that will provide for the construction of an advanced recycling plant near Wilmington. The State and the many supporters of this proposal are to be commended.

Two recent newspaper articles appeared on this subject that I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues. One appeared in the Wilmington Morning News yesterday, and describes in some detail the background of the proposed Wilmington plant. The same day, the Wall Street Journal carried an article that details some of the problems facing another recycling operation. I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed, with my comments, as a part of the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Wilmington (Del.) Morning News June 23, 1970]

HERCULES GETS STATE BID: WASTE RECYCLING PLANT PLAN ACCEPTED

(By John D. Gates and Bob Dolan)

DOVER.—A Hercules, Inc., proposal for the design, construction and operation of a solid waste recycling plant in New Castle County was accepted yesterday by Gov. Russell W. Peterson.

Peterson announced he had accepted the Hercules plan on the recommendation of his Committee on Solid Waste as he signed House Bill 822, appropriating $1 million for design and engineering work on the plant.

The plant, billed as the first in the world to reclaim all waste materials fed into it, would handle 500 tons of domestic and industrial waste and 70 tons of wet sewage sludge a day, or nearly half the solid waste generated in New Castle County.

The next step will be contract negotiations between Hercules and the state to iron out details concerning what exactly the state wants from Hercules in the way of design work. A Hercules official said these negotiations would probably be completed in from three to six weeks.

Construction and operation of the plant would require more negotiations—as well as more money. These negotiations would involve New Castle County government and, if hoped-for federal funds are available, the federal government.

Cost of the plant from initial design to start of operations would be about $10 million, according to John N. Sherman, director of advanced programs for Hercules' chemical propulsion division, which submitted the proposal.

Design of the plant allows for eventual doubling of capacity through expansion. After an initial shakedown phase, money realized from the sale of recycled waste products would pay the operating expenses of the plant, according to the Hercules proposal.

Members of the Governor's Committee on Solid Waste said that similar plants may be built in the Dover and Georgetown areas at a later date.

A bill to provide federal aid for pilot waste recycling projects is now being prepared by the U.S. Senate Committee on Public Works, of which Sen. J. Caleb Boggs, R-Del., is the ranking minority member.

The committee hopes to have the bill on the Senate floor for action next month. Delaware hopes to get some of that money to help finance the plant.

State Rep. Robert J. Berndt, R-Hillcrest, who sponsored the bill to fund design work and chaired the governor's committee, said a site for the plant must be chosen soon because Hercules designs will depend on the nature of the site.

The Hercules proposal included a completion schedule for the plant of 22 months from the date of site selection, barring unforeseen obstacles and assuming full financing of the project.

Committee members present when Peterson signed H.B. 822 were Berndt, George Dutcher, New Castle County public works director; Richard Weldon of Bear; Arthur W. Dobberstein of Dover; State Sen. J. Donald Isaacs, R-Townsend; and Rep. R. Glen Mears Sr., D-Seaford.

Berndt said the selection narrowed to Hercules from nine firms which filed proposals. Some withdrew their plans, he said.

Berndt said Hercules was chosen because "They have the talent to do it; they're way out in front of everybody else." He said the firm also has markets for the byproducts.

The proposed plant, designed to be operated by about 50 employes, is to have three major elements.

The first is a digester system for converting organic waste materials to a high quality humus product free from disease producing organisms. A similar plant in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is currently processing 300 tons a day.

The second is the application of pyrolysis techniques—subjecting organic materials to high temperatures—for the controlled decomposition of organic solid wastes such as rubber and plastics.

The third is a residue separation system for the inorganic residue separated from the digester discharge. The separation of metals, glass and grits will be accomplished through a series of screeners, gravity tables and other equipment.

Hercules adapted the systems design knowledge of its chemical propulsion division to come up with its plan. Parts of the system designed by Hercules were the result of Hercules research, while other parts are patented products of other companies.

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 23, 1970]

RECLAIMING REFUSE: EFFORTS TO SAVE, REUSE WASTE PRODUCTS SLOWED BY VARIETY OF PROBLEMS

(By David Gumpert)

Six years ago Victor Brown came up with what he thought was a progressive—and profitable—idea. He would form a company to build processing plants capable of shredding and mechanically separating trash into its basic components of paper, metals, glass and other refuse, and then he would sell the recovered materials back to industry to be used again.

That way he would be making money from both the city whose garbage he handled and the companies that bought the separated trash. And he would also be performing a valuable service because the garbage would be kept out of incinerators and landfills, and resources would be saved through the reuse of the materials.

Today Mr. Brown is president of Metropolitan Waste Conversion Corp., which operates a plant that processes 25% of Houston's garbage. He charges Houston $4.11 a ton to handle the garbage, which is separated into paper, metals and a combination of crushed glass, yard refuse and food waste for garden compost.

AHEAD OF HIS TIME

But Mr. Brown is frustrated and disappointed, and he is beginning to feel he may be slightly ahead of his time. The reason: He's losing about $2 on each ton of garbage he handles because he can't sell most of the materials he salvages.

Of the 2,000 tons of garbage Mr. Brown handles each week, for instance, 1,200 tons consists of paper. But he can sell only 200 tons. "It's good solid paper—paper that's only been used once," says Mr. Brown. "It represents trees and a lot of other resources, and we're throwing it away and burning it."

Mr. Brown's business is known as "recycling." In recent months, with the surge of public concern over environmental issues, more and more government officials, business leaders and conservationists have pointed to recycling as a fundamental step toward alleviating such problems as pollution and the depletion of resources.

But, as Mr. Brown's experience indicates, several hurdles must be overcome before recycling is likely to become a routine, widely accepted process. At the moment, any broad move to recycling seems to be blocked by a complex set of factors, including unfavorable economics, technological shortcomings and restrictive government regulations.

NOT A NEW IDEA

Recycling is far from a new idea. Many metals and large quantities of textiles and rubber once were routinely collected by scrap dealers and reprocessed. But in recent years rising costs of collecting and processing used materials have discouraged their use.

About half the copper, lead and iron used in the U.S. is still recycled, but only about 30% of aluminum and 20% of zinc are reused. Less than 10% of textiles, rubber and glass is reprocessed nowadays. Of paper, the largest component of municipal waste, only about 20% winds up being used again.

The effects of recycling on conserving natural resources are particularly evident in the case of paper. The Association of Secondary Material Industries, a trade group, estimates it takes 17 trees on the average to produce a ton of paper. Of the 58.5 million tons of paper used in the U.S. last year, 11.5 million tons were recycled—meaning that 200 million trees did not have to be cut. But if 50% of the paper had been recycled, the association figures, the cutting of another 300 million trees could have been avoided.

GLASS FOR PAVING

A number of projects and experiments have been launched recently to investigate possibilities for recycling. At the University of Missouri scientists are testing the feasibility of extracting glass from garbage and crushing it for use as an aggregate in asphalt paving. In San Francisco and in Madison, Wis., the public has been asked to separate its newspapers from other trash so that the papers can easily be collected and recycled. Officials in both cities say the public's cooperation has been greater than expected.

But advocates of recycling say far more work will have to be done before recycling begins to have any significant effect on environmental problems. "I think the approach up till now has been totally unimaginative," says Merril Eisenbud, professor of environmental medicine at New York University and former head of New York City's Environmental Resources Protection Administration. He advocates government subsidies to encourage industry to become more involved in recycling.

The Federal Government would become heavily involved in recycling activities if legislation now pending in the House and Senate gains approval. Bills in both houses provide for spending some $500 million in the next few years to support research and the building of recycling facilities by local and regional governments.

Recycling advocates aren't sure if the pending legislation is the real answer, however, since it places most of its emphasis on technology and tends to ignore economic factors. A closer look at Victor Brown's operation in Houston shows how technological and economic problems are intertwined.

In planning his Houston plant, which was built more than three years ago, Mr. Brown figured most of his recycling income would be from the sale of scrap paper to paper companies. But so far he has been unable to sell any of his paper to paper companies; the 200 tons he sells each week go entirely to the construction industry to make building ma-

terials. "We have to fight just to maintain that small market," Mr. Brown says.

Mr. Brown contends the paper industry has rejected his paper because paper companies have such a heavy investment in woodlands and in pulp-making equipment that they simple aren't interested in recycling—an assessment that at least one paper industry executive concedes is partly true.

OTHER REASONS AS WELL

"A lot of the companies are oriented to the trees," says John Schmidt, assistant manager of manufacturing for St. Regis Paper Co. "If you have a lot of land with trees, you aren't inclined to abandon that."

But Mr. Schmidt says there are also other reasons for the difficulties Mr. Brown has had in selling his paper. St. Regis has considered buying wastepaper from Mr. Brown but so far has rejected it, arguing that the paper is mixed in quality, contaminated by other garbage and too expensive to transport from Houston to the company's recycling paper mills in the Midwest and North.

St. Regis officials argue that technology isn't yet sophisticated enough either to separate paper according to quality nor to remove the odor of garbage completely. "When we get to that point, Victor Brown might have a product," says Mr. Schmidt.

Mr. Brown's difficulties extend beyond paper. He says he's capable of turning out 60,000 tons or more of compost a year, but right now he can sell only 5,000 tons annually to agricultural markets. His only success has been in the sale of metals, mostly cans, to the copper industry, which uses them as catalysts in the production process. As a result of his losses, which he says have amounted to about $2 million over the past three years, Mr. Brown is cutting back on his research and development in an attempt to reduce costs.

REGULATORY PROBLEMS

Besides the economic and technological problems such as those plaguing Mr. Brown, there is the problem of regulatory restrictions. M. J. Mighdoll, executive vice president of the National Association of Secondary Material Industries, argues that many scrap metal, paper and textile dealers have been forced out of municipal centers to less-convenient locations on city outskirts because their businesses are considered "unsightly."

Mr. Mighdoll also contends that export limitations on materials such as copper and nickel, considered vital to national needs, have restricted markets and thus discouraged recycling efforts. He also cites a 10% depletion allowance that provides a tax break to growers of timber as a deterrent to the recycling of paper.

Recycling advocates maintain that many of these factors will have to change before industry will take more interest in recycling. Richard Vaughan, director of the Federal Bureau of Solid Waste Management, urges that the Government "provide the same kind of incentives for recycling" as have been provided for the exploitation of raw materials. He observes, for instance, that freight rates for iron ore and pulpwood currently are lower than those for scrap metal and scrap paper, a situation he argues could be changed by Government regulation.

ASSESSING PENALTIES

Recycling might also be encouraged by adding extra charges on disposable consumer products, making reusable products more attractive and by somehow penalizing manufacturers who shun recycled raw materials when they're available. Such penalties might be imposed through special taxes, though conservationists haven't come up with any specific proposals yet. "These penalties would force the producer and consumer to look for alternatives," says Michael Brewer, vice president of Resources for the Future Inc., a nonprofit Washington-based research organization.

Many of these active in recycling argue that once the economic problems are overcome, the technological obstacles will easily fall. "All of the exciting things are in technology and all the answers are in economics," says Harold Gershowitz, executive director of the National Solid Wastes Management Association in Washington, a trade group that represents private handlers of solid waste.

Mr. Gershowitz argues, "You cannot separate the need for technology from the need for markets." He suggests that the Government begin creating markets for recycled products by confining its own purchases to recycled goods. The same argument is echoed by conservationists. "If the Government would say it would buy only recycled paper, recycling paper plants would spring up all over the country," maintained Jerome Goldstein, executive vice president of Rodale Press Inc. in Emmaus, Pa., which publishes several conservation magazines. Mr. Goldstein says that he has asked his paper suppliers to seek out only recycled paper for use in Rodale publications.

NIXON POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

HON. JEFFERY COHELAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 24, 1970

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, the Nixon policy in Southeast Asia is replete with contradiction. There is, however, one basic fact that runs through all the scenerios of Vietnamization—the presence of 200,000 U.S. troops for an indefinite period of time. Whether we call these U.S. troops "support" or "combat" is really meaningless. The unalterable fact remains—the current Nixon plan for Southeast Asia requires a large U.S. manpower and material commitment in that area well into the foreseeable future.

This is the wrong course, as I have pointed out on numerous occasions. Any impartial study of the sociopolitical problems of Vietnam or of the entire Southeast Asian area, for that matter, and the heavy U.S. commitment, point inexorably to a single conclusion: The Thieu-Ky regime will not be forced into active negotiations while they have a massive U.S. presence. In addition, Cambodian-type operations conducted by U.S. personnel or U.S.-sponsored "volunteers" have done little to forward a negotiated settlement.

Two former Defense Department officials from the Johnson administration, Townsend Hoopes and Paul Warnke, have carefully delineated the problems faced by the Nixon administration. This is a thoughtful and provocative essay and I recommend it to my colleagues:

NIXON REALLY JUST DIGGING IN

(By Townsend Hoopes and Paul C. Warnke)

President Nixon's speech of June 3 has now made undisguisably clear the aim of his Vietnam policy. It is not a total withdrawal of U.S. forces in the next 12 or 18 months, or even in the foreseeable future; nor does it involve a willingness to accept the consequences of the free play of political forces in Indochina. Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policy involves three basic elements:

Endeavoring to reduce U.S. forces to that level which, in his judgment, will be politically acceptable to American public opinion.

Striving to strengthen ARVN (the South Vietnamese army) to a point where, in collaboration with remaining U.S. forces, an unassailable military posture can be permanently assured.

Hoping to force Hanoi to recognize the enduring nature of that posture, thereby inducing Hanoi to negotiate a settlement in Paris on present U.S. terms.

Behind a smokescreen of ambiguity, there is now the clear shape of the Nixon policy. It is confirmed by the surfacing of U.S.-subsidized Thai "volunteers" for Cambodia and by the lack of administration resistance to indications that ARVN will continue its Cambodian operations indefinitely.

It has been supposed that of the three major considerations said to have produced the April 30 Cambodia decision, what counted most was the concern that continued American force withdrawals depended on "cleaning out the sanctuaries." Even in that context, the Cambodian border crossings were pre-emptive strikes designed not to meet an immediate threat but to reduce enemy capabilities in the area for four to six months, thereby buying time for the "further strengthening" of ARVN.

No doubt that was the thrust of Gen. Creighton Abrams' view (which suggests how unreliable and unpromising ARVN is really regarded by the U.S. command, beneath all the chamber of commerce ebullience about Vietnamization). The President on June 3 made this view his own official explanation for the decision to strike Cambodia.

However, this explanation looks like an after-the-fact rationalization invented by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. For as Stewart Alsops look at the Presidents yellow pad (Newsweek, June 1) made quite clear, Mr. Nixon is still tilting with "international communism" in Southeast Asia and his chief concern on April 30 was that Cambodia might go Communist.

The most revealing point on the yellow pad was the Nixon concern that, if neither side moved, an "ambiguous situation" might arise in Cambodia which would make it very difficult for the United States to hit the sanctuaries—i.e., we would be charged by international opinion with attacking a neutral convention and the degree of disarray special scrutiny.

Specifically his conclusion on June 3 that activities in the Cambodian sanctuaries between April 20 and April 30 "posed an unacceptable threat to our remaining forces in South Vietnam" is belied by Laird's statement to newsmen that the attacks represented "an opportunity" because the North Vietamese in Cambodia, unsettled by the Lon Nol coup, were at that time facing west. More generally, his concern to act precipitately would seem to reflect a failure to understand that in limited war, there are sanctuaries by definition.

Why attack Cambodia rather than Laos or across the DMZ? Why refuse to acknowledge that a certain mutual respect for sanctuaries is what has kept U.S. bases in Thailand essentially free from sapper attacks?

There is a further point. One would have supposed that a President who had publicly eschewed the prospect of military victory and who was conducting a strategic withdrawal had long since made the judgment that the particular coloration of petty nongovernments in Southeast Asia did not affect the serious interests of the United States. A statesman who had in fact decided that a genuine U.S. extrication from the area was necessary would indeed be at pains to foster "ambiguous situations." He would go out of his way to avoid a clear-cut Communist-anti-Communist polarization.

THAT "JUST PEACE"

Mr. Nixon's quite opposite concerns and actions tell us something very important.

With respect to Vietnamization, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Laird have consistently run ahead of the President with their clear implication that the program is primarily a vehicle for total U.S. extrication (even though the war might continue after our forces were gone). Mr. Nixon, however, has always insisted that Vietnamization will lead to "a just peace" and an end to the war.

On June 3, he said categorically: "I have pledged to end this war. I shall keep that pledge." These have been puzzling assertions, since all signs indicate that even successful Vietnamization (i.e., a transfer of the entire military burden to ARVN), could produce nothing better than interminable war. The speech of June 3 and the revelation of the yellow pad now makes these assertions a good deal less puzzling.

They show that what Mr. Nixon means by a "just peace" is Hanoi's recognition of a permanent position of U.S.-ARVN military strength in South Vietnam. Since even the White House has in various ways revealed that it has no illusions about ARVN's ability to go it alone, it is a fair inference from a series of official statements that a "just peace" will require the indefinite retention of something in the neighborhood of 200,000 U.S. troops as well as indefinite support for the Thieu regime.

How Mr. Nixon plans to make these requirements politically palatable at home is not yet clear. Until recently he has kept both his aims and his formulations artfully vague, but now the fig leaf has fallen away.

The difficulty with this vision of the future is that it is a gossamer dream on at least two counts: (1) On all the evidence, the American people are not prepared to sustain a sizable military commitment in Vietnam for an indefinite period, especially under conditions that requires our forces to go on winning victory after meaningless victory in the pattern of the past five years; and (2) there is absolutely nothing in the history of the Vietnam war (or in the present or prospective power balance there) to indicate that Hanoi will come to terms with the Thieu regime.

If Mr. Nixon and his advisers really believe that they can force a settlement in Paris on present U.S. terms, then they remain deluded about the most fundamental political-military realities in Vietnam; they also fail to grasp how very narrow are the margins of domestic tolerance for their conduct of the old war, not to mention the new and wider war they have now arranged.

Negotiations in Paris have failed chiefly because our political aims exceed our bargaining power. Hanoi is not prepared to accept arrangements for elections worked out under the auspices of the Thieu government and in which the winner would take all; and the U.S.-ARVN military position, even at the point of its maximum strength, was not sufficient to compel Hanoi to bargain on our terms. The departure of 110,000 U.S. troops and the promised withdrawal of another 150,000 hardly strengthen our military position.

A VULNERABLE PROCESS

Thus strapped to a negotiating position that cannot succeed, Mr. Nixon is thrown back upon Vietnamization. But owing to the very uncertain qualities of ARVN and to the President's unstated (but now undisguisable) insistence that our proxy regime must be permanently secured, the process of American withdrawal is necessarily slow and ambiguous.

Its lingering nature makes it vulnerable to unanticipated intervening events, like the Lon Nol coup, which knock it off balance and create new pressures for compensatory military action—pressures which Mr. Nixon promptly translates in "opportunities" in the permanent holy war against communism. Its conditional nature—the unspoken determination to hang in there until we have ended the war in a "just peace"—precludes a negotiated settlement and also works against a tacit understanding with the other side with regard to lowering the level of violence.

In this mushy situation, the war is considerably enlarged, and with it, American responsibility for the Cambodian government. The setting in motion of imponderable new political forces (in Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, Saigon, Hanoi, Peking, Moscow and Washington) indicates that the struggle in Cambodia will be protracted, will probably spread, will reopen old tribal hatreds and will continue to involve us in situations which the American presence can aggravate but can do nothing to resolve.

Meanwhile, American force withdrawals continue, impelled by domestic pressures. As they do, the truth is borne in upon the administration that the gradual and unnegotiated character of the reductions cannot, below certain levels, assure the safety of the remaining forces.

This unfolding denouement requires that the American people wake up to the self-deception and bankruptcy of the Nixon policy in Vietnam, for it is now a matter of the utmost urgency to bring policy into accord with realities both in Indochina and at home. Our transcendent need at this juncture is for leadership in the White House—and if that is not possible, then in Congress—with the scale of mind and the inner firmness to explain the real choices facing the country.

The task is to lead public opinion toward an understanding that a Vietnam policy based upon these realities is consistent with our national interest, can be carried forward without a traumatic loss of self-confidence and need not cause a lapse into mindless isolation—above all, that such action is infinitely preferable to continued self-deception.

PERSISTENT RHETORIC

We are not getting that leadership. President Nixon seems somewhere between believing in the essential rightness of the war and understanding that the American interest requires its liquidation. He has evolved a policy of substantially reducing, but not ending, the American role.

At the same time, he has been unwilling to abandon the rhetoric that supported our intervention in the first place. One must conclude that either he genuinely believes the rhetoric or is afraid to risk, through candor, even a transient loss of national prestige for the sake of a healthy adjustment to the facts.

Viewed in the light of the political situation in the United States and the military situation in Indochina, the Nixon policy is a grab bag of contradictions, illusions and expedient actions. It seeks objectives that are unattainable while warning that acceptance of anything less would mean "humiliation and defeat for the United States." The increasingly visible gulf between this martial bravado and the known facts is producing a form of official schizophrenia; if unchecked, it could lead to a national nervous breakdown.

Worse still, if the President really does believe his own rhetoric, there is the predictable danger that he will feel compelled to take action more drastic than the Cambodian strikes in certain foreseeable situations—e.g., after U.S. forces have been further reduced but there has been no corresponding improvement of ARVN and no corresponding deterioration of North Vietnamese capability. Indeed, the looming probability, of just such a crunch is what makes it imperative for the country to face the realities now while there is still time for dignified, rational, deliberate choice.

If we continue down Mr. Nixon's path, we could easily reach a situation which seriously threatened the safety of our remaining forces. At that point, we would face a constricted choice between immediate escalation and immediate liquidation. Can anyone believe a wise decision could be made in such circumstances? Given the divisiveness, the frayed nerves and the general distemper that now define our national mood, does anyone have confidence that our political system would not be grievously shaken by the consequences of either choice?

THREE MAJOR POINTS

It is now obvious that Mr. Nixon missed a golden opportunity, during the honeymoon period of early 1969, to lead the country firmly away from a decade of self-deception by beginning to uncoil the contradictions and restore the national balance. He could have taken definitive steps toward liquidating the war and binding up the national wounds.

He could have done this without political risk to himself and indeed with positive benefit for his party and the cause of national unity. Though time is running out, it is still not too late for someone—preferably, of course, the President—to take up this vital task. Three points need to be explained to the American people with absolute clarity.

1. That after five years of major combat, we have done about as much as any outside power could do to shore up the government of South Vietnam;

2. That the tangled political issues which divide Vietnam, growing as they do out of long colonial repression and the ensuing struggle to define a national identity, can only be settled among the Vietnamese themselves;

3. That, contrary to the erroneous assumption on which U.S. military intervention was based, the particular constitutional form and the particular ideological orientation of Vietnamese (and Indochinese) politics do not affect the vital interest of the United States.

Adoption of such a posture would lead directly (a) to a policy of deliberate, orderly, unswerving and total withdrawal of U.S. forces to be completed not later than the end of 1971; and (b) thus to circumstances that could bring about a serious negotiation based on our declared intention to depart.

This kind of negotiation would not be unconditional. We would require the return of our prisoners and the safe withdrawal of all our forces; we would seek at the same time to provide, with Russian and other outside assistance, for the restoration of neutrality at least in Cambodia and Laos, and hopefully in Vietnam as well. This approach is fully consistent with plans put forward at different times by Averell Harriman and Clark Clifford.

It must be faced, however, that the Nixon decision to strike Cambodia has moved us further away from the chances of political settlement. For that act has surely deepened Hanoi's suspicion that we do not intend to leave while it has reinforced Saigon's natural resistance to compromise. In addition, of course, it has put into our laps the problem of working out the political future of yet another country.

GIANTS IN QUICKSAND

Nevertheless, it does not seem impossible that steady, candid, clearheaded leadership, based squarely upon the three points set down above, could steer the American Leviathan through the dangerous transition without running the ship aground or producing general hysteria. For one thing, there is really no choice about leaving Vietnam; for another, there are enormous advantages ahead if we can by skill and steady nerves make a safe and sane passage.

To change the metaphor, Mr. Nixon's "pitiful giant" of April 30 is pitiful chiefly because his leg is in quicksand up to the midthigh and because he is unresolved about its extrication. But the military, economic and psychological advantages of removing the leg are demonstrable.

With two feet on solid ground again, the

country would regain its global poise. Our influence and power would not evaporate. We would not be rendered incapable of defining and defending our legitimate interests. On the contrary, our ability to reassure our NATO and Japan treaty partners, and our capacity to exert a steadying influence on the smoldering situation in the Middle East, could only be enhanced. Our industrial, technical and cultural achievements would continue to astound and attract the world.

At home, we desperately need a breathing space in which to redefine our vital interests, our military strategy, our basic relationships with the rest of the world. We are still operating essentially within the frame of a foreign policy worked out in the late 1940s.

The main tenets of that policy were strong and valid for their time, but they are now badly in need of revision; among other things, they fail to reflect the fragmentation of the "Communist bloc," the recovery of Europe and the deep divisions in our own society that call for drastic realignment of national priorities. We cannot gain the breathing space, we cannot reconcile the younger generation, we cannot conduct a reasoned self-appraisal until the Indochina enterprise is liquidated.

It is important that the American people understand what is going on so that they can effectively assert their right to a policy consistent with their interests.

SUPPORT FOR ACTION IN CAMBODIA

HON. STROM THURMOND

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, June 24, 1970

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is inspiring to receive letters from our combat men in Cambodia who fully agreed with President Nixon's decision to attack the privileged sanctuaries in Cambodia. One of the most impressive letters I have received was from 1st Lt. William J. Price, First Cavalry Division, whose home is in Spartanburg, S.C. Lieutenant Price also sent me a copy of his letter supporting the President which he wrote to the editor of the Spartanburg Herald-Journal.

Price's letters presented clear, logical, and practical evidence of why President Nixon's decision was the right decision. The success of the operation, as experienced by Lieutenant Price and many others, shows beyond any doubt that President Nixon's bold action was a master stroke of tactical surprise at the right time, at the right place, and under the right circumstances. Lieutenant Price states that—

One reason that the American morale is so high is that we are finally being able to take the offensive instead of the passive role we have been taking in which our hands were tied.

Mr. President, I commend Lieutenant Price for his loyalty, dedication, patriotism, and wisdom. It would behoove all Americans to support our fighting men and our President in order to hasten an honorable and just end to the war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Lieutenant Price's letter to me and his letter to the editor of the Spartanburg Herald-Journal be printed in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM),
May 12, 1970.

Senator STROM THURMOND,
Columbia, S.C.

DEAR SIR: I am writing to let you know that I'm glad you are supporting President Nixon's move of U.S. troops intto Cambodia. I feel that he made the right decision and I admire him of his convictions. I sent the enclosed letter to the Editor of the *Spartanburg Herald-Journal* today and I thought you might be interested in reading it.

My Father is Dr. George W. Price of Spartanburg, S.C. and if you will recall, we played tennis with you at the Spartanburg Country Club tennis courts about two years ago. I certainly enjoyed meeting you and playing tennis that afternoon. I wrote Governor McNair on 3 Feb. 70 concerning servicemen in Vietnam paying state income tax and I also asked him for a South Carolina state flag to display over here but I have never heard from him. If it is not too much trouble, I would surely appreciate a state flag for it would mean a lot to me over here. I did learn about the income tax from my Father.

I am looking forward to leaving Vietnam and the Army this September. That will be a a happy day returning to my wife and family in Spartanburg. I certainly have been proud of what you have been doing in the Senate and I'm glad I will be home in November to vote. My wife and I voted absentee for Nixon when I was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas in November 1968.

I hope you and your wife are fine. Thanks so much for your time.

Sincerely,

First Lt. WILLIAM J. PRICE.

QUAN LOI, RVN,
May 12, 1970.

EDITOR,
The Spartanburg Herald-Journal.

DEAR SIR: I have been a resident of Spartanburg for the past 23 years and graduated from Wofford College in 1968. Since September 1969, I have been serving with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the Republic of Vietnam.

I have been concerned with the reaction of the American public and especially the college and university students who have been rioting since American troops entered Cambodia the first of May. I had mixed emotions at first concerning our American troops entering Cambodia for I didn't want this war escalated but I know that President Nixon made the right decision now. I admire him for making that decision as it may cost his a second term in office but I hope not.

My battalion, the 2/5 Cav, built the first American fire support base inside Cambodia and I was with the battalion when we made this move. It was quite an experience and most of the troops had mixed emotions at first but now their morale has never been higher for the troops out in the field. We are finding large caches of supplies to include weapons, ammunition, rice, and numerous other things needed by the NVA to continue this war. By entering Cambodia and finding all of these supplies, many American lives will be saved and it will also give the South Vietnamese Army a longer time to build up their army. It will also be quite awhile before the NVA can build up their supplies again to mount a strong offensive.

One reason that the American morale is so high is that we are finally being able to take the offensive instead of the passive role we have been taking in which our hands were tied. The men feel that they are finally accomplishing something and that they are really hitting the enemy where it hurts and possibly this war can come to an end soon. The GI's over here would like nothing better than to end this war and go home so other Americans won't have to come over here.

I can't understand why there is so much violence and trouble on the campuses of America. I doubt that many of the protesters have been over here and I don't think they really know what it is like here. I didn't ask to come over here and I don't enjoy being away from my wife and family for a year, but since we are so deeply involved in Vietnam, I feel that the American public should support our troops over here for this isn't an impersonal war. This war is affecting the lives of families in every city in the United States.

Being in Vietnam for a year is no fun but one does learn to appreciate all the things we have in America that everyone takes for granted. I feel that I will be a better American after being over here for I will appreciate all the freedoms and conveniences that I took for granted before I came over here. America would be a better place if everyone woke up and tried to work together instead of fighting among themselves and if they didn't take everything for granted.

All we ask is for your support so this conflict in Vietnam can come to an end so the American troops can come home. Our intervention into Cambodia is really paying off for we are really hurting the enemy and this should help speed up the end of the war. Everyone over here surely prays and hopes so.

If the college students want to protest the war in Vietnam, they should have protested the way it was being fought before we entered Cambodia for now we are winning and fighting the war in a way that is really hurting the enemy and his supplies, not just waiting for him to attack us like we were doing before. President Nixon and the American troops in Vietnam need your support so this war can come to an end.

First Lt. WILLIAM JAMES PRICE,
First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Republic of Vietnam.

BROADCAST NEWS AND THE GOVERNMENT

HON. F. EDWARD HÉBERT

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 24, 1970

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Albert Allen, editor and publisher of Television Digest, spoke before the National Institute for Religious Communications at Loyola University in New Orleans on June 15, 1970.

Because his topic is a matter of discussion today, I was requested to include his speech in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Mr. Warren is an experienced journalist who has been with Television Digest since 1945 and its editor since 1961. During his years in Washington journalism circles, he has covered the Federal Communications Commission, Congress, courts, trade associations, and others.

I insert his speech in the RECORD at this point:

BROADCAST NEWS AND THE GOVERNMENT

(Remarks by Albert Warren)

It has been my privilege and good luck to serve as a reporter in Washington for the last 25 years. In addition, I've been writing in a print medium, addressing readers who manage the electronic media, while covering the government officials who regulate these media.

national body, a composite of many regional agencies, or all of them—is so overwhelming that an immediate, urgent and concerted action by all countries seems imperative.

THE VIETNAM WAR—NO END IN SIGHT

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, 3 years ago this month the Saigon correspondent of the Washington Post, Mr. Ward Just, wrote a final dispatch before leaving South Vietnam after 18 months of reporting. In good journalistic fashion, Mr. Just began his last report—on June 4, 1967—by coming directly to the point. He wrote:

This war is not being won, and by any reasonable estimate, it is not going to be won in the foreseeable future. It may be unwinnable. Frustrated at the resiliency and resources of the enemy, the administration revises its rules of engagement and widens the war. South Vietnam, unattainable at best, threatens to become unmoored altogether.

Now, 3 years later, what has really changed, Mr. President? We are still, as Mr. Just wrote, "chasing straws in the wind." Recent articles by Washington Post correspondents Robert Kaiser and Laurence Stern provide the latest documentation that this war is "recycling itself—returning full circle to a low-level, guerrilla-type war, based upon attrition and the political isolation of rural areas by the Vietcong.

Today, after years of war, we are returning to the point where we came in and we call it progress—although political "pacification" remains as illusive as it has always been. Mr. Stern writes:

The unglamorous war in Vietnam is still waiting to be fought; while it has not been lost by any means, it is still—as ever—far from won.

Mr. President, on how many tombstones must that epitaph appear—"yet to be won"—before we change our priorities and take negotiations seriously?

I ask unanimous consent that the recent articles written by Messrs. Kaiser and Stern and published in the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, May 31, 1970]

THE VIEW FROM SAIGON: NO END IN SIGHT

(By Robert G. Kaiser)

"O mouse, do you know the way out of this pool? I am very tired of swimming about here, O mouse!"—Alice in Wonderland.

SAIGON.—If the mouse knows, he isn't saying. After a month of foraging in Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, after a year of Vietnamization and 16 months after Richard Nixon took office promising to end the war, the United States is still swimming about in Indochina. The end may be in sight in presidential speeches, but it isn't in sight from here.

The Cambodian adventure has reopened the breach between the image of the war one gets by looking at it in Vietnam, and the image conveyed by the speeches of high officials in Washington. While President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird imply that the Cambodian incursions will accelerate the American withdrawal and ensure the success of Vietnamization, the men most directly responsible for conducting the war in Vietnam refuse adamantly to make any such predictions.

Many American officials here are still shaking their heads at the terms of President Nixon's April 30 speech announcing the Cambodian offensive. "A move that was taken for small tactical reasons got swept up in the big strategic picture," as one senior official put it in a somewhat helpless tone of voice.

To an outsider with no claim to expertise beyond 14 months experience chasing his sense of curiosity around Vietnam and Cambodia, the qualms of these officials seem thoroughly justified. Neither the situation before April 30 nor the situation since then much resembles the descriptions coming from Washington.

