



Department of State

TELEGRAM

37127

CONFIDENTIAL 797

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ACTION AID-85

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 RSR-01 RSC-01 SSO-00 E-04 SS-10 H-01
ORM-01 SR-01 INR-07 UPW-01 P-02 PRS-01 PM-04 L-04

1130 W

RF
OC/PR 4
OC/ICD 4
OLC
OER 2
ORGI 2
SAVA 2

25X1A

6
action

065036

O 231217Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7567

25X1A

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 4 VIENTIANE 2033

AIDAC

SUBJECT: SENATORIAL INQUIRY CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF
LAOS WAR

REF: STATE 38869
JOINT EMBASSY/USAID MESSAGE

25X1A

FOLLOWING INFORMATION GEARED TO SPECIFIC RESPONSES:
REQUESTED PARA 6 REFTEL.

1. A RE CASUALTY ASPECTS, REFUGEE MOVEMENT, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND MORBIDITY ARE DIRECTLY RELATED MILITARY ACTION WITHIN LAOS. FIRST LARGE REFUGEE MOVEMENTS IN LAOS STARTED 1961-1962 AS RESULT KONG LE COUP AND OCCUPATION PDJ AND CERTAIN AREAS SAM NEUA PROVINCE BY NEUTRALIST-PATHET LAO FORCES. ABOUT 70,000 PEOPLE WERE DISPLACED TO HILL AREAS SOUTH OF PDJ AND WEST AND SOUTHWEST OF SAM NEUA CITY. IN 1964 PL-VN FORCES OVERRAN MOUNTAINOUS AREA SOUTH OF ROUTE 7 FROM NVN TO THE PDJ, AS THESE GROUPS WERE HARASSING THIS IMPORTANT SUPPLY ROUTE. LEVEL REMAINED STATIC.

1964-1968 (SHOWING CONSTANT ATTRITION) WITH EXCEPTION PEAK IN CASUALTIES IN EARLY 1965 COINCIDING WITH REPLACEMENT OF NVN CADRE BY TACTICAL UNITS. IN 1968 CASUALTIES INCREASED AND IN

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COUNTRY MILITARY ACTION HAS STEADILY ESCALATED WITH DISPLACEMENT PEOPLE AND COINCIDENT INCREASE CASUALTIES AND MORBIDITY -- DOUBLING IN PAST 18 MONTHS. HISTORY OVER PAST YEAR THOROUGHLY COVERED IN VIENTIANE 1294.

1B RE OVERALL PRINCIPAL CAUSES FLOW OF PEOPLE, THESE BASICALLY STATED IN ATTACHMENT TOAID A-959, 12/19/69, HOWEVER SUGGEST YOU REVIEW AND ADD TO STATEMENT, AS APPROPRIATE FOR RESPONSE TO SENATOR, FROM PARA 4, VIENTIANE 8055, 11/25/69, RECURRENCE CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES, EXACT NUMBER CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (KILLED, MISSING, WOUNDED) UNKNOWN AS LAOS HAS NEVER BEEN ABLE DEVELOP EVEN RUDIMENTARY REPORTING SYSTEM. CANTON AND DISTRICT RECORDS OF FAMILIES DISPLACED ARE SENT TO PROVINCIAL OFFICES AND MAY OR MAY NOT BE TRANSMITTED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. RECORDS HAVE BEEN KEPT DURING PAST FIVE YEARS AT SAM THONG BUT THESE NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO RAPID EVACUATION THIS SITE MARCH 17 (CHECKING TO SEE IF DUPLICATES ARE AVAILABLE AND CAN BE COMPILED VIENTIANE). AS INDICATION MAGNITUDE CASUALTIES, FOLLOWING STATISTICS COVERING PERIOD 1 JANUARY 1969 - 1 JANUARY 1970 HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED FOR USAID-SUPPORTED FACILITIES DESCRIBED PARA 9.B BELOW:

