

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 1719

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, there being no further requests for time, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 14910, REGULATION OF DEVICES CAPABLE OF CAUSING RADIO INTERFERENCE

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 1084 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 1084

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14910) to amend the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to give the Federal Communications Commission authority to prescribe regulations for the manufacture, import, sale, shipment, or use of devices which cause harmful interference to radio reception. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LATTA], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 1084 provides an open rule with 1 hour of general debate for consideration of H.R. 14910 to amend the Communications Act of 1934.

The bill would add a new section 302 to the Communications Act which would empower the FCC to prescribe reasonable regulations governing the interference potential of devices capable of emitting radio energy which could cause harmful interference to radio communications. These regulations would be applicable to the manufacture, importation, sale or offering for sale, shipment, or use of such devices.

Such regulations would not be applicable to carriers transporting such devices without trading in them; devices constructed by electric utilities for their own use; or devices for the use of the Federal Government, or devices intended solely for export.

The legislation also provides that such devices for the use of the Federal Government be designed so as to reduce ra-

dio interference, taking into account the needs of the national defense and security.

Devices capable of causing radio interference are, among others, electronic garage door openers, certain electronic toys, high-powered electronic heaters, diathermy machines, welders, radio and television receivers, ultrasonic cleaners, and remote control devices for such equipment as industrial cranes.

I am happy to say this legislation will not result in any additional cost to the Government.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of House Resolution 1084 in order that H.R. 14910 may be considered.

(Mr. LATTA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the statements just made by the gentleman from New York concerning this bill. The present law is often the fact and and causes the FCC to proceed on a case-to-case basis in locating devices which are causing radio interference. With the passage of this legislation they will be able to regulate the manufacture of such devices and prescribe regulations relative to their manufacturer so that they will not cause interference. This is the sole purpose of the bill, according to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. STAGGERS] at the time he appeared before the Rules Committee.

However, I raised a question about the language in the bill as it seems to be much broader. He has assured me and the other members of the Rules Committee that the FCC already has these additional powers and no new authority is being granted herein.

I do wish to call to the Members' attention lines 5, 6, and 7, on page 2, which read as follows:

Such regulations shall be applicable to the manufacture, import, sale, offer for sale, shipment or use of such devices.

That language raises in my mind a question as to whether or not the new language, if it is new language, will give them power to go out to every home that has electronically operated garage doors and tell the owners how to operate and use them, or does this give the FCC the authority to tell the owner of one of these little walkie-talkies that he is not operating it properly or that he is on the wrong frequency.

These are questions that I hope will be answered during general debate. They were not answered to my full satisfaction before the Rules Committee, but, with the assurance of the chairman of the full committee that this bill only grants additional powers to the FCC relative to the manufacture of these devices, I voted to report this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time. I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

DD/S-1
TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT, AS AMENDED

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14940) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 14940, with Mr. FULTON of Tennessee in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MORGAN] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON] will be recognized for 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14940. H.R. 14940 authorizes \$33 million to finance the operation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for a 3-year period. The bill makes no change in existing law except for the amount of money.

The last previous authorization was enacted in 1965 and authorized \$30 million for the 3 fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968.

The work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency involves primarily the backup of the U.S. negotiators who participate in international negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

The Agency was established in 1961 because it was generally recognized that the United States could not very well refuse to participate in such negotiations, and that if we were going to participate, our representatives should have available to them adequate expert assistance and technical information in this highly complex field.

Mr. Chairman, I do not suppose that there is any agency of the U.S. Government Agency is trying to undermine the the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Every once in a while I hear someone say that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is trying to undermine the Defense Department, that the United States is spending money out of one pocket to build up our Armed Forces, and that we are spending money out of another pocket to weaken these forces or to put them out of business.

This idea completely disregards the facts. In the first place, the Department of Defense is fully informed about everything the Arms Control Agency does or

proposes to do. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports to, and all of its operations are reviewed by, the Committee of Principals which consists of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

In the second place, let me point out that arms control does not diminish U.S. security. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that national security can be improved by balanced, phased, and safeguarded arms control agreements limiting the military capabilities of nations in a manner conducive to the achievement of a secure, free, and peaceful world.

The military posture of the United States would be stronger and our security would be greater if we could get an effective agreement with other nations to limit the size and nature of their forces and weapons.

Secretary McNamara has stated the issue very clearly in the recent discussion of anti-ballistic-missile defenses.

If both the Russians and ourselves maximum our anti-ballistic-missile defense and then maximize our vehicles for penetrating these defenses, neither country will be more secure but both will be poorer.

The main job of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is to enhance the security of the United States. The function of the Agency is to see that the United States goes into any arms control agreement with its eyes open.

Another misconception about the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is that it is an organization that believes that the Russians can be trusted. There are those who argue that it is a complete waste of time to negotiate with the Russians on arms control since any agreement will not be worth the paper it is written on and that the people in charge of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are unrealistic and gullible.

Let me say that my experience has been that the more contact people have with Russian negotiators, the fewer illusions they have. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is fully aware of the pitfalls and the frustrations.

Nevertheless, we have to consider that the Russians on occasion may find that an agreement will serve their interests as well as ours. They have been known to live up to agreements when it is to their advantage to do so.

The United States could refuse to enter into any negotiations relating to arms control and disarmament on the grounds that the Russians cannot be trusted. Nearly all of the governments of the world fear the consequences of atomic war and give top priority to efforts for arms control.

If we are to participate in such negotiations, it is essential that we know what we are doing.

The highest degree of military and scientific knowledge must be readily available to our negotiators. The job of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is to see that the United States has the proper backup for our negotiations.

After 7 days of hearings, which included testimony from distinguished citizens such as John J. McCloy, General Gruenther, and Lewis L. Strauss, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the committee decided to approve the full amount of funds requested and the 3-year authorization as requested.

The bill received strong bipartisan support in the committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee has 36 members—21 Democrats and 15 Republicans. There were only five votes against the bill out of 25 voting.

During the hearings, most of the discussion centered around the nonproliferation treaty, a draft of which has been approved by the United States and by the Soviet Union, and is now pending before the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

Several witnesses and some members of the committee are against the nonproliferation treaty, but almost every one favored the continuation of the Agency.

Although the nonproliferation treaty is a matter of concern to the Members of the House and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, this bill does not have anything to do with the approval of the treaty.

The real issue which confronted the committee was whether the operation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be curtailed or whether it should continue at its present level.

The Agency has had appropriations of \$9 million a year for fiscal 1967 and fiscal 1968. They are asking \$10 million for fiscal 1969. This does not involve an expansion of the Agency's operations.

The Agency has to find the money to finance the employees' pay raise which the Congress enacted last year.

The Agency also has to finance the entire cost of field tests since funds for sharing the cost of such tests was eliminated from the Defense Department appropriations.

This is a small agency with only 268 jobs. Its functions are highly specialized. It does not have the sort of budget which can absorb cuts and continue to perform all of its functions.

Ten million dollars for fiscal year 1969 means that the Agency will be able to continue its present scale of operations. It does not mean an expansion.

The Agency has never had a 1-year authorization. The original authorization in 1961 was adequate for 2 years. In 1963 there was a 2-year authorization, and in 1965 the Congress authorized funds for 3 years.

The committee was impressed by the argument of John J. McCloy, who said:

I think the 3-year authorization is very important. Particularly at this state, if there

was any limitation of the 3-year provision at this point, I think perhaps there would be undue significance attached to it.

Perhaps this is the chief reason I would urge you not to limit the authorization to one year but that you continue with the 3-year period, that it is rather important psychologically at this point. * * *

In short, I think that with the annual review which is incidental to every appropriation bill, together with the fact that at any point this committee can call on anyone to come down to testify and report on its affairs, that it would be unfortunate to give any indication at this point that there is any hesitation about our attachment to the policy of arms control and disarmament which are consistent with the security of the country. (Hearings, pp. 225 and 226.)

Over half of the funds requested are to finance external research. That is research performed under contract by private firms or by universities, or by Government agencies such as the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission, which are reimbursed for research services.

Although there is always a tendency to be suspicious of research expenditures by operating agencies, this Agency has a major research function.

In the first place, the Agency is required to carry on research in a dozen categories which are defined by statute. These are set forth on pages 2 and 3 of the committee report.

The Director of the Agency is directed to do research in these fields. A substantial cut in funds would mean that the Director could not discharge the responsibilities imposed on him.

In addition, although the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission carry on much larger research programs relating to atomic and other weapons, there are a number of problems that are peculiar to the arms control and disarmament business that are not of particular concern to other agencies.

A case in point involves the detection of the existence and the characteristics. Such detection is a major responsibility of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. Their efforts are directed to a large degree to detecting such weapons by covert means.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency faces the problem of developing techniques for such detection when the country involved has avowedly opened its doors to inspection. While much of the technical information needed for open inspection can be obtained from the Defense Department or the Atomic Energy Commission, there is a different kind of problem which requires special research.

Many pages of the hearings and several pages of the additional views which are printed with the committee report deal with the desirability of making atomic weapons available to NATO.

This discussion really has nothing to do with H.R. 14940, but the Nonproliferation Treaty does require that none of the countries which have atomic weapons—both the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed on this point—shall transfer nuclear explosive devices to any one—including NATO.

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 1721

This provision of the treaty is in complete accord with the Atomic Energy Act which forbids such transfers.

At least one member of the Foreign Affairs Committee believes that the treaty should be changed so as to permit transfer of nuclear weapons to NATO.

The overwhelming majority of the committee do not support this point of view.

Nuclear weapons are now located with NATO forces and are available to carry out NATO defense plans. These weapons, however, belong to the United States and are subject to U.S. control. I do not believe that there are many in the Congress or among the people of this country who want to change this arrangement and turn over to NATO control over nuclear weapons now controlled by the United States.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, On January 24 the President sent a message to Congress, asking continuation of the Arms Control Agency for another 3 years and for authorization of needed appropriations.

H.R. 14940, to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to extend the authorization for appropriations, was reported out of the Foreign Affairs Committee on February 27.

It authorizes an appropriation of \$33 million to finance the continued operation of the Agency for 3 years. For 1969 the Agency is requesting \$10 million including \$4,682,000 to finance its program operations and \$5,318,000 to finance external research. The Agency also has programmed \$12 million for fiscal year 1970 and \$11 million for fiscal year 1971.

Except for the authorization of funds, the bill makes no change in the existing authority of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. There is a measure of congressional control because annual appropriations are required. All previous authorizations have been for more than 1 year.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. KELLY].

(Mrs. KELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, this bill is intended to extend the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for another 3 years. The title of the Agency raises questions and fosters misgivings. I can readily understand why this is so. One day we are voting for increased military appropriations; the next day we are voting on a bill authorizing funds for arms control and possible future disarmament. It makes a Member feel like a split personality.

I regret the inclusion of the word "disarmament" in the title of the Agency. It diverts attention from the immediate and more basic objectives of arms control. The decision to give the Agency jurisdiction in that far-out field was that of Congress.

It was Congress that provided the guidelines and objectives when it created the Agency in 1961. The basic statute reads:

This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based.

It then enumerated the primary functions of the Agency:

(a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation;

(b) The preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;

(c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and

(d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

Those who criticize the Agency for moving on too many fronts at one time would do well to read what Congress has expected of it.

In an effort to do its job, the Agency has identified five broad objectives within which research is conducted that is basic to the national security:

First, to limit and reduce armed forces, armaments, and military expenditures through arms control and disarmament measures;

Second, to prevent the proliferation among nations of nuclear weapons, nuclear delivery vehicles, and conventional armaments;

Third, to reduce the risk of outbreak of armed conflict, to inhibit its escalation, and to limit its destructiveness and duration through arms control and disarmament measures;

Fourth, to avert harmful economic consequences of reduced defense spending resulting from arms control and disarmament measures, and to study the most constructive use of the resources thus released; and

Fifth, to assist in achieving an international environment conducive to arms control and disarmament negotiations.

During its short span of life the Agency has given a high priority to the control of nuclear weapons. This is a period that coincides with a breakthrough in nuclear technology. Where once the only concern was with the military application of nuclear energy, it suddenly offered the prospect of cheap electric power. No longer is nuclear energy an element of war alone; it is the hope for human happiness. As the Agency has noted, the world "must find a way to survive the first if it is to enjoy the benefits of the second."

