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Each one assured the committee that he had objectively reviewed the record of the nominee and had reached the conclusion that he was unqualified and they were opposed to him. Mr. President, is there anyone so naive that he would believe that the opposition to this man is based on any rational or objective foundation?

These witnesses concentrated primarily on the school desegregation cases handled by Judge Carswell. This fact in itself clearly demonstrates their lack of objectivity, for Judge Carswell has dealt with a number of different kinds of cases and yet they were not mentioned in the testimony.

The basic belief of the ultraliberal is that if a law is bad it is not to be obeyed. This sort of premise leads directly to the destruction of our republican form of government and ultimately to anarchy.

The criticism of those who oppose Judge Carswell is based on the premise that a judge should not support or obey a law which in their opinion is bad but should go beyond the law and through the process of opinion writing destroy the existing law and impose in its place his own brand of law.

Judge Carswell's treatments of the issues before him have been in accordance of the law as it was at the time the matter was in his court. In this context I call attention to an article that appeared in the New York Times written by Fred P. Graham. The article is a lengthy one and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. THURMOND. This article bears witness, as do the decisions of Judge Carswell, to the fact that Judge Carswell understands and practices the proper role of a jurist as it should be practiced in our system of government; namely, that he is to apply the law, not as it should be, or used to be, or ought to be, but as it is.

Mr. President, look at the record. This man is no zealot and yet he is accused of being a racist and of being incompetent by some people who are zealots. The ultra-liberals have come here mouthing the pretty platitudes of the left, both old and new, but after one removes the slick veneer from his pious pronouncements of objectivity it is readily obvious that they simply oppose anyone who will not rule their way in every case, every time, even if it means complete disregard of the rule, letter, and spirit of the law. The opposition posed by these individuals is purely political and without substance.

Mr. President, this man is qualified, both as a student and practitioner of the law. The Senate has confirmed his nomination to high Federal positions three times, two of which nominations were to the Federal bench. In doing so, this body has gone on record as approving his qualifications to sit on the Federal bench.

Some time ago, the ultra-liberals in this country decided that Congress would not go along with all of their ill-conceived visionary schemes, so they turned to the other branches of Government and found the courts most vulnerable to their

arguments. They have enjoyed a virtual monopoly on judicial appointments until this administration, and they have reacted by vicious and unwarranted attacks on President Nixon's appointments.

The American judicial system is the backbone of our Republic, because the court is the place where the citizen can redress his grievances, sue his Government, and right his wrongs without force or violence. To undermine the court is to undermine the Nation, and to destroy the court is to destroy the Nation.

So we come to the crux of the matter—if Carswell or any other strict constructionist is denied a seat on the Court, it will remain outside the constitutional boundaries set by our forefathers; but if Judge Carswell is confirmed, then a balance will be effected on the High Tribunal, and the system of checks and balances will again function within the constitutional framework.

Mr. President, we must look to the dangers of refusing confirmation. Congress legislates; the Executive legislates through executive orders, regulations, and bureaucratic fiat; and the Supreme Court has taken upon itself to legislate. Where, indeed, is our system of checks and balances? It appears that it is dormant, but it must be revived and renewed. The only way to resurrect these checks and balances is to balance the court, and it will require the placing of a strict constructionist such as Judge Carswell on the Supreme Court to accomplish this purpose. By confirming Judge Carswell, we shall accomplish more than fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court; we shall by that action reaffirm our belief in the American system of checks and balances.

Mr. President, I support the confirmation of Judge George Harold Carswell to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and I call on my colleagues to support President Nixon in his choice of this able and dedicated American.

EXHIBIT 1

JANUARY 24, 1970.

HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR BRAD: Although I realize that you will not be called upon to vote on the confirmation of Judge G. Harold Carswell, I am writing to you to share information which may be of some interest to those who will be required to decide how to vote on the matter.

You have no doubt read that Judge Carswell served in the United States Navy during World War II. He and I reported for duty aboard the U.S.S. Baltimore early in 1943 at the Fore River Works in Quincy, Mass. We were both newly-commissioned ensigns, and we were put in the junior officers bunkroom together with about twenty other civilians in uniform.

The Baltimore shook down in the Caribbean, then went to the Pacific and operated as part of the fast carrier striking force screen, participating in all the invasions of the Central Pacific campaign, Gilberts, Marshalls, Saipan, Guam, Iwo, Philippines, Okinawa—interrupted only by a return to the West Coast in August, 1944 to pick up President Roosevelt and take him to Pearl Harbor to meet with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.

George Carswell and I were aboard all during that period, until he was detached in February, 1945, to attend staff school, and I was aboard until May, 1945, when I was ordered to Japanese Language School. We were promoted to junior grade lieutenants and

moved out of the J.O. bunkroom and into a cabin for two officers, where we were roommates for about a year. We had a chance to learn each other's views during a period when we were both under a good deal of combat-generated emotional pressure. I think that under such circumstances a lot of basic human values become evident, and during that year we talked about everything under the sun—education, politics, philosophy, sex, history, movies and anything else that came to mind.

During all that time, I never heard George utter any point of view that could be described as racist or illiberal. His attitude was a truly humanistic and liberal one in that he reacted to people as individuals and not as stereotypes. This was especially apparent in his behavior toward black sailors. At that time Navy policy was segregationist, and black sailors afloat could only serve in the wardroom mess as stewards mates. There were other officers of Southern origin who were outspokenly antagonistic to the steward's mates for racial reasons, but George Carswell was always pleasant and considerate to all. Our Gunnery Officer, Comdr. Truesdell, felt that the steward's mates ought to be given the opportunity to serve in a more meaningful capacity, and saw to it that their station at general quarters was to man a battery of 20 millimeter anti-aircraft guns. While other officers questioned the desirability of this, George Carswell was enthusiastically in favor of it.

I remember that once during a shore excursion in the forward area George and I together encountered for the first time a black petty officer, evidence that at long last the Navy was beginning to move away from its segregationist policies, and George could see the wisdom of that too.

In view of the attacks on Judge Carswell's legal philosophy by civil libertarians, and especially in view of the pro-segregationist views expressed in his campaign for election to the state house of representatives from a rural constituency in Georgia in 1948, which he recently has firmly and, I am convinced, sincerely repudiated, I am sure that members of the Senate must be subject to pressure to vote against his confirmation to the Supreme Court. At the same time I am sure that the Administration would welcome an expression of regularity and support by an affirmative vote.

