

PROBLEMS IN INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION
OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
TO 1949

Paper No. 6

PROBLEMS IN INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

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I. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS

Intelligence related to the national security produced and disseminated by the Director of Central Intelligence was to be "officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or carry a statement of substantially differing opinion."¹ It was left to the Director and the Agency chiefs to interpret the terms of this statement and discover the means of putting them into effect. Meanwhile, there were important questions regarding the coordination of estimates still to be answered. In the absence of answers it would be difficult to develop satisfactory techniques for the actual coordination of papers.

Did "concurrence" mean that the party concurring stood equally responsible with the originator for every word in the agreed estimate? Or was concurrence a mere nihil obstat to the paper as a whole? This question alone, so long as it remained unanswered, posed formidable problems of coordination.

A clearcut concurrence or dissent is not always possible with respect to an opinion based on incomplete evidence and intended for use in the formation of national policy. Yet the Directives spoke only of "concurrence" or "dissent." What if one of the Intelligence Agencies could not agree entirely yet did not entirely disagree?

At what stage was a given item to be submitted for concurrence or dissent? Should the Director make up his mind to the validity of a

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1. NSCID-1, Paragraphs 4, 5, 6

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1. Subject: "Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates with the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War, and Navy Departments." This is Paragraph 4 of an enclosure entitled "Suggested Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Board." See Historical Files, Safe #8405

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given estimate and then present it to his colleagues for a peremptory opinion? Or was he to submit a tentative draft and then evolve his own and others' opinions through successive revisions? Could he insist on an immediate opinion, or must he wait until the Agencies were ready to render one?

What discretion had the Director with regard to concurrence or dissent? Could he permit an Agency not to comment at all if it chose? What were his prerogatives if an Agency wished to submit an opinion not germane to the subject at issue, or whose effect would be to confuse the issue? Must the Director accept whatever the Agencies offered, or could he insist on an opinion that he considered acceptable under the terms of the Directives?

Finally, was coordination considered a process that would take place naturally by general consent and mutual desire, or was there to be a means through which the coordinator could ensure an orderly completion of the process? If coordination by general consent failed to bring the desired results, what was Central Intelligence expected to do? This problem, which in a sense comprehends the rest, arose early in the history of coordination.

A memorandum of July 16, 1947, from the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates to the Director of Central Intelligence illustrates the point:¹

"One of the functions of Central Intelligence, if not the most important function, is that of coordinating the intelligence efforts of governmental intelligence agencies. In this instance, it is a matter of thoroughly coordinating production of particular types of intelligence reports between the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War, and Navy Departments and Central Intelligence. The rigid and

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cumbersome techniques established to effect this coordination in fact place in the hands of any one of the intelligence divisions of the participating departments the power of determining when and to what extent coordination has been accomplished. Under the system this power is absolute and can be exercised at the sole and absolute discretion of any one agency irrespective of the desires or views of all of the others. Manifestly the situation is an absurdity in that the coordinator (Central Intelligence) cannot discharge its responsibilities except on the sufferance of each one of the very agencies it is required to coordinate. It is believed that this situation is fundamentally wrong, is pregnant with possibilities of friction, and is capable of gravely impairing the production and presentation of national intelligence. In view of the fact that Central Intelligence is required to coordinate the production of national intelligence, it is believed that concomitant responsibility for this coordination must be vested in Central Intelligence."

This paragraph, written at a time when no more than twenty papers had been subjected to the coordination process under discussion, could have been repeated without essential change at any time during the ensuing three years. In the concrete terms of actual coordination of papers as between their authors and reviewers, it resulted in a difficult situation. Because the recommendation implicit in the memorandum was not acted upon, there was no essential change in the situation described.

From 1946 on, Central Intelligence wrote its own first drafts of reports and estimates rather than editing drafts produced by the Agencies. Drafts so written had to be "coordinated," but in practice "coordination" meant seeking Agency approval. Legally, perhaps, Central Intelligence did not have to seek approval; it had only to note any substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency. But in the absence of any "concomitant responsibility" on the part of Central Intelligence and in the face of what proved to be the realities of

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coordination, rigid application of such presumed legal prerogatives would have been an invitation to nonconcurrence. Papers encumbered with dissents might be "coordinated" papers in a technical sense, but they would not be taken as such by those who read them.

Actually, therefore, Central Intelligence was in the position of seeking approval. Its position in fact was that of bargainer on more or less equal terms. As a result, Central Intelligence was likely to have to choose between an unsatisfactory estimate and an undesirable dissent.

II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN A SYSTEM FOR COORDINATION

Naturally, there was a difference between the plans for producing "national intelligence" as they were developed in theory, and what proved to be the facts of "coordination." The official directives issued in 1946 and 1947 were necessarily stated in theoretical terms. Thus estimates were said to be produced by the Director of Central Intelligence, submitted by him to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and published by him with their concurrence or dissent.

This was an over-simplification, as was of course realized by the authors of the Directives.

In point of fact, neither the Director nor his immediate assistants "produced" estimates. Actual production was by intelligence analysts with specialized knowledge of subjects and areas. These analysts might

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and might not write actual drafts, but even if they did not, their approval was necessarily sought by those who did the writing. Not only were these experts capable of holding differing opinions on the same subject, but they were in the employ of five different intelligence organizations and generally shared their several points of view. Thus immediate agreement in draft estimates was unlikely; even the first stage in production of an estimate usually presented difficulties.

When the experts were in general agreement, a draft estimate had to be cleared with some form of reviewing authority within the producing agency. Here, conflict between author and editor usually became a complicating factor. Indeed, this conflict, in one or another form, usually continued all the way through the inter-agency coordination process.¹

Agreement between author and editor having been obtained, this reviewing authority must seek the approval of similar authorities resident in the several agencies. Whereas the analysts had been primarily concerned with facts and interpretations of facts, those handling the estimate at this stage must concentrate on broad conclusions to be drawn from the whole mass of evidence as applied to a particular situation in a particular world context. At the same time, there entered the problem of how a paper's conclusions affected or were affected by departmental "views." Thus the total problem became how to draw valid conclusions adequately supported by evidence so stated

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1. Cf. the Branch-Staff conflict within CIA (ORE) in the summer of 1947, No. 1, p. Note also some of the controversies described in pp.

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1. See initiation order in ORE 4/1 folder, Historical Files

that they did not conflict with departmental preferences. It is evident that considerable possibility of disagreement existed at this stage.

