

*Edwards - 13.1 MFR*

DD/S&T-4882/69

19 December 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Spencer K. Anderson R presenting  
President Friedman, ITT Corporate Office  
(Aerospace Group) on the West Coast

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1. On 18 December Mr. Anderson met with [redacted] of DD/S&T apparently to review technical programs in ITT of possible interest to DD/S&T. A preliminary check disclosed that Mr. Anderson has a SECRET Contract clearance and a pending SECRET Contract clearance. Actually, during his discussion Mr. Anderson stated that ITT was formulating plans for a small corporate group to represent the interests of the intelligence community by applying over-all ITT resources (including independent research) to assist the Agency and the community. He was primarily interested in knowing what the Agency's requirements were so that the planning in ITT could concentrate on those areas of maximum interest to the Agency.

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2. [redacted] advised Mr. Anderson that at some future date the DD/S&T R&D coordinator (who is also the Agency R&D coordinator) would be in a position to advise selected groups of contractors of special Agency R&D interests in the hope that such contractors could devote attention to meeting these requirements. However, he noted that in the interim there was no basis on which Agency requirements across the board could be made known to an individual contractor. It was stated, however, that it is normal practice for contractors with particular developments of interest to the Agency to make these products or ideas known to Agency offices and that this could be done by establishing appointments with interested Agency people from time to time.

3. Mr. Anderson said that one of the problems facing ITT corporate is that he does not know where the Agency is contracting within ITT plants and divisions because of security compartmentation. He pointed out to us that this tended to defeat their plan to channel more corporate resources

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A doctor diagnoses global crises

# WHEN SICK MEN RUN THE WORLD

Would the course of history have been altered if, in 1956, the Suez crisis had not hinged on a desperately sick Anthony Eden and an aged John Foster Dulles who was at the point of a physical breakdown? Or could the U.S. today afford to have the office of the President occupied for nearly a year and a half, as it was in Woodrow Wilson's administration, by an incapacitated man fiercely protected and kept in office by his wife, his secretary, and his physician?

Ever more threatening are the world crises that could be precipitated by the physical or psychological disability of a key statesman. And Dr. Hugh L'Etang, a London physician, is sounding a warning. He has assembled the significant medical data on many historic figures, from pre-World War I to the present, demonstrating how often the shape of destiny has been determined by the illness of a powerful leader.

Dr. L'Etang's book, *The Pathology of Leadership*, just published in England, may well reverberate in the halls of government and in the councils of medicine. The threat of a leader's incapacitation, combined with the swiftness of events, today could menace the entire world.

The months and weeks leading to World War I are brought back in vivid detail as Dr. L'Etang rapidly sketches the unhealthy state of significant men of the great powers: "Ministers and diplomats of this period were weak in the widest sense . . . They were weak in body and weak in mind and dissolved into tears at moments of crisis."

Military commands on both sides were shot through with ailing, aged, and disabled officers, some of them called back from retirement as new fronts opened in various parts of the world. Germany's General Erich Ludendorff, one of the chiefs of staff, grew so tense he "could control neither his nerves nor his armies." He collapsed and resigned in 1918. Years later, his condition was diagnosed as toxic goiter. After thyroidectomy, he said that if the operation had been performed earlier, Germany would have won the war.

In the U.S., President Woodrow Wilson maintained reasonable health until the Armistice. Then his deterioration came on so swiftly as to cause international as well as national havoc. Always rigid in personality, he grew worse. He suffered an infection of prostate and bladder and was thought to have had a stroke. He had severe headaches and

asthmatic attacks and was "tired and absent-minded."

A severe stroke in October, 1919, so disabled the President that the office of the chief of state was virtually brought to a halt. As Dr. L'Etang reports, the presidency was sustained by "a self-elected council of three: Mrs. Wilson, Joseph Tumulty (the President's secretary), and Dr. Cary T. Grayson." Only they could attest to Wilson's incapacity, and none of them would.

Britain was still plagued by sickness in high officials as events began their slow swirling toward World War II. Sir Nevile Henderson, ambassador to Berlin, was operated on for an abdominal cancer in 1938. When he returned to duty shortly afterward, German leaders took advantage of his physical incapacity. "They would keep him waiting all evening at a reception and then grant him an interview in the early hours of the morning," reports L'Etang. "Goering would invite him to his hunting lodge, tire him out with a day's shooting and a heavy and presumably alcoholic dinner, and then summon him to an important diplomatic discussion."

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the chief executive whose state of health must have engendered more rumors, speculations, and malicious reports than that of any earlier historic figure, had been struck down by polio in 1921, at age 39. This did not deter him from twice winning the governorship of New York, and going on to be elected four times as President of the U.S. But by the end of his second term, Roosevelt's health was visibly deteriorating.

In his chapter, "The Invalids Who Worked With Roosevelt," Dr. L'Etang names a frightening number of sick, aged, or disabled men appointed to high office or heavy responsibilities by FDR. Among them are Louis MacHenry Howe, a special assistant who was an asthmatic invalid; and Harry Hopkins, whose partial gastrectomy exacerbated many other conditions, and whose final mission was the ill-fated Yalta, where he spent all his time in bed when he was not taking part in the conference.

FDR's appointed attorney general died before he could take office. Secretary of the Treasury William Woodin died after one year's service. The Secretary of War, George H. Dern, was too ill to attend many cabinet meetings, and died of bladder and kidney ailments in 1936. Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson, appointed in 1933, was admitted to the hospital for high blood pressure that same year, and by 1937 had to be led in and out of meetings, could not stand unsupported, and could not be understood when he spoke.