My own position is this: I have no axe to grind for or against whatever position Senators may take, but I hope that you may find useful the opinion of a concerned constituent who happens to have had some extended personal conflict with Judge Carswell. My opinion is that Judge Carswell was not and is not a racist or a bigot. He is a warm, friendly, outgoing person, extremely intelligent, and about as liberal as the Southern milieu into which he was born could produce at that time. I have no fear of his subverting past actions and decisions of the Court should his appointment be confirmed. While I do not think that his elevation to the Court would warrant the probability of his development into a liberal of the Hugo Black variety, neither do I believe that we should fear the emergence of a modern Roger B. Taney. Out of personal knowledge and affection for George Carswell as I knew him during the war, I am happy to be able to give some justification for a favorable consideration of his appointment.

Sincerely yours,

ALLAN L. LEVINE,
Executive Vice President, Towers Motor Parts Corp., Lowell, Mass.

EXHIBIT 2

CARSWELL'S CREDO IS RESTRAINT

(By Fred P. Graham)

WASHINGTON, January 20.—Judge G. Harold Carswell, President Nixon's new nominee to the Supreme Court, has a virtually unblemished record as the type of "strict con-

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structionist" that Mr. Nixon promised to appoint when he campaigned for the Presidency.

In speeches across the country, Mr. Nixon promised to name men to the high court who would "interpret" the law, not "make" it.

In 11 years as a Federal District judge in Tallahassee, Fla., and in six months as a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Carswell sprinkled the lawbooks with opinions on matters ranging from civil rights to the legality of Florida's poultry law.

Throughout these opinions runs a consistent tendency to view the law as a neutral device for settling disputes, and not as a force for either legal innovation or social change.

AN IRONIC COMPARISON

An ironic byproduct of this consistency is that Judge Carswell's judicial record is more conservative than that of Judge Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., who was defeated for confirmation to the same seat by liberal forces that branded him as a conservative who was "not a contemporary man of the times."

Judge Haynsworth was ahead of the Supreme Court in devising fuller review for state prisoners in Federal habeas corpus proceedings, and occasionally anticipated the high court in ruling in favor of Negroes in civil rights cases.

An exact comparison with Judge Carswell is difficult, as the new nominee served as a trial judge much of the time, and most of his opinions dealt with day-to-day issues rather than sweeping constitutional matters. But the lawbooks contain at least 25 appellate opinions he wrote when he sat, as District judges frequently do, on the Court of Appeals.

These opinions reveal a jurist who hesitates to use judicial power unless the need is clear and demanding; who finds few controversies that cannot be settled by invoking some settled precedent, and who rarely finds the need to refer to the social conflict outside the courtroom that brought his cases before him.

ATTITUDE OF RESTRAINT

This attitude of restraint has generated friction only in the field of civil rights, where Judge Carswell's policy of sticking with settled precedents until change came from higher courts had the result of allowing dilatory school officials to delay segregation.

An example was provided when parents of Negro children in the Pensacola area sued to break up the segregation of faculty and staffs in the formerly all-black school. Although the higher courts had not said in so many words that faculty, as well as student, segregation must end, lawyers for the Negroes argued that these courts could not have meant that the newly integrated schools would be staffed with all-black and all-white faculties. Judge Carswell ruled otherwise.

"The Brown cases," he wrote, referring to the Supreme Court's landmark school decisions of 1954 and 1955, "hold that the segregation of white and Negro children on the basis of race denies to Negro children equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution." He put the word "children" in italics, and went on to state that these decisions and subsequent ones by the Fifth Circuit did not reach the question of faculty desegregation.

NOT DIRECTLY AT ISSUE

"This court can not indulge in a presumption that these Federal courts decided the points of law asserted by plaintiff by inference," he said, because staff members' rights were not directly at issue in those cases.

Finally, he declared, students have no standing to intervene in such matters: "Students herein can no more complain of injury to themselves of the selection or assignment of teachers than they can bring action to

enjoin the assignment to the school of teachers who were too strict or too lenient."

Some civil rights lawyers who have appeared before Judge Carswell have charged that his tendency to issue declaratory judgments rather than injunctions—to hand down limited desegregation orders rather than sweeping ones—was a convenient use of judicial self-restraint to cloak segregationist sympathies.

Leroy D. Clark, a professor of law at New York University, who formerly headed the operations of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., in northern Florida, asserted in an interview today that Judge Carswell had repeatedly delayed school cases by failing to rule until pressed to do so, and then by often issuing decisions that were palpably wrong and quickly reversed.

"We would have a hearing and it would take several months for him to rule," Mr. Clark said. "I would have to file a motion to ask him 'would you please rule?'—which is outrageous.

"It was my view that of the Federal District judges I appeared before, Harrold Carswell was clearly the most openly and blatantly segregationist. He was a clever and an intelligent man, so that when he was wrong on the law it wasn't because he didn't know what the law was—it was because he was biased."

*** wrote a political science dissertation in 1968 that analyzed the civil rights decisions of the 31 Federal District judges appointed to posts in the Deep South between 1953 and 1963.

When she ranked the 31 judges in terms of the number of times they had ruled in favor of Negro plaintiffs' position, Judge Carswell ranked 23d. Her study showed that, of his civil rights decisions to be appealed, 60 per cent were reversed.

In most of these cases, Judge Carswell would have had to move beyond clearly settled precedents to rule in favor of the civil rights position. When these precedents have existed, he has struck down segregation in crisp forthright opinions.

In 1965, he declared that the barber shop in Tallahassee's Duval Hotel had to serve Negroes under the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

He brushed aside a barber's assertion that he was not covered because 95 per cent of the customers were local people and not guests in the hotel. "From a reading of the act it is clear," Judge Carswell observed, "that relative percentages of local, as compared to transient, customers may not be used as criteria to determine coverage."

PROSPECTS BRIGHTER

In 1960 when Tallahassee Negroes sued to desegregate the counters, waiting rooms and restrooms in the city-owned airport, he did not hesitate to order desegregation.

Even though Judge Carswell's civil rights record may be fully as objectionable to civil rights forces as that of Judge Haynsworth, the new nominee's prospects for confirmation seem much brighter, partly because he has not antagonized organized labor as Judge Haynsworth had.