(A) HOSPITALS - 3,450 MILITARY, 1,864 CIVILIAN; (B) DISPENSARIES AND COMBAT MEDICS (AVERAGE OF 60 PERCENT OF TOTAL LOCATIONS REPORTING) - 8,999 MILITARY, 1,810 CIVILIAN. THIS BEST WE CAN DO UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES AND REPORTING SYSTEM PRETTY WELL IN COLLAPSE DUE TO RECENT EVENTS, PARTICULARLY MR II. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, 3,715 MILITARY CASUALTIES WERE HANDLED IN USAID/RO SUPPORTED FAR HOSPITALS. ADDITIONAL FIGURES FROM RLG/OB CIVILIAN HOSPITALS BEING COMPILED, BUT UNABLE PROVIDE WITHIN DEADLINE THIS MSG. THESE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE TREATMENTS GIVEN IN OVER 125 FIELD-TYPE DISPENSARIES FOR MINOR WOUNDS AND ILLNESSES. THEY WOULD AMOUNT TO MANY THOUSANDS MORE.

2.A 204,000 PLUS.

2.B ABOUT 50 PERCENT APPROXIMATELY



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SINCE FEB 1. SEE PARA 12, VIENTIANE 1294.

2.C. OUR ASSUMPTION THIS QUESTION SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO 2B ABOVE, IN WHICH CASE ANSWER IS NO. IN EARLIER PERIODS, E.G., 1963 AND 1966, SOME DISPLACEMENTS HAVE RESULTED FROM OVERCROWDED CONDITIONS AND NATURAL DISASTERS SUCH AS FLOODS.

2.D. AS OF MID-MARCH, THERE WERE APPROX 204,000 REFUGEES BEING SUPPORTED BY U.S. PROGRAMS IN LAOS. OF THIS NUMBER ABOUT 100,000 ARE ACTUALLY DEPENDENTS OF MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES LOYAL TO THE RLG. THESE LATTER ARE GIVEN THE SAME SUPPORT AS THE 104,000 CIVILIAN, NONMILITARY DEPENDENTS. AS OF MID-MARCH, THESE REFUGEES WERE LOCATED IN THE FOLLOWING PLACES:

(1) 45,000 - AREA NORTH AND ALONG WESTERN PERIMETER PDJ (BAN LOUM, BAN SAN PHA KHU, PHE COM, MUONG SOUI, XIENG DAT COMPLEX). THESE REFUGEES LEFT THEIR ORIGINAL HOMES AS RESULT OF MILITARY ACTIONS. THEY CAME FROM (A) AREAS NORTHEAST OF PDJ, (B) BAN BAN AREA, (C) NA KHAUG/HOUA MUONG, (D) NORTHWESTERN SECTOR OF PDJ, AND (E) FROM BORDER AREA BETWEEN SOUTHERN HOUA PHAN AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES.
GODLEY



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ACTION AID-85
INFO OCT-01 EA-06 RSR-01 RSC-01 SSO-00 E-04 SS-10 H-01
ORM-01 SR-01 UPW-01 P-02 PRS-01 PM-04 L-04 /123 W
066813

O 231217Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7568

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 VIENTIANE 02033

AIDAC

25X1A

SUBJECT: SENATORIAL
INQUIRY CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF LAOS WAR

REF: STATE 38869

JOINT EMBASSY/USAID MESSAGE

1) 78,000 - SAM THONG/LONG TIENG COMPLEX AND SOUTH. 25X1A
THEY CAME FROM NORTHEASTERN LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE
(HOUEI TONG KO, PHOU SALLY, HOUIE TONG) AND XIENG KHOUANG
(PDU) AND SAM NEUA.

2) 20,000 - NAM THOUET IN HOUA KHONG PROVINCE. THESE
REFUGEES HAVE COME MOSTLY FROM THE MUONG SING/
NAM THA AREA ALONG HOUA KHOONG-CHINESE BORDER.

3) 5,000 - LUANG PRABANG. THEY HAVE COME FROM
NAM BAC AND SOUTHERN PHONG SALLY PROVINCE (PAK
BENG).

4) 2,000 - NAM TAN/NAM PHUY AREA. FROM XIENG
KHOUANG, MUONG SAI AND MUONG HOUN.

5) 16,000 - VIENTIANE PLAIN (BAN KEUN, BAN THALAT,
THADEUA). FROM XIENG PHOUANG (PDU).

6) 28,000 - APPROX 80% FROM PHOUANG (PAKSANE) FROM

RF
OC/PR 4
OC/ICD 4
OLC
OER 2
OBGI 2
SAVA 2

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INDICO
DDP

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OS/LSD

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to
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CIA
NSA
DDP



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BAN DONE, SANX AK, MUONG MOC AREAS.