Then there was James Forrestal, a Roosevelt Secretary of the Navy and later the first Secretary of Defense. Driven by compulsions and delusions that he was being followed and his telephone tapped, he careened into severe depression, and fell to his death from a hospital window in 1949.

Pathological changes in the arteries were responsible for Roosevelt's death, says Dr. L'Etang—but not for other signs and symptoms that had been present for more than a year. Loss of weight and cachexia were so evident at Yalta that photographs were suppressed. Long-term "bronchitis" and his heavy smoking habit suggested carcinoma of the lung. But most dramatic of all is a medical incident four years after his death.

A pigmented nevus above FDR's left eyebrow did not appear in photographs taken after 1943. Then in 1949, a medical paper by surgeons from Walter Reed Hospital, on treatment of malignant melanoma, was given at a St. Louis meeting. All the slides and specimens shown had a serial number, reports Dr. L'Etang—with one exception. This was a section of brain with a large metastatic melanoma in the right hemisphere. It bore only a date—14 April 1945. It was the same day that Roosevelt's body arrived in Washington from Warm Springs.

President Dwight Eisenhower, aware of the problems in both the Wilson and Roosevelt administrations, took two major steps toward ameliorating the risks in having a disabled President. First, he directed the release to news media of full clinical details on every illness he suffered in office—even though he winced at the worldwide disclosure of his bowel habits. Second, he made arrangements for delegation of authority during any period of incapacitation of the President. In 1958, in a detailed letter to Vice President Nixon, Eisenhower tried to design machinery for running the government if the chief of state became disabled. But an effective plan was not forthcoming, for the President's directions called for the patient to judge his own disability.

Floods of medical-interest copy, but less candor, characterized the short term of John F. Kennedy, as Dr. L'Etang reports. Exuding attractiveness and vitality, and stressing the need for Presidential fitness in his campaign, JFK is seen by Dr. L'Etang as the candidate with the most precarious health. Indeed, he wore a back brace as a result of a 1937 injury, and he was rejected by the Army in 1941.

Just before election day in 1960, a congressman demanded that Kennedy confirm or deny a report that he

had Addison's disease. Guardedly, the Kennedy organization revealed a "partial adrenal insufficiency." He had been receiving replacement therapy, including cortisone, almost continuously since 1947. JFK later told an aide: "The doctors say I've got a sort of slow-motion leukemia, but they tell me I'll probably last until I'm 45."


As Dr. L'Etang describes it, long-term cortisone therapy, even when carefully administered, may trigger strong mood and energy swings. This is reflected, in his view, in the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco when Kennedy was charged with defective judgment and poor leadership, in contrast with brilliant statesmanship during the Cuban missile crisis a year later.

When Lyndon Johnson was swept into the Presidency by Kennedy's assassination, he was eight years past his first heart attack. The strains of office might well have led him to expect another, considering his natural exuberant, explosive disposition. But he was to fill the unfinished Kennedy term and serve one of his own before his voluntary retirement, apparently in good health, in 1968.

Many important questions are raised by Dr. L'Etang. Is a predominantly sick leadership the product of a sick society? Can medicine and government ever achieve safe guidelines to prevent state crises when the leader is disabled? Should our statesmen as well as our military leaders have to meet stringent physical standards? And finally, should the physician of a famous person release full medical details, as did Lord Moran with Churchill, for the benefit of history?

As the *London Times* comments, the fact that Dr. L'Etang raises the questions without giving answers is in no way a criticism of his study. His presentation should point the way toward action. ■


**IN TIMES OF MOMENTOUS DECISION, THESE LEADERS SUFFERED SEVERE ILLNESSES**




1945 (Yalta): Churchill, 71, was sick with fever; FDR, 63, may have had advanced cerebral arteriosclerosis.




1956 (Suez crisis): Dulles, 68, fell ill with bowel cancer.




1965 (Pleiku and Dominican Republic): LBJ had gall bladder surgery.



1955 ('Summit'): Ike had heart attack that fall.



1924 (five years after Versailles): Since 1919 Woodrow Wilson's strokes had remained unpublicized.



1961 (Bay of Pigs): JFK had Addison's disease therapy.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM COMMENT

STATION WWDC Radio

DATE December 4, 1969 9:00 PM-1:20 AM CITY Washington, D.C.

LYMAN KIRKPATRICK INTERVIEWED

FRED GALE: We have one guest with us in the studio tonight and Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick is his name and he has written a book called CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES and it is all about intelligence failures in World War Two. Some of the big battles the United States was involved in, in Austria, Germany and different countries. Mr. Kirkpatrick is the former executive director of the CIA. Where on the level of the top echelon is the executive director as far as the CIA?

LYMAN KIRKPATRICK: Number three. The director and deputy director are appointed by Congress and the number three man, the executive director, the executive director controller now, is the number three man, the top career man in the agency so to speak.

GALE: I see sir. The other two men are political appointees that more or less come and go with the administration.....

KIRKPATRICK: Well they are. But of course the present director, Richard Helms, is a career officer who has risen up and became deputy director under Admiral Rayburn and for the last, since 1966 has been the director. So the executive director in the line is more or less the general manager of the agency, and the chief of staff, whatever you want to call it.

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GALE: I see. In other words there is nothing clandestine about, you don't go out in the field necessarily and.....

KIRKPATRICK: No I don't. My cover is pretty well, my cover, when I left in 65, was pretty well gone.