Federal District Judges rarely rule on labor cases, which are usually appealed from the National Labor Relations Board directly to a Court of Appeals.

Tom Harris, the official of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations who led the successful attack against Judge Haynsworth, said today that Judge Carswell "doesn't appear to have a significant record on labor cases." He said the AFL-CIO had no plans as present to oppose him.

The few labor opinions that Judge Carswell has written reflect his reticence to use judicial power and his tendency not to extend the judiciary's power.

SOME DISSENTING OPINIONS

In one decision, when a three-judge Court of Appeals ordered a soft-drink company to

comply with the minimum wage laws, he dissented, saying: "It is my view that the injunctive power of courts should never be invoked lightly, nor should it be converted into a mere ministerial function triggered automatically upon the finding of an infraction of the law."

Judge Carswell's opinions tend to be bloodless documents, setting out the facts and the precedents, then briskly coming to a conclusion that is said to be within the precedents.

He is not given to broad statements of his philosophy, but his creed at this point in his career seems to have been summed up in one statement from an opinion he wrote shortly after he became a judge in 1958: "Established law, with its imperfections, must nonetheless be applied as it is and not on the predilections of the court."

WHY THE LONG DELAY IN RELEASING THE LAOS TESTIMONY

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, it is now more than 5 months since the Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad completed its hearings on Laos.

The record of those hearings remains classified top secret at the insistence of the State Department. That record contains a great deal of information about U.S. activities in Laos which the American people should know and have a right to know. Repeated attempts on the part of the subcommittee to persuade the State Department to declassify portions of the record, however, have been to no avail.

We want it to be clear, Mr. President, that we have never suggested the entire record should be published. I agree it contains some material which should not be published. But it contains a great deal of material which should be published if the American people are to maintain that proper confidence in their Government.

Almost daily the press makes more revelations—or raises more questions—about what is going on in Laos, and in Thailand as it affects Laos.

The Washington Star, in a dispatch by Henry S. Bradsher from Udorn, Thailand, March 15, described how the air war in Laos is run out of seven bases in Thailand, sometimes with unmarked planes.

The Washington Post on March 16, in a dispatch by T. D. Allman from Vientiane, reported in detail how 12 Americans were killed 2 years ago defending a secret air navigation facility at Phou Pha Thi, Laos.

The Washington Star on March 17, in a dispatch by Tammy Arbuckle, described the evacuation of Sam Thong, Laos, by Air America. This story went on to say that there have been approximately 70 Americans in the Sam Thong-Long Chien area armed with M-16 rifles and captured Communist AK-47 submachineguns.

In a dispatch from Vientiane March 20, the Associated Press reported that two Thai battalions have been flown to Long Chien in U.S. civil aircraft to help defend that Army base from an expected North Vietnamese onslaught.

On March 23, a story from Bangkok by Jack Foisie in the Washington Post de-

scribed other Thai activities in Laos. According to this story, two Thai artillery battalions were used in Laos last year under American auspices during the defense of Muong Soui. Further, according to Mr. Foisie, Thai pilots have flown T-28 bomber planes, and Thai observers fly in spotter planes to direct artillery fire and bomber strikes.

On March 22, the Associated Press had the Thai Premier himself admitting that some volunteers may have gone to Laos.

On March 23, the Christian Science Monitor stated flatly, "A Thai artillery battalion is operating in Laos with the support of the United States."

And finally, on March 25 a story from Vientiane in the Washington Star described in some detail an American-directed secret army which operates all through Southeast Asia.

I ask unanimous consent that the full texts of the newstories to which I have referred may be printed in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I again urge the State Department to agree to telling the American people the facts. What the Thais may or may not be doing in Laos is a matter between the Thais and the Laotians—unless the United States is paying for it, in which case it becomes a legitimate matter of public concern for the citizens of the United States.

The President himself stated it best in his televised address of November 3 last year:

The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington Star, Mar. 15, 1970]
UDORN AIR BASE IN THAILAND U.S. MAINSTAY
IN LAOS FIGHT

(By Henry S. Bradsher)

UDORN, THAILAND.—When President Nixon admitted nine days ago the well-known fact that the U.S. Air Force is flying combat support missions for the government of Laos, he did not mention where the bases are.

The biggest of them is on the southern edge of this dusty northeast Thailand town.

The 36 F4D Phantom supersonic fighter-bombers stationed at Udorn fly day and night to attack North Vietnamese forces in Laos.

They also escort Udorn's unarmed RF4C Phantom reconnaissance planes over Laos and North Vietnam. They are authorized to attack antiaircraft weapons in North Vietnam if fired on—or perhaps if they only expect to be fired on; Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird refused to clarify this point when he was in Saigon last month.

The Udorn base is also busy with helicopter units, C47 "Spooky" gunships and some other ground-support firepower planes, not all of which are marked with U.S. Air Force insignia, and shuttles of supporting transport planes.

And sharing the 10,000-foot runway is Air America, the airline created by the Central Intelligence Agency to provide logistical support for Lao government forces.

The base is officially known as Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, and the 6,500 U.S. military men here are guests of the Thai government.

The official base commander is Thai Lt.

Col. Jaru Sanguanphokai. He commands a Thai Force squadron of propeller-driven T28s stationed here.

U.S. officials are careful to avoid anything which might imply Thailand lacks control of Udorn or the other six air bases used by the United States in this country. They do not want to give offense that might, among other things, become a cause for Thailand's restricting American activities.

But at the moment the Thai attitude seems to be the opposite.

Rather than being worried about Americans exceeding their authorization here, the Thai government fears that public opinion in the United States—or at least senatorial criticism—might cause a restriction of air operations over Laos from Thai bases.

Thailand wants a maximum U.S. air effort to check the North Vietnamese dry-season offensive in Laos. Laos lies just across the Mekong River from Thailand and this country sees itself threatened.

ANXIETY NOT RELIEVED

The current lull in the offensive while the Lao Communists propose peace talks has not relieved the anxiety in Bangkok. One top official there described it as "a diplomatic offensive to go with the military offensive."

That concern over Lao air war criticism in the United States means a continuation of the sensitivity which always has marked U.S. Air Force operations here, but for a reversed reason.

Originally, the United States was secretive about its Thai operations to avoid embarrassing the government in Bangkok. Although 80 percent of the U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam were flown from Thailand, this country did not want to appear too committed to Washington.