The first two stages having been successfully passed, the estimate was ready for the approval of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Considering the preparation that had gone before, it might have been expected that the Committee's approval would become almost a formality. This was not invariably the case.

In order that a given estimate could be shepherded through the three processes outlined above, there obviously had to be some sort of system. It would have been possible to construct such a system by preliminary inter-agency agreement, but this was not done. Instead, individuals proceeded according to whatever methods seemed appropriate. There were as yet no official rulings to guide them.

The first estimates produced (i.e. those published during 1946) were handled by informal and ad hoc methods. "ORE-1," for instance, ("Soviet Foreign Military Policy," 23 July 1946) was "coordinated" by an ad hoc committee which was not officially appointed but was assembled hurriedly by its author.

On the other hand another estimate begun four months later, "ORE 4/1" ("Petroleum Resources Within the USSR," June 16, 1947) was handled without the appointment of any inter-agency group. It was directed, when this paper was initiated, that it should be prepared by certain analysts within the Office of Reports and Estimates "in consultation with the appropriate departmental specialists."¹ Who these were to be or to what extent they

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were to be consulted was at the discretion of the Central Intelligence analysts. This method was presumably followed and a draft was produced in the course of five months. Final concurrences with comment were then returned by the Agencies in separate memoranda.¹

It was the written rather than the oral method of coordination that prevailed after 1946 and until a regular system of inter-agency conferences was adopted in 1949. The reason probably lay in the fact that the Chiefs of Agency Intelligence would not accept the plan proposed by the Central Reports Staff under which Agency representatives would be attached to the Central Intelligence Group for purposes of coordination. The fact that these representatives remained in their home offices may have suggested written communication with the Agencies through these representatives.²

The theory underlying this method postulated that if the specialists in Central Intelligence who were charged with the preparation of an estimate constantly sought the aid and consent of Agency specialists; and if on completion of a first draft, specialists in all agencies were in agreement, then official approval of such drafts when circulated in writing should not be difficult to attain. The hope, in other words, was that Agency reviewing authorities, prompted by advisers who had already been brought into agreement, would concur without serious hesitation.

The hope was sometimes fulfilled. At other times the results were such as to make the whole effort of preliminary coordination seem

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1. As published neither ORE-1 nor ORE 4/1 contains any indication of the position taken by the participating agencies. The reason probably was that the importance of indicating specific Agency positions as a part of each estimate had not yet been borne in upon the participants in coordination. It was not until November, 1947, in fact, that published estimates began regularly to contain a specific statement of concurrence or dissent. Before that time, it was apparently assumed that in the absence of a statement to the contrary, readers would assume that an estimate must have been published with complete Agency agreement.

The change to a more specific statement in the form of a footnote which stated exactly the position of each agency apparently came about as a consequence of the controversy between Central Intelligence and Army Intelligence over ORE-62 ("Soviet Objectives in Korea," November 18, 1947). See discussion below.

2. See Central Intelligence Agency as an Instrument of Government, 1940-1950, Chapter III, pp. 27-31 and Paper No. 1, pp.

to have been wasted. In any case a flat concurrence requiring no further action by Central Intelligence was seldom to be expected. Instead, the Agencies returned concurrences with comment.

The resultant problem was often a formidable one. The comments returned by the respective agencies were compiled independently. Central Intelligence was expected, within limits, to adopt them all. Adoption of even a single suggestion might have a damaging effect upon the carefully constructed Central Intelligence draft. The adoption of numerous independent suggestions was almost sure to have such an effect. Furthermore, suggestions independently made would sometimes conflict as between themselves, thus making it impossible for Central Intelligence to adopt more than one of them.

Under such circumstances there was little the Office of Reports and Estimates could do but construct a new draft of the estimate under discussion based upon all comments received, and return it to the several agencies for further comment. This new draft usually elicited new comments calling for another draft. The method was obviously cumbersome and time-consuming. That it would eventually be replaced, at least in part, by some form of officially sanctioned oral negotiation was almost inevitable.

Meanwhile, however, the method became generally accepted and was described in a memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Board prepared for the Director of Central Intelligence by the Office of Reports and Estimates on July 16, 1947, as follows:

"a. Initially, the Central Intelligence Officers assigned to prepare a report call on the appropriate officers of the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War, and Navy Departments. At these meetings, the departmental representatives are informed of the project and are consulted in detail regarding its scope and coverage.

b. During the preparation of the report, day to day consultation is maintained to the extent necessary to keep informed of departmental views.

c. Upon completion of a preliminary draft of the report, it is referred to the appropriate officers of the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War, and Navy Departments for comment, criticism, suggestion, and possible amendment. The views of these experts are thoroughly considered, and at a series of conferences, revisions are worked out and usually agreement is reached on a revised draft acceptable to all concerned.

d. The draft report incorporating any revisions arrived at as a result of the procedures outlined in c above is then referred through official channels to the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War, and Navy Departments for formal concurrence through representatives of those departments specifically designated for this purpose by each of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

e. Formal comments on this revised draft report are received from the departmental intelligence divisions and are made the basis for further revising the revised report to produce a final draft of the report. Whenever there is a dissent or a divergence of point of view on the part of any one of the departmental intelligence divisions, the matter is discussed in detail between representatives of Central Intelligence and the dissenting departmental intelligence division. If these representatives are unable to resolve their differences, the statement of the dissenting departmental intelligence division, setting forth its views, is published as a part of the finished report."¹

III. THE FORMAL AGREEMENTS OF 1948

It was readily apparent by mid-1948 that a formal agreement was needed to cover assorted problems of interdepartmental production and coordination of reports and estimates that had arisen in the course of two years. There were several outstanding controversies as between the participants in the coordination process. There was still a demand

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1. See file marked "Coordination with IAC Agencies in Historical Files, Safe #8405. See also CIG Administrative Order #32 implementing NIA Directive 31, Paragraph 6.

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1. For copies of these Directives, see Historical Files

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that current intelligence (particularly the Daily and Weekly Summary and the Monthly Review) be accorded full interdepartmental coordination. There was a complaint that Central Intelligence, in the preparation of reports and estimates, was proceeding too independently and not providing for sufficient agency participation. Disputes had developed over agency failure to return comments and other material to Central Intelligence on time, but there was no agreement on the amount of time allowable for such procedures. Finally, there was a clear need for an official delineation of allowable dissent.

