one of the founders of the Committee of One Million against Admission of Red China to the United Nations. He speaks Chinese fluently and knows personally most of the influential Chinese leaders, both Nationalist and Communist.

—Franz Michael taught in Hangchow, China from 1934 to 1938. From 1942 to 1964 he was professor of Far Eastern History and Government and assistant director of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute at the University of Washington. He is now professor of International Affairs and Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University. Among his publications is *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China*. He has just published the first part of a three-part documentary history of the Taiping Rebellion.

—George Taylor is Director of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington. He lived and taught in China from 1930 to 1939. During World War II he served as a China expert in the State Department. He is the author of a number of books on the Far East, including *The Struggle for North China* and *America in the New Pacific*. He is the co-author (with Franz Michael) of *The Far East in the Modern World*.

Although these scholars represent a minority view in the American in-



tellectual community, their testimony articulates American public opinion on Red China (an opinion mobilized in large degree, since 1953, by the Committee of One Million).

Significantly, the national platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties oppose the admission of Red China to the UN; a Gallup poll of January, 1966 shows 67 per cent of the American people are opposed to the admission of Red China to the UN; the Congress has repeatedly gone on record opposing concessions to Peking.

All of which opens the nagging question: Why does the Liberal Establishment pursue an appeasement policy toward Communist regimes?

The appeasement policy is not based on a principled pacifism, in view of the fact that the Liberals enthusiastically supported the war against Nazi Germany. Nor does the appeasement policy spring *exclusively* from a fear of a mutually destructive nuclear war. It should be remembered that the Liberals also pushed for an appeasement line during the early postwar period when the United States enjoyed a *monopoly* of nuclear bombs.

The answer is indirectly suggested

in a statement by Senator J. W. Fulbright in the first of his Johns Hopkins University lectures. Commenting on the national debate on the Vietnam war, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee warned: "It is by no means certain that the relatively healthy atmosphere in which the debate is now taking place will not give way to fears, and tolerance and freedom of discussion will give way to a false and strident patriotism."

Senator Fulbright's qualification of patriotism is not to be taken too literally. This is the Aesopian language of the modern, sophisticated Liberal. For it is patriotism—normal, healthy patriotism—which propels the average American to oppose international Communism. And it is this normal healthy patriotism which, in the nature of things, would be heightened in the course of a genuine, all-out struggle against international Communism. The Liberal senses the violent contradiction between patriotism—of any degree—and the intellectual power position of the Establishment. It is patriotism—more than Communism—which the Liberal Establishment sees as the main enemy.

To be sure, there is always the possibility that normal, healthy patriotism, under a condition of great international stress, may be transformed into the "false and strident" patriotism that Fulbright evokes. It is this added risk from which the Liberal particularly shrinks, preferring instead, through an appeasement policy, the risk of a Communism triumphant.

If this be so, there can be no genuine debate between the Liberal and the anti-Communist communities. Yet it is important that the formal argument against appeasing Communist China be widely disseminated. For the argument finally finds its way to grassroots Americans and fortifies them in their conviction that there is no substitute for victory. And it does correct the thinking of those members of the Liberal Establishment who are sensitive to the persuasive power of right reason.

Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the press, radio and television gave only meager coverage to the genuinely expert testimony of these witnesses. In the interest of fuller reportage, the thrust of their polemic is reproduced in this Special Supplement.

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## *The China Problem Today in United States Policy-Making*

DAVID NELSON ROWE

THE KOREAN WAR proved that Communist China was willing to fight the Free World in order to achieve Communist expansionist aims in Asia *vis-à-vis* Korea (Japan was the real objective and the most important one).

The formula has been repeated in: Tibet—anti-India and Nehru.

Laos—250,000 Chinese Communist troops massed on the Laos frontier in 1961-1962 to bring a settlement favorable to Communist China.

Indian Frontier—this involved an actual Sino-Indian war, with Communist Chinese troops fighting Indian troops.

Communist Chinese support for North Vietnam aggression against South Vietnam. The Sino-Russian ploy: North Vietnam (the North

Korea of this episode) is immune from destruction at the hands of the United States and its allies, because of its joint Sino-Soviet backing. Communist China stands behind North Vietnam's aggression militarily, to prevent such military action against North Vietnam as is necessary to the attainment of our military objectives in and for South Vietnam. Thus, Communist China achieves for North Vietnam immunity from the consequences of its aggression in South Vietnam which the previous Sino-Soviet techniques and strategies of support for North Korea failed to achieve, and this without any cost thus far in Communist Chinese manpower.

Thus, Sino-Soviet "indirect" aggression in South Vietnam depends

upon their joint success in preventing the United States from taking military action against North Vietnam adequate to achieve the defense of South Vietnamese independence.

The chief Sino-Soviet weapon in this psychological warfare struggle is the threat of massive Chinese manpower intervening as "people's volunteers" in the Vietnamese war.

To mitigate the risks of Communist China's Southeast Asia policy is the aim of all true friends of Communist China in the U.S.A. today. Many others aid and abet this aim for a variety of reasons.

Thus, almost immediately after the Johnson policy of heavy, direct United States military involvement in the Vietnamese war was initiated, the friends of Communist China be-

gan to emerge from the relative obscurity into which they had been forced by the Communist Chinese attack on us in Korea and to start openly supporting Communist China again and attacking the United States Far Eastern policy at the same time.

These movements, so patently anti-anti-Communist, seem to have forced the Administration to speak as though Communism by and large was not involved in the Vietnamese war, thus robbing us of one of the chief psychological supports and chief political bases of the war in Vietnam and the

such as the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense (much of whose testimony has to be classified). This show then goes on radio and TV (highly edited toward the Left). The whole effect is to depict public "experts" as at odds with the Administration. This not only convinces the Communists in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow of divisions of opinion in the United States that do not exist in fact. It also seems to drive the Administration toward public positions on Communist China that contradict its public position that the

course of the Communist world revolution. In the course of such an event, however, the USSR would assuredly grab both Manchuria and Sinkiang, in order to have those Chinese areas available as bases to start over again the job of communizing east Asia. But the rest of China could be saved, without doubt.

If such a showdown can be prevented for five to ten more years, the pro-Communist-China and anti-anti-Communist elements in this country count on the development of Communist Chinese thermonuclear power to produce a standoff and make Communist China then invulnerable to United States destruction, by means of the retaliatory threat. They could prolong this stage ten to twenty years during which either one and probably both of two things would happen:

The United States would prove unable to develop any effective deterrent to so-called "indirect aggression" and "people's war" with the result that all of Asia would come under Chinese Communist domination and control and the impact on Africa and Latin America would be disastrous.

Under the deterrent of terror the political and psychological pressures toward a *détente* with Communist China similar to present illusions along that line with the USSR, would engender a thorough and complete co-existence policy *vis-à-vis* the Communist Chinese.

The Communist Chinese need co-existence much worse than do the Russians. Why? The lack of massive external support and their huge and insoluble internal problems doom them forever to weakness and mediocrity and complete totalitarianism and military adventurism. They are trying their hardest now to soften our approach to them under the blackmail of aggression and war, to gain *at no cost to them politically* what they need in outside economic and technical support from the West and particularly from the U.S.A. This is why their friends in the United States are trying so hard to soften the American approach to Communist China.

What are the main themes now being pushed by the pro-Communist China and anti-anti-Communist elements along this line?

(Theme) The historical causation



whole war against Communist aggression everywhere. This is clearly seen in President Johnson's Baltimore speech and even more so in his recent speech at Freedom House, New York where he uses "Red" and "Communist" just once each in the whole speech, playing down Communism as an issue in the Vietnam war.