In the case of Lao operations, there also has been the same consideration which long kept Washington mum about American activities. That was the theoretical neutrality of Laos under the 1962 Geneva agreement.

HISTORY OF BASE

Those who get Thai government permission to visit the U.S. Air Force at Udorn—not an easy thing to do—are given a history of the base which only begins in 1964.

In May 1964, the State Department confirmed that U.S. reconnaissance flights were being made over Laos at the request of the Lao government, then as now fighting North Vietnamese troops.

A few days later, after a fighter-bomber had been shot down, the State Department confirmed that armed escort was being flown for the reconnaissance planes and the escorts were allowed to shoot back if fired upon.

For six years that was the official explanation of Phantom fighter operations over Laos from Udorn and other American planes' Lao operations from other Thai bases.

INTERDICTIONARY MISSIONS

But on March 6 Nixon said that in May 1964, U.S. planes "began flying certain interdiction missions against invaders" of Laos. That means bombing North Vietnamese.

The United States, he said, has continued "to fly combat support missions for Laotian forces." The North Vietnamese offensive has caused and increase in missions, making Udorn busier than it has been since the bombing of North Vietnam ended in 1968.

Nixon's statement has not yet filtered down through channels to provide a more comprehensive explanation of what goes on from Udorn. U.S. officers here are cautiously noncommittal and they let visitors look but not talk to people.

The 1964 date is deceptive.

A plaque on the wall of the U.S. consulate here marks eight years of Air America operations from Udorn—March 1961 to March 1969.

This base was obviously a key point in U.S.

support for Lao anti-Communist forces long before Washington was asked in 1964 to help the government legally established in Vientiane by the 1962 agreement.

That long support from here reflects long Thai concern over the danger of Laos falling completely under Communist control.

On April 1, 1961, the Chinese Communist newspaper, People's Daily, complained that "the United States has built an Air Force base capable of handling large aircraft at Udorn in Thailand, only 50 miles away from Vientiane across the Mekong River . . ."

It was to Udorn that U.S. Marines, helicopters and weapons were rushed in 1962 when the North Vietnamese rout of Lao forces at Nam Tha, in northwest Laos, panicked the Bangkok government. The Marines later left.

GUERRILLAS TRAINED

The Air America date of March 1961 is about the time the first U.S. Special Forces teams went into Laos to train Lao guerrillas—what have become today the "secret army" of Gen. Vang Pao. These guerrillas could not exist without Air America's aerial support.

Recently Air America advertised in the Bangkok Post for Thais to work in Udorn at a long list of jobs, mostly technical ones like aircraft mechanics. Two job listings, however, were "stock control clerks with military supply experience" and "supply storekeepers with military warehouse activities experience."

U.S. military supplies trucked from ports on the Gulf of Siam are flown by Air America to hazardous little air strips in the Lao mountains.

The separately fenced Air America part of the air base has a wide variety of planes, from small liaison craft to four-engined transports. Some are marked "Air America," some have no markings.

USED TO TRAIN PILOTS

A few unmarked T28s are used by Air America to train Lao Air Force pilots. T28s, slow old planes originally built as trainers, are used by Laos to bomb enemy positions.

The Lao T28 operations have to be coordinated with U.S. Air Force strikes in Laos, which are ordered from Saigon. Udorn is a link in the control system, which ends with U.S. Air Force officers stationed at Lao T28 bases up and down Laos.

Udorn is the headquarters for the 7-13 Air Force, which directs all U.S. Air Force activities in Thailand.

It comes under the 7th Air Force at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base for operational matters and under the 13th Air Force at Clark Field, the Philippines, for logistical support.

The A1 Skyraider prop-driven fighter-bomber that was shot down over northern Laos Tuesday, and announced as part of the post-March 6 policy of reporting American losses in Laos, came from Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base.

Located on the Mekong River border with Laos 80 miles east of Udorn, it is directly linked with Udorn operations.

On five-minute standby at Nakhon Phanom is a team of two rescue helicopters, a transport plane to refuel the copters in the air and direct them, and four A1s to provide covering fire during a rescue. Such a team brought back Tuesday's downed A1 crew.

Last August and September, when the U.S. use of Thai bases was being much discussed in Washington to the displeasure of the Thai government, a reduction of American activity here was envisaged. Vietnamization seemed to make it possible.

But at the moment there is no indication that Udorn or the other six bases will slow down. While Vietnam was the consideration then, Laos has been added now as a main—perhaps the main—factor.

Under a Sept. 30 agreement, 4,500 U.S. military personnel have been withdrawn from

the 48,000 then in Thailand. A total of 6,000 is scheduled to be gone by July.

Officials say the 6,000 are mostly Army construction troops whose job is done but include some Air Force units flying obsolescent support planes.

Any further reduction would begin to cut into U.S. capabilities to support the Lao and South Vietnamese wars. And the mood of worry over Laos in Bangkok makes that seem as undesirable for the Thai government as it seems from here to be for Nixon.

So the hot, now dusty but soon muddy air base here at Udorn is likely to go on making the claim of being the busiest in Southeast Asia.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1970]
12 AMERICANS DIED IN LOSS OF SECRET LAOTIAN
OUTPOST

(By T. D. Allman)

VIENTIANE, March 15.—More than a dozen Americans were killed in Laos two years ago when Communist troops overran a secret American installation that assisted U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. The incident has been kept a secret.

In his March 6 statement on Laos, President Nixon said, "No American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations."

The sentence, although carefully phrased to exclude casualties in the American air war in Laos and U.S. military personnel who have fought in Laos from U.S. bases in South Vietnam and Thailand, failed to cover scores of Americans performing military and military supported functions on the ground in Laos who have been killed in combat with North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops.

[Speaking with newsmen Friday, White House spokesman Ronald L. Ziegler said there were "some" U.S. casualties in Laos besides the announced death of Army Capt. Joseph K. Bush Jr. Without saying how many, Ziegler said "some of the casualties would be U.S. civilians, some would be U.S. military."]

The most costly of these engagements, according to long-time Laos residents, occurred just two years ago, when more than a dozen Americans were killed defending an American radar, reconnaissance and rescue base in extreme northeastern Laos that guided U.S. aircraft to their targets and electronically released their bomb loads by radio.