(8) 2,500 - SAVANNAKHET/THAKHEK. FROM HO CHI MINH TRAIL AREA.

(9) 3,500 - PAKSE. FROM TRAIL AREA.


(10) 1,000 - SARAVANE. FROM TRAIL AREA AND CLOSE AROUND SARAVANE. SARAVANE BASICALLY FORMS A RELATIVELY SAFE HAVEN, BUT IS COMPLETELY SURROUNDED.

(11) 3,000 - ATTOPEU. FROM TRAIL AREA AND, SIMILAR TO SARAVANE, IS COMPLETELY SURROUNDED. CHANGES IN COMPOSITION AND NUMBERS OF REFUGEES IN SAM THONG/LONG TIENG SOUTH AREAS WERE DESCRIBED IN VIENTIANE 1918. SITUATION IS FLUID AND THEREFORE CANNOT READJUST NUMBERS AT SPECIFIC LOCATIONS THIS MOMENT.

2.E UP TO LAST YEAR MOST REFUGEE GROUPS CONSISTED OF NUMEROUS MINORITY TRIBES IN LAOS, I.E., MEO, LAO THEUNG (KHAMU), YAO, LAVE, SOUIE, ETC. RECENTLY BOTH LOWLAND AND UPLAND LAO GROUPS HAVE BEEN FORCED FROM THEIR HOMES ALONG WITH THE ETHNIC TRIBES. PRESENT REFUGEE POPULATION COMPOSED OF 40 PERCENT MEO, 30 PERCENT LAO THEUNG, 20 PERCENT LAO, 10 PERCENT OTHER. AGE, SEX OF THE PRESENT REFUGEE GROUPS CONSISTS OF MAINLY OLD MEN, OLD WOMEN, AND CHILDREN 10 YEARS AND UNDER, WITH A MARKED PAUCITY OF MILITARY AGE MEN. THIS IS THE NORMAL DISTRIBUTION PATTERN FOR REFUGEES IN LAOS.

3. PRESENT ATTITUDE OF REFUGEES TOWARD RLG VARIES APPRECIABLY BETWEEN THE MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS, I.E., HILL TRIBES - LAO.

(1) HILL TRIBES: DURING THE EARLY 1950'S AND 60'S THERE WAS A FEELING OF RESENTMENT TOWARD RLG. THIS ATTITUDE STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT FEW MINORITY GROUPS HAD REPRESENTATION IN RLG. THERE WERE PRACTICALLY NO HILL TRIBES EMPLOYED



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THROUGHOUT INFRASTRUCTURE. TODAY THERE ARE CIVIL SERVANTS.
FROM SEVERAL MINORITY GROUPS AND ANIMOSITY HAS DIMINISHED.
THE LAO OFFICIALS HAVE MADE A DECIDED EFFORT UNDER-
STAND HILL TRIBES AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN IM-
PROVING MUTUAL RELATIONS.
GODLEY



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42
ACTION AID-85

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 RSR-01 RSC-01 SSO-00 SS-10 H-01 ORM-01

SR-01 UPW-01 P-02 PRS-01 PM-04 L-04 /119 W
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O 231217Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7569

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 VIENTIANE 2033

AIDAC

25X1A

SUBJECT: SENATORIAL INQUIRY CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF LAOS WAR

REF: STATE 38869

JOINT EMBASSY/USAID MESSAGE

(2) LAO: LAO REFUGEE IS RELATIVE NEWCOMER TO REFUGEE SCENE AND EXPECTS RLG WILL AND SHOULD UNDERTAKE HIS WELFARE.
RE REFUGEES AS A WHOLE, THERE IS GENERAL ATTITUDE THAT RLG CENTRAL GOVT IN VIENTIANE IS FAR REMOVED FROM PLEAS FOR ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION BUT THAT LOCAL RLG AUTHORITY IS RESPONSIVE. BASIC REASONS FOR THIS CONTRA-POINT IS LACK EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION EITHER PHYSICAL OR ACTUAL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND VILLAGE LEVEL.

25X1A

3.D SEE PARA 4, VIENTIANE 8055, 11/25/69.