The purpose of the anti-anti-Communists here is clear, namely to try to show that the war in Vietnam has no valid ideological basis and thus to depict it as naked United States aggression without any justification. Who sold President Johnson the line of de-emphasizing Communism as an issue in the Vietnamese war?

Paralleling these movements are the hearings in the Senate which seem to aim at two main effects:

1) To align selected civilian propagandists uniformly against the main lines of United States foreign policy in Asia and then to bring to rebut them the main Administration figures

war in Vietnam could soon be ended if only Communist Chinese attitudes and measures would change. It also seems to lead members of the Administration to start softening their policy of resistance to Communist China by talking "containment without isolation" and to that extent undercutting the Administration's own experts such as Secretary of State Rusk and Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy.

2) To have a main effect of softening our resistance to Communist China. Senator Fulbright himself states that the main aim of his hearings on China is a political aim, namely to prevent a war with Communist China.

In fact, the prevention of a military showdown now between the United States and Communist China is the main aim of Communists everywhere. Why?

If such a showdown came soon it would destroy Communist China as such and constitute the single most catastrophic setback in history to the

line. The Communist Chinese foreign policies are merely a logical result of China's frustrations and suffering at the hands of the outside world for the last century or more.

(Theme) The "inevitable softening of the Communist Chinese." This line is pushed hard by all the pro-Communist-China and anti-anti-Communist elements. Even Fidel Castro gives them aid and comfort by blasting the current Chinese Communist leaders as "senile" and anticipating a less dangerous Communist Chinese leadership to come with the demise of Mao.

(Theme) The "two-Chinas" line. This is tantamount to saying we can play with enemies without alienating friends. Whatever the distant future holds we cannot know. But for the responsible policy-making future there can be no two-Chinas policy for the United States or anyone else. For example, the United Kingdom has tried to adopt a two-Chinas policy: recognition of Peking and trying to do business with Taipei. Result: it has neither China. The Communist Chinese have never entered full diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom cannot really cooperate with the Republic of China, or Taiwan, the single most rapidly advancing and developing area in Asia. By contrast, the United States without recognition of Peking has much higher-level diplomatic contacts with the Chinese Communists than Britain, and is the main ally and collaborator with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

### *Hard and Soft*

*Question:* Can any United States Administration advocate abandonment of the Republic of China without committing political suicide?

*Answer:* This is what two-Chinas policy advocates really are urging the Administration toward, some knowingly and others unwittingly. I.e. the two-Chinas policy means to start full diplomatic and other relations with Communist China, and with a trend toward this once set in motion we can more easily abandon the Republic of China on Taiwan, particularly since it would break relations with us if we recognized Communist China.

(Theme) The "they don't mean what they say" line. Anyone who be-

lieves in drawing the lessons of history should not object if we say the world would have been better off if more people had taken seriously such historical documents as the Marxist Manifesto, Hitler's *Mein Kampf* or the pre-World War II utterances of the Japanese imperialists. The current utterances of the Communist Chinese leadership seem just as dangerously unrealistic today as the previously cited ones did then. They are therefore hard to give credence to. They are, in fact, filled with nonsense, but then of course so too was *Mein Kampf*! But this is merely to say that all madmen are dangerous, to a great extent precisely because they are mad.

*Questions:* When men talk madness (as the Communist Chinese do) would it not be wise to assume they mean it until and unless they prove otherwise by their acts? Yes. Are the Communist Chinese proving otherwise by their acts? No—they do just the opposite. Witness: Korea, the Taiwan Straits, the Indian frontier, Laos, and Thailand, as well as Vietnam.

(Theme) The "simultaneous hard and soft" line: "containment, but not isolation." The friends of Communist China and the anti-anti-Communists are constantly describing our post-World War II policy toward the USSR as combining these two features and advocating that we adopt such a policy toward Communist China.

What is the truth?

Our immediate postwar policy toward the USSR was not one of containment, but of surrender. Eastern Europe and Outer Mongolia were surrendered to the USSR with the connivance of the U.S. and the highest pressures being brought to bear by the U.S. on our allies to surrender to the USSR land grabs, as in the case of Nationalist China and of Mongolia. This was an effort to appease Stalin and get him to accept this as his price for cooperating with us. He took the bribe, but did not cooperate.

The containment policy was then resorted to and it has prevented further territorial takeover. However, this whole policy is now threatened by French action in re NATO, and the chief deterrent to armed action by the USSR in Europe is now the mutual thermonuclear threat.

Accordingly, we have generally not applied the policy of surrender of ter-

ritory to Communist China, and in every case but one have resisted Communist Chinese efforts to push outward. This case was Laos in 1961-62, and much of our trouble in Vietnam stems from the application to Laos of the formula of appeasement and surrender through the device we tried to use in China (1946-47) to prevent a Communist Chinese takeover pure and simple, i.e. the coalition government with Communists in it. Sino-Soviet cooperation helped bring about the surrender in Laos and thus to mark out South Vietnam and Thailand as the most likely Communist targets.

As far as Communist China is concerned containment means isolation: the two are one and inseparable and the crux of this problem is Taiwan. The Communist Chinese price for non-isolation (which is a two-sided matter, not solely under our control) is the handing over of Taiwan to them, i.e. destruction of containment. *Any United States Administration which would even suggest any such thing would commit political suicide by producing a major catastrophe in Asian affairs.*

### *What About Our Allies?*

(Theme) The "there is no support among our allies" for our Southeast Asian policy line. This line was, for example, advanced in re the Japanese by that great authority (?) on Japanese affairs, Mr. George Kennan. Mr. Kennan today seems to know even less about Far Eastern affairs than he did seventeen years ago, when I asked him what Asia would mean in our future struggle with Communism. He replied then that the struggle with Communism would be settled somewhere along a line drawn between Stettin in the north and Trieste in the south. Of course, since then we have had Greece and Turkey in Europe; Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and the 17th parallel in Vietnam, not to mention Laos, and the Indian frontier, in Asia.

The Japanese people will respect and honor success on our part in Vietnam. Like others, they view with apprehension any irresolution, lack of determination, or willingness to pull out and surrender, on our part. This is generally true of all Asians, from

Japan clear around through Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Southeast Asia and South Asia. This is one of many reasons why we cannot and must not fail in Vietnam.

Other friends and allies, including Korea, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, are all helping in various ways in Vietnam, and will doubtless help still more in the future. If and when the need arises, the arrangements have no doubt already been worked out for the Republic of China, on Taiwan, to become directly involved. But, whether this will be required only time can tell.

As to allies and friends in Europe and elsewhere the vast preponderance of them approve what we are doing whether they say so or not. Secretary Rusk is right on this.

### *What Price Knowledge?*

Indeed the notion that to know the Chinese Communists better will make it easier for us to tolerate them is no more true than if we were to say that to know Italy better would make it easier for us to tolerate the Mafia. The fact is we already know enough about both the Mafia and the Chinese Communists to know one thing, and that is that we do not need to know any more in order to justify our policies of opposition and hostility. Of course we can always use more knowledge on what can be described as a tactical level, such, for example, as is being supplied by U-2 overflights from Taiwan. But we are not likely to learn much from proposals to allow our scholars and students of China to visit Communist China, and for two reasons:

1. The Chinese Communists are not going to allow anyone to visit there unless they are convinced that he is a dependable friend of Communism and of Chinese Communism, in particular. They have been following this policy for years.

2. Under these circumstances what knowledge is brought back is likely to be either superficial or biased along pro-Chinese Communist lines.

Even in the USSR, as my colleague Professor Barghoorn [of Yale, who was imprisoned by the Soviets for a fortnight] could no doubt testify, efforts at objective fact-gathering by foreign scholars are not without their

risks! The hazards to life involved in even minor contacts with the utterly incompatible, are clear from the recent death of an innocent American traveler [Newcomb Mott] while in the hands of the Russians. The subsequent warnings to such potential travelers by the State Department were well merited.