The installation was called Phou Pha Thi. Phou Pha Thi is a 5,860-foot-high mountain, 190 miles northeast of Vientiane and about 160 miles west of Hanoi, in Lao's Communist-dominated Samneua Province ("Phou" is the Laotian word for mountain). Phou Pha Thi, one of the highest and most isolated mountains in the hilly northeast, lies within 15 miles of the North Vietnamese frontier in a province that was granted to the Pathet Lao in 1954 as a regroupment area.

Phou Pha Thi, like most of the mountains of northeast Laos, is largely limestone. It rises up sheer on three sides. The fourth side also steep but negotiable, rises more than 1,600 feet from a valley.

The mountain was controlled by Meo partisans of the CIA-organized Clandestine Army until March 1968.

In August 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, according to reliable American sources then working in the Air Force, U.S. aircraft completed surveys of northeast Laos with the principal objective of finding areas close to the North Vietnamese border that could be used to support the American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and North Vietnam itself.

STARTED IN 1964

Although foreign military intervention in Laos was prohibited by the 1962 Geneva ac-

ords, the sources say construction of the Phou Pha Thi installation was begun in late 1964.

The mountain had obvious strategic advantages. It faced a narrow valley where a 700-foot-long dirt landing strip was built.

Its proximity to North Vietnam and its commanding heights made it ideal for radar guidance systems and as a base for "Jolly Green Giant" rescue helicopters, which were used to save American pilots downed by anti-aircraft fire in North Vietnam.

The base, as described by a variety of Americans and Laotians here who visited it, was like something out of an Ian Fleming novel.

Exotic telecommunications equipment, including radar nets, dotted Phou Pha Thi and several nearby hills. American Air Force and CIA personnel used the valley landing strip as the base for American-led teams of Meo mercenaries entering North Vietnam on special harassment missions.

These teams were also used to attack the Pathet Lao administrative headquarters and Samneua town, 23 miles to the east.

REMOTE-CONTROL BOMBING

The radar was used to pinpoint exact distances between Phou Pha Thi and targets in North Vietnam, and guide the planes there. This sophisticated installation was considered essential for bombing in bad weather and at night.

The main American headquarters was in a deep limestone cavern near the mountain's summit.

Inside the cavern were control consoles for the electronic equipment and a situation room. Living quarters were in a nearby concrete bunker.

The entire complex was ringed with Clandestine Army positions, directed by American personnel in cooperation with Meo officers paid by the CIA.

Into the Pha Thi runway, civilian American pilots, employed by Air America, the charter airline that acts as the U.S. logistics arm in Laos, would fly supplies, electronic equipment and arms.

Unmarked, armed helicopters transported Laotian soldiers and U.S. personnel on missions. Short take-off and landing aircraft based at Pha Thi were used to link scores of other "friendly" positions deep in the Communist hinterland.

JUST VISITING

Some of the Americans there would fly into North Vietnam just so they could say they'd been there, one witness said. There was a Philippine cook who made steaks and ham sandwiches, he added.

This American use of Laos to support the bombing of North Vietnam quickly became intolerable to Hanoi. Several attacks at Pha Thi failed in 1965 and 1967.

"The place was impregnable," said one American. "To get up three sides you would have needed to be an Alpine expert. On the fourth was a lot of American hardware and Vang Pao's Meos."

On Jan. 12, 1968, four Soviet-manufactured single-engine biplanes of the North Vietnamese air force attempted to destroy the base. The planes were AN-2s, vintage Soviet aircraft that can carry some 10 passengers at a speed of less than 200 miles an hour. The aircraft are used by Aeroflot for crop dusting, rural transport and passenger service in remote areas of Siberia.

An American civilian, who was at Pha Thi at the time of the only confirmed North Vietnamese air attack in the history of the Laotian war, related:

"JUST WACKY"

"It was just wacky. We saw these four incredibly slow-moving old planes coming out of North Vietnam. It was like something out of the First World War. The Viets were trying to shoot machine guns out of windows. The AN-2 has no bomb bay and they

were going to push explosives out of the open door. Everybody saw them coming, so the Air American helicopters took off at once and, being much faster, ran rings around the Viet planes. The Air America guys fired M-16s at the planes right on the border. One of the planes crashed inside Laos.

"Another went down about two kilometers inside North Vietnam. The other two got away. It was like a joke."

The wreckage of one plane eventually carried to Vientiane, where it was exhibited in front of the That Luang Monument, Vientiane's most important religious shrine, as evidence of North Vietnamese military aggression in Laos.

TAKEN BY COMMUNISTS

Two months later, however, in March 1968, Phou Pha Thi was taken by Communist troops. During the dry season of 1966 and 1967, Laotian troops, with American support, had re-taken large areas of Pathet Lao territory, including Nambac, a valley town 65 miles north of the royal capital of Luang Prabang.

In early 1968, the North Vietnamese re-took Nambac and pushed into other government-held areas, such as the Sedone Valley in South Laos, where an American strategic-hamlet program had been started in an attempt to deny the valley's rice harvest to the Pathet Lao who, it was believed, were passing it on to North Vietnamese troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The 1968 Laos offensive, which corresponded to the Tet offensive in South Vietnam, also saw increased Communist attacks in Samneua Province.

After several North Vietnamese attacks at Phou Pha Thi in February 1968, a Communist assault there finally succeeded. Several guarding positions fell early in March, and some U.S. personnel were evacuated.

On March 10, 1968, the landing strip was lost, cutting Pha Thi's only link with the outside world. North Vietnamese troops then fought their way up the exposed side of the mountain, advancing in some cases in hand-to-hand combat, and attack.

Inside the limestone cave and concrete bunker, again according to American sources familiar with the incident, were between 12 and 21 Americans, mostly U.S. Air Force personnel, a number of Laotian officers and some 100 Meo troops.

FOUGHT TO LAST MAN

"They fought to the last man," said one American. "They were all killed on March 11, inside that grotto. An enormous amount of electronics equipment was lost, too."

The U.S. government never has acknowledged officially the deaths of these Americans, nor the fact that Laotian territory within a few miles of North Vietnam was used to support the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

The incident, however, has been common knowledge among long-time residents of Vientiane for two years. It was never fully reported before in the press and was fading from memory when President Nixon's statement raised the question of American ground combat deaths in Laos.

