

President rejected setting a deadline or date certain for the total withdrawal of our forces, saying the North Vietnamese have only promised to "discuss" the POW question if we did so. In his words:

"We need action on their part and a commitment on their part with regard to the prisoners. Consequently, as far as any action on our part of ending American involvement is concerned—and that means a total withdrawal—that will have to be delayed until we get not just the promise to discuss the release of our prisoners, but a commitment to release our prisoners, because a discussion promise means nothing where the North Vietnamese are concerned."

And finally, in his press conference of June 1, 1971, the President was asked the question: "What is there to lose by setting a date contingent upon release of all prisoners?" The President responded:

"According to Ambassador Bruce, the position taken by the North Vietnamese has been, 'If we end our involvement in Vietnam and set a date, they will agree to discuss prisoners, not release them . . . Now, as far as we're concerned, we at this time are not going to make any kind of agreement with regard to prisoners that is not going to be followed by action or concurrent action; and from the standpoint of the North Vietnamese, we have yet no indication whatever that they would be willing to release prisoners in the event we took certain steps."

I have drawn upon these Presidential statements because I think they do point to an evolving American policy vis-a-vis the negotiations and conditions for the total withdrawal of American forces. As our force levels decrease, our bargaining 'stroke' at Paris is reduced so far as an Indochina settlement is concerned, and eventually, the only point to be negotiated between us and the North Vietnamese will be the prisoner of war issue and the date of our final withdrawal. I do not mean to imply here that the President has taken the position that the only condition for our final withdrawal is the release of our prisoners, though there are indications from the statements I have quoted that we are moving in that direction. The fact is that the President has stated another condition for the final withdrawal of American forces, and that is "the ability of the South Vietnamese to develop the capacity to defend themselves against a Communist takeover." In other words, the completion of the Vietnamization program.

My resolution, on the other hand, goes back to the President's statement on April 7th of this year to the effect that our goal is a total withdrawal through the Vietnamization program if necessary, "but we would infinitely prefer to reach it even sooner—through negotiations"; and the President's statement on April 26th of this year to the effect that as our force levels diminish, the only point left to be negotiated between us and Hanoi is the prisoner of war question. Under the policy suggested by my resolution, we would express to the North Vietnamese our willingness to accelerate our withdrawals and complete them by a date certain if they in turn agree to release all American prisoners being held in Indochina 60 days prior to that date, and guarantee the safe and orderly withdrawal of our remaining forces.

My resolution does not specify a date, leaving this a matter to be negotiated concurrently with the prisoner of war question. But obviously, it would have to be within a reasonable time frame to have any appeal at the bargaining table. It seems to me that the value of this approach is that rather than having each side waiting for the other to make a move on either the matter of setting a date or the matter of releasing prisoners, both would have to agree to discuss these issues simultaneously, and the resolution of one would be contingent upon the other.

While suggesting a specific date in such a resolution is appealing from a political standpoint, or from the standpoint of reassuring the American public, I think from a practical negotiating standpoint this is something best left to be worked out in the secret sessions at Paris and not publicly announced until an agreement has been reached.

To get back to the question of what effect an accelerated withdrawal and date certain for its completion would have on the Vietnamization program, let me say that while an earlier withdrawal date would reduce the amount of final preparation we could give the South Vietnamese to defend themselves, it would not be fair to suggest that we haven't already given them a reasonable capability for survival. You will recall that on April 7th of this year, shortly after the Laotian operations, the President announced that, "Vietnamization has succeeded."

A report released by the Department of Defense last week points out that ground combat responsibility will be completely turned over to the South Vietnamese by this summer, thus completing phase one of the Vietnamization program; and phase two—developing South Vietnamese air, naval, artillery, logistics and other support capabilities—has been proceeding concurrently with phase one, though it will take a little longer.

Over the last year, according to the DOD report, American air sorties have decreased 46% while South Vietnamese attack sorties have increased 65%. The pacification program has likewise been proceeding with marked success. Regional Forces have increased 48% since June of 1968 and have thus relieved the ARVN for combat duties, while Popular Forces have increased 51% since June of 1969, and over 95% of the Popular Force platoons are now fully trained and equipped with modern radios and armed with M-16 rifles.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I hardly think an accelerated withdrawal, contingent upon the prior release of our prisoners, could in any way be considered precipitous in terms of the Vietnamization program since the South Vietnamese have developed an impressive capacity to shoulder the burden themselves, all the way down to the hamlet level.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to briefly address myself to Section 3 of my resolution which states as a further matter of national policy our intention to provide continued military and economic assistance to the nations of Indochina, in amounts approved by Congress, and consistent with the objectives of the Guam Doctrine; and to arrange asylum for those who might be endangered by our withdrawal.