From here, the fall of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia seems to have changed the Indochina situation radically. Though spokesmen for the administration aren't saying so, the United States' ability to control events on this peninsula—which has never been great—seems less now than ever before.

On April 30, the President said attacks against the sanctuaries were necessary "to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs." He added that the enemy is "concentrating his main forces in these sanctuaries . . . where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam."

As it has turned out, that concentration of enemy troops in the sanctuaries did not exist. Thus U.S. and South Vietnamese troops met almost no opposition when they entered them early this month.

This is one of those small errors of fact that have recurred throughout the war in Vietnam, disturbing but not crucial. Much more important was the President's basic contention that the sanctuaries *had* to be attacked to allow withdrawal and Vietnamization to continue successfully.

On that question, like all the big questions in the history of the Vietnam war, there can be no certain answer. There is only one way to try to predict events in Vietnam: One assembles a portion of the information available (there is too much ever to consider it all), judges it on the basis of experience and intuition and ends up with a guess, more or less educated. For most who have tried it, this system has proven woefully imperfect. But it is all that exists, so we continue to use it.

A NEW DEPARTURE

President Nixon's prognostication came as a surprise in Vietnam. What he said, in effect, was that all the boasts about Vietnamization in the past were hollow: the program couldn't work because of the enemy's sanctuaries in Cambodia. Those sanctuaries existed before Sihanouk was deposed March 18. Nothing that happened after March 18 made them any more dangerous, according to Mr. Nixon's own commanders in Vietnam.

It is difficult to begrudge Mr. Nixon his decision to change his mind about the allegedly rosy future of Vietnamization. The theory that a relatively constant number of Vietnamese soldiers could grow in stature—but not in numbers—to replace half a million Americans has always been questionable. Many of the President's critics had accused him of dreaming on this score, or of deliberately misleading the public.

And yet in Vietnam, Vietnamization has looked like a reasonable bet—not a sure thing, not even a clear favorite, but by Vietnamese standards, a wager with a fair chance of success.

To be sure, it was a risky idea, not least because the North Vietnamese did have large forces in the Cambodia sanctuaries. But one could travel all around this country asking Americans and Vietnamese and outsiders, too, if they thought it would work, and the answer has been a conditional but widespread "yes" for many months.

The question had to be posed carefully: Could the United States withdraw its forces without the last men having to shoot their way to their airplanes? Could the South Vietnamese army and government hold up the tent until the Americans got out from under it? As the geopoliticians sometimes put it, could the Americans withdraw and leave behind a decent interval before fate took its course in South Vietnam?

The question had to be put in those terms because any broader assertion could not be justified. The long-term future of South Vietnam depends on so many variables, so few of them dependent on the outcome of the current shooting war, that any grander prediction would be foolhardy. Americans and Vietnamese here tend to agree about that.

When you asked those who answered a cautious "yes" if they could think of another way to get the United States out of Vietnam in an orderly fashion, you heard two answers. The first, and much the more popular, was "no"; the other was that America might negotiate a settlement with the North Vietnamese that would allow a complete and quick withdrawal.

This idea, so popular among war critics in Washington, is not very popular here. Among Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam, there is widespread doubt that the North Vietnamese will negotiate a settlement unless they can be sure it is to their advantage. From here, where the Communists appear to be weak on the ground, negotiation does not look like an appealing alternative for Hanoi. A negotiated settlement that accurately reflected the current balance of power in South Vietnam would, in effect, force Hanoi to give up most of its stated objectives. And it is hard to imagine the South Vietnamese or the United States agreeing to a settlement that did not accurately reflect the current balance of power.

BASIS FOR OPTIMISM

The limited optimism that has existed here was due to a few apparent facts about the state of the war that have gained wide acceptance in the last year or so. Briefly stated, these are the principal ones:

The government has established a dominant physical presence in all of the urban areas and in most of the countryside, including the crucial Mekong Delta, the area around Saigon and heavily populated coastal regions in the north. U.S., ARVN and local militia forces have obliterated most of the old Vietcong army, pushing its remnants out of the populated areas. The Communists now must rely on North Vietnamese to do most of their fighting.

Most of the remaining enemy force units, primarily northern, have been forced to stay close to their sanctuaries.

Without its local military forces, the Vietcong's political organization has been weakened, at least ostensibly. People in the countryside are therefore less conscious of the Vietcong's presence while more active government programs have made them more conscious of the Saigon regime.

Apparent rural prosperity has also helped the government. Economists say the prosperity is false, based entirely on props provided by American dollars, but it is real to the farmer who can buy a radio, a motorbike or a tractor.

And President Thieu, with the army, has established an unprecedented degree of political stability in wartime Vietnam. The chaos of the 1963–6 period has been superseded by a remarkable calm, relatively speaking.

If those generally optimistic assertions were widely accepted here, so were a number of doubts and questions that put any optimistic conclusions in jeopardy. The fundamental reservation must be that none of

these factors can be counted on in the long term. The Vietcong have demonstrated an ability to revive their organization, and all the Saigon government's apparent strengths seem to be based on slender reeds. All could be reversed in one way or another.

The future of Vietnamization has long seemed to depend on the answers to these questions: Could the lamentable ARVN officer corps become effective? Could the local militia, now extremely erratic, assure local security without U.S. and ARVN assistance? Could the army survive without the American props that now support them at every level?

Could official corruption in Vietnam be controlled or regularized? Could the woefully weak civil administration be improved? Could economic collapse and chaos in South Vietnam be avoided? Could the non-Communists ever compete with the political organizing skill of the Vietcong? And finally, could South Vietnam ever cope with enemy forces in the northern half of the country, where the Communists have much more secure sanctuaries and a much better tactical position than in the south?

These were the long-term problems. Despite them, it seemed possible that over a short term of, say, five years, the South Vietnamese might be able to hold their own—not because of their strengths so much as because of the Communists' grave, if temporary weaknesses.

The offensive into Cambodia seems unlikely to help provide any satisfactory answer to the questions about the long-term prospects for Vietnamization. But by further weakening the Communists' tactical position, the new offensive should make the situation on the ground in South Vietnam even more hopeful.

In sum, if the Nixon's administration was pursuing a short-term strategy of getting out of Vietnam as quickly as possible without the tent collapsing in the process, the Cambodian operation might have been very helpful. Might have been, had others remained equal. But of course they have not. For reasons over which the Nixon administration had only slight control, the entire Indochina situation changed dramatically during the past several months.

THE HOPES FADED

Before this change, the United States had what seemed a fair chance of escaping more or less honorably from Indochina if it could cope with the situation in South Vietnam. The war in Laos seemed stalemated, albeit precariously. Cambodia's neutrality under Sihanouk, though benevolent to the Vietnamese Communists, seemed to assure stability in that country for the foreseeable future (in this part of the world, no more than a few years). So in those good old days, the United States just might have escaped from the region, leaving Indochina intact, at least for a reasonable period of time.

The good old days are gone. The situation in Laos looks more precarious than ever. The Communists are in a stronger position, especially after their recent offensive in southern Laos. Souvanna Phouma's neutralist government faces a gloomy future.

More important, the pretense of Cambodian stability is gone. Cambodia has become an active battlefield of the war, a third front for the North Vietnamese. In the first days after the March 18 coup, there might have been a chance for Lou Nol to negotiate a modus vivendi with the North Vietnamese. But instead, he threw down the gauntlet, and the North Vietnamese responded in kind.

The new government in Cambodia is weak, uncertain and apparently ineffectual. The same adjectives would flatter the Cambodian army. The Cambodian economy is in shambles, and will almost certainly get very much worse. The rubber industry, which provides almost all of Cambodia's exports, has already been severely disrupted by the new war.

U.S. intelligence now expects the Lon Nol regime to be challenged by a Cambodian liberation movement, led at least in name by Prince Sihanouk, whose personal popularity is said to remain high in the Cambodian countryside. The new regime's ability to cope with this challenge is, at the very best, problematical. If any prediction in Indochina is justifiable, it is that Cambodia will be in turmoil (or in Communist hands) for a long time to come.

Despite these baleful prospects, the United States seems to be tied to the new Cambodian regime almost willy-nilly. President Nixon said it was necessary to attack the Cambodian sanctuaries to assure the success of U.S. policy in Vietnam. If Sihanouk returns to power, all of Cambodia will probably become a sanctuary for the Communists. Must the whole country then be invaded?

Moreover, regardless of presidential rhetoric, it seems impossible not to interpret the offensive into Cambodia as a signal to Hanoi that the United States would not allow Cambodia to fall. Such a signal must have seemed unavoidable in Washington, if 50,000 dead in Vietnam were not to be written off as a bad go.

If one defends the Vietnam war for its stated purpose—to assure self-determination in South Vietnam—or for its cold war purpose—to stop the advance of communism in Asia—the reaction to events in Cambodia must be the same: Cambodia must be saved. But in the long run, barring a re-creation of the American presence in Vietnam, there appears to be no way Americans can prevent Communists (or pro-Communists under Sihanouk) from taking over Cambodia.

As a result of the coup against Sihanouk and events since, Indochina is now a maelstrom of conflicting vital interests: The North and South Vietnamese, the Laotians, the Cambodians and now even the Thais all see their vital interests in jeopardy.

President Nixon apparently sees America's vital interests at stake here too. But these vital interests are not compatible—in several combinations, they are mutually exclusive.

And there is no foreseeable way that the maelstrom can be calmed, unless North Vietnam abandons its Indochina campaign.

That, of course, has always been the dream of American officials, in both the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Someday, the United States always believed or hoped, the men in Hanoi would have to cry uncle. One can hear that talk again: They've overextended themselves, according to the new version of the old line; they can't fight on three fronts in the rainy season after losing their supplies, with hostile forces on all sides.

Perhaps this time it is true, but the small bits of evidence available suggest the contrary. Skeptical Westerners very recently in Hanoi were impressed by the apparent high morale and resiliency of the leadership. According to one of these recent travelers, the morale of the masses has apparently risen lately, because the government has cut prices and ended rationing of many consumer goods.

LONG FIGHT AHEAD

In the field, the Communists show every sign of having the patience to carry on the war. In Cambodia, according to U.S. intelligence and captured documents, they are beginning the long difficult task of building an indigenous revolutionary movement from the hamlets up.

Surely the North Vietnamese have grave supply problems, but they have already secured a new infiltration route via the Sekong and Mekong rivers into southeast Cambodia, which conceivably could be extended to their forces in southern South Vietnam.

And if it is true, as Presidents Johnson and Nixon have both said, that North Vietnam is counting on the American opponents of the war to win their victories, then the men in Hanoi must now be dancing the North Vietnamese version of a jig. Perhaps something resembling the gloomy picture that now seems to face the United States was inevitable even before Sihanouk's fall. Some old Indochina hands have long criticized American policy as shortsighted and self-deluding, because it failed to face up to the entire Indochina problem.

The United States has devoted its attention to South Vietnam, these critics have said, hoping that the Communists would do the same, thus localizing the problem. The criticism is harsh but difficult to dispute, if one assumes the United States has had long-term objectives in this region. Almost certainly there would have been serious instability in Indochina's future even if Vietnamization in the old context had been a smashing success.

Even in the new context, Vietnamization seems certain to continue. In Vietnam it is assumed that the end of the Cambodian operation on June 30 will be quickly followed by a substantial further withdrawal of U.S. troops. These withdrawals should be possible without serious repercussions in South Vietnam. Three months ago, that alone would have been very good news. It is still, on balance, good news; but now one must wonder if the orderly withdrawal of Americans from South Vietnam will be seen, a year or two from now, as a very significant achievement.

[From the Washington Post, June 19, 1970]

REDS MOUNT GUERRILLA DRIVE, DISRUPTING PACIFICATION

(By Laurence Stern)

DANANG, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 18.—While Cambodia has preempted the world headlines, the Communists in South Vietnam have mounted a fierce and determined guerrilla-style military campaign.

The reversion to guerrilla war tactics by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong cadres has been foreshadowed for nearly a year in Communist military proclamations and directives, starting with a much-publicized Vietcong resolution (COSVN nine).

American and Vietnamese military commanders call the new strategy a policy of "desperation" that is being waged by an adversary who knows he is "losing."

Whatever the motive, the current Communist offensive has sent pacification scores—the elaborate accounting system used here for measuring government security—tumbling in numerous South Vietnamese provinces since the onset of spring.

It has also exposed gaping weaknesses in the ability of South Vietnamese territorial forces to defend civilian populations in the so-called pacified areas from Communist attack.

In II corps, the central highland region which contains half of South Vietnam's land mass, the number of "D" and "E" hamlets (lowest on the pacification scoreboard) has doubled from 10 to 20 per cent since February. American military observers expect the trend to continue, partially in response to the Cambodians operations.

Northward in I corps, which extends from the highlands to the Demilitarized Zone, small Communist units have attacked government-controlled villages, government military dependents quarters and American firebases with growing boldness and intensity in recent months.

SCENE OF ATTACKS

During a four-day tour of the central and northern provinces I visited the dependents quarters of Vietnamese ranger units at Pleiku where 31 had been killed and 83 wounded—nearly all the wives and children of rangers—in three successive Communist attacks. The last was on June 3.

This narrow neck of South Vietnam lying

just below the DMZ has been the scene of the fiercest fighting in both Indochina wars, the French and the American.

In both I and II corps there is every evidence that the Communists—following a meticulously formulated game plan—have broken down many elements of their main forces into small assault units whose mission is to strike at American military targets as well as civilian population centers (the Communists still call them "strategic hamlets") then fade back into the forests and jungle.

The objective is not to hold territory against the massive retaliatory firepower of the Americans and South Vietnamese so much as to demonstrate the ability of the Communist guerrillas to strike at will and to terrorize civilian populations living within the military occupation zones of the Americans and the Saigon government.

To the unknowing the word "pacification" may be misleading since there are few areas in Vietnam, no matter how pacified, without guns, sandbags and soldiers.

The Communist strategy is based on patience and attrition, the two staple elements of revolutionary war as it has been practiced in Vietnam over the past two decades. Now, in a climate of American withdrawal, such tactics could have all the more telling effect on the allegiance of Vietnamese villagers and peasants—especially in this hardcore region called the cradle of the Vietminh movement.

Some South Vietnamese commanders, who will inherit greater and greater responsibility as the Americans leave, are frank to voice their anxieties.

YANKEE COME BACK

"Is there anything I can do for you?" an American general recently asked the Vietnamese chief of an important province in II corps. "Yes," the Vietnamese official replied. "Please bring back the Fourth (U.S. infantry) Division."

Since the American unit had left, security in the province, Pleiku, had dropped sharply. Several weeks ago, Communist sappers staged a daring ground offensive into the provincial capital of Pleiku, coming within 200 yards of the headquarters in which the American pacification staff was housed.

"Pacification," sighed an American official in that headquarters, "is like a balloon."

The upsurge in small force, hit-and-run Communist attacks is a reflection, only in part, of the spring-fall offensive pattern that governs the cycles of the war. American military observers familiar with that pattern are almost unanimous in their judgment that something new is afoot.

The successes of the new tactics in the Central Highlands have already cost the chiefs of two important provinces—Tuyenduc and Phuyen—their jobs.

The chief of Tuyenduc doubled as mayor of Dalat, the resort city that is absentee-owned by Saigon's elite. It was effortlessly invaded last month by a small Vietcong force which escaped unscathed. "They let the little bastards get out," fumed one American adviser, "and I want to find out why."

CAMPAIGN SUCCESS

In Phuyen, the Communists had been highly successful in a campaign of kidnapings and assassination directed mainly at village and district officials. In February, the number of abductions reached 300.

The most spectacular act of terrorism in I Corps recently was the strike by North Vietnamese Sapper Battalion 89 against the village of Phuthanh south of Danang. The Sappers killed about 100 civilians and wounded about 170.

Not a single member of the local territorial force impeded the invading force. Today's Quangnam provincial hospital in Danang is still crammed with the burned and disfigured survivors of the attack aimed with deadly precision at the families of the regional and popular force members.

The victims can take little comfort in the statistics recited with utter conviction by American officials here, showing that I Corps regional and popular forces have outperformed all the rest in South Vietnam.

Small Communist units have also waged intense attacks at the string of special forces camps manned by Vietnamese civilian irregular defense groups, who operations are masked in heavy security. The camps, 12 to 15 run along the Laotian border from the tri-border area with Cambodia at Kontum to Quangduc.

NOT WON OR LOST

All this is not to say that the war is being lost in the two northern corps which have always borne the brunt of the bitterest fighting in South Vietnam. It does mean, however, that despite all the widely heralded successes of "pacification," the Communists are still able to wage what the late Bernard Fall called "revolutionary war" across a wide expanse of South Vietnamese terrain.

It means that despite the extra territorial allure of battle in neighboring Cambodia, the unglamourous war in Vietnam is still waiting to be fought. While it has not been lost by any means, it is still—as ever—far from won. The Communist objective, at the moment, is to keep things that way, or so it appears.

HOMEBUILDING IN THE SEVENTIES: PREDICTIONS BY MR. J. WILLIAM BROSIUS

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, an increasingly important segment of the American housing industry is the vacation home and second-home market. Although this market is still relatively small, it is growing rapidly, in spite of the tragic national shortage of basic family housing today. It may not be vain to hope that within a generation, the second home may be the kind of goal for American families that the second car is today.

Recently the prospects for vacation homes and second homes in this decade were surveyed by Mr. J. William Brosius, president of the Linganor Corp. Mr. Brosius is well qualified to review this industry's future, for he is a director of the National Association of Home Builders and past chairman of the Association's Institute of Environmental Design. Currently he is developing the Lake Linganor at Eaglehead Community, a recreational project encompassing about 3,200 acres of woodland in Frederick County, Md.

Mr. Brosius' report is interesting and informative on a little noticed but rapidly expanding aspect of the construction industry. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOMEBUILDING IN THE SEVENTIES

(By J. William Brosius)

(The Linganore Corporation is currently developing Lake Linganore at Eaglehead, a 3,200 acre recreational community near Frederick. Mr. Brosius is a director of the National Association of Home Builders and past chairman of its Institute of Environmental Design.)

The one to watch in home building in the Seventies is the vacation and second home market.

Secondary homes within a one or two hour drive from the primary home could easily double in number in the next decade—a recent survey shows 1.7 million Americans own second homes, accounting for three per cent of the total 59 million homes in this country.

In the Seventies, second homes could easily number one-fifth of the 200,000 to 250,000 new homes expected to be constructed each year.

These new second homes will reflect a strong interest in design and function according to a family's activities. They will be built in areas focusing on such recreation facilities as lakes, the ocean, or forests.

Environmental design will be of paramount importance. There will be a renewed awareness of the natural setting of the home, and definite attempts to fit the home to the landscape, rather than to level trees and terrain to accommodate the house.

Recognizing this, better builders will take added pains to minimize any effects their communities might have on the ecological balance. Some builders are already consulting with ecologists and water, beach and forestry experts before designing their communities.

Based on past performance, the Washington region should be in for the biggest share of the second home building boom. The number of vacation homes built in the Northeast has doubled since 1950, and now represents 38 per cent of vacation homes in the country. (The North Central area accounts for another 30 per cent, the South for 17 per cent and the West, Hawaii and Alaska share the remaining 15 per cent.)

Cottages account for three-fifths of these, houses for one-third and cabins for the remainder.

Last year alone, 150,000 vacation homes were built. By contrast, 55,000 were built in the early and mid-Sixties; 20,000 during the Forties. We're closing out 1969 with spending for second homes up 67 per cent over 1965.

In that same time period, vacation land and lots spending came up 86 per cent. Industry experts anticipate a record $1.5 million second home market for this past year.

The character of the market buyers has changed, too. No longer are upper and upper middle level income families the only ones buying: a number of people with incomes ranging between $10,000 and $18,000 per year are buying. And more people are shopping. A University of Michigan survey earlier this year found that one of 10 U.S. families are saving for a second home, and that 50 per cent of all American families want a vacation home.

The age level of second home owners is dropping, too, and will continue to lower in the Seventies. By the end of the Sixties, eight per cent of all second home owners were under 35, some 71 per cent were 35–64 years of age, and 21 per cent were 65 or older. These figures should gradually change over the next decade, with the under 35's forging way ahead in the percentage.

As the age level falls, there is less resistance to longer drives between the first and second homes. Three-fifths of all vacation homes today are within 100 miles of the primary home. A full 80 per cent are within 200 miles.

Increased air transportation service, new roads, and even the shorter work week will help to push the range even farther from the metropolitan areas.

Another new phase of the second home market that is just beginning to blossom is rental programs. A number of recreational area developers and vacation home builders offer the prospective buyer rental service, enabling him to rent during periods he isn't using the house.

In New England, for instance, a person buying a home for summer sports can rent from December to April for winter sports and bring in from $1,500 to $2,000 in rent.

An estimated one-half of all second homes today are used only 30 to 90 days a year. When a second home is available for rent most of the year it qualifies for income tax deduction of business expenses (repairs, maintenance, management fees and depreciation.)

Variations abound, of course. Some developers are finding vacation condominiums an excellent sales packet. Average sales currently run from $15,000 to $50,000, taking in one room studios to four bedroom villas.

Renting is especially attractive to condominium owners. Rates can go as high as $5,000 or $6,000 per year, giving rise to excellent investment opportunities.

The only cloud threatening on the horizon is mortgage rates. But even here the picture in the Washington area is somewhat encouraging. Locally, buyers of second homes and/or vacation land average down payments of $9,000 for a $30,000 purchase with a 10-year payment period. Nationally, the average downpayment is only 25 per cent.

A SON'S AND A FATHER'S LETTERS ON THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, a fellow Member of Congress recently showed me an astonishing letter he had received from his son, a 23-year-old officer in the Marine Corps. Though the young man had volunteered for military service and has asked to be assigned to duty in Vietnam, he warns eloquently and chillingly of the terrible things he believes the Indochina war is doing to our country.

His letter, along with his father's reply, dramatically point up the conflicting emotions this war has aroused in the so-called younger and older generations. The young, who are troubled by a sense of duty as well as a social conscience, are beginning to despair that the answers to today's problems can be found within the present system; the old, who have a troubled conscience as well as a long-standing sense of duty, are still confident that the answers can be found within the democratic process.

But we who believe in democracy have a lot of work to do and little time left in which to do it if we are going to save democracy. The first, indispensable step is to stop this awful war that sends our boys to die in defense of dictatorships abroad while freedom and diversity are threatened at home and our country is being torn apart.

Mr. President, acting with the permission of my fellow Member of Congress and respecting his request for anonymity, I ask unanimous consent that the young Marine's letter and his father's reply be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEAR DAD: It may seem trite to speak out on what's happening here in the USA and what I say won't be new to you. I'm not trying to be original, just sincere.

Being in the Marines, I feel I have a strange perspective on the confusion here in the country. I'm going to have to risk my life in Southeast Asia within the next year . . . Risking my life in a war that hasn't been declared. Can't be fought and can't be won. What's more, a war that is contrary to everything I've been taught to believe about America. Sure, I'm not unique. Thousands have already gone with their minds doubting the purpose of it all. More than 50,000 have died. It's not that I'm reluctant to go. I'm actually intrigued by the thought of having to do something exciting and dangerous. The problem is that in the past year I've come to the realization that our country has fallen so very short of its ideals—not necessarily through unfortunate, naive blundering, but because of a conscious effort by a large number of stubborn, uncompromising traditionalists who fear any interference with their project mission for the United States. These xenophobes seek to maintain a level of suspicion within our country in order to continue the economic and political status quo not only here but abroad. You know as well as I the old theory of "you're with us or you're against" no longer holds any water in a world of emerging independent nations who seek no formal binding ties or allegiances to the powers that be in either the "Communist" or "Free World." Yet we continue to politically, economically, and militarily intimidate countries who don't toe the line; we encourage and finance counter-insurgency programs in countries whose present governments are farther away from democracy than any liberalizations in these nations that would enhance the local populations at the expense of American interests.

Well, you say, these observations and criticisms are all fairly true—but what do I plan to do about it all, what's my solution? The fact that I can offer no solutions that would satisfy all concerned interests is not important. For the last decade Americans have been electing men who said they had the solutions. You were one of those men. Going through the campaign you and many others promised to go to Washington and see that the war was ended in as long as it would take to get the troops out. President Nixon pledged to put an end to the insanity and the war, fight inflation, promote continued social reform and bring us together. Promises have been compromised, the war has been expanded as it was in 1964 and 1968, the economy has gone to hell, racism has been ignored, and the Government has made a strong effort to polarize the country into two hostile camps with no middle ground. The people who have seen the enormity of the problem and have taken to the streets to protest the duplicity of the Administration's words and actions have been ignored by the man in the White House while his "internal security forces" have been unleashed to beat, maim and kill those who dissent. The people who are demanding the peace they were promised for 10 years are being portrayed as traitors in order to alienate them from the "silent majority." Nixon seems to be employing the same tactic in the United States as he is continuing abroad—strengthening the police and security forces of the Nation rather than diverting funds necessary to alleviate the causes of the ills that beset us.

The old generation gap concept is no joke anymore. The Indochina war is a war your generation started and continued to preserve your generation's concepts of world order and America's role. My generation is being used to fight that war. Old soldiers never die, just the young ones. A large number of people are directing all their energies at resisting the war they regard as unjust and unnecessary. The Nixon administration labels them cowards and traitors. It sends out troops to repress them and even kill them.

There's much talk about the irresponsible revolutionaries. Well, I don't think you'll deny that the National Guard and the police have had much more luck and opportunity to beat, shoot, and kill. I used to think that all the talk of revolution was just romantic speculation on the part of my generation—but no more. I've watched close friends discard the banner of peaceful dissent for the bricks of defense and resistance.

If the war doesn't end soon, I see an underground development that would seek to disrupt the country with arson, sabotage, and assassination. The development is difficult to imagine, but just stop to listen to the words of songs played on current radio programs. No more singing about peace and flowers, but about "tearing down the walls" and killing cops. It's very much for real. If it comes to a civil war it would, of course, be a slaughter, but the movement is being pushed and radicalized to the point of no return. What else can you expect the youth to do when the alternatives are to go to Vietnam and get blown away or stay here and get blown away. "Brother" and "sister" are becoming part of the new language—I'm sure much like "comrade" was somewhere else another time. I'm 23 and my brothers and sisters are my future. I am greatly disturbed by the number of people who come to me for instruction in street warfare and similar actions.

Hopefully, people like you, Dad, will prevail and get the U.S.A. back on the right track. People like you can save America but you'd better get busy, because I think the Administration is rapidly destroying the relative harmony that the schools teach kids always existed in the U.S.A. I love you and Mom very much and hope you can understand what I've tried to say.

Love,

YOUR SON

JUNE 11, 1970.

DEAR SON: Your well composed letter certainly organized the current case against Congress and the Administration. I recognize that this letter was not a casual expression but represented deep conviction.

I assure you that many in the Senate share your concern and I further assure you that we are determined to do the many things that are on the national agenda. The Administration is slow to respond. The urgency just isn't there but today for the first time a majority of the Senate stuck together for the cause of peace and rationality, however obscured it was in the Cooper-Church amendment fight. If we can but hold this small edge perhaps we can proceed in a manner that will demonstrate to the dismayed and discouraged that our elected officials are responsive and that democracy can and will work toward solving our many problems.

As you perhaps know I have been making Commencement Addresses and have been straining to bring words of assurance. There are still many who believe the system is the best possible arrangement for people to govern themselves. I would hope that your serious examination will further convince you that this is true. But frustration is not sufficient ground for even thinking of violence. Our system is the most open and available to change of any in the world. The safeguards, the machinery for dissent is there and available. We have long stressed and admired the fact that we govern by consent of the governed. This means by consent of the majority. Disgruntled minorities always have the opportunity to become victorious majorities. Our House of Representatives is elected en toto every two years. One third of the Senate on each biennial election. Congress can assume and exercise its policymaking function. Its members can and perhaps should be changed; just remember that the opportunity is there and available. But if the disgruntled take to the barricades and abandon their legal and constitutional role they will assure the election of those they feel unresponsive and perhaps pull the whole structure down on their heads with disastrous results to the whole of mankind.

Violence breeds violence and once unleashed cannot be recaptured or controlled. The real danger is not the take over by

overwhelming. Such illnesses are proving increasingly painful to middle-class families, who are neither eligible for Government assistance nor financially able to meet the soaring cost of medical care on their own.

No one knows how many families face medical bills of this magnitude. But the Health Insurance Institute in New York notes that while 85% of all Americans under 65 have some medical insurance, fewer than half this number are protected by major medical policies covering prolonged illness. Furthermore, many families are covered by major medical policies that were written several years ago and carry maximum benefits of only $5,000 to $10,000—sums wholly inadequate to meet today's hospital costs, which reach $100 a day in many metropolitan areas.

To be sure, most Blue Cross plans and commercial insurance companies are upgrading their coverage whenever new policies are written. But they admit that their efforts haven't closed the gap. One reason is that most people are covered under group policies negotiated by unions and management. At contract time there generally is more pressure to provide broader coverage—for such things as semiprivate rooms, visits to a doctor's office or dental care—that would affect the many than to increase payments for catastrophic illnesses affecting the few.

"It never crossed my mind that I wasn't adequately insured," says John Baines, a craggy-faced, self-made man of 42. But as a vice president of Southern Materials Co., a large building materials concern, he confesses he faces a dilemma. "Now I know how much an illness like this can cost, but as part of management I also know we're limited in what we can pay for group insurance." As a result, he and other Southern Materials employes still are covered by a policy with a maximum of only $10,000.

PINCHING PENNIES

The Baineses found that most of their insurance was used up during the first year of Karen's illness. Their savings have long since been replaced by mounting debt, and even with John's salary of nearly $30,000 a year, the family has had to cut out many things to make ends meet.

"I never used to pinch pennies, and I'd look down my nose at those who did," says Betty Baines, a trim, dark-haired mother of three other children. "Lately, however, I think I'm the biggest penny-pincher in town."

Grocery bills have been pared by $50 a month, and Betty's Easter shoes this year cost $16, not the $40 or more she used to pay. The Baineses have withdrawn their three sons from private school, canceled memberships in four golf, beach and country clubs, and cut their entertaining expenses and charitable contributions. John, an antique car buff, sold his 1922 Model T Ford for $1,100 and applied the money against Karen's bills. He also has borrowed against his stock, cashed in his life insurance and no longer is the first to reach for the check when lunching with friends.

Their losses constitute a significant change in the Baineses' style of living. For instance, a neighbor and close friend who used to socialize and vacation with the Baineses says she no longer extends invitations to the couple. "It would just hurt their feelings to ask," she explains, noting that John and Betty would feel obligated to reciprocate.

Similarly, John finds his new austerity embarrassing while working with other businessmen on a committee to seek new industry for Virginia Beach or while serving as a vestryman at his Episcopal Church. He has also had to pass up a promotion that would have involved a move to Texas and a change of doctors for Karen.

THE BRIGHTER SIDE

The picture isn't entirely black, however. With a large house in one of the most fashionable areas of town, the Baineses readily admit they still live better than most families. Also, they're thankful for the care their daughter is receiving. "I also think we've grown closer together as a family," Betty adds.

In addition, they've been extremely lucky. John has wangled more money from his insurance company than he previously thought possible. The president of his company has helped him arrange loans at favorable rates. Friends and foundations have picked up some drug costs. The specialist who has worked most closely with Karen's case has never submitted a bill, and recently Johns Hopkins Hospital unexpectedly wrote off a substantial portion of the family's hospital charges.

It doesn't always work out that way, of course. The wife of a Philadelphia merchant, for example, had to transfer to a charity ward in the city hospital after her insurance benefits expired and a private hospital refused to continue her treatment. On the other hand, as hospital authorities point out, many families overwhelmed by medical bills simply refuse to pay at all. But for those families that do make the effort, a close look at the Baineses case shows the ordeal of balancing medical costs against the needs of the rest of the family.

When Karen was first admitted to the hospital in Jacksonville, Fla., where the family was then living, there was little to indicate that her stay would become a protracted one. Under terms of their insurance, the Baineses agreed to pay the first $10 of Karens hospital bill and 20% of anything above that. However, after six weeks of massive transfusions to replace the protein that was being lost through Karens damaged kidney, it became apparent that more extensive treatment was needed. Karen was transferred to the University of Florida hospital in Gainesville. After another six weeks of treatment her condition still remained poor, and her parents were beginning to realize that recovery would be an agonizingly slow, expensive process. (Their out-of-pocket costs to Florida doctors and hospitals alone totaled about $4,800.

Through friends, the Baineses were introduced to Dr. Harriet Guild, a pediatrician at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, who has devoted her life to the treatment of nephrosis. Karen was referred to Dr. Guild and Johns Hopkins. Like most patients referred to a major medical center, Karen entered the Baltimore hospital with what was by then recognized as a major illness, and with her insurance benefits, and her parents' resources, already seriously depleted.

Karen's first visit to Johns Hopkins lasted 11 months, six of them spent in isolation (not even her parents were permitted to see her). Then shortly after her release in September 1967, it was discovered that she was suffering side effects from the heavy doses of cortisone she was taking. She developed a diabetic condition and an allergy; cataracts formed in both eyes, causing total blindness.

Since then, Karen has been back to Johns Hopkins seven more times for stays of three to six weeks. Operations in the spring and fall of 1968 fremoved the cataracts, and with the aid of bifocals she has regained her sight. She is scheduled to return again later this month.

Financial records on her case at Johns Hopkins weigh five pounds and list charges totaling $29,814. Of this amount, insurance has paid $13,082. (The insurance company treated Karen's eye surgery as a separate ailment and then, after the $10,000 limit on the kidney ailment was reached, it allowed the Baineses to reinsure their daughter and collect another $1,000 a year).