Agreements on these and other problems were reached in "Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/1" dated 8 July 1948 and "Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/2" dated 13 September 1948. The proposals on which the first of these is based came chiefly from the State Department; the second from Central Intelligence. The final drafts were produced by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.¹

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/1, entitled "Standard Operating Procedures for Departmental Participation in the Production and Coordination of National Intelligence," provides first that in the case of "current" intelligence, "departmental concurrence or dissent is not required." This represented a concession on the part of the agencies in recognition of the fact that coordination of current intelligence under prevailing conditions simply was not feasible. It was provided, however, that copies of all current material published by Central Intelligence would be sent to the Agencies "as quickly as possible," and that

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notice would always be given that this material had not been coordinated.

Passing quickly over the subject of National Intelligence Surveys (on which agreement had already been reached by a special committee) the Directive then took up "National Intelligence Reports and Estimates" at some length. Section "a" provided that whenever Central Intelligence proposed to produce a report or estimate it must notify each departmental intelligence organization of the problem under consideration, the nature and scope of the project, the scheduled date of a first draft, what would be expected of each Agency, and the date upon which Agency action should be completed. It required Central Intelligence, in addition to providing this information in writing, to discuss it with appropriate members of the departmental intelligence organizations.

The directive then proceeded to outline three different types of procedures for the production of estimates: "normal," "urgent" and "exceptional." It does not define these terms to the extent of specifying who should declare a given paper "urgent" or "exceptional," or under what circumstances.

The first specification under "normal procedures" is that "The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare an initial draft of the report or estimate....." This provision represents no more than a recognition of the status quo. Because, in practice, the matter of who produces first drafts may be of considerable consequence, however, this statement is of some importance.¹

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1. Paragraph 3 C (1) of "DCI 3/1"

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1. Paragraph 3 C (3)

In the same sentence it is provided that Central Intelligence in producing reports and estimates, shall utilize "available departmental contributions," a practice which, of course, had always been recognized. It is not directed, however, that the Agencies must always furnish written contributions. Under the actual circumstances of 1948 to 1950, formal written contributions were the exception rather than the rule.

Under "normal procedures," Central Intelligence was required to furnish each agency with initial drafts of each report and to request Agency comments; to arrange for an interdepartmental meeting in case serious disagreements developed out of these comments; to prepare, (after the comments had been dealt with) a final draft for concurrence or dissent; and finally, to publish the estimate with accompanying statements of concurrence or substantial dissent.

"Normal procedures" also provided the length of time allowed for Agency action. This was to vary according to circumstances but the normal time allowed would be "five full working days." Although this may not seem to involve an excessive delay for a non-urgent paper, it should be recognized that five working days meant at least seven calendar days and that the five-day allowance was a minimum requirement. In practice, it was seldom met.

One other provision under "Normal procedures"¹ may be of passing interest. It enjoined the Central Intelligence Agency to make "no changes other than those of a strictly editorial nature while the paper is under agency review without informing the agencies of such changes."

Reasonable as such a provision may seem, it would be manifestly difficult in all cases to know exactly what changes could be considered "strictly editorial." It is probable, furthermore, that no necessity for making such a statement in writing would have been felt had there not been a latent suspicion among the Agencies even by 1948 that Central Intelligence would be capable of deliberately modifying agency views under the guise of the coordinating and editing process.

The principal difference between "normal" and "urgent" procedures as outlined in "DCI 3/1" lay in the fact that Central Intelligence, after notifying the departments and writing the initial draft, was directed to call an interagency meeting to consider the paper; then prepare it for final concurrence or dissent, then go ahead with publication as soon as Agency positions were known. The description of "urgent" procedures does not, however, provide for what would happen if the representatives failed to agree at the meeting, or if their superiors declined to sign an official statement of concurrence or dissent. The possibility thus remained that "urgent" procedures could be considerably delayed.

Under "exceptional" circumstances it was provided that Central Intelligence could "prepare and disseminate most urgent reports and estimates immediately upon completion and without formal coordination within the departmental intelligence organization." In other words, "exceptional" circumstances called for the rules applying to current

intelligence. It was provided, however, that reports published under "exceptional" procedures must (a) carry a statement to the effect that they had not been coordinated and (b) be subjected to coordination as soon as possible after publication.

In cases where individual agencies failed to meet deadlines for concurrence or dissent "DCI 3/1" allowed Central Intelligence to publish a paper "with a note explaining that the department concerned has neither concurred nor dissented within the time allowed for such purposes." The purpose of this provision was to prevent a single party to a national estimate from unilaterally delaying its publication (See p. 3 above).

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/2 entitled "Policies Governing Departmental Concurrence in National Intelligence Reports and Estimates" was produced in final agreed form by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff. Its purpose was to establish procedures under which there could be "clarity and uniformity in the preparation of concurrences in or dissents from national intelligence reports and estimates."

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/2 does not really deal with concurrence or dissent as such, but with the means through which the participating agencies might arrive at concurrence or dissent. Or, to state the case in another way, "DCI 3/2" does not deal with concurrence and dissent at the level of the chiefs of intelligence but at the level of their subordinates.

The document states that on receipt of a report or estimate "departmental agencies should take action as promptly as possible in one of the following ways: (a) concur, (b) concur with comment, (c) dissent, (d) return the paper with the statement that the agency has no comment." In other words, an Agency could agree fully; could agree but limit the extent of its agreement and thus the extent of its liability; or could agree while at the same time suggesting changes that would make its agreement more compatible.

This last provision, of course, tended to sustain an existing ambiguity, even though the Directive goes on to state that "a comment does not qualify or limit the concurrence in any respect but is a suggestion designed to strengthen the substance of a national intelligence report or estimate." Despite the fact that this statement seemed to have made official the stand of Central Intelligence that it might but was not obliged to include Agency comments in its final reports, the Agencies did not accept this interpretation, and the point of whether or not Central Intelligence must accept or might decline to adopt comments remained in dispute over the ensuing two years.

In describing "concurrence with comment" the Directive also specified that the departmental agencies were at liberty, if they chose, to comment on subjects outside their special fields of interest. This may account for later papers in which the service agencies dissented for political reasons or the State Department on the basis of military considerations. It was also specified under this heading that "it is not

necessary to comment on a national intelligence report or estimate merely from an editorial point of view on matters of punctuation, phraseology, or grammatical construction which do not materially change the meaning of the estimate." The point had been inserted for obvious reasons of efficiency, but whatever value the sentence might have had from that point of view was destroyed by its final phrase. Superfluous inter-agency arguments continued to develop over points that were primarily editorial.