The Agency has directed its limited resources toward curbing the indiscriminate pollution of this planet with atomic matter. The groundwork that went into the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Outer Space Treaty of 1966 provided a wealth of experience to the Agency in conducting the negotiations for the recently completed Nonproliferation Treaty. Studies of a highly sophisticated nature preceded the final agreement. Let me suggest a few of these in order that the Members may appreciate better the detailed attention which the Agency has given to this difficult sub-

ject. One was a study on techniques for inspection of ballistic missile testing; another concerned the reduction of ICBM leadtimes; another was a study of the validation of records of production.

Some critics of the Agency have raised questions about the merit of other contracts into which the Agency has entered. I can understand the basis for concern. But their worth can only be judged against the poverty of material that marks the entire field of arms control. Any one of the projects by itself may seem insignificant, even irrelevant. But each has to be viewed as part of the total effort to weigh past experience and to explore unknown paths. After all, if the end results of each research project were known, there would be no need for research.

Members should know that the work of the Agency is under the scrutiny of a General Advisory Committee of 15 members. This is a statutory body whose Chairman is the Honorable John J. McCloy. Mr. McCloy has devoted many years under several administrations to work in the field of armaments and disarmament. Another outstanding American on this committee is Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, now retired, who is so well known and respected by all of us at home and abroad, and who was in command of NATO. The committee was fortunate to have the carefully considered views of these two gentlemen when the bill was under consideration.

In his testimony Mr. McCloy stated:

I think at this stage we might be on the verge of another arms race which could achieve an intensity that would be quite dangerous and sinister. I think of all times in my experience with the Agency, this is the time for a vigorous, well-researched and competent agency to deal with this rather complicated problem.

I asked Mr. McCloy very bluntly whether the United States would be better off or be more secure if the Agency went out of business. His answer was equally blunt:

No; I think it would be less secure. I think that the disarmament business and arms control are so extremely important at this stage. It is important to avoid an intensive arms race with the hazardous nature, as history shows, of those races in the past, and the dangers that would be involved in having nuclear weapons on everyone's doorstep. I think the security of the country would be considerably lessened if it did not have an expert, objective group of people in the Government looking at this problem seriously from day to day.

This bill carries an authorization for \$33 million—and I stress the word million—over a 3-year period, an average of \$11 million a year. As Members know, our committee has been reluctant to recommend long-term authorizations. Both General Gruenther and Mr. McCloy made a persuasive case for an exception. In response to a question whether the Agency should be continued for 3 years, General Gruenther gave a wholehearted "Yes" and added:

To reach any solution other than that would be almost a catastrophe from the standpoint of our posture in the world—the things we as a nation stand for. I would regret very much to see any deterioration in that position.

Mr. McCloy was no less emphatic when he stated:

If there was any limitation of the 3-year provision at this point I think perhaps there would be undue significance attached to it. This is particularly true in view of the fact that . . . we are at a critical stage in the whole problem of arms control and disarmament. There are some plans that do have to be prepared over more than a 1-year period . . . with the annual review which is incidental to every appropriation bill, together with the fact that at any point this committee can call on anyone to come down to testify and report on its affairs, that it would be unfortunate to give any indication at this point that there is any hesitation about our attachment to the policy of arms control and disarmament which are consistent with the security of the country.

Mr. Chairman, when all the evidence is weighed, it is my firm conclusion that the work which this Agency has done and is committed to do is in our best national interests. Compared to the billions that we spend—and properly so—for our defense, the amount contained in this bill is so small as to defy a meaningful comparison. Yet these small expenditures may yield dividends of untold proportions, not capable of expression in dollars, for the happiness and peace of mankind.

Mr. Chairman, the pursuit of peace through inspected, verified arms control is the most urgent—and perhaps the most under rated—task confronting the U.S. Government.

We must all realize that the rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons in recent years has brought mankind to the threshold of a disaster which can be triggered by the frustrations or an emotional breakdown of even a single major field commander.

If the entire Government of the United States can move into armed action against a distant country—as we did a few years ago—on the basis of an admittedly incomplete report of an attack on one of our ships, what greater dangers are involved in the positioning of nuclear weapons in the proximity of war zones unless we have U.S. control.

These issues are seldom discussed. At times it seems as if a conspiracy of silence existed to shield the public from the recognition of the dangers involved in a mass distribution of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

These reasons make it imperative that we approve an adequate authorization for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The \$11 million a year authorization requested for this Agency is frighteningly small when compared with the \$76 billion which we will spend this year—of necessity—to develop even greater military power.

I urge, therefore, that the House show a sense of responsibility and a sense of proportion by refusing to approve any amendment reducing the authorization for the Arms Control Agency and pass the bill H.R. 14940 by an overwhelming vote.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR].

(Mr. ADAIR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, the bill before us today provides for a 3-year authorization for an appropriation of \$33 million—\$10 million for fiscal year 1969, \$12 million for the following year, and \$11 million for the year after that.

The Agency is currently operating under a 3-year authorization which became law in 1965. It is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that this is too long an authorization for this Agency. At the proper time I propose to offer an amendment reducing the time to 2 years, and the dollars to \$22 million. The reason I shall offer that amendment, as I will explain more fully at the time I offer the amendment, is because I believe that every Congress ought to be given the opportunity to take a long, hard, careful look at this Agency and its operations.

Mr. Chairman, I suppose it is an oversimplification to say that this Agency acts in two general areas. It performs research and it negotiates treaties. On the question of research it is interesting to note that substantially more than one-third of its budget for this year is being used for contracts for research made with other institutions. I for one happen to believe that this is far too high. If you will examine the supplemental views signed by several of us, along with the committee report, you will find listed there some of the matters for which research is being done.

In my opinion a great deal of this research is possibly repetitive, and does not really contribute to the increase of knowledge which would be useful for this Agency.

There are some other matters that concern some of us. For example, there is a prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons in outer space, as the Members know.

Some time ago Secretary McNamara announced that the Soviets had a capability, had a vehicle which could travel in outer space, and was capable of conveying nuclear weapons. When members of the Agency were asked whether or not, in their opinion, this was a violation of that treaty, they said "No," because this vehicle did not have to make a complete circuit around the earth. In other words, on the flimsy excuse that the vehicle could make only a fractional or part of an orbit, the Agency took the position that it was not therefore in violation of the treaty.

I would submit that this is a dangerous position for us to take. It is extremely dangerous to us as a nation to rely upon that kind of advice. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I do feel it is highly desirable for this, and a great many other reasons—that it is highly desirable that we limit somewhat the length of time for which we authorize this Agency to continue.

I would not want it thought that I would do away with the Agency. I would not—I intend to vote for this bill. I think it is useful and important that we have a body of people with knowledge and skills who are constantly studying these problems and able to negotiate on them. If we did not have an agency of this kind now, I feel quite certain that someplace in our Government we would find it very desirable to establish a body of people with their special talents and skills.

There are now 263 people working for the organization according to the last report that we had. It is not a large agency either in terms of personnel or in terms of the relative amounts of money involved.

I recommend that we limit the time and funds and then pass the bill.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD].

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee for yielding to me.

I want to commend the chairman and the members of this committee who have supported and recommended the bill, H.R. 14940. This bill represents in my opinion one more example of the numerous forward-looking and desirable pieces of legislation that have emanated from the Committee on Foreign Affairs during Congressman MORGAN's chairmanship over the years.

Mr. Chairman, I am not on this committee. I used to be on this committee, and I regret that the pressure of other work on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and of the House Committee on Government Operations made me feel it was necessary to resign from the Committee on Foreign Affairs and go on the other committees.

I do not ordinarily intrude myself into the discussion of legislation of other committees. But there is so much in this report about the nuclear problem that I feel from my background of 21 years on the Joint Committee that I know a little bit about it and therefore I have asked the chairman for this time.

I have alternated as chairman and vice chairman on this Joint Committee since 1961.

Beginning in 1959 when the United States was negotiating with the U.S.S.R. on a test ban treaty, I have been continuously an adviser of our representatives negotiating in Geneva on nuclear weapons test limitations and nonproliferation treaty arrangements and periodically have participated in actual negotiations.

I was the chairman of the subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which made the study of the program and prepared a report which was sent to President Truman recommending that the United States proceed on a crash basis to develop the hydrogen bomb.

I have been a consistent and strong supporter of a nuclear navy and the development of strong nuclear deterrent force for the United States.

I have personally observed atomic and hydrogen bomb tests and I know the tremendous destructive forces that they represent.

I wish that I could bring to every Member of this House the experience of seeing a hydrogen bomb test, with the millions of tons of TNT force that is released.

I would say to those who would oppose a bill like this to think about it and think about nuclear war in this world. If there is anything under God's sun that can be done by mankind to avoid this suicidal race toward their own extinction, I think it ought to be done. I think one of the ways of doing it is to explore, explore, and explore with patience, taking every little bit of progress you can get, every

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H1723

little step further that you can get to prevent this country from going down the road to a nuclear war. That is my interest on this floor today.

And when I hear people talking about the proliferation of nuclear weapons under any kind of situation, such as is contained in this report, I will tell you it chills my blood, too.

I say that every step that we can take, in the name of God we should take it, to prevent any proliferation we can prevent. We cannot prevent it all. Of course, some of these nations may decide to manufacture their own nuclear weapons. But if you get them signed up not to do it, that means they are signed up not to receive nuclear weapons.

That does not mean they will always live up to their treaties. Treaties have been broken ever since mankind started to make them. Of course there will be nations that will break treaties. This treaty is not binding even on the United States. Article X provides the means for the United States to get out of it—for the purpose of protecting the national security of this country.

The use of the Nonproliferation Treaty that has been discussed here to destroy this bill is using something that is extraneous to the authorization for continuance of the ACDC. You may agree with the treaty or not. But the Congress of the United States will pass on the final form of that treaty. The ACDS is negotiating. They are trying to arrange it. They are trying to develop it. When they do develop it, it will be up to the other body, of course, to turn it down or to accept it. But in the name of God, do not prevent a continuing search for a treaty that may save mankind.

The Joint Committee has followed every step of this treaty. We have followed every word and every phrase. We have had something to do with the writing of this treaty, because we have constantly advised those who are in charge of the negotiations that the Congress will not accept unrealistic language in a nonproliferation treaty. So we have had something to do with it, both Republicans and Democrats. This has not been a partisan matter in the Joint Committee, and I hope that this subject matter never becomes a partisan matter.

I can state categorically that the proposed nonproliferation treaty in no way affects the current arrangements of the United States with our NATO allies pertaining to their nuclear defense. You talk about nuclear defense, weakening NATO in its nuclear defense. Every one of those 6,000 weapons that are located in the NATO countries is for their defense. They are defense weapons for their defense, if they are attacked, and I would hope we would never use nuclear weapons unless we were attacked.

The Atomic Energy Act, since first passed in 1946, has never permitted, and still prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons by the United States to any nation except in time of war or when the President, as Commander in Chief, shall so direct on the basis of preserving our Nation. That is the only way we

can transfer nuclear weapons into the sole sovereign control of any other nation, and I hope that it always stays that way. I do not want any other finger on that trigger except the finger of the President of the United States, and I do not care whether it is Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Percy, Rockefeller, or Romney. I want the President of the United States to have the final finger on that trigger. That is the way the law provides at the present time.

When you talk about "fuzzing" this thing up and preparing for some fear-some eventuality in the future, you are talking nonsense. We will take care of the future when the time comes. This Congress will take care of it. There will be no change in the present situation by the Arms Control Agency or by anybody else until the Congress has the final say-so as to whether it will be changed, and they will say how it can be changed.

As I said, we have over 6,000 nuclear weapons in the NATO countries, but those weapons are under a dual control system. First, the nation where the weapon is has to agree to use it. Second, the President of the United States has to agree to the use of that weapon. Let us keep it that way. When I think of transferring to any nation, weak or strong, the control of the nuclear weapon and the use of it, for example, to West Germany—the Germans do not want it. They have never asked for it. It would destroy NATO if we transferred nuclear weapons into the sole control of West Germany, and everybody in this room knows it. It would create a wave in this country that we could not stand, and any man who voted for that would be endangering, in my opinion, not only his political career, but more importantly the security of the Nation.