The Baineses have paid another $6,056 to Johns Hopkins out of their pocket. This has been in the form of monthly installments to the hospital of $75 a month since 1967 as well as additional payments of $1,000 or so each year from income tax refunds or borrowings. On top of this they have paid out $3,500 to doctors in Baltimore and Virginia Beach and have been shelling out up to $130 a month for the 32 prescriptions Karen needs to control her illnesses or to counteract the drugs that do. (The Kidney Foundation, a national group that supplies some drugs to kidney patients without charge, and a friendly druggist who sells other prescriptions at wholesale combined recently to cut the Baineses' monthly drug bill in half).

There have been other less obvious costs. Because cortisone has left Karen highly susceptible to disease, the Baineses have spent $5,000 to install an electronic air filtering system, a humidifier and zoned heating and air-conditioning in their house. Before the illness they had a part-time maid; now they need a fulltime one (at $230 a month) to lift Karen and help her exercise. Long periods in bed and heavy drug use have weakened Karen's legs and left her overweight. Although now six years old, she is just learning to walk with the use of parallel bars and requires frequent physical therapy sessions. She also is getting special tutoring and will need more in the future.

A few months ago the Baines were desperate. Betty, for instance, fretted over how they were going to afford college educations for their three sons, who are now aged 16, 14 and 9.

SOME LUCKY BREAKS

Then, without the Baines' knowledge, the Kidney Foundation wrote Johns Hopkins and solicited help from the hospital. By tapping a restricted endowment fund, Johns Hopkins promptly wrote off $8,850 of the Baines bill, leaving a remaining balance of only $1,826.

Thomas Barnes, Johns Hopkins treasurer, explains that an excessively large bill like the Baineses, which would have taken them more than 10 years to pay off even if Karen had needed no further treatment, is so discouraging that it often prompts families to quit paying altogether. So, whenever possible, the hospital uses its endowment funds to reduce bills to the point that the "guy can see some light at the end of the tunnel."

Mr. Barnes also was impressed by the way the Baineses had kept up their payments over the years without complaining about the size of Karen's bill. "Obviously we weren't dealing with some guy who was taking an irresponsible attitude toward his obligation," he says.

The write-off may not result in a loss for Johns Hopkins in the long run. Vows John Baines: "One of these days when all this is behind us, we hope we'll be in a position to help Johns Hopkins as they have helped us." The Baineses already are moving to repay their obligation to the Kidney Foundation by heading a drive to organize a local chapter in their area of Virginia.

Perhaps the Baineses' most generous benefactor, however, has been Dr. Guild, the specialist who has been Karen's principal doctor and who has never sent a bill. "If I got a bill from her for $20,000 tomorrow, I wouldn't say a word," John confesses. But Dr. Guild says she has made it her practice to charge her patients only that amount that she can collect from their insurance. And so she has marked the Baines account as paid although in four years of intensive care she has collected only $763.

GOVERNMENT AGENCY—CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD—PROTECTS INDUSTRY IT WAS ORGANIZED TO MONITOR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. McDONALD) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. McDONALD of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, another Government agency has reared its inconsiderate head and taken steps to protect the industry it was organized to monitor. I am speaking of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and its recent, so-called temporary action which permits air carriers to round out our air ticket costs to the highest dollar. A recent Wall Street Journal article, in reporting on this action, used words to the effect that air travelers would not have to fuss any longer with odd dollars and cents. Well, Mr. Speaker, those odd dollars and cents amount to an additional $50 million annually from the pockets of those who use the airlines as a means of transportation.

This irresponsible action on the part of the CAB will be effective July 1, 9 months following a 6.35 fare increase in October and 16 months following a 3.8 fare increase in February 1969. On top of those increases, July 1 will see a 3-percent ticket tax increase go into effect.

I have several questions about this recent action. First, whatever happened to the board established to protect the rights of the public? And second, what sort of action is this which deliberately flaunts the policy of wage and price restraint requested Wednesday by our President?

I do not recall the President asking everyone to show restraint except the airline industry. Nor do I recall the CAB being constituted to act on the behalf of the airline idustry.

If the CAB is to provide ways and means for the airlines industry to increase its revenues, perhaps the airlines industry should reciprocate by taking over some of the burdensome cost of running this Federal agency.

The CAB's promise to limit the so-called rounding up increase to 60 days is not very convincing to me. Mr. Speaker, I feel very strongly that the CAB has acted capriciously and without any kind of objective investigation against the public interest.

For the benefit of my colleagues who may not have yet read a report of this act, I am including a copy of the Wall Street Journal account for printing in the RECORD.

I have no further remarks at this time, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps the next time we discuss the CAB and its cavalier attitude it will be during that agency's appropriation bill.

The item follows:

CAB VOTES TO RAISE ODD-SUM AIR FARES TO NEXT EVEN DOLLAR

WASHINGTON.—Air travelers won't have to fuss any longer with paying fares with odd dollars and cents figures like $38.42. But they will have to pay a little bit extra to avoid worrying about the odd change.

Starting July 1, airlines will round the price, including tax, upward to the next highest dollar. The Civil Aeronautics Board approved a proposal by air carriers to make this upward adjustment, averaging 43 cents, or 0.9% more a ticket. The rounding-upward process will start the same day that the ticket tax goes up to 8% from 5% under the recently enacted Airport and Airways Improvement Act.

The board specified that the rounding-off increase would last for 60 days, through Aug. 31. The time limit was specified because the change is being allowed to take effect on unusually short notice. The airlines can file later for the right to carry on the rounding-upward process on a permanent basis, with longer notice given to permit comment by the public.

In all cases, rounding off will mean a boost; if the calculated fare comes out to $46.01, the passenger will pay $47.

The board voted three-to-two to approve the fare-rounding proposal. Chairman Secor D. Browne and members Whitney Gilliland and John G. Adams backed it, with members Robert T. Murphy and G. Joseph Minetti dissenting.

The proposal, submitted by American Airlines, was backed by other trunk line and local-service carriers. They argued that the additional revenue was needed to offset a new basic annual aircraft registration tax of $25 plus an added charge of 3.5 cents a pound for jets and two cents a pound for piston aircraft, applying to planes over 2,500 pounds. These charges were part of the new airport-airways package.

A CAB spokesman estimated that the 0.9% fare rise would add slightly less than $50 million to annual airline revenue, based on 1969 traffic.

Separately, the CAB is conducting a broad investigation of air fare structure to determine whether different levels and different approaches are in order. The board granted a 3.8% general fare increase in February 1969 and another averaging 6.35% last October. The investigation grew out of that latest boost, spurred by court action brought by a group of Congressmen protesting the increase.

OUR NEED FOR SOME CONCRETE INFORMATION ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. FEIGHAN) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, the assigned mission of the Select Committee on U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia is a most challenging one, and I wish the Members every possible success in their search for the information to lend some understanding of the problems at hand.

Central to all questions on Southeast Asia today is the situation in Vietnam. We have been involved there in the longest military conflict of our history. Controversy has surrounded this subject for years, and we need some clarification regarding the direction in which we are heading. This select committee in its fact finding will accomplish much in closing the present information gap on Vietnam if it can come up with some answers on the following subjects:

First. The state of training and equipping of South Vietnamese forces to ultimately displace the combat role of U.S. forces.

Second. The future prospects of the pacification program to assure stability in the villages, hamlets, and general rural areas to avoid or prevent subversion by the Vietcong cadre.

Third. Future prospects of the South Vietnam Army to successfully protect the sovereignty of a free South Vietnam Government.

An evaluation of other prospects in Vietnam, such as: First, the ability of a coalition government in Saigon to withstand political pressures, internal or external military pressures, subversion, and/or economic duress; second, the consequences, if any, of an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam without endangering their security, or our role in Asia.

Some say that with our growing problems at home, there is increasing doubt that we can police the whole world, therefore, I believe we are in great need of some statement defining the strategic importance of Southeast Asia. This may clarify the basis for our being there, or not being there. Heretofore, many have been led to believe that our strategic interests in that remote area have been expressed only in terms of the geographic arc extending from Alaska, through the Aleutians, Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Marianas to include Guam. This has been known as our Western Pacific strategic frontier. Do we now add all of Southeast Asia to this concept, or is Southeast Asia a strategic factor relating to an obligation under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is recognized for 10 minutes.

[Mr. GONZALEZ addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

ON THE EVENTS AT LORTON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON MAY 22, 23, AND 24, 1970

(Mr. ADAMS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, during the weekend of May 22–24, there were a number of disturbances at the Youth Center and the Correctional Complex at Lorton, Va. Much of the reason for the disruption at the Correctional Complex was due to a power failure which blacked out lighting, resulting in some escapes, destruction of property and fires.

Seen in perspective, the handling of these incidents was admirable. District of Columbia and local fire fighting and law enforcement personnel executed their responsibilities with a great deal of control. There was no excessive use of force and thus no danger of escalation of the disturbances. The staff and administrators of the Department of Corrections performed their duties in a cool, disciplined, and efficient fashion. Most inmates visibly resisted a minority of troublemakers by remaining noninvolved and peaceful.

Prosecutions or other disciplinary ac-

5. Who said this? "In my judgment the war in Vietnam is a tragic national mistake . . . a collosal one. In any other context of life, when a mistake has been made—whether by a person, by a company, or by a nation—there is only one thing to do: face up to it. No amount of cover-up—rationalizing, alibiing, or ducking the facts—will avoid the inevitable day of reckoning: it only compounds the cost . . . In my judgment, it is time the people begin to call for an end to the squandering of American blood, morale and resources on what is in essence an Asian war of nationalism."

A. Dr. Spock.

B. Bobby Seale, Black Panther Leader.

C. A. W. Clausen, President, Bank of America.

The answer to each one is "C".

These statements were made, in order, by the Chairman of the Board of IBM, by the President of the United Auto Workers Union, by the Board Chairman of the Allied Chemical Corporation, by the President of the International Chemical Workers Union and by the President of the Bank of America, the largest bank in this country. Each was made in the last six weeks.

These statements were made by God-fearing, freedom-loving Americans—heads of major American businesses and unions—who oppose the continuation of an expanding and endless war which is detrimental to the land they love.

A VOICE FROM THE WEST AGAINST THE WAR

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the Los Angeles Times, whose growing dismay over American policies in Southeast Asia over the years has now resulted in a forceful editorial this week which, without fudging, states in the opening sentence:

The time has come for the United States to leave Vietnam, to leave it swiftly, wholly, and without equivocation.

The editorial acknowledges that the threat of the Soviet Union is real, but that we are militarily engaged in the wrong place:

All questions of American foreign policy are subordinate to the central one, which is to prevent nuclear war between the two super-powers. We shall be engaged against the Communist world one way or another all our lives; but in Southeast Asia we are engaged on the periphery of that world in a battle obscured by the elements of civil war and Vietnamese nationalism.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GET OUT OF VIETNAM NOW

The time has come for the United States to leave Vietnam, to leave it swiftly, wholly, and without equivocation.

The President still has in his hands the opportunity to effect such an exit. He should seize the chance now as it presents itself, for it may not come so readily again.

That the war must be ended, all are agreed. That, as the President said last week, "peace is the goal that unites us," all are also agreed.

Long ago, when we began to help the anti-Communist Vietnamese against the Communist Vietnamese, it seemed a worthwhile thing to do. It seemed cheap, first in dollars, then in men. No need now to trace the melancholy history of how, bit by bit, decision by decision, it became extravagantly expensive of money, of human lives, of the tranquility of this country, of our reputation abroad.

The President said recently he would not have this nation become a "pitiful helpless giant" in the eyes of the world. We are not entirely pitiful, and not yet helpless. But we are like a giant lunging about with one foot in a trap, a spectacle that is disconcerting to our friends and comforting to our enemies.

NOT THE CENTER RING

Our great adversary is now, and will remain, the Soviet Union.

All questions of American foreign policy are subordinate to the central one, which is to prevent nuclear war between the two super-powers. We shall be engaged against the Communist world one way or another all our lives; but in Southeast Asia we are engaged on the periphery of that world in a battle obscured by the elements of civil war and Vietnamese nationalism.

Our response ought to be commensurate with the challenge: as it was over Berlin, in the Cuban missile crisis, as it may yet have to be in the Middle East. But we have so overresponded in Indochina that it may be harder for us to respond as we ought should a greater and more direct challenge arise.

No need now either to delineate at length the consequences in our own country of the Indochina war:

The war is not the sole cause of strife between parents and children, yet it has inflamed that strife.

The war is not the cause of conflict between the races, but it has made that conflict more bitter.

The war is not the only reason for our present economic distress, but it has rendered that distress harder to treat.

The war alone did not create the illness afflicting our public and private institutions, but it has brought that illness to the crisis point.

Like a small wound the war has festered until its infection has appeared in every organ of this Republic. Its ache is felt in every limb; its pain clouds the national judgment. The country is losing heart.

"Peace," therefore, "is the goal that unites us."

As the President said, our national debate is not about the goal of peace, but about "the best means" to achieve it.

JOB CAN BE BETTER DONE

The President has better means at hand than he is using.

He has promised a withdrawal of American combat troops—another 150,000 by next May 1—but the withdrawal in these summer months has been reduced and after the 150,000 leave there will still be 284,000 troops left in Vietnam. If Mr. Nixon has a private schedule for their withdrawal he has not revealed it.

He has declared that his goal is the total withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam, but by making open-ended threats of counter-action should the enemy attack, he has made it necessary to make good on those threats. Thus he has given to the enemy a large measure of decision over our own rate of withdrawal.

By the President's move into Cambodia, and by his encouragement of the Vietnamese and Thai operations there after we leave, he has entwined American prestige with the fate of that unhappy but unimportant little country.

In declaring that the credibility of American promises elsewhere in the world hangs on our achieving "a just peace" in Vietnam, he is making it harder for us to make with credibility those compromises which everyone, including the Administration, believes will eventually have to be made.

The President, in sum, is pursuing, for reasons which of course he deems excellent, an ambiguous and contradictory policy—a policy of which the stated purpose is to leave Indochina, but in which it is implied that it may be necessary to stay in Indochina.

The Times believes the United States has discharged all the responsibilities it has in Vietnam. The Times believes this nation has—bravely and honorably—done everything, and more, that could reasonably have been expected of it.

American men prevented Communist forces from precipitantly seizing South Vietnam. American men, at an enormous cost in lives, have secured for the South Vietnamese a reasonable length of time for improvement of their army and consolidation of their country and government. Short of permanent occupation, there is no more America can reasonably be expected to do for Vietnam.

The President said last week that the Cambodian venture "eliminated an immediate danger to the security of the remaining American troops" and "won precious time" for the South Vietnamese army.

This, then, is the opportunity for the President to accelerate the withdrawal.

THE TIME IS NOW

Let him now publicly set a deadline for removing not only the remaining combat troops but all American forces, combat and support, according to a swift and orderly schedule. Let him begin to hasten the removal of combat troops this summer. It ought to be possible to bring about a total and orderly withdrawal in the next year and a half at the longest.

Such a program of withdrawal would of course be hazardous. But it would be much less hazardous than the policy the President is presently pursuing.

The South Vietnamese would be firmly on notice that their future is where it belongs—in their hands. The United States could continue to support them with arms and money, should they choose to keep on seeking a military solution; more likely they would feel impelled to put their own political house in order pending that day when they will come to the political compromise that is the inevitable outcome in Indochina.

American troops would be in some danger, but they are certainly in some danger now, and the faster they leave, the sooner they will be in no danger at all.

IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE

We shall not argue, as some do, that rapid American withdrawal would induce the North Vietnamese to negotiate; but it is certain they are not inclined to negotiate now. On the contrary, the longer we stay in Vietnam the more inclined the North Vietnamese will be not to negotiate, and the readier they may be to mount attacks on our forces in hope of pushing us out.

Let the President, therefore, remove all foreign and domestic doubts about our intentions by announcing a speedy departure from Vietnam.

The President said last week he was determined to end the war in a way that would "promote peace rather than conflict throughout the world . . . and bring an era of reconciliation to our people—and not a period of furious recrimination."

The Times believes that the program of withdrawal we suggest would bring about the kind of peace Mr. Nixon spoke about the the kind of peace Mr. Nixon spoke of. The policy suggested here would hasten the end of one war and put the United States on a better footing to prevent other more dangerous conflicts.

The policy suggested here would certainly be met with recrimination from some in this country. But we firmly believe that this policy would be thankfully approved by the great majority of our people as an honorable conclusion to this terrible long war.

LAST WEEK'S SENATE ACTION LAUDED

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, editorials called to my attention have uniformly praised the vote of the Senate last week in refusing to accept the original Byrd amendment to the Cooper-Church amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act. Editorials interpreted the action as a reassertion of the constitutional powers of the Senate in respect to war-making. I agree.

One typical comment was that of the Baltimore Sun which said:

What the Senate in majority was saying . . . was that it opposes open-end authority for a President to commit the country to large armed actions without the consent of Congress.

I ask unanimous consent that four editorials be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Baltimore Sun, June 14, 1970]

SENSE OF THE SENATE

The present effect of last week's vote on an amendment to the Cooper-Church proposal (which seeks to cut off funds for American military operations in Cambodia past July 1) is, or should be, to warn President Nixon against any new impulsive adventure into that country. What the Senate in majority was saying more broadly was that it opposes open-end authority for a President to commit the country to large armed actions without the consent of Congress.

The question was presented as a constitutional one, and so it is. On the one hand is the power of a President as commander-in-chief. On the other is the right and duty of Congress to have a voice in major national decisions, including decisions of war. One difficulty today is of course that the Indochina war is unlike any other we have ever waged.

As Senator Church said, "This being the first limited war in which the United States has engaged, it is altogether appropriate that the Congress share with the President the responsibility for defining the limits of our involvement." With that the majority of the Senate obviously agrees.

It also holds, as evidenced by its approval of another amendment offered by Senator Mansfield after the vote which in effect rebuffed the administration, that nothing in the Cooper-Church proposal "shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional power of the President as commander-in-chief."

In any case, Congress could not actually prevent a new move into Cambodia should the President decide on such a move. But the burden of proof of necessity would be on him in a way much more severe than was the case at the end of April.

If it is said that last week's vote was, practically, only an expression of the sense of the Senate, the expression was still a forceful one, and the administration would make a grave mistake in any failure to recognize its importance.

[From the New York Post, June 12, 1970]

THEY REMEMBERED TONKIN

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

"That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." (From the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, August 7, 1964.)

Nearly six years, thousands of casualties and countless bitter regrets later, the Senate has decisively rejected another deceptive declaration of war in Indochina; in doing so, it has issued its own declaration for peace.

The issue in question yesterday was the "Byrd amendment," sponsored by the senior Virginia Senator and eagerly embraced by the Nixon Administration; the section, to be added to the foreign military sales act, would have authorized the President to take whatever action he deemed necessary to protect U.S. forces in Vietnam.

The President has already taken such action without authority—from either Congress or the Constitution—by invading Cambodia; the Byrd amendment was intended to emasculate the pending Cooper-Church amendment, holding the President to his promise to pull all U.S. forces from Cambodia by June 30 and forbidding their reentry.

The Administration might have established confidence in its candor by asserting—as it did late last year in somewhat similar circumstances when Congress sought to prohibit deployment of U.S. combat troops in Laos or Thailand—that the Cooper-Church amendment was consistent with its policy. Instead, it mobilized massively for a showdown.

In that campaign, it deployed not only its regular lobbyists but a contingent of "fact-finders" hastily dispatched to the war zone. In the late stages of debate yesterday, the action became even more feverish as Sen. Byrd bid for votes with vague amendments to his own amendment.

But in the end, he was voted down by a firm 52 votes to 47 and the way is now clear for a conclusive test on Cooper-Church, and later on the comprehensive McGovern-Hatfield amendment specifying that funds for all military operations in Southeast Asia be cut off by the end of the year, with total troop withdrawal by mid-1971. The 1964 resolution has not been directly repealed—although that may still be a possibility. But it seems clear that the Senate is resolved to prevent expansion of a war that has carried the U.S. from the Gulf of Tonkin across to the Gulf of Siam.

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 13, 1970]

NO BLANK CHECK

With their well remembered experience with the Tonkin Resolution, most senators were not about to be burned again by a blank-check authorization for Presidential military action in Cambodia.

The 52 to 47 vote against Senator Robert C. Byrd's amendment was thus both a rebuff to President Nixon and a reassertion of the Senate's constitutional powers.

The Senate has before it the Church-Cooper amendment forbidding the President, in the absence of congressional approval, to spend any funds after July 1 for retaining U.S. forces in Cambodia, for providing military advisers or combat air support for the Cambodians, or for financing the pay of forces from third countries going to the aid of the Cambodians.

This amendment on its face would seem merely to back up President Nixon's own commitment to U.S. troop withdrawal from Cambodia by the end of June.

Nevertheless, it was not satisfactory to the Administration; Senator Byrd acted as Nixon field general in pressing his amendment which declared that the President could retain troops in Cambodia whenever he considered such action necessary to protect the safety of American forces in Vietnam.

Opponents of the amendment argued that it would permit Nixon to do anything he wanted in Cambodia on the grounds that he was protecting U.S. forces.

The principle they were upholding was that of the constitutional role of Congress. "We stand up now," Senator Frank Church told the Senate, "or we roll over and play dead."

As the House is unlikely to accept the Church-Cooper amendment even if it gets past the Senate—and a Nixon veto is yet another prospective obstacle—the Senate majority action may turn out to be largely symbolic. Even so, it is symbolic of something immensely important: the Senate's rejection of the blank-check theory of Presidential military authority.

[From the Philadelphia Bulletin, June 14, 1970]

THE PRESIDENT ON NOTICE

The Senate has rejected what it interpreted as an attempt to give President Nixon black check legislative authority to send American forces back into Cambodia after July 1, if he thought it necessary to protect U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

By its action, the Senate has actually done two things:

It has asserted most strongly its feeling that the war-making authority of Congress must be reestablished.

It has served notice on the President that its patience with U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia is just about exhausted.

American disengagement in South Vietnam is Mr. Nixon's aim, too. He has already withdrawn many U.S. troops and has set a deadline for the withdrawal of another contingent of U.S. troops.

But the steady pace of American withdrawal, which had been so reassuring to the U.S. public, and which had reduced the fever of dissension over the war, was interrupted by U.S. military operations in Cambodia.

Vagueness as to continued involvement of American Asian allies in Cambodia fighting—which means U.S. involvement by proxy, with uncertain consequences as to the support that might be called for—contributes to unease.

The long debate in the Senate over the Church-Cooper amendment is not over, to be sure. The Senate has not yet approved its provisions, which deny the President authority to spend money after July 1, without congressional approval, to keep U.S. troops in Cambodia, to supply advisers or air support to Cambodian troops, or to finance other countries aiding Cambodia.

If the legislative fate of the Cooper-Church amendment is uncertain in the Senate, and even more so should it reach the House, it is also uncertain as to its impact if passed.

Its own sponsors are at pains to put on record that they do not intend to interfere with the President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief. They point to emergency circumstances under which the President could still take military action in Cambodia.

But already, in rejecting language that even possibly could be interpreted as approval of future free-wheeling Presidential military action across the Cambodian border, the senators have written large on the wall their message to the Administration.

The complexities of the debate and the argument over constitutional powers aside, it seems clear that the only satisfactory answer to this bitter controversy is for the President to move more swiftly and certainly to eliminate its source.

That is by speeding the rate of American military withdrawal from South Vietnam.

DARK VIEW FROM AN ASIAN OUTLOOK

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, Stanley Karnow of the Washington Post is a veteran, respected Asian watcher. His dispatches over the years have been in-

than they were. They are not, however, completely satisfactory yet.

Vietnamization is working. It is ahead of schedule.

Our troops will be coming home.

That brings me to the current business now before the Senate. We have concerned ourselves here with writing new laws which would, somehow or other, restrain and restrict this new President, the third President to inherit this problem, the one who is meeting with success.

Some said immediately when the Cambodian decision was announced that it was broadening the war. That is not true. It deescalated the war.

We are fighting in a different area, but there is a lot less fighting. I just told the Senate about the 13 million bullets that will not be used by the enemy to kill American boys.

The casualties are down. The effort is moving in the right direction. And we are meeting here to debate and discuss new laws that will restrain and restrict the powers of this third President.

Mr. President, I have said, and I repeat, that I think it is proper that we debate and eventually delineate exactly the powers of the President of the United States as Commander in Chief with regard to declarations and actions that may bring involvement in war. I think it is to be desired. But I do not think that this is the time for it. I do not think that this is a well chosen date for this discussion and debate.

I can see nothing productive, nothing that would help solve the problems of the United States that could come from such discussion at this time.

I think this debate should be held at a time when we are at peace, held with calmness and with complete, cool reasoning.

We can make this delineation then and spell it out so that it will be clearly drawn for all future time. But let us see what happens as we do it in these days, with these problems facing us, with this ongoing situation.

I can see immediately that certain elements of the unfriendly, foreign press will say that the American people have lost confidence in their President. That is not true. That is a falsehood. The polls show this.

Regardless of the fact that some of our highly publicized editorial writers indicate this, it is just not true. It adds to the confusion. And they should rectify this because in time of war this Nation must be solidified and there must be full understanding.

It is difficult to write restrictions, because we do not know the conditions. We only know our side of the story. What will the enemy do? What would have happened in the Cambodian incursion, had there been a debate in this Chamber ahead of the incursion and at long last the President had been given permission to do what should have been done so many years ago?

I will tell the Senate what would have happened. It would have cost the lives of thousands of American boys, because the enemy would have known about it. They would have been prepared for it. The element of surprise would have been denied us.

The first two moves into the southern sanctuaries could possibly have failed. As it was, one of the defectors told us they had 20 hours notice. That is not very much notice.

The Senators will be glad to know that they did not have time to booby trap the bunkers. When we left, there had been only two cases of booby traps. And they were quickly contrived. They simply were hand grenades with the pins pulled and placed under boxes so that if one raised a box, it would detonate and explode.

They moved a lot of supplies. There is no doubt about that. We heard it said that we did not capture the headquarters. We never really expected to, because they are very mobile. They never put their roots down firmly in any one place. However, we captured enough of their communications and supplies to destroy their efforts and break them up so that they are and will be ineffective.

We do not know what may be necessary. We do not know what action, what quick, sudden decision may be necessary for the safety of our men, for the success and final victory and for a solution to this awful dilemma.

That is why I say that this is not the time and that these are not the days for this type of discussion.

I have the greatest confidence that my colleagues, the proponents of such restraints and restrictions, feel that what they are doing will bring about an end to this awful dilemma. They want to see it finished. But I assure them, Mr. President, that no one wants to see it finished more than the President of the United States. No one wants to see it brought to an end sooner than the Senator from California. But it is a matter of judgment. It is a matter of certainty that it must be carefully considered.

We have made too many mistakes in the past. And some of those who have advised us in the past and must share partially the responsibility of this awful experience, continue to raise their voices in this debate. I think they should bethink themselves and be cautious and careful. We cannot afford any more unfortunate mistakes.

Mr. President, I have concluded that the advantage in this unfortunate war has changed, that the third President is on the right track. And I would suggest and recommend most highly that we join solidly behind him and give him our support. And as long as he is going in the right direction, we should give him all the help we can and urge him on so that not only in the negotiations in Paris but also in the negotiations in the SALT talks, the disarmament talks and the confrontations which must take place with regard to the problems in the Mideast, the world will know that we have confidence in this third President and that we, the great majority of the people, believe that his judgment has been good, his decisions have been well taken, courageous, daring, and have been based on facts and reality, not on fiction and theory and he is arriving at the accomplishments which are desired by all.

These are the things that I believe should concern us at this time. That is why, Mr. President, I hope that many of my colleagues will express their feelings with regard to these restraints and restrictions.

I know that some of the opponents have said, "We will only do what the President said he would do."

However, I get the feeling that they want to lock him in. They say, "He said this. So, to make certain, we will put it into law."

It would almost appear to some that there was a matter of distrust there. I do not think that should exist.

I do not think that is based on the evidence. I do not think it is healthy or helpful at this particular time. Let us not lose the advantage that has been gained after such a long struggle, after such a costly experiene. Let us keep that advantage and let us see if we cannot improve on it so that at long last we can bring about the honorable, lasting, and decent peace that all of us so earnestly desire.

Mr. President, I hope that the people, and the young people particularly, who were here yesterday and who were so enthusiastically interested in the outcome of the vote that took place in this Chamber, will take the trouble to read what I have said here today; that they take the trouble to get an understanding of the entire situation.

This is not a matter of who wins or who loses a vote on the floor of the Senate. That is incidental. That is gone as the sun goes down. The matters that concern us are matters of permanent policy that will affect the future of this great Nation for years and years to come, and that is why these matters should be approached with careful and mature judgment. Enthusiasm is wonderful; it is great; but it never should burn so brightly it overcomes the fires of wisdom, good sense, and reason.

So, Mr. President, I can only wish in closing that these galleries had been as filled this morning as they were yesterday. We hear quite often now that the older generation—and I am certainly a part of that older generation, having lived in this great country for over 60 years—does not communicate with the younger generation.

I made a promise to some of the students in my State that I am going to communicate and I am going to be available to them in the universities, not to those who are concerned with a confrontation, but I will be available to those who are interested in sitting down and having a free, honest, and open-minded discusison. I hope I learn a great deal from them, and possibly, with good luck, they may learn something from me and my experience. Out of the interchange may come some ideas that will be of advantage to the future of this great Nation. I hope that these same young people will take the time to read the RECORD as I have attempted to make it this morning.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. MURPHY. I have talked for several years and at great length about the problem in the Middle East. I have taken a firm public position on the importance and the necessity of the healthy, strong viability of the new country of Israel.

In the Washington Post this morning, there was published a most interesting article by Mr. Joseph Alsop entitled "Mideast Crisis Provokes Only Silence From the Left," and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MIDEAST CRISIS PROVOKES ONLY SILENCE FROM THE LEFT

(By Joseph Alsop)

The most bewildering feature of the Middle Eastern crisis is the strange silence on the left. Here is the most dangerous situation that the United States has had to face since the Second World War. Here is the Nixon administration pursuing, at least to date, a policy so limp that it actually increases the danger to Israel.

Here are the liberal Democrats in Congress, with their highly articulate allies, the liberal and leftwing intellectuals, in a perfect fever of rage about Cambodia, which promises to be a brilliantly successful U.S. operation. Yet they have not given the Nixon administration as much as a tap on the wrist where it is most vulnerable, in its management of the Middle Eastern crisis to date.

The contrast is so extraordinary that it cries out for explanation. The only available explanation is not exactly creditable, however, to the liberal and leftwing intellectuals and their heroes in active politics.

With ludicrously premature sighs of relief, this entire, highly influential American group firmly decided, some years ago, that all problems of the Cold War had ceased to exist—if indeed they had not been imaginary problems in the first instance. The tragic loss of President Kennedy, who never went in for self-delusion, seems to have been the signal for the beginning of this enormous exercise in self-delusion by so many who had admired him.

Thus a new world view began to be promulgated, as unchallengeable doctrine. The view was that all the dangers of history in the latter half of the 20th century could be largely blamed on the United States. The whole American effort to maintain a reasonably safe balance of power in the world was seen the exclusive source of all risks and troubles.

This world view leaves no room at all, of course, for an increasingly militarized Soviet Union, bent upon crushing Israel, and by crushing Israel, aiming to gain control of the entire Middle East. The choice has been, therefore, between continuing to peddle the world view above-defined, or publicly swallowing it whole, as a grossly erroneous view, and thereupon facing the terrible new facts.

Vanity, ignorance and arrogance have all combined to prevent the admission of error that is now in order by the liberal and leftwing intellectuals and the liberal Democrats in Congress. So Israel's deadly peril has been all but ignored. Or if not ignored, it has been treated as really no more than Israel deserves. And the Indian war dance about Cambodia has continued, with a rising decibel count.

For the short run, this is quite bad enough. The Nixon administration badly needs to be hammered on its Middle Eastern policy. Otherwise, none of the right things are likely to be done. For the long run, too, the continuing liberal and left-wing exercise in self-delusion is bound to end in disaster for the self-deluders, among others.

The Middle Eastern facts alone are enough to show the threat to the self-deluders. The unprecedented Soviet injection of Russian troops into the Middle Eastern war quite directly menaces Israel's very existence. The design, furthermore, is not just to crush Israel. The design is to exclude any form of power except Soviet power from the Middle East.

Suppose that the Israelis are beaten to their knees or actually destroyed. Suppose that we also experience the immense upset in the entire world balance of power that will result if the Kremlin's Middle Eastern design is successfully carried out. We shall then be doubly haunted, by the ghost of Israel, and by the obvious danger of a third World War caused by the upset in the balance of power.

Can anyone suppose that the self-deluders will not then be rent asunder, in the storm of fury, recrimination, fear and scapegoat-hunting that will follow in this country? The answer is obvious. Yet this is only part of the story, for the Middle Eastern crisis is only part of the danger.

Except for Japan after the rise of the militarists, the Soviet Union today stands alone among major nations in this century. With the exception noted, it is in fact the only major nation that has allowed the uniformed leaders of the armed services to name their own boss, the defense minister.

That grim fact is clearly linked to other facts—the Soviet pilots in Egypt; the invasion of Czechoslovakia; the rising pressure on Romania; the increasing number of divisions deployed along the Sino-Soviet border. The Nixon administration's defense policy, which amounts to shambling disarmament, is therefore as vulnerable as its defense policy.

But on this front, too, the administration is never attacked, except for not disarming fast enough. The truth is that the geese that should sound the alarm on the Capitol have all been taking mind-blowing drugs.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRANSACTION OF FURTHER ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a period for the transaction of further morning business, with statements limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMUNIST TERROR AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the basic objective of the Vietnamization program initiated by President Nixon is to realize an orderly withdrawal of American forces from the war zone and, at the same time, secure the safety of the people of South Vienam against possible acts of terrorism which might be perpetrated by the forces of North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

Some of my distinguished colleagues in the Senate have questioned the likelihood that such atrocities as mass civilian execution and lengthy incarceration would result if the United States left the South Vietnamese without adequate means for defense. Yet, as President Nixon pointed out in his April 30 speech to the American people, we cannot expose 18 million South Vietnamese "who have put their trust in us to the slaughter and savagery which the leaders of North Vietnam inflicted on hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese who choose freedom when the Communists took over North Vietnam in 1954." I believe the President is correct in this position.