As to the problem of dissent itself, Central Intelligence in 1948 was anxious for real clarification. Certain "dissents" had already been published (See below, pp. 28-31) which did not seem to fit the commonly held concept of a clearly opposed opinion on a point clearly of major importance, and of such a nature that it merited the attention of a reader desiring a balanced view of the problem at issue.

As stated in "DCI 3/2", however, the nature of allowable dissent was not clarified. Instead, two general points were offered: that the purpose of a dissent was to assist readers in understanding the question; and that the existence of the dissent called upon the reader to make a choice between divergent views. No dissent should be offered, therefore, unless it presented a clear and important choice. This may have been clarification to a point, but beyond this point the directive simply says: "a disagreement should not become a dissent unless the dissenting intelligence organization believes that the reader will otherwise reach conclusions which are false or dangerously misleading." Such a statement as this, of course, did not narrow but if anything, tended to widen the latitude already enjoyed by the agencies in "dissenting" on Central Intelligence papers.

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In summary it might be stated that not very much was accomplished through the two directives just discussed. Central Intelligence was enjoined but not compelled to further Agency participation in the preparation of estimates. The Agencies were likewise instructed but not forced to refrain from misusing the processes of concurrence and dissent.

Central Intelligence complied with the requirements about announcing the nature and scope of projects as soon as they were undertaken, and its analysts continued to consult informally with Agency analysts in the course of preparing estimates. But Central Intelligence wrote its own drafts largely on the basis of its own research. It did not always request Agency contributions on which its estimates might be directly based even though this method was implicit in the directives.¹

On their part, the agencies, of course, continued to be laggard in meeting deadlines, and to dissent on grounds considered dubious by Central Intelligence.

IV. LATER DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM

Partly as a result of the two procedural directives just discussed, but more through force of circumstances, what amounted to realistic standard operating procedures took form gradually during 1948 and 1949 and were continued without much change through 1950. Because this system was not exactly the one officially established and because it depended largely on custom and tacit agreement, it never became thoroughly standardized. Probably no two estimates were handled in exactly the same way, and in some cases the procedures were radically different.² The ensuing description of the procedures as developed in 1949 should be taken, therefore, as approximate.

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1. This statement should be qualified to the extent that procedures differed within the intelligence organizations affected. It would probably be accurate to say for example that the Far East Branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates did everything within its power to make agency participation in Far Eastern estimates a reality. This was not necessarily true, however, of the Office as a whole.

2. See, for example, the case of ORE 22-48 in No.

In general, however, an estimate would be handled in the following steps:

1. Proposals for a new project were received from within or outside of Central Intelligence.
2. Except in rare instances where Central Intelligence declined to accept a proposal, the project became official forthwith.
3. The agencies were sent information concerning the new project including the proposed scope; sometimes complete terms of reference, and occasionally a request for contributions.
4. These proposals were sometimes discussed in an official meeting with agency representatives before Central Intelligence went further with the project, but this was more the exception than the rule.
5. Ordinarily, as soon as information concerning the existence of the project had been sent out, Central Intelligence would proceed to the preparation of its own estimate, discussing it informally with agency representatives as it progressed.
6. When a Central Intelligence draft had been completed, it was cleared with all interested elements within the Office of Reports and Estimates including the Assistant Director in case he should wish to study it, and was then sent out in duplicate to the participating agencies.
7. The fate of this draft would depend upon circumstances, but normally it was negotiated through a combination of interagency meetings and exchange of memoranda until those negotiating it would express themselves as in agreement (or official disagreement). During the period 1948-1951 interagency meetings took on increasing importance as the primary method of coordination.

8. The agreed draft was not submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Committee because the Intelligence Advisory Committee at this time did not meet for such purposes. Instead, a copy was furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence and to each agency chief. The Director seldom if ever made any formal comment on these drafts. By 1949 it had become generally the custom, however, for most of the agency intelligence chiefs to affix their own signatures to memoranda of formal concurrence or dissent. These memoranda were furnished to Central Intelligence severally and independently; and probably, in most cases, apart from consultation as between members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This fact may help in explaining why it was possible for two or more agencies to dissent on the same estimate for unrelated reasons.

9. The process of coordination was not necessarily at an end when all formal replies from agency chiefs had been received by Central Intelligence. If all concurred without objection or comment, the paper would, of course, be published at once; but in cases where further comment was furnished or where there was a proposed dissent which Central Intelligence considered still avoidable, coordination was likely to be further protracted until either a definite agreement could be reached, or the force of circumstances made immediate publication mandatory.

Certain weaknesses in this system are evident. The failure of the Office of Reports and Estimates to encourage the fullest agency participation probably diminished agency cooperation in other respects. Likewise, the failure to involve the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as a group, in the business of coordination doubtless made for less efficiency and less cooperation than might have been obtained. It should be recognized,

however, that during this period the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as a Group, preferred not to deal directly with coordination of individual estimates.

The attempt to arrive at not only agreed conclusions but at agreed literary form in intelligence estimates through exchange of comments by memoranda was, of course, essentially impractical. Comments had to be compared and assimilated. For intelligent handling of such problems, more than one representative had to be on the ground, preferably one to speak for each Agency. This had been better recognized in 1946 than in 1948, and the first formal call for an inter-agency meeting to discuss an estimate was drafted for the Central Intelligence Agency by Mr. James S. Lay in November, 1947. Thereafter the idea seems to have lapsed until Theodore Babbitt, as Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, proposed in February, 1949 that such meetings be regularly adopted as a means toward better coordination.¹ A system was then developed under which Central Intelligence furnished an impartial chairman to preside over the deliberations of expert Central Intelligence and Agency representatives. By 1950 it had also become customary to make phonographic recordings of these meetings.

Interagency meetings, however, did not solve as many problems as had been hoped. For one thing, oral negotiation allowed more latitude for discussion than is possible when comments must be stated in writing. Meetings were often protracted and sometimes inconclusive. The bringing together of individuals rather than documents did nothing toward increasing the spirit of cooperation which had progressively deteriorated during

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1. See files relating to ORE-7 and ORE 3-49 in Historical Files, Safe #2465

1947 and 1948. Finally there was an objection that had held from the beginning and probably had had much to do with the hesitance of Central Intelligence to adopt oral procedures before it did: namely that a meeting in which the members could not speak officially for their departments could never accomplish anything final. The importance of this fallacy was borne out in the experience of 1949 and 1950.