This is a rough job. The gentleman from Illinois has challenged me to give some of the things that are wrong in his statement. I do not have the time to do it, but if, during the 5-minute rule, I can get some time, I will be glad to show the gentleman where his statements not only are in error, but where, in my opinion, his assumptions are unfounded.

I am serious about this. Before I do so, I will be glad to talk to the gentleman to let him know what I will be talking about, before I get the floor. I know time is limited, and I feel I am imposing upon this Committee by taking this 7 or 8 minutes, but I want to make three or four points in the minute I have left.

There is a nuclear umbrella in the military agreement with NATO, which is working, and NATO is satisfied with it. There are bilateral military agreements with the principal NATO nations—not all, but the ones who want them—and they are satisfied. Nobody is raising any problem about that. We are training other nations' teams of all the nations who want to participate and who are participating with us in bilateral agreements. We are training teams to use these weapons when and if the dual control method is exercised.

I am sorry I do not have any more time, but I would say let us go ahead and seek ways to prevent a nuclear holo-

caust. Let us keep the control in the Congress of the United States. Let us not let this genie out of the bottle and let it loose among any more nations in the world than can get it on their own. That we cannot prevent, but we can prevent giving them this terrible destructive nuclear weapon force.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois.

(Mr. DERWINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind the Members that we are debating a 3-year authorization for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We are not debating the treaty that became the subject of discussion between the gentleman from California and my colleague from the State of Illinois.

At the risk of sounding facetious, I would suggest to the gentleman from Illinois and the gentleman from California, that if they wish to continue their battle they might repair to one of the side rooms and fight a duel at 10 paces with press releases, while we get back to discussing the authorization.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I presume the gentleman means a non-nuclear duel?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Of course.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield, since the gentleman mentioned my name?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I was surprised to see this nuclear treaty question brought into this discussion, but this is about the only thing in the additional views of the gentleman from Illinois, and it is in the report, and, of course, that is the only thing I would repair to.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, let me say to the gentleman that I appreciate his discussion with the gentleman from Illinois, since that frees the rest of us to debate with the chairman of the committee. I think the gentleman has balanced and equated the views of the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the views of the gentleman from Illinois were on the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am sure the gentleman will agree that about the only topic which was thoroughly discussed in the hearings was the draft treaty on nonproliferation, and also that the only real product of the past 3 years of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at least any product that needs and deserves our attention at this point, is that same draft treaty.

I hope he will agree it is quite appropriate for us to take some time at this point in connection with the prolonged life of this Agency to see what the Agency has accomplished in the past 3 years.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I wish to emphasize the concern we should have this afternoon; do we need a 3-year authorization for this Agency? In view of the concern over the treaty and in view of the rather perfunctory attention which our committee gave this Agency, I believe it would be in the interest of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency if their officials would give us the word that they would support the pending amendment of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR], and would accept a 2-year authorization.

There are a number of arguments we could use. For example, those who are interested in old-fashioned economy in Government ought to be reminded that there are more supergrades in relationship to total employment in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency than there are in any other department or agency of the Government. One out of six employees of this little Agency is in a supergrade status. The next best staffed supergrade operation is the White House.

Just by looking over the budget of this Agency every 2 years instead of every 3 years we might achieve a few proper economies.

The thought that Congress could effectively exercise legislative oversight during the period when the bill does not come before us is not at all a sound argument. Please note that our committee theoretically has jurisdiction over the U.S. Information Agency, but they have an open end authorization, and we have about as much influence on the U.S. Information Agency, in setting its authorization and its policies—as I would hope the Foreign Affairs Committee would—as Senator McCARTHY has on present foreign policy of the White House.

We cannot control, we cannot have proper legislative oversight unless there is legislation before the committee in a necessary fashion.

I would consider that a 2-year authorization would be in the interest of the Agency.

I want to underscore that the gentleman from Illinois and the gentleman from California diverted attention from the basic issue. I should like to emphasize we did not write opposing or minor views. We wrote supplemental views. As friends of the Agency, we would prefer a 2-year authorization to scrutinize it properly, to save it from criticism, to save it from the possibility of escaping control.

The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. THOMSON] has a very interesting amendment to offer. He suggests that perhaps we link the disarmament program with arms sales, so that the left hand and the right hand in Government will know what they are doing.

There are a lot of questions which could be asked. They should be asked at least every 2 years instead of every 3 years.

I feel that if there is any need for legislative oversight, if we in the Congress take our responsibility to heart, at least once in a 2-year period, at least once in the lifetime of every Congress, we should review the authorization and scrutinize this and every other agency.

I would hope that Members would join us at the proper time in passing a 2-year authorization. I believe this would be a progressive step and would achieve the proper congressional control, restraint, and supervision this Agency deserves.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I am very glad to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. THOMSON].

(Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I want to supplement what has been said by the gentleman from Illinois regarding a suggestion for economy and efficiency in our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. You know, it might be assumed that the bill now pending is for the only so-called arms control agency that exists in this country. As a matter of fact, in the Department of Defense we have a Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of plans and arms control. So we have another arm control agency in the executive branch of the Government. Then I was looking for the Deputy Assistant Secretary who is in charge of arms sales in the Department of Defense. Now, surprisingly enough, it is not called arms sales in the Department of Defense. It is called international logistics negotiations. Now, this is an unwieldy term for the average citizen—international logistics negotiations. So I thought if we would call it by its right name, which is arms sales, it would be a big help. They are spending three-quarters of a million dollars a year in selling arms. They are annually spending \$757,000 on the effort to sell arms throughout the world. Now, if we could get all of these agencies under one administrative head, we would have greater efficiency and we would have some economy, and the people in America would realize that we are engaged in the sale of arms while we purportedly are trying to control arms and induce other countries to disarm.

Think what a salutary effect it would have if we had one agency that knew what countries we were trying to disarm and what countries we were trying to arm. It might save a lot of duplication of effort on our agency personnel who might be going to the same countries to sell them arms while another agency thought that was one of the countries that they should be disarming.

You talk about your right hand knowing what you left hand is doing. I think it is high time that the American people realize we are engaged on both sides of this street and we are spending money in all these agencies. Therefore I thought at the appropriate time I would offer an amendment for the purpose of strengthening, streamlining, and improving the efficiency of this Agency, which amendment would read as follows:

On the first page, after line 7, add the following:

"Sec. 2. At the end of such Act, add the following new section:

"Sec. 51. (a) All powers, functions, and duties of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under this Act are hereby transferred to the Secretary of Defense, together with all personnel, property, and records utilized by such Agency in the performance of the powers, functions, and duties transferred by this section.

"(b) The Secretary of Defense shall exercise the powers, functions, and duties vested in him by this section through the Office of International Security Affairs, which office shall hereafter be known and designated as the Office of International Security Affairs, Arms Sales, Arms Control, and Disarmament."

I hope that the chairman will be willing to accept the amendments so that we can improve the efficiency of this Agency and effect some economy in Government.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. Yes. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. And make a little sense to the taxpayers who foot the bills. They will better know what is being done to them and where it is being done.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY].

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to indulge again in discussing the Arms Control Agency's principal product—the draft Treaty of Nonproliferation—even though this may seem to be a bit aside to some Members. It is directly on target, in my view, and in my opinion it fully justifies our examination.

The distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD] indicates that he shall be forthcoming with some citations of errors in the remarks which I placed in the committee report. But up to the present time I cannot see that he cited anything as erroneous. I am afraid the gentleman is indulging in attacking a strawman to some considerable extent, when he talks about those who want to proliferate nuclear weapons to other nations.

The objective which I seek by the introduction of my amendment is not to proliferate weapons to any nation whatsoever but, rather, to support and to implement the position which President Eisenhower insisted upon in his administration, that the late President Kennedy insisted upon under his administration, and that President Johnson insisted upon until October 1966.

I am sure no one would accuse any of these Presidents of being wild or ridiculous or unreasonable or dangerous in what they were doing or saying or seeking to do in regard to nuclear weapons.

My amendment would protect what is known as the NATO option. This is an option clearly recognized by all three Presidents up until October 1966 as being supremely important. We might ask ourselves, What did happen in October 1966 to bring about a change in our position?

The only factor which I can cite to the members of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union is that by that time President Johnson had concluded that this NATO option was not acceptable to the Soviet Union and he therefore saw it as his proper objective to modify our purpose and accommodate the Soviets. However, this does not reduce one whit the validity of the position

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 1725

taken by our American leaders, by President Eisenhower, by the late President Kennedy, and by President Johnson until that fall period in 1966.

We have retreated substantially from our previous position as a nation in bargaining with the Soviet Union upon the question of arms control and nonproliferation.

Mr. Chairman, involved here is the problem of nuclear guarantees. If this country makes a deal on what amounts to a bilateral basis with the Soviet Union as it is attempting to establish an arrangement of worldwide nuclear policing, what guarantees and commitments do we undertake?

I tell you that the answer to that question is murky. President Johnson said, under the treaty, nations subjected to nuclear blackmail could expect "strong support" from us. What does "strong support" mean?

Mr. Adrian Fisher testified to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in response to my questions that in his view the adoption of this treaty on the part of the United States would not increase the responsibility of the United States to protect any nation in any respect whatever. In other words, it would not enlarge our responsibility beyond present commitments in any manner whatsoever.

Mr. Chairman, if that is the case, what is the quid pro quo from the standpoint of the nonnuclear nations? How can we expect any nation that might feel that its interests may some day be pressed with a Communist threat, whether Red China or the Soviet Union, how can we expect such a nation to accept this treaty, lacking as it does guarantees in any practical measure?

I can give you another little episode that just became clear. Just today I learned that our Government, that is, the officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, have refused to give West Germany assurances of continued supplies of fissionable material for peaceful uses until they agree to sign this treaty. To me that is a threat that is reprehensible in dealing with our trusted loyal, and patient ally that is so exposed to Soviet threat.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BUCHANAN].

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, America's strength is the world's best hope for peace. I am not really so much concerned about the weaponry in the hands of the police as I am about the weaponry in the hands of the Cosa Nostra, nor am I so much concerned about the rifle in the closet of the law-abiding citizen of this Nation, which he might use to defend his family against the criminal or the insane, as I am about the weaponry in the hands of the criminal or the insane himself. And even though there is reason for concern about nuclear destruction, my concern is not so much directed toward our own nuclear power as it is toward the fact that the most dangerous and irresponsible powers in the world already are or are becoming nuclear powers.

The Soviet Union is a very sophisticated nuclear power. Red China is becoming a nuclear power. And it seems to me that there is reason for concern about the 3-year continuation of the life of an agency without any review at all by the 91st Congress, the whole thrust of which is to press toward more and bigger and better treaties with such nations as the Soviet Union. It seems to me that consistently in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Space Treaty, and the proposed Nonproliferation Treaty, the effect has been to bind the hands of the good guys who wear the white hats, who live up to their commitments and their treaties, and free the hands of the bad guys who wear the black hats and who do not honor their treaties or their commitments.

The Soviet Union only signs such treaties when it is in its military strategic interest to do so, and honors one only so long as it is in its military and strategic interests to do so.

I would reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that it is not the weaponry in the hands of the innocent about which I am concerned, but the weapons that are in the hands of the guilty. And I repeat that America's strength is the world's best hope for peace.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of our time to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 6 minutes.

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, interesting as the discussion has been with respect to the so-called nonproliferation treaty, I should like to remind the Committee that the subject before us today is simply whether to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act so as to extend the authorization for appropriations for a 3-year period. If we keep that in mind I believe we will realize we have a relatively simple issue. It is one that I would hope most Members of the Congress would accept.

We may get into an argument, but I believe it should raise no blood pressures, as to whether the authorization should be for a 2- or a 3-year period.

Let me simply remind the Members that in 1961, when this Agency was established, the vote in the House was 290 in favor, and 54 against. When the authorization was extended in 1965 the vote in the House was 302 in favor and 63 against. In the other body in 1961 the vote was 73 in favor, and only 12 against, and in 1965 the other body voted 74 in favor and 11 against.