The campaign along the lines analyzed above is being carried out in this country at a pitch of intensity unmatched in recent propaganda history. The so-called "teach-in" more extensively used in the earlier phases of the anti-Vietnam-war campaign, has not been emphasized in this one. Instead, full-blown new organizations have been established on a nationwide basis, including ARFEP, or "Americans for a Review of Far Eastern Policy." This organization was started on the Yale campus by a group of students and faculty members. It has been spread across the country from there by a well-manned group of promoters and organizers. Recently a large advertisement advancing its views appeared, for example, in a San Francisco newspaper, as emanating from the "Northern California Chapter" of ARFEP.

Certain features of this organization appear very clearly. For example, what they mean by a "review" of our Far Eastern policy usually turns out to be nothing but propaganda in favor of Communist China in the shape of support for its admission to the United Nations, United States recognition of the Red regime, full United States relations in trade, cultural relations, etc., well calculated to advance the aims, purposes, and interests of Communist China. This propaganda also, at times, is heavily in derogation of our ally, the Republic of China, of President and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, etc.

Second, the main centers of organization and the main personnel involved are the colleges and universities. I do not know how many ARFEP centers and branches there are, or how many persons have "signed up" or are otherwise formally or informally affiliated with them. Nor can we fully know at present just what activities they engage in. The following is no doubt an incomplete list of activities: signing petitions and placing advertisements in newspapers; holding small and unadvertised "semi-

nars" conducted by faculty members on China and China policy; sponsoring open debates on China policy questions, with both sides represented (a minor feature); conducting what amounts to a speaker's bureau to supply speakers from one campus to another.

It should be noted that at the University of Pennsylvania conference, not a single academic expert on China will be present to speak on the program in favor of the official United States policy toward Communist China. This defense is relegated to official representatives of the United States Government and of the Republic of China. This repeats the pattern so clearly seen elsewhere, of putting up as academic "experts" on China only those in opposition to the official policy, and "balancing" them with "official spokesmen" who can be discounted in advance as such. Thus, the false impression is created that the "public," represented by the academic experts, is uniformly opposed to the policy of our government at this time. This is false, utterly false.

### *Owen Lattimore Again*

At a conference at Harvard under the auspices of the Collegiate Council for the United Nations on March 25-27, Professor Owen Lattimore of Institute of Pacific Relations fame was scheduled to speak on "The Chinese Revolution: Causes and Consequences."

Also, from an organizational point of view, new and political uses are being made of an organization that predictably would be used for pro-Chinese Communist purposes if and when the time comes to do so. This is the Association of Asian Studies. When I say its current political uses are predictable, I mean just that. I refer you to my statement on this organization made in testimony under oath before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, on March 27, 1952 (pp. 4010-4013). I referred then to the Far Eastern Association, which is now the Association of Asian Studies, and I characterized it as designed, at least in part, to take over the political propaganda functions of the Institute of Pacific Relations in case the latter institution came to

grief, as I believe it subsequently did, over questions of the pro-Communist bias of its activities.

What the *New York Times* will print is well exemplified by the letter in its columns for March 18, 1966 by Professor Vera M. Dean of New York University. In this letter the professor, while expressing her views on various policy matters, also expresses her hopes. Among these, as she puts it, is that the "ghosts," as she describes them, of "Senator McCarthy and the Committee of One Million on China" should be "exorcised," and that former "China experts" who she says were driven from the State Department by "McCarthyism" should be sought out to advise the President and Secretary Rusk. Leaving this latter point aside, the Professor should be informed that before she can exorcise the "ghost" of the Committee of One Million it will have to die and produce such a ghost. Far from dying, the Committee is very much alive today, and shows no signs of atrophy. All reports to the contrary are highly premature, to say the least.

In this situation and from this background, in what policy area should our best and strongest efforts be made, to counter the current attempts to support Communist China and its program for Asia and the world? We are talking here, of course, of United States policy alternatives.

I do not believe the matter of possible United States recognition, trade and cultural relations, etc. is central. It is quite doubtful that, under current circumstances, any Administration in Washington would move toward such policies. More real is the danger that we will succumb to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. In fact, so central do I believe this whole question to be to the problem of "standing up to Communist China's grandiose demands" in world affairs, as Professor John Fairbank puts it, that I believe here is where major emphasis should lie in respect to China policy today.

Let us see why the Chinese Communists should not be admitted to the United Nations.

*What was the origin of the United Nations?*

The United Nations originated as an association of victors in World War II. It excluded the soon-to-be-defeated powers, Germany, Italy, and

Japan. In its very origins it was thus exclusive, not universal. The essential feature was the wartime association of the wartime allies, the "United Nations," and the community of interests that that alliance embodied.

*The United Nations: what for?*

The United Nations was founded in the hope of peace and to search for it. The functional approach was adopted, i.e. cooperation wherever possible, in whatever measures possible. Measures were to be taken for common and mutual security. The problem of expanding the United Nations mem-



bership arose at the United Nations Conference of 1945. Exhaustive debate at San Francisco in 1945 produced the decision that the organization should not be based on universality of membership, but that there should be qualifications for membership. In the Charter these are:

a) Only peace-loving nations are eligible. It may be difficult to define and determine what is meant by a peace-loving nation, but it is not hard at any given time to determine what nations are breakers and disturbers of the peace.

b) Only those nations are eligible for membership that are willing to assume and live up to the obligations of the Charter.

This opened the way for the defeated nations in World War II to enter, if and when they qualified, and also for new states to enter. But the United Nations, unlike the League of Nations, has never expelled a member, although a member [Indonesia] has voluntarily withdrawn.

*Now, what are the issues today?*

Communist China's record as to

aggression. This is overwhelmingly relevant to the question of its accepting the "obligations of the Charter." This is not just a matter of Korea. In February 1950, five months after the Chinese Communists established their regime, it began its aggressive course. This was predictable: Mao says every good thing comes out of the barrel of a gun. In February 1950 the Chinese Communists issued a call to all people of Southeast Asia to overthrow their governments. Was this merely a move against colonialism? No. It called for revolution against independent governments also. Then there came the Chinese Communist 1950 Korean aggression and the United Nations resolution (still outstanding) which branded Communist China as aggressor. The Chinese Communist philosophy is: "Ours is a policy of fight-fight, stop-stop, half-fight, half-stop. This is no trick, but a normal thing." This is a philosophy of alternating war and subversion. This was followed by direct Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia (Laos and Thailand), Tibet, India, and indirect aggression in Vietnam.

In view of this, in order to admit Communist China to the United Nations, the United Nations Charter would have to be changed and the relevant qualifications for membership removed. The Communist Chinese know this and themselves say the Charter must be revised as a prerequisite for accepting a seat.

Communist China's position re the United Nations is as follows:

"All countries should review the United Nations Charter together." All "independent countries" should then be admitted and all "imperialist puppet states should be driven out." It wants to expel some members even before its own admission. Clearly the Chinese Communists neither want nor plan either universality or "coexistence."

They openly state what kinds of changes would have to take place in the United Nations:

As a prerequisite to Communist China's accepting a seat, the United Nations would have openly to declare that the United Nations resolution condemning Communist China for aggression in the Korean War was "wrong," and brand the United States as the aggressor in Korea.

Another United Nations would have to be set up as a rival to the present United Nations.

Thus, there is no more argument possible about what the necessary effect of the United Nations admission for Communist China would be: it would destroy the United Nations as we know it. The United States could not be a member under those conditions and would have to withdraw.

The current issue today is the war in Southeast Asia.

