



February 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM

TO: SYMINGTON SUBCOMMITTEE INTER-
DEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP

FROM: John R. Stevenson
Chairman

SUBJECT: Korea Hearings

Attached are copies of the letters from Senator Symington to the Secretaries of State and Defense setting the date for the Korea hearings before the Symington Subcommittee for February 23.

I would propose a preliminary organizational meeting in the Operations Center Conference Room, room 7516, at 3:00 p.m., Wednesday, February 11. This would be followed by a meeting at 3:00 p.m. Monday, February 16, with the State and Defense witnesses present. Statements of the witnesses should be circulated for review by noon, February 18. A further meeting should be held Thursday at 2:00 p.m. primarily with the witnesses, and thereafter as necessary.

All meetings will be held in the Operations Center Conference Room, room 7516.

Attachments:

- (1) Letter to Secretary of State
- (2) Letter to Secretary of Defense

Distribution: EA - Ambassador Green
Ambassador Brown
Mr. Peters

White House - Mr. Lehman
Defense - Mr. French

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DOS and OSD Reviews Completed

S/PC - Mr. Seligmann



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

OLC 10-0075

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January 29, 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Highlights of Symington Subcommittee Session on Japan and Okinawa (3), January 28, 1970

DISTRIBUTION:

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S/S

EA - Ambassador Green
- Ambassador Brown
- Mr. Moore

EA/J - Mr. Finn

L - Mr. Stevenson

L/EA - Mr. Futterman

PM - Mr. Spiers

PM/JW - Mr. Wolf

S/PC - Mr. Cargo
- Mr. Seligmann

H - Ambassador Torbert

WH - Mr. Ehrlichman
- Mr. Lehman

DOD - Mr. French
- Mr. Knaur

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The day's hearings were devoted to Okinawa. Senators Symington, Cooper, Sparkman, Fulbright and Mansfield were present during the morning session.

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2

After General Lampert finished reading his prepared statement, Senator Symington commented that it contained much good information and he hoped as much as possible would be declassified for publication.

Counsel asked whether the Nixon-Sato Communique constituted a firm commitment for the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. General Lampert and Mr. George said the turn-over was subject to the completion of detailed arrangements, but it was the intent of both sides that these be concluded in time. They denied the press had created a misimpression in suggesting there was a firm date.

Counsel attempted to show a contradiction between General Lampert's statement that Okinawa would retain its strategic importance after reversion and the loss of unrestricted nuclear storage rights. General Lampert replied that if restrictions were placed on our right to store nuclear weapons there would be some reduction in our overall freedom of action, but it would not materially affect our ability to carry out our mission.

Senator Symington asked whether reversion wasn't the first step prior to a demand that we get out of Japan and

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Okinawa. General Lampert said that the demand for reversion had been emotional, but while left-wing politicians regarded all countries in the area as peaceful and saw no threat to security, responsible leaders understood the need for bases. Mr. George added that the Government of Japan had decided the treaty made sense as did our presence. What disturbed people some years ago was seeing foreigners in privileged positions to which they could not aspire, but with Japan's growing economic prosperity this was no longer so. Senator Symington commented that it did not matter that well-to-do people had access to facilities similar to those of foreigners, if all the people could not enjoy them.

Senator Symington asked a series of questions about the role of unions in Okinawa, the relationship between the Chief Executive and the High Commissioner, the role of various political parties, and the characterization of Chief Executive Yara as a "moderate." In reference to General Lampert's statement that Okinawa was a key element in the deterrence of aggression, Senator Symington asked a number of questions intended to show that neither the Chinese nor Soviets posed a serious threat to Okinawa.

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Senator Cooper commented in this connection that his conversations with visiting Japanese led him to believe that they wanted us to get out at the same time they acknowledged the need for a continued military presence.

Senator Fulbright inquired about when B-52's were deployed to Okinawa, whether they had missions in Laos, and where they would be moved after reversion. Generals McGehee and Lampert replied that their mission was to run the base for the Strategic Air Command and they did not know the answers in regard to targeting and future plans.

Senator Fulbright asked a good many questions about the role of the Special Forces detachment, including the activities of Special Forces in joint exercises with the Republic of China, suggesting that the involvement of a GRC airborne battalion suggested the exercise was not purely defensive. He also inquired about project Phoenix, but General Lampert and Colonel Simpson (Commander, Special Forces Group Okinawa) said that they did not know about it. Colonel Simpson explained why his operations were not properly characterized as clandestine, inasmuch as the men remained in uniform and carried identification. Moreover, their mission was to work with indigenous forces largely in

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training missions rather than to conduct their own operations. Senator Fulbright said he was glad to have this explanation, which cleared up some misconceptions he had had, and Senator Symington commented that he had visited many Special Forces installations and regarded the Special Forces as among the finest soldiers we had.

Pursuing the role of nuclear weapons, Senator Fulbright asked about the theory on the use of tactical weapons and said that apart from questions about their location, which did not bother him so much, there was a need to know how we planned to use them. Pressed for his personal view, General McGehee said he was unable to comment in regard to questions of control and decision, which would be made elsewhere, but that as far as the possibility of escalation was concerned, he thought this could be controlled. Senator Fulbright speculated whether, if the US used tactical nuclear weapons, the Russians would stand by and accept it. He said doctrine on use should be a matter of policy and not left vague. Senator Cooper added that there had been NATO discussions on the subject, but he did not know their content.

General Lampert, asked by Senator Fulbright about the removal of gas from Okinawa, said that plans were completed

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locally for the removal by five ships, but arrangements had not yet been made in regard to the destination of the weapons, and therefore they had not yet been transferred. He provided additional details in regard to the type of weapons on Okinawa.