In order to determine whether the North Vietnamese and Vietcong have changed their method of assuring obedience and loyalty we must inquire about the expressed intentions and actions of Communist forces.

The record is not encouraging. In fact, Reuter's News Service reported this morning that at least 70 South Vietnamese civilians were killed and another 70 wounded in a 2-hour bloodbath when Communist forces attacked a village near Danang. The Associated Press said that civilian deaths in the incident might be as high as 115.

News reports also quote a South Vietnamese military spokesman as saying it was the worst toll of civilians since the Tet offensive of 1968.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Associated Press account of the tragedy printed in the Washington Post this morning be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

KILLING OF 115 CIVILIANS CHARGED AGAINST VIETCONG

SAIGON, June 11.—About 115 South Vietnamese civilians were killed and another 70 wounded in a two-hour bloodbath today when Vietcong troops overran a village south of Danang, reliable sources said.

The U.S. Command said 70 civilians were known to have been killed and 70 wounded in the assault on Baren, a hamlet of about 2,000 residents 17 miles southeast of Danang.

[Reuters reported that a South Vietnamese military spokesman said it was the worst toll of civilians since the Tet offensive in February, 1968. In the city of Hue alone, during that offensive, several thousand civilians were massacred by the Vietcong. In the village of Mylai, U.S. forces have been formally charged with the deaths of 109 civilians.]

The assault followed a withering mortar barrage which set fire to much of the riverside village.

One U.S. officer, who flew over the smoldering remains of the hamlet, said it was about 90 per cent destroyed or damaged.

Survivors said Vietcong ran through the streets of Baren "shooting anyone they saw" and hurling grenades into homes and civilian bunkers, he said.

The U.S. Command in Saigon reported a sharp drop in American battlefield deaths last week. (Story on Page A16.)

The attack on Baren came less than a week after a Vietcong assault against another village two miles south of the same bridge, when 22 villagers were killed and 13 wounded.

Today's attack occurred as other Vietcong troops hit an outpost at the end of the bridge just north of Baren, manned by U.S. Marines.

The attack was the heaviest of seven reported Thursday against civilian population centers ranging from deep in the Mekong Delta to Dalat in the central highlands.

The commander of the Marines at Baren, Lt. T. S. Miller, 27, New Kensington, Pa., was quoted by the command as saying the Vietcong's "main objective was to destroy this village."

"They kept my Marines pinned down while they infiltrated the village, and then they started their massacre," said Miller. He estimated that more than 200 mortar shells hit the village.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, some critics of President Nixon's Vietnamization program have argued that reports of Communist terrorism are exaggerated. They contend that no "bloodbath" would ensue should we make a hasty withdrawal since the situation of mass terrorism in the north in the 1950's is not analagous to the present.

The evidence to support this position is hardly convincing, especially in light of today's reports of atrocities.

I submit that the enemy's intentions and actions are to similar today to risk the further preparation of such atrocities against the people of South Vietnam.

All available Communist propaganda points to a continuation of the strategy of terror and savagery by the north. On September 18 of last year a high official in the North Vietnamese Communist Party said:

It is absolutely essential to use violence against the counter-revolutionaries and exploiters who refuse to submit to reform.

He continued:

We must pay continuous attention to consolidating the repressive apparatus of the people's democratic state.

For those who "stubbornly oppose the revolution" a decree issued by the President of North Vietnam provides for severe punishment, ranging from 2 years to life imprisonment and capital punishment. Edicts such as these are hardly unusual coming from the Communists.

The distinguished Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) has pointed out repeated statements by North Vietnamese leaders demanding what are called "blood debts" of their opponents in South Vietnam. His address to the Senate of May 21 as printed in the RECORD includes some of the statements of the Communists which hardly seem to indicate a change in policy from the massacres of the early 1950's.

Mr. President, this most recent report of Communist terrorism should not be hastily forgotten, especially considering past behavior and expressed intentions of the Vietnamese Communists.

LATEST BLS AND SEC STUDIES SHOW NEED FOR PENSION REFORM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, for several years I have sponsored legislation intended to secure certain reforms of the private pension system. Last year, I again introduced this legislation as S. 2167. Today, I am more convinced than ever that unless these basic reforms are undertaken, the American worker will lose his confidence in the value of these plans.

The harsh facts are that despite close to $126.2 billion being accumulated in these pension plans, and despite indications that they will grow to over $200 billion by 1980, only a relatively small number of employees in many of these plans will ever receive a single dollar in retirement benefits.

The underlying reason for this alarming state of affairs is that the private pension system has failed to respond to new realities generated by technical, business, and social change. This failure is most noticeable with respect to the so-called "forfeiture" problem. It seems to be a recurring theme, for example, that:

First. Employees with relatively long periods of service are laid off due to technological or business reasons without having acquired pension rights.

Second. Employees who voluntarily quit to accept more advantageous employment often forfeit benefits they had expected to receive in retirement.

Third. Many employees cannot even hope to qualify for a private pension because the characteristics of their occupations as well as the nature of their job opportunities demand such mobility that they cannot earn a pension benefit even under the more progressive plans.

What makes these circumstances profoundly disturbing is that in all these cases contributions on behalf of these employees have been made into a pension fund. These contributions, which are tax deductible, are supposed to provide employees with retirement benefits, but restrictive requirements in many of these plans virtually insure that these contributions will not, for the most part, achieve this purpose. In the technical language of the pension specialist, the right to obtain some type of retirement benefit when leaving employment prior to retirement is known as a "vested right." When an employee leaves employment without obtaining such a vested right he is said to have "forfeited" all moneys credited to him for retirement benefits based upon his service with the employer.

The shocking extent of the risk of forfeitures of private pension benefits in this country is fully revealed by the latest Bureau of Labor Statistics' study. This study is summarized in press release No. 11–024 issued this year by BLS. Very briefly, the BLS study of vesting coverage in private pension plans shows that despite the fact that the proportion of plan participants belonging to plans with vesting provisions increased by 29 percent in 1969, only one out of every three plan participants will receive a vested pension right if he leaves employment with 10 years of service under the plan, and only one out of every two participants will receive a vested pension right if he leaves employment after 15 years of service. Moreover, even this estimate may be too rosy since many terminating participants with the requisite years of service may still not qualify for vested rights if they have not attained an age specified by the plan.

The currently unacceptable level of vesting protection is further magnified by the continued spectacular rise in the growth of private pension fund assets. For example, the latest SEC survey—described in SEC press release No. 2437, April 20, 1970—shows that noninsured pension fund assets increased by $7 billion during 1969 while insured pension reserves increased by $4 billion. The current book value of assets in all private noninsured pension funds is over $87 billion while in insured pension reserves it is at $39 billion. Ten years ago, the total assets in both insured and noninsured pension funds were at $52 billion. I question whether the enormous wealth being built up in these funds could not support a more equitable system of vesting than is presently the case, and, indeed, whether one of the factors bearing on this phenomenal growth in assets is an unwarranted level of forfeitures.

These statistics speak for themselves. I believe these releases, as well as earlier reports in this connection, fully justify the steps which I have continually urged as a necessary corrective to a significant inequity in the private pension system. While it is gratifying to learn that voluntary progress has been made in this regard, it is quite evident that the rate of progress is hardly adequate.

Lack of adequate vesting is, of course, only one of a number of problems presented by the present operation of the private pension system. For example, there is a widening concern, which I share, that the vast resources concentrated in these funds are not being sufficiently utilized in connection with the resolution of pressing domestic social problems. Also, recent business reverses in certain industries, notably aerospace, has once more turned the spotlight on the general problem of employers who terminate their business operations with the result that their employees are not only out of jobs but find that their pension rights have been severely reduced and, in some instances, virtually destroyed.

Solutions to these persistent problems cannot be deferred much longer. Pursuant to Senate Resolution 360, the Senate Labor Subcommittee is in the process of conducting an indepth exploration of the private pension system to ascertain the facts surrounding many of these matters. I am hopeful that the subcommittee will hold hearings in the summer on this subject and that backed by the findings of its investigation, serious attention will be given to appropriate reform measures.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the RECORD the charts and tables contained in the BLS and SEC release.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE 1.—ASSETS OF PRIVATE NONINSURED PENSION FUNDS

[Book value in millions of dollars; figures may not add to totals due to rounding. Includes funds of corporations, nonprofit organizations and multiemployer and union plans.]

Annual	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969 [1]
Cash and deposits	550	660	710	770	890	940	900	1,320	1,640	1,590
U.S. Government securities	2,680	2,720	2,920	3,050	3,070	3,100	2,610	2,170	2,540	2,590
Corporate and other bonds	15,700	16,880	18,100	19,560	21,210	22,700	24,580	25,500	26,160	26,640
Preferred stock	780	760	750	710	650	750	790	980	1,320	1,740
Common stock	10,730	13,340	15,730	18,120	20,840	24,450	28,340	33,830	40,260	45,960
Mortages	1,300	1,560	1,880	2,220	2,750	3,320	3,810	3,940	3,910	4,010
Other assets	1,400	1,590	1,800	2,120	2,510	2,820	3,430	4,110	4,450	4,740
Total assets	33,140	37,510	41,890	46,550	51,910	58,090	64,470	71,840	80,280	87,240

Quarterly	1967		1968				1969			
	3d quarter	4th quarter	1st quarter	2d quarter	3d quarter	4th quarter	1st quarter	2d quarter	3d quarter	4th quarter
Cash and deposits	1,050	1,320	1,120	1,290	1,500	1,640	1,240	1,640	1,490	1,590
U.S. Government securities	2,180	2,170	2,400	2,390	2,330	2,540	2,600	2,480	2,600	2,590
Corporate and other bonds	25,420	25,500	25,830	25,900	26,140	26,160	26,010	26,080	26,530	26,640
Preferred stock	940	980	1,020	1,150	1,210	1,320	1,460	1,570	1,710	1,740
Common stock	32,460	33,830	35,210	36,810	38,640	40,260	41,760	43,350	44,140	45,960
Mortgages	3,930	3,940	3,950	3,910	3,920	3,910	3,940	3,910	3,970	4,010
Other assets	3,780	4,110	4,190	4,270	4,350	4,450	4,360	4,530	4,570	4,740
Total assets	69,760	71,840	73,720	75,710	78,090	80,280	81,380	83,560	85,010	87,240

[1] Preliminary.

TABLE 2.—ASSETS OF ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS

[Book Value, in billions of dollars; figures may not add to totals due to rounding]

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969 [1]
Private:	52.0	57.8	63.5	69.9	77.2	85.4	93.9	103.9	115.3	126.2
Insured pension reserves	18.8	20.2	21.6	23.3	25.2	27.3	29.4	32.0	35.0	[2] 39.0
(Separate accounts, included above) [3]			(4)	(4)	.1	.3	.6	1.2	2.2	(5)
Noninsured pension funds [6]	33.1	37.5	41.9	46.6	51.9	58.1	64.5	71.8	80.3	87.2
Public:	56.4	59.3	61.4	65.0	69.5	72.8	80.4	90.3	98.4	111.3
State and local	19.6	22.0	24.5	26.9	29.7	33.1	37.1	41.7	46.0	52.0
Federal:										
Federal old-age and survivors insurance	20.3	19.7	18.3	18.5	19.1	18.2	20.6	24.2	25.7	30.1
Federal disability insurance	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.6	1.7	2.0	3.0	4.1
Civil service retirement and disability program [7]	10.4	11.4	12.5	13.5	14.7	15.9	17.0	18.1	19.4	20.8
Railroad retirement	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.3
Total private and public	108.4	117.1	124.9	134.9	146.6	158.2	174.4	194.2	213.6	237.6

[1] Preliminary.
[2] Estimated.
[3] Separate accounts of life insurance companies, set up for specific pension plans, allow greater investment latitude than is permissible under State laws for general life insurance assets.
[4] Less than $50,000,000.
[5] Not available.
[6] Includes funds of nonprofit organizations and multiemployer plans.
[7] Includes Foreign Service retirement and disability trust fund.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

TABLE 1.—NUMBER OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS, AND NUMBER OF COVERED WORKERS AND PERCENT OF WORKERS IN PLANS WITH VESTING PROVISIONS BY SELECTED PLAN CHARACTERISTICS, 1969, 1967 AND 1962–63

Characteristic	1969	1967	1962–63
Number of plans [1]	17,403	17,091	16,031
Number of active covered workers (thousands) [1]	19,511	17,485	15,787
Single employer plans	13,869	12,555	11,802
Multiemployer plans	5,550	4,929	3,985
Noncontributory plans	15,368	13,351	11,784
Contributory plans	4,051	4,134	4,003

Characteristic	1969	1967	1962–63
Percent of active covered workers:			
Plans with vesting provisions	76	63	59
Single employer plans	87	77	71
Multiemployer plans	51	26	23
Noncontributory plans	74	57	51
Contributory plans	89	80	78

[1] Data relate only to those private pension plans covering more than 25 participants for which the plan administrator filed a report with the Department of Labor's Labor-Management Services Administration. Plans providing noncomputable retirement benefits (such as profit sharing plans) were excluded from all studies. The active worker count in each study is for a period of about 2 years earlier than the study's reference date. The totals presented here for 1969 include 529 plans covering 92,332 workers, for which complete information was not available in the Department's files at the time the study was conducted; all subsequent data for 1969 exclude these plans.

TABLE 2.—PREVALENCE OF VESTING AND EARLY RETIREMENT PROVISIONS IN PRIVATE PENSION PLANS, 1969

Type of provision	Total		Type of employer unit				Method of financing			
			Single employer		Multiemployer		Noncontributory		Contributory	
	Plans	Workers	Plans	Workers	Plans	Workers	Plans	Workers	Plans	Workers
All plans number (workers in thousands) [1]	16,874	19,439	15,230	13,869	1,644	5,550	12,482	15,368	4,392	4,051
Plans with either vesting or early retirement provisions	14,902	17,619	13,515	13,315	1,387	4,306	10,535	13,733	4,367	3,886
Vesting and early retirement	12,309	14,241	11,631	11,641	678	2,601	8,526	11,003	3,783	3,230
Vesting only	632	640	478	418	154	223	523	284	109	356
Early retirement only	1,961	2,738	1,406	1,256	555	1,482	1,486	2,446	475	292
Plans with neither vesting nor early retirement provisions	1,972	1,799	1,715	555	257	1,244	1,947	1,634	25	165

NEW YORK TIMES DATE 10 JUN 70 PAGE 1

Many U.S. Civilian Roles In Asia May Go to Military

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 9—The Nixon Administration is drawing up plans for the shift of numerous American economic and social programs in South Vietnam and Laos from civilian to military control.

Under the plans, the United States Defense Department would gradually take over, wholly or in part, the financing and operation of such programs as the balancing of the South Vietnamese defense budget, pacification of rural areas, public health, the training of the police and the care of refugees.

Those programs are financed and administered alone or in cooperation with the Defense Department by the Agency for International Development. In many instances the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Information Agency also participate.

During the fiscal year ending on June 30, the aid agency, it is estimated, will have spent $365-million in Vietnam.

The Administration plans to incorporate some of the changes in its revision of the foreign-aid program, which is expected soon. Part of the program will require Congressional approval.

The plans are expected to generate considerable controversy in and out of Congress because they deal with the subject of civilian vs. military control of policy. The contemplated shift could transfer the responsibility of Senate review from the Foreign Relations Committee, which has generally been critical of American operations in Southeast Asia, to the Armed Services Committee, which has generally been sympathetic.

Civilian officials have been citing private remarks by high-ranking officers involved in policy planning for Vietnam, to the effect that civilian leadership is failing and that well-trained Army men should be increasingly assigned to positions of responsibility in the administration of wartime and postwar programs.

Continued on Page 5, Column 1

A major argument among Administration officials favoring an increase in the military role in Asian and other support-assistance programs is said to be that the Defense Department is expected to have an easier time getting funds from Congress, where opposition to foreign-aid appropriation has been growing in recent years.

Indications are that the new approach has support in the White House staff as well as among many though not all civilian and military officials in the Defense Department. Top officials in the aid agency are described as resigned to the change, partly because A.I.D. as an entity would disappear under the projected reorganization of the foreign-aid program.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers has participated in the discussions only to a limited extend. The whole question is expected to be reviewed by the National Security Council.

Dr. John A. Hannah, the aid administrator, discussed the problem with President Nixon at the White House May 25 in one of their rare meetings.

In recent public statements Dr. Hannah has made it clear that the "support assistance" programs would be divested from the agency that would be set up to handle overseas economic development under the reorganization, expected to take effect in about a year. He has recognized that some of the support functions would be turned over to the Defense Department.

Other aid officials foresaw a tug-of-war between the Pentagon and civilian agencies over the extent to which the military establishment would assume responsibility for the activities now performed by the aid agency.

They said that the State Deparment, which is to coordinate the support assistance under the reorganization blueprint, does not have "enough clout," funds or experienced personnel to run the programs.

Larger C.I.A. Role Foreseen

The officials also foresaw that the C.I.A. would seek to increase its role in the support programs. They noted that in a radio interview last Sunday Dr. Hannah implied that the intelligence agency had been using A.I.D. as a cover for its activities in Laos since 1962. In Vietnam, the C.I.A. is an active partner in the pacification program, which it created eight years ago, and is engaged in many other operations.

While there is resistance among civilian officials to what is viewed as military encroachment, A.I.D. recognizes its inability to obtain sufficient funds and personnel to finance and operate some programs in Vietnam.

Early this year, for example, the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, turned down insistent proposals from the United States Military Assistance Command in Saigon that he accept 135 Army officers as advisers to the aid agency's public-safety program, which seeks to build up the South Vietnamese civilian police.

The Defense Department plans to finance several projects that have been administered and funded by the aid agency, among them the supply of high-protein food to the South Vietnamese Army. Tentative estimates are that in fiscal 1971 the Defense Department will finance up to $50-million in programs that previously were paid for from aid funds.

In many recent situations, officials said, A.I.D. had to turn to the military for administrators and physicians to run refugee and public-health projects because of a shortage of civilians willing to serve in Vietnam.

Rapidly Growing Ability

Such developments indicate the rapidly growing capability of the military, especially the Army, to administer typically civilian programs.

This month the newly reorganized John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, N. C.—originally established by the Army to teach antiguerrilla warfare—will graduate the first class of Army officers trained in the political, social, economic, cultural and linguistic aspects of overseas military activities.

Commenting on the trend, a civilian official said that "the realities of the situation" would increasingly force the Administration to turn to the military for the financing and management of certain programs because of the inability of civilian agencies to muster adequate funds and personnel.

The major institutional changes are expected to come in the message that President Nixon will send to Congress later this month.

Deriving from the report of the task force on international development headed by Rudolph A. Peterson, retired president of the Bank of America, the Presidential message is expected to recommend a clear separation of international economic-development assistance from military and support aid. It is the latter that, in situations like Vietnam, has been administered by A.I.D. while the Pentagon has handled military sales and grants.

The Peterson report call for a law covering both military assistance and support assistance, and for an agency on international security cooperation in the State Department that would supersede the present aid agency. The law would vest in the State Department the direction and coordination of the security-assistance program.

While the Defense Department would control military assistance, the State Department, under the Peterson recommendations, would be responsible for support-assistance and public-safety programs.

Senior Administration officals said that it appeared inevitable that considerable responsibility for the support programs would be shifted to the Pentagon even if, in theory, the State Department retained over-all policy direction.

Officials discussing the situation are convinced that the Pentagon financing will be followed by insistence that projects be increasingly administered by the military.

Civilian officials have been citing private remarks by high-ranking officers involved in policy planning for Vietnam, to the effect that civilian leadership is failing and that well-trained Army men should be increasingly assigned to positions of responsibility in the administration of wartime and postwar programs.

tions, etc. The organization relies heavily on volunteer attorneys who either handle cases directly or write and prepare briefs. There is no specific amount of time which a volunteer must contribute.

I. New York Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights Under Law

This organization, co-chaired by Vincent L. Johnson and Russell D. Niles, is the operating arm in New York of the National Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights Under Law. It has been active in providing workshops and training programs to assist lawyers and others in understanding the Community School District System Act. Other projects include urban areas programs, antipoverty programs, challenges to various administrative decisions. Board of Elections cases, civil rights cases and class actions in unfair labor practices cases. There is a continual backlog of work and cases in all of these areas and volunteer attorneys are needed.

SECTION V

The following organizations are involved in general projects related to the poverty area or the administration of justice in the poverty area.

A. The Vera Institute of Justice

Vera operates entirely within New York City and its work is limited to criminal law reform. It provides no litigation services, but works closely with other agencies in the criminal justice system and is concerned with the quality of justice afforded the poor. Vera is currently engaged in a variety of activities, including consultant to the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, operating a project in the Manhattan Criminal Court designed to provide counseling, job training and employment for selected defendants as an alternative to criminal prosecution, an experiment in the Bronx Criminal Court with an advance adjournment program, and an experiment with the use of short form pre-sentence investigation in misdemeanor cases. Other programs under way include a study of the prosecution in juvenile delinquency cases, a comprehensive study of bail jumping, a study of the feasibility of a centralized prearraignment facility and an experiment of monitoring of police interrogation. Volunteer lawyers will be employed in the research and writing of studies and reports concerned with these matters. No block of time need be made available.

B. VISTA

VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America) recruits volunteer lawyers (among others) to work in economically depressed urban and rural areas. Law graduates, selected for the Legal Services programs on a national basis, live among the people whom they serve. The regular term of service is one year after six weeks of training in the area of urban and poverty law. VISTA attorneys serve as advisers and house counsel to local community organizations on matter of strategy, legal requirements and appropriate types of action. They are also engaged in the area of statutory reform, working with the Office of Economic Opportunity's Neighborhood Legal Services Agencies. VISTA attorneys are working on problems relative to consumer fraud; housing violations; cooperatives; credit unions; community planning; welfare rights; health issues; economic development; Federal and local funding; and preparation of individual and group cases for court actions.

C. The Council of New York Law Associates

The Council of New York Law Associates was formed this past November for the purpose of increasing the flow of information among young associates with the expectation of thereby increasing the degree of participation of such attorneys in the public service area. In its first few months some 600 lawyers have become members. This membership is spread among 75 firms and offices.

The Council expects to make a significant contribution to a great many sectors of the public service simultaneously without establishing any program of action or priority of interests. It will promote any and every potentially valuable project that may be of interest to any appreciable segment of its membership. The bulk of the Council's work, then, consists of maintaining relationships with a broad range of organizations already engaged in public service projects, assisting those organizations to make efficient use of the resources that the Council attracts. The supplying of legal assistance to the underprivileged is one of the areas of public service in which the Council engages. Legal assistance organizations with which and projects on which the Council and its members already are involved include: Trying civil liberties cases; working on Family Court matters; lecturing to high school and community groups on housing, consumer law, criminal law, etc.; helping the state defend against habeas corpus petitions; counseling small nonprofit organizations and community groups working with ghetto businesses on tax, corporate, labor and real estate matters.

Respectfully submitted.

GEORGE J. WADE, Jr.,
Chairman, Young Lawyers Committee.

THREAT TO BLAME PRESIDENT IF COMMUNISTS CONTROL SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, a few days ago one of Washington's more critical newspaper columnists, Miss Mary McGrory, who writes as if she is convinced that the world will come to an end because Richard Nixon is President, wrote one of her typically hypercritical columns.

Toward the end she said of the President:

He is incapable of believing that the Democrats would not, someday, accuse him of "losing Indochina," even though some of them are committing their futures to the proposition that it might be the best thing that ever happened to this fractured and anguished country.

Mr. President, the former Democratic National Chairman, my colleague from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), said some things that might make it difficult for anyone including the President to believe that the Democrats do not mean to have their cake and eat it, too, so far as Indochina is concerned.

Ever since the President took office, the former democratic chairman Senator HARRIS, and his successor, Lawrence O'Brien, have demanded that the President surrender now and get all Americans out of Vietnam. They, more than any other two persons, have sought to turn Vietnam into a political issue.

Yet, in an off-guard moment, Senator HARRIS told some members of the press that the Democrats will blame President Nixon if the Communists take control of South Vietnam.

Columnists Roscoe and Geoffrey Drummond quote Senator HARRIS as saying:

We will hold Nixon responsible if he turns South Vietnam over to the communists.

That is a very interesting threat, one that Miss McGrory apparently was not aware of.

The Drummonds go on to say:

But simultaneously, Senator HARRIS and Democratic Senators like EDWARD KENNEDY, GEORGE MCGOVERN, EUGENE MCCARTHY, and J. W. FULBRIGHT are continuing to demand such a rapid pullout of U.S. troops that the end result would be to give the Communists control of South Vietnam.

So there you have it. Former chairman HARRIS and his successor demand that we pull out of South Vietnam, whether or not it means the Communists will take over.

But at the same time they are prepared to blame the President if the Communists do, and attempt to reap as much political gain as possible.

Miss McGrory is obviously capable of believing that Senator HARRIS did not mean what he said. So far as I know, he has not changed his mind. Incidentally, I should like to make reference to one other of Senator HARRIS' statements regarding the war in Vietnam. He is quoted in an Associated Press story of last October 8 as saying in January, 1969:

Arguments of critics of President Johnson's policy in Vietnam have little validity. The biggest factor "—and I emphasize this point—" the biggest factor in prolonging the war is division at home. I'm sure the government will continue in Vietnam its present course and that we will not abandon the countries of Southeast Asia.

It is helpful to know, that at one time, Senator HARRIS' views, those who are fracturing our country are the biggest factor in prolonging the war. Those are my views, also.

Mr. President, in the interest of world peace now and in the future and to prevent needless killing in Indochina, those who are tempted to try to gain partisan or philosophical advantage by criticizing the President could do a great service to the country and probably to themselves by controlling this impulse. Partisanship may no longer stop at the water's edge, but certainly it has little merit in the rice paddies and jungles of Indochina.

I ask unanimous consent that Miss McGrory's column and two other articles on the same subject be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DICK NIXON WEARS A HARD HAT

(My Mary McGrory)

The Senate was extremely polite, almost apologetic, as it wound the first delicate threads around the hands of a President bent on some unknowable venture in Indochina.

Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, one of its least partisan members and co-sponsor of the Cooper-Church amendment, explained that "no disrespect was intended" by this tentative, preliminary attempt at preventive detention of the war-making executive.

"We are strengthening the President's hand," said Church, "helping him overcome the evasions and foot-dragging by bureaucrats and foreign allies."

The language of the preamable of the amendment, which merely holds the President to his promise to bring all American troops "home" to Vietnam by July 1, was so softened that even Chairman John Stennis of the Armed Services Committee, a fierce and unwavering hawk, said it was "meaningless."

The Senate is extremely nervous on its first expedition into composite dissent, which

probably will come to a vote this week. Since 1967, individual members like Sens. J. W. Fulbright and Eugene McCarthy have formed and led resistance, but the Senate as a whole has been content to let the commander-in-chief, who is the proprietor of the flag, the definer of "patriotism" and the protector of "our boys," make all the decisions.

The Senate is not built for speed or defiance. Nor had it seen itself in the role of savior of the country, which it has now assumed in the eyes of millions of troubled and despairing Americans.

Since Cambodia, it has been swamped by mail and besieged by lobbyists—not the old comfortable kind who bought them lunch, but lean and hungry hordes of students, housewives, doctors, lawyers and clergymen demanding justice and threatening retribution at the polls. The senators are told that if they could reject Carswell, they can reject the war.

The President is free of such pressures. He is surrounded by servants and courtiers in his splendid mansion. He is told by his staff that the men who oppose him never did or would vote for him, and merit his contempt.

While George W. Ball, former undersecretary of state, the celebrated, tame dove of the Johnson years, was telling the House Foreign Affairs Committee that "congressional consultations," not congressional curbs, were the answer, the President was receiving the construction workers, the most vocal and violent supporters of his Cambodian decision, in the Oval Room. The day before, he had seen the head of the far-right Young Americans for Freedom.

"I'm only a senator," moaned Warren G. Magnuson, D-Wash., when importuned by the Yale Law School student lobby to stand up to the President.

It is, to be sure, an unequal contest. The President has symbolic and actual superiority. He did not even tell the Senate he was sending troops into Cambodia. Eight thousand were over the border when the Senate, with the rest of the country, learned about this new expansion to shorten the war.

When the howls of outrage went up, the White House virtuously claimed "fear of security risks on Capitol Hill."

Sen. George D. Aiken of Vermont, dean of Republicans and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sputtered, "I have never betrayed a president's confidence. He didn't tell us because he knew we would not approve."

The President reckons, apparently, that disunity and fear will strike the anti-war forces in the Senate, who, after they deal with Cooper-Church, must face the radical McGovern-Hatfield fund cut-off. His marksmen have no convenient personal target, the sponsorship is bipartisan. No stars have yet been born during the struggle and, to date, no deep divisions. His spokesmen are invoking the prisoner-of-war issue to delay the vote.

It seems unlikely the Senate will part him from his money. For many of them, it would smack of regicide, and the presidency has become, partly due to the Senate's compliance, something of a monarchy.

What is needed more is an effort to separate the President from his memories and suspicions. He came of age in the 1950s, came into prominence as a Red-hunter and cold warrior. He was a leader in the hue and cry against the Democrats that they "lost China," never mind that we never had it. *He is incapable of believing that the Democrats would not, some day, accuse him of "losing Indochina,"* even though some of them are committing their futures to the proposition that it might be the best thing that ever happened to this fractured and anguished country. The President has, in short, put on his hard-hat, and the Senate is going to have a nasty, awkward time getting him to take it off.

OU, OSU War Protest Meetings Book Harris

Oklahoma City.—U.S. Sen. Fred R. Harris will speak at the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University next Wednesday for the war protest meetings, but Gov. Dewey Bartlett declined an invitation to appear.

Harris said he expects to discuss the Vietnam War situation in all his speeches, but added, "I regret that some people have tried to put a partisan label on the strong feelings I have concerning the war."

The Democratic national chairman said he "didn't change my mind on this war during this administration. I spoke out against it during the last administration."

During the final year of President Johnson's Administration, Sen. Harris spoke out in support of the President's policies in Vietnam, newspaper files show.

In a January 1968 interview with Lawton newspaper reporters, Sen. Harris said:

"Arguments of critics of President Johnson's policy in Vietnam have little validity.

"The biggest factor in prolonging the war is division at home. I'm sure the government will continue in Vietnam its present course, and that we will not abandon the countries of Southeast Asia."

He said he had visited Korea, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Malaysia and others.

"To a man, the leaders of those nations say, 'If you leave us here and pull out without a successful conclusion in Vietnam, you will have weakened our positions almost overwhelmingly.'"

Democratic Leaders Are Playing With Dynamite on Vietnam

The leaders of the Democratic Party are playing with political dynamite in trying to force President Nixon to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam so rapidly as to throw away all prospect of negotiating a peace.

The United States of America would be hurt—grievously hurt—by this shortsighted, reckless, perilous undermining of what the President is doing to end the war by seeking a fair peace.

No one is suggesting that those who want peace at any price, those who want to withdraw all American forces immediately, regardless of the consequences, should still their protests. All the President and others who are earnestly seeking disengagement and a decent peace are asking is that for a reasonable period Congressional critics should stop telling Hanoi that it doesn't need to negotiate, that all it has to do is to wait and they—the Congressional critics—will see that the U.S. government accepts a no-peace policy.

The Vietnamese war has never been a partisan issue, and attempting to bring it to an end with a fair peace is not a partisan issue. But leaders of the Democratic Party are now trying to make it so. Sen. Fred R. Harris of Oklahoma, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, disclosed this strategy in a candid remark to the press last week.

"We will," he said, "hold Nixon responsible if he turns South Vietnam over to the Communists."

But simultaneously, Senator Harris and Democratic Senators like Edward Kennedy, George McGovern, Eugene McCarthy, and J. W. Fulbright, are continuing to demand such a rapid pull-out of U.S. troops that the end result would be to give the Communists control of South Vietnam.

Thus, the national chairman of the Democratic Party is not only acting to make Vietnam a pay-dirt partisan issue but is also seeking to put President Nixon in such a box that no matter what he does he's bound to lose. . . .

In other words, Senator Harris' neat formula is to make Mr. Nixon punishable by the voters if he doesn't yield to pressures to get out quick and also if evil consequences come from yielding to such pressures.

Senators and congressmen know that the President has the constitutional duty to conduct foreign policy and that negotiating peace is the most difficult and delicate act of foreign policy. Heckling and harassing the President is delaying the peace—not hastening it.

Have the Democrats forgotten so soon that Richard Nixon is acting to end a war which he inherited from his Democratic predecessor and which they helped to authorize?

FOREIGN BANK SECRECY—COMMENTS ON S. 3678 AND H.R. 15073

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, a problem which is of great concern to me and to all Americans is the apparent increase in tax and criminal activities which have been aided and concealed by the use of foreign bank accounts, especially in those countries that offer a maximum degree of bank secrecy.

The Committee on Banking and Currency is now holding hearings on two similar bills which attempt to curb this increase: S. 3678, introduced by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Proxmire), and H.R. 15073, which was passed by the House on May 25, 1970.

There is widespread agreement on the need for legislation to curb the illegal use of foreign bank accounts. H.R. 15073 was passed unanimously. At the hearings held by the House Committee on Banking and Currency on this subject, all administrative agencies that testified supported the implementation of legislation to curb the illegal use of these accounts. The American banking community has also supported the need for corrective measures in this area.