The Communist Chinese show complete obduracy here and hold to a hard line of demanding total United States-South Vietnam surrender.

Can we change this by admitting Communist China to the United Nations? On September 1, 1965 New China News Agency authorized broadcast stated: "The Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations."

Another current issue is the Taiwan issue. Communist China demands that we abandon a loyal ally, an excellent partner in economic, social and political development, and a strategic strength close up, by insisting that the United Nations throw the Republic of China out of that body as a prerequisite for its own entry. This would mean we would tell everyone else: "Go make your own settlement with Communist China; become its vassal." Is there a way out of this in the so-called two-Chinas policy? No;

this policy is utterly unfeasible, because the two main parties to it, Communist China and the Republic of China, reject it totally and absolutely.

The general issue today in regard to the western Pacific is: can we have any security if the whole area falls under control of such a hostile power as Communist China? No. We tried withdrawal between 1920 and 1941, but it just led to a greater war.

Can we hope for change in Communist China? It is often said that we can make the United Nations a reform school for Communist China. But, of course, the answer is that if the United Nations is made over on the Communist Chinese model, Communist China won't have to change, will it? Since we can't change that much, we will have to get out if they come in on their terms.

The overriding policy question is the growing United States-Communist China confrontation in Southeast Asia and what it may mean to Communist China: destruction at our hands. In view of this, it is natural that more interest in United States China policy should develop. The possibility is clear that *this time* another major United States-Communist China confrontation may destroy Communist China.

Finally, Pope Paul VI has been widely quoted (October 4, 1965) as urging Communist China's United Nations admission by saying to the United Nations that it should "study

the right method of uniting to your pact of brotherhood in honor and loyalty, those who do not yet share in it." But here is what *L'Osservatore Romano*, the official organ of the Vatican, said of this on October 18-19, 1965. In an editorial under the title "The Church and the Universal Community of States," it takes note of the fact that there are people who have "given a precise political meaning" to those words of His Holiness. Then the editorial declared: "But true universality does not mean the arithmetic sum of nations; it presupposes the convergence of everybody on the effective recognition of and respect for natural law, which is the foundation of the United Nations." That is to say, the rule of law is primary; expanding United Nations membership is secondary.

The Pope is thus saying what we all know to be true, namely that any form of political association must be founded on some measure of agreed-upon community of values, and that for such associations to tolerate as components thereof those elements which deny and forcefully flout the agreed-upon community of values, will seriously endanger and probably eventually destroy the association. Thus, limitations upon membership and upon participation in political action are common to all political communities. The United Nations, weak as it already is, is no exception. It cannot be an exception.

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## United States Policy Toward China

WALTER H. JUDD

NO GREAT EXPANSIONIST movement has ever stopped until it was checked. Our choice—with Red China as it was with Japan and Hitler—is not between checking and not checking; it is whether to check early, while we can, and with allies—or try to check the aggression later when it is stronger, closer, and we have fewer and weaker friends and allies.

The question is *how* to check it—with least risk and cost.

From what I have seen in the press, most of the proposed changes in American policy towards Communist China appear to be based on certain

assumptions which do not seem to me to be justified:

—That the Communist regime now in control of the China mainland is here to stay.

The same was said of Hitler, of Khrushchev, of Sukarno, of Nkrumah. People are not so sure now of Castro. Despots generally appear invincible—"until the last five minutes."

—That the United States is stubbornly keeping Red China isolated and therefore we are responsible for its hostility and belligerence. The reverse is the truth; it is Red China's hostility and belligerence in its international attitudes and actions, that are re-

sponsible for its isolation.

—That there is a better hope of getting Red China to change its attitude and activities by giving in to it on matters like diplomatic recognition, trade, and admission to the United Nations than by resolute continuance of the policy of containment as long as Red China refuses to act like a responsible member of civilized society.

—That changing our policy *vis-à-vis* Red China just might start an evolutionary process there.

But, of course, it might just as easily reduce the chances of such an evolutionary process. Everybody de-

sires and hopes for "evolution" in Red China. The debate should be over *what measures are most likely to produce it*:

Giving Red China greater prestige, influence, entrée, that is, making it stronger? Or keeping it as weak and isolated as possible?

Concessions from its intended victims—like the United States? Or pressures from its present victims—the Chinese within Red China, those on Taiwan and in Southeast Asia, Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia, etc.?

Proving that Red China's truculence and stubborn defiance of the world succeeds? Or showing that it will fail?

Let us look now at the changes in policy toward Red China suggested by some. They are mostly three: official diplomatic recognition by the United States, expansion of trade relations, and admission of Communist China to the United Nations. What would be the probable results of such changes, the gains and losses?

Almost no one, so far as I have seen, goes further than expressing the vague hope that after these steps Red China may "mellow, moderate, mature, evolve." But there is no evidence on which to base the hoped-for gains.

What benefits, economic or political, has Great Britain received from her granting of diplomatic recognition in 1950? Or France two years ago?

Prime Minister Nehru of India recognized Communist China in 1950 and worked out with Chou En-lai the "Five Principles of Coexistence." He remarked that Americans didn't get along very well with the Chinese Communists because we are not Asians, implying that he, being a fellow Asian, could. He was Red China's chief apologist and advocate—at the UN and elsewhere. How did his fellow Asians in Peking respond to his being their best friend? They invaded India, and left Mr. Nehru a broken man.

It is suggested that with diplomatic recognition we might get more information about conditions in Red China. But we have been getting plenty of information by a variety of means, especially from the thousands of escapees each year. Red China has not allowed any newspaper correspondent of any nationality to travel freely in that land unless it had reason to be-



lieve in advance that he was generally sympathetic. Our trouble is not lack of information but erosion of our steadfastness, our patience, our will—as Mao boasted would be the case.

In contrast, there is no uncertainty as to the losses that would result from the suggested weakening of American policy. Here are some:

It would pull the rug out from under our loyal allies on Taiwan. The Chinese are a realistic, even fatalistic, people. With no hope for reunion in freedom with their brethren on the China mainland, they would have little or no choice but to prepare for the inevitable. Americans who advocate admitting Red China and then add glibly, "Of course we would support the defense of Taiwan," may be salving their own consciences but I think no Asians will be deceived. Twelve million Chinese could hardly maintain indefinitely the will or the capacity to resist 700 million, with the world organization for peace itself rejecting the twelve million and accepting the 700 million!

With weakening or loss of Taiwan our Pacific island chain of defenses would be breached. It is doubtful that the Philippines could long resist Communist pressures and blandishments. Filipinos remember that it was from Taiwan that their country was invaded by the Japanese. It would take vast intervention with American forces to save that new nation for which we certainly have a special responsibility in the Pacific. I have not found any responsible Filipino leaders who favor recognition of Communist China.

The fifteen million or so Chinese living in Southeast Asia occupy key positions of power and influence in Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines. The governments of those countries could not refuse to recognize Communist China once we did. That would mean every

Chinese embassy and consulate in Southeast Asia, and in the world for that matter, would become a protected center of Communist espionage, propaganda, sabotage and subversion of the host government—as recently exposed in Indonesia and Ghana. Through these "embassies and consulates" the Chinese minorities would be under direct and almost irresistible pressure to support the aggressive policies of the Mao regime.

The stability of the strategic countries of Southeast Asia would inevitably be weakened. Can anyone reasonably expect the governments of these smaller and weaker countries to be stronger and firmer *vis-à-vis* Red China than the great United States is?

If the United States were to show that it is not a dependable ally in Asia, our allies elsewhere, including those in Europe, would know they could not count on us either. What would happen to the whole system of collective security we have been building at such cost and effort and which is absolutely indispensable to our own survival as a free nation? Why should any country anywhere stand by us if it is not sure we will stand by it?