I would guess there will be some, probably somewhat more than a handful, who will again oppose any extension of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. However, I would suppose that the overwhelming majority of the Members on both sides of the aisle would continue to feel as they did at the outset;

surely, it is a reasonable suggestion to have a focal point in the executive branch of our Government, a relatively small, highly motivated group, less than 300 individuals, who admittedly are highly paid in comparison to the average bureaucracy, to provide the expertise needed to develop an attitude toward these basic problems of national security.

I would suppose that support for this Agency continues because the world is no less stable than it was in 1961. The threat of war is at least as great. The urgency of doing something about the problem of other countries acquiring nuclear weapons is at least as urgent. Thus the need for an arm control agency is clear.

We can easily be misled if we get off in a discussion of what is basically the prerogative of the other body; that is, whether a treaty to prevent further proliferation by providing limitations on both nuclear states and nonnuclear states is a good thing or not.

I would suppose the other body has enough good sense, and it certainly has the responsibility, to face up squarely to its responsibilities prior to any ratification of that treaty.

I, myself, find myself very strongly in agreement with the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in his expression of doubts as to the wisdom of any proliferation of weapons by this country with our allies, individually or collectively.

I say this recognizing the importance of NATO to our own security, but in the belief that the present arrangements with our NATO allies are of sufficient clarity and sufficient definiteness to protect both us and them.

We in the House have no direct control over this treaty, and I certainly urge that we should not try to torpedo the Agency and its employees. Certainly we should not put any restriction on the pay of employees of the Agency because we individually may have reservations about the wisdom of preventing individual NATO allies or others from getting nuclear weapons from us.

It does seem to me essential that we keep this point in mind.

One final point which will come up is whether to provide a 2-year authorization or a 3-year authorization. I, myself, do not think it makes a great deal of difference to anybody, except perhaps the employees of the Agency, whether we grant a 2- or 3-year authorization. I have mixed emotions myself. Thus far, I find myself and probably I shall continue to be, in favor of a 3-year authorization. It seems to me that a shorter authorization does not do anything except pose the question to the Committee on Foreign Affairs as to the advisability of taking a close look at what the Agency is doing.

Yet this year—and I do not feel I am revealing any secrets by saying this—we on the committee are coming up with no farreaching recommendations, either to increase or reduce the number of employees of the Agency. Nor are we making any serious suggestions either as to expanding or contracting the nature of their research program.

Regardless of the length of the authorization for the Agency, there is a definite obligation on us as members of the committee to watchdog this operation closely.

I assume if we have not done this in the past, we will do it in the 91st Congress whether a bill such as this comes up 2 years from now.

Mr. MATHIAS of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MATHIAS of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bill and in support of the point that the gentleman has just made which is very well taken.

I think this is a necessary area of oversight and one that perhaps we have not exercised as vigorously as we should have in the past.

I have particular reference to the area of study of the economic consequences of disarmament which is a tremendously important field in which I think more could have been done, and perhaps we in the Congress should have done more.

Mr. Chairman, there is no cause more vital than the cause of peace. In this difficult year, it is especially important for the Congress and the United States to reaffirm, in clear and unmistakable terms, not only our constant hope for peace, but our continuing commitment to lessening international tensions, slowing down the arms race, curbing nuclear proliferation, and generally reducing the omnipresent threat of nuclear war.

Passage of H.R. 14940, to extend the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for 3 additional years, would by such a reaffirmation, and I strongly support this bill today. In so doing, I might point out that, considering the gravity and the extremely technical nature of the Agency's assignment, this is a very modest bill. It would authorize the expenditure of only \$33 million during the next 3 entire fiscal years. Meanwhile, at current cost levels, we are spending that much, \$33 million, every 9 hours in Vietnam.

Other Members will discuss the contributions of ACDA to the drafting of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the development of workable nuclear inspection systems, and other tasks. I would like to focus briefly on one very important part of the Agency's mandate: the question of economic conversion, or the economic impact of disarmament.

It is ironic that the United States, a nation dedicated to peace, has lived so long under the clouds of war and international tensions that the needs of national defense have become the single largest influence on our economy. When President Eisenhower warned us of the influence of the "military-industrial complex," our defense budget was about \$40 billion per year. Now, 8 years later, that budget has almost exactly doubled, to about \$80 billion, and the impact of defense spending on our entire economic structure is even greater than it was during the Eisenhower administration.

I do not cite President Eisenhower's remarks to suggest that there is anything sinister, improper or threatening about the alliance between our Military Establishment and American industry.

Certainly the strength of our national defenses is a tribute to the talent and technology of American free enterprise. But it is a fact, one which we should not ignore or discount, that our entire economy is extremely sensitive to changes in the scope and direction of our defense effort, and that reductions in defense spending have a direct, immediate, and lasting impact both on individual defense contractors, and on our economy as a whole.

My own congressional district felt this impact several years ago, when the Department of Defense ceased ordering the famous "flying boxcars" which had been produced by the Fairchild-Hiller Corp. in Hagerstown. Many of my constituents remember vividly the unemployment which resulted in western Maryland while Fairchild-Hiller was converting to other types of production. They and I would not want changes in defense requirements to put workers out on the streets again.

If the effect of one change in military procurement can be so great, we can imagine the nationwide impact of a reduction in the overall level of defense spending, including both procurement and research and development. A cut of 10 percent in the overall Defense Department budget would take \$8 billion in orders and employment out of the economy. The end of fighting in Vietnam would have a much greater effect on production and employment rates. Even if a sizeable share of our current Vietnam expenditures were redirected to strengthening the defenses elsewhere which are now stretched so thin, the eventual reductions in spending, assuming that no other similar conflict emerged elsewhere, would completely change our economic picture, cause hardships in many communities now dependent on defense payrolls, and compel us to reexamine our overall economic policies.

Mr. Chairman, no matter how distant peace in Vietnam or around the globe may appear right now, I feel that we cannot afford to neglect these questions. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has done some very valuable research on the economic impact of defense cuts, and on the types of readjustments which would be required. A year ago, the President established a special Cabinet-level Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the End of Vietnam Hostilities, and directed that group to "begin at once a major and coordinated effort to review our readiness to make the economic adjustments which a termination of hostilities in Vietnam might require."

Mr. Chairman, I am today asking the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers for a report on the work of this Coordinating Committee, the level of its activities to date, and any preliminary findings or recommendations which it may have shaped.

In general, I feel that far more should be done, beginning now, to increase our readiness not only for any reduction in the level of combat in Vietnam, not only for the distant dawn of gradual general disarmament, but also for such eventualities as the return of significant

numbers of American forces from Europe and a reduction in our expenditures in that theater.

In intensifying our work in the field of conversion, we should regard economic readjustment not as a threat but as an opportunity. We have already begun to see how much our defense industries, with their advanced technology and modern management techniques, can contribute to the solution of many of our most urgent domestic problems, such as transportation, air and water pollution, urban development, and economic planning. I have joined the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MORSE] and many of our colleagues in sponsoring legislation to create a Commission on Public Management to develop means of putting American free enterprise to work on public policy. I believe that this legislation, too, should be considered and passed this year, and such a study of possibilities should be coupled with intensified research on economic readjustment.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, passage of this bill today has both international and domestic significance. It will reaffirm our commitment to continuing the search for peace in a nuclear world, a search begun during the Eisenhower administration, and even more critical now than it was then.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the gentleman. I might say the Agency has taken a look, and is continuing to take a look, in that area. I would agree with the gentleman that it is an important area. I would agree with him also that it might well be that the Committee on Foreign Affairs could do more than it has to see individually what has been accomplished by this agency and what it is planning to do.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER].

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey for 2 minutes.

(Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a great paradox of our time that young men are chasing each other with rifles in distant places while we in Washington are trying to prevent a nuclear war, and yet finding a way to prevent incineration of this planet must be as meaningful as our desire for peace in Vietnam.

It seems to me at the end of this debate there are three outstanding issues: First is the issue raised by the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin that these men are arms salesmen. Actually they are not salesmen. They are employees of an agency engaged in perhaps the world's most important work: how to prevent the world from becoming a pile of ashes. I do not think the gentleman's amendment is germane.

The other issues we have are whether or not we should have a 2- or 3-year authorization. All of the witnesses, including Mr. McCloy and General Gruenther, indicated that the most efficient and economic use of the limited funds

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 1727

that this agency has available can be had by a 3-year authorization.

As to the men employed in this Agency, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN] did state that they were highly motivated men, and I agree thoroughly with that statement. These men are highly motivated. Most of them could obtain higher salaries on the outside. They are highly skilled and dedicated, and they ought to have a right to know whether or not their careers can be extended and what the future may hold for the Agency. So while it is a value judgment, the fact is that the preponderance of the evidence before the committee was that it should be a 3-year authorization.

The other issue before the Committee that we shall vote upon is the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois. I think we should put this within its proper framework. We are not here today to discuss and debate whether or not this body should consent to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This is an agreement that has been reached after the considered judgment of those who must advise the executive branch. We have already indicated that we would join in the Nonproliferation Treaty. So that is not the issue of the debate.

The gentleman from Illinois has reservations. We all have reservations on many things, and so this is his reservation, as to whether it should continue. But withholding the salaries of the people in this Agency is no way to go about expressing displeasure. This is a governmental decision that has been made, and to deescalate the people that are presently on the Federal payroll is not the way to reexamine that decision.

Mr. Chairman, on January 30, I introduced H.R. 14941—a bill identical to the one now before the House. Its purpose was to extend the life of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by authorizing appropriations of \$33 million for the next 3-year period. After hearing many distinguished witnesses—both proponents and opponents of the draft legislation—the Committee on Foreign Affairs reported the bill favorably, without amendment.

I rise today to express support for the committee's report, for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and for its work which President Johnson has characterized as "the most urgent business of our time."

This concept of arms control is not a partisan one, and never has been. In an address before the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, former President Eisenhower said armaments must be controlled "if civilization is to be assured of survival." And just a few weeks ago Senator BAKER pointed out in the Republican "state of the Union" presentation:

We must be imaginative enough to use nuclear energy to make peace instead of war, to promote cooperation instead of conflict.

To these ends the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is dedicated.

It is to promote these objectives that I support a 3-year authorization—an authorization no longer than the current one.

Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the Agency, in testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said:

Contrasted with the enormous expenditures undertaken by the United States each year for defense purposes, the requested authorization is small—both in amount and duration . . . For the United States to cut back on the length of its future authorized arms control effort at this time could have an adverse impact on U.S. objectives.

Such a cutback could be interpreted as a withdrawal of support for the U.S. arms control effort. Adherence of non-nuclear countries to a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons depends largely on whether they are convinced that the nuclear weapon countries are sincere in their pledge to work for curtailment of the nuclear arms race. A decrease in our effort to curtail the arms race, therefore, could decrease our security by frustrating the nonproliferation policy of the U.S. Government—a policy endorsed by every national administration since World War II.

This has also been the consistent policy of Congress, which clearly closed the U.S. option to proliferate nuclear weapons to other countries in 1946 with the adoption of the McMahon Act. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which succeeded it, prohibits the transfer of atomic weapons in foreign commerce. This prohibition applies both to other countries and to international organizations.

Given this established U.S. policy, it is appropriate for the United States to get an international commitment from the Soviet Union not to proliferate nuclear weapons, and a commitment from possible nonnuclear nation recipients not to receive or acquire such weapons.

In 1966, U.S. efforts to reach agreement on a nonproliferation treaty received overwhelming support in connection with Senate Resolution 179. This resolution passed the Senate by 84 to 0, with all but one absent Senator declaring in favor.

In spite of all this, Mr. Chairman, an amendment has been proposed today which denounces the U.S. policy to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The amendment would condemn as wrong the policy of every administration since World War II and frustrate an express policy of the Congress.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that this amendment is wrong. It would cut off Agency funds unless the nonproliferation treaty is revised to permit the United States to transfer nuclear weapons to regional defense organizations such as NATO.

Our NATO allies have not asked for this. Under the circumstances, Mr. Chairman, I submit that this amendment would make the United States more allied than the allies—or as the saying goes, more Catholic than the Pope.