As the members of this subcommittee are well aware, the United States cannot legally or morally turn its back on Southeast Asia after the last troop has been withdrawn from South Vietnam. We will continue to be a Pacific power and we will continue to have certain obligations and responsibilities to the people of that part of the world. In July of 1969, the President issued the Guam Doctrine which said in effect that the United States will honor its treaty commitments, extend its shield to any nation allied with us which is threatened by a nuclear power, and, in cases involving other types of aggression, we will furnish military and economic assistance but look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense. I think the Congress should officially endorse this policy of encouraging self-sufficiency on the part of our allies, and at the same time help formulate specific programs for its implementation.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I am interested in seeing that the Congress reasserts its Constitutional role in matters of war and peace. I think we can and should play a role in extricating the United States from Viet-

nam and in preventing future Vietnam-type involvements. If this is to happen it must begin right here in this committee. I commend this committee on its war powers hearings and its Indochina hearings, and I urge you to follow through in such a way that the full House will have an opportunity to express itself on these issues of crucial importance to our country and our Constitutional form of government.

H. CON. RES. 347

Whereas, the President of the United States is pursuing a policy designed to bring an honorable end to the war in Vietnam through the withdrawal of American Armed Forces from that country, through a reduction in the level of hostilities, and through negotiations; and

Whereas, the President has withdrawn over half of the American Armed Forces from Vietnam since taking office, and has further announced that two-thirds of all such forces will have been withdrawn by December 1, 1971; and

Whereas, the President has announced that, "Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam"; Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress hereby declares that it is the national policy to continue the safe and orderly withdrawal of American Armed Forces from South Vietnam on an irreversible basis, with the objective of the total withdrawal of all such forces at the earliest practicable date.

Sec. 2. It is the national policy to accelerate and complete such withdrawal by a date certain provided that there is a negotiated agreement to: (a) release and repatriate all American prisoners of war being held in Indochina by a date 60 days prior to such date certain, under the supervision of the International Red Cross or other such organization; and (b) guarantee the safe and orderly withdrawal of all remaining American Armed Forces from South Vietnam by such date certain.

Sec. 3. It is the national policy to: (a) provide assistance to the nations of Indochina, in amounts approved by the Congress, consistent with the objectives of the Guam Doctrine of July, 1969; and (b) arrange asylum or other means of protection for South Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians who might be physically endangered by the withdrawal of American Armed Forces.

AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. STEELE) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. STEELE. Mr. Speaker, on June 22, 1971, a bill H.R. 9330 was introduced in the House by Mr. REIN of New York to provide for creation of an American Council for Private International Communications, Inc. The primary purpose of the council would be to receive congressional appropriations and make grants to Radio Liberty for broadcasts to the Soviet Union and to Radio Free Europe for broadcasts to Eastern Europe.

Because of my own interest in Soviet affairs, I wish to speak today about Radio Liberty. It appears that unless Congress acts on H.R. 9330, Radio Liberty will have no other source of support and will have to end its broadcasts to the Soviet Union. Indeed, I am informed that Radio Liberty's present funding does not extend beyond the end of this month,

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and that unless an interim arrangement can be made pending passage of H.R. 9330, the station will have to go off the air very shortly.

I urge the Congress to take action to prevent this emergency, which would seriously damage the foreign-policy interests of the American people and the cause of international understanding.

In more than 18 years of continuous broadcasting, Radio Liberty has built up a specialized following of concerned Soviet citizens. Unlike other radios beamed to the Soviet Union from outside, Radio Liberty speaks as the voice of former Soviet citizens and focuses primarily on the country's internal political, economic, and social life. The station has approached Soviet problems constructively, in terms of moderate and nonviolent solutions. It issues no appeals to action, but concentrates on dissemination of news and diverse opinions.

Ever since 1960, when I visited the Soviet Union with one of the first groups of American students to go there, I have been keenly aware of the role of information in the development of Soviet society. It is ironic that today, as the Soviet Union rises to the challenge of the space and nuclear age and the number of citizens with professional training at the university level is growing by leaps and bounds, the dead hand of the censor lies ever more heavily on Soviet life. This contradiction between progress and backwardness has given rise to a dissent movement which, although small in visible size, cuts deeply into the fabric of its society.