3.E AND 3.F BASICALLY THERE ARE THREE LEVELS OF DECISION MAKING IN EVACUATIONS, DEPENDING ON (1) MAGNITUDE, (2) IMMEDIATE CAUSE AND (3) TIME. WHEN DANGER FROM ENEMY ACTION IS SUFFICIENTLY IMMINENT, DECISION WILL BE MADE ON THE SPOT BY LOWEST ECHELON OF LEADERSHIP (LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDERS AND VILLAGE OR CANTON CIVIL OFFICIALS) AND PEOPLE BEING TO MOVE USUALLY IN NUMBERS NO

RF

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001/D 4

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OBGI 2
SAVA 2

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GREATER THAN 300 - 1,000. WHERE NUMBERS ARE SOMEWHAT LARGER, GENERALLY FROM 1,000 TO 5,000, DECISIONS ARE TAKEN BY PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS AND THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF MILITARY REGIONS. IN THE CASE OF MR II, GOVERNOR OF SAM NEUA PROVINCE AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED NEAR MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS. THE GREATEST BULK OF REFUGEE MOVEMENTS FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY; CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE NORMALLY NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN MAKING THESE DECISIONS (BECAUSE OF TIME-DISTANCE FACTORS) BUT ARE KEPT FULLY INFORMED BY PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS. IN THE CASE OF LARGE MOVEMENTS WHERE IMPENDING DANGER FROM MILITARY ACTION CAN BE ANTICIPATED SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE, THE DECISION IS MADE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. IN THE CASE OF THE MOVEMENT IN FEBRUARY OF REFUGEES FROM PDJ TO VIENTIANE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DECISION WAS MADE BY PRIME MINISTER. THUS, AMERICANS DO NOT MAKE DECISIONS TO EVACUATE OR MOVE REFUGEES, THE DECISION TO ASSIST IN REFUGEE MOVEMENTS, WHEN REQUESTED BY THE RLG AT LEVELS DESCRIBED ABOVE, IS MADE (1) BY THE AREA COORDINATOR IN THE CASE OF MINOR MOVEMENTS, (2) OR BY THE AMBASSADOR WITH ADVICE OF COUNTRY TEAM IN THE CASE OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS. IN THE CASE OF THE PDJ REFUGEES, THE DECISION TO EVACUATE WAS MADE BY THE PM; THE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WAS MADE IN WRITING TO THE USAID DIRECTOR BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE; AND THE DECISION FOR THE U.S. TO GIVE SUCH ASSISTANCE WAS MADE BY THE AMBASSADOR AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNTRY TEAM.

3.6 IF AN AREA IS SCHEDULED FOR EVACUATION BY AIR AND THERE REMAINS SUFFICIENT TIME, PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS ASSISTED BY USAID ASSEMBLE THE EVACUEES BY CANTON OR VILLAGE TO AWAIT AIRCRAFT. WHEN THE REFUGEES DISEMBARK AT THEIR NEW RELOCATION SITE THEY ARE REGISTERED AND GIVEN, IF NECESSARY WELFARE ASSISTANCE, I.E., MEDICAL ATTENTION, INOCULATIONS, BLANKETS, KITCHEN UTENSILS, FOOD, ETC. EVACUATIONS BY FOOT ARE USUALLY CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE VILLAGE LEADERS AND THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDERS, IF THE DESTINATION POINT IS SEVERAL DAYS WALK, MILITARY ESCORTS WITH RADIOS



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ARE PROVIDED. RICE DROPS ARE MADE ALONG THE PROPOSED ROUTE IN ADVANCE OF THE EVACUEES AND CONFIRMED BY GROUND TO AIR COMMO. IN EMERGENCY EVACUATIONS LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDERS CALL FOR IMMEDIATE HELP AND ANY AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT (RLG, USAID CONTRACT, USAF) THAT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE IS USED.

8.A VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, PRIVATE AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN ACCREDITED FOR MANY YEARS IN LAOS AND ARE ASSISTING THE REFUGEE CAUSE. VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OPERATING IN LAOS CONTRIBUTE WELFARE, EDUCATIONAL, FOOD AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES.