While there has been uniform support for legislative action to control secret foreign bank accounts, there has been some disagreement over the specific means to be employed toward this end. The Treasury Department speaking on behalf of the administration strongly opposed several elements of H.R. 15073 and urged the enactment of several other provisions. Moreover, S. 3678 introduced by Senator Proxmire includes an additional provision not found in the bill passed by the House. This provision would prevent U.S. securities brokers from transacting business on behalf of a foreign entity unless that entity disclosed the person for whom it is acting or certified that it is not acting for a U.S. citizen or resident. It is a new and different concept which should be studied thoroughly. I believe that these differences will be thoroughly discussed and examined by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, and that all Members of the Senate will give careful consideration to the proposed legislation before us.

I would also note that new legislation is just one element of the program necessary to effectively curb the illegal use of foreign secret bank accounts, and that I am pleased with efforts being made presently in connection with these other elements. In addition to any legislation to strengthen our own legal framework to combat this problem, the United States must seek increased assistance from foreign nations, especially those in which secret accounts are maintained for il-

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

GET OUT OF VIETNAM NOW

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, the Los Angeles Times, one of the great newspapers of our country, announced an important new editorial position Sunday when, for the first time, it called upon President Nixon to reveal his private schedule for American military withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and to publicly set a deadline for removing not only the remaining combat troops, but all American forces, combat and support, according to a swift and orderly schedule.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the June 7, 1970, editorial of the Los Angeles Times entitled "Get Out of Vietnam Now," be printed at this place in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GET OUT OF VIETNAM NOW

The time has come for the United States to leave Vietnam, to leave it swiftly, wholly, and without equivocation.

The President still has in his hands the opportunity to effect such an exit. He should seize the chance now as it presents itself, for it may not come so readily again.

That the war must be ended, all are agreed. That, as the President said last week, "peace is the goal that unites us," all are also agreed.

Long ago, when we began to help the anti-Communist Vietnamese against the Communist Vietnamese, it seemed a worthwhile thing to do. It seemed cheap, first in dollars, then in men. No need now to trace the melancholy history of how, bit by bit, decision by decision, it became extravagantly expensive of money, of human lives, of the tranquillity of this country, of our reputation abroad.

The President said recently he would not have this nation become a "pitiful helpless giant" in the eyes of the world. We are not entirely pitiful, and not yet helpless. But we are like a giant lunging about with one foot in a trap, a spectacle that is disconcerting to our friends and comforting to our enemies.

NOT THE CENTER RING

Our great adversary is now, and will remain, the Soviet Union.

All questions of American foreign policy are subordinate to the central one, which is to prevent nuclear war between the two super-powers. We shall be engaged against the Communist world one way or another all our lives; but in Southeast Asia we are engaged on the periphery of that world in a battle obscured by the elements of civil war and Vietnamese nationalism.

Our response ought to be commensurate with the challenge: as it was over Berlin, in the Cuban missile crisis, as it may yet have to be in the Middle East. But we have so overresponded in Indochina that it may be harder for us to respond as we ought should a greater and more direct challenge arise.

No need now either to delineate at length the consequences in our own country of the Indochina war:

The war is not the sole cause of strife between parents and children, yet it has inflamed that strife.

The war is not the cause of conflict between the races, but it has made that conflict more bitter.

The war is not the only reason for our present economic distress, but it has rendered that distress harder to treat.

The war alone did not create the illness afflicting our public and private institutions, but it has brought that illness to the crisis point.

Like a small wound the war has festered until its infection has appeared in every organ of this Republic. Its ache is felt in every limb; its pain clouds the national judgment. The country is losing heart.

"Peace," therefore, "is the goal that unites us."

As the President said, our national debate is not about the goal of peace, but about "the best means" to achieve it.

JOB CAN BE BETTER DONE

The President has better means at hand than he is using.

He has promised a withdrawal of American combat troops—another 150,000 by next May 1—but the withdrawal in these summer months has been reduced and after the 150,000 leave there will still be 184,000 troops left in Vietnam. If Mr. Nixon has a private schedule for their withdrawal he has not revealed it.

He has declared that his goal is the total withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam, but by making open-ended threats of counter-action should the enemy attack, he has made it necessary to make good on those threats. Thus he has given to the enemy a large measure of decision over our own rate of withdrawal.

By the President's move into Cambodia, and by his encouragement of the Vietnamese and Thai operations there after we leave, he has entwined American prestige with the fate of that unhappy but unimportant little country.

In declaring that the credibility of American promises elsewhere in the world hangs on our achieving "a just peace" in Vietnam, he is making it harder for us to make with credibility those compromises which everyone, including the Administration, believes will eventually have to be made.

The President, in sum, is pursuing, for reasons which of course he deems excellent, an ambiguous and contradictory policy—a policy of which the stated purpose is to leave Indochina, but in which it is implied that it may be necessary to stay in Indochina.

The Times believes the United States has discharged all the responsibilities it has in Vietnam. The Times believes this nation has—bravely and honorably—done everything, and more, that could reasonably have been expected of it.

American men prevented Communist forces from precipitantly seizing South Vietnam. American men, at an enormous cost in lives, have secured for the South Vietnamese a reasonable length of time for improvement of their army and consolidation of their country and government. Short of permanent occupation, there is no more America can reasonably be expected to do for Vietnam.

The President said last week that the Cambodian venture "eliminated an immediate danger to the security of the remaining American troops" and "won precious time" for the South Vietnamese army.

This, then, is the opportuntly for the President to accelerate the withdrawal.

THE TIME IS NOW

Let him now publicly set a deadline for removing not only the remaining combat troops but all American forces, combat and support, according to a swift and orderly schedule. Let him begin to hasten the removal of combat troops this summer. It ought to be possible to bring about a total and orderly withdrawal in the next year and a half at the longest.

Such a program of withdrawal would of course be hazardous. But it would be much less hazardous than the policy the President is presently pursuing.

The South Vietnamese would be firmly on notice that their future is where it belongs—in their hands. The United States could continue to support them with arms and money, should they choose to keep on seeking a military solution; more likely they would feel impelled to put their own political house in order pending that day when they will come to the political compromise that is the inevitable outcome in Indochina.

American troops would be in some danger, but they are certainly in some danger now, and the faster they leave, the sooner they will be in no danger at all.

IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE

We shall not argue, as some do, that rapid American withdrawal would induce the North Vietnamese to negotiate; but it is certain they are not inclined to negotiate now. On the contrary, the longer we stay in Vietnam the more inclined the North Vietnamese will be not to negotiate, and the readier they may be to mount attacks on our forces in hope of pushing us out.

Let the President, therefore, remove all foreign and domestic doubts about our intentions by announcing a speedy departure from Vietnam.

The President said last week he was determined to end the war in a way that would "promote peace rather than conflict throughout the world . . . and bring an era of reconciliation to our people—and not a period of furious recrimination."

The Times believes that the program of withdrawal we suggest would bring about the kind of peace Mr. Nixon spoke of. The policy suggested here would hasten the end of one war and put the United States on a better footing to prevent other more dangerous conflicts.

The policy suggested here would certainly be met with recrimination from some in this country. But we firmly believe that this policy would be thankfully approved by the majority of our people as an honorable conclusion to this terrible long war.

NEED FOR PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FIXED TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, for months I, along with other Members of the Congress, have urged the President to announce publicly a fixed timetable for the withdrawal of all American troops from South Vietnam.

We have urged that it be a timetable determined solely by the safety of our men and subject neither to the inflexibility of Hanoi nor the convenience of Saigon. The South Vietnamese government, in its own self-interest, clearly has no desire to speed an American departure that would leave it to do all the fighting itself.

The President has never declared openly that he has a timetable for withdrawing all of our men—ground, air, and naval. But he frequently hints at the existence of an overall administration timetable and has talked of a timetable for removing some of our ground forces, specifically, those he calls "ground combat" troops.

Neither the Congress nor the country knows what the President's timetable is; it is a private timetable that he has never made public. But even while he refuses to reveal his timetable, the President from time to time suggests that he is meeting

it, and is even a bit ahead of schedule.

This strange state of affairs is like a railroad refusing to publish a timetable, and then announcing that all its trains are running on time.

Critics, and they include the President, have claimed it would be disastrous to announce a withdrawal timetable publicly. They say it would remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate, that it would tip our military hand and endanger our war aims and our men.

But an odd thing has happened in recent weeks: the President has himself taken to publicly announcing timetables, though in a circumscribed way.

First he announced on April 20 that he would would withdraw 150,000 additional men from South Vietnam within a year. Then, following his decision to invade Cambodia, he announced he would have all men out of there by June 30.

The pending business in the Senate is the Cooper-Church amendment, which relates to that timetable announced for Cambodia. It relates also to the feeling of many in this body, and in the other body of Congress, that responsibility for ending wars as well as beginning them, responsibility for determining timetables for orderly termination of wars in which in which we become involved, and responsibility for the power of the purse in connection with our Armed Forces, can, and indeed must be exercised by this body to fulfill its constitutional duties.

If the President now finds it proper to announce a fixed timetable for Cambodia, how can he any longer justify not announcing one for Vietnam? And if he can announce a limited timetable for some of our men in Vietnam, how can he any longer justify not announcing a total timetable for all?

Just such a fixed, total timetable is set by the Amendment to End the War, which I have cosponsored with Senators McGOVERN, HATFIELD, GOODELL, and HUGHES, just such a fixed timetable, which the President himself set, is the subject of the pending matter—the Cooper-Church amendment dealing with the American incursion in Cambodia. The Amendment to End the War would bring about the withdrawal of all our men from Indochina by June 30, 1971, safely and systematically, as the Cooper-Church amendment would withdraw all American troops from Cambodia, in accordance with the President's schedule, by July 1 of this year.

Passage of the amendment would prove to the North Vietnamese that we are in earnest about withdrawing from the war, completely and soon—not piecemeal and over an indefinite and dangerous period of time, as is our present policy. Such unequivocal assurance would, I believe, do much toward getting the Paris talks back on more productive tracks.

The amendment would also put the Thieu-Ky government on notice that we do not intend to go on fighting and dying in their cause forever, that they have a definite deadline by which they either must work to bring about a negotiated peace or, if they want to keep on fighting, shape up and fight without us.

If the President does indeed have a timetable for total military withdrawal from Southeast Asia, let him make it public. If his timetable agrees with ours, fine. If it differs, then there can be full and healthy public debate over the difference and full and healthy congressional participation in, and shared responsibility for, the final decision.

If the President continues to refuse to make public his timetable, he leaves open the inference that he really does not have one. By his own acts, he has conceded that national security cannot be used as an excuse for secrecy in the matter of a timetable.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRESIDENTIAL USE OF THE MILITARY FORCE

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I continue to receive numerous significant communications from scholars concerned about the current debate over the President's powers as Commander in Chief. I am anxious to share these communications with all concerned Senators.

Today it gives me special pleasure to call to the Senate's attention an illuminating letter I have received from Prof. Joseph E. Kallenbach of the University of Michigan.

Professor Kallenbach is a member of the department of political science at that university, and is a widely respected authority on the Presidency. He has published numerous articles in scholarly journals. His books include "The American Chief Executive"—Harper & Row, 1966.

I would especially call attention to two pertinent sections of that distinguished book. The first deals with "Presidential Use of Military Force" and is in the chapter covering pages 512–518. The second section is on "The President, Congress and the 'War Power'" and is in the chapter covering pages 533–540.

In his letter to me, Professor Kallenbach gives useful insight into the background of the Founding Fathers' understanding of the war power. He says:

The current debate in the Senate on the so-called Church-Cooper Amendment, which would invoke the fiscal powers of Congress, in effect, to order the withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia by June 30 and prohibit their redeployment there without the specific approval of Congress, raises a question of utmost concern to the people of this nation as well as to American military personnel engaged in combat in Southeast Asia. Legislation of this character, if passed, would amount to an undisguised vote of lack of confidence in the President's personal integrity, good faith and judgment in the discharge of his constitutional duties as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. More than that, if enacted into law in its undiluted original form it would constitute in a most fundamental sense a challenge to the soundness of our constitutional arrangements regarding the proper division of functions between the President and Congress with respect to control over military operations in a zone of combat.

These arrangements have stood the nation in good stead for nearly two centuries. To unbalance them with a legislative *demarche* of the sort proposed would, in my opinion, be setting a precedent of gravest consequence. It is not only the security of the American forces now in process of being disengaged from combat in the Southeastern Asia area but the future security of the nation itself that is threatened.

With the experience of the Revolutionary War behind them, the Framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the dangers and frustrations involved in divided authority in the direction of military operations, once the stage of combat conditions has been reached. For this reason they reached the conclusion, with a complete absence of dissent, that the Commander-in-chief role should be assigned to the President, by constitutional mandate. With this clause they placed in his hands the ultimate responsibility for direction and deploying American troops in the field. This provision was characterized by Hamilton in the Federalist Paper (No. 74) as one "the propriety of [which] is so evident in itself" that he felt "little need be said to explain or enforce it."

The assignment to Congress of authority through the Constitution to raise and support armies, to provide for and maintain a navy, to declare war, and to appropriate funds in pursuance of these purposes reserves to it powers of a very fundamental nature also, so far as the national military establishment is concerned. These are powers which, in conjunction with the grant of authority, in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to pass laws necessary and proper to implement these and other powers vested in Congress or in other branches of the national government, equip the Congress with a vast reservoir of constitutional authority to legislate in the area of national security where military concerns are involved. But surely the Commander-in-Chief clause must stand in some degree as a constraint upon Congressional power in this connection where field operations of American military forces are concerned.

Professor Kallenbach is especially persuasive in applying his understanding of the Presidency to the realities of the current policy of disengagement in Vietnam.

The constitutional issue of where the line should be drawn between the authority of Congress to shape American military defense policy, on the one hand, and of the President to direct military operations in an actual theatre of military operations on the other, is not one that can or should be resolved by creating a constitutional crisis, in the fatuous expectation that the issue can be eventually passed upon in a definitive way by the courts through some sort of "test" case. The nation cannot afford the luxury of that method of resolving a difference of opinion between the legislative and executive over the appropriate manner of effectuating American military disengagement in South Vietnam.

The President has committed himself and his administration, so far as words and actions can do so, to a policy of step-by-step disengagement of American combat forces in this area. The sorties by South Vietnamese and American forces into Cambodia have as their clearly stated military tactical purpose the furtherance of that policy. For Congress to seek to write into law a tactical blueprint and time-table for carrying out this, or any other aspect of the widely advertised and nationally accepted overall strategy of

standing that the violent left and right are the enemies of all the *rest* of us.

What, then—and finally, now—can, or should, Congress, and this particular Congressman, attempt to do?

Well, again without expecting to enjoy your full support for my answer, I believe Congress—and this Congressman—must do what we can, at this late date, to broaden the base of public discussion and understanding of our painful few alternatives in Indochina.

In such an effort *you*, of course, have a part to play and, if you have not yet written me to give me the benefit of your views about Vietnam, and now Cambodia and Laos—though, looking at my backlog of mail, I tend to think I have by now heard from *every* person in this 33rd Congressional District!—you are still invited to do so. Participatory democracy, as we have known it, demands no less of you in any event, for it is now undergoing in this Nation its severest test ever.

And I shall listen to you as, all day Thursday—as a member of a six-man, ad-hoc committee I helped form in the House for such purpose—I listened to student representatives from some 25 of our college campuses; this continuing effort having been designed by us to encourage persons in this age group to believe that they can, and *must*, work within and through our system of government—and *only* through it—to bring about, if they can by the forces of reason and logic, the changes in policy they demand.

But, you may well ask, what at this time is the purpose of all this?

What good will it do for you—or for some student—to give me or any Congressman, or even the President, the benefit of your views?

Won't the President—with or without the concurrence of Congress—still do what he wants, or what he thinks best, anyway?

And, to tell the truth, some of you—for you have written me along such lines—seem to feel that the President, whoever he is, *ought* to be left alone to do what he wants; a sort of "father-knows-best" attitude based apparently, on the theory that only the President has all the "facts."

Well, when it comes to the straight-out defense of these United States, that's about the way it has to be—given the realities of the nuclear age in which we live; and I see no way around those realities

However, when it comes to un-declared wars or "Presidential" wars—or "political" wars, if you will, like the one in Vietnam, where the *defense* of this Nation in the way the framers of our Constitution evidently thought about it is involved in only the most-obscure way—I don't think any such open-ended grant of authority to any President is wise. Besides which, one of the weightier lessons we should have learned from Vietnam is that *no* President can, for long, carry the people with him in pursuit of the purposes of such a war without eventually emperiling the future of representative government, itself.

I therefore believe—as I trust you believe—that some way must be found for restoring the war-making power for such purposes under our Constitution to the representatives of the people; meaning the Congress of the United States.

The central problem in trying to do so now is complicated by the fact the we are already up to our ears in such a war; a war—need we be reminded—that Mr. Nixon inherited, but one we have had every reason to believe Mr. Nixon wants to see ended just as soon as possible and, generally, for about the same reasons I have already stated in my own regard.

Now, I want—by my votes and such influence as I may have—to *keep* him moving in the direction of withdrawal. I cannot support—nor do I think a majority of the American people would support—any widening of the war, or any lasting escalation of our participation in the conflict.

This is why I have expressed my reservations about the incursion into Cambodia—the public reaction to which the President seems to have misjudged. This is also why I have already voted—week before last in the House—for language to be added by way of amendment to a defense-procurement bill which, though not the best vehicle for such purpose, would have expressed the sense of Congress that the President should have, as he has promised, all of our troops out of Cambodia before July 1st, as well as a suggestion to Mr. Nixon that, before repeating any such move, he should first seek Congressional concurrence.

That vote—which I would repeat again today—has been applauded by some and vigorously condemned by others as, somehow, showing my "disloyalty" to the President. As one who has strongly supported the President in other ways, I don't see it at all in that latter light. I don't doubt the President's sincerity or his motives—but I do doubt, even as I did in Lyndon Johnson's case, the wisdom of some of the military advice that has been offered and apparently accepted by him. Though I hope and pray, like you, for the full success of this new effort—so much so that, after it is over, it may enable the President to announce a speed-up in the withdrawal of the 150,000 men to be brought home this year—I have tended, up to now, to view this effort as just one more (and this one a massive one) "search-and-destroy" mission of the type we tried at such great cost and such little, lasting success for far too long in years past in Vietnam.

At this point, I don't know whether Congress will yet adopt any such precautionary limitation on the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief or not. Perhaps it doesn't matter, for it is probable that the force of public opinion—by itself—would from now on prevent him from repeating such an exercise without, at least, first obtaining Congressional consent.

But what other actions may Congress also be called upon to consider along comparable lines?

There are numerous possibilities, ranking from an unlikely vote on an actual declaration of war on North Vietnam (which a Senatorial aspirant in this State is pushing to make Congress "face up to the issue"), consideration of which I think would be madness under the existing circumstances, to an even-unlikelier vote on a resolution to impeach both the President and Vice President for having committed (as stated in the Constitution) "Treason . . . (and) other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Despite the fact that I have recently received from Harpur College students and faculty a petition bearing a purported 2,372 signatures demanding my support for such a move, this, I must say, is utter nonsense. At worst, the President—with the Vice President as onlooker—has been guilty of bad judgment which is yet to be proved; at best, he deserves in this difficult time all our understanding and support, as well as our *guidance* insofar as God gives any of us wisdom to guide him. To all of which one might add that, should such a move somehow succeed, the Nation would for now be left with Speaker John McCormack, of Massachusetts, as its President—an event I am confident even Mr. Nixon's most-violent critics do not really wish to promote.

However, what I undoubtedly *shall* have to consider—and this in the near future—is language by way of amendment to be added to the forthcoming Defense Appropriation Bill for Federal fiscal year 1971 (beginning on July 1st), which would require the President to have *all* our forces out of Vietnam, and the Indochina area, before July 1st of 1971. This is the so-called "McGovern-Hatfield-Goodell-Hughes" proposal in the Senate—its companion piece in the House being H. Res. 1000, which some local groups are vigorously supporting.

Though Congress has never, in its 181 years, so used its ultimate "power-over-the-purse" to end a shooting war, there is no doubt of the Congressional *right* to do so.

However, I have grave reservations about the *wisdom* of doing so.

I am for withdrawal, paced to "Vietnamization"—and I woud like to see us make, now, a new effort at negotiations again—but setting an inflexible deadline for withdrawal, in a "hang-the-consequences" mood, would seem to finally end whatever slim chance there still is for obtaining a political settlement; unless, of course—and this needs to be said in fairness—such a deadline might move the Saigon government to do some needed negotiating on its own, at least with the large *non-Communist* groups within South Vietnam, itself. We have made only painfully slow progress—even as with promoting land-reform—in getting Thieu-and-Ky to broaden the base of their government, but until they try the latter as they now are the former there is little chance of our leaving behind a government in Saigon that can survive.

Be all this as it may—and I have taken far too much of your time—I do *not* think this Congress will mandate a "forced" withdrawal on the President. But it ought alternatively consider, I suggest, action somewhat along the lines offered in a Concurrent Resolution I have submitted with, now, some thirty House colleagues. This resolution calls firmly for a *national* policy of withdrawal from Vietnam—of *all* our forces—but leaves the mechanics of doing so free of any deadline and flexible enough so that our remaining forces face a minimum of danger, and no military or political vacuum is created overnight.

This resolution also states that it is in our national interest to work to achieve a political settlement and, in the meantime, to avoid enlarging the present conflict, and finally declares that Congress—as it should—from now on ". . . expects to exercise its Constitutional responsibility of consultation with the President on all matters, now and henceforth, affecting grave national decisions of war and peace."

The precise language of all this could obviously be improved, but I see it as at least a proper beginning, as well as an effort to *unite* Congress—and, behind them, the people—with the President in the all-important task of extricating this Nation from Indochina.

Perhaps what I have offered you is no answer. Surely some of you have already rejected it as such. But, as these are not easy days, so is it also true that there are no "easy" answers—and equally true that silence of the sort that, on the part of too many of us these past seven years, led us down the wrong pathway, would be the worst sin of all.

So, I hav tried tonight to tell you "like it is"—so far as I am concerned—over Vietnam; urging you, at the same time, to share the burden of decision with me for, in the end, after those decisions are made, it is "we the people" who must live with them, as well as with ourselves, our children and our fellow human beings throughout this so fragile world.

Robison Supports Presidential Commission To Investigate Tragedies at Kent State and Jackson State

Rep. Howard W. Robison has announced that he has sponsored a Resolution in the House of Representatives expressing the sense of Congress that the President should establish a commission to examine the recent events at Kent State, Jackson State, and other college campuses. A similar resolution has been co-sponsored by well over forty other members of the House. In sub-

mitting this resolution, the Congressman made the following statement:

"Anyone who watches television or reads a newspaper knows that our campuses have become battlegrounds for the conflicting factions in our increasingly polarized society. The situation is becoming ever more serious and tense. We are not now dealing with a mere handful of students throwing rocks, but with large crowds of youth—and with policemen and National Guard troops with bayonets and live ammunition. The armed confrontation resulted in the senseless deaths earlier this month of four students at Kent State and of two students at Jackson State. It is justified to ask, where will it all end if we do not develop better ways of dealing with the dissatisfaction and frustrations of our people?

"I am as disturbed as anyone else about the small minority of college youth who practice violence on our campuses—who, in the process, seriously impair the freedom and rights of their fellow students. But it is equally disturbing that authorities have found it necessary to respond to random rock throwing with random rifle fire. There is no logic in either act: only horror and irrationality.

"The value of a Presidential commission at this point is that it could study the events at Kent State, Jackson State, and other campuses and present to the American people an objective analysis of the shootings. Hopefully, it would also make specific recommendations and set forth reasonable guidelines for the handling of future campus disturbances.

"It should be obvious that stringent guidelines are long overdue. Even if one accepts the explanation offered by both the National Guard at Kent State and the police at Jackson State that a sniper's fire precipitated the outbreak of shooting, there is little justification for the bloody response.

"Are we really to believe that the best way to deal with a rooftop sniper is to fire into an unarmed crowd on the ground? That is what the official explanation at Kent State seems to imply. Are we ready to accept the fact that the way to react to an unseen sniper at night is to pump over a hundred rounds into a women's dormitory occupied by hundreds of students? The police in Jackson, Mississippi seem to be suggesting that.

"I do not accept that, and I believe that the vast majority of the American people—after proper reflection—will not accept that either. I hope, therefore, that we will have a good deal of public support for establishing the commission I have recommended. The commission could perform a valuable public service by carefully evaluating the events on our campuses over the past few weeks; and also by suggesting viable regulations to insure that such tragedies do not re-occur."

Vietnam

SAIGON REGIME TORTURES THOSE WHO SEEK PEACE

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 8, 1970

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, on May 30, the New York Times noted the occupation of the Veteran's Ministry in Saigon by 200 disabled South Vietnamese veterans. On the same day, thousands of students and Buddhist monks demonstrated at the state funeral for Phan Khac Suu, former South Vietnamese Chief of State. The Thieu-Ky government responded to the veteran's sit-in and the student demonstration with tear gas and clubs.

It has been brought to my attention, Mr. Speaker, that students, disabled war veterans, Buddhist monks and laymen have been holding demonstrations in Saigon almost every day since mid-April. In addition to tear gas and clubs, many demonstrators have also been subjected to torture and imprisonment.

These demonstrations against the Thieu-Ky government and the continuation of the Indochina war have not been adequately reported in the American press.

The following statement from the Fellowship of Reconciliation and an article by Don Luce, former head of International Voluntary Services in Vietnam and coauthor of "Vietnam: The Unheard Voices," describe the brutal and repressive response of the South Vietnamese Government to these sincere demands for reform and peace.

I believe every Member of Congress should be aware of the repressive nature of the Thieu-Ky regime which claims to be our ally in the search for peace.

The statement and article follow:

STUDENT PROTESTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

While the attention of the American public has been riveted on the protests and demonstrations of American students and other anti-war forces, a sequence of equally significant and far more hazardous actions in South Vietnam has gone almost entirely unreported and unnoticed.

For more than two months, protests against the war and the government of Generals Thieu, Ky and Khiem have occurred almost daily under the leadership of students, disabled war veterans, Buddhist monks and laymen, and Catholic priests, and have led to the beating, imprisonment and torture of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of their participants.

The Thieu government is facing a crisis comparable to that preceding the fall of President Ngo Dinh in 1963, and has reacted with predictably ferocious repression. Yet the demonstrations continue. When police surrounded the Cambodian embassy in Saigon that had been occupied by 400 students in protest against the Cambodian adventures, and refused to allow other students to pass through to bring them food, members of the House of Representatives carried the food to the students.

Important Saigon newspapers, including *tin sang, Dong nai* and *Duoc Nha Nam* have challenged the omnipresent censorship by carrying stories of these actions, with photographs, on their front pages. It is reported that, as a consequence, 40 of the last 48 issues of *tin sang* alone have been confiscated by the police.

All universities and high schools have been closed; arrests have multiplied, and the most brutal forms of torture inflicted on the protesting students. Repression has been characteristic of the Thieu government since its formation, but according to eyewitnesses, is worse now than ever.

Yet almost none of this has been reported in the American press. The U.S. embassy in Saigon refused even to see a delegation of American relief workers protesting American collusion in the repression.

We align ourselves with these students, and will seek every way possible to identify with them more directly. We call on the peace movement in the United States, and particularly the students, to find means to publicize and reinforce these actions by their Vietnamese counterparts.

We remonstrate with the American press for its failure to report and interpret these events to their American readers. Nothing so clearly reveals the nature of this war as the fact that the Thieu government is so strenuously opposed by these non-NLF, non-Communist people in their own country.

We plead with the officials of our own government, at every level, to withdraw support from this tyrannical puppet we have created, and take the burden of the war off the backs of the Vietnamese people.

TORTURE IN SAIGON

(By Don Luce)

It is now known beyond any doubt that the Saigon police are subjecting Vietnamese students to brutal torture in an attempt to stifle student dissent against the war and the government. On April 21, ten of these young people were released. Their condition was pitiable but not nearly as grave as that of some whom they left behind in prison.

Do Huu But lies in semi-shock in a laboratory at the College of Agriculture which has been converted into a dispensary for the ten released prisoners. His fingernails are blackened from having pins pushed underneath. He is nearly deaf from having had soapy water forced into his ears, after which they were beaten. Miss Que Huong, a philosophy teacher at Doan Thi Diem high school in Can Tho, forces a small smile when visitors come. Her knees are swollen three times their normal size, and black and blue welts cover her thin arms. She was completely undressed in front of several policemen who watched and drank whisky while she was beaten. Her fiance, Nguyen Ngoc Phong, was brought into the room to watch in an attempt to get him to sign confession papers.

After five weeks in jail, Luu Hoang Thao, deputy chairman of the Van Hanh University student association, is one of the few students in good enough physical condition to give an extended interview:

"For the first three days, the police beat me continuously," he said. "They didn't ask me any questions or to sign anything. They just beat my knee caps and neck with billy clubs, then hit me with chair legs until I was unconscious. When I regained consciousness, they beat me again. Finally, after three days, they asked me to sign a paper that they had already written. I wouldn't sign it, so they beat me some more." Thao said he doesn't know why he was arrested or why he was released. Some observers believe that the government released the tortured students to frighten other students who have been demonstrating against government repression in large numbers in recent weeks. In any event, the torture of Luu Hoang Thao continued day after day, increasing in ferocity and variety. The details of what they did to him are sickening.

"Finally," he said, "they injected medicine into me and took my hand and signed a paper. It said that I had had liaison with the Communists."

Dr. Nguyen Dinh Mai, who is attending the ten students, said he did not yet know the full extent of their injuries.

"When they regain their strength, we will take them to one of the large hospitals for x-rays and thorough medical examinations," he said.

But the students are concerned about the many others who are still in jail. The condition of three of them, who were reported "too ill" to appear with other students for trial in Saigon April 20, was described by the newspaper *Tin Sang* (Morning News) on April 11. One lay near death from torture suffered for refusing to sign a statement that police had found weapons and explosives in his house. Two others were in grave condition with paralyzed legs in both cases and other serious injuries. While refusing to comment on its accuracy, a government spokesman, Nguyen Ngoc Huyen, called the article "objectionable" and had the paper confiscated—for the ninth time in less than a month.

Article 7 of the Constitution of South Vietnam specifically prohibits the use of torture

or of confessions obtained by torture, threat or force. Yet signed statements obtained in this way are used extensively in the trials of political prisoners. In the case of the students, the government denies that it has tortured or manhandled them but will not comment on their obvious disfigurement when they appear in court.

The gravity of the situation has led several leading Vietnamese to come to the aid of the students. Father Nguyen Huy Lich, a respected Dominican priest, has investigated reports of torture and obtained substantiation from nurses and doctors who have the job of treating prisoners during the day in preparation for another night of torture. On March 31, Father Lich and seven other priests called upon the Saigon government to provide humane treatment of its prisoners. Others, like former Minister Vu Van Man, Vietnam's foremost legal authority, have joined the struggle against torture in the prisons.

On April 21, Leo Dorsey, a volunteer social worker with the Unitarian Universalist Committee in Vietnam, went to the U.S. Embassy to request a private interview with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker for himself and a small group of American volunteers concerned with the fact that U.S. equipment is supporting the Saigon government's repression of its people. The tear gas grenades the police use, for example, are made by Federal Laboratories Inc. in Saltsburg, Pa., and are part of the U.S. assistance program to Vietnam. Mr. Dorsey's group was unable to meet with the ambassador or his deputy.

THE ENVIRONMENT—HERE IS WHAT TO DO

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 8, 1970

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, high school students of San Francisco were recently asked to write their suggestions of what best advice could be given the President as to how best protect our environment and preserve our natural resources.

As high school and college students across the Nation have deep concern for the protection of the enivronment, the response to this contest conducted by the San Francisco Electrical Industry Trust was heavy.

The winner was Miss Diane Lynn Calden of Presentation High School.

Miss Calden's suggestions and comments are excellent and I think my colleagues in the Congress would benefit by what she says:

NOW, HERE'S WHAT TO DO . . .

Mr. President, as you yourself stated in your State of the Union address, our goal in the '70s should be "restoring nature to its natural state." This takes money. It has been estimated that it will take 4 percent of the GNP, nearly $40 billion annually, for the United States to even hold its own against pollution.

The existence of a suitable environment is necessary for our very existence and while you agree with this you are still holding back money that Congress appropriated last year to fight pollution. According to you, fighting inflation has more urgent priority for the moment.

Since you are of this mind, my first suggestion to you is that the least you could do is get started on environmental remedies which don't require heavy Federal spending.

NEW COUNCIL

For example, your new Council on Environmental Quality could be put to work looking over the operations of the Federal government. The Council might start by asking the Corps of Engineers to justify their depredations of the landscape; the Transportion Department, to establish a better allotment of funds between their lavish highway construction grants and their less than adequate aid to public transport; the Agriculture Department, to cut back subsidies that encourage farmers to misuse land and to keep on using harmful pesticides.

Another point of investigation should be Robert Finch and his Department of Health, Education and Welfare. HEW is, or will shortly become, the custodian of $45 million in public funds to be spent on cleaning the air we breathe.

I have serious doubts about how effectively and efficiently the money is being used. I have made a rather extensive study of how the funds have been allotted to various projects and after considering them, I think you might also be convinced that they merit some looking into.

HEW AND ENGINES

HEW has stated that it doubts the internal combustion engine can be "cleaned up" enough to meet their standards and claims "there is a lack of motivation within the (automotive) industry for it to mount a significant effort to develop serious competition to the ICE."

On that basis, HEW has cancelled their meeting with the automotive industries representatives, which might have proved very informative. The industry itself is well aware of the need to eliminate pollutants and according to one representative of The Big Three it will be done to everyone's satisfaction "within five years," with a minimum of cost to the car buyer and the taxpayer.

It is unfortunate, however, that HEW cannot accept Detroit's plan and would rather have their own "Big Project."

HEW proposes spending $21.7 million on the development of "Rankine-cycle" engines, over a five-year period. It might prove profitable if they consulted Bill Lear, who already has spent $4.5 million on steam and concluded that "the most can be said about the Rankine-cycle engine is that it is rank."

