

Chapter XII

1. Differentiated from other papers on Greek "situation" by virtue of having been written before rather than after the fact and thus presumably having served purposes of basic policy with respect to Greece. To this extent might be deemed fortuitous rather than deliberate "national" intelligence.
2. Possibly marred as "national" estimates through coming too close to pleading a special cause. At the same time, were undoubtedly consensus of intelligence community on subject for vital policy decision at the time.
3. Same as 2 above
4. Might be differently classified except for undeniable applicability to problem as finally dealt with and disposed of four years later. Point of whether this estimate actually used in connection with Japanese treaty negotiations not applicable.
5. Using the "subject" criterion, any estimate concerning Korea written before June, 1950 might be classified here. This one chosen because it is most directly applicable to the problem that Korea was to represent.
6. Possibly should be in "I". Problem of a British loan was important at the time. If this estimate published too late to be applicable, was no fault of CIA.
7. So classified because limited to Italy. The problem was European rather than Italian. Aside from this, might belong in "I".
8. Problem being attacked (Berlin "blockade") was undoubtedly subject for "national" estimate. These treatments are not of "national" scope, however.
9. Same as 8 above
10. If criterion "requested by competent authority" is used, these are "national" as they were called for, exactly as written, by NSC.
11. Same as 10 above
12. Same as above

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13. Same as 10 above
14. Same as above
15. Same as above
16. Same as above
17. Same as above
18. These were also by request. In the one case, it was to settle argument as to possibility of a future for Chiang in China; the other probably to determine authenticity of Air Force's contention that Ryukyu bases must be retained.
19. Same as 18 above
20. Too limited for "national" estimate but was on request from White House.
21. "National" in purpose---to determine policy in Latin America in view of Soviet aims. In scope as written does not satisfy definition.
22. Difficult to classify. Both subjects of great importance; question is whether or not they were subjects that belonged in the province of intelligence.
23. Same as 22 above
24. Presumably could not be written without information. Otherwise, would have been State Department paper rather than of common concern.
25. If criterion of legitimate request used, was "national" estimate.
26. In view of actual developments---which were reasonably predictable---the subject should be classed as trivial. It is nevertheless conceivable that the "Hatay" problem might have taken on immense significance soon after the estimate was published. Question might be interesting for debate if the result would have been to make this estimate "national".
27. Subject possibly important, but was not supra-departmental.
28. Same as 27 above
29. Same as above

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