8.B THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES ARE ACCREDITED TO THE FLG: CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICE (CRS), ASIAN CHRISTIAN SERVICE (ACS), WORLD VISION (WV), SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST (SDA), ASIA FOUNDATION, OXFORD FAMILY GROUP (OXFAM). ALSO WORKING IN LAOS ARE TWO MISSIONARY GROUPS: CHRISTIAN MISSION MISSIONARY ASSIANCE (PROTESTANT), AND OBLATE MISSION (CATHOLIC).
GODLEY



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ACTION AID-85

25X1A INFO OCT-01 EA-06 RSR-01 RSC-01 SSO-00 E-04 SS-10 H-01
action ORM-01 SR-01 UPW-01 P-02 PRS-01 PM-04 L-04 /123 W
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RF
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SAVA 2
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O 231217Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7570

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 VIENTIANE 2033

AIDAC 25X1A

SUBJECT: SENATORIAL INQUIRY CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF LAOS WAR

REF: STATE 38869

JOINT EMBASSY/USAID MESSAGE

8.C ALL AGENCIES ARE BASED IN VIENTIANE BUT HAVE SOME
ASSIGNED FIELD PERSONNEL. PERSONNEL ARE: CRS, FOUR;
ACS, NINE; WV, TWO; SDA, NONE AS YET; ASIA
FOUNDATION, ONE; OXFAM, ONE EX-OFFICI.


25X1A

8.D THERE IS ONLY ONE AGENCY DIRECTLY CONNECTED
TO THE U.S. MISSION -- CRS IN ITS CAPACITY AS U.S.
AGENT FOR FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAMS (PL 480).

9.A SERIOUS AND GETTING WORSE, STATISTICS PROVIDED
1.A ABOVE REPRESENT CASUALTIES ONLY. THEY DO NOT
REFLECT THE INCREASED MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY
IN THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM
DISPLACEMENT AND COMPACTION OF PEOPLE FLEEING THE
CONTESTED AREAS. MALNUTRITION AND VARIOUS
DISEASES ARE EPIDEMIC.

9.B USAID AND THE RLG HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE 1963 THE
VILLAGE HEALTH PROGRAM TO PROVIDE MEDICAL SUPPORT
TO PARAMILITARY, THEIR DEPENDENTS AND REFUGEES

GENERATED BY ACTION PERSONNEL IN THIS



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PROGRAM ARE DEVELOPED FROM INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, MOST OF WHOM HAVE TO BE TAUGHT TO READ AND WRITE LAO PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO TRAINING PROGRAMS. PRESENTLY THERE ARE 125 MEDICAL FACILITIES OF VARYING DEGREES OF SOPHISTICATION IN SUPPORT OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POPULATION IN THE CONTESTED AREAS. BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY ARE TREATED WITHIN THE SAME SYSTEM FOR MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF SCARCE MEDICAL PERSONNEL. PRESENTLY PATIENTS FLOW FROM OUTLYING DISPENSARIES AND FROM FRONTLINE RLG COMBAT MEDICS TO RECEIVING STATIONS MANNED BY MORE QUALIFIED MEDICAL AUXILIARIES WHO REFER THOSE CASES OUTSIDE THEIR COMPETENCE TO BASE HOSPITALS MANNED WITH THE MOST QUALIFIED MEDICAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE. LAO DOCTORS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL AND AMERICAN (USAID) MEDICAL ADVISORS.

10.D THERE ARE TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTIES/PROBLEMS WHICH IMPEDE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES, I.E., PLANNING AND FUNDING. FUNDING DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IN OUR RECENT SERIES OF SIX CABLES, LAST DISPATCH VIENTIANE 1978. OUR INABILITY TO MAKE ANY PRECISE PLANS FOR THE NUMBERS AND AMOUNT OF FUNDS REQUIRED DURING ANY FUTURE PERIOD IS EXEMPLIFIED BY SITUATION REPORTED VIENTIANE 1918. AS IS SELF EVIDENT, WE DO NOT CONTROL EFFECTIVE DEMANDS ON REFUGEE AND RELATED PROGRAMS, SINCE THESE DEMANDS ARE GENERATED BY MILITARY ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY NVN/PL. WE ALSO KNOW REFUGEE MOVEMENTS WILL FOLLOW FROM ANY MILITARY ACTION INITIATED BY EITHER SIDE. WE CAN ALSO PREDICT WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY THE EXTENT OF REFUGEE MOVEMENTS THAT CAN BE EXPECTED FROM PLANNED RLG ADVANCES INCLUDING AMOUNT OF FUNDS REQUIRED CARE FOR THESE REFUGEES. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, PREDICT SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES NVN/PL TACTICS AND OFFENSIVE ACTIONS. HENCE WE ARE CONSTANTLY FACED WITH EVENTS THAT CALL FOR QUICK PLANNING, URGENT PREPARATIONS AND FUNDING REQUESTS. TO MEET EMERGENCY SITUATION WE UNABLE FORESEE EARLY ENOUGH IN ADVANCE TO DEVELOP SYSTEMATIC PLANS AND FUNDING ESTIMATES. THESE ARE REAL DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS.