GALE: I have a couple, I had a couple of friends that used to do this for fun every once in while. And I guess you're not supposed to do it, like kidding around with the party and would not actually come out and tell anybody that they were with the CIA but more or less intimate it. And I guess that's not the right thing to do, is it?

KIRKPATRICK: Well, it used to be fun and games in the Washington cocktail circle, but I don't think it is anymore I think, I think Washington has probably grown a little more mature and sophisticated in that regard. It used to be I think that quite a lot of people would say where do you work? And they would say, I work for the government, which was a dead give away. But I think that's pretty well gone these days. The people recognize now that intelligence is a pretty serious business.

GALE: But there are CIA people that are involved in just about every business in the country, are there not?

KIRKPATRICK: No. I think that's a popular mythology. I think in the great orgasm the country had a couple of years ago of exposing, or trying to expose everything they thought CIA was involved in, that we ended up with CIA men under every bed.

GALE: That's true. I remember talking to a few people that thought that, and still do as a matter of fact.

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KIRKPATRICK: Under the beds or otherwise.

GALE: Everywhere, and otherwise.

KIRKPATRICK: Well the answer is that it isn't quite that way. I think Allan Dullas once made a very classic remark after commenting about some Russian allegation on CIA activities. I think the gist of which was he said that CIA did everything that the Russians alleged that they did they would have every angel in heaven, everybody else on earth working for them.....

GALE: Excuse me.

KIRKPATRICK: Go ahead.

GALE: Isn't it a little difficult to have an intelligence outfit, and a top notch one in a country like the United States where we do have many more freedoms than most countries? Because Congress and a lot of politicians in the last campaign mentioned the CIA as a government within a government. And they were upset because the CIA does not have to let them know every move they make. That they are free and very flexible to do many things that the Congressmen and the politicians do not know of.

KIRKPATRICK: Well, you've mentioned so many things in that one brief statement to comment on. First, the congress does know what CIA does. Not every congressman but the three committees that are charged with CIA responsibilities do know what CIA is doing. Secondly, it has become a popular political plaything, and a fairly easy one because most politicians that take a crack at CIA know that it is not in a position to reply, generally speaking. And I don't consider these comments to be particularly responsible from the point of view of the country.

And third, back to your original premise, your opening statement. Yes, there is no more difficult job in a free society than operating a secret organization like the CIA. It's an exceedingly difficult job and I must say I have the utmost of admiration of people that work for CIA and take the slings of ignoble fortune that are so often cast at them, for things that quite frequently aren't their doing.

GALE: But they do make mistakes, don't they?

KIRKPATRICK: Of course they do. But in a human society that happens to be a natural fault. The CIA makes mistakes and the CIA is not one to say well forgive us for our mistakes because we're secret. But what they do say is at least give us a chance to do our job without making it too difficult.

GALE: Nobody knows what their job is.

KIRKPATRICK: Well I think the President does and I think the key members of the executive branch and I think the 35 or 40 members of the CIA committees in the Congress do. And I think that if the public is intelligent about it, they know what CIA is trying to do.

GALE: Well, I get the feeling in talking to a lot of people, let's say people with the new left or the new politics, whatever you want to call it, that are not dummies, generally. They are fairly intelligent people, considered intellectual. They are forever mentioning the CIA, they are mentioning as if the CIA is tapping their phones looking over their shoulders, know all of their movements, and that sort of thing.

KIRKPATRICK: Well they're hitting at the wrong target. Because the CIA is not domestic, the CIA is overseas. The CIA



has no internal security functions domestically. And incidentally, I talk to new left too, I'm on a university campus, I see them all the time. I was interviewed recently on the campus for a television program NET is producing in the general area of the formulation foreign policy and some of the students and some of the new left interviewed me and one of them made the comment about not believing anything that CIA said or that anything the government said about CIA. Well what I would say about your comment about the new left and other intellectuals making this type of comment, is that I can only equate it to what the former foreign minister of Indonesia said, when he was tried. Doctor Sabandrio, the former foreign minister who was tried by the present government. He blamed everything that happened in Indonesia on CIA until finally the prosecutor said to him, well Doctor Sabandrio, did all of these things, did the CIA really do them? He said no, but it's the most convenient scape goat to blame all of our problems. I think this is a good part of what the allegations are made today, because I don't think many of these people know what CIA is doing and they hark back to some classics in the area where the agency has been involved and blame it for that and assume that it is still doing that sort of thing.

GALE: Well when I started to read your book, I thought oh boy, were going to find out all of the terrible mistakes that CIA has made.

KIRKPATRICK: Well of course that book your talking about CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES, is pre CIA. CIA was not in existence during World War Two. The previous book I wrote THE REAL CIA,

is the one that should have been the primer before the secondary.....

GALE: I know. That's why I say I started, well I was thinking oh boy we're going to find out about all the CIA little bungles, and it has nothing to do with CIA.

KIRKPATRICK: No it doesn't

GALE: CIA came in what 48, 49.....

KIRKPATRICK: No, CIA was established by the National Security Act in 1947, which was passed in July 1947 and CIA's official birthday is September 18th, 1947. It's now in its twentysecond year. It will be 22 years old next September. But prior to CIA we had no National intelligence agency, never had had one in our history.

GALE: Why was that? I mean the Russians had them the Germans had them. You talked about the Russians having one of the most extensive intelligence networks and organizations in the world.

KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think part of the reason was we didn't think we needed one. After World War One we had made the world safe for democracy and we slipped back into the euphoria of isolation with two vast oceans to defend us. And if you review the history up to the outbreak of World War Two and then even in the early stages of World War Two, why we thought that we weren't going to get involved in the wars of Europe. And Pearl Harbor brought us into the war and Hitler did us the, perhaps the advantage of declaring war on us, we didn't need a national intelligence agency. Why would we need a national intelligence agency when we weren't really concerned with the affairs of the world?

GALE: But we did have some intelligence agents scattered about, but they were mostly connected with the military.

KIRKPATRICK: Yes, Yes we did. They were our Army and our our Navy agents. Of course I always perhaps lapse into the technology of the jargon of the profession, an agent is a spy. We probably didn't have an awful lot of spies, we had officers in our services trying to collect information. But intelligence service per se generally speaking, we didn't have one.

GALE: Well, did those officers do a pretty good job or wasn't it very difficult for them, being connected with the military services to do the kind of job that the civilians.....

KIRKPATRICK: Well, they weren't doing the spying, you see. The officers connected with the military services were trying to get the informers, or the agents so called, or the observers to work for them. And I think based upon the environment of the country and the attitude towards intelligence and all of the other factors, I think they did a pretty good job, yes. But there were very very few of them. Our services didn't really regard intelligence as something that was very essential. You never need intelligence until its desperate and then you need it desperately.

GALE: Yes, I notice you write about Hitler and how he, he really didn't think too much of his intelligence outfit, or his ego overwhelmed him so much, or them so much, that he felt that he really didn't have the need.

KIRKPATRICK: No, I think Hitler is a very good example of it. Because in the first place he distrusted his military

intelligence service, the Ab Fhar, who were indeed treasonable in many respects from the German point of view. But happily from our point of view they were more or less in accord with Western ways. And each Hitler victory made him more sublime and more less susceptible to influence from intelligence so that by the time he attacked Russia he really didn't feel he needed intelligence. He disregarded all the intelligence about Russia which was available. So this incidentally is a factor. One way I think the policy makers, the leaders occasionally don't think they really need intelligence until suddenly there's something they don't know. And they want to press buttons and have it produced before them. Intelligence doesn't work that way.

GALE: But now of course, the important factor, I think most of your countries, and most of the leaders in the countries realize that in the Cold War atmosphere that is vitally important.

KIRKPATRICK: I think so. Except the new left who you mentioned earlier, who perhaps don't consider it so vitally important.

GALE: That's because I think that a lot of the people that I know in the new left feel that they are they are possibly becoming victims of some organization of this type.

KIRKPATRICK: Yes. But I do hope we can try to delineate this fact that the Central Intelligence Agency is engaged in collecting foreign intelligence. Or even more specifically, positive foreign intelligence and is not directly concerned with the internal security in the United States. It is a mistaken target, it's a very good target, because it has been public

far beyond anything of a desire. But it is engaged in finding out what's happening in the world and why it should interest us.

GALE: In other words, I have a feeling you want to make this very clear. That the CIA never involved itself in internal problems.

KIRKPATRICK: Well the law that created the CIA is very specific in this regard. It says that CIA shall have no police or subpoena powers. It clearly delineates between its role and that of the FBI, The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Which I think is fine.

GALE: In actuality if anything is found of an internal nature is turned up at CIA, they turn it over to what, the FBI?

KIRKPATRICK: Well, they'd not only turn it over to the FBI. But if somebody comes in and says well look my neighbor down the street is not a good guy, or whatever it might be, they urge that the neighbor take it to the FBI and not bring it to them. They want to stay clear of that for very good reasons. Now I think what has gotten a lot of people feeling that the CIA may be involved domestically, is because naturally it has to base some of its things in this country in order to operate abroad, and this is what came out in the recent couple of years.

GALE: You mean the NSA, the National Student Association?

KIRKPATRICK: The National Student Association and all the rest of that jazz.

GALE: Well, probably is at the crux of most of it, because the students themselves were quite upset to think that they were being funded by or to find out that they were being

funded by an organization such as this. So that probably has spread now and people are becoming a little bit paranoid over it too.

KIRKPATRICK: Well I think that's true. But I think it all goes back to what's more fundamental basically and that is the so called gap, credibility gap. It started to develop between the government and the people in the country, or some of the people in the country.

GALE: That's true. Listen can you jump ahead in your book a little bit to this chapter or kind of skip over Germany a little bit. Although there is a major invasion of Russia and a few other things. But to Pearl Harbor which is interesting, most of the people are still talking about Pearl Harbor. They are still talking about the fact that we really knew that something was going to happen at Pearl Harbor. That dispatches had been decoded, or dispatches with their, that there was subliminal information somehow. In your chapter you deal with Pearl Harbor, and you deal with the dispatches, and what happened here in Washington, which is very interesting, a lot of background material. I still remember, not vividly, but I recall the fact that the Japanese had a group of men here in Washington, Ambassadors, what have you, talking to, I think it was Roosevelt at that time. And, so could you give us a little background on what happened as far as CIA, what was the involvement there?

KIRKPATRICK: Once again, there was no CIA.

GALE: Well, excuse me. Intelligence, intelligence.

KIRKPATRICK: Intelligence. Yes. There was no CIA

at the time of Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Very directly for a period of eighteen months or two years before Pearl Harbor, the United States and Japan had been in a stage of confrontation which was not favorite word then but which is a favorite word today. In which we had, the United States had, more and more directly been trying to persuade Japan to give up its aggression in Asia. It then had been fighting in China most vigorously for nearly a decade, but very aggressively for five years. And it was very clear that they had aspirations towards establishing what they quite clearly said in their public statements, a greater Asia cope for prosperity sphere.