It would tell the neutrals and "uncommitted" nations that they were right all along and that they might as well give in to the winning side at once.

Perhaps worst of all, it would tell the 700 million people on the China mainland that we are accepting their subjugation, that we think there is more hope for peace for ourselves in deals with their oppressors than in standing steadfastly with them, the oppressed.

During the war and postwar years the United States relaxed under the skilfully built-up illusions that the Soviet Union was a "peace-loving democracy," eager and willing to cooperate to build a world of order and peace, and that the Chinese Commu-

nists were just agrarian reformers. Perhaps our best hope of getting out of our present predicament and peril without a nuclear holocaust lies in the urge-to-be-free that lives in the hearts of a billion human beings behind the Communist curtains. Unless these people are able from within to force their Communist regimes to change and eventually abandon Communist world objectives, there is little hope of our avoiding an ultimate all-out clash. Is it intelligent or realistic to adopt a foreign policy that can cause those millions behind the Curtains to abandon hope? If the strong accept the Communist overlords, how long can the weak continue to resist them?

What would be the gains from resumption of trade relations? The Communists themselves have made clear on numerous occasions that their unwavering purposes are:

*First*, to get military and industrial equipment and supplies which they cannot yet obtain within the Communist bloc—not in order that they can trade more with us in the future, but so they can become self-sufficient and not need to trade with us at all.

*Second*, to take advantage of a favorable trade situation wherever there is one that they cannot match even by exploitation of their own people and of their satellites.

*Third*, to induce countries to become more and more dependent on trade with the Soviet bloc, and therefore more and more at its mercy. This applies particularly to Germany and Japan.

*Fourth*, to divide the free world powers.

### *Communist Trade Monopolies*

All trade is conducted by Communist state organizations and monopolies that have as their single objective the strengthening of the State. They cannot trade under the accepted rules of the free world without ceasing to be Communist. They cannot cease to be Communist without their movement collapsing. Trade is as much a weapon of their expansionism as are missiles. It is to be expanded or contracted, to be directed here or shifted there, as those at the top determine to be advantageous in promoting the Communist world revolution.

Where trade between Communist China and other countries exists, it is

only on sufferance of the Communist government and will be extinguished when it has served its purpose. This has never been denied by the Chinese Communist leaders. On the contrary, they have avowed on numerous occasions that complete nationalization of industries and trade and collectivization of agriculture has to come, but in stages—which means just as fast as they feel themselves strong enough to impose it. Would it be in our interest, economic or otherwise, to help them do it faster?

### *The Head-in-Sand Line*

What would be the result of admitting Communist China to the United Nations?

Admission would represent for Red China the greatest possible diplomatic victory. It would give the Mao regime the stamp of legitimacy and add immeasurably to its prestige and power all over the world. Why has every Communist government, party, and front in the world worked tirelessly for fifteen years for Red China's admission if that would be bad for Communism and good for us?

Some say, "But Communist China is a fact. We must be realistic. We cannot hide our heads in the sand and ignore it or pretend it is not there." But that is not a description of our policy. On the contrary, it is just because we recognize that Red China is indeed a fact, and such a powerful and dangerous fact, that intelligent concern for our own and the world's future requires its exclusion from the United Nations until it is willing to meet the qualifications for membership. To admit it prior to that time would only make it more powerful and more dangerous.

The Communist regime in China avowedly is dedicated to the isolation and destruction of the United States. Should America help it to a better position from which to work for that objective?

It is an utter non-sequitur to say that because "Red China is there" it ought to be admitted to the UN. There are gangsters in some of our cities. We do not argue that therefore the city councils, courts and police force should take the gangsters in. Rather we demand that lawless elements be kept out of the forces responsible for maintaining law and

order, or "peace and security"—which the UN Charter states is the purpose for which the organization was established.

To keep Red China isolated and weaker than it would otherwise be is not denying or ignoring its existence; it is the realistic way to deal with its existence.

It is said that the United Nations ought to be a universal organization with all existing governments in it. But the Charter makes perfectly clear that the UN was never intended to be a universal organization. That concept was discussed at San Francisco—and rejected. Why would the Charter have Article 6 providing for expelling "a member which has consistently violated the principles contained in the present Charter," if the organization was supposed to be universal?

So it is grossly untrue that the United States is stubbornly, blindly, arbitrarily keeping Communist China out of the United Nations, as is sometimes claimed. Red China is stubbornly keeping itself out. It simply refuses to qualify. I don't know any university that will admit a student without his meeting its entrance requirements—even if he has a gun.

It is said that if the United Nations is not to admit Communist China, then it ought to expel the Soviet Union. This is a good logical argument, but it is a useless one. The Soviet Union can veto its own expulsion.

### *Never Trouble Trouble*

The fact that there are already some bad actors in the UN is all the more reason why we should not, knowingly, bring any more in.

It is suggested that if we recognize Communist China and admit it to the United Nations, it might improve the functioning of that and related international organizations. There is far more evidence that it would hamper their functioning. The only time the United Nations has been able to operate as it was intended to on a matter as serious as aggression was in 1950 when the Soviet Union was absenting itself from the Security Council in an effort to pressure the United Nations into admission of Red China—and thus was unable to veto UN action against the Com-



munist aggression in Korea. Moscow is not likely to make the mistake of being absent again.

It is clear that Communist governments do not join the United Nations with the same purpose in mind as we and other governments do, namely, to help make it an effective instrument for resolving disputes. Obviously the Soviet Union joined in order to make sure the UN does not work effectively. It has a world organization of its own, the Communist Party, with organized, disciplined, efficient units in every country. The Communists intend to win for their world organization. What could be more advantageous than to have seats in the other world organization also, particularly in the Security Council, where perfectly legally under the Charter, they can keep the rival organization crippled and ineffective whenever they wish to? Almost all of the more than 100 Soviet vetoes have been against measures that were favored by the overwhelming majority of UN members and were in the direction of peace.

It is not necessary to have Red China in the UN in order to negotiate with her, on this or any other matter. We have had over 130 negotiations with it in the last eleven years—almost one a month—and more than any other non-Communist government has had.

Then there is the old diversionary argument. "What about Chiang Kai-

shek?" Well, what about him? History will decide his proper place and I predict it will be a high one. But our policy is not and has not been based on Chiang; if he were gone tomorrow, America's interests would be precisely the same. We are trying to help free peoples remain free; therefore, it is to our interest to support all peoples who will make determined efforts in that direction. The Free Chinese on Taiwan certainly are making such efforts—and succeeding. They are ahead of every other country in Asia except Japan. We were able to stop our economic assistance to Free China last July.

So if one examines the results of the proposed changes in American policy toward China, it is apparent that the benefits would be minimal, if any. The dangers to the countries still free in Asia, to the United Nations itself, and to our own security and peace, would be certain and serious indeed. On the other hand, the policy of keeping Red China contained and isolated has proved successful in promoting the vital security interests of the United States.

Men have always found ways of bringing down tyrants—and the Chinese will bring down theirs—if only we are not beguiled into throwing the ball game away in the last quarter by failing to stand fast—"five minutes longer." We are called upon by history to prove that free citizens have greater fortitude, stronger

nerves and steadier patience and faith than do tyrants—faith in man and faith in God.

In summary, seating of Red China in the United Nations would be *illegal*. It would require violation of the organization's Charter.

It would be *immoral*. It would almost certainly mean removal of a member that abides by the Charter to seat a non-member that brazenly refuses to abide by the Charter. It would abandon 700 million people to Communist subjugation. It would properly be regarded as an attempt to buy peace for ourselves by sacrificing our principles and other peoples' freedom.