V. THE RESULTS OF COORDINATION

Theoretically, under the established rules, dissents on national estimates ought to have been rare. An estimate was to be primarily a statement of conclusions on a matter of consequence to national security. These conclusions were to be based on evidence equally available to all five parties to each estimate. Theoretically under these assumptions, a dissent could occur only in case (a) one or more parties arrived at a legitimate interpretation of the evidence which differed from that of the others; or (b) when, by equally valid logical processes, one or more parties derived conclusions from the evidence that differed substantially from those drawn by the rest.

The spirit, if not the letter of the regulations, however, allowed for a different form of dissent. It was generally understood that the provisions regarding concurrence and dissent were established to allow individual agencies to bring their "views" before those charged with forming policy. Whether or not it was so intended, this provision made possible the entering of dissent for reasons which did not derive purely from interpretation of evidence or logical inference. To state the case in another way it was possible for an agency to be in general agreement with conclusions, but to believe that such conclusions as stated should not

be brought to the attention of the National Security Council at a given time.

The way was also open under existing regulations for minor disagreements to develop into major ones. It was not difficult for disagreements which were basically semantic or even rhetorical to be confused with actual positions contrary to the validity of an estimate.

It was also admissible under the terms of "DCI 3/2" for an Agency to dissent when it believed that statements made in estimates might be "misleading," a provision which seemed to take for granted that intelligence employees would know what would and would not mislead a policy-making officer. The effect of the provision was virtually to allow for dissent on any grounds selected by any agency.

With all this as a background, certain results developed that could easily have been foreseen. Dissents based on differing evaluation of evidence or contrary inferences were rare. Depending on one's interpretation, there probably was not one dissent of this nature during the period under consideration. Dissents apparently traceable to departmental "views" were not uncommon. The same may be said of official disagreements whose origins may be found in the inability of analysts to agree on what were essentially minor points unrelated to immediate or long-range requirements of national security.

A. Summary of the First Five Dissents

Aside from "ORE-1" on which Agency concurrence may be considered more passive than active,¹ there were five "dissents" on the fifteen papers published between July, 1946 and July, 1947. All things considered,

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1. The paper was done in a great hurry. It had the consent if not the concurrence of an interagency committee. It did not have the signed "concurrence" of the agency chiefs. It is doubtful that the publication of "ORE 1" would have been as smooth as it was if the full "coordination" process had been invoked.

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the rate of protest seems high.

The subjects covered were not particularly controversial. The fact that there was controversy and that there were formal "dissents" on any of them would seem to point to a flaw somewhere in the Central Intelligence system as so far developed.

Very briefly, the "dissents" could be summarized as follows:

1. ORE 6/1 "The Greek Situation" 7 February 1947

The Army dissent is called a "Comment". It says that: "...the paper, despite isolated statements in the contrary sense, attributes to the Leftists, and particularly the leftist bands, a strength and national character which they lack. Concurrently, the paper places in question the representative character and competence of the Rightist parties or leaders to an extent which does not correspond to known facts, particularly the results of the recent elections." This dissent does not directly dispute the main conclusion of the paper which was that Greece was in grave danger of succumbing to Communist domination.

2. ORE 13/1 "The Situation in Austria" 20 February 1947

This paper is described as "only partially coordinated," dissent if any to follow. Whether or not it became part of the official record, State disagreed with portions of the paper at length. The greater part of this disagreement is with items said to have been omitted and with statements said to be misleading.

3. ORE 14 "Future Soviet Participation in Long-Range International Air Transport, 11 March 1947

In the case of ORE-14 Army took issue with the statement that....

"the USSR, without relaxing the safeguards to its political and military

security, will eventually modify its present international air transport policy to the extent of granting rights to land at points on the perimeter of Soviet territory." Army maintained that the USSR "...will continue to regard the factor of internal security as more important than the introduction of International Civil Aviation to the USSR on a reciprocal basis." The disagreement is not clearcut unless it is taken to mean (as is not stated) that one party believes the USSR will eventually grant landing rights on its territory while the other party does not.

4. ORE 11/1 "Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany" 8 April 1947

State took issue with two sentences. The first said: "The ultimate over-all objective of the USSR is the extension of Soviet hegemony over the whole of Germany." The other maintained that the Constitution published by the East German Communist party would allow for control of the country by a well-entrenched minority. State found the first statement too sweeping and pointed to alternative policies that the USSR might adopt: weakening through division; or sacrifice of political advantages to tangible economic benefits. As to the second, it was State's view that the constitution granted "almost unlimited power to the parliamentary majority."

5. ORE 17 "The International Economic Position of the United Kingdom" 31 May 1947

The disagreement between State and the Group over this paper is too complicated for brief summary. It would appear from a reading of the paper, the "dissent," and the Group's comment on the dissent, that actual disagreement over the main points with which the paper was concerned was less than the length of the commentaries would indicate.

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The implied accusation by Central Intelligence that State's dissent was dictated by Department policies may explain the confusing nature of the dissent as recorded.¹

B. SELECTED CASES IN LATER COORDINATION

If the record of July, 1946-July, 1947 were to be substantially repeated thereafter, the result would be an alarming proportion of disagreement on papers not necessarily worthy of controversy on a national level. Whether or not this was actually the case during 1947-1949 would be a matter of opinion. The proportion of formal dissent was lowered from 31% to 19%. Some of the dissents were on papers of less than the highest importance. The problem of gaining assent tended to become more rather than less difficult. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that cases of complete concurrence were far more frequent than cases of dissent or near dissent and that there were occasions when the coordination system, with all its faults, worked very well.

To illustrate, ORE 38-38 "Possible Developments from the Palestine Truce", July 27, 1948, was requested by the Office of the Secretary of Defense at ten o'clock on the morning of July 20, 1948 and was delivered to that office, complete even to the point of an accompanying map, at 4:45 that same afternoon. It was not in printed form, and it had not received formal concurrence over the signatures of the chiefs of Agency intelligence, but it had the full approval of agency representatives whose suggestions had been incorporated. A printed edition, virtually unchanged, and with the formal concurrence of all Agencies, was distributed one week later. Much the same can be said of ORE 7-48 "Possible

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1. See memorandum for Assistant Director R & E from Chief, Intelligence Staff dated 5 August 1947, in File ORE 17, Historical Files, Safe #2465

Developments in Palestine", 28 February 1948, which had a similar history and was printed with full concurrence in less than a week. There were other examples of the same type, such as the papers in the 1947-1948 estimates series on China (See No. 12, pp. 29-40) which, though highly controversial, gained full agency agreement without suffering in the process. For an example, ORE 27-48 "Possible Developments in China", 19 November 1948 was completed, from request to dissemination in sixteen days.