It has already been pointed out that the Atomic Energy Act prohibits the type of transfer of nuclear weapons advocated by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY]. But even if the Atomic Energy Act were amended to permit transfer to regional organizations of defensive nuclear weapons which had been "safed" so they could not be used for offensive purposes, Mr. Fisher testified be-

fore the committee that, by the use of X-rays and other scientific techniques, another country could obtain classified design information on the warhead. This would show the design of a sophisticated thermonuclear weapon which could be used offensively.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the Honorable John J. McCloy, former High Commissioner for Germany under the Eisenhower administration, testified before the committee that amending the Nonproliferation Treaty to permit the transfer of defensive weapons to NATO "would frustrate the objectives of the treaty." The Nonproliferation Treaty would, in fact, have to permit proliferation—and in a manner contrary to U.S. policy and contrary to legislation enacted by Congress.

I suggest the defeat of any such amendment.

Mr. Chairman, negotiations to end the nuclear arms race are delicate, immensely complex, and difficult. Though progress has been slow and deliberate, earlier landmarks, such as the 1963 "hot line" agreement, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and, more recently, the Outer Space Treaty, give us good reason to hope for continued, if slow, progress.

We have within our ability the power to end the human story here on earth. We now share that power with at least four other nations. The efforts to turn us back from the brink of nuclear holocaust and to preserve the world for our children are and should be supreme. We should never give any indication other than that the United States is the leading advocate of peace in the world today. We cannot afford to do otherwise. I ask strong approval of this 3-year authorization of our official agency for peace and stability in the world.

Mr. COHELAN, Mr. Chairman, nuclear war is insanity. The prevention of nuclear war is the most pressing task facing man today.

For the present we are dependent on a balance of nuclear terror to keep the peace and prevent holocaust. Each year the world produces more terrible, more deadly weapons. These new developments threaten the balance of terror and lead to seemingly unstoppable arms races.

It is the job of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to research the problems of reversing this awful spiral. This Agency advises the President, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other departments of the Government on matters related to arms control—supplying scientific, military, psychological, and legal information necessary to the formulation of policy and the negotiation of agreements.

Three of what history may view as the largest steps away from world nuclear destruction have been taken in this decade. In each the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has in good measure been responsible for the progress we have made. As an original sponsor of the bill establishing this Agency, and as a man firmly convinced of the primacy of the objectives of arms control, I am gratified with these striking developments.

One year after the establishment of the Agency the Limited Nuclear Test

Ban Treaty was signed. This treaty has protected our lives by eliminating radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear explosions by signatory countries including the United States and the Soviet Union. This treaty has also had a salutary effect in limiting the development of newer and more terrible weapons by these countries.

Last year the Agency saw the fruition of its considerable efforts to ban the explosion and the presence of nuclear weapons from outer space, with the execution of the Treaty on Outer Space.

This year, after considerable efforts by the Agency, there is a draft Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to stop the spread and development of nuclear weapons in nonnuclear nations. This treaty, which is acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union and to many nonnuclear nations, has been presented to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva for consideration.

These three treaties are singular accomplishments of the 1960's, and in each the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been largely and effectively involved.

Today, we are asked to consider the future of this Agency—and we are asked to prove to this country and to the world our dedication to the principles of arms control. I think this is a question we cannot fail to answer loudly, strongly, and affirmatively—the Arms Control Agency must be continued. It should be afforded the \$33 million this bill asks, and it should be given a new 3-year mandate to pursue its overwhelmingly necessary efforts.

Some Members have raised questions concerning the propriety of a 3-year authorization for the Agency. I am not a pessimist, but I do not foresee the end of the need for this Agency's work in the next 3 years. The world is looking to us today to determine how much we believe in arms control. At this point to limit the Agency to a 2-year authorization would be to depreciate the credibility of our national commitment to disarmament.

Further still, and as the committee report points out, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is dependent on a well-trained and highly motivated staff. The recurrent question of continuing the Agency takes a toll on the morale and the quality of this staff.

In short, I can see no valid reason why we should not today act to enable the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to continue seeking ways to halt the arms race and to avoid Armageddon.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, the American people are beginning to wonder just how many more of their tax dollars are going to be wasted on the disarmament folly. The Communist leaders in Moscow and in Peking must "burn the midnight oil" devising plans for disarmament that we will "fall for." To them disarmament is but another dialectic device to be used as a means to accomplish world domination. We negotiate, then capitulate to their demands, then execute a treaty, only to see it breached by the Soviets. When will we learn that the mere negotiation of those types of treaties will not usher in a great era of world peace?

More important, when will we learn this accrues to their distinct advantage?

Mr. Chairman, I am at a loss at how good faith can be demonstrated by the Communists in the realm of disarmament when they are the ultimate cause of the arms race today? They are supplying the arms that sustain aggression in Vietnam and that is bleeding American youth white. They have perpetrated an arms race in the Mideast and have fanned the flames of Arab emotions with Communist guns, planes, and rockets. They will supply the needed arms to any revolutionary group in any part of the world if it will further their goal of world domination.

Beyond this, the Soviets are developing missile systems that either breach or are an open subterfuge of the much praised Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to say nothing of the so-called Outer Space Treaty. One example of this is the fractional orbiting bombing system, that Robert Strange McNamara disclosed last year. The former Secretary showed his usual lack of concern in this area, and said that the United States was in a defenseless position against this missile system which could become operational this year. He stated he was not concerned. Not only that, but he jumped to the Soviets' defense by pointing out that the flying three-fourths of the way around the earth on a new low orbit with a nuclear warhead would not be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty. McNamara could hardly wait to tell the Soviet Union that we would never accuse them of thinking evil thoughts. Instead of an immediate outcry, he suggested this orbiting weapon would really travel more through "outer inner space" than through "inner outer space." It would not fly in full orbit, he said, but in a fractional orbit. What this would mean is that before it could complete a full orbit, it would be detonated over American cities. Robert Strange McNamara's samantical disarmament mumbo jumbo could well be the last that our country may hear. I do not wish to beat a "dead horse," but I am glad his poor judgment is out of Defense.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must awake to the realities of the disarmament game. The computers and the ivory towers are not aware of these realities, nor is the Disarmament Agency. Let us not waste our resources on this self-destructing folly.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the second sentence of section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)), is amended by inserting immediately after "\$30,000,000", the following: ", and for the three fiscal years 1969 through 1971, the sum of \$33,000,000."

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ADAIR

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ADAIR: On the first page, beginning in line 6, strike out "and for the three fiscal years 1969 through 1971, the sum of \$33,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "and for the two fiscal

years 1969 through 1970, the sum of \$22,000,000".

(Mr. ADAIR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

Thirty-eight Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 48]

Ashmore	Gibbons	Moss
Berry	Green, Oreg.	Nelsen
Bray	Hawkins	Passman
Brown, Calif.	Holland	Pepper
Cederberg	Howard	Philbin
Celler	Jones, Mo.	Resnick
Corman	King, Calif.	Rosenthal
de la Garza	Kluczynski	St. Onge
Diggs	Macdonald,	Seiden
Dowdy	Mass.	Sikes
Fallon	Machen	Stanton

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore having assumed the chair, Mr. FULTON of Tennessee, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H.R. 14940, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 400 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR] is recognized.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, the amendment which is before the House would reduce the period of authorization from 3 years to 2 years, and would reduce the amount of money authorized from \$33 million to \$22 million.

The appropriation request is \$10 million in fiscal year 1969; \$12 million in the following year, and \$11 million the following year.

So my amendment would make available to the Agency the amount of money which it has requested for the next 2 fiscal years.

As I said earlier, I feel very strongly that every Congress should have an opportunity to examine the operations of and pass judgment on this Agency.

By limiting the authorization to 2 years, we are giving it enough time to operate; yet we are assuring ourselves that it will be back here during the next Congress so that we can secure information and raise questions, as may seem necessary or wise.

Let me recall a little history. In 1961 this Agency was authorized for 2 years. In 1963 it was authorized for 2 years.

In 1965 we wound up with a 3-year authorization. In that year the committee reported out a 4-year bill, if my memory serves me correctly, providing \$55 million. The House reduced it to 3 years at \$40 million, and the bill as eventually signed into law was for 3 years at \$30 million.

The amount appropriated for the current fiscal year was \$9 million. The Agency has apparently been able to operate very well on that amount of money.

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 1729

In fact, the 263 employees which it now has on its payroll is an increase over the number that it had at the beginning of the last fiscal year. So I think the question of money should not be one that would bother anyone who is inclined to support this move for a 2-year program.

Mr. Chairman, I conclude by saying that this is a simple amendment. It does not penalize the Agency dollarwise. It simply assures the 91st Congress of an opportunity to look into this authorization and to check the activities of the Agency.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

I believe it is a measure of the acceptance of the Agency on the part of this body that the only primary issue is whether or not we should have a 2- or 3-year authorization. The gentleman has indicated his reasons for suggesting a 2-year authorization and, as I said during my remarks in the general debate, I think this is a value judgment that must be made.

The reasons that the committee voted out a 3-year authorization hinged on the fact that this is a highly specialized Agency. There is a limited number of employees in the Agency. All of them are skilled. They are scientists and people with specialized backgrounds, people who could find other more lucrative employment. I think it is necessary to them to know that the Agency shall be in business.

Similarly, in the programing of contracts, if they can program these research contracts out over a 3-year period, it gives them a better opportunity to do so economically and efficiently. All of the people who testified before the committee thought that the compelling reasons that justified the 3-year authorization still in fact exist.

John McCloy, who was asked about this 3-year authorization, and who was one of the principal figures in the advisory group, along with General Gruenther, said—

I think the 3-year authorization is very important. Particularly at this stage, if there was any limitation on the 3-year provision at this point, I think perhaps there would be undue significance attached to it.

Perhaps this is the chief reason I would urge you not to limit the authorization to one year but that you continue with the 3-year period, that it is rather important psychologically at this point.

In short, I think that with the annual review which is incidental to every appropriation bill, together with the fact that at any point this committee can call on anyone to come down to testify and report on its affairs, that it would be unfortunate to give any indication at this point that there is any hesitation about our attachment to the policy of arms control and disarmament which are consistent with the security of the country.

So while we are here today debating whether it should be 2 or 3 years, the preponderance of knowledgeable expertise related to these matters all combine to say that we should vote out the 3-year authorization. I urge that the Committee do so, and I urge that this amendment be defeated.

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I doubt if many of the Members of the House realize that in the charter of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency there is a provision unique to any agency or department of the U.S. Government—that is, this Agency is authorized to propagandize domestically in the United States. In other words, it can spend its money to talk the people of the United States into any kind of disarmament or arms control provisions that it desires. It is a unique and extraordinary power this Agency has. Certainly when the gentleman wants to have a look at the funding of the Agency oftener than every 3 years, and at the most every 2 years, this is one of the most important considerations that should be in the minds of Members of Congress.

We have a great suspicion in this country of using the people's money to propagandize them, whether it be on domestic issues or foreign issues or anything else that our Government does. It is one of the most risky things I know of to use U.S. public funds to control U.S. public opinion. I say this in support of the gentleman's amendment and urge the Members to support the amendment with that caution in mind.

I listened to the remarks of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DERWINSKI] in which he seemed to imply that the only reason I am against the Disarmament Agency's money is that the Agency has negotiated this nonproliferation treaty. This is not the fact. I simply used the nonproliferation treaty as an example of the Agency negotiating a treaty before it did its homework and found out whether or not the treaty was in the interest of the United States. The treaty may be or it may not be. The trouble is that ACDA never looked to find out, which was its job to do before negotiations ever began and which it has not yet done.

As a matter of fact we set up an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the specific purpose not only of finding the good arms control arrangements we could get into, but spotting the bad ones, so we could stay away from the pitfalls. The Agency has not performed this function and, as a consequence, its funding should be looked at more frequently, or better, stopped until reforms are accomplished.

I also pointed out this Agency has failed to do its research in the proper manner. It has hired a lot of people to come up with studies that support and agree with the preconceived opinions of the people who head the Agency. Instead, it should be doing an impartial and an honest job of impassionate analysis of these various kinds of disarmament proposals.