And it would *bring no practical benefits*. On the contrary, there would be certain and disastrous losses—with our allies; with the neutrals; with the peoples in Asia and everywhere else who desire to retain their freedom; and with the long-suffering millions now under Communist rule who yearn to regain their freedom. Do not break the hearts of the oppressed and their continued will to resist from within by accepting their oppressors.

Until someone can suggest policies that offer better prospects of success, based on something more substantial than speculation, wishful thinking or just hope, I can see no sound, sensible, or logical reason to change present policies and every reason to continue them, always being flexible in our tactics as required by developments as they come along.

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## *Communist China, Vietnam and United States Policy*

FRANZ MICHAEL

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT has to be seen within the framework of Communism, as a power struggle within the Communist world, and not as an expression of national interests by competing states of an international order of the past.

In discussing today the problems our own policy faces with regard to Communist China, in Vietnam and in Asia in general, I believe it to be of foremost importance that we accept the fact that our opponent, or rather our opponents, are not national states

or traditional powers with traditional ambitions, but components of that Communist movement that is out to conquer the world by whatever means and to transform it in its image. I believe that the most fatal mistake that we can make is to assume that Communism is dead, that a Communist ideology is dead, and that we deal with powers which pursue traditional national interests and have to be dealt with on that basis. Lately it has often been argued that the behavior of the Communist Chinese

leadership can be explained, at least in part, in terms of the imperial Chinese tradition of past centuries; that if we only could understand this tradition and help to break down the barriers that have kept its present representatives from understanding the world, we would then be able to deal with them on rational terms, that is, terms that are rational within our concept of rationality.

I believe nothing could be further from the truth. There could be no greater contrast, ethically and intel-

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lectually, let alone politically, than that between the emperors of Confucian China of old and the Communist Party's Marxist-Leninist China of today. The two are not even historically related. Between the period of the rule of the emperors of old and that of the Communists of today, China was under the National Government which accepted the Western concept of the nation-state. When the Communists took over in 1949 they did not abolish a Confucian imperial order but the law courts, the codes, the educational system, the Western economy and the Western thought that had been the basis of a Nationalist China that was well on the way to taking its place in the world until the Japanese attack in World War II, and the civil war that followed, destroyed it.

### *Communizing China*

The Communists, after their conquest of power, had two major purposes: to communize China internally and to contribute to the world Communist revolution externally. It is the latter purpose which poses the problems we are facing today in Asia. Any attempt to ignore this Communist purpose is done at our risk. It is simply unrealistic to assume that by gestures or offers, by trade or discussions we will sway the Communists to accept our world of live and let live. They are realists, of course, who will not go into ventures they regard as hopeless. They will move when they regard the time and the situation as opportune; and they will bide their time when, in their terms, the revolutionary wave has subsided. But we have to understand that their logic is not our logic. When we negotiate, we have to remember that their purpose is not ours. And until the Communist purpose of world domination has changed, all that can be arranged is at best a truce.

The hope has been expressed that what is sometimes called the "outmoded doctrine of Marxism-Leninism" is losing its grip on Communist leadership, or that at least the next generation of leaders will no longer believe in world revolution. This can only be regarded as wishful thinking. There is no evidence whatsoever that the main tenets of the gospel itself have been affected in Communist

thinking by this or the younger generation, whatever shifting strategy may recommend itself to them at the time.

But, of course, the strategies have been shifting. Karl Marx's original predictions of the increasing misery of the industrial proletariat have been completely disproved by developments in the industrial countries, and then the Bolshevik revolution occurred in what was at best a marginal area of industrialization. The hopes which its leader, Lenin, placed on a Communist revolution in Germany in 1919, 1920 and 1922, proved false. It was Lenin who then shifted to strategy number two in the Communist grand plan for world conquest. His theory of Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism permitted the use for Communist purposes of revolutionary tensions in what we call today the developing countries of the world. The strategy for Communist conquest in China and today in Vietnam and elsewhere, was Lenin's. It is the strategy of what the Communists call "wars of national liberation." It feeds on two elements. One is agrarian discontent or what is called the agrarian revolution in these predominantly agricultural countries. The other is the emerging nationalism of a small, Western-educated elite, regarded by the Communists as bourgeois-capitalist or nationalist-capitalist, but "anti-imperialist." The use of peasant discontent and of nationalist aspirations for Communist purposes must, however, not lead us astray. Mao Tse-tung, who followed this Leninist-Stalinist policy, was not an agrarian reformer nor was he a heretic. And Ho Chi Minh and the Vietcong today are Communists and not nationalists with Communist trimmings.

The two strategies of proletarian revolution and of national liberation movements or wars of liberation are by no means irreconcilable. But the matter of coordinating them may pose problems. And the question of emphasis today, where there are two headquarters in the overall Communist movement, has become a part of the expression of the conflict for power. Communist advance in the industrial world today is not possible through proletarian uprisings as once conceived after World War I, nor did the Communists prove able to

exploit their participation in the resistance movements during World War II in France and Italy for eventual take-over. And since there is now a universal fear of hydrogen war, blustering threat of same, as once used by a Soviet, has been excluded since it became clear that the United States would stand for Berlin or any part of Europe. So the strategy has shifted to what is called "peaceful coexistence." In Khrushchev's words:

Peaceful coexistence does not imply conciliation between socialist and bourgeois ideologies . . . The peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems presupposes an unremitting ideological, political, and economic struggle of the working people inside the countries of the capitalist system, including armed struggle when they find that necessary [sic!] and the steady advance of the national liberation movement among the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries.

### *'Peaceful Coexistence'*

Their "peaceful co-existence" does not mean the end of confrontation with Communism, but it is confrontation in an area where our superiority—once we understand the threat—should not make us fear the battle, so much better to be fought in the intellectual rather than in the military field.

But it is different with the wars of liberation. This type of warfare, focused today in Vietnam, is the strategy that the Soviets have as much approved as the Chinese. If they are somewhat reluctant to go all out for it as the Chinese Communists do, it is in order not to compromise the peaceful co-existence strategy for which they want to be known. In my view, Ho Chi Minh has not only received Soviet support from the beginning, but will be backed as long as the Soviets believe that this particular national liberation war looks favorable. The Chinese Communists, however, have gone all out for this strategy. Its priority in today's Communist advance was openly stated by the Indonesian Communist leader D. N. Aidit, who lost his life recently in the Communist coup in Indonesia. It has become most memorably proclaimed in the often-quoted statement of the Chinese Communist military leader Lin Piao, who compared the

national liberation wars in the developing countries to the strategy once used in China by the encirclement of the cities through Communist control of the rural areas in preparation for eventual take-over of the whole country. In the same way the rural areas of the world—the countries of Asia, Africa, and South America—are to be taken over first by the encirclement of the industrial nations now regarded as the cities of the world. The most important sentence is perhaps the one in which Lin Piao compared the effectiveness of the two strategies:

Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously.

It is this Communist advance that we are facing today. Should it succeed in Vietnam it will continue elsewhere; in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America. That, at least, is the Communist intent. But things have not been going well for the Chinese Communists both in Asia and in Africa, and the Chinese setbacks have, in my view, something to do with the proof of our willingness to resist in Vietnam.

Since we are facing a Communist strategy and not Chinese nationalist imperialism, or for that matter, Soviet nationalist advance, such Communist insurgencies as in Vietnam have to be locally based. But a local insurgency is only possible as a part of the Communist conspiracy, using the organizational and ideological framework that is uniform for all Communism. On this basis the local Communists receive not only political support from the movement but also outside aid in the form of equipment, financing, military expertise and leadership and, where feasible, direct military support. Where they were left alone as in Malaya or in the Philippines, such Communist insurgencies could be defeated. The problem today is to defeat such an insurgency in Vietnam where it is receiving that outside support.