The elements that made for ease in coordinating an estimate on the Palestine papers, however, did not usually exist with respect to other problems. There was seldom such urgency in the minds of all concerned toward completion of a Central Intelligence estimate. The motivation toward getting the paper completed was often overborne by a desire to delay publication, if necessary, in order to make sure that a given point of view became part of it.

Ordinarily, any estimate was the product of friction between the analysts in Central Intelligence who wrote the papers and their counterparts in the other agencies who reviewed the drafts. There was some supervision of the papers they wrote, and there was subsequent clearance of papers with persons on a "higher level" than that of the analysts. Occasionally the Chiefs of intelligence themselves entered into the final phases of the argument. But when they did so it was always in the negative role of upsetting prior agreement. The records show no case where the Chiefs stepped in to settle arguments and bring about harmony among their subordinates.

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It may have been questionable if intelligence analysts should have been allowed as free a rein as they were. If those in higher office had intervened more often for the purpose of concentrating attention on the essential conclusions of estimates, there might not only have been fewer dissents but there might have been less friction among the analysts. Furthermore, if those in command had taken more direct charge of the coordination process, there might have been less tendency for this friction to interfere with the orderly process of producing coordinated national estimates.

Of the some fifty-three items in the "ORE" Series bearing publication dates from April 10, 1947 to March 17, 1949 ten carry Agency dissents. In the same group of papers, there are nine instances of "no comment," almost all of them by Air Force; five where military agencies concurred "in the military aspects only"; and one where State publicly disclaimed all responsibility. None of this, of course, takes account of the dissents and near dissents which do not appear in the published papers. Some of these, though unpublished, were of some importance in the development of coordination and are therefore noted here.

The following examples, chosen from the files of the Office of Reports and Estimates illustrate the progress of disagreement over individual papers, and the possible effect on the coordination system as it was developing after July, 1947. They are arbitrarily arranged in chronological order.

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1. ORE 9-48 "Cuban Political Trends", March 26, 1948

The paper argued that as a result of the vagaries of Cuban politics the party in power may not be as favorably inclined toward the United States as it seems. It linked this problem with the concept of the security of the United States with reference to maneuvers open to the Cuban government embarrassing to the United States policy.

The State Department dissented on the general grounds that any elections anywhere are likely to modify international relationships, but that those in Cuba could hardly have an "adverse effect" on the security of the United States. It can be inferred from the nature of the dissent and the negotiations over it that the real disagreement was not so much with anything in the paper as with two different interpretations of the word "security."

2. ORE - 16 "Soviet Objectives in Latin America"
April 10, 1947

The principal argument of this paper (which was begun in 1946) is that for various reasons Soviet aims in the area were essentially negative--to foment bad hemisphere relations rather than to communize individual countries.¹ State's comments on the first draft run to five full pages. The principal objections were:

1. An allegation that the estimate gave an impression of "greater Soviet danger in Latin America than the material presented warranted."
2. A statement that "Strictures upon U.S. policy toward Argentina and toward negotiation of a hemisphere defense pact seem gratuitous."
3. An assertion that the paper had not proved that Soviet foreign policy was based on the inevitability of war.

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1. For a summary of the papers here discussed, see No. For correspondence relating to the papers, see ORE collection in Historical Files.

The first point was a matter of interpretation; the second criticized alleged motives of the authors; the third asked for something beyond the scope of the paper which the Central Intelligence Agency considered to have been settled in "ORE-1". The records make it clear that those in Central Intelligence who dealt with these comments were offended by the tone in which they were written.¹ State finally entered a formal dissent on grounds that "in certain respects, the estimate is misleading." It can be inferred that the effect of the controversy on relations between State and Central Intelligence analysts was not good.

2. ORE-62 "Soviet Objectives in Korea", November 18, 1947

No dissent is recorded with this paper as published. In the files, however, there is a memorandum from the Army Intelligence Division dated December 4, 1947 (sixteen days after formal publication which probably explains why the memorandum did not become attached to the estimate) saying that the Intelligence Division "does not concur with subject paper as written."

The Intelligence Division took exception to the paper's main these-- that the USSR would eventually withdraw its troops from Korea and that if the United States followed suit, a North Korean invasion would follow. Army took the position that the Soviets would neither withdraw nor foster such an invasion. Its principal reasons were:

1. The North Koreans were a "volatile" people who could not be trusted to remain loyal to the USSR once Soviet troops had been withdrawn.

2. There was so much dissatisfaction in the North with the Pyongyang government that the Russians would not dare leave for fear

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that the Communist regime would be overthrown in their absence.

3. The USSR feared the United States. The Soviets would not gamble on withdrawing their troops when they could not be sure that the United States would do the same. "The USSR," said Army in this connection, "is as much in the dark regarding future steps of the U.S. in Korea as is the U.S. regarding Soviet plans and policy."

4. Even if the Russians had plans for a North Korean invasion of South Korea and could trust the North Koreans, they would not rely on them to carry out the plan in the absence of Soviet troops. The reason given for this was that Koreans fight well when they are attacked, but not when they are the aggressors. This was based on historical analogies furnished by the Army.

5. Finally, the Army contended that the USSR was bound by treaty agreements with respect to Korea, could not find a legalistic means of evading these treaties (as Central Intelligence had maintained) and so would not dare take overt steps in Korea for fear of adverse reaction in the United Nations.

3. ORE-64 "The Current Situation in France", 31 December 1947

This paper was requested by the National Security Council as a matter of priority. It was written under pressure, therefore, and a draft was sent to the Agencies (on December 16, 1947) with a request for formal concurrence or dissent by the 23rd. Air, Navy, and Army concurred on December 22, 23, and 29 respectively. The first word from State was received on the 24th, but it was neither concurrence nor dissent;

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1. See folder on ~~ORE-16~~ in Historical Files

it was rather an unofficial memorandum, signed by a State analyst, which purported to give advance notice of what State's position would be.

This memorandum begins: "I sincerely hope that the ORE analysts concerned will be given an adequate chance to study these criticisms and that we may have a conference to discuss points on which we remain in disagreement."

Following this formal opening, there are numerous individual comments on the paper, the following being examples:

"Our conclusion is that this is a distressingly poor paper."