GALE: The fact they were fighting in the area that is now Vietnam or Indo China.

KIRKPATRICK: Well they had moved in to Northern Indo China in 1940. And you spoke of their representatives here in Washington they had Ambassador Kurusu, who was the Ambassador, the Japanese Ambassador here in Washington during these very intensive negotiations which went on through late 1940 and early 1941 on into the fall of 1941 and then the Japanese sent another Admiral, Admiral Numura, to associate with Admiral Kurusu in their negotiations. And the people negotiating with most specifically were Cordell Hall, our then Secretary of State. And the Japanese Ambassadors occasionally saw President Roosevelt and they made many other contacts here in Washington. What developed of course, was that it was very clear in Washington that the Japanese were bent on aggression, and when they finally moved into Indo China, the United States embargoed all oil shipments to Japan and this was followed immediately by embargoes the Netherlands, Holland, and by the

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their Admirals put it very bluntly, if the embargo continues for two years we will surrender without firing a shot. If they didn't have oil they couldn't, their Navy simply could not fight and Japanese industry would collapse.

GALE: Interesting enough, I notice you wrote in here about the build of of the Japanese fleet before Pearl Harbor and this was back in the 30's, 32 the pact was signed, limiting the Japanese.....

KIRKPATRICK: 1922 the Washington Naval Agreement of course delimited the fleet to 5 5 3 bases. Great Britain and the United States got 5 5, Japan on three. And then there is second conference in London in the 30's and finally the Japanese broke this in the middle 30's and started to build their big fleets.

GALE: It actually limited the Japanese fleet to 60 percent of the size.....

KIRKPATRICK: That's correct.

GALE: Of Britians and the United States.

KIRKPATRICK: That's correct. ANNOUNCEMENT

GALE: This is Fred Gale, our guest is Lyman Kirkpatrick. He is the former Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency now a professor of Political Science at Brown University and living in Rhode Island. And his new book is out, it's called CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES. He mentioned his previous book, which was called what, inside, no THE REAL CIA. And I have to go back and read that one. So I can find out more about the CIA. So I can argue about it.....

KIRKPATRICK: Well, if you're going back to read that one to find out more about the CIA, I'll be glad to help you.



think you'll find out a lot about how the CIA actually works. But if you're going back to find out fascinating spy stories, why.....

GALE: No, no, no, no.....

KIRKPATRICK: It's not in the real CIA.

GALE: No I really don't, I'm not, I don't read spy books anyway. I try to deal with reality, sometimes sort of difficult, but I try to. I'd like to up to headquarters and just look around and pick up some materiel about the agency. But I don't think you can do that, can you?

KIRKPATRICK: No, I don't think they really do that. It's not on the usual Washington tour.

GALE: But as a member of the Press they'll let me just go and look around a little bit.

GALE: Why? I know a friend of mine that has been trying to get into the White House because he contends there are ghosts there and he wants to go in and take pictures of them. And they won't let him in either. Maybe it's the same, the (unintelligible) the same. They think I'm a little wierd too. Alright let's get back to the book, and the Pearl Harbor, because that's an important part of our history. And most people remember that, and recall that. We were talking about the fact that the Japanese fleet was limited by a pact that was signed, and then of course they, they served notice on the United States that they were not going to abide by that.

KIRKPATRICK: That's right Doyle. How clear the notice was I think is subject to some debate. But they very obviously started to violate the pact and the Washington Naval Agreement

and started to build, and started to build large battleships and aircraft carriers, and so on. So by the middle of the 30's the pact was void and the naval race was on again, perhaps in some respects comparable to the present arms race. Japanese aggression in Asia had started in the 30's with their attack and seizure of Manchuria. And then in the late 30's in their war with China which became more and more aggressive and the Japanese obviously were intent upon gaining a major influence in Asia. And of course I think one very interesting aspect of this was the change inside Japan, which we saw the military becoming very powerful and the Army eventually assuming major command. I think that as far as the Navy was concerned, I think the Navy had very high respect for both the United States Navy and for the British Navy. So this was the build up to this episode and intelligence was a very important aspect of it. I think in your original statement you made some comment about a lot of people thought that they were going to attack Pearl Harbor. That really wasn't, a lot of people may have thought they might attack Pearl Harbor.

GALE: No, no, no. I said that that now, other people have come to the conclusion that the United States knew ahead of time that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked...

KIRKPATRICK: Well, that's just as wrong. That's just as wrong as it could be. Nobody knew that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked. In fact most people, I would say 99.9 percent did not believe Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked. As far as evidence was concerned of the attack on Pearl Harbor,

there was one clue that came out of Japan, that Ambassador Joseph Grew, one of the outstanding foreign service officers the United States, man who served in Japan for a decade, reported back. Turned out to be something that had been heard by the Peruvian minister at a cocktail party and it was purely speculation and there was a good deal that as soon as some of that brew that infects cocktail parties probably had something to do with this. Where somebody said they were going to attack Pearl Harbor. The plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor were developed in great secrecy by Admiral Yamamoto, who had become fascinated by the British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, in Italy. And by the fact that the British had very successfully used torpedo planes in shallow water to sink three Japanese, three Italian battleships.

GALE: Yes, I notice, he had the, you mentioned that he had the naval attache.....