Radio Liberty's audience includes important segments of the Soviet cultural and scientific elites, those pressing hardest for positive change in their society. If the Soviet system yields to pressures for modernization, decentralization and liberalization, as someday it can hardly fail to do, these people will be in the forefront of the country's leadership. From our standpoint as Americans, they will be more important in our relations with their country than the aging bureaucrats at the top level with whom we now must deal.

Resistance to censorship among thinking members of Soviet society has given rise in recent years to a movement unprecedented in the Soviet period. I refer to so-called samizdat, an abbreviation of two Russian words meaning "self" and "publishing." Samizdat consists of literally hundreds of unpublished works—fiction, criticism, political essays, protest documents, appeals for human rights—now circulating throughout the Soviet Union in manuscript form. In a country where even the use of mimeograph machines is controlled by the regime, samizdat manuscripts must be painstakingly copied on typewriters, a few carbons at a time.

Samizdat has been a major source for Radio Liberty. More than one-sixth of the station's Russian-language programming in the first half of this year has consisted of broadcasts of samizdat items which have filtered out of the Soviet Union. Thus, Radio Liberty is able to provide its audience with their own uncensored medium of mass information, a unique forum for the exchange of ideas.

The meaning of this to Soviet intellectuals chafing under censorship is expressed in a recent comment by one of them:

If I want to say something to the people, to the country, then the only way I can say it is through Western radio.

A major samizdat item now being readied for broadcast by Radio Liberty is the new novel "August 1914" by the Nobel Prize-winning Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whose work has been suppressed in his own country. A Washington Post reviewer, the newspaper's former Moscow correspondent Anatole Shub, has written of "August 1914":

Millions of Soviet citizens, spiritually demeaned by the official mendacity and pap, would surely queue up instantly, as a breadline in a siege, to read even a few pages of a book of such shining merits.

Radio Liberty has also acquainted its audience with the iconoclastic writing of the Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov, called the "father" of his country's hydrogen bomb, who has warned:

The division of mankind faces it with destruction . . . In the face of these perils, any action increasing the division of mankind, any preaching of the incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is madness and a crime.

Especially since the post-Khrushchev leadership came to power, a relatively small but important number of Soviet citizens, prominent in various professions, have managed to seek asylum in the West. Many of these are now contributing to Radio Liberty programs: Writers, journalists, social scientists, natural scientists, and others. On several occasions Svetlana Alliluyeva has gone to Radio Liberty studios to read from her own writings on the air. Such broadcasts are virtually the only link through which such former citizens, who have given up their citizenship in order to work for reform from abroad, can communicate with the public in their homeland.

In addition to its Russian broadcasts, Radio Liberty speaks to Ukrainians, Uzbeks, and other Central Asian and Siberian Moslems, to Belorussians, and to the peoples of the Caucasus, using a total of 16 languages of Soviet non-Russian nationalities. A proposal to add Lithuania, Latvian and Estonian is now pending. The non-Russian nationalities, which the recent census shows are on their way to outnumbering the Russians themselves, remain for the most part linguistically and culturally distinct and buoyed by a soaring rate of elite formation. In thinking of the future of our relations with the Soviet Union, we Americans must consider our links with these peoples as well as with the Russians.

An important component of Radio Liberty's Russian broadcasts has been programs in behalf of Soviet Jews. This has included scores of separate appeals by individual Soviet Jews and groups of Jews protesting discriminatory practices and demanding in many cases the right to emigrate to Israel. I understand that the station also tries in other ways to keep alive for its Jewish listeners an awareness of their ethnic and cultural identity in the face of regime efforts to efface traditional values. Jewish high holidays have been celebrated in Radio Liberty broadcasts with Hebrew prayers

and songs. A regular feature of Russian broadcasts has been material dealing with condemnations of anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance by revered Russian humanists of the past, and by persons abroad whose names are respected in the U.S.S.R. A recent immigrant to Israel, the physicist Boris Tsukerman who was associated with Academician Sakharov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and others in creating an unofficial "Committee on Human Rights" in the Soviet Union, commented after leaving the country:

Special hopes have been placed, of course, on a radio station which has paid special heed to the requirements of various categories of Soviet radio listeners and has had the mission of satisfying these requirements.

Radio Liberty's value as a world asset is recognized internationally. In the past few months, as word has reached the press of the station's difficulties, public statements of support have been issued by leading Soviet specialists at centers of learning like Oxford, Cambridge, London University, and the Sorbonne. Such influential newspapers as the London Daily Telegraph, the Paris Figaro, and the Neue Zuercher Zeitung of Switzerland have written favorable articles.