Counsel asked a hypothetical question, whether, if the US participated in efforts to influence the Okinawan elections, this would be consistent with General Lampert's mandate to encourage the development of democratic institutions. General Lampert replied that he was not in Okinawa at the time of the chief executive election, but he tried to be guided by the principles of the executive order setting out his charter.

Returning to the question of B-52's, Counsel inferred that the deployment to Okinawa after the Pueblo incident was part of a ploy to move the planes there to be used in Vietnam. General Page (former Commanding General 313th Air Division) said he was unaware of any such intention at the time.

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senators Symington, Aiken, and Cooper attended the afternoon session. Most of a truncated session was devoted

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7

to Counsel's detailed questions, including such topics as the relative cost of B-52 sorties from Kadena, Clark, etc; plans for redeployment of air squadrons to Okinawa after Vietnam; why the Marine air wing could not be relocated at Futema instead of Iwakuni; the timing of the withdrawal of Mace missiles in relation to the Sato visit; rumors about Naval ammunition storage construction; why Marine battalion landing teams had to remain afloat; why the Fuji maneuver ground in Japan was required in addition to maneuver grounds in Okinawa; plans for relocating nuclear weapons; rules for the use of firearms by installation guards; and additional questions about the missions of the Special Forces Group.

After Senator Aiken commented that he was concerned lest the hearings disturb our relations with Japan, Senator Symington said that he was surrounded by the Japanese press after each session. He had told them that the hearings were pleasant, that all the Senators wanted was information, and that he hoped the hearings would in no way affect the mutual friendship we valued with Japan. Senator Symington said that the hearings would be of great assistance when the Okinawa agreement came up on the floor of the Senate,

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8

inasmuch as the Subcommittee members would be armed with the facts, which made it much easier to get things done.

Counsel inquired in depth about a speech General Page had reportedly delivered before the American Chamber of Commerce^{in Okinawa}, which left the impression with Counsel that the General was opposed to reversion. General Page explained that his informal remarks before American businessmen had been badly distorted by the press, which in one instance attributed to him the remarks made by a businessman. He said it made no sense for him to oppose reversion and that he thought it was a natural development. Counsel pursued with the military witnesses their views as to whether they felt muzzled in the expression of their opinions. Generals Lampert and McGehee replied to the effect that they had ample opportunity to speak out and express themselves, that there were adequate mechanisms for them to receive foreign policy guidance, and that they felt no conflict in this regard.

Pursuing the matter, Senator Cooper said that President Nixon had set out some broad outlines of Asian policy and he assumed it was the function of military leaders to advise on the facilities that should be maintained consistent with the US position of retaining a military presence in the

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Pacific. General Lampert said he had no inhibitions in expressing his views through established channels and he felt his views were always welcomed.

When Counsel turned his questioning to the role of the Seventh Psyops Detachment, Mr. Knaur of Defense said that he understood this would be addressed at a special session with only one transcript kept and the room cleared.

Senator Symington asked what the basis was for this understanding, and Mr. Knaur replied that he was instructed by the Secretary of Defense that an agreement had been reached to this effect. Senator Symington then suggested that the Subcommittee proceed to take testimony from the staff after others had left the room, in the understanding the Subcommittee would retain the transcript. Mr. Knaur agreed. The following account is from the notes of Mr. Futterman, L, who attended this portion of the proceedings.

Walter Pincus, the Staff Consultant, recounted the activities of the 7th Psy Ops as he understood them from his trip last year to Okinawa and Japan. In regard to the Voice of the UN Command, which has four transmitters beamed at North Korea and one transmitter directed at the Seoul area, Mr. Pincus said that the USIA people he had talked with felt

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10

that VUNC was too "hard line." Mr. Pincus defined "hard line" to mean taking the position that there could be no improvement of relations until there was a change in the North Korean Government. Senator Symington asked whether this was not inconsistent with our whole policy as announced by the President.

Mr. Pincus referred to a Tad Szulc article in the New York Times, which reported that an NSC committee chaired by Under Secretary Richardson was studying the whole question of psychological warfare operations, especially in Asia, and that the Richardson report pointed out that these activities are assuming a disproportionately large role in our total information program.

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On Taiwan, he said a 3-man detachment was maintained to provide input for joint exercises conducted by US and ROC Special Forces. Mr. Pincus said he was told by the Air Force people who carried the paratroopers that these exercises were understood by the ROC paratroopers as being geared around a return to the mainland.

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11

Another detachment stationed in Thailand in conjunction with USIA supported psychological warfare activities by the Thais. Beginning in 1969 these activities were carried over into Laos at the specific request of Ambassador Sullivan.

Mr. Pincus testified that all the activities in Korea were attributed to VUNC, except for [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Similarly, in Thailand attribution was to the Government of Thailand and in Laos to the RLG.

Senator Symington indicated that he saw nothing particularly wrong with this sort of activity. Mr. Pincus replied that the primary issue was the question of how these efforts were coordinated within USIA and the country team.

Senator Symington asked why these activities were so sensitive that the Subcommittee could not learn of them from executive branch witnesses in a regular executive session. Mr. Pincus said he understood from Messrs. Stevenson and French that the sensitivity of the subject derived from the fact that it was undergoing NSC review. Senator Symington expressed amazement that this could justify withholding the basic facts about what had been going on. Mr. Pincus

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responded that in reply to this point Mr. Stevenson had claimed he had no control over the matter because it was a DOD activity, while Mr. French had claimed that the question of testimony was out of DOD's control.

About mid-way in the hearing Mr. Knaur offered to make Colonel Bentz available to comment on Mr. Pincus's testimony and correct any errors. Senator Symington declined the opportunity, stating that this staff hearing had been undertaken in the face of the administration's intransigence and that they would just go ahead and complete their record before deciding the next step to take with the administration.

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