KIRKPATRICK: The naval attache in London, the naval attache in London, Genda, who was recently in this country as a matter of fact, assigned to the Imperial Navy Staff to work with Yamamoto in planning for Pearl Harbor. Because one his surprises at Pearl Harbor was of course the fact, that it was not believed that torpedo planes could not be effective in shallow waters, and when I speak of shallow waters I'm speaking of 30 or 40 feet deep, because of the trajectory of the torpedoes coming out. And this of course was one of the great successes that the Japanese achieved at Pearl Harbor. If in hindsight

people think that we knew that they were going to attack at Pearl Harbor, the answer is no. If we thought, if they say well we thought the Japanese were going to engage in further offensives in the Pacific, the answer is categorically, very yes. Because on November 29th a message was sent to all commands in the Pacific that started off with the sentence this is war warning.

GALE: This is on November 29th?

KIRKPATRICK: November 29th. Pearl Harbor was December 7th. And the cable that went out started off, This is a war warning. Well my feeling, after having studied this at great length, and all of the cables that we sent out, plus the intercepts of the Japanese cables, gave me the clear feeling that this was about the eighth wolf call. That we had been sending out war warnings, and war warnings, and war warnings and the commands there had been exercising and remembering the fact that we had not been in combat for a generation, for twenty five years, they felt they probably were alert.

GALE: I guess all that is very important when you think about it. The psychology of .....

KIRKPATRICK: I think that is tremendously important.....

GALE: You tend to become a bit complacent about that. You mentioned wolf calls.

KIRKPATRICK: Yes, yes, very definitely. And I think too, that there was great deal of feeling that the Japanese would have been in to the our military felt that the Japanese would have been insane to attack Pearl Harbor.

GALE: What about all the communication with the Japanese

Ambassador here? And you mentioned also a couple of naval attaches in Washington who were as ill informed as the American politicians at that particular time. They were not let in on the surprise.....

KIRKPATRICK: Well, yes, well what you are saying is that nobody in the Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised by their government they were ready to attack Pearl Harbor. In fact very few of the Japanese government in Tokyo new they were going to attack Pearl Harbor. This was a highly kept secret. And I might add, a very highly debated issue in the Japanese government.

GALE: But Mr. Kirkpatrick, back to my original premise, the thought that I had was the fact that there is still some argumentation about the United States government having known hours before, days before, that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor. Have you not heard this?

KIRKPATRICK: Oh. Let me make sure we're not talking at crossed purposes here. We did, we were intercepting their cables. We were reading their diplomatic and some of their military traffic. And when I say reading their traffic, I mean this is a, this was encoded diplomatic traffic and we were breaking their code and reading it. In this book I have tried to quote from the pertinent cables in that regard which led to the build up of the tensions. And there was a fifteen part cable that started to be received in Washington on December 5th, and we got the bulk of it, we got all thirt, we got thirteen of the fourteen parts by the night of December 6th. And on the morning of December 7th the fourteenth part was received and broken

and reported. And that part made it very clear that this was more or less termination of the negotiations. There has been a great deal of controversy as to whether that reached the President and Secretary Hall and Secretary Simpson and Secretary Knott, Simpson being Secretary of War and Knott Secretary of Navy, and the chiefs of staff in time. Chief of Staff of the Army being General Marshall and the Chief of Naval Operations being Admiral Stark. The answer is it reached them not in time from one point of view, because Pearl Harbor, the attack had already started. The other point of view was that by the time it reached they had already agreed that it meant war, the fourteen part message they were already reading. In fact they were reading it as soon as the Japanese Ambassador was reading it.

GALE: So how would it have change anything had they received it different.....

KIRKPATRICK: It wouldn't have changed anything. They might have sent out in fact.....

GALE: Another wolf call?

KIRKPATRICK: General Marshall and Admiral Stark talked on the phone about sending out an even more urgent message, and they finally agreed to send it out. And it didn't get there, because we were sending it by commercial cable, and it wasn't clearly understood in the Pentagon incidentally, that it was going by commerical cable, where it would be carried by bicycle messenger to the command, the attack was coming in at the time.....

GALE: Perhaps yes. Perhaps that is where the argument exists, the fact.....it was sent by commerical cable and the guy riding the bicycle and some people possibly feel that had they sent

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KIRKPATRICK: Or picked up the phone and called them and said duck, or something to that order or that regard.....

GALE: But if they had done that, when would they have done that, the night before, possibly or what?

KIRKPATRICK: Well, if they had done it at the precise time that the last message was received and General Marshall and Admiral Stark conferred by phone, and after a certain amount of discussion back and forth, finally agreed that another warning should be followed. Remember November 29th, just less than a week before they had sent a this is a war warning. And George Marshall's feelings was that message. And if it had been sent at that precise moment and there had been no delays in going through, with the speed of messages as they were then carried, it might have gotten there a few minutes before the attack, but not much before. It might have gotten, as a matter of fact one thing I think people don't really recognize is that the fleet did respond to the attack. Fifty percent of the guns were firing before the attack was over.

GALE: It was just a well planned attack.

KIRKPATRICK: It was an exceedingly well planned attack with great surprise and one thing I tried to point out with the few maps we do have in CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES, was that they came through the empty seas. The empty seas being to the north, the attack was expected to come from the southwest, if there was an attack. And they came in a way that the Japanese planned, too beautifully through the seas that had no merchant lanes in them, or no shipping that might intercept them. In fact the

Jap fleet order was if they were intercepted to recon: the attack and perhaps turn back.

GALE: I understand from other readings that I have done on Pearl Harbor that they had perfect weather conditions, that there was a low lying fog, or something of that sort on that particular morning that they came in so it would have been hard to see them anyway.