"This curious juxtaposition of French political psychology and certain surface aspects of current party strengths does justice to neither subject."

"It seems odd, to say the least, that no space is given to France's interest in peace in general."

"This is a good example of ORE putting France's worse foot forward."

"A childish generalization partially contradicted on page 9."

"Meaningless as written."

These comments elicited the following proposed reply (which was probably never sent to the State Department but indicates a state of mind unfavorable to successful negotiation of the paper).

"Reference (a) is hereby returned because its tone, substance and uncertain representation of departmental authority render it entirely unacceptable.

No useful purpose is discernible in the conference proposed by Reference (a) and the suggestion is therefore rejected because the captious

attitude which has become characteristic of OIR offers no basis for fruitful negotiations.

Enclosed, are two (2) copies of WE's¹ final draft of ORE-64, which represents the coordinated views of CIA, Army, Navy and Air, the last three of which are enthusiastic about CIA's estimate.

In view of the foregoing, it is strongly recommended that a copy of ORE-64 be forwarded to the Department of State, for such action as it may deem advisable, with a request that the anticipated dissent be in ORE's hands not later than 7 January 1948 since publication will then have been delayed by the Department of State for thirteen (13) days over and above the time allotted to all supporting agencies."

The controversy culminated in a formal dissent by State. The "dissent" took issue with no major conclusion. Rather it consists of seriatim comments on individual points in the paper.

4. ORE-65 "The Venezuelan Elections of 14 December 1947",
5 January 1948

The principal point made in this paper was that the Accion Democratica, a political party returned to power by the December elections, was not Communist and would be friendly to the United States. The Departments of State, Navy, and Air Force concurred in this view. The Army dissented because it did not believe "that Accion Democratica is at present an active non-communist party" and "their present temperate pro-United States policy represents expediency."

Records show that the Navy was on the point of dissenting also, for much the same reasons as the Army. The Army's analysis of the Accion Democratica seems to have been built chiefly on the opinion of the military attache in Caracas, who considered, contrary to many experts on Venezuelan politics, that the party was a dangerously left-wing group. This was, of course, a case (see p. above) where a reader of the paper might have been confused at finding a dissent on purely political affairs

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1. The Western European section of the Office of Reports and Estimates

made by a military Agency against the findings of both non-political Agencies.

5. ORE-69 "Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Greece in the Absence of US Counteraction",
February 9, 1948

The National Security Council asked for "ORE-69" as a guide in the formation of policy for Greece at a time when the success of the new United States aid program seemed to be in grave doubt. It was not unnatural that Council members should have wanted to know what would happen if, on the one hand, the United States abandoned Greece to the Communists or, on the other, backed the "Truman Doctrine" in Greece with military force. "ORE-69" outlined the probable consequences of the first extreme; "ORE 10-48" (see below) of the second.

In order to present the issues involved in "ORE-69" clearly, the Central Intelligence Agency adopted a hypothetical assumption (suggested as it happens by the National Security Council Secretariat) that a Communist regime (the "Markos" government) had already seized power in Greece and that the United States had chosen to do nothing about it. It was this assumption, basically, that made the coordination of "ORE-69" troublesome.

The actual "coordination footnote" on "ORE-69" reads as follows:

"The information in this report is as of 28 January 1948 at which time the report was submitted to the member agencies of the Inter-departmental Advisory Council for coordination.¹

"The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, and the Air Intelligence Division, Department of the Air Force, have concurred in the military aspects of this paper but have not concurred in the political aspects. The statement of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State disassociating itself from the paper is set forth in Enclosure 'A'. The dissent of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, is set forth in Enclosure 'B'."

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1. This title was not a misprint. The publishing office of Central Intelligence was not yet aware of the correct meaning of "IAC"

What this means is that "ORE-69" received no concurrence at all. The "military aspects" of the paper--whatever that term might mean--were not important. State's "disassociation", if not a dissent, was certainly not a concurrence. The total effect was to make it appear that no Agency had any real quarrel with the paper as such, but rather with the fact that such a paper had been attempted.

The trouble, of course, lay in the second part of the assumption--that the United States would take no counteraction under the circumstances set forth. This was, indeed, an assumption contrary to any conceivable sort of fact, but it should have been evident to the Agencies that no matter how the paper had been written, some such device would have been required by the mere mechanics of presentation. Nevertheless, although Central Intelligence representatives made earnest and patient efforts over a considerable period of time, they could never overcome Agency qualms to the effect that it is impossible to arrive at correct conclusions when the starting point is an assumption known to be invalid. The fact that the reasoning in question was wholly hypothetical seems not to have carried weight with the Agencies.

State gave as its reason for "disassociation" that a sound analysis of the problem could not be based on the assumption as adopted. The Navy "dissent" makes the same point but is more elaborate in adding that: (1) no valid conclusion with respect to Greece could go much beyond a general formula (outlined by the Navy in its dissent) which ended with the words: "Greece is the keystone....in the whole Communist circle"; (2) it was doubtful that the loss of Greece "would bring on international panic" (the paper had not said "would"; it had said

"could"); (3) loss of Greece would not necessarily mean the loss of Iran (again the paper had said "could"); (4) it was unlikely that Turkey would capitulate (the paper had mentioned this only as conceivable); and finally (5) the paper left the impression that the hypothetical events enumerated were "inevitable."

6. ORE 6-48 "Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means," March 5, 1948

One month after the publication of "ORE-69," the Central Intelligence Agency was called upon to write substantially the same estimate with respect to the situation in Italy. The assumption used in this case was that the Italian Communists had won the elections of April 18, 1948; the problem to construct a hypothesis as to what the consequences of this assumed development would be. In this case, State concurred; Army and Air Force resorted to the "military aspects only" formula, and Navy, still opposed to reasoning from hypothesis, dissented on grounds that it was "not prepared to underwrite the detailed speculative predictions derived from the estimates."

7. ORE 10-48 "Consequences of Certain Courses of Action with Respect to Greece," April 5, 1948

The only published dissent on this paper was by Army which maintained that the estimate was too "pessimistic" with respect to Greek army capabilities against the guerrillas. Much more important was an Air Force dissent that was never published.

Air Force representatives concurred in the final draft, and the Director of Air Force Intelligence entered a formal concurrence thereafter. With three formal concurrences and the Army dissent, the paper

was duly published after a delay of some twenty days, occasioned by what the author called the "vagaries of coordination." The paper outlined various courses of action that the United States might take in Greece and concluded that none of them--including the use of actual American troops against the Greek guerrillas--would be taken as a casus belli by the USSR, unless the Russians concluded, for other reasons, that United States maneuvers in Greece meant an imminent attack by the United States on the USSR.