We pay money to this Agency to support it as insurance against going down the wrong road, and the Agency is not producing and not doing the kind of research job that is needed to keep us from inadvertently going down a wrong road in these negotiations at an international level. Congress should require it to do so or cut off its funds.

Again, I might say this Agency has managed to hire so many people in its

own research staff that it does very little contracting out of research, and what contracting out it does, it also seems to me, it does with like-minded organizations who are not going to upset the applecart and oppose any of its views.

This is not the way an agency should operate, particularly an agency with this important function.

That again is an argument in favor of the gentleman's plea to look at what the Agency is doing every 2 years, instead of letting it go 3 years in a row, and let it get way down the pike before we have an opportunity to overcome the damage it might do us because it is sloppy in doing its job.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOSMER. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think the Record should be clear that half of the money this Agency will get will go into contracts and research and development.

Mr. HOSMER. That is true possibly according to the new budget, but let me make this additional point relative to the Agency. The Agency has been administered in such a manner that it has not bothered, before negotiating, to do this research needed to determine if it is negotiating toward the proper ends. More contracting out of research will not obviate this deficiency. Only reformed administration can. The Agency's negotiators still will go out over the green tables and get themselves out on a limb on some proposition, and then its researchers will be told to, and have to, back them up, regardless, instead of having the chance to tell them they are wrong. The only remedy for this is to put negotiating responsibilities back in the State Department and confine the Agency and its proper sphere of honest research.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I can understand those who are opposed to an authorization in this case, but it is very difficult for me to understand why anyone who is in favor of the authorization would wish to limit it 2 years, rather than making it a 3-year authorization.

Now, the 3-year time period suggested in the bill and recommended by the administration was a time period which was set by the Congress itself. This was a compromise worked out on the floor of the House.

It seems to me there are enough problems in making progress in this field without the Congress trying to hamstring this Agency in this way. Right now the Agency is trying to work out a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. It is asking many non-nuclear nations to renounce nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear countries naturally want the nuclear powers to halt the nuclear arms race if they also are to renounce their own nuclear ambitions.

The best we can do is to promise to keep talking in good faith about arms control, to keep it within the same degree of effort as before. That seems to me to be the essential point.

How can the United States hope to convince the nonnuclear countries of our good faith in this effort if the Congress cuts back on our arms control effort? How can we get them to renounce nuclear weapons if the Congress will not even give talks to halt the nuclear arms race the same support it gave them when this measure was last before the Congress, in 1965?

This Agency was created in 1961 by bipartisan effort. Republican supporters of the bill at that time included Dwight Eisenhower, Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert Lovett, Thomas Gates, John McCloy, and Alfred Gruenther.

Progress can only be made with continued bipartisan support. We have to have bipartisan support if this Agency is going to do a job. It would be a sad day if what we did here were construed as manifesting partisanship in any particular.

That is why I was so glad the chairman of this great committee called in John McCloy and Alfred Gruenther to get their views. Mr. McCloy was asked if he thought the question of the length of the Agency's authorization should be a partisan matter. He replied:

I think this particular agency was born in a nonpartisan atmosphere. I was just talking to General Gruenther about that today, although this was put forward by a Democratic administration, the extent to which the Republicans supported it put it in the class of a nonpartisan action. A former Republican President gave statements in favor of it and so on.

I gave other reasons why I thought it would be unwise to limit its existence at this particular stage in history. But in any stage of history I think this matter of the security of the country is one of a nonpartisan nature.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ALBERT. I am glad to yield to the distinguished gentleman.

Mr. ADAIR. Does the gentleman feel that the Agency was less efficient, less effective, during those periods when we did give it a 2-year authorization?

Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman is not responding to the issue by his question. The gentleman's question assumes that I might think it was not efficient. My observation is that if we change what the Congress did by shortening the term it might be interpreted by the world as an indication that the Congress itself, today, is not as strongly behind this Agency as it was 2 years ago.

Mr. ADAIR. If the gentleman will yield further, I pointed out earlier that two times previously we have limited it to a 2-year authorization.

Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. ADAIR. And only once provided a 3-year authorization.

Mr. ALBERT. Had we never given it a 3-year authorization, the gentleman's argument would be very valid. Once having done that, we have said to the world we believe this Agency is important enough to require a 3-year authorization. It seems to me it would be a retreat should we now curtail the authorization to 2 years. It would have been better never to have had a 3-year authorization at all.

SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GROSS FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ADAIR

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. GROSS as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. ADAIR: On the first page, beginning in line 6, strike out "and for the three fiscal years 1969 through 1971, the sum of \$33,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "and for the fiscal year 1969, the sum of \$5,000,000."

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I listened with a great deal of interest to the gentleman from Oklahoma, the distinguished majority leader, and his plea for a 3-year program. We do a lot of ludicrous things around here, but I cannot think of anything more ludicrous than to authorize continuance of this disarmament outfit at \$11 million a year, or a total of \$33 million for the next 3 years.

There are many agencies and departments of Government, including the State Department, which are not authorized to be funded for 3 years. They have alleged policies in the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and many others but they are funded annually.

This disarmament agency is one of the most incongruous, contradictory operations in Government. It has spent millions to talk about disarmament while the Pentagon peddles \$1 billion worth of arms around the world each year. I do not mind keeping a few warm bodies in circulation to go through the motions of talking about disarmament if somebody wants to talk about it. Therefore I have left \$5 million in this bill for 1 year, and that is too much, but I want to get started down.

This program is overfunded and has been overfunded. It is now proposed to overfund it again. It needs to be closely scrutinized every year, and I would hope that next year it would be cut far below \$5 million.

We were spending on an average, for years, until the New Frontier and then the Great Society came along, less than \$1 million a year on this disarmament business and just as much was accomplished as there will be by spending \$33 million. Where is the disarmament and where is the peace for the money already expended on this Agency?

Let me call your attention to a few of the contracts of this organization. Here is one to the Purdue Research Foundation. It provides that—

Sociological and psychological principles relevant to the nature of international assurance will first be surveyed. Finally the study will consider the social and psychological factors involved in the actual inspection process, such as the conditions under which organizations and individuals divulge information of various kinds to organizations, authorities, and foreigners.

What business has the Disarmament Agency in research and studies concerning the divulging of information? We have the FBI; we have the CIA; we have security operations in the State De-

partment and in the Defense Department—and in all the military services. Why should the Disarmament Agency spend a single dollar on research in this field?

Then, Mr. Chairman, there is a contract to Johns Hopkins University as follows:

The Peacekeeping Proposals of the U.S. "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty of General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World."

Description: A panel of experts from the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, which is affiliated with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, considered the basic problems of maintaining the peace in the three stages of disarmament and after general and complete disarmament is achieved. Their analysis was made in the light of existing U.S. proposals in the U.S. Treaty Outline for General and Complete Disarmament tabled at the Geneva Conference in April 1962. The panel members wrote individual essays elaborating on the various topics discussed in the panel sessions. These essays constitute the final report.

Mr. Chairman, I wonder who among all of these essay writers won the prize for the best essay? This involves that wonderful "Alice in Wonderland" disarmament proposal, a three-stage deal by which we would put our Army, Navy, and Air Force into the United Nations under an international command.

Mr. Chairman, when I asked the question during the course of the hearings this year as to what has happened to this fantastic deal, I received virtually no answer. They gave the impression they had forgotten about it. No one knows how much money was expended through the years on this three-stage disarmament booby trap. Apparently it is temporarily a dead issue, something of a moot issue.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from California.

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, this three-stage disarmament proposal is certainly not a moot question. It is my opinion that the Members of the House of Representatives should be reminded of the fact that the policy of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency therefore of the present administration of the U.S. Government is, in fact, the execution of this three-stage disarmament proposal, leading to total and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Iowa has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Gross was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Iowa yield further?

Mr. GROSS. Briefly.

Mr. HOSMER. And this administration wholeheartedly supports other treaties too; a treaty to halt the production of nuclear materials; a treaty to halt the production of nuclear delivery vehicles; a treaty to scrap nuclear weapons. There are several others, too, which at the moment I cannot recall.

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H1731

Mr. Chairman, all this is true and somewhat frightening; so I do not wonder why the distinguished gentleman from Iowa is worried and wants to look over the operations of this agency frequently and thoroughly.

Mr. GROSS. I say to the gentleman from California that what we have heard on the floor of the House today has been a discussion of nuclear warfare. There has been no discussion of chemical warfare, or bacteriological warfare, and no discussion of conventional arms. Virtually no information was provided by the disarmers before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and none here today in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union with reference to conventional arms, the weapons that are being used now, today, with which to kill Americans in Asia.

Mr. Chairman, as I said before, here is this Government using the Pentagon to peddle \$1 billion worth of arms a year around the world and yet it has the colossal guts to ask for \$33 million to continue futile talks about disarmament. This is not merely a contradiction; this is another addition to the Great Society's "credibility gap."

Mr. Chairman, permit me to read to the Members of the House the description of a research contract with Columbia University:

This study, a follow-on contract to ACDA/E-45, will undertake a comprehensive description and analysis of a number of the emerging reforms to the fiscal and financial systems in Poland, Hungary, in Czechoslovakia and compare these record-keeping systems with the Soviet Union to provide an understanding of the role of statistical and economic analysis in the ratification system.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma, the majority leader, to explain what business we have in entering into a contract of this kind. The gentleman insists that we ought to spend \$33 million in the next 3 years on the Disarmament Agency.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished gentleman from Iowa yield to me at this point?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. ALBERT. Why would the gentleman from Iowa want a 1-year extension or any extension if he objects to the 3-year extension?

Mr. GROSS. On the basis of its demonstrated failure, I would cut it out altogether. However, I am attempting to get something started toward the phasing out process.

I said before I would vote to keep a few—

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. In just one moment. I would vote to keep a few warm bodies in circulation so that, if the Russians or somebody else—the Czechoslovaks, the Hungarians, or the Nigerians—wanted to talk about disarmament we could go through the motions, but this futility ought not to cost the taxpayers more than a few thousand dollars, not \$33 million.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Iowa has again expired.

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, we are told that Nero fiddled while Rome was burning. Whether that is true or not, I do not know, but I do not want this House to fiddle when our country is in the greatest danger it has ever faced. We are requesting \$33 million for the purpose of looking for a way to peace, and we quarrel about it and we fiddle. Why waste words over pennies for peace when we vote billions for war without a murmur?

My colleagues, it is my deep conviction that we have but 3 years in which to save our civilization. I am not dramatizing. I am not putting an exaggeration on my reasoned conclusion. Today the two great nuclear powers are Russia and the United States. Either can destroy the other within a matter of hours once the first nuclear bomb is dropped. There is no secret about it. And that is why Russia and the United States, however much they may disagree in other areas, have a common interest in working to avert a war that would destroy all of Europe, all of America.

A nuclear bomb is exploded, and within 24 hours all of America is wiped out. It is that simple. It is that horrible.

As long as nuclear weaponry is in the exclusive control of the United States and Russia, self-interest can be depended upon to avert the tragedy of a civilization it has taken centuries to build being blown into oblivion in a matter of hours.

Now, Red China has become a nuclear power, as have France and Britain to a limited extent. Within 3 years Red China will have nuclear weaponry, and by "weaponry" we mean not only power to build nuclear bombs, but to fly them and explode them all over the world—in Washington, Chicago, New York, and Moscow.

I say 3 years. Other people say 5. But they all agree that within 7 years at the utmost Red China will have nuclear weaponry—and then what? And then what?

For all the centuries China has dreamed of world dominion. Russia wipes out the United States and the Americas; the United States wipes out Europe including Russia—and Red China takes over. It is that simple. It is that horrible.

And here we are in this historic Chamber, facing the possible annihilation of our civilization, and quarreling over spending \$33 million in 3 years to seek the way to peace and understanding.

Mr. Chairman, I was privileged and proud to be at the White House the night of the final framing of the language of the bill creating the disarmament agency that was drawn up. I served with Dr. Foster as a delegate to the United Nations. I have never known a more devoted and dedicated man in my life. His life, every impulse of his being and every image of his brilliant intellect, is devoted to finding the way of peace.