In the United States, Radio Liberty's support is bipartisan. The station has friends among liberals and conservatives, among hawks and doves. Some of its most vigorous support comes from academic specialists. I understand that in recent weeks those sending messages to Members of Congress in behalf of Radio Liberty have included such distinguished scholars as Philip Mosely and Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia, Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, Frederick Barghoorn of Yale, Richard Pipes of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, Robert V. Daniels of the University of Vermont, and Foy Kohler of the University of Miami—a former Ambassador to the Soviet Union. I might add that hundreds of specialists in the United States and abroad rely on Radio Liberty's research analyses of Soviet affairs.

Radio Liberty is less well-known to the United States public at large. It has never conducted mass public—relations or advertising campaigns, largely because it has not solicited donations from the general public.

What would be our loss if Radio Liberty ceased broadcasting?

Radio Liberty performs a function that is not feasible for official radios like the Voice of America. If its unique role were to end, the United States and its friends abroad would relinquish an important medium of international understanding. They would rebuff an audience which has been built up over the years through investment of time, money and dedication.

If once dispersed, Radio Liberty's human resources including many persons with rare linguistic skills and cultural backgrounds would be lost beyond recovery. The station's technical facilities, once dismantled, would require years to replace. Its frequencies would be yielded permanently to other broadcasters in the crowded shortwave spectrum. Above all, notice would be served on important, friendly segments of Soviet society that

they have been downgraded by the people of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, Radio Liberty is not an outmoded instrument of the "cold war." It is an institution involved in the vital work of establishing links with those in the Soviet Union working for peace and a better life. In terms of money, its total annual operating budget is little more than the price of a single F-111 jet fighter. At that cost, it must be preserved.

Today I join Mr. REID as a cosponsor of H.R. 9330.

TAKE PRIDE IN AMERICA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MILLER) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, today we should take note of America's great accomplishments and in so doing renew our faith and confidence in ourselves as individuals and as a Nation.

The United States is the location for the largest medical center in the world. The District Medical Center in Chicago covers 478 acres and includes five hospitals, with a total of 5,600 beds and eight professional schools with more than 3,000 students.

NEED FOR AMERICAN-ISRAELI TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. HALPERN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I am today reintroducing a House resolution urging the negotiation of an American-Israeli treaty of friendship as a timely move to stabilize the Middle Eastern situation and prevent further deterioration of the tenuous cease-fire. It is cosponsored by, Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG, Hon. JOHN DUNCAN, Hon. JOSEPH ADDABBO, Hon. SAM STRATTON, Hon. ROBERT MCCLORY, Hon. ROBERT DRINAN, Hon. GEORGE COLLINS, Hon. JOHN DOW, Hon. GUS YATRON, Hon. JAMES SCHEUER, and Hon. BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL.

My proposal is prompted by the recent grave events in the Middle East. These events took place at a time when our attention was preoccupied by Vietnam and the disclosure of sensational information related to our involvement there. Our preoccupation with Vietnam was cynically exploited by the Soviet Union to sabotage American efforts to promote peace between Egypt and Israel.

Moscow entered into a 15-year friendship treaty with Egypt that advanced Soviet military involvement in Egypt and transformed that country into a virtual Russian satellite. The Soviet President, Nikolai V. Podgorny, expressed Moscow's belligerent new views on the Middle East on May 27 after signing the new treaty of friendship and cooperation with Egypt. He condemned "the imperialists in the United States" and denounced American efforts to mediate the conflict.

President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt subsequently denounced the United States and said that even if Israel with-

drew from all territories occupied in June 1967, the Arabs would not make peace.

Soviet-built Sukhoi jets have resumed flights over the Suez Canal to spy on Israeli positions. They have been driven off by anti-aircraft fire on a number of very recent occasions. The cease-fire is in danger.

With possible collaboration by the Soviet Union, the leftist Arab regime in Yemen permitted extremist Arab elements to use a seaport over 1,000 miles from Suez as a base for a sneak attack by sea on an oil tanker bound for an Israeli seaport. The tanker narrowly escaped destruction. Credit for the attack was claimed by the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the group that last year hijacked and destroyed American aircraft.