KIRKPATRICK: Well, they came down from the north in miserable the Coral Islands where the fleet had convened and the reason that the fleet had gathered in that particular harbor was because they knew it would be free from any foreign observation. There were no foreigners up there, that's for sure. And then they sailed north from there up towards the Alutians and got close to the Alutians and then came down almost directly towards Hawaii. And they figured this was the way to stay in the bad weather area and out of observation. And they did have, from their point of view, good weather conditions.

GALE: Obviously they figured it just about right.

KIRKPATRICK: Yes, they did. From the point of view of a planned attack, they must be given credit.

GALE: Looking back....I just wanted to discuss that particular area.....the communications going back and forth and the question in a lot of peoples minds about how fast Pearl Harbor could have been warned. The officials at Pearl Harbor could have been warned if at all. There was a story going around for awhile that somebody had written that there was a young Lieutenant somewhere at the Pearl Harbor base that had received a message, but didn't turn it in, and all sorts of things.....



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KIRKPATRICK: Well I think....There were several things that happened, I mean in addition to the fourteen part cable that had been intercepted that was presented to the President. There were two young airmen in the ArmyAir Corps as it was then, manning a radar station on one of the outposts in Hawaii, and they blits on their screen which actually were the Jap attackers coming in. And they reported these blits back to the headquarters and were told to ignore them because Pearl Harbor was expecting some B17's coming in from the west coast of the United States. And the officer on duty thought these were flying fortresses coming in. And besides these airmen were only practicing, it was not a true operation, we weren't manning the radar right around the clock as perhaps one would today, having been through a Pearl Harbor.

GALE: I wonder why not in lieu, in light of the warning, the war warnings that had come from Washington about the tense situation that was possibly developing in the Pacific.

KIRKPATRICK: I think you have to put that in the same context that you put the fact that they didn't have around the clock reconnaissance going, which they did not. That when the war warning came, the commanders felt that they were already doing everything they should do, that a destroyer off the, off Pearl Harbor, outside the submarine boom, had contacted a submarine and had reported that. That actually didn't reach Pacific Fleet Headquarters until I think two minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor. All of these combined simply to prove that what I've become more and more convinced of, and incidentally was not convinced of when I started to write this particular chapter.

That it was all part of the psychology of the time and the attitude of the time. And that's an awful hard thing to change.

GALE: Yes, I think you have a very good point. I guess that we haven't studied the psychology of, what complacency, or between battles or what have you. And this may have a great deal to do with it.

KIRKPATRICK: Well, my feeling was that unless you took that into account certainly from the point of view of the number of warnings that were sent out, the number of times that Admiral Kimel in Hawaii, who was Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations had communicated back and forth. It was a very steady correspondence between the two, both in cables and in letters back and forth, and they were close personal friends. And Stark, in several of his letters, mentioned, "You know I don't know whether the Japanese are going to do, in fact they might even attack Pearl Harbor." He said that on I think three or four different occasions. And it was all this back and forth, and I think if you went back and reconstructed the attitude of these men, they would say and probably be quite sincere, and probably quite right in saying that they thought they had done everything that should be done.

GALE: Possibly so. Okay let's take another little break here. Our guest is Mr Lyman Kirkpatrick who's written a fascinating book called CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES, intelligence failures in World War Two. This is preCIA. I keep saying CIA, I mean just intelligence, military intelligence, Pearl Harbor, the Battle of the Bulge, the German Invasion of Russia, and a couple of others. ANNOUNCEMENT

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GALE: All right, let's get to the telephone. As I said our phone number is LU 78888, LU 78888. Hello comment.

UNKNOWN: I'm sorry I didn't get the name of your special guest. I just started listening a few minutes ago and discovered he was talking about the attack on Pearl Harbor.

GALE: Yes mam, do you have a question?

UNKNOWN: I think I do know something about that and would like to know more (inaudible).

GALE: All right. We don't really have a great deal of time mam, can you.....

UNKNOWN: Please give me the individuals name, please.

GALE: Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick.

UNKNOWN: Kirkpatrick.

GALE: Yes.

UNKNOWN. May I ask him if he's read certain books and so on. See I was one of the few that was not surprised at all at Pearl Harbor. I knew it was coming within a week. I mean I had read the two articles in Time Magazine which let me know that it would happen very soon. I didn't know how soon, but I knew it would happen soon; however, I expected it to happen in Southeast Asia instead. Because you know President Roosevelt (unintelligible).

GALE: Mam, mam I hate to interrupt you, but we don't have a great deal of time.

UNKNOWN: I would like to ask him if he's read certain things.

GALE: Well, would you please ask, would you please ask we don't have much time.

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UNKNOWN: All right, what I would like to know I don't find the man there, I haven't talked to the man.

GALE: Well, he's listening.

UNKNOWN: Oh, he's listening.

KIRKPATRICK: I'm all ears.

UNKNOWN: Yes. Okay. Do you ever read the book FROM PERRY TO PEARL HARBOR?

KIRKPATRICK: I think I've read the book, yes. What we're actually talking about is the book I've written in which there's a chapter on Pearl Harbor which in view of your comments, I think you'd find very interesting, it's called.....

UNKNOWN: What is your name?

KIRKPATRICK: Lyman Kirkpatrick.

UNKNOWN: Lyman Kirkpatrick. And what's the title of the book?

KIRKPATRICK: CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES.

UNKNOWN: CAPTAIN WITHOUT EYES

KIRKPATRICK: CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES.