EXOTIC BATTERIES

Another $12.2 million will be fed into the development of electric propulsion systems; not for the development of a decent fuel cell as you might expect, but on exotic batteries. Even if they do develop then, what are they going to do with them?

New York has already had one massive power failure. What would happen if everyone plugged in their cars for recharging at night? Even by eliminating the pollution produced by cars with the electric car, you would increase the pollution caused by the electric power generating plants. Little is accomplished when you move the source of pollution from lots of cars to a couple of power plants.

Only $7 million was proposed for the gas turbine investigation, but of course there are a lot of people around who already know about building efficient gas turbines. HEW even plans to pay someone a few million for the development of things like flywheel buses which the Swiss have already been using and I'm sure that they would impart their acquired knowledge for a lot less than a million dollars.

NATURAL GAS

Strangely enough, HEW has tossed in only $700,000 for the Sterling engine, the most probable replacement of the present automobile engine.

Another non-inflationary measure would be for Washington to set up standards and, if necessary, penalties for industries who contribute to the destruction of our country's resources. The government should encourage large-scale service companies to switch from gasoline to natural gas as a fuel for their fleets of trucks, as PG&E did this last month without government pressure.

PG&E reports that this switch eliminated as much as 90 percent of the pollutants contained in their regular truck emissions PG&E also stated that natural gas itself is safer than regular fuels and in the long run it should be cheaper also.

With some encouragement, business could make pollution elimination a profitable enterprise. "How to make America smoother, cleaner, quieter longer?" I'm sure with some strong prodding, the packing industries could come up with "bio-degradable" packing, meaning containers which would rot away naturally, to replace the mountains of indestructable no-deposit, no-return trash which is staring us in the face.

GREEN BELTS

Another type of land pollution is the result of exploitation of the land for the sake of progress. Farmlands are being eaten up with taxes, housing and freeways. According to Irwin Luckman, the only way to prevent this urban sprawl is to maintain green belts between large urban areas.

To implement this plan, when the nation's inflationary status goes down, the government should buy land between great metropolitan areas. The land should then be leased to others for the sole purpose of creating recreational areas. Even if you don't agree this is the way to stop urban sprawl, people need large green belts to furnish sufficient oxygen in order to breathe and recreational areas to free themselves from the confining city.

AIR POLLUTION

When you, Mr. President, think the economy can afford it, I would encourage Federal spending first in the area of air pollution. In California, one million trees are dying and $200 million worth of crops were lost last year because of a lack of clean air.

Industries should be encouraged by Federal subsidies to create more byproducts from their waste products and, if possible, a system could be achieved where numerous enterprises could pool their wastes and jointly make use of a nuclear reactor which would eliminate the waste material and produce at the same time, enough power to operate all of the plants involved.

The other large areas of pollution, water, also requires substantial federal aid to be overcome. The prime source of water pollution is industry and this is where my suggestion of standards and penalties would come in. What would be far more effective than penalties, however, would be giving industry something to do with their liquid wastes.

My suggestion is to help communities, especially highly industrialized ones, to build sewage treatment plants like the one at Indian Creek Reservoir in California. This operation produces reclaimed water which is above the U.S. drinking water standards. Operations such as this could also be used to help farmers in places like California's Imperial Valley, where millions of dollars in crops were lost last year because the salt content of the irrigation water is too high.

AND NOISE

A third area of pollution which requires Federal aid before any notable progress can be made is noise pollution. In the downtown areas of large cities the noise is trapped by tall city buildings and amplified to the point that it can cause damage to the human ear. San Francisco's new buses operate at about 105 decibels; that is 10 decibels above the safety level.

Quiet mass transit seems to be the only

solution. Constant exposure to noises at the levels which now exist in most modern cities result in physical and psychological harm to the human body. The Transportation Department has made an excellent first step in trying to help cities such as San Francisco find a solution to their noise problems.

Many people seem to think that "no-growth" is the solution to all of our environmental problems. This theory is faulty by the very fact that it will take even more technology and wealth to undo what our technology and wealth have done to the environment.

But more important than numerous projects is that a new awareness must be born which realizes that it is not a right of affluency to squander and spoil our resources, but it is a threat to it. "A country which has long taken pride in 'conquering' nature is now learning to live with it."

TWO COMMENCEMENT ADDRESSES

HON. BILL NICHOLS

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 8, 1970

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Speaker, one of the most enjoyable duties that I have as a Congressman is to deliver the commencement addresses at several high schools in my district each year. It is a pleasure to see our young people ending their high school education and going either on to college or into the business world.

This year, I was invited to speak at the Pell City High School's commencement exercises. I was particularly impressed by the valedictory and salutatory addresses delivered by members of the graduating class. Because of the timeliness of these address and the views expressed by these young people, I would like to insert them in the RECORD at this point:

GET INVOLVED

When Nathan Hale said, "I regret that I have but one life to give for my country," he became involved. When George Washington consented to serve as President of a newborn nation, he became involved. When Franklin D. Roosevelt began to jerk the American economy out of a severe depression, he became involved. When Ralph Nader acted as self-appointed overseer of consumer interests, he became involved. When Richard Nixon decided to send United States troops into Cambodia to stamp out the kindling fires of Communist takeover there, he became involved. Can we, as United States citizens, do any less?

It is so easy to become uninvolved. It is possible to lie on one's living room couch, exclaim over the horrors of war as reflected on the newsreels, push a button on the automatic channel changer, and watch reruns of the "I Love Lucy" show. Or, one could listen to reports of highay fatalities on the radio, and then research for another station that is playing the latest "Three Dog Night" record. Or, perhaps upon scanning the front page on one's newspaper and reading of a violent demonstration, one quickly flips through to find the funnies. And, upon arriving at one's favorite swimming spot at a lake or stream and finding the stench of pollution unbearable, it is possible to merely begin swimming at a public pool. But, these and other problems confront people every day, and I contend that it is not right to assume a passive attitude toward them. In order for these or any other problems to be solved, someone must be interested in solving them. Someone must be involved.

To be involved does not necessarily mean to picket the city hall daily or to take part in a demonstration at the local university, but it does mean to be concerned with things which happen in one's own community and in the world also. We, who are almost high school graduates, have a responsibility to learn what we can about world, national, state, and local affairs because in approximately three years, we will have a voice in them. A citizen who does not bother to care about the problems surrounding him is not a very effective voice in choosing the right officials and in making the right decisions. An informed citizenry is the key to an effective government, and an informed citizenry is one which is concerned, knowledgeable, and, above all, involved.

I've mentioned the word "involved" many times, but perhaps some are asking the question "What is she talking about? How can I become involved in anything?" I submit to you that "involved" covers a wide range of meaning. For the past twelve years, all of us have been involved in the take of obtaining a high school education. But, after this night, the paths of our lives will divert in many different directions, and we will no longer be known as a senior class but as 138 separate individuals. Some of us are going to college or trade school; others are beginning to pave their own way in life by holding a job; still others have chosen to be married. But, no matter what path we choose, each of us has the responsibility of recognizing problems which are around us and doing our best to correct them. However, before deciding whether or not to be involved in a certain problem, it is imperative that one think about every aspect of that problem, weigh the pros and cons in one's mind, and act upon his decision only when he feels very deeply in his heart that his decision is right. After deciding to become involved, his actions *must* be constructive; the actions of the men fighting in southeastern Asia is constructive; lying down in the streets is not. Forking out a few extra tax dollars to fight the pollution of our environment is constructive; protest rallies are not.

In conclusion, I would like to say that each of us has a responsibility to ourselves, our community, and our country. This responsibility is to be aware of the problems around us, to be concerned enough to search for a solution to these problems, and to be involved enough to be willing to work toward the correction of these problems. In other words, Get Involved!

SALUTATORY ADDRESS BY CHARLES DENNIS ABBOTT

Faculty and friends, I wish to extend to each of you the warmest of welcomes and to express our appreciation for the support and assistance that you have given us for so many years. Through our years of public education you have guided us with patience mingled with hope. Now, as we await the final steps of graduation, there are no words capable of expressing our gratitude.

We are venturing into a new world—a frightening world—a world we have had no part in creating. But we possess one great advantage over any human being in our country. That advantage is being an American citizen. We will journey along life's path with the same basic rights granted to each and every individual. How we use these rights determines our destiny.

With each right, however, there is a responsibility; and it is this burden that weighs heavily upon our shoulders—responsibility which some of us have never known. The very word frightens us. After tonight, however, we must meet the challenge, we must grow up, we must face responsibilities, and we must make our own decisions.

We will make our own decisions and we will live with the results of our choices for the rest of our lives. But we, at least, have the right to make the decisions. We are American citizens living in a free society under a democratic government—a government which cannot exist without rights, responsibilities, and decisions. Human sense is still the lifeline of this great country even though we do live in an age of mechanized brains and computers. Indeed, this country is run on "the will of man."

And in the same sense our society thrives on "the will of man." Our country can only be as great as we want it to be. Our rights and responsibilities can be fulfilled only if we want to fulfill them. And, more importantly, our future lives can only be as good as we wish them to be. We, as Americans, possess the rights and abilities, and it is our duty to our country and to our personal lives to use them.

Through our basic training in high school we have learned to forgive, to share, and to possess. But most importantly, we have learned to become involved—involved in pep rallies, sports events, school elections, and many other extra-curricular activities. This involvement has helped us to realize the democratic way of life: this life of "better to give of yourself than receive." This admonition of being an American with rights and responsibilities, this thought of being a *part* of a country, a state, a city, and even a school. We are ready to meet the challenge, and I think we will succeed. And so it is tonight that I, as do the other Seniors, welcome you "on the first day of the rest of our lives." Thank you.

NATURAL GAS SHORTAGES

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 8, 1970

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the shortage in natural gas remains unsolved—it approaches crisis.

Unless we exert some leadership to encourage the FPC bureaucracy to act I fear we can expect a mounting wave of dissatisfaction from our people at home when services, homes, and a lot of jobs start being interrupted because of a lack of natural gas.

Nor will the people at home be satisfied to learn that we are awaiting international agreements to obtain even emergency supplies from foreign countries.

A most interesting and timely article by Mrs. Shirley Scheibla appeared in Barron's magazine for June 1, 1970, entitled "Simmering Crisis." I include her article, as follows:

SIMMERING CRISIS: THE FPC HAS PRODUCED NO SOLUTION TE THE SHORTAGE OF NATURAL GAS

(By Shirley Scheibla)

"When I talked with you three years ago, I said our pricing of natural gas was a big fat mess. Now it has become a big fat crisis." (Carl E. Bagge, FPC Commissioner.)

WASHINGTON.—Members of any regulatory body, notably the Federal Power Commission, tend to avoid being quoted by name regarding their views on matters pending before them. However, FPC Commissioner Carl E. Bagge feels that "someone has to stick his neck out to make the public aware of the impending very serious national shortage of natural gas due to the Commission's control of producer prices."

Mark Twain said: "Soap and education are not as sudden as a massacre, but they are more deadly in the long run."

I speak today on that deadly subject of education.

If you put yourself in the position of Mark Twain's audience, his words become not just funny but poignantly so. He was a mid-westerner, addressing mid-westerners at the end of the Nineteenth Century. Many of them had heard about the great Indian massacres from their parents. Such sudden death was still close enough to cause a shudder.

The old farmer reading Twain by his kerosene lamp on Saturday night had some instantaneous reactions to the words "soap" and "education": they were luxuries to him. He was still struggling to survive in the terrible harshness of the central plains. All day long he had sweated in the fields. If he had the time for a bath (and the water, and a tub to squeeze into) he would still have doubts about the soap—certainly storeboughtn soap. First, it was expensive, and second, it might smell nice. He feared that nice smell for himself and for his family. They might get used to such refinements and come to despise sweat which was the essence of their survival.

As to education: he was doubtful about that, too. He had had little schooling himself, because his parents had needed him on the farm, just as he probably still needed his own children to help in the desperate business of staying alive. He was skeptical about allowing their minds to be lathered up with perfumed ideas that seemed to have little to do with plowing and planting and harvesting.

But like all parents he also hungered for a richer life for his children, and he knew in his heart that education was the only door that led to it. That's why he could laugh at Mark Twain, and at himself. The statement was both true and ridiculous at the same time.

Since Mark Twain's time, American higher education has performed a miracle in providing a place for virtually every student who wishes to go to college and has the brains to get in, whether or not his family can pay the cost. It has also provided a place for a good many without the brains. The pressure on the educational system that brought this about has been enormous, and a lot of it arises from the peculiar and often artificial prestige attached to a college degree. In performing this miracle of numbers, the colleges have often lost sight of quality. The production line has always been more interesting to Americans than the quality of the product. Many colleges have tended to produce not educated men and women who think independently, understand their world broadly, and possess genuine mental muscle, but merely *trained* graduates who possess a specific, useful skill; or *knowledgeable* graduates, whose heads are stuffed like a mattress ticking with uncoordinated facts.

While engaged in this energetic enterprise, those who run such colleges have batted around the term "Excellence" like a balloon. Like most balloons it is pretty but empty, except for a little hot air. They seem to believe that a scholarly faculty, a fine campus, and students selected merely for their brains add up to excellence in the fields of education.

Far from excellence, I think this constitutes failure.

Part of the failure stems from a specific and glorious achievement of the American education system: the ability to sort out students according to their scholastic aptitude. Those of you who are educators know the extraordinary degree of accuracy of those tests, when combined with the student's record in high school. The intellectual capacity of an entering freshman may be measured to a nicety. In the whole murky fog of predicting human behavior, these tests provide a single brilliant light—in fact, not just brilliant, but blinding.

And college administrators have often been blinded by putting too much emphasis on scholastic aptitude while ignoring other essential qualities of students. The most important other quality is motivation—maddeningly difficult to measure, frustrating to encourage and impossible to change once its direction is set. Motivation lies at the core of an individual's personality, like the nuclear reactions that boil in the center of the sun. The outpouring of energy is visible on the surface, and the warmth and light of extraordinary accomplishments may be admired, but until psychology is a more mature science the sources may only be guessed at.

Further, the sources of motivation keep changing. At one time America was a hard land, and in the mid-west this was not so long ago. Some of you remember when these northern plains were not the rich and friendly area we now enjoy. The land and the environment were hostile, and the simplest needs of human life—food, shelter and a little warm clothing—had to be earned by bitter work. At an earlier time the sodbusters who opened up this land did so with a plow pulled by oxen or horses through soil that had never been turned since the world began. Month after month they swore and sweated and struggled and suffered to till, plant, harvest and start all over again. These men were face to face with the most terrible reality of all: either keep going or die. They changed the land, but the experience changed them. They were tough beyond comprehension.

Not long after the industrial revolution finally furnished these marvelous men with the tractors, combines and other tools they needed for an easier life, the Great Depression struck them down with hardship of another sort. The plains became economically hostile. Their motivation was tested once more in a terrible way; and if their motivation was lacking, disaster was their reward. As though this weren't enough, the tribulations of the Dust Bowl days were visited upon them, when the wind literally lifted the topsoil off their farms and carried it away into the black sky.

The Great Depression and the Dust Bowl are not forgotten. All of America has become a garden of affluence and educational opportunity. But with these blessings has come flabbiness in the moral fiber. The desperation and some of the challenge is gone. Everyone in this audience detects it, the students most clearly of all. They are suspicious about what has happened in recent years to this country. They do not respect the phony standards in America which value national pride above humanism, and property above lives.

This year students are disturbed about two big issues: Southeast Asia, and the pollution of our environment. They have authority of history to back them up. Rome declined and finally died in part for these two factors. Foreign military adventures bled the Empire economically and fractured it politically. And lead poisoning from the use of lead pipes in the water supply of Rome caused infertility among the most able Romans and their birthrate fell drastically.

We have overcome physical hardship and to a great degree economic hardship, but we haven't replaced these motivating forces with anything else.

I have no formulas to propose. I am as bewildered as the next person about what might be done, but I sense that motivation must now be aroused by focussing on the responses of individuals, rather than by focussing on broad social incentives.

Physical and economic hardships as broad social incentives were strong, but is we could, we would not wish to bring them back. The price is too high. To be sure economic motivation of a sort still exists: people still work for dollars, but the dollars most of them work for now are marginal dollars that will buy a second car or a color T.V. set. At one time they worked for the minimum food to stay alive and the coat that kept the cold out of their homes. Money and goods as incentives are no longer as important as they once were.

What else makes people stretch themselves? A hundred things, and in thousands of different combinations. Some men are driven by sheer red blood, the desire to use themselves against existing challenges. Hillary said he climbed Mount Everest simply because it was there.

A desire to improve the world—pure altruism—is not to be underrated as a human force. We are social animals, and whether we admit it or not, all of us care to a greater or lesser degree about the welfare of our fellow man. "Never send to know for whom the bell tolls: it tolls for thee." We all believe it, and some of you are driven by it.

A hunger for power cannot be ignored, and it is not necessarily destructive. Many of our finest politicians and our builders of business empires are driven by the taste for power. They live to control things, and they must earn their power by producing what society needs.

Pride and a sense of obligation to one's family or one's own expectations are deep incentives. The student who knows keenly the sacrifices made by his family for his education may well earn grades far beyond his normal achievements. The businessman whose pride would be shattered by failure is more apt to succeed.

Curiosity has been the principal motivating force in the lives of history's greatest scientists. Madame Curie could not anticipate the benefit her discoveries would have for mankind; she was simply and very purely fascinated by nature's mysteries.

The hunger for creative satisfaction drove Thomas Edison and most of the artists who have graced our planet. Picasso, when asked what he would do if imprisoned and denied all brushes and paints, said he would draw with the head of a burnt match or his own finger dipped in mud. Such men are intoxicated by the satisfactions of their own work.

There are dozens of other motivations that are still valid, most of them positive and relating to the temperament of the individual rather than negative and arising from broad social events like the Depression. Perhaps this is a measure of civilization: that men will be increasingly driven by positive impulses rather than by hunger and fear and deprivation.

Motivation varies enormously among children. None are born without it. Some seem to lose it at an early age—and even on occasion to regain it. Teachers know the happy phenomenon of the "late bloomer". He didn't develop a better mind, but something happened to his motivation.

Every teacher is aware of the motivational facts of life, and delights in the responsive student; but the colleges have too often filled his classroom with bright students with lead in their intellectual pants.

American private colleges face other problems besides trying to educate students some of whom are unmotivated, and those problems are practical, urgent and far from esoteric.

First, the private colleges face competition from the state universities that are huge and getting bigger in response to public demand. They perform a necessary public function, and they are encouraged by the high protein diet of feeding at the public trough. In the end they will have trouble maintaining their quality because they must concentrate so much on quantity. They will also have trouble with their independence, because the legislatures which feed them will wish to some extent to control them. What has happened to universities owned by the government in socialist countries could happen

here, and it is sad. In the long run, the very independence of private colleges may be their most important asset.

The second practical and very urgent problem is money, and it is heartbreaking. Just when the cost of running colleges has leaped beyond their means, the government has seen fit to discourage private philanthropy to a significant degree with the Tax Reform Act of 1969.

Private colleges, including Jamestown, are suffering and will continue to suffer for a while from this competition and this poverty. They have no choice but to tighten their belts, re-examine their functions and make sure that the education they sell is something society needs to buy.

Before Jamestown college can re-examine its function and set a new course, it must take stock of its assets. Some of them are not evident to the casual eye: its location, the character of its students, its alumni, its lack of graduate programs, its faculty, its history, and its managers.

It sits in the middle of a vast and rather empty plain from the static of cities and far from many of the groups who would try to push it around if it were within reach. It is geographically disengaged, and this enables it to do its work serenely and thoughtfully. One of the most corrosive contaminants of our atmosphere is noise — actual noise and cultural noise. Jamestown has been spared.

Your students are a balanced group, a little closer perhaps to the basic realities of this world than some students in more densely populated parts of the country who inevitably are more susceptible to fancy or faddish or extreme notions. Your students, following the leadership of the senior class this term, have demonstrated their belief that reason can be more effective than raw emotion, and constructive action than violence.

There are a hundred colleges that wish they had students such as you in their classrooms.

Your alumni are the preachers of Jamestown's gospel in the world at large, the financial supporters of its programs, the encouragement of its efforts and in a sense the justification of its existence. Perhaps no one listens to the alumni while the students get all the attention, but what is a student except an embryo alumnus? Graduation is just a big hatching process.

On occasion this college may have wished it had a range of graduate programs. They are conceived to be the academic big time. For small colleges they are largely disastrous. Their expense is uncontrollable and the competition they face for money, faculty and students is intense. Jamestown is administratively compact and academically efficient.

The faculty is tailored to the function. With all those poisonous jokes about North Dakota being passed around the educational world, no teacher comes here unless he has the sense of purpose to pursue his high calling with dedication.

One of the greatest strengths of this school has been its hard history. Like the women of Berlin after World War II, Jamestown might well adopt the motto "what doesn't kill me, strengthens me." The college has developed sinews out of its adversity. Those who run this college talk no nonsense, as a reflection of the fact that the college has never been in a position to afford nonsense.

One of those no-nonsense people is John L. Wilson, the chairman of your board, who has modestly devoted to this college more courage, generosity, educational wisdom and just plain horse sense than many of you may know about. One of his most significant acts of horse sense was to select, with the help of his fellow trustees, Roy Joe Stuckey as president. Jamestown College is in good hands.

Those are some of the assets. What can Jamestown make of them, without risking its solid achievements, or incurring expenses that will ultimately cripple it?

Here I speak with real diffidence. I am not a professional educator. I am a lawyer, and the law is said to sharpen a man's mind by narrowing it. What's more, as a guest on this campus I'm well advised to mind my manners and not try to tell my academic host what to serve for dinner.

My ideas are only suggestions. After you think about them, you may reject them—but in the process you may also develop ideas of your own.

For what it's worth I suggest that Jamestown College quietly but deliberately start to focus its main attention on the highly motivated student. Those with brains *and* the incentive to use them are certain to be the movers of this world. There is no reason why Jamestown should not be highly selective about whom it chooses to educate. It is already. I merely suggest it select its students increasingly for motivation.

How could this be accomplished, when there are no tests or other sure guides to measure that quality?

Awareness of the goal is the first step. Embracing the policy will carry the intention part of the distance.

Admissions would have to be held down as far as economically possible. This is a tricky financial problem and calls for careful judgment, but obviously under a supply and demand theory, the smaller the supply for a given demand the greater the chance to be selective.

In weighing applicants, the college must balance motivation against scholastic aptitude. Most colleges settle for the better brains (which are measurable) rather than take a chance on the average student who conceals a jet engine in his tail feathers. That jet engine may carry his average ability to extraordinary heights. Academically he's a good bargain.

Further, your faculty and admissions officers may be able to devise admissions procedures to test a student's hunger for a college education. Such tests might well be rather artificial—just as the procedures for screening lawyers for the bar in some states are almost ridiculously artificial. If the machinery seems eccentric, never mind, so long as it separates the nuggets from the mud.

If this highly motivated bird can be caught, how then do you care for him and feed him during the four years he stays in the academic cage?

In general, he must learn tight intellectual discipline in an atmosphere that will maintain his morale at the highest level.

You must expose him to a faculty selected more for its teaching ability than for its scholarly qualifications. I deeply respect scholars, but they pursue a different course than those whose first love is to deal with students. Our colleges have often failed to distinguish the two functions clearly, and the ambiguity has led to unhappiness.

A teacher who can inspire—or drive—students of high native motivation will inevitably stretch their minds. One helpful academic device is to require a good deal of individual work, particularly work involving careful writing. Nothing is so demanding of a student, nothing is so sure to stretch him, nothing is so sure to expose to his eye weaknesses of his own thought than having to write lucidly. The pain of learning may be great, but no skill is more to be cherished by an educated man.

Sensitive individual counselling of students would be an essential part of such a program, to help to uncover the mainsprings of the student's incentive and act on them with the carrot and with the stick. Jamestown, with imagination, has already undertaken a strong counselling program. To be effective, such a program must not be content to hold the student's hand but must require him to use his own intellectual muscles, to exert himself till he is sore with the effort.

Further, much could be accomplished merely by reminding students and faculty at every turn of their function: not merely to learn and teach, but to expand the capacities of the student's mind. During World War II, a marine recruiting poster demanded of everyone who read it: "Are you man enough to be a marine?" This college might well challenge each student in the same way: "Are you man enough to be an educated person?"

This little sketch doesn't begin to complete the picture. Every member of the faculty, every administrator and every trustee could add a dozen different elements. And certainly the students, if anyone bothers to ask them, can seed more ideas on this subject than the rest of you can harvest. Their own future is at stake, and they also happen to be the only ones who know for sure what turns them on.

What I propose calls for no major revisions of the curriculum, no major changes in faculty except a change of emphasis, no need for new plant, new administrators, or new expenses of any significant amount that would not normally be incurred. Such a policy contains little drama or glamor, but it would be founded on the great assets this college already possesses, and the great need of our country.

In effect I suggest a program of academic stress combined with high morale that would demand from strongly motivated students an enlargement of their abilities and a stiffening of their intellects. I suggest an academic program to accomplish for the minds and hearts of students what the unplowed sod of these plains did for their great-grandfathers: it called forth the best they were capable of giving, because it was so difficult.

That old farmer is a man to contemplate. He drove his plowshare through the stubborn soil while the rain tried to wash him away and while the sun tried to broil him. He must have loved nature because he was so directly dependent on her, and he must also have hated her for the droughts that killed his grain, the grasshoppers that ate it, the hail, the blizzards and all the other miseries that she gratuitously gave him. After a time even his own feelings, all that love and all that hate, must have been submerged beneath the overwhelming will to be strong enough and smart enough and enduring enough to conquer his environment.

In the end that old sodbuster became larger than life-size, and he *did* conquer his environment. As a man, he had stretched himself in a way that few of us can fully comprehend. He had made himself bigger, and he accomplished more than can reasonably be expected of a man.

He's dead now, but we need people just like him worse than ever.

Perhaps this college can devise a way to reinvent him for the good of the country.

THE VIETCONG TERROR AGAINST THE FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, critics of the South Vietnamese Government are prone to seize on every aberration from utopian democracy as a proof that this Government is dictatorial and unworthy of support. More than one of them has argued that there is really nothing to choose between the dictatorship in the south and the dictatorship in the north.

I am not among those who are prepared to give blanket endorsement to every single action of the South Vietnamese Government. I believe that that

Government has been guilty of certain mistakes and certain excesses. In particular, I deplore the recent imprisonment of Tran Ngoc Chau, an official who has been given the highest rating by all Americans who have worked with him. But if the critics want to be fair, they must also be prepared to give credit where credit is due.

Under the present Government, a constituent assembly was elected, in elections that were given high marks for fairness by virtually all observers and correspondents; a democratic constitution was hammered out after months of vigorous debate; free elections were held for the National Assembly and for the Senate and for the provincial assemblies; village self-government, which was suspended by President Diem, was restored, and over the past 3 years some 2,100 villages have elected their own governing councils, in harmony with the centuries-old Vietnamese pattern of village democracy. An ambitious land reform program has been introduced, under which the land will be turned over to those who till it, very much along the lines of the enormously effective land reform program in Taiwan.

For all of these things the Thieu government must be given credit—and all the more credit because this progress has been achieved in the midst of a bloody and bitterly fought conflict.

Apart from ignoring the truly remarkable progress that has been achieved in many fields, I have the impression that some of the critics who equate the Saigon government with the Hanoi regime simply do not know the meaning of totalitarian dictatorship.

How false their equation is should be apparent to anyone who is willing to take the time to look at a few basic facts.

Hanoi has one political party, the Communist Party. Saigon has several score political parties, competing with each other frantically for cuts of the political pie at various levels.

Hanoi has one newspaper, which faithfully reflects the Communist Party line and only the Communist Party line. Saigon has 25 Vietnamese newspapers, 10 Chinese newspapers, two English and one French. And while there is censorship, there is also much vigorous criticism of the Government in the Saigon press.

But perhaps the most impressive evidence that there is far more democracy in South Vietnam than there is dictatorship is provided by the existence of a free trade union movement.

In the North, of course, there is no free trade union movement. As in every other Communist country, there are government controlled unions, in which membership is compulsory and whose officials are selected by the Communist Party. Strikes of any kind are not tolerated by these unions, because in Communist countries unions are instruments for government control over the workers, rather than instruments through which the workers may seek to improve their lot.

In South Vietnam, in contradistinction, there is a free trade union movement—the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor, or CVT—500,000 strong. The officials of the affiliated unions and of the confederation are elected by the workers themselves. The unions engage in strikes and fight militantly on many fronts to improve the lot of their members.

The tenant farmers' union, for example, played an extremely active role in lobbying for the land reform legislation approved earlier this year by the National Assembly. And recently, the CVT announced that it planned to organize a farmer-labor party of its own, on a program approximating the political programs of the European social democratic parties, and compete in its own name in the political arena.

The CVT is headed by Mr. Tran Quoc Buu, a veteran of more than 20 years' trade union activity, whose courage and independence is respected even by his enemies and who served a term in prison under President Diem. A measure of the esteem in which Buu is held, not merely in Vietnam but throughout the western Pacific, is the fact that he has for some time now served as president of the major regional trade union organization, the Brotherhood of Asian Trade Unions—BATU.

Sometimes the CVT has had to operate against government opposition. But on other occasions it has received welcome support from the Thieu-Ky government. In 1968, for example, the provincial police sought to suppress the textile workers strike in Gia Dinh by arresting the woman organizer and ordering a blockade of food supplies to starve out sympathy strikers. At that point, Nguyen Cao Ky, who was then prime minister, intervened to release the union organizer and end the blockade and suspend the overzealous police chief.

Despite their many political differences with the Government, the leaders of the CVT unions have been bitterly and militantly anti-Vietcong because they know only too well what has happened to the free trade union movement and to free trade union leaders under the Communist regime in the north. Because of this, the free trade union officials of South Vietnam have been favorite targets of the Vietcong terrorists.

Mr. President, for the purpose of illustrating the kind of terror that can be expected if the Vietcong takes over, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks a tabulation I have received from the CVT, listing over 60 officials of their union movement who have been assassinated by the Communists over the past 10 years.

I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the statement issued by the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor on February 7, 1968, condemning the Communists for the treacherous attacks they made on so many Vietnamese cities in their so-called Tet offensive.

Finally, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement adopted by the AFL–CIO executive council in March of 1969, reiterating its support for the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LIST OF CVT CADRES WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

Name	Age	Union local	Union position	Profession	How, where, when assassinated by VC
Giao Can	54	Farmers local Dien Ban district	Local representative	Farmer	Assassinated while carrying on union activities on Mar. 15, 1965.
Doan Kiem	35	Farmers province union of Quang Nam	District secretary	do	Assassinated while carrying on union activities on Mar. 15, 1968.
Nguyen Luong	55	Farmers local of Quang Nam province	Provincial representative	do	Assassinated while carrying on union activities on Apr. 20, 1968.
Nguyen Buong	54	Hang Gon local	Treasurer	do	Assassinated while carrying on union activities in 1968.
Tran Minh Chanh	45	Plantation workers' local Thanh An district	Local representative	Worker	Assassinated while carrying on union activities on Apr. 9, 1964, at Than An.
Nguyen Van Do	53	Plantation workers Phu-My Hung local	Treasurer		Kidnaped in July 1961 and presumed killed.
Nguyen Van Nua	52	do	Local representative		Assassinated by VC on Dec. 23, 1960 at Phu My Hung.
Bao Van Thanh	40	Lambretta drivers Union, Binh Duong province	President	Driver	Assassinated by VC on Dec. 23, 1960 at Binh Duong.
Nguyen Van Hai	58	Trade Unions Council Vinh Long province	Secretary General	Worker	Kidnaped and presumed killed by VC.
Nguyen Ngoc Anh	56	Farmers union	Treasurer	Farmer	Assassinated by VC in 1962.
Nguyen Van Nghia	60	do	Vice President	do	Assassinated by VC in 1965.
Le Cong Tap	56	do	Secretary of My Loc local	do	Assassinated by VC in 1960.
Phan Van Kieu	38	do	Local Representative of Phuoc Hau village.	do	Assassinated by VC in 1964.
Le Hoang Vinh	60	do	Local propagandist-organizer	do	Assassinated by VC in 1964.
Nguyen Van Cho	48	Farmers Union of Binh Thuan province	President	do	Killed by VC at VC Offensive of Mau-Than New Year holidays (1968).
Le Van Huong	43	Farmers Local of Bac Lieu province	Representative	do	Assassinated by VC in 1965
Tran Van Hoai		Farmers local of Phong Thanh village, Baclieu province.	Local secretary	do	Assassinated by VC in 1962.
Tran Van Doi	55	Farmers local	Treasurer	Farmer	Died from torture in 1959.
Pham Trung Giao	63	do	Committee member	do	Assassinated by VC at Thanh My in 1969.
Le Van Mieng	45	do	Vice president	do	Died from torture in 1965.
Kim Choc	63	do	Committee member	do	Assassinated by VC at Da Loc village, Vinh Binh province, on Aug. 22, 1969.