We have today begun to understand that this insurgency is not simply military action which requires a military answer. One of its most

important ingredients and one that is not contained in Mao Tse-tung's homilies on guerrilla warfare is the use of terror. This terror is not the use of atrocities for atrocity's sake or as some have held, "the killing of some unpopular landlords or administrators." It is rather the systematic elimination of the leadership of the communities to be taken over by the Communists through assassinations of the most educated and most respected local leaders: the local school teacher, the village head, the monk, and the families of these people. It is also directed against all those who refuse to cooperate, who refuse to provide intelligence and service. Its aim is not only to intimidate the communities, to show on which side one can survive, it is also directed at depriving the communities of their leadership so that the Communist cadres can take the place of those who have been killed.

To fight this strategy requires more than simple military action. What is necessary, of course, is the ability to protect the population from this threat. Before this protection can be guaranteed, all the destruction of the guerrilla forces is at best a temporary reprieve. But there is much more at issue.

The problem of the developing countries of Asia is the problem of a vast transformation. A revolutionary transformation indeed, which will take place and is taking place in these countries under whatever auspices. Under the impact of the modern world, its ideas and its economics, the traditional agrarian



societies of this world of old agrarian civilizations are disintegrating. The Western-educated small elites are the first to have been affected by Western ideas, Western education and Western forms of life. But the gap has widened between these Westernizing cities and the rural areas, mostly neglected and often contemptuously disregarded or exploited by the newly emerging elites. It is this gap that the Communists have been exploiting. What is needed, regardless of the Communist threat, is the re-integration of the societies and nations of the world of developing states, a revolution within their old tradition based on their own beliefs and ideas. This revolution does not consist simply of technical change. Modern hygiene, health measures, the fight against malaria, hospitals, schools, new agrarian methods, are only technical forms of changes. What matters is the cultural framework in which this transformation takes place, and "cultural" in this sense is more than the outward manifestations of a material world. It has been said that Communism is strong because of its political organization. And the fight against Communism is truly an organizational battle. But the Communist organization is based on Communist ideology and Communist purposes. If there were no ideology there would be no Communist Party and no Communist threat. The problem of the countries of the developing world is to integrate revolutionary changes into their cultural tradition. In the solution to this problem we can and should assist. To do so we need an understanding of the beliefs and ideas of the great Asian cultural traditions in order to comprehend the setting in which these changes will take place. A true nationalism in these countries—not the Communist exploitation of it—must be founded on these cultural traditions.

We have to realize, for instance, that democratic elections which we rightly regard as the free expression of a people's will require a social framework that does not necessarily exist in the countries concerned. Without a viable organization in the communities there is a serious problem of political organization. Political parties in our sense are a new development and need time and the foundation upon which to grow.

I believe our government's policy has today recognized the need of "capturing the revolution." The economic, social and political reforms initiated in South Vietnam, the special teams that are to compete with the National Liberation Front—our real enemy—lead us in the right direction.

I would regard it as a deadly mistake to give administrative recognition in negotiations—let alone beforehand—to the very foe who is aiming to destroy the society we are trying to build. Truly free elections, once they can be held, need not be feared.

But Vietnam is not an isolated

issue. It is only the focal point in what I would regard as the present main front in the battle between Communist totalitarian aspirations and the support of our kind of revolution, in a world that we want to keep free for the pluralism of cultures and traditions, in Asia as well as elsewhere.

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## *United States Relations with Communist China*

THE UNITED STATES is better informed about Communist China today than is any other country in the Free World. Our government provides daily translations of the mainland press and periodicals for general use, it translates for its own purposes a great variety of specialized Chinese printed material, some of which it puts at the disposal of scholars. There are about a dozen major universities with libraries and staff sufficient to provide the student with advanced graduate training on China. Courses in the Chinese language can be taken at hundreds of universities and colleges. The financial support provided by private foundations and by the National Defense Education Act has been instrumental in giving us hundreds of scholars well trained in the Chinese language and one or more of the disciplines. Our library holdings on Communist China are very extensive, and we publish more studies on Communist China than all other non-Communist countries put together. The combined resources of England, France, and Germany, both human and material, are small indeed when compared with those of the United States.

The American scholar, it has been pointed out, cannot go to Communist China and therefore loses a valuable asset. This is true; the Communists will not allow him in. There is no substitute for being in the land, but in some cases there is not a great advantage. Most of the correspondents of other countries who have resided in Peking are quite frank about the difficulties and frustrations facing the journalistic profession in that country. Hong Kong is a far more valu-

able source of information about Communist China than is Peking.

The main difficulty in getting information about China stems not from the fact that Americans are not allowed to visit there, but from the extraordinary efforts made by the Communist regime to prevent both its own people and other peoples from knowing those things it wishes to conceal. I would not be surprised if Peking found our economic studies to be more accurate than their own. I wish to mention this point about information because there are those who feel that we would be much better informed if we recognized Communist China and could send our scholars and journalists to that country. Unless there were a radical change in the attitude of the Communist regime the evidence does not suggest that access to the mainland, considering the price we would have to pay, would make that much difference.

### *The Soviet 'Model'*

I am not suggesting that we have sufficient information about Communist China, merely that we have as much if not more than anyone else. In the academic profession, while we all read the same materials, we do not arrive at the same conclusions. I find myself in general agreement with the descriptive material presented in this testimony—that Communist China's domestic problems are serious and exacting, her military as well as economic resources are not those of a great power, her adventurous excursions in foreign policy have been costly and discouraging,

GEORGE E. TAYLOR

and that she is not getting along very well with the Soviet Union in either party or state relations. But I cannot follow some of the policy recommendations of my colleagues because I think that they are based on debatable premises, and it is the premises that are crucial.

Much is made of the assumption that we have stabilized our relations with the Soviet Union and that the same can be done with Communist China. The Soviet model is so taken for granted that it is never clearly defined. It is asserted that we now have a stable and tolerable relationship with the Soviet Union and that this has come about through an evolutionary process marked by changes within the Communist system. There certainly have been considerable changes and there is a sort of stability. But in my view the present stability is brittle in the extreme and is based mainly on the superior military power of the United States and its allies and on a common interest in avoiding one kind of war, nuclear conflict between the U.S. and the USSR. Moscow still favors subversion and "just" wars of national liberation. The balance can change because it does not rest merely on a counting of nuclear bombs. There are other factors in the balance such as the state of the economy, the state of our alliances, the quality of our leadership. As we showed at the time of the Cuban crisis, a shift in the nuclear balance of power can be prevented by the use of conventional weapons. Nor can we fail to note that the present stability includes a war with the Soviet Union by proxy in Vietnam, and Soviet cooperation with


Cuba in an effort to subvert Latin America, whose governments are so alarmed by Cuban activities that many have broken off diplomatic relations with both Moscow and Havana.

Two sets of reasons are usually given for the new Soviet behavior. There are those who think that the stability of our relations with the Soviet Union is due to changes in the mode of production which have been reflected in changes in the ideological superstructure. They would phrase it differently but it is still vulgar Marxism. As the Communists put on fat, according to this theory, they acquire a democratic dislike for muscle. Such scholarly investigation as we have of this subject, to say nothing of the record, suggests that the question of whether or not there have been basic changes in the political objectives of the Soviet Union is still open to serious question. Then there are those who think that present Soviet behavior arises from the fact that we followed a policy of containment combined with recognition of the Soviet Union and its membership in the UN. The same formula applied to China should produce the same results. It is proposed to continue the containment, offer recognition, and cease to block the way into the UN. This is a doubtful analogy on which to base action. Nor is there any real parallel between Communist China and the USSR, nor any surety that the same techniques will bring the same results. But the USSR could be used as an interesting case study of what happens when a Communist nation is treated with generosity and good will (as during World War II) and allowed to operate within an organization for the maintenance of peace.