My resolution envisages a 15-year American-Israeli friendship pact that would serve as an effective answer to the mounting crisis created by the new 15-year Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty and the resulting escalation of tensions. The threat to world peace has been increased. Massive new Soviet arms shipments are arriving in Egypt. Soviet air and naval bases in that country are being expanded. Soviet officials have just visited new Russian naval units concentrating in the Mediterranean in a bid to neutralize the U.S. 6th Fleet. The Soviet Navy is now manning submarines and missile ships as well as jet bombers displayed the insignia and colors of Egypt.

It is my conviction that we have not taken the Soviet-Egyptian pact seriously enough. My resolution would serve the national security interests of the United States by providing a dramatic notice to potential aggressors. We would indicate that our country will not be moved from its commitments to Israel. We would show the futility of efforts to drive a wedge between our Nation and the state of Israel.

My resolution would give added strength to the existing understandings between the United States and Israel. It would serve notice to the Russians that they do not have an "open sesame" to the Middle East.

My resolution provides that "the President should give favorable consideration to the negotiation by the Department of State of a 15-year American-Israeli Treaty of Friendship." Enactment would give added prestige and strength to the existing relations linking the two countries. It would provide, in the words of the resolution, "a formal basis for the existing close relations between the two nations relating to economic cooperation and the supply of military and defense material."

It appears to me that the United States has taken the new pact between Russia and Egypt too lightly. There is already evidence that the treaty is calculated to prevent a just peace settlement and to cover the shipment of additional arms to Egypt.

The new treaty made Egypt almost completely subservient to the Soviet Union and made Cairo regime a virtual satellite of Moscow. The most effective American answer, serving the national security interest of the United States, is to stabilize the now unbalanced situa-

tion by a treaty formalizing American-Israeli friendship.

The Soviet Union entered an arms accord with Egypt in 1955 with tacit undertakings that led to the war of 1956. Soviet-Egyptian accommodations were further expanded in 1967, leading to the outbreak of war in that year.

There have been some reports that the United States is withholding new contracts for arms to Israel although Egypt has become more bellicose following her new pact with Russia. The United States is pressured by Egypt and the Soviet Union to withhold arms required by Israel.

A new Soviet strategy has emerged to keep tensions broiling in the Middle East over Israel which is not protected by NATO. The Russian aim is to isolate the United States from its allies, to undermine the credibility of our defensive capacities, and to test our resolve. Russia is consolidating air and naval bases in Egypt to dominate the Mediterranean.

As a member of the Near East Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I recently visited Israel and Lebanon to study the developing situation. The Soviet-Egyptian pact has not been taken seriously enough by our own Government; not only did it forge a tie between Russia and Egypt as states but also links the two peoples and their only legal political parties.

The Communist bloc provided the only parallel in existence for a pact of this sort. Egypt can be considered from now as virtually a Russian satellite in the Middle East.

The imbalance of arms between Egypt and Israel is reaching dangerous proportions as the United States defers new Phantom Jet contracts. Russia, meanwhile ships MIG-23's and its finest ultra-modern firepower into Egypt in a shocking escalation of weapons systems. American preoccupation with peace and withdrawal from military commitments is being cynically exploited by the Russians in the Middle East.

The danger of the new pact linking Moscow with Cairo lies in the prospect of new fighting. To deter such a possibility, the United States must act now to clarify its relationship to Israel and determination to keep faith with an outpost of freedom.

The United States-Israeli treaty would not obligate the United States to automatically go to war in defense of Israel or vice-versa. It would nevertheless dramatize to potential aggressors that we are willing to formalize the existing commitments and contractual arrangements, including the provision of arms, linking the United States with Israel. Our relations with all concerned governments—Israeli, Egyptian, and Russian—would be strengthened. Our policies would be made clear to friend and foe alike.

My resolution, if adopted, would serve as an insurance policy for peace.

STANDARDS FOR OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle-

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

Acting Legislative Counsel

[Redacted]

DATE

25 June 1971

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED FORWARDED

1. Acting Director

2. Executive Director - Comptroller

3. OPPB

4. Mr. Cord Meyer

5. [Redacted]

6. [Redacted]

7. [Redacted]

8. [Redacted]

9. [Redacted]

10. [Redacted]

11. [Redacted]

12. [Redacted]

13. [Redacted]

14. [Redacted]

15. [Redacted]

Attached is an excerpt from the Congressional Record of Thursday, 24 June 1971, containing remarks by Representative Bob Steele expressing his support of Radio Liberty. He also sets forth the urgency for an arrangement for interim funding of the Radios pending passage of Representative Reid's (Case's) bill. [Redacted]

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signed

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Acting Legislative Counsel

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