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WISH GIVE QUESTIONS 4 AND 5 ADEQUATE CONSIDERA-
TION IN ORDER PROVIDE SENATOR WITH THOUGHTFUL AND
BALANCED ASSESSMENT. YOUR DEADLINE FOR REPLY
REFTEL AND EXTREME CURRENT PRESSURES ON KEY
MEMBERS OF COUNTRY TEAM DO NOT ALLOW SUFFICIENT
TIME FOR DEVELOPMENT MEANINGFUL ANSWER THESE
QUESTIONS. WILL PROVIDE ANSWER BY COB WASHINGTON
TIME MARCH 25.
GODLEY

SECRET

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Monday - 23 March 1970

Page 4

13. (Internal Use Only - JGO) I met with Mrs. Nettie Nagel, on the staff of Representative John W. Wydler (R., N.Y.), concerning a constituent request for information on contract investigative services for the Federal Government. The reference in the constituent's letter was to CIC, not to CIA. After a very brief discussion, Mrs. Nagel withdrew the Congressman's letter with appreciation for our consideration in the matter and advised that she will contact the Department of the Army for assistance in responding to the constituent's letter.

14. (Secret - JGO) Met with Representative John Rhodes (R., Ariz.) and discussed with him Ambassador Godley's suggested itinerary for the Representative's visit to Laos during the Easter recess. (Ambassador Godley's message was forwarded through Agency channels, see IN 48135.) Representative Rhodes would like to follow the itinerary suggested by the Ambassador if at all possible and requested that I meet with Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. Wells, in the Office of the Director of the Budget, Department of the Army, who will be his escort officer and who is handling travel arrangements with the Department of the Army.

In meeting with Colonel Wells, I learned that Ambassador Godley was referring to April 3 and 4 and that the Army itinerary was officially changed by notification to the field this morning to April 2 and 3 for the Laos portion of his travel. SAVA is querying the field to ascertain whether Ambassador Godley's itinerary may be moved ahead 24 hours.

15. (Confidential - JMM) Called Chairman Morgan, House Foreign Affairs Committee, regarding plans for the Director's briefing tomorrow. Morgan said he hoped to end the session by around 12:00 p.m. and would like to leave nearly an hour for questions. I informed the Director who revised his prepared text accordingly.

16. (Internal Use Only - RJK) Delivered to the offices of Senators Robert Griffin, Edmund Muskie, Harold Hughes, Charles Percy and Representatives Richard McCarthy and Gary Brown, items in which 25X1A their names were mentioned.

SECRET

SECRET

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Wednesday - 18 March 1970

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10. (Confidential - GLC) Picked up from the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the transcript of the executive session with

[redacted] This will be forwarded to DDP for review.

11. (Secret - JMM) Representative William E. Minshall (R., Ohio) (new member of the CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations) visited Headquarters for an orientation briefing. Colonel White explained the responsibilities and relationships among members of the intelligence community and the DCI's role therein. He then discussed the organization and activities of the Agency. John Clarke covered the Agency budget and personnel strength. Following the briefing Mr. Minshall lunched with the Director, General Cushman, Colonel White and Messrs. Karamessines, Smith, Duckett, Bannerman and Maury.

During the discussions, Mr. Minshall indicated particular interest in our communications and said he would like to return for a more detailed briefing on this subject. He asked several questions about our assessment of military intelligence and especially the attache system. On departing he commented critically on DIA's past performances.

12. (Secret - JMM) Ed Braswell, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, called in behalf of Chairman Stennis to ask about the situation in Cambodia and I summarized for him highlights of our last situation report.