On 9 April, four days after publication, the Office of Reports and Estimates received a memorandum signed by Colonel James S. Olive for the Director of Intelligence, United States Air Force. The Director of Intelligence, according to Olive, had noted an inconsistency between the conclusions of "ORE 10-48" and those of "ORE 22-48," Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948 (see No.). ORE 10-48 said that "The Kremlin would resort to war only if convinced that a U.S. attack was in prospect and inevitable;" while 22-48 stated that "the USSR might resort to direct military action in 1948, particularly if the Kremlin should interpret some U.S. move, or series of moves, as indicating an intention to attack the USSR and its satellites." Consequently, said Olive, "the Director of Intelligence, USAF, wishes to go on record as amending the estimate (Conclusion (7)) contained in ORE 10-48 as follows: Delete the sentence 'The Kremlin would resort to war only if convinced that a U.S. attack of the USSR was inevitable.'"

In a memorandum dated April 13, the author of the Central Intelligence draft, in a proposed memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence,

attacked the Air Force position. He attributed the memorandum to "careless and thoughtless reading out of context" and to "poor staff work in the United States Air Force." He recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence should make formal representations to the Air Force to this effect. This was not done.

Instead, the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates prepared a reply via the Director stating that, "since the Director of Intelligence, USAF wishes to go on record as amending conclusion 7 of ORE 10-48... The original of your reference memorandum has been filed in the Reference Center, CIA, with the record copy of ORE 10-48 and a copy of this reply." There is no record of further transactions. Presumably, the Air Force decided to let the matter pass.

The Air Force letter contained so many implications regarding the future of coordination, however, that it engaged the serious attention of everyone concerned, including the Director of Central Intelligence. In the first place, although the Director of Intelligence, United States Air Force had not said so, he apparently wanted to enter what amounted to a dissent on a paper already published and disseminated. Or if this was not his aim, he must have wished to have the offending words deleted from the published copies. The precedent that would be established if either of these courses of action were allowed, might well have been detrimental to the whole process of producing coordinated estimates. In the second place, if it became possible for a single agency to revise estimates without regard for the rest, there would seem to be little future for the idea of unified intelligence in any form. There was also involved the principle that statements made in one

estimate could be used out of context to damn those made in another, though the second might be unrelated to the first.

The Central Intelligence Agency did not have the authority--or did not believe it had the authority--simply to reject as inadmissible any comment, objection, or dissent offered on any of its estimates. As to the legality of reversing a concurrence once it had been signed and published, there was no ruling and no precedent. Hence this particular problem ended in the Central Files. It was by no means solved, however, and was to arise again.

8. ORE 22-48 "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948," April 2, 1948

The Air Force again dissented after the paper had been disseminated and this time succeeded in having its dissent published (See Paper No. for a full account of the important controversy regarding this paper).

9. ORE 23-28 "The Current Situation in the Free Territory of Trieste," April 15, 1948

This paper was produced in an atmosphere of urgency, apparently occasioned by the national elections to be held in Italy on April 18, 1948. The story of what happened in the course of coordination can be gleaned from a memorandum (undated but must have been sent after April 17) from the Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates, to the Director of Army Intelligence.

According to this memorandum, Army representatives had professed full agreement with the various drafts of "ORE 23-48" up until the moment of final concurrence. The Central Intelligence Agency was then informed

of a reversal of Army's stand, not in official communication to the Director of Central Intelligence, but in the form of a telephone call from the Army office that handled immediate coordination detail to its counterpart in Central Intelligence. By this time, "ORE 23-48" had already gone to press with an urgent deadline as noted above. Since it would have been insecure to discuss Army's objections over the telephone, the Central Intelligence representative requested an immediate meeting to determine if a compromise solution could be reached. To this suggestion the Army representative replied that it would be useless to call such a meeting because the Army's dissent was "too fundamental" to allow compromise. All other Agencies having given formal concurrence by this time, and the Italian elections being only three days off, Central Intelligence went ahead with publication, stating in the "coordination footnote," in accordance with "DCI 3/1, that Army had not yet reported its position, which would be published when received. It was received on the sixteenth, bearing the date of 14 April, but apparently was never published.¹

According to its memorandum, Army disagreed with a statement to the effect that Italo-Yugoslav desires to control Trieste were based on national pride and tradition more than strategic consideration, since Trieste no longer had any great strategic significance from the point of view of either. Army took the contrary view, that Trieste was still of considerable strategic importance to both countries. This would presumably have been a legitimate matter of dispute, but the point is still unexplained why the Army should not have been concerned about

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1. This was probably the first case in which CIA made use of the relevant provisions in DCI 3/1

the strategic importance of Trieste until "ORE 23-48" was about to go to press, or why, thereafter, it should have considered the resultant difference of opinion too "fundamental" to allow even of discussion.

10. ORE 46-48 "Communist Strength in Japan",
September 28, 1948

A footnote states that all Agencies had concurred in this estimate. Documents in the ORE file on ORE 46-48, however, show that Navy was not fully in accord. The Office of Naval Intelligence was asked to participate in production of the paper but failed to do so. Up to the last stage of coordination, Navy acted as a sort of passive onlooker. It then sent a memorandum of provisional concurrence. After having done so, however, the Office of Naval Intelligence forwarded a memorandum which is not in the file, but whose tone can be deduced from the reply to it by the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates which reads in part as follows:

"3. To characterize a paper as 'another example of what we consider to be unprofessional work' and to say that 'the paper loses value due to its verbosity and the unsystemitized (sic) development of its information' does not of itself enable CIA to improve its production, even assuming these comments to be valid."

11. ORE 44-48 "Prospects for Survival of the Republic of
Korea," October 28, 1948

Navy entered a dissent on this paper, first on grounds that the new South Korean government would not gain United Nations recognition (which it did within a few days) and second that Central Intelligence

had based its discussion of South Korea's future on an assumption of continued United States aid. This assumption, the Navy thought, might engender too optimistic conclusions on the part of persons reading the paper. Rather, said Office of Naval Intelligence, the problem should have been discussed on the assumption that aid would not be granted, and then have been followed by supplementary remarks on what would happen if it were. However commendable the Navy's suggestion may have been, the grounds for dissent might seem difficult to follow.