And here we are, the wise men and women of our Nation, representative of the American people, quarreling over a pittance of \$33 million in 3 years, looking for the way to peace while we vote billions for war, and here we are fiddling—oh, I should not say that. I have the

utmost faith and confidence in the patriotism, wisdom, and integrity of all my colleagues, but in this matter for all that is sensible let us get together. We are fighting for peace. We may not attain it. In 3 years the nuclear war may have engulfed us. But with faith and courage and unity we can prevail. While the civilization of which we are a part and which means so much to us is endangered, for the sake of Providence, let us not fiddle as we quarrel over pennies.

Those who would survive a nuclear war, the very few, would go back to the caves to begin again the long, long tedious climb from the caves to another civilization. It is too horrible to contemplate. It surely is the part of wisdom and of prudence to do all within our power to protect the civilization that has built by the millions upon millions in the years alone that have climbed from the caves to give us what we have.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to take the full 5 minutes, but I do want to make a few comments in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana.

There has been a great deal of discussion here this afternoon about the quantity—the number of dollars. And there has been some discussion about the length of time.

With the exception of some contributions here on the minority side about the quality of the work and the importance of it, there really has not been much attention given to that most important question.

Now, it has been suggested by the distinguished majority leader that if the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana carries, the people of the world will say that this country is not backing up its concern, its desire, its goals, and its articulated and frequently-restated goals in this very vital area of arms control and disarmament.

You know, it recalls when, in debating the extension of the Selective Service Act, there was an amendment pending to cut that extension of the 4-year program to a 2-year program. The comment on that side of the aisle was that if we did cut the extension of the Selective Service Act from 4 years to 2 years why, it would be showing the world that we lack resolve.

I must say that I do not agree with that viewpoint.

In the first place, I do not think any of us know exactly what the world is going to say as to what is the motive behind our acts. If I personally were to guess, I would guess that the world would think that we were not doing our job if this Congress did not review these programs more than every 3 or 4 years.

It seems to me our responsibility in the legislative body is to do that, and I do not think we ought to say to the Agency that we cannot do it or we will not do as is suggested by the majority leader.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

H 1732

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

March 6, 1968

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I do not know whether the gentleman was here when I remarked that I did not think it should raise anyone's blood pressure too much whether we have a 2- or 3-year authorization.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I was not.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think the legislative history that is being written is most unfortunate.

I personally regret the remarks of the majority leader when he indicated that there was some partisan approach to the 2-year suggestion.

I am a Republican, and I see no damage in a 2-year authorization. Nor can I buy his argument that this would in any sense represent a retreat on the part of the Congress regarding the importance of continuing our efforts to bring arms under more reasonable control than they are today.

I do not buy his argument that a treaty is less likely to be negotiated with a nuclear or nonnuclear power because of the length of the authorization that Congress may provide for this Agency.

In fact, if anything, his speech made me lean in favor of the 2-year authorization instead of the 3-year authorization.

I do not think the legislative history of this bill should indicate that we accept this argument, that it would represent a retreat on the part of the Congress about the necessity of gaining greater control over this problem of arms control than now exists.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. I think he is right on the point and I agree completely.

My point is simply this. This committee has jurisdiction over this subject matter. I think this committee should review it every year, if possible—or every 2 years—but certainly not merely every 3 years and certainly not every 4 years.

If the goal is worth the money and it is, then it is worth the time of this committee and the Congress every year or two to review not merely how long the act should be extended and not just how much money should be expended, but more importantly the quality of the work that they are doing.

As the gentleman from Iowa pointed out what is the real substance, merit, and basis for their effort? Is it enough? Is it too much? Can it be better directed? I think it is time, that we frame these questions on an accurate basis. It is time that we frame them on the basis of what is our job as legislators. What is the role of the legislative branch of this country? It seems to me we have a responsibility in this area that is not being done particularly well. I know it can be done considerably better, and we are much more likely to do it if we adopt the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and in opposition to the substitute.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, it is very surprising to hear Members offer these amendments. We have before us a substitute amendment which would provide only \$5 million to operate the

Agency for 1 year. I suspect that the gentleman from Iowa will find that more money is spent in his State on agricultural research than that in 1 year. We do not have a 1-year authorization for the agriculture appropriation. We have a continuing authorization. The Committee on Agriculture gets along without the House passing on their authorization each year.

I suppose it is possible that we spend more money on hoof-and-mouth disease than we will spend on this whole program over a period of 3 years to support its effort to bring peace to the world.

I wonder whether or not we spend more money on fish research than we are going to spend in this Agency. There is no annual examination of these other research programs except by the Appropriations Committee. This is the same process by which this program will be examined every year by the great subcommittee headed by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. ROONEY].

As chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, I can assure the gentleman from Illinois that my committee keeps busy. We work hard. I spend a great deal of my time following the operation of our subcommittees, including the one on which the gentleman himself serves. There is nothing unusual about this 3-year authorization. The agency has been operating under a 3-year authorization. Never once during that 3-year period has any member of my committee or any Member of this House come to me and said, "Why don't you call the Arms Control people up here and find out what they are doing?" I have never had such a request, not one. The pressure has always been from the people down in the Agency, who have kept bothering me to invite them to come up here and inform the Foreign Affairs Committee of what they are doing.

Even though the Committee has a heavy workload we have always found time to hear them two or three times a year and to review their progress and their plans.

This small Agency has done a good job.

If this authorization is cut back from a 3-year authorization to a 2-year authorization, it is going to have effects upon the nonnuclear nations all over the world whom we are urging to accept this treaty. I am afraid they will question our determination and our sincerity in our support of nonproliferation.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. The gentleman spoke of agriculture research. I do not recall any time, except under Henry Wallace and the New Deal, when we encouraged farmers to produce more and then hired someone to come out and tell the farmers to destroy what they had produced. In this case we are peddling arms around the world at the rate of a billion dollars a year, and then we are going through the motions of telling the people that we are trying to do something about disarming.

Mr. MORGAN. I know the gentleman does not approve of the work of this Agency. He apparently does not believe in any form of international cooperation to enhance our security. This treaty is not consistent with the concept of fortress America. I know there are many that adhere to this concept of our national defense. As a previous speaker has just said, we live in the most dangerous age in the history of the world. We cannot risk a "fortress America" concept any more.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I must say, as a supporter of the Agency—and my chairman knows I am a supporter of the Agency—I again regret he should be using the line of argument that a 2-year authorization, instead of three, could be used in any sense and construed fairly as any indication of a lack of sincerity on the part of any legislative branch about the desirability of reaching some kind of agreement on a nonproliferation treaty.

It does not make sense to use that kind of argument when basically there is no substance to a 2- or 3-year program, except that it points a finger at our committee and suggests we ought to take a closer look than we have. It does not indicate, in my opinion, and I do not think the legislative history should indicate this, that there is any slackening of desire on our part to come to terms with this most serious problem of nuclear weapons.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by pointing out that in my opinion, it will inevitably cause concern among the nonnuclear countries around the world, and I want to compliment the majority leader for taking the position which he has so ably discussed.

We are also in danger of losing our highly competent technical people, who want assurance that they are working for a continuing agency.

The 3-year authorization was backed by John McCloy. Mr. McCloy has been in this disarmament business for a great many years. He was head of the original arms control and disarmament operation created by President Eisenhower back in 1959. He came before the committee only a couple of weeks ago and made a strong plea for a 3-year authorization. He was backed up by General Gruenther. Both of these distinguished citizens, as Members are aware, know the problems of operating a government agency and they are also in close touch with what is going on overseas.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.

(On request of Mr. ALBERT, and by unanimous consent, Mr. MORGAN was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H1733

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, in order that the legislative history may be clear, in view of what the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey has said, I think we should refer back to the testimony of Mr. McCloy in the hearings in response to a question by the gentleman from New York [Mr. FARBERSTEIN] when this was said:

Mr. FARBERSTEIN . . .

Gentlemen, do you think that the question of internal politics should enter into the determination as to whether or not this disarmament organization should be continued for 1 year or 3 years, or do you think that this is way above and beyond the question of politics, because, after all, this is a rather delicate year.

Mr. McCloy. I think I can respond to that very quickly. I think this particular Agency was born in a nonpartisan atmosphere. I was just talking to General Gruenther about that today, although this was put forward by a Democratic administration, the extent to which the Republicans supported it put it in the class of a nonpartisan action. A former Republican President's gave statements in favor of it, and so on.

I gave other reasons why I thought it would be unwise to limit its existence at this particular stage in history. But in any stage of history I think this matter of the security of the country is one of a nonpartisan nature.

I think Mr. McCloy's answer to a specific question as to whether that issue—the length of the authorization—should be partisan is important. I am not saying to the gentleman from New Jersey that he does not support this Agency, and I am not questioning the motives of the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey, who is a strong supporter of this program, but the question of partisanship as to the period of the authorization was brought out in the hearings and was commented upon by Mr. McCloy. It seems to me, therefore, on that issue there should be no partisanship, because the whole thing, from the beginning to the end, has been the result of bipartisan or nonpartisan effort. I do not think it should be otherwise in any area of this matter at all. As I have previously pointed out Mr. McCloy is a Republican and a strong supporter of the work of the Agency.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, what dumbfounds me, and I might say appalls me, is that the majority leader keeps dragging in this issue of partisanship. No one argues the fact that the Agency was created on a bipartisan basis, and no one argues the fact that the Agency is going to be continued and be supported on a nonpartisan basis. The only thing is whether it would be advisable—and again this is done on a nonpartisan basis—to continue this for a 2- or a 3-year period.

For the majority leader to be dragging in the red herring that in some way there is a plot afoot on the part of one of the major parties to destroy or to disrupt this Agency, or to try to prevent the ratification of the treaty, strikes me as most unkind.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the majority leader.

Mr. ALBERT. The gentleman is going far astray. I did not say any such thing as that. The truth of the matter was I was merely quoting from the hearings.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The record says nothing except it should not be partisan. Who suggests it but the majority leader?

Mr. ALBERT. The record was made in response to a question as to whether the extension should be for 1 or 3 years, and directly in response to that question Mr. McCloy said "No," it should not be partisan.

I am asking the gentleman to go along with all of us, with those Republicans who are for a 3-year authorization, so that there will not even be the appearance of partisanship in this matter. It is too important.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOSMER. I believe the majority leader is under a misapprehension which ought to be cleared up. He keeps talking in terms of the existence of this Agency.

This Agency is legislated, on the law books. We are not talking about its existence. We are only talking about for how long is its current funding to be authorized? For 3 years? For 2 years? For 1 year?

There is no question about its existence.

I do hope the majority leader will acknowledge that fact, so that there is no question on the record that the existence of this Agency is at stake, but only the period of extension.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield for one comment, how will the Agency exist without an authorization?

Mr. HOSMER. Just as it would if we passed this for 3 years. We would pass the next one. If we pass it for 2 years, then we will pass another. The same is true if we pass it for 1 year.

I believe the majority leader is not being fair, confusing the House on that basis.

Mr. ALBERT. The majority leader is only trying to cite the record. He is not trying to confuse the House.

Mr. HOSMER. Then admit that the existence of the Agency is not at stake.

Mr. ALBERT. It will be, if we do not pass an authorization. If we do, of course it will not be at stake, if we pass a 1-year or 6-month authorization. But the existence of the Agency is at stake in the authorization.

Mr. HOSMER. If we pass it for 3 years, it will be at stake at the end of 3 years.

Mr. ALBERT. Of course.

Mr. HOSMER. It is not at stake any more in any one length of time or the other.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, it is not the majority leader who has me confused. I was under the impression, back in 1961, that the gentleman from California was a strong supporter of the Agency. I know he voted for the original Act.