In my view it is safer to proceed on the premise that there is no world community, as the phrase goes, into which we can induce the Chinese to enter. Unfortunately we live in a world in which there are at least two violently opposed concepts of international relations, of political and social organizations, and of world order. The dialogue between them is still minimal. Everything we do with Communist China has to be seen in this context. Whatever the relations between Peking and Moscow, as far as the world community is concerned,

they share the same outlook. The problem then is how to define our relations with the Chinese section of the Communist world. It is clearly necessary, in this dangerous world, to do this.

Further to clarify my premises, I do not think, for example, that the evidence supports the fashionable view that the Communist world is falling apart and that Communist states have the same sort of foreign policy objectives as any other nation state or can be expected to pursue them in the same manner. The social and political content of nationalism is determined by the institutional power configuration and this is what is new and lasting about Communism. It is because it is the nature of power that determines foreign policy—to put the matter very briefly—that I feel there is little hope of any changes in Chinese Communist policies that are not forced on her. It is necessary to men-



tion this because there is a great reluctance on the part of China specialists, perhaps because they love the Chinese so much, to admit that the Chinese Communists are really Communists.

The agrarian reformers of the forties are now the aging paranoids of the sixties, to be handled, it would seem, by group therapy. If they were really nationalists masquerading as Communists, then Chinese tradition as well as the humiliations of nineteenth-century imperialism would be relevant to their mood, but in my view the Communists represent a complete break with the past. Their world view is not conditioned by the

imperial past although they are willing to exploit it. A comparison with some real nationalists will point up the differences. It was the National government that won the ending of imperial privileges in 1942 and lost the chance of building up a modern China largely as a result of the Japanese invasion. We might have difficulties with them if they were in power on the mainland, but I doubt they would be sponsoring the Vietcong or fomenting trouble in the rest of the world. There is nothing about Chinese nationalism that calls for the hate campaign of the Chinese Communists against the United States, for the militarization of a quarter of the people of the earth, for the racial invective that pervades so much of their propaganda, even in Hong Kong, or for the support of revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America as spelled out in the Central Committee decisions of 1963 and reaffirmed in the Lin Piao statement. A true nationalism would call for attention to domestic problems and would certainly avoid a quarrel with a powerful neighbor.

The most recent statement of Chinese Communist political goals, the Lin Piao position paper of September 1965, is variously interpreted. The Aesopian dialogue of the Communist world is not always easy to follow and this effort was clearly designed to achieve several purposes at the same time. In my view it should be taken seriously as a general indication of the objectives and strategy of the Peking wing of the movement. It is not impossible that this strategy could be made to work. It is based on the assumption that the revolution is not going to occur in the great industrial states, that the Achilles heel of the West is the Third World, that the promotion of wars of national liberation in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia will distract and waste the energies of the Western powers, confuse their peoples, and demoralize their leaders.

Some believe that Communist China is too weak to carry out such a grandiose strategy, that in fact she is now reeling from shattering defeat. When the Soviets came to the assistance of the Chinese Nationalists in 1923 they were not a strong power, but they almost succeeded in taking over the Nationalist movement at a

cost of 1,000 advisers and about \$3 million. The Chinese Communists were not very strong when they provided the Vietminh with the heavy weapons that made possible the conquest of Dien-Bien-Phu, nor when they intervened in North Korea, nor when they promoted a Communist attempt to take over Malaya in 1948. May I also suggest that the Chinese Communists were involved in the attempted *coup d'état* in Indonesia last October and that it came very close to succeeding? If it had succeeded it would have been followed by an intensification of the war against Malaysia; Thailand would have been caught in a pincer, and our position in Vietnam would have become very precarious.

The main question that the leaders and peoples of Southeast Asia are asking is, who is going to win? Under

these conditions it would have seemed that the Chinese brand of Communism was in the ascendancy; Lin Piao's statement would have looked like a curtain-raiser rather than noisy bragging or defensive defiance. China is obviously in no position to seek a head-on collision with the United States and is most unlikely to give us the opportunity to declare war on her, but she is quite capable of fostering wars of national liberation wherever opportunities are provided.

It is said that we should not isolate Peking. It is Peking that is trying to isolate us. Communist China is far from being isolated; she has diplomatic relations of a sort with about forty countries and is trading with many she does not recognize, such as Japan and Canada. She is very much in the international community where it counts; in fact, much too much. The terms she has announced for tak-

ing a seat in the UN are so outrageous that they must have been designed to show her contempt for that organization. Her terms for accepting recognition are humiliating in the extreme, although she would be delighted to have us help her finish off the civil war by reducing or eliminating the international status of the Nationalist government. If the Chinese Communists really want to live in peace with the world they are quite capable of making a move in that direction.

In the meantime, it should not be beyond the wit of man to devise ways and means of putting the burden of proof, as far as peaceful intentions are concerned, on the Peking regime, so long as nothing is done to damage American credit in Asia and her willingness to stand by her friends and her principles.

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## *Conclusion: Red China's Reaction*

*The official Peking reaction to the Fulbright hearings was that they were in effect a venture in futility since the new proposals made by the members of the Red China Lobby were, nothing more than another approach by American Imperialists to frustrating the Chinese revolution. An article in the influential People's Daily of April 9, 1966, carries this commentary, in part:*

"The so-called China question has become the focus of attention in the U.S. in the past two months. U.S. scholars and idea men in the service of the ruling classes and responsible officials have put forth their views in a great debate on China policy. . . .

"In reality, the 'containment without isolation' formula is a manifestation of the U.S. imperialist counter-revolutionary dual tactics on China policy. In short, this means on the one hand continued aggression against and encirclement of China, containment and isolation of China, while on the other, indulging in the vain hope to bring about 'peaceful evolution' in China so that revolutionary China will degenerate gradually.

"It can be seen that the present de-

bate reflects not the 'powerfulness' of the U.S. but its weakness and defeat and its helplessness and dilemma in face of the great Chinese people. Some influential Americans too criticized the U.S. China policy as 'in a fundamental sense unsuccessful' and 'long since out of date.' They called for a 'fundamental review of our China policy.' It is against such a background that the Johnson Administration wants to make use of the debate as a smokescreen to sidetrack the strong dissatisfaction at home and abroad with the U.S. anti-China policy and to cover up the continuance of the policy of hostility and aggression against China.

"The debate shows that the difference between these idea men is about what counter-revolutionary method should be adopted. They are at one in persisting in the policy of hostility and aggression towards China. That is why none of them could put forth a feasible formula. After repeated deliberations and consideration, the experts ended in agreeing to the continuation and stepping up of the 'containment' policy.

"Helpless and hopelessly, Harvard

Professor John K. Fairbank, the so-called veteran 'Chiang specialist,' and others, again put forward the long discredited 'two-Chinas' formula. Some others proposed that 'unconditional discussions' be held and 'diplomatic relations' established with China before the future of Taiwan is discussed. But even Dean Rusk himself had to admit that as far as the 'two Chinas' proposal was concerned, 'it was useless' because China had rejected it.

"U.S. imperialism's persistent hostility towards the Chinese people is determined by its reactionary and aggressive nature. There is nothing strange about it. What is strange is that U.S. imperialism even hopes to find a 'way out' of the blind alley of its China policy. The great debate in the United States over Washington's China policy shows once again that it is mere illusion.

"Look, how many politicians, 'scholars' and 'specialists' took part in these discussions. But nothing fruitful has come out of them. Nor will there be any result if more discussions are held. Gentlemen in Washington, there is nothing you can do about it!"