UNKNOWN: Who publishes it?

KIRKPATRICK: McMillan

UNKNOWN: McMillan

KIRKPATRICK: Yes.

UNKNOWN: (Unintelligible)

KIRKPATRICK: Pardon.

UNKNOWN: Just recently

KIRKPATRICK: October 1969

UNKNOWN: (Unintelligible)

KIRKPATRICK: No this is in regards to the attack on

Pearl Harbor.

GALE: Yes mam. Read the book, please. It tells you all about it.

GALE: Hello comment.

UNKNOWN: I'd like to ask a question, I think (unintelligible). Naval commanders over there have our ships lined up like sitting ducks, everybody was enjoying themselves. Wouldn't you have thought they would have taken some sort of precaution.

KIRKPATRICK: Well the answer is they were taking a great number of precautions. It's quite true in retrospect, when we look at it, it seems rather unfortunate that they had the eight battleships lined up off the island there. But I think when you study all of the things that were being done, you'll find they were taking precautions. But again this is what I tried to explain in some 90 pages of this particular book.

UNKNOWN: Doesn't that slap our intelligence, our management when they sent the message, as you say they did, of course a lot of that came out on the hill in the hearings, you know, in a mighty different story. And they never did find out where General Marshall was that morning, it sounds to me.....

KIRKPATRICK: Oh, they knew where General Marshall was. He was horse back riding.

UNKNOWN: Yes, that's what I say, Horse back riding and a bicycle was taking the intelligence across the ocean, I think that's interesting.

KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think what you have to do, in fact I've read all of the forty volumes of the Pearl Harbor

hearings, which were the accumulated hearings of the Congress, the Army, and the Navy. There were seven hearings on it total. And what I tried to do was to distill this down and to tell the highpoints of why it happened and I hope I've told it the way it is.

UNKNOWN: I thank you.

KIRKPATRICK: Your welcome.

GALE: Hello comment.

UNKNOWN: Sir. I was wondering if it is possible for me to get a comment on the Vietnam war. I know that this is, you asked man talking about the Pearl Harbor, World War Two attack.

GALE: We can talk about Vietnam later. If you want to talk about Vietnam, wait about a half an hour and give me a call back or something, alright?

GALE: Right. Not necessarily related unless you want to go for a long, unless you want to go around about and bring it into perspective. I guess it is since theyre fighting in Indo China took place and Japan was there and Ho Chi Minh hrpped the United States drive the Japanese out, we can bring it in somehow from left field through that.

KIRKPATRICK: Should we drag it in?

GALE: We can fit it in there somewhere.

GALE: Hello comment.

UNKNOWN: Hello. I'd like to talk to your guest about the activities of CIA. Do I understand that he was an ex director of it?

GALE: He's a former executive director, which as he said is

UNKNOWN: Okay. Fine. I find your comment from your former position. And I find your view on the activities of the CIA in the student organizations rather humorous. You don't seem to consider that interfering with internal affairs. And you don't mention the bogus book publishing activities of the CIA or the voice of, no its not the Voice of America, the radio activities, the foreign radio activities of CIA which they say is a backer up and constantly on the air begging for funds from the public.

GALE: Are you talking about Radio Free Europe?

UNKNOWN: Yes. That's been exposed as a CIA front rather recently.

KIRKPATRICK: Are you asking a question, or making a statement?

UNKNOWN: I'm making a statement, I find it rather interesting that you neglect to mention these things with regard to the activities of CIA in internal affairs of the United States. When Fred asked you whether the CIA was involved in the internal affairs you didn't answer the question, you stated the law.

KIRKPATRICK: I think you're using a different word than I used. I said internal security not internal affairs.

UNKNOWN: Alright, internal security, you didn't answer the question you quoted the law.

KIRKPATRICK: Everything you've mentioned has been directed outside of the U.S., hasn't it?

UNKNOWN: Certainly not, when (unintelligible) United States is not outside the United States.

KIRKPATRICK: I believe that I made the statement that

what they did in this country was based to operations outside of the United States.

UNKNOWN: Right, in other words you have a very loose interpretation of the law. In fact so loose that it has no meaning by your interpretation, as far as I'm concerned.

KIRKPATRICK: Which law are you talking about.

UNKNOWN: The law that supposedly controls the CIA, which of course it doesn't pay any attention to.

KIRKPATRICK: Well I think you're probably covering a great deal in your broad statement, because the law has to be enforced and the President is the.....

UNKNOWN: Who enforces that law? Nobody even knows how much money the CIA has, or their activities?

KIRKPATRICK: The congress does.

UNKNOWN: It's idiotic to talk about enforcing that law.

KIRKPATRICK: The congress knows how much the CIA has. The President knows how much it has.

UNKNOWN: A good number of congressmen will tell you they you that they haven't the slightest idea.

KIRKPATRICK: Have they asked?

UNKNOWN: Yes, I'm sure they've asked.

KIRKPATRICK: Who have they asked?

UNKNOWN: They asked the CIA. What kind of answer are they going to get from them.

KIRKPATRICK: Well they probably haven't asked the right congressmen.

GALE: Well anyway sir we are out of time. I hate to



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UNKNOWN: Right, thank you.

GALE: I hate to cut you off but we're out of time.  
Mr. Kirkpatrick thank you very much for coming by, appreciate it. The book is called CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES and it's all about intelligence failures in World War Two and most interesting too. As you will find it so. We just touched on basically one chapter, talked a little about Hitler and his involvement in intelligence in Germany. But it goes into five specifics and a great deal more.

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