LIST OF CVT CADRES WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT—Continued

Name	Age	Union local	Union position	Profession	How, where, when assassinated by VC
Nguyen Toan	42	Farmers local of Quang Ngai province	Secretary of Tu Nguyen local	Farmer	Assassinated by VC at Tu-Nguyen in 1964.
Nguyen Sau	39	do	Secretary of Tu-Luong local	do	Assassinated by VC at Tu Luong in 1963.
Le Tan Tham	41	do	Vice president of Tu-Luong local	do	Assassinated by VC in 1966 at Tu Luong.
Nguyen Huu Nghia	40	do	Secretary of Nghia Loc local	do	Assassinated by VC in 1967 at Nghia Loc.
Tran Cao Nghiep	45	Farmers union of Quang Ngai province	President of Nghia Loc local	do	Assassinated by VC when carrying on union activities at Nghia Loc in 1967.
Ton Ngoc Trang	45	Horse-vehicles workers union of Quang Ngai	Member	Driver	Assassinated by VC in 1963.
Le Van Hong	30	Lambretta drivers union of Quang Ngai	Local vice president	do	Assassinated by VC when carrying out union activities on July 14, 1969.
Huynh Van Trang	35	do	Secretary	do	Do.
Phan Them	37	MIC tobacco workers union	Treasurer	Superintendent	Assassinated by VC on Dec. 6, 1968.
Le Van Huong		Farmers local of Ba Xuyen province	Local representative	Farmer	Assassinated by VC in 1955.
Nguyen Van Nhiem	60	Farmers union of Dinh Tuong province	President	do	Assassinated by VC when carrying out union activities on Oct. 1, 1969, at Tan Hoa Thanh, Dinh Tuong province.
Nguyen Du	56	Fischerman's union of Quang Tin province	Vice president	Fischerman	Kidnaped by VC and assassinated by VC in 1961.
Le Khanh	40	Fischermen's local of Ky-Anh	Local president	do	Assassinated by VC at his home in 1965.
Dang Duc Tan	40	Farmers local of Ky-Ly	Local vice president	Farmer	Kidnaped and assassinated by VC in 1961.
Dinh Thanh	46	Farmers local of Ky-Nghia	Local president	do	Assassinated by VC at his home in 1964.
Nguyen Luan	45	Farmers local of Ky-Phu	Local secretary	do	Assassinated by VC at his home in 1963.
Ho Van Anh	53	Farmers local of Ky-Nghia	do	do	Killed by warfare in 1965.
Dang Dat	50	Farmers local of Binh Quy	Local vice president	do	Killed by warfare in 1967.
Tran Quang Phuc	43	Farmers local of Ky Sanh	do	do	Killed by warfare in 1966.
Nguyen Doi	60	Farmers local of Ky-Nghia	Local treasurer	do	Assassinated by VC in 1961.
Luong Van Quang	47	Farmers local of Ky-Sanh	Local committee member	do	Assassinated by VC in 1963.
Vo-Thong	50	Farmers local of Binh-Quy	do	do	Assassinated by VC at his home in 1966.
Vu-Van-Nhang	57	Lambretta drivers Union of Saigon-Giadinh	Social committee driver member	Driver	Assassinated by VC in 1962.
Le Van Ven		Plantation workers Union of Tay Ninh	President	Foreman	Assassinated by VC at Cau-Khoi on July 8, 1965.
Dao Ngoc Tam	55	Plantation workers' Courtenay local	Financial officer	Sapper	Abducted on Oct. 13, 1962, and presumed dead.
Lai Bao Ngoc	34	Plantation workers union of Long Khanh	Secretary	do	Kidnaped on Dec. 2, 1965, and presumed dead.
Dang Van Tich	37	do	President	Technician	Kidnaped on Dec. 6, 1962, and presumed dead.
Nguyen Van Huan	39	Plantation Hang Gon local	Representative	Sapper	Kidnaped at Long Khanh in July 1962.
Nguyen Dang	50	do	Committee member	do	Do.
Nguyen Bieu	54	do	Member	do	Do.
Vu Qaan Quy	35	do	Secretary	do	Kidnaped at Long Khanh in May 1963.
Nguyen Van Truy	55	Planatation workers' Courtenay local	Member	do	Kidnaped at Long Khanh in October 1962.
Le Van Lang	45	Plantation workers' union "Tran Van Phong"	Representative	Carpenter	Kidnaped at Long Khanh on Nov. 6, 1963.
Tran Van Thai	43	Plantation workers local "Tran Van Phong"	Financial officer	Tapper	Kidnapped by VC at Long Khanh and presumed dead on Nov. 6, 1963.
Phan Van Tot	32	do	Committee member	do	Do.
Le Van Moc	57	do	Controller	Superintendent	Do.
Le Van Nuoc	29	do	Committee member	Tapper	Do.
Le Thai Tuy	40	do	Member	Foreman	Do.
Huynh Thi Hieu		Trade Unions Council of Binh Duong	Secretary general	Nurse	Kidnapped by VC at Binh Duong in 1956 and presumed dead.
Phan Thanh Giau	40	Goldsmiths' Union of Vinh Long	President	Goldsmith	Kidnaped by VC and presumed dead.
Bach Le	47	Farmers Union of Quang Ngai	Secretary general	Farmer	Presumed dead after 8 years jail.
Tran Chanh Hoi	42	Fischermen's Union of Quang Tin	President	Fisherman	Kidnaped by VC and presumed dead.
Le Thang	34	Fischermen's local of Ky-Xuan	Local president	do	Do.
Tran Van Co	42	Fishermen's local of Binh Dao	do	Fisherman	Kidnaped by VC and presumed dead.
Bui Thuoc	57	Farmers' local of Ky Sanh	Committee member	Farmer	Do.
Do Phien	57	Farmers' local of Ky Anh	do	do	Do.
Le Tai Nguyen	70	do	do		
Le Tai Nguyen	70	Farmers' union of An Trach, Gia Rai district	Farmers' union cadre in village		
Le Trung Quoi	42	Farmers' Federation	Federation's cadre in charge of management of a village of implantation of refugees (An-Luong).		Kidnaped by VC on Dec. 25, 1964, and presumed killed.
Nguyen Van Chi		Federation Plantation workers of Phuoc Tuy	Secretary of Binh-Ba local	Worker	Kidnaped at Phuoc Tuy in 1957, and presumed killed.
Pham Cong Dao		Federation Plantation workers of Phuoc Long	President of union	Superintendent	Kidnaped by VC at Bu Dop on July 19, 1966.
Nguyen Nang Tiep		Plantation workers' union of Phuoc Long	Treasurer of Thuan-Loi's local	Teacher	Kidnaped by VC at Thuan Loi in June 1965 and presumed killed.
Huynh Van Tu		Plantation workers' Federation in Phuoc Tuy	Cadre	Worker	Kidnaped by VC on July 24, 1961, at Phuoc Tuy.

FREE VIETNAM LABOR DENOUNCES VIETCONG ATTACKS

President Tran Quoc Buu of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT) on February 7 sent the following cable to the AFL–CIO:

"We at the CVT are safe and sound. We appeal urgently to free world union organizations to aid the workers and other Vietnamese who were savagely attacked by the Communists during the truce of Tet, the traditional sacred feast of Vietnam."

President Tran Quoc Buu and General Secretary Tran Huu Quyen of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT) issued the following statement on February 2:

"Concidering that the armed forces of the Vietncong have invaded the capital area of Saigon, Cholon, Gia-Dinh and in chief towns during the new lunar year's truce; considering that the people's quarters generally and the working class quarters especially were treacherously used by the Vietcong for concealment and as a battleground to combat the army of the Republic of Vietnam; considering that the workers and their families have become as a matter of fact the miserable victims of street fighting inside the cities; considering that the permanent position of CVT is anti-war and for realization of peace by constructive social action, based on brotherhood, in order to protect the sacred freedom of man within the framework of social communities;

"The Bureau of CVT, in its extraordinary meeting on February 2, 1968 in Saigon issued the following communique:

" 'We condemn the criminal actions of the Communists causing war in the days of truce.

" 'We earnestly appeal to all brothers and sisters, cadres and members over the country to be calm and to tighten their ranks in these troubled and perilous days. We earnestly request the government to apply suitable measures to protect the lives and property of the people and to restore quickly the general security and the public order.' "

AFL–CIO BACKS CVT

(Statement by the AFL–CIO Executive Council)

The Executive Council notes the visit of President Buu of the CVT. After hearing his report about the activities of the Confederation of Vietnamese Workers and his being encouraged by the cooperative attitude manifested by the head of state, President Nguyen Van Thieu, we reaffirm our policy of cooperating with the CVT for the advancement of free trade unionism, democracy, social justice and a just and enduring peace.

In this connection, we note with satisfaction the recently announced readiness of AID to contribute substantially towards a $100 million undertaking for helping the government of South Vietnam speed a massive program of land reform and redistribution.

We emphasize that the success of this program and its being safeguarded against the sabotage by Communist infiltrators and undermining by corrupt forces can be best assured through organizations like the CVT participating actively in its execution so as to assure that the full benefits of the agrarian reform be enjoyed by the tillers of the soil.

BIASED NEWS MEDIA

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, a story published in Variety for May 27 is of interest to some of us who think that the news media could do a little more objective job in some cases.

The story, interestingly enough, is not exactly free of bias, either, but even so the reporter could not get around the fact that officials of the affiliated television stations of the National Broadcasting Co. think its network news coverage of the war is biased.

The reporter gratuitously blames this attitude by the officials on a lack of pro-

Malnutrition in the U.S. is not confined to low-income groups, but extends to the affluent as well.

Private industry should take immediate steps to provide foods with a higher nutritional content for consumers.

Food companies should begin by improving the nutritional qualities of those foods which people enjoy and are accustomed to eating.

Changing eating patterns of the American public should also be recognized. Snacks and sweet goods are forming a large part of the cereal portion of the diet of many consumers, particularly young people and the poor.

KROGER IN ENRICHMENT SINCE 1941

Kroger has produced enriched white bread and rolls since 1941 when current standards of enrichment were formulated, Mr. Reusser stated. At that time, white bread was chosen as the vehicle for enrichment because it is a basic food and was considered probably the most universally consumed food throughout the country.

The use of enriched flour and bread has been credited with virtual elimination of such deficiency diseases as pellegra, which was prevalent in the United States as late as the 1930's.

RECIPE AND MENU PROGRAM PLAN

The recipe and menu program, which will be made available throughout Kroger's 28-state area, has been planned to emphasize meals that are well-balanced and nutritional and make them more attractive to homemakers.

Menus and recipes were planned around the Department of Agriculture "Smart Shopper" releases (based on plentiful foods) and the "Low Cost Cookery" series developed by Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. (using U.S.D.A. recommendations).

TENTH LARGEST BAKER IN U.S.

Kroger, which produces in excess of 300,000,000 lbs. of baked goods a year, ranks itself as the 10th largest baker in the United States. The company has operated bakeries since before the turn of the century. B. H. Kroger, who founded the company in Cincinnati in 1883, is recognized as the first grocer to operate his own bakeries.

ECONOMIC DISPOSAL OF JUNKED AUTOMOBILES

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, at a time when there appears to be an overabundance of rhetoric in response to a national concern over environmental problems, it is refreshing and encouraging to find real progress in this area. As most of us are aware, technological solutions to many environmental problems exist, but cannot be placed into practice because of the associated economic impact. Engineers in the Bureau of Mines have apparently contributed substantially toward one of the Nation's major environmental problems, the economic disposal of junked automobiles.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Mineral Information, Service, May 1, 1970]

NEW INCINERATOR PROVIDES SMOKELESS BURNING OF JUNKED CARS

A low-cost way to avoid the air pollution caused by open-air burning of junked automobiles has been developed through research now being pushed to completion by the U.S. Bureau of Mines.

Bureau engineers have developed a relatively inexpensive smokeless incinerator that can efficiently process all the junked cars from a metropolitan area with a population of 300,000. Preliminary tests of the incinerator have been successfully completed. Further testing is underway to get more precise information on performance and operating costs.

Principal attraction of the new incinerator is its construction cost, quoted by the Bureau a about $22,000. This is roughly one-tenth the cost of smokeless models now commercially available and should stimulate interest among scrap processors whose open-air burning practices are being increasingly restricted by new regulations aimed at curbing air pollution.

Burning is considered the cheapest way to rid junk cars of combustible material. The cost of using hand labor to remove upholstery, plastic parts and similar substances could make the recovery of metals uneconomic.

Because smokeless incineration has been so expensive, the burning has usually been done in the open where it generates dense clouds of black smoke. With growing public concern over air pollution, many cities already have outlawed open burning and many others are moving to do so. As a result, some auto scrapping operations may be forced to close down, and car hulks will be either used in ways that leave their metals unreclaimed or will be left to rust in vacant lots or on city streets.

The Bureau's smokeless incinerator was developed at its Metallurgy Research Center in Salt Lake City, Utah, as part of a varied program to facilitate recovery of millions of tons of valuable metals now discarded annually as waste. Other facets of the program are aimed at recovery of minerals from municipal incinerator residues, more effective use of fly ash accumulated at power plants burning pulverized coal, and conversion of garbage and other city refuse into an energy source.

Capable of processing 50 junked cars every eight hours, the new incinerator is simple in operation. Burning two cars at a time, the incinerator heats combustion gases to temperatures of more than 1,850° F in an afterburner chamber. At such temperatures, the carbon particles which normally constitute smoke are oxidized and are drawn upwards to the atmosphere with other combustion gases through a 54-foot stack.

Once incinerated, the junked auto can be dismantled in the usual manner for its metal values and the scrap sorted, baled, or bundled for sale and re-use.

REGIONAL POLLS SHOW SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT'S VIETNAM POLICIES

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, independently taken, regional polls continue to show strong support by the people for President Nixon's policies in Southeast Asia.

The Wichita Eagle, in my State of Kansas, reports a poll taken by my colleague, Representative GARNER E. SHRIVER, which shows that about 75 percent of the people in his district, the Fourth Congressional District, support the President.

Another poll, taken for the Indianapolis News by a professional polling organization, showed that 64 percent of all Indianians approve of the way the President is handling his job, and 53 percent approve of his move into Cambodia.

Mr. President, I believe the continued solid support of the President and his leadership by Americans all across the Nation deserve the careful consideration of the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that these two articles be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Indianapolis (Ind.) News, May 26, 1970]

NEWS' POLL SHOWS STATE FOR NIXON

An independent poll conducted for The News by a professional polling organization shows a majority of Indiana's citizen's support President Nixon and his controversial decision to send American troops into Cambodia.

The poll was conducted May 15–17 in 36 Indiana cities. Experts questioned 500 people at 74 sites in the Hoosier cities.

The President received 64 per cent endorsement of the way he has handled the presidency, the poll showed. The breakdown by political parties showed:

[In percent]

	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Approve	43	89	60
Disapprove	42	2	28
Don't know	15	9	12

The over-all percentage of those who disapproved of the way President Nixon is handling his office was 24 per cent, with 12 per cent saying they had no opinion.

Sixty-eight per cent of the Republicans, 40 per cent of the Democrats and 50 per cent of the Independents said they agree with the President's decision to send U.S. troops to fight in Cambodia.

The breakdown, again by party affiliations, showed:

[In percent]

	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Yes	40	68	50
No	50	18	39
Undecided	10	14	11

The over-all figures showed 53 per cent of those polled endorsed the President's action; 35 per cent opposed it, and 12 per cent were undecided.

[From the Wichita (Kans.) Eagle, May 30, 1970]

POLL BY SHRIVER SHOWS KANSANS SUPPORT NIXON

WASHINGTON.—Solid support for President Richard Nixon's southeast Asia policies is revealed in early returns of his opinion poll, Rep. Garner E. Shriver, R-Kan., said Friday.

Shriver released a sample tabulation representing 10 per cent of the first ballots received from his constituents in the Kansas 4th congressional district.

His office mailed out about 110,000 ballots.

Shriver's sample tabulation showed 75 per cent support for the President's decision to conduct a military operation in Cambodia, 19 per cent opposition and 6 per cent "no opinion".

68 per cent said America should follow the Nixon policy of gradually phasing out U.S. troops and replacing them with South Vietnamese; 20 per cent indicated they favor immediate withdrawal from Vietnam.

The returns also showed that in the fight against inflation, 62 per cent favored wage and price controls, with 32 per cent opposed and 6 per cent with no opinion.

On other issues, 62 per cent were against lowering the voting age, 37 per cent favored it and 1 per cent were undecided.

51 per cent favored higher taxes to pay for an all-out anti-pollution fight; 42 per cent were opposed and 7 per cent undecided; 54 per cent wanted an all-volunteer army, 38 per cent were opposed and 8 per cent undecided.

Shriver emphasized that tabulations are continuing and results will be announced after final tabulations.

REPORT OF STEERING COMMITTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A VOTE ON THE WAR

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, on behalf of Members on both sides of the aisle in both Houses of Congress, I am pleased to present to the Senate the report of the steering committee of the Congressional Committee for a Vote on the War.

The report is a significant document because it is a serious effort by Senators and Representatives to explain to the American public what must be done to end the war in Indochina.

The Congressional Committee for a Vote on the War was formed in early May as a bipartisan endeavor to seek alternatives to a policy that has promised peace but has bought only a widened war and more American lives lost.

However, the amendment to end the war is more than another policy alternative. It is a fundamental effort to end American military involvement in Southeast Asia through a reassertion of Congress constitutional power to declare war and fund armies. We are asking the President to share with Congress the burdens and responsibilities of ending the war, ordering a safe and systematic withdrawal of American forces, and making the peace.

The report of the steering committee endeavors to explain the purpose of the amendment and the effects it will have in America and abroad as it comes nearly two decades after we became involved in the extremely complex political situation in Indochina.

The report makes it very clear that the amendment to end the war should not be regarded as a symbolic effort to change the course of events in Southeast Asia. The millions of people who have written Members of Congress in its support do not consider it as a mere symbol or pious hope for peace. Neither do the amendment's 24 cosponsors in the Senate who are determined to see that the representatives of the American people have the chance to vote "yea" or "nay" on whether more American lives should be lost in Indochina pursuing a military solution to a political problem.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the report of the steering committee of the congressional committee for a vote on the war be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE AMENDMENT TO END THE WAR

(Report of the Steering Committee of the Congressional Committee for a Vote on the War)

INTRODUCTION

The Committee for a Vote on the War was created early in May by a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives who share a deep feeling of the need to find a new method of affecting national policy in Southeast Asia. They are among members of Congress, in numbers growing apace with the multiplication of public dissatisfaction over the Vietnam war, whose attempts to persuade the Presidency to a different course have been constantly frustrated, and who perceive a Congressional duty to participate more fully in decisions on war and peace.

There seems to be little doubt that if the President or the Congress were blessed with a new opportunity to decide whether American lives and treasure should be invested in Vietnam, with the benefit of the knowledge gained over seven years of expanding conflict but without the burden of having to justify its costs, the declaration would be firmly against. While the United States may have preference as to the political character of Vietnam's rulers it has no paramount interest even nearly equating the heavy toll demanded by an effort to establish and preserve palatable leadership in Saigon. Moreover, decisionmakers with an ability to perceive the future would have probably been convinced that the mission could not be accomplished anyway without taking risks far more profound than any possible advantage.

Yet we continue in a war we do not want, cannot win, but will not end. An accumulation of seven years of dissent, a collection of costs so obvious that accounting is superfluous, the election of two presidents pledged to peace over opposition identified with war, all have failed to work a decisive change in basic national policy.

Meanwhile the passage of time erodes the new President's ability to escape the mistakes of his predecessors. Each sacrifice under his command makes him feel a greaetr share of the total responsibility for the ultimate outcome of a war he did not start, wedding him tighter to an approach whose lack of promise fairly glows in the eyes of more detached observers. Critical anslysis only prompts more expansive descriptions of America's stake in the war and more excited portrayals of the consequences of failure.

Against this background the Committee rejected more speeches and resolutions as clearly ineffectual. Little hope was seen in any gesture, no matter how dramatic, which would be aimed at the same objective which had eluded all past efforts—to convince the White House in favor of a sharp change in policy.

Rather it turned to an option always available but never employed. Instead of offering more advice to the President on how he should exercise the authority granted to him by the Constitution, the Committee determined to focus on the powers held by its members themselves in concert with their colleagues in the Congress.

The Committee's vehicle for reasserting Congressional authority over the Vietnam conflict is the "Amendment to End the War." The Committee's premise is that Congress can do directly what its indirect efforts have failed to accomplish, through its undisputed control over the resources without which the war cannot be prosecuted.

The amendment offers to each member of Congress an effective, temperate and responsible alternative to the President's policy.

To the White House it is an offer to share the burden of decisions over which the Constitution assigns at least equal responsibility to the Congress, and to assume a proper share of any blame or any credit ensuing from a plan to bring American involvement to an orderly end.

Before Americans of all ages and all stations who are distressed by the war it places a vehicle for peaceful, lawful political action. It says that the "system" can work.

The Senators and Representatives who formed the Committee for a Vote on the War and who have since swelled its ranks have no regard for the amendment as a symbolic act. They mean to see it approved, and they have committed their full energies and resources to that end.

THE AMENDMENT TO END THE WAR

The Amendment to End the War would require adherence to an orderly plan for U.S. disengagement from Cambodia, Laos and Indochina. Its authors are convinced that only such a committed procedure for ending military involvement can succeed in extricating the United States from protracted Indochinese conflict.

Specifically, the Amendment provides that none of the monies authorized by the bill to which it is offered, or by another law, shall be spent for any military operation or assistance in Cambodia from 30 days after enactment; for military operations in Laos after December 31, 1970; or in Vietnam— for purposes other than the process of withdrawal and other carefully defined activities—after the same date.

It would permit all necessary expenditures after December 31, 1970, for the "safe and systematic" withdrawal of U.S. armed forces, for terminating U.S. military operations in Vietnam, for prisoner exchanges, and for arranging asylum for South Vietnamese who might be physically endangered as a consequence of the withdrawal. Further funds would remain available on a continuing basis for any military and civilian assistance to South Vietnam, in the amounts authorized by the Congress and approved by the President.

Finally, the Amendment provides that U.S. armed forces would be totally withdrawn from Vietnam no later than June 30, 1971, unless Congress—by joint resolution—were to approve a determination by the President that additional time is required and authorized an extension.

Similar plans to achieve a vote on a binding Indochina withdrawal program are underway in the House of Representatives. Since procedures in that body are more complex, initial activities center upon achieving broad cosponsorship of a House resolution in support of the same basic objectives as the Amendment to End the War.

SAFEGUARD NATIONAL INTERESTS AND HUMAN LIVES

Any major initiative affecting American posture in Indochina must be carefully and critically examined.

The American people are united in wanting the war to end. They are also united in wanting to know how any adjustment in policy, regardless of its source, will weigh on such overriding concerns as the safety of American forces now in Vietnam, the prospects for return of prisoners of war, the security of Vietnamese citizens, the negotiations in Paris, and the future position of the United States in world affairs.

The Amendment to End the War obviously deserves such scrutiny. There is, of course, little dispute over the premise that it would end the involvement of American combat personnel and reduce the costs of conflict more quickly than the program likely to be pursued in its absence. It sets forth a definite, unambiguous process for returning United States forces, and will thus fulfill most effectively that primary objective upon which all can agree.

But what of other major interests?

Protection of American lives

If the protection of American troops is a primary concern it can best be accomplished by bringing them home—so long as that step does not dismantle more pressing national interest. The Amendment will save lives that would otherwise be lost.

If the return of U.S. forces is wise policy, as the Amendment contends, then their safety during disengagement and withdrawal is the focal point of concern, and for this the Amendment makes thoroughgoing provision.

There is no question of taking ammunition from combat troops while they are facing or engaged in combat with the enemy. The Amendment lays down a withdrawal plan with very wide latitude for such tactical options as are necessary to protect U.S. life and limb.

Offensive combat activities are to be brought to an end in six months and withdrawal is to be completed in twelve, allowing ample time for safe and deliberate redeployment. If the time is insufficient Congress can extend the deadline by joint resolution.

Throughout this period appropriated funds may be spent in whatever ways are deemed necessary by the Commander in Chief to insure that maximum safety is achieved. This would include all forms of defense against attack. The most prudent course might be to withdraw combat troops last, but in any case the entire range of protective options would be available to commanders. These are prerogatives with which the Amendment does not, and with which the Congress certainly should not, interfere.

Just as relevant is the likely reaction of enemy forces, the source of whatever dangers exist. It is, of course, impossible to predict how the North Vietnamese and Vietcong will respond to the short run. But it is difficult indeed to calculate a motive for them to attack troops which are in the process of being removed from battle. On the contrary, the Amendment puts them on explicit notice—with its provision for extension of the deadline—that anything they do to endanger U.S. forces may result in a longer American presence than would otherwise be the case. Something approaching an informal ceasefire during the withdrawal period is quite plausible, with a reduction in the overall level of violence.

Prisoners of war

Whatever Vietnam policy is pursued by the United States cannot alter the fact that the North Vietnamese have life and death control over Americans shot down and captured over years of conflict. Surely this truth accounts in some measures for the depth of concern for their safety which has been so broadly exhibited; concern heightened by a sense of helplessness and frustration.

The same truth renders impossible a guarantee by advocates of any policy that the course they recommend—be it escalation, Vietnamization, or withdrawal—will result in the certain return of American prisoners. Again, as in the case of the safety of U.S. forces in combat, predictions can only be based on estimates of intentions and motives of the adversary.

The Amendment to End the War will, however, hold out hope not available under the alternative of continued conflict. The latter, coupled with sharp protestations and invocations of international law from Americans of virtually every shade of political philosophy, has accomplished nothing and probably never will. So long as everything the United States does militarily is guided by goals unreated to the prisoner issue—primarily the preservation of the Thieu-Ky government—and perhaps so long as we are deeply involved in Vietnam, our options for action on that single matter will be severely limited.

If, on the other hand, it is true that the prisoners are being held as hostages in order to influence American policy, then the Amendment to End the War will eliminate much of the reason for their continued incarceration. Moreover, by enhancing the outlook for meaningful negotiations on all war-related issues, it will advance the resolution of the issue, which is essential to any acceptable settlement. The amendment does, of course, continue authority for spending on arrangements for exchanges of prisoners as required.

The negotiations

In the January, 1969, issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger supplied an apt description of the military realities which assure that if and when the war in Vietnam does end, it will be through political rather than military process. "The guerilla wins," he wrote, "if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win." The combined armies of the United States and South Vietnam, as assumed by the stated policies of the current President as well as by those adopted in the last year of his predecessor's term, cannot achieve a military victory, while the other side does not need one. The war will be interminable without political arbitration of the deep antipathies in Indochina.

Meanwhile the Paris negotiations are clearly failing. They are stalemated, and there is no evidence that the stalemate will be broken without the introduction of some new factors. The United States, although agreeable to free elections, insists that the Thieu-Ky government as now composed must remain in power until and unless a successor is chosen.

It holds that coalition with the Communists is unacceptable. The Thieu-Ky government is, if anything, even more adamant on this point, for obvious reasons.

North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, on the other hand, believe that the outcome of such elections depends directly on the identity of the organizers and administrators of the electoral process, and they refuse to accept such control by those now in power. In turn this also makes the U.S. proposal for "mutual withdrawal" unacceptable, since it would leave the Saigon administration—while still unable to win—still in exclusive command of all governmental machinery in South Vietnam.

The United States has essentially two options in these circumstances. One—the application of military pressure and the threat of even more damaging applications, both seeking bargaining advantage by force on the battlefield—has been tried without success. In a sense it was the touchstone of American policy throughout all the years of military escalation even before the talks started in Paris. It differs little from a strategy of military victory.

The other option is to seek a true reconciliation of the differences between the negotiating parties.

Present American policy, as evidenced by the "decisive" military moves of recent weeks, appears to tend more toward the first option. Although it is carried out in the context of a gradual withdrawal program, the withdrawals are made contingent upon moderated enemy activity. The threat of military response is explicit.

One strong element in the stalemate appears to be the ambiguity as to ultimate U.S. intentions. Successful bargaining usually begins when the parties perceive that their adversaries' positions are predictable, systematic and clear-cut. The United States position in Vietnam has been anything but that, partly because of inconsistent rhetoric and partly due to rapid swings in military policy.

The Amendment to End the War would meet this problem directly by laying down our plans with precision and clarity in a program espoused not by the Executive alone, whose capacity for shifts of strategy must be painfully evident, but by a bipartisan, broadly representative Congress. It would inject a new element of order and reliability to the U.S. position.

But the Paris stalemate has a more complex genesis, and that is the refusal of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam to work toward a breakthrough in negotiations. It is here that the Amendment would have its most salient effect.

Initially it would provide a strong inducement to Hanoi and the Vietcong to bargain while the United States is still a party to the negotiations and before U.S. withdrawal is complete. The present government of South Vietnam is notoriously less flexible than the United States. Hence, it is to the advantage of the adversary to bargain while the United States has a negotiating presence coupled with a direct battlefield interest. That presence will constitute a leavening influence toward accommodation.

In addition, without an unacceptable loss in negotiating strength and with momentous benefit in terms of conditions in South Vietnam, the Amendment would set a definite date for U.S. withdrawal which could be extended only by Congressional action. Such a commitment would dispose of one of the most serious impediments to meaningful talks.

By the same token, the Amendment would give the Saigon government incentives to seek political accommodations as well, by meeting what is perhaps the central dilemma facing American policy. The Thieu-Ky Administration has been vocally and embarrassingly unwilling to make any of the concessions and commitments necessary to break the deadlock. Its intransigence—and even on occasion Saigon's willingness to pull the rug out from under the U.S. position—derives in large measure from our blank-check commitment to its preservation. No regime, born as this one in the heat of war, would be likely to hazard its fortunes in peacetime politics as long as it would enjoy the underwriting of the most powerful military nation in the world.

Our commitment, in effect, gives Saigon almost dictatorial power over the direction of U.S. policy. Paradoxically, it is a power best exercised by political and military shortcomings. Palpably the Thieu-Ky government's interests lie in continuing the conflict which keeps it in power; in retaining the hazards of war and avoiding the hazards of politics. To further this interest Saigon can prevent agreement indefinitely unless the United States sets precise, unquestioned limits upon the extent and duration of its commitment—as the Amendment to End the War would do.

If this route is followed it is not difficult to imagine the terms of an agreement which, while perhaps not reflecting the preferences of Saigon, would square fully with U.S. advocacy of self-determination for the Vietnamese people.

South Vietnam after withdrawal

The Amendment's effect on Saigon's attitude toward negotiations in Paris would have a parallel influence on its manner of facing military and political challenges back in South Vietnam. Again the result would coincide with the goal of U.S. policy.

It is appropriate to first address the dismal predictions of terror and bloodshed which have come to attend nearly all discussions of fixed disengagement from Vientam. The Amendment includes provisions for dealing with such eventualities by suggesting and funding arrangements for asylum for Vietnamese who might be physically endangered by the withdrawal of U.S. forces. But it neither abandons allies nor invites their destruction.

The Amendment would by no means force Saigon to capitulate. Although it is difficult to make exact estimates, it would leave South Vietnam with roughly one million men under arms in the regular forces, plus perhaps another quarter-million in national police, all arrayed in combat against enemy forces only one-fourth to one-fifth as large. This numerical superiority would hold even if North Vietnamese troops held back thus far were committed to battle. The ARVN is, in comparison to North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces, elaborately equipped and metic-

ulously trained. And the Amendment preserves continued aid, both civilian and military, in amounts to be determined by the Congress.

Suggestions that South Vietnam would be overrun and its people slaughtered after withdrawal do not, therefore, reflect the realities of existing power—unless the Saigon government is unable to marshal the support of its people—so that no amount of American help can preserve it. A conclusion to that effect clearly destroys the premise that Vietnamization can ever be more than a faint hope.

The Amendment does not abandon the Saigon government nor demand its removal from power. Rather it would confront its leaders with a series of choices, based upon realistic assessments of their own strength without the artificial inflation of an American guarantee. As noted, they might assume a more amenable posture in Paris. They might implement the kind of economic and political reforms long recognized by American advisers as essential to the achievement of broad indigenous support. It might adopt less ambitious military strategies aimed at defense of critical areas instead of seeking to control the entire countryside and parts of other countries as well.

The President made it clear in his Guam statement that Asian nations must chart their own destiny without relying upon open-ended commitments of American help. This can be no less true for Vietnam than for other nations of the region. The Saigon government must learn to walk by itself.

The Amendment to End the War would leave it with this choice. Without just such an explicit decision it is probable that the choice will never be made.

Effect on U.S. global posture

An argument in favor of our continued military presence in Vietnam has been that disengagement there would somehow do irreparable injury to our entire global posture.

The Committee is convinced, however, that the opposite is true—that disengagement would enhance the return of global standing and influence.

The war does not improve the U.S. position in Asia; it weakens it.

The Vietnam experience has clearly shown that the United States cannot establish a bridgehead in an Asian nation in defiance of indigenous forces of nationalism. A reason for our lack of success in Vietnam is that we permitted ourselves to become identified as the foreign occupier and the successor of the French colonist in a country in which anti-colonialist and nationalist sentiments far surpass the appeal of any other political ideology or system.

Nationalism is also the great catalyst in the rest of Southeast Asia—and for that reason our continued involvement in what is widely regarded as a colonial war has and will seriously undermine our credibility in the region.

The war has been advertised as a deterrent to Communist expansion in Asia, but thus far has succeeded chiefly in being a magnet for it. Our stand in Vietnam appears to have precipitated, rather than prevented, the spread of the war into the rest of Indochina. Our new involvement in the internal affairs of Cambodia has, for the first time, drawn the Communist Chinese into unequivocal support of a "war of national liberation" in that country.

The way to influence in Asia does not lie in continuation of the war and the propping up of unpopular regimes in the face of the rising forces of nationalism. It lies, rather, in ending the war and forging strong economic and political inks with independent and internally strong nations. We have much more to gain, for example, from improving our ties with Japan—now one of the world's leading industrial and economic powers—than in propping up a sagging military dictatorship in Cambodia by force of our arms.

On a global basis, the war has been weakening, not strengthening, our influence and power. By tying down our resources, our military capacities, our energies and our attention to a futile and endless war in one corner of the world, it has drained our capacity to influence developments in Europe, in the Middle East and elsewhere, and damaged our credibility and prestige in the view of our allies.

Above all, the war has weakened us in the eyes of the world by dividing us internally. American power and resources were never in doubt—but our ability to utilize these capacities for global objectives have been placed in serious question by our profound internal split over Vietnam.

And if it is our moral leadership with which we are concerned, this can only be enhanced by ending a war that the rest of the world largely regards as an immoral and futile effort to rescue a corrupt dictatorship.