The number of Americans killed at Phou Pha Thi is not exactly known. Pathet Lao broadcast in March 1968 claimed the total as 21.

The Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane, Col. Soth Pretasi, said in an interview this week that the number was 19. Several American and Laotian sources also have given the number killed as 19.

"SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT"

An American official, while refusing to confirm or deny the account of the fall of Pha Thi as reconstructed here, has said the Pathet Lao account "appears to be substantially correct."

Other well-informed sources have said the total of Americans killed at Pha Thi was "13 or a little less."

The above version of the incident was corroborated in cross-interviews with American, Laotian, European, and Pathet Lao sources.

In an interview yesterday, an authoritative North Vietnamese diplomat said, "If Laos is to be neutralized and have peace again, it must be in such a way that its neighbors will not be threatened and be able to coexist peacefully with Laos."

Other Communist sources have indicated that North Vietnam, as the part of any overall Laos settlement, regards guarantees that Laotian territory will never again be used to attack North Vietnam, the sine qua non of permanent peace.

The U.S. government and the government of Prince Souvanna Phouma see things differently. They point out that the Ho Chi Minh Trail has been used by North Vietnam to attack South Vietnam since the early sixties, that an estimated 50,000 North Vietnamese troops are in Laos, and that the North Vietnamese recently attacked the Plain of Jars.

"SERVED ITS PURPOSE"

"There's no use being a bleeding heart about Phou Pha Thi," said one of the Americans who provided some of the above details. "The North Vietnamese have used Laos. So have we. Phou Pha Thi served its purpose, and Hanoi will have no right to complain until it begins to practice what it preaches."

Although Laotian government troops briefly reoccupied Phou Pha Thi in December 1968, the mountain never again has been used to support the U.S. war effort in Vietnam.

Nineteen days after the outpost fell, President Johnson announced the halt of bombing of North Vietnam north of the 19th Parallel.

REDS CAPTURE LAOS OUTPOSTS OF GUERRILLAS
 (By Tammy Arbuckle)

VIENTIANE.—North Vietnamese forces launched new thrusts in northern Laos today directed at the outer defenses of U.S. and Meo guerrilla bases in Sam Thong and Long Chien, 100 miles north of Vientiane.

(Wire service reports indicated that some Americans—perhaps a dozen—were being evacuated from Sam Thong.)

Meo guerrillas in the hills around Tha Tam Bleung, 5 miles northeast of Sam Thong, woke up this morning to find North Vietnamese troops occupying Tha Tam airstrip.

The Communist forces took Phou Pa Xai outpost a few miles east of Sam Thong after a brief fight at 4 a.m., the Lao military said. A Communist commando squad threw satchel charges at a U.S. generator outpost 5 miles southeast of Long Chien.

Reliable military sources said seven battalions of Hanoi's 316th Division were involved in the advance on Sam Thong. This means between 2,000 and 3,000 troops.

Air America today evacuated more than 200 government wounded from Sam Thong hospital as a precaution in the event the base falls. Fifty-six of these were seriously wounded troops from this morning's fighting which was described by the military as "spotty."

In Washington, the State Department said the American Embassy had reported that the "Military situation is serious" at both Sam Thong and Long Chien.

The Communist thrust against the U.S.-guerrilla bases represents a new Communist move in the Laos war.

Previous Communist attacks have been confined to retaking areas held by the Communists when the 1962 Geneva Accords were signed. The Sam Thong-Long Chien thrust means that the Communists are attacking areas held by the government in 1962.

Meo refugees today were reported to be walking into Sam Thong from fallen outposts.

There have been approximately 70 Ameri-

cans in the Sam Thong-Long Chien area, including one woman.

The figure includes eight workers, for the U.S. Agency for International Development, 12 Air America employees at Sam Thong and between 40 and 50 others—CIA and military advisers, interrogators and Air Force men.

The Americans are armed with M16 rifles and captured Communist AK47 submachine-guns.

Long Chien houses sophisticated American communications equipment.

The North Vietnamese military aim—if the present thrust continues—would be to smash the U.S.-supported Meo guerrillas headed by Gen. Vang Pao. With American backing, Vang Pao has held off the North Vietnamese for eight years with the loss of at least 15,000 men on each side.

Informed sources said the thrust is timed to coincide with the Communist call for political talks with Premier Souvanna Phouma's government.

"It's part of the Communists' old talk-fight policy," sources said, explaining that the destruction of Vang Pao would so seriously weaken the forces of neutralist Souvanna Phouma that he would be forced to make concessions to the Reds at the bargaining table.

The Pathet Lao have offered a five-point peace plan but have not yet sent an emissary to Vientiane with the proposal.

The Pathet Lao radio said today, however, that the emissary has left "the liberated zone" but gave no destination for him.

If the North Vietnamese take Long Thien, they will be within 20 miles of an American-built road leading to Vientiane, the administrative capital.

Also, the troops of Gen. Kouprasith Abhay at Sala Phou Khoun, 150 miles north of here, will be cut off by road from Military Region 5 including the capital defense for which the general is responsible.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Mar. 21, 1970]
 THAI TROOPS SAID TO HELP DEFEND LAOS—BUT
 ZIEGLER INDICATES INVOLVEMENT AT BASE
 IS "VERY LIMITED"

VIENTIANE, LAOS, March 20.—Two Thai battalions have been flown to Long Cheng in U.S. civil aircraft to help defend that Army base from an expected North Vietnamese onslaught, well-informed sources said today.

In Washington, Ronald L. Ziegler, White House press secretary, confirmed some Thai involvement, but said the report that two battalions were involved was "grossly exaggerated."

Mr. Ziegler first said he would not comment on the report, but added: "I will say that the report is grossly exaggerated. I am not going to comment on the very limited Thai involvement in Laos." He said he would leave that to the governments of Laos and Thailand.

Long Cheng, 90 miles north of Vientiane, appeared in peril after the North Vietnamese seized three hill top positions and advanced to within a mile of the base, the informants reported.

This report came just about the time a pro-Communist Pathet Lao emissary arrived in Vientiane from Hanoi bringing a peace plan for Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Premier. The Pathet Lao emissary, Col. Pradith Thientham, is expected to see the Premier tomorrow.

FIVE-POINT PEACE PLAN

The Pathet Lao recently unveiled a five-point peace plan and announced that Colonel Pradith, an aide to Prince Souphanouvong, nominal head of the Pathet Lao, would carry details to Vientiane.