13. (Secret - JMM) Bill Woodruff, Senate Appropriations Committee staff, called to say that arrangements had been made for a joint session of the two CIA Subcommittees at 10:00 a. m. on 23 March in room 212 Old Senate Office Building for a briefing on the general situation in Southeast Asia, to cover recent developments in Laos and Cambodia and update the Director's earlier briefing on Vietnam. Woodruff said that Senator Margaret Chase Smith would probably attend as a new member of our Appropriations Subcommittee.

In response to Woodruff's query (about the situation in Cambodia), I gave him the highlights from our last situation report.

cc:
ER
O/DDCI

[redacted]
JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

Mr. Houston Mr. Goodwin
DDI DDS DDS&T
EA/DDP
Item 1 - [redacted]

SECRET

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Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010007-8

Rogers and Fulbright Attempt To Clarify U.S. Stand on Laos

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 17 —

Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Senator J. W. Fulbright sought today to soften the impact of Mr. Rogers's assertion that the United States has no present plans to send ground combat troops to Laos if that country should be overrun by Communist forces.

Senator Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, revealed yesterday that, in a closed session of the committee on March 3, Mr. Rogers said of Laos: "We have no present plans, if it is overrun, to use combat troops."

Both men emphasized today that it had been Mr. Rogers's intention to stress the "no present plans" and to assure the Congress that none would be made by the Administration without seeking Congressional approval.

Mr. Rogers said that "if a situation should arise that would require consideration of combat forces in Laos, I told the Senate of the United States that we would consult with them to the fullest extent possible."

The Secretary, in a televised interview on the National Broadcasting Company's "Today" show, said he had explained to the Foreign Relations Committee "that I was not in

Continued on Page 9, Column 1

a position to foreclose the President in making any decision which might be required in the future."

A spokesman for the Secretary said that Mr. Rogers, in his remarks, had been trying to soften the impact of the March 3 statement.

In a telephone interview, Senator Fulbright said he had talked with Mr. Rogers this afternoon to explain the circumstances under which the statement had been made public. He said the disclosure had "not involved security" and was "not intended to embarrass the Secretary."

Senator Fulbright said he thought the "small incident" had been "grossly exaggerated" and indicated that there was no disagreement between Mr. Rogers and himself.

Conflict in Views Seen

The quotation from Mr. Rogers came up yesterday while the Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. Richardson, was testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee. Senators John Williams, Republican of Delaware, and Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, thought that Mr. Richardson had differed from Secretary Rogers on how fully the Congress would be consulted prior to any decision to send troops to Laos.

They asked to see the transcript of the testimony that Mr. Rogers gave on March 3. After consultation with Senator Fulbright, they asked him to read from the transcript. That produced the quotation in question.

Mr. Rogers's statements on television this morning, however, appeared to put him at some variance with the Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird. On Feb. 26, Mr. Laird told newsmen that if President Nixon decided to send troops to Laos, "he would come to the Congress of the United States for such approval."

Spokesmen for the State and Defense Departments were unable to reconcile the use of "consult" and "approval." Each said his department stood by what its Secretary had said.

The issue of the political and military conditions under which American soldiers might be sent to Laos came against a backdrop of intensified North Vietnamese action in that country.

A State Department spokesman, Carl Bartch, told newsmen that the military situation in Laos was serious. He confirmed that the North Vietnamese had taken several hill-top outposts around the Royal Laotian forces headquarters at Sam Thong and Long Tieng.

Objective Uncertain

Mr. Rogers said that the ultimate North Vietnamese objective was not known. "We hope that what they are up to is to make their negotiating position a little stronger," he said in his television appearance. "We hope that they do not intend to overrun Laos."

Other officials here said they believed the North Vietnamese forces were moving in for the kill against the clandestine army of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, the force trained and supplied by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. General Vang Pao's army has provided the only substantial opposition to the North Vietnamese in Laos for several years.

The officials also said they had received no word on when the courier with negotiating proposals from Prince Souphanouvong, the leader of North Vietnam's Pathet Lao allies, might be expected to reach Vientiane, the administrative capital of Laos.