Those who argue that disengagement would make us seem, in the President's words, a "pitiful helpless giant" have forgotten their recent history. The Russians themselves were compelled to disengage their missiles from Cuba in 1962—a move that certainly had the appearance of a setback, if not a defeat. Yet no one—least of all the architects of Vietnamization within the Administration—ever discounted Russian power. The reverse in Cuba did not undermine that power because like our own, it was based upon overwhelming and incontestable economic and military resources. Similarly, the French termination of the colonial war in Algeria proved a prelude of a sudden resurgence of French prestige and influence. The name holds true of us, were we to terminate the war in Vietnam. No rational observer in the Kremlin or elsewhere would regard our nation—with its armies and rockets and missiles and technology and riches, and with a sense of renewal born of the ending of a divisive and hopeless war—as anything but a force to be reckoned with very seriously.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

Quite apart from its value in setting a more promising direction in Indochina, the Amendment to End the War will establish a precedent of major consequence: By their simple exercise it will give vitality and meaning to Congressional powers which—although among the most critical vested in the Legislative Branch—have suffered from disuse.

The constitutional arrangement of shared power was devised against the background of two centuries of vigorous contest between King and Parliament in England, centering on the location of the power to make war. In many respects it was seen as an exclusive prerogative of the monarch, but Parliament had set out long before the American Revolution to exert a negative influence through its control of the purse. Thus, for example, the Supply Act of 1678 was passed for the express and sole purpose of financing and disbanding the Charles Army in Flanders.

The Founding Fathers were vividly aware of the history of this struggle and were determined not to repeat it. Their inclination in nearly all areas, but particularly in issues of war and peace, was toward a broadened legislative scope and function.

The first power and duty of the Congress under the Constitution was: "To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Impost and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States." For the purpose of providing for the common defense, Congress was empowered in Article I, Section 8, to "declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." It was to "raise and support armies," to "provide and maintain a navy," to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," to provide for the calling out of the militia to execue the laws, suppress Insurrection and repel invasions, and to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States." Appropriations for the army, though not for the navy, were limited to a term of two years, the only such limitation prescribed in the Constitution on the duration of funding for a particular purpose.

An elected President replaced the King as "Commander in Chief" of such forces as the Congress might determine to put into the field. Article II, Section 2, established him in that office, thus assuring civilian control and leadership even down to the most minute tactical detail.

The point of division of war powers between the President and the Congress has not been precisely defined. It has long been recognized, for example, that the President can use the forces available to him to repeal invasions without a declaration of war, a conclusion which finds support in the legislative history of the Constitution itself. In an early draft Congress was given power to "make war", but the words "declare war" were substituted with the intent, according to the authors of the motion, of "leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."

Beyond that, the scope of the President's asserted authority as Commander in Chief has been much debated, both in general and with specific reference to Vietnam. Reasonable men differ as to whether we are at war in the constitutional sense in Indochina, and whether Congress should have declared that war; whether the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was an adequate substitute for such a formal declaration; and whether the President is otherwise acting within his constitutional prerogatives in directing military operations in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

It must be recognized, however, that the Amendment to End the War does not demand resolution of those issues. The question whether the war is legal or illegal is not relevant to a determination whether Congress may, based upon its evaluation of prudent uses of American military power and of the benefits and costs attending a given military action, choose to stop a war no matter how begun. The Amendment does not seek to declare the Vietnam policies and measures of four presidents unlawful. It does not adjudicate the past; rather it creates a procedure for the present and the future.

If there is a constitutional issue it is whether the Congress may do that much without infringing upon the President's powers as Commander in Chief. The Constitution itself and a century and a half of practice answer firmly in the affirmative.

The view of Alexander Hamilton, a partisan of a strong executive, is in point in construing the breadth of the office, "Commander in Chief." He pointed out that the President's power "amounted to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy. . . ." The implication is that the President is empowered to determine how forces can be best managed in pursuit of agreed objectives. An attempt by the Congress to substitute one particular combat tactic for another would be seen as an improper interference with presidential discretion.

But the military resources available to the President remain the exclusive domain of Congress, along with its decisive share of the power to choose which objectives shall be pursued and which shall not. It is these prerogatives which the Amendment to End the War would exercise.

Congress has, of course, consistently qual-

ified its appropriations and authorizations in all areas. The use of funds it appropriates is limited by riders and amendments in many cases each year, as witness programs requiring satisfactory desegregation plans as a condition of Federal school aid.

Military appropriations, moreover, are of a special character, as established by the unique constitutional requirement that they may never be made for a period exceeding two years. They represent—and were designed by the Founding Fathers to force—a continuing, affirmative re-examination of the record of the Executive Department in the military arena.

Such examinations and limitations are by no means unusual. One of the most detailed directives to be found was included in the 1909 Naval Appropriations bill, through which the Congress required that the Marine Corps should serve alongside Naval personnel on battleships and cruisers, in contradiction of an order of President Roosevelt. Upon request of the Secretary of the Navy, Attorney General George Wickersham ruled that the act, which conditioned the appropriation upon compliance with the Congressional mandate, was constitutional and that the President was obliged to follow it. He said:

"Inasmuch as Congress has the power to create or not create, as it shall deem expedient, a marine corps, it has the power to create a marine corps, make appropriations for its pay, but provide that such appropriations shall not be available unless the marine corps be employed in some designated way. . . ."

More recently, and in more direct parallel to the Amendment to End the War, the Defense Appropriations Act of 1970 provides that:

". . . none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand."

The proviso is an obvious limitation on the kinds of actions and the locations in which the President may command the military forces made available to him. Its propriety under the Constitution is beyond question.

The Amendment under consideration here leaves the President with full discretion as Commander in Chief, to manage the removal of United States forces from Indochina. It does no more than exercise a power clearly held by the Congress to determine that military forces shall not be available for a particular purpose, and thus comports exactly with the constitutional arrangement.

If Congress does have the power to decide upon military appropriations, it follows that such appropriations can properly be construed as a Congressional mark of approval for the military programs they fund.

President Johnson made this clear with explicit reference to Vietnam on May 4, 1965, when he said in requesting a further $700 million for the war:

"This is not a routine appropriation. For each member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our effort to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and the Communist attack will not succeed."

Congress has, therefore, as much responsibility as the Executive for the continued conflict in Vietnam. It cannot turn aside that conclusion by claiming that the President is Commander in Chief and, in that role, desires the appropriation. Nor can its responsibility be avoided by noting that Vietnam funds have in each instance been included in large authorization and appropriations bills, for the opportunity to amend or limit has always been available. Congress does not acquiesce in appropriations; it makes them.

The one procedural difference between the Amendment to End the War and prior votes on the conflict in Indochina is that the Amendment singles out the issue and calls for a direct decision. In this sense it fulfills much more completely than has previously been the case the constitutional mandate for scrupulous review of military activities.

It will, moreover, make war once again a shared decision and, by an act of respectful and solemn law-making, reassert the responsibility of the Congress in the most momentous area of national policy. The practice of recent years—the President bearing alone the grave burdens of deciding to send U.S. troops to battle and death; the Congress retreating from its own role—is unstable, undignified and unwise. By engendering a renewed understanding of and willingness to assert Congressional obligations, it can make a positive contribution to the process of U.S. foreign policy far beyond Vietnam and share the burden of responsibility for declarations of war and peace, as intended by the Constitution.

THE ORIGINS OF INVOLVEMENT

The United States first moved into Vietnam in the closing days of World War II, when it appeared that neither England nor France would be able to recover the dominance they had achieved prior to World War II.

As World War II drew to a close, the Vietnamese resistance movement, led by Ho Chi Minh and his military commander, Nyugen Giap, established control over much of Vietnam and, on September 2, 1945, proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The same month General Philip D. Gallagher arrived to head a U.S. military mission; and an office of the OSS was set up. This first U.S. presence supported Vietnamese independence under Ho Chi Minh. However, the British, who had liberated the southern part of Vietnam, permitted the French to return. The French proceeded to sign an agreement recognizing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as "a free state with its own government, army, and finances, forming a part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union." In exchange for this recognition of autonomy, Ho Chi Minh agreed to the return of 15,000 French troops. In subsequent months, the French position on Vietnamese independence hardened, and by November the war for Indo-China had begun, with a deadly French artillery barrage on the city of Haiphong. The French also began the process of setting up a rival government in Saigon under Bao Dai, who had served as emperor under the Japanese. This set the pattern for later, anti-communist governments in Saigon.

The United States first began to take a serious interest in Indo-China in the summer of 1949, after the final victory of the Communists in China. Secretary of State Dean Acheson directed an assessment of U.S. policy in Asia with the premise that "it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of communist domination upon the continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asia area." Early in 1950 the government of Bao Dai was granted independence by the French, and the United State immediately recognized this regime as the government of Vietnam. Several months later we agreed, for the first time, to provide direct military and economic aid to the French, who were continuing the war against the Vietminh based in Hanoi. Before the French pulled out in 1954 we were to give more than $1.5 billion in aid for this struggle.

In spite of this massive assistance, the French effort went downhill, culminating in the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu. Some advisors strongly advocated U.S. intervention in the form of a large-scale air strike, but the British would not support us and there was intense congressional resistance to American intervention on the land mass of Asia. President Eisenhower refrained.

Without direct American intervention, the French were unable to carry on the struggle. The State Department, in assessing the causes of the French defeat, observed that "failure of important elements of the local population to give a full measure of support to the war effort remained one of the chief negative factors." The French agreed to meet in Geneva to settle the war.

The United States refused to join in the resulting accords, fearing that they would lead to the surrender of all of Indo-China to communist domination. Geneva represented a genuine compromise which satisfied neither side. Although he had achieved the clear military advantage, Ho Chi Minh somehow was *persuaded*—apparently by a joint Sino-Soviet effort—to settle for half the country. Ho knew that his regime was popular throughout Vietnam—President Eisenhower later observed that "80% of the population would have voted for the communist Ho Chi Minh"—and he agreed to a nationwide election as the means of ending foreign control of Vietnam. Eisenhower, of course, provided for a provisional zone of demarcation along the 17th parallel pending "the general election which will bring about the unification of Vietnam." The Geneva Accords stated that "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary."

In spite of these provisions, the United States was determined to establish a non-communist regime in the southern part of Vietnam. Three days after the Geneva Accords were signed, the *Wall Street Journal* observed that "the U.S. is in no hurry for elections to unite Vietnam; we fear Red leader Ho Chi Minh would win. Secretary Dulles plans first to make the southern half a showpiece—with American aid." A coalition of American military officers, professors, bureaucrats, and publicists joined forces to convert the provisional government south of the 17th parallel into a "viable" non-communist state. Ngo Dinh Diem was imported from the Maryknoll Seminary in New Jersey to serve as premier of the new regime; the U.S. began the process of "nation-building". The U.S. supported Diem in his refusal to permit the national elections provided for in the Geneva Accords, and provided his regime with $3 billion in economic and military aid between 1955 and 1959. Experts in land reform, currency control, police administration, and, eventually, counterinsurgency, sought to buttress the fledgling regime.

The land reform program was hindered by opposition from the landlords. Diem's ruthless suppression of opposition led, by 1957, to a beginning guerrilla warfare within South Vietnam. These efforts were initially led by the anti-communist National Salvation Movement and the Dai Viet; Hanoi initially attacked the insurgents for losing patience in the Geneva settlement and advocating a prematurely radical program. Eventually, Hanoi gave its support to the guerrillas in South Vietnam. During those early years there were many reports of dissension between guerrilla forces in the south and the communist government in Hanoi. At one meeting of the National Liberation Front, the anti-Diem coalition set up in South Vietnam, agents from Hanoi were greeted with scorn: "What are you waiting for to help us? If you don't do anything, you communists, we will rise up against you, too?"

With the aid of Hanoi, the guerrillas grew in strength and, by the time the Kennedy Administration took office, the Diem regime was near collapse. In May, 1961, the U.S. ambassador in Saigon thought "it would be a miracle if South Vietnam lasted three months longer." The Kennedy Administration decided to send in large doses of military assistance, including thousands of "ad-

visors", backed by helicopters and massive amounts of supplies. By the summer of 1964 there were 25,000 American soldiers in Vietnam, but the government was more unstable than ever. The Diem regime had been overthrown and six successive military juntas had attempted unsuccessfully to govern.

The guerrillas, opposing a succession of weak and unpopular regimes in Saigon and expressing Nationalist opposition to the influence of the Americans, continued to grow in strength. Even in late 1964, when the Johnson Administration was planning large-scale intervention and the bombing of the North, there was still very little direct intervention from the North. Pentagon figures show that there were only 400 North Vietnamese soldiers south of the 17th parallel at that time. Nevertheless, the Johnson Administration saw, in Secretary McNamara's words, that the Viet Cong were "approaching possible victory" and they moved, in February 1965, to strengthen the fragile regime in the South by carrying the war to the North. The result was bombing on a scale exceeding even that carried on during World War II and the introduction of more than 500,000 American soldiers. But with even this level of support (with U.S. expenditures exceeding $150 billion) and with the loss of more than 45,000 American lives, and the devastation of much of the country, the guerrillas, with assistance from North Vietnam, are still carrying on the fight, and the regime in Saigon must resort to political repression and American force of arms to maintain itself in power.

THE ALTERNATIVE—VIETNAM

Any resolution of the Vietnam conflict short of an impossible military victory will be distasteful to many Americans, and the Amendment to End the War cannot avoid such consequences.

But the Amendment cannot be considered in a vacuum. A truly satisfactory solution is not available under either alternative—the Amendment or the program announced by the Administration. What, then, will be the consequences of a Congressional refusal to act?

Prospects in that event depend in large part on the Thieu-Ky government, which has been maintained in power for years almost solely by the American military presence.

Its political base continues to rest mainly on a small group of army officers and North emigres. It has steadfastly refused to permit any participation by perhaps the most important non-communist elite in Vietnam—the Buddhist leadership. Despite pretentions at legitimacy, its constitution and electoral system are carefully structured to support present war policies and deny effective participation by dissident political elements. It has systematically branded as "neutralists" and "traitors" noncommunists who have expressed interest in any negotiated settlement. The imprisonment of Tran Ngoc Chau and the closing of more than two dozen newspapers by government censors are dramatic examples of such political repression.

If such a regime were able to survive at all after the dparture of American forces, it could only do so by undertaking drastic reforms and by permitting the participation in the country's political life of elements that are now completely excluded. The simple truth is that the Saigon government presently has no intention of going forward with this painful process—painful because it would require the regime to share its power with others—since it can cling to the hope of an almost indefinite presence of at least a residual force of American troops.

The overriding interest of a clear majority of the South Vietnamese people is peace—to stop the killing, to stop the destruction of the cities, villages and farms of Vietnam.

The overriding interest of the military regime of South Vietnam is war—for it is the war that is the basis of the regime's power.

We have long ago made the choice of government for the South Vietnamese people. We have done so by supporting with our armies and with enormous sums of money a military regime which is totally dependent on that support, and which suppresses all political opposition. As long as such a narrowly based government remains in power, there can be no real "self-determination" for the South Vietnamese people.

Vietnamization is nothing new—it is as old as the Indochina war. It was attempted by the French, by the Kennedy Administration, and by the Johnson Administration in its first year. In each case this strategy—of arming, training and directing the South Vietnamese armies has not worked, and has proven the prelude to further military involvement.

Vietnamization is not, therefore, a true policy of disengagement. It is not a delayed version of the complete withdrawal policy proposed by the Amendment. It is, at best, a troop reduction strategy—a plan aimed at reducing the American presence to a level that would sustain the Saigon government and army and at the same time seem "acceptable" to American public opinion.

So far only about one-fifth of American troop strength has been withdrawn from Vietnam. If the President's announced withdrawal schedule were followed, there will be nearly 300,000 American troops in Vietnam well into the third year of the Nixon Administration's term in office. That is about the same as American force level in Vietnam in mid-1966.

By all indications, the Administration is contemplating the retention of a "residual force" in Vietnam for an unspecified and possibly indefinite period. Even a relatively "low" residual force figure represents a permanent troop commitment of the same order of magnitude as that which existed in early 1965, when we initiated bombing of the North.

The price of so large an American commitment will be from 5,000 to 10,000 or more American dead by the end of 1972. It will be from 25,000 to 50,000 or more American wounded by that time. And the cost will be $30 to $50 billion or more—a cost that must be measured in the opportunities forgone to respond to urgent domestic needs.

No U.S. interest in Vietnam justifies such sacrifice in this seemingly interminable war.

This is the staggering price if Vietnamization works as planned. And recent developments in Cambodia show that Vietnamization is plainly unlikely to work.

The South Vietnamese army, whose capacity to defend even South Vietnam is still critically dependent upon American military forces, now seems intent upon spreading its resources ever more thinly in long-term ground operations over half of Cambodia. It is clear that the number of Vietnamese soldiers available to relieve American manpower in Vietnam is now drastically reduced. To extend assignment of Saigon's forces to wide areas of Cambodia makes a travesty of whatever prospects for success Vietnamization might have enjoyed, had the role of Saigon's troops been confined to Vietnam. Since Vietnamization means substitution of Vietnamese soldiers for Americans, it is clear that the process set in motion by the Cambodian invasion works directly against prospects for achievement of that policy and bringing American soldiers home.

Moreover, the invasion threatens the American position in areas of Southeast Asia not previously contested in earnest. North Vietnamese forces have already responded by expanding their position in Southern Laos—seizing Attopeu and menacing Saravene, both major strategic centers. The U.S. intervention also invites the North Vietnamese to extend their operations anywhere within Cambodia—including the area around Phnom Penh and districts opposite the Thai frontier. This, in turn, would threaten the security of Thailand, whose open southeastern flank was previously protected by the existence of a neutralist Cambodia.

The loss of Cambodian neutrality thus presents a striking illustration of the fragility of a policy which relies upon military pressure in a widening war with shrinking numbers of men. Encouragement of an alliance between Saigon and Phnom Penh will weaken rather than strengthen the U.S. position. It brings into the fray a dismally weak new military force on the allied side while extending the battlefront over thousands more square miles of jungle. It offers both political and military advantage to the enemy, by identifying American interests with a new narrow dictatorship and in opposition to a deposed leader enjoying broad respect and support among the populace.

Vietnamization has emerged in recent months as a formula for an indefinite U.S. presence in Vietnam. Coupled with a strategy of decisive, military response—a procedure for making the war bigger quicker—it gravely endangers the life of each serviceman who is obligated to remain in Vietnam with shrinking support. Nearly any alternative would be more in keeping with U.S. interests.

THE ALTERNATIVE—AMERICA

The most damaging, irretrievable cost of any war to any society, and particularly to one that respects individual life and liberty, is measured in blood spilled. Now some 50,000 young Americans have made the greatest sacrifice any government can exact; dead, lost to their families and to the country, because of the war. Hundreds of thousands more have been injured.

Perhaps some would have the war continue precisely because of those tragic costs; to seek justification for lives already ended and bodies already torn. But surely most of us must recognize as cruel and intolerable a premise that further sacrifice in a futile cause can give meaning to sacrifice already made. The great national contribution of Vietnam war dead can be found instead in the wisdom and maturity the Vietnam experience can bring to the American character, traits that can avoid more loss of life both in the immediate and more distant future. Instead of the casualties we can expect from further conflict, their memory can be best honored by the preservation of life.

For America the basic alternative to the Amendment to End the War is to continue these losses and to postpone these lessons. Surely the burden of persuasion must lie with those who choose that course.

The war and the economic crisis

If some bear the burdens of war most heavily, no one in America can escape its pervasive, pernicious influence. The economic crisis engendered by the war touches each of us.

During the 1960's the United States experiences one of the longest periods of sustained economic growth ever recorded. In the first half of the decade the purchasing power of the dollar held firm. Every new dollar that contributed to growth was worth a full dollar.

Since the mid-1960's, however, the United States has seen the dollar's value eroded to the point that any apparent growth in the national economy has in fact been offset by a decline in real worth. This economic stagnation, in tandem with an endless round of rising prices and rising wages, is the result of marked, uncontrolled inflation.

The country actually faces two kinds of economic maladies. Inflation is a crisis in

itself and its causes and effects merit priority attention. But the second set of problems—the economic impact of measures designed to halt inflation—should cause equal concern. They create serious obstacles to meeting the nation's pressing needs, and they have meanwhile brought us to the brink of recession—while still not ending the price spiral.

Inflation is a self-propelled movement. As prices rise, labor legitimately asks for higher wages. Wage increases in turn push prices higher, and the process continues as long as the basic causes are not countered. Today they have not been, and selected economic indicators record the bleak reality:

Gross National Product, the dollar value of all the goods and services produced in the economy, has ceased to grow as the decline in the value of the dollar more than eats up any gains made in production.

The Consumer Price Index, which shows the cost of the average market basket for individuals, rose 28% in the 1960's, but three-quarters of this increase came after 1965.

Corporate profits grew by more than 50% in the first part of decade, but the growth rate dropped to less than 17% between 1966 and 1969 as industry shifted to war production.

The nation's debt ceiling has had to be lifted repeatedly. It is now about $400 billion.

The effect of war spending on the United States balance of payments has been estimated to be about $4 billion a year, a figure that the Defense Department has accepted. The United States is "losing" this much each year on international transactions, and the outflow has increased the pressure on the dollar and has contributed to the massive loss of American gold.

But the average person is more concerned with more concrete indicators:

Telephone service is declining due to a lack of men, material and adequate research and development.

Food prices are going up 5% every year.

In some areas, the price of a house has gone up 25% in two years.

Steel prices are raised several times a month, making everything from refrigerators to cars more expensive. New auto price increases are planned for the fall models.

Property taxes have climbed as much as 10% in one year and Federal taxes have gone up thanks to the surcharge.

The cost of going out to the movies or to dinner has doubled in the big cities in the last five years.

Indochina war spending—estimated by Professor James Clayton in his book *The Economic Impact of the War* at about $350 billion—is the central cause of inflation. Dr. Roy L. Reierson, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist at Bankers Trust, sums up the grim outlook and its origins this way:

"The enhanced involvement in military operations in Asia in mid-1965 resulted in sharp boosts in defense orders, production and spending, and these had their normal inflationary impact. These war-engendered inflationary forces were strengthened by a serious mismanagement of fiscal policy, including greatly underestimated defense spending and its impact on the economy, lack of restraint on non-defense spending at a time when defense spending was rising rapidly, and delay in taking action to raise taxes. This culminated in a massive $25 billion deficit in fiscal 1968 in the face of an overheated economy and acute labor shortages."

The answer to inflation is to end the war. Until that is done it is probable that every American will be doubly-taxed, by regular taxes and by the cruel tax of inflation, bearing most heavily on those least able to pay. Early in 1969, Arthur Burns, then counsellor to the President and now Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, said that inflation could be reduced to a 3 percent rate by the end of the year. April, 1970, estimates set the rate at 7 percent. The economic prognosis is more trouble, more distortion of a delicate economy, so long as the war goes on.

Lost opportunities

The Indochina War has a direct effect on the allocation of resources in the American economy. The high cost of the war simply means that the government has less money for other programs. In addition, the measures that the Administration has adopted to stop inflation, without halting the war, determine in large part "who gets what" from national wealth and productivity.

In 1969, Senator Ralph Yarborough described the kind of economic choice implicit in the continuation of the American military effort in Indochina: "There are an estimated 240,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong now in South Vietnam," he said. "If we take that 240,000 and divide it into the $5.2 billion they (the Defense Department) want for ammunition alone, that is $21,666.67 for ammunition to shoot at each Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldier, whether they hit him or not. But they (the Administration) ask only $3.2 billion for elementary and secondary education for 72 million school children, which is $44 for each child."

Every hour the United States spends $2 million on the Indochina War. These are some of the programs that are not receiving necessary funds because of the war effort and *all of which* could be financed out of war expenditures in a two-year period:

Provisions of public libraries for 12 million Americans who have no access to libraries.

Four years of training for 125,000 nurses and 50,000 doctors.

Construction of 296,000 new elementary classrooms.

Provision and equipment of 600,000 hospital beds.

Capital spending program for mass transportation systems amounting to $10 billion over 10 years.

Federal grants for urban renewal of $14 billion over 10 years.

Provision of the Federal government contribution of $13 billion to end air and water pollution. Sewage plants cannot be built at present, because there is little Federal money available to match local bond issues.

There is no assurance today that the money made available from an end to the war would be made available for these or similar programs. The decisions on how the money should be spent is in the hands of the Administration and the Congress and, ultimately, of the people. But it is absolutely certain today that money will not be available for these or similar programs unless the war is ended.

In order to stem inflation while continuing the Indochina War, the Administration has adopted a stringent economic policy. It is aimed at cooling off the economy by reducing at the same time industrial production and consumer purchasing. The key elements in this policy is raising interest rates, which makes it more difficult to raise money for industry. Theoretically this policy is also designed to encourage saving by individuals who could expect to get high interest instead of spending all their income. In fact, however, the rising interest rates charged for all purchases—from a washing machine to a home—have eaten up the money that individuals might have been expected to save.

The effects of reduced consumer demand and higher costs for producers have led to a recession. Industry must lay off workers. Unemployment across the country has risen to 4.8%, the higest in five years. In some areas this means an unemployment rate of 8% and for some less-skilled groups a rate of 15%. For each percentage point on a national basis, almost one million wage earners are thrown out of work. They are called "soldiers" in the war against inflation; in fact, because inflation is caused by the Indochina War, they are making a major and involuntary contribution to the pursuit of that conflict.

Industrial production is declining steadily as manufacturers find that fewer consumers are able to purchase their goods. In the nine months ending on April 30, 1970, it fell 2.5%. American industry is now operating at only 80% of capacity.

Reduced production means reduced profits. As was mentioned earlier, corporate profits rose more than 50% from 1962 to 1965, but increased only about 17% from 1966 to 1969.

Falling profits have undermined investor's confidence in American industry. In May, 1970, prices on the New York Stock Exchange hit a seven year low in two days in succession. In April 1970, in the face of a falling Stock Market, President Nixon said: "Frankly, if I had any money, I'd be buying stocks right now." Apparently, like many other Americans, he did not have any money. But if he had bought stocks that day, he would have lost money in the next 30 days, when the Dow Jones index plunged from 735 to 665.

Slower economic activity has also resulted in decreased revenues from taxes paid to the Federal government. Thus, at the same time as the Administration is increasing expenditures related to the Indochina War, its income has fallen below expectations. A deficit in the Federal budget is expected through mid-1972, according to the White House. The only method proposed to close this gap is the imposition of a new tax on leaded gasoline. And if the Administration succeeds in "getting the lead out" through this measure, the fiscal benefits will be slight and the deficit will remain. This deficit becomes a part of the national debt and must be repaid later with interest.

In sum, the war has upended national priorities. It has shrunken the supply of resources needed to meet domestic goals, public and private, both by its direct consumption of those resources and by consequential deterioration in their worth.

Again each American, regardless of his view toward America's involvement in Indochina, must account its costs in terms of lost opportunities at home. Our contributions for the preservation of one government in one country 10,000 miles away have been great indeed.

Spiritual Decline

The costs of inflation resulting from the Indochina War and of the measures employed to combat it can be calculated objectively. There is little room for debate about the economic impact of inflation and recession. But beyond these costs are those which are less easy to calculate, though they may be far higher. These are stresses placed on the roots of American society by the continuation of the War.

Whether an American's concept of his patriotic duty leads him to support fully the President's policy in Southeast Asia or to oppose it and support an early withdrawal of American forces, he will undoubtedly recognize that the prolonged debate over the War is having harmful effects on the cohesion of his country.

The United States was conceived by its Founding Fathers as a nation in which divergent views could exist in an atmopshere of freedom made possible by common acceptance of a democratic form of government. Now this common will is in danger of being torn asunder.

Violence as a form of political expression either in favor of or against the war is increasing. Tolerance of unorthodox forms of dress and speech, of the right to hold a different opinion, of the right to speak out for or against government policies, is fading fast. Invective and name calling have become the order of the day.

The political system seems to many to have become unresponsive to their viewpoint. Suc-

cessive administrations have made a point of demonstrating that they will not be affected by opposing opinions and that they would prefer it if these opinions were not even expressed. This attitude has led to a growing sense of frustration. Frustration has in turn led to growing dissatisfaction with the political system itself.

The strength of the American political system is that it has continually evolved since the Articles of Confederation and then the Constitution were adopted. The unyielding policy on Vietnam, which has clearly become the national issue of paramount importance, marks a step back from this tradition. Those who have sensed this change have reacted vigorously, occasionally violently, to it. Their acts have provoked counter-violence and sometimes repression.

The major question before the American people is whether the pursuit of the Indochina War, a war which will not be won on the battlefield in any case, is worth the real chance of permanent damage to the American political system.

Not only does the debate over the War endanger society through its menace to the underlying consensus that has enabled America to become a great nation, but it prevents energies from being devoted to the great issue of American history—the construction of a society in which men of all races, religions and national origins can live together.

The Amendment To End the War seeks to preserve the American political system by using it. Its ultimate success depends on the willingness and the ability of those who support its objectives to work and to persevere within that system, so that the system itself will survive to cope with problems and challenges that lie ahead.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 15628) to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 667, as modified.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN).

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, it has become the fashion today for the vocal minority to undertake a game of second guessing the President of the United States. It is increasingly apparent to all of us that this minority, which takes pride in using clear hindsight, will question the President on every move he makes.

When the President announced he was going into Cambodia, there was an instant cry by many that this was a mistake. Many jumped on the President's decision as a vehicle to express displeasure with the President—regardless of the reason. For many, I would guess that the decision on Cambodia served as the vehicle for purely political displeasures.

Nevertheless, Mr. President, it is evident to me that the President's decision was the right and correct decision to make. In order to continue the plan for Vietnamization, I believe the President had no other choice but to destroy the Cambodian border strongholds. The President's decision was justified and necessary. What it means is that fewer American lives are going to be lost, and we can bring our fighting men home at an earlier date.

When I heard that the President had made his decision to knock out sanctuaries over the Cambodian border, I expressed my complete support for his decision.

In fact, I had been concerned for some period of time with the fact that the enemy had been able to walk across an imaginary line in the night, strike and kill Americans and Vietnamese under the shadow of darkness, and then retreat back over this same imaginary line before sunrise.

Be that as it may, there were significant events leading up to the President's decision. Let me summarize some of those events:

Prior to the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk on March 18, Cambodia had in large part avoided the fighting in Vietnam. This was the case despite the fact that North Vietnam had established bases for an estimated 55,000 to 70,000 of its troops on the Cambodian side of the South Vietnamese border. It is true that from 1965 until March 18, 1970, the Cambodian Government did little to interfere with these bases.

The Vietnamese Communists have made use of its territory for tactical sanctuary, for base areas, for infiltration of personnel, and for shipment of supplies. They have also procured arms, food and other supplies from Cambodian sources.

The utility of Cambodia to Hanoi became crucial in 1969, when the North Vietnamese decided after the defeat of their Tet offensive and two subsequent offensives in 1968, that they would shift to a strategy of "protracted struggle." This strategy, as outlined in detail in a document issued August 1969 by COSVN, the "Central Office for South Vietnam," which is Hanoi's main headquarters in the southern part of South Viet Nam, called for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Communist main forces into the Cambodian base areas, from which they would wait out the U.S. troop withdrawals under Vietnamization, stage occasional forays, or "high points," to maintain military pressure on the allies, and support the Communist infrastructure and local forces left behind in South Vietnam. Here the Communist forces enjoyed sanctuary, a particularly important feature for the forces operating adjacent to the relatively open, densely-populated, and heavily-garrisoned areas of IV Corps and southern III Corps—the Delta and the Saigon region. (Safe haven in Cambodia is less important farther north where the rugged, densely-forested and lightly held South Vietnamese highlands provide more elbow room for Communist forces on the move or at rest.)

These base areas have now been turned by the NVA/VC elements into comprehensive military installations where troops and new recruits are received, supplied, and trained; military and political staffs maintain their headquarters; and fighting forces receive refuge and medical treatment. Some base areas contain sizable ordnance depots, weapons and ammunition factories, petroleum storage facilities, truck parks, and POW camps. Clearly, the base areas provide the foundation upon which rest Communist expectations of maintaining an effective military-political apparatus in southern South Vietnam while the U.S. withdrawal proceeds.

The more northerly base areas, opposite II Corps and northern III Corps, serve as safe havens for Communist troops operating into these areas, and also facilitate the southward movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies toward COSVN and eastward into the highlands of South Vietnam. They constitute, in effect, an extension of the Laos corridor—but a sector in which the NVA has enjoyed virtual immunity from Allied attack. To the extent that the Communists were denied free use of these areas, their forces in the highlands of South Vietnam could suffer a loss in combat effectiveness and increased casualties.

The southernly base areas, opposite the delta and the Saigon region, have grown rapidly in size and importance since August 1969 as Hanoi has sought to limit exposure of its main force units and reduce casualties while attempting to halt the erosion of its political-military base in this populous and decisive theater. The bases are situatted in well populated areas, many in villages and plantations inhabited by ethnic Vietnamese and and controlled by Communists since the days of the Viet Minh.

The Cambodian sanctuaries play a key role in Hanoi's response to the Vietnamization and pacification programs. Because of their existence, especially the sanctuaries in southern Cambodia along the III and IV Corps frontiers, Hanoi can always mass large hostile forces in close proximity to major South Vietnamese population concentrations. This ability enables Hanoi to pose a continuing threat to South Vietnam's internal security that progress in pacification or Vietnamization cannot eradicate.

The Cambodian base structure, as noted above, supports infiltration of NVA personnel into South Vietnam, and the shift of units from one portion of South Vietnam to another, as in the case of the movement of NVA regiments into the delta last year. The infiltration system through Cambodia handled nearly 55,000 to 70,000 NVA personnel in 1969, an estimated 60 percent of total NVA infiltration into South Vietnam last year. About 45,000 to 55,000 of these enemy troops moved as far as the southerly base area subordinate to COSVN. The foot trails used lie very close to the border and occasionally cross into South Vietnamese