The plan calls for an end to all U.S. bombing in Laos, including the Ho Chi Minh supply trail used by the North Vietnamese in eastern Laos, a cease-fire, a consultative conference of all political parties, creation of a

demilitarized zone for the conference, and a provisional coalition government.

The informants, in a position to know, said the Thai battalions were flown from Thailand bases in planes of Air America, which is chartered by the U.S. Aid agency in Laos. (The airline is also believed to have close ties to the Central Intelligence Agency.)

A Thai battalion normally has a peak strength of 500 men. This was the first report of any sizable Thai force entering the conflict in Laos. There have been numerous reports, however, of small groups of Thai advisers working with the Laotian forces.

The sources said anti-Communist demonstrations in neighboring Cambodia, topped by the coup Wednesday that deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk as chief of state, encouraged the royal Laotian government to stiffen its stand against the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies.

The sources did not know precisely how the Thais fitted into this situation, although they noted that Thailand has recognized a potential threat to its borders in the North Vietnamese drive through Laos.

The sources explained that Lao officials initially had ordered their forces to pull back from Sam Thong, a key supply base 10 miles northwest of Long Cheng, in the face of the North Vietnamese advance. The officials had been considering abandoning Long Cheng as well until the Cambodian events occurred.

In addition to the two Thai battalions, hundreds of other reinforcements have been sent into the Long Cheng-Sam Thong region. These include regular Laotian Army troops and American-trained Laotian special forces troops.

The advance on Long Cheng was reported to be by company strength units although the North Vietnamese are believed to have about 4,000 troops in that area.

Laotian Air Force T-28 bombers made 15 raids a mile from the eastern end of the Long Cheng airfield after a North Vietnamese force was detected there moving toward that headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao.

Col. Thongphanh Knoksy, the Defense Ministry spokesman, denied that the North Vietnamese actually had captured Sam Thong Wednesday, as reported by well-informed sources. In any event, the U.S.-maintained supply base was abandoned by officials. A pilot flying over the town yesterday reported it appeared deserted.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1970]
 THAIS LONG INVOLVED IN LAOTIAN FIGHTING
 (By Jack Folsie)

BANGKOK.—Thai military involvement in Laos may be "very limited," as presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler cautiously allowed Friday, but it is not new.

Under American auspices, two Thai artillery battalions were used in Laos last year during the defense of the northern road junction town of Muong Soui.

Thai pilots have flown T-28 bomber planes, although now the pilots may be almost entirely Laotian.

Thai observers fly in spotter planes to direct artillery fire and bomber strikes on the enemy. They are valuable because of their ability to speak Lao (which is similar to the Thai language) and English.

There are Thai "liaison officers" in every Lao military region. Their function is obscure but likely to be connected with the allied trail watching teams that range deep into the area of enemy infiltration routes through Laos into the South Vietnam war arena.

For this highly paid and dangerous assignment, Asians are used because the presence of white faces would quickly be transmitted to the enemy. Besides Thais, trail watchers include Nung tribesmen from South Vietnam, Filipinos and Chinese. Laotians generally do not serve because of the danger of including enemy agents.

There are estimates that as many as 5,000 Thais may be involved, in some role, in the Laotian war; but most long-time observers think the number is lower, and that the level fluctuates greatly.

In a sense, the United States counts on the Thais as a strategic ground force reserve in Laos. When the war heats up, Thais are flown in.

Almost without exception the Thais arrive in American aircraft, are armed and trained by Americans, and are paid—indirectly—by Americans at scales much greater than regular Thai army pay.

What may be new about Saturday's fly-in of a new Thai contingent to Long Teng is that it indicates a tipping of the scales within Thai top-level policy bodies for larger and possibly more open involvement in the Laotian war.

Thailand has a growing insurgency in its northern regions adjacent to Laos and there is ample evidence that insurgents are moving into Thailand from Lao bases.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Mar. 23, 1970]
CIA AIDING LONG CHENG DEFENDERS—100 AGENTS SAID TO BE INSTRUCTING MEOS FOR LAOTIAN OPERATION

VIENTIANE, LAOS, March 22.—The American Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Army and neighboring Thailand are directly involved in the defense of the threatened Laotian base at Long Cheng, informed sources said tonight.

They said as many as 100 CIA agents, working under the cover of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Agency for International Development, are taking part in the secret operation, training Meo tribesmen as guerrillas in both Laos and Thailand.

It is known that U.S. Army officers directed a massive airlift of both Laotian and Thai reinforcements into Long Cheng, which is the headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao's American-trained army of Meo guerrillas and is under heavy North Vietnamese pressure. It is located 80 miles north of the capital, just below the Plain of Jars, now held by the North Vietnamese.

"SOME VOLUNTEERS"
In Bangkok the Thai premier, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, denied today that two Thai army battalions were sent to reinforce Long Cheng but admitted that "some volunteers" may have gone there.

Estimates in Bangkok of the number of volunteers, reportedly being trained by U.S. Special Forces teams, range from 300 to 12,000. The figure mentioned most often is 5,000.

Sources in Vientiane said as many as 400 Thai troops, including an artillery detachment, were flown into Long Cheng, mostly from bases in Thailand.

They added that the United States has been prodding the Thai government to give Laos more support, both economically and militarily.

AERIAL OBSERVERS

Americans listed in official records as Army attaches constantly fly over Long Cheng as aerial observers, gathering intelligence on which to base tactical ground and air operations.

Sources said these Americans never remain at Long Cheng overnight, but commute daily, leaving Vientiane early in the morning and returning by dusk. It is a 45-minute helicopter flight each way.

"We wouldn't want the Communists to capture any Americans or find any American dead on the battlefield," one source explained. Most enemy attacks on Long Cheng are launched under the cover of darkness.

North Vietnamese hit the base with rocket fire today for the third successive day. About a dozen rockets exploded in the predawn darkness, sources said, but first reports indicated no casualties or damage.

U.S. PLANE IS DOWNED

The U.S. Command said Sunday in Saigon that a U.S. Air Force OV-10 Bronco was shot down and destroyed yesterday over the Plain of Jars north of Long Cheng, but the pilot was rescued with no reported injuries. The twin-engine armed reconnaissance craft was the eighth U.S. plane lost over Laos since the command began reporting air operations there March 10.