Prince Souphanouvong has broadcast his intention of sending a messenger with proposals for negotiations. The broadcasts have indicated that the Communists want a cease-fire, withdrawal of American military support of the Laotian Government, a new coalition in Vientiane and the halt of all American bombing of the North Vietnamese supply trail through Eastern Laos.

Rogers Insists U.S. Plans No Use of Troops in Laos

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16—Secretary of State William P. Rogers has assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Nixon Administration has "no present plans" to commit ground combat troops to Laos even "if it is overrun" by Communist forces.

Mr. Rogers went on to promise that if the Administration did decide to send in ground troops, it would seek the "advance approval" of Congress.

The Secretary's assurances were regarded as probably the most emphatic statement thus far of the Administration's intention to avoid becoming involved in a ground war in Laos.

Pledge Is Strengthened

Previously President Nixon and other officials had stated repeatedly that the Administration had no plans to introduce ground combat troops into Laos. But Mr. Rogers's statement represented an important amendment to these assurances, for in effect the Secretary of State was saying that the Administration was prepared to accept a Communist takeover in Laos rather than become involved in ground combat in that Southeast Asian country.

Mr. Rogers's statement was made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a secret session on March 3. An excerpt from his secret testimony was made public today by Senator J. W. Fulbright, the committee chairman, apparently without having checked for clearance with the State Department.

Senator Fulbright decided to make public Mr. Rogers's testimony after a somewhat more conditional statement had been made before the committee today in a public hearing by

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Elliot L. Richardson, the Under Secretary of State.

Mr. Richardson gave an Administration pledge that no ground troops would be sent to Laos without Congressional approval, but he then went on to say that this approval might be sought through consultations with Congressional leaders rather by a formal, affirmative action by Congress, as Mr. Rogers had indicated was contemplated.

At the same time, however, Mr. Richardson argued that the Administration needed no Congressional authority or approval to engage in air combat over Laos because it was merely continuing an operation started by the Johnson Administration.

Mr. Rogers had been called before the Senate committee for an unannounced, closed-door meeting to discuss the American military involvement in Laos and the question whether the Administration had any plans to send in ground combat troops.

"Well, we have no present plans if it is overrun to use combat troops," Mr. Rogers said at one point. "I do not want to say that we would never think about it. But there are no present plans of that kind."

The United States now has military advisers but no ground combat units in Laos. The Administration has acknowledged in recent weeks that American planes have been providing air combat support to Royal Laotian army forces in northern Laos. Such American air support has been increased in the last year as the war has intensified between the Laotian Army and the Communist-led Pathet Lao, supported by North Vietnamese military units.

Mr. Richardson offered the theory that North Vietnam was increasing its military strength in Laos to put pressure on the United States to stop the bombing of North Vietnamese supply route that runs through eastern Laos into South Vietnam.

French Study on Laos

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, March 16—A recent French official study traces United States involvement in Laos to the Administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

This contrasts with President Nixon's account as issued in a statement at the Florida White House on March 6, which noted that Laos had been "a battleground for most of the past 20 years" but discussed American involvement from the Admin-

istration of President John F. Kennedy.

The Nixon statement said: "When this Administration came into office we faced a chronically serious situation in Laos. There had been six years of seasonal Communist attacks and growing United States involvement at the request of the Royal Laotian Government. The North Vietnamese had steadily increased both their infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam and their troop presence in Laos itself. Any facade of native Pathet Lao independence had been stripped away. In January, 1969, we thus had a military-assistance program reaching back over six years and air operations dating over four years."

This would date the Laotian troubles and the direct United States involvement as having begun in 1963, the third year of the Kennedy Administration. But according to the French version, by then the United States had been engaged for nearly a decade in military, economic and political effort to frustrate the neutralization and unification of Laos, as envisaged in the 1954 Geneva accords, which ended the Indochina war.

The study, "Le Laos," was published by the Government last Oct. 20. From internal evidence, it seems to have been prepared in 1968. A wide-ranging survey of the history and economy of modern Laos, it is

sharply critical of all foreign influences there except the French.

Nixon's Goal Defined

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16—The White House has declined to comment directly on the French report. A spokesman said, however, that President Nixon's statement about Laos "was intended primarily to address the scope of our current involvement in Laos."

"The logical starting place," the spokesman said, "was the formation of the present Government in 1962. The statement obviously was not intended to be a historical recap of the relations between the United States and Laos."