Speaking with newsmen at Bangkok Airport after seeing off Indonesian President Suharto, Mr. Kittikachorn said the reason Thai volunteers were going to Laos was "probably because Laos and Thailand are neighbors and both countries' people have blood relations. The volunteers may be cousins or brothers of Laotians."

Pressed on whether the airlift of Thai troops had taken place, he said: "There may be some truth in it." But he added: "As I said, these men may be volunteers."

He also said some Laotian soldiers have "received training in Thailand and returned to Laos to be advisers and instructors in the Laotian army."

Gen. Surakit Mayalarb, the Thai army chief of staff, said no Thai troops had been sent to Laos.

General Surakit was reported to have flown secretly to Laos two weeks ago for talks on the military situation with the Laotian premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and his generals.

Vang Pao, the guerrilla general, was in Vientiane today with other top Laotian military commanders to discuss the deteriorating war situation with Mr. Phouma.

[From the Christian Science Monitor,
Mar. 23, 1970]

SINGLE THAI BATTALION IN LAOS

A Thai artillery battalion is operating in Laos with the support of the United States.

The presence of the Thai artillerymen has been a closely held secret of the governments concerned. Hints of its presence in the battle zone came Friday in wire dispatches from Laos referring to "two Thai battalions" in the area of the beleaguered support base at Long Cheng. Apparently the perhaps 300 artillerymen were confused with a larger force. The confusion may have been abetted by the presence of a Thai general with the artillerymen. Normally, a battalion would be under the command of a lieutenant colonel.

Sources here disclosed, however, that the U.S. has not so far favored the insertion of more Thai forces than the single artillery battalion.

Because of the delicacy of the situation, American funds to support the Thai artillerymen have been provided separately from other, more obvious funding for the war in Laos.

The Thai battalion has been flown in and out of Laos from time to time, most recently a week or so ago.

It was not immediately clear why the original decision was made to use the Thais in Laos with American support. The use of the combat force was, of course, a violation of the Geneva agreements. But the violation of those agreements has been a fairly regular occurrence since the North Vietnamese decided to initiate the campaign against Laos and the Americans reacted.

Sources here say that the artillerymen were more desirable than Thai ground forces for several reasons. First, they are a 155 mm. howitzer battalion, and there were no Meos (hill tribesmen who live along the border) or Royal Lao forces trained in 155 mm. howitzer operation when the decision was considered to bring the Thais in. Second, it was thought that, as artillerymen, they would prove to be less visible during the fighting than would infantrymen confronting the enemy directly. Finally, they could serve as ground forces if absolutely necessary.

When the decision was made to send the Thais in, the Thai Government was interested in demonstrating support for the Royal Lao Government. Laos separates Thailand from North Vietnam and acts as a buffer. The Lao Government, which does not possess an extremely capable army, was eager for the help and the United States was willing.

At this moment, the disclosure of the Thai presence does not seem likely to alter the course of the war. It is apparently not a prelude to anything more. Indeed, according to present plans, the artillerymen are to be withdrawn from the battlezone around mid-year to be replaced by Lao forces newly trained in the use of medium artillery.

[From the Washington Star, Mar. 25, 1970]
DIRECTED BY THE UNITED STATES.—"SECRET ARMY" ACTIVE AROUND SOUTH ASIA

(By Tammy Arbuckle)

VIENTIANE.—The Thai troops who have joined the fighting in Laos are part of an American-directed "secret army" which operates all through Southeast Asia.

Making up its units are Cambodians, Vietnamese, Chinese and Laotians, as well as Thais and various hill tribes, such as the Meos who have been active on the Plain of Jars.

Its operations extend into northeast Burma, China's Yunnan Province, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand—all part of the guerrilla war fought by both Communist and anti-Communist forces for many years in this part of the world.

For example, Haw tribal agents working for the Central Intelligence Agency cross into South China from Laos and Black Thai tribesmen cross into North Vietnam from Laos.

These tribes live on both sides of the borders, the Haw in northern Laos and Yunnan, the Black Thai in Laos' Sam Neua Province and North Vietnam's Dien Bien Phu Province, making their detection difficult.

The pro-American guerrillas have killed Communist leaders, destroyed key links in Communist communications and logistics and, tied down large numbers of Communist soldiers in defensive actions.

In Laos the secret army has wiped out Communist headquarters and taken over prison camps and rescued inmates.

On one occasion in South Laos, a guerrilla group in one night operation wiped out a prison camp controlled by Pathet Lao guards and rescued 59 prisoners, crossing back into Thailand before the Communists could strike back.

The Thai force at Long Chien, which helped yesterday to clear a ridge overlooking the base, may be listed as the secret army's latest success.

About 1,000 Thais were reported yesterday to have joined Gen. Vang Pao's army of Meo tribesmen at Long Chien. Reports from the area today said a North Vietnamese attack was beaten back and some positions previously lost to the Communists had been retaken.

Thais have long operated in Laos. In February 1967, reporters saw Thai commandos at Nam Bac, a Lao government base 60 miles north of the royal capital of Luang Prabang, not far from the Hanoi-Peking borders.

The Thais stood out like a sore thumb for they spoke in a Bangkok dialect.

When questioned closely they admitted they were from the Thai military.

The secret army operations in Southeast Asia are directed by small groups of efficient Americans working out of offices under cover of organizations in various cities in the region.

Laos, bordering on all the Southeast Asia nations, is ideal for these U.S. operations. And the secret army concept fits neatly into the Guam doctrine.

Americans take care of the leadership,

March 26, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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training, planning and logistics. The Asians do the bulk of the fighting.

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Thereupon (at 2 o'clock and 58 minutes p.m.), the Senate took a recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 2 o'clock and 59 minutes p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. HUGHES).

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS ON TUESDAY NEXT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, immediately following the remarks of the able senior Senator from Ohio (Mr. Young) on Tuesday morning next, there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements limited therein to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, what is the pending question before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the adoption of the conference report on H.R. 514, Primary and Secondary Education.

ADJOURNMENT TO TUESDAY, MARCH 31, 1970

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move in accordance with Senate Concurrent Resolution 59, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock meridian on Tuesday, March 31, 1970.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 3 o'clock p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Tuesday, March 31, 1970, at 12 o'clock meridian.