He apparently has changed his posi-

tion here today, I remember that in 1961 he was a supporter.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Perhaps to bring the debate back into focus, the issue of partisan indictment was not raised, really, by the majority leader nor by my colleague from New Jersey. The real nub of this argument is who raised the fact that a lack of 3-year authorization would be construed as lessening of our interest in the Agency. Actually, the fellow who raised that point, the gentleman who first raised the point about the psychological impact of a less than 3-year Agency authorization, was John McCloy. He said:

Perhaps this is the chief reason I would urge you not to limit the authorization to 1 year but that you continue with the 3-year period, that it is rather important psychologically at this point.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I believe it would be fair to say that some who hope for a 2-year authorization do so out of faith in the American people, who this fall will elect the 91st Congress, and out of faith that that Congress will be as dedicated to peace as this Congress is. It would seem to me to be no violation of the world's hope for peace to give the 91st Congress a shot at review of the authorization of this Agency, as we have had in the 90th Congress.

Mr. MORGAN. I am sure that most of us agree that John McCloy is a hard-headed realist, that he knows something about our Government and that he also knows something about the attitudes in foreign countries.

As the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER], just pointed out, he thinks the 3-year authorization is important. I am ready to accept his judgment.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished chairman of the committee mentioned that I supported this Agency as a free agent when it was first established and asked the question why I had changed my mind about it. I want to assure him that I have the same feeling now as I had then. I feel there is great value to the national security of the United States to have an agency which does an excellent job or at least a good job of evaluating arms control and disarmament measures. My quarrel is not with the principle of having such an agency. My quarrel is with the Agency as it now operates.

I think if you had watched it as closely as I have, you could not give it much more than a D plus and more likely a D minus or even an F on the way it has operated. So I think it is up to the Congress now to insist that the Agency do a better job. One of the ways this insistence could be evidenced is by a shortening of the term of the authoriza-

tion of the money. I think it would be neither burdensome nor unhealthy to bring the Agency down out of a dream world for a few days every year or two and bring it before the Congress so that it could reevaluate itself and explain to the American people what it is doing. This is not an outrageous proposal.

I want to caution people also on this business of trying to interpret what the people overseas are going to make of what we do here in the House. I serve as an adviser to our delegation to the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference. A couple of years ago I was over there, and I mentioned how the United States was really interested in arms control and disarmament because we have this Agency set up for that very special purpose. One of the Soviet delegates challenged me on this and said that "the people you have in arms control are not the military people. You avoided the issue by establishing a civilian agency. It is the military that controls and uses arms. In the U.S.S.R. we have our military people directly assigned to the negotiations in Geneva. The military is involved, and therefore we are doing a better job than you, and your civilian disarmament agency is a sham." So please do not go too far out on a limb in trying to interpret what people overseas are going to say or attribute to what actions we take here. They may misinterpret anyway. I think the safest thing to do is to see this thing through for a couple of years and then let ACDA come back and justify itself.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOSMER. Yes. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mrs. BOLTON. Does it not seem possible to you that people overseas would feel we are being particularly careful because we would want to go into the work of this Agency every 2 years instead of letting it go for 3 years?

Mr. HOSMER. I would think they would say, "Well, the Congress of the United States regards arms control and disarmament as an important matter."

Mrs. BOLTON. Yes.

Mr. HOSMER. Sufficiently to take the time and trouble to review it more frequently. Not just to pass a 3-year authorization and then walk away and not think about it again for 36 months.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOSMER. Yes. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I said earlier, Mr. Chairman—and this proves I am a poor prophet—that I doubted that any blood pressures would be raised by our discussion of whether this should be a 1- or 2-year authorization. Certainly the majority leader's blood pressure is up. It seems to me that what we have here is primarily an internal housekeeping decision on whether to put the bee on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by saying that within 2 years you have a specific obligation to come back with a renewed authorization request if this Agency should be continued. We think you should do it in 2 years instead of in a 3-year period. As I said, I see no neces-

sity for us to be pointing at it in that way, because we could be doing that job on an annual basis where there was an authorization. I see no possibility for justifying the claim that there is any partisan advantage either sought or to be obtained by an individual or members of a party taking a position on this one way or another. In spite of and not because of what the majority leader says, I still think I will go along with a 3-year authorization, but the proponents of that program have, in my opinion, stated a poor case and written poor legislative history.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. HOSMER. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise merely to point out the fact that the first vote will come on the Gross substitute which will, in effect, gut the entire program by reducing it down to \$5 million.

Mr. Chairman, although we have been debating the Adair amendment, the first vote will be on the Gross substitute, and a vote for that substitute will be a vote to eliminate, in effect, this Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gross] for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR].

The substitute amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR].

The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. ADAIR and Mr. GALLAGHER.

The Committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 87, noes 88.

So the amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FINDLEY

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY: On page 1, line 7, immediately after "\$33,000,000," strike out the period at the end of such sentence and insert in lieu thereof the following: "Provided, That no funds authorized by this Act may be spent for salaries or other expenses connected with preparing, advancing or negotiating proposals which preclude the provision of nuclear materials for purely defensive purposes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, those who have looked at the committee report will recognize that this amendment is the same one as set forth in the language of my additional views.

Admittedly, the amendment is not the ideal way for this House to bring about a change in the draft treaty on non-proliferation, but it is certainly the one

most readily available and probably the only one that will be available to the House in the time between now and the time the draft treaty will be initialed and placed before the Senate.

It is certainly in the great tradition of this body for us to attempt to use the power of the purse, and that is what is intended by this amendment, in order to influence action on the treaty.

Now, if this amendment should be adopted, it would have the immediate effect of causing our Government—at least, that is my feeling—to call back the draft treaty and reinstate a provision that three administrations over a 10-year period insisted upon; namely, the NATO option.

During the testimony before the committee, Admiral Strauss, the former head of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated to the committee that in his opinion the committee should use every legislative means at its disposal in order to protect what is known as the NATO option. I feel it is badly needed in order to halt what I would describe as retreat on the part of the United States in negotiating with the Soviet Union.

This retreat has occurred over a 10-year period. The United States, beginning in 1957, has changed its position to our disadvantage on three major points. It no longer suggested that the nuclear powers reduce their own stockpiles at the same time that a nonproliferation treaty was undertaken. It no longer insisted upon the arrangement for some individual self-defense, some form of transfer of weapons to individual nations. But the most significant retreat that our Government undertook in this 10-year period occurred in the fall of 1966, when we dropped the requirement that any arms deal, weapons control deal with the Soviet Union, must necessarily protect the future interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We dropped the NATO option.

During all of those 10 years that our Government insisted upon the NATO option as a condition to any deal with the Soviet Union, no one raised the question whether this would be a violation of the McMahon Act.

I might say that some of those who have criticized my amendment on the floor today were on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy during that same period of time when our Government was consistently upholding the NATO option.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MORGAN. Is the gentleman's amendment contrary to the McMahon Act?

Mr. FINDLEY. No, it is not indeed.

Mr. MORGAN. Is the gentleman's amendment contrary to section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1964?

Mr. FINDLEY. No, sir; I do not think any reasonable interpretation of the amendment could lead to that viewpoint because my amendment does nothing except prevent foreclosure of a deal under which a NATO nuclear defense system could be developed in the future.

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 1735

It does not authorize any nuclear defense system at all.

It does not violate the McMahon Act or any part of it.

It simply protects the future interest of a most essential alliance and recognizes that we, as a nation, should be more concerned over the interests of our friends and allies than we are over working out a dubious arms deal with the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORGAN. Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act has this prohibition:

It shall be unlawful except as provided in Section 91 for any person to transfer or receive in interstate or foreign commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer or acquire, possess or import or export any atomic weapon.

How does your amendment get around that section of the Atomic Energy Act?

Mr. FINDLEY. That is an interesting observation but it has nothing to do with my amendment, because my amendment simply reinstates a bargaining position that President Eisenhower insisted upon and that President Kennedy insisted upon and until 1966 President Johnson insisted upon—and nobody including the gentleman who serves with such distinction as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, ever raised any question as to whether that bargaining position was a violation of the McMahon Act. It was not and is not a violation.

A-WEAPON TREATY REMOVES NATO OPTION

In the year 1493 leading statesmen of the world powers perceived that the struggle for empire might result in war among the European states as each raced for the promised bounty of colonialism in the New World. In an attempt to preserve peace, Pope Alexander VI, with the acquiescence of the major powers, divided the world into two colonial hegemonies. On one side of the line Spain was to have undisputed access to the wealth of the New World, while on the other side Portugal, then the other major power, was granted influence in Africa and the Far East. It was assumed that the division would be a stable one for the two major beneficiaries and would jointly enforce their preeminent influence in their respective spheres. Of course, these well laid plans collided with the reality of Britain's emerging seapower. Determined to carve an empire upon which the sun would never set Britain, among others, proceeded to disregard and dismantle the Pope's plan.

Notwithstanding that experience, however, almost each successive generation has attempted through hegemonies to control what was perceived to be the greatest danger to peace. Some of these ambitious plans have been crude and materialistic such as the carving of China into commercial and political spheres of influence. Others have been idealistic, although ill-fated, such as the attempted control on naval capitol ships. But, unfortunately, all have in time failed, usually to the detriment of the party proposing the limitation.

The proposed Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty drafts submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee—ENDC—is the latest in the series of these

maneuvers to preserve peace. Its premise is not unlike that which guided Pope Alexander. The United States and the Soviet Union, now the major nuclear powers, perceive that the spread of nuclear weapons endangers the bipolar status of international politics.

For the last 20 years the world has been divided essentially into two camps, each headed by a nuclear superpower. Each power could impose its will upon its allies, as was proven in the Suez and Hungary crises in 1956.

However, bipolarity was doomed on February 13, 1960, when France exploded a tiny nuclear device on the Sahara desert. Its small yield hid its larger political significance. Four years later China exploded her own nuclear device. Since that time the power, influence, and prestige of both France and China have grown to the dismay of their camp leaders, the United States and Soviet Union. If France and China could so easily disturb the "grand design" of each camp leader, then imagine, the two camps reasoned, what six or eight more nuclear powers could do.

Prior to the membership increase in the nuclear club, nonproliferation efforts were largely propaganda. However, in the last few years they have been undertaken with deadly seriousness. Each side has compromised so much on its original position that it is hardly recognizable in the effort to achieve a halt to proliferation. On its part the United States undertook every diplomatic measure available, short of open threats, to disarm the nuclear force of France or bring it under U.S. control, and some authorities have even suggested that Khrushchev intended to completely destroy China's embryonic nuclear capabilities before his sudden political demise.

Before the U.S. Congress is faced with a fait accompli, now is the time to question seriously the motives and purposes of our efforts to promote a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. There is no better way to do this than by the bill to extend the authorization for appropriations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

If Congress waits until the treaty is initialed and presented to the Senate, the House will be effectively excluded from making its desires known. At the same time once the prestige of the President is committed formally to a particular draft then the Senate will be under pressure to protect the President's position. Whatever influence or control the House wants to exercise in the Geneva negotiations must be exerted in the framework of H.R. 14940.

In my judgment, the draft treaty which has been proposed is a threat to the national security of the United States and the free world. It contains the seeds for the final disruption of the Atlantic Alliance. It may lead to involving the United States into guarantees of the security of every non-Communist country in the world, regardless of its real importance to our security. It may set the stage for another German-Soviet Rapallo. Since neither France nor China will sign the treaty, their own influence will increase enormously because of their ability to

transfer nuclear weapons to those countries who need or desire them but cannot obtain them from the United States or the Soviet Union. As a preventative of nuclear proliferation this treaty has as little substance as the emperor's non-existent new clothes. The treaty draft does not strengthen peace; it weakens it. In our zeal to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union we have turned our backs on the legitimate defense needs of the Atlantic Alliance and at the same time have seriously damaged the prospects for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Before outlining eight arguments against the language proposed in the treaty, I want to comment on three aspects of the draft that have largely been ignored. These are the retreat in U.S. negotiating position, the question of guarantees to nonnuclear states, and the assumption that nuclear proliferation is imminent.

THE RETREAT IN U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION

On August 29, 1957, the United States in cooperation with three other powers—France, Canada, and the United Kingdom—proposed a scheme that would restrict nuclear proliferation but at the same time require nuclear nations to cease their production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. A caveat to the nonproliferation proposal was that nuclear weapons could be transferred for individual or collective self-defense.

Initially the U.S. position envisioned some nuclear sharing arrangement within the framework of multinational alliances like NATO but it sought to reduce nuclear weapon production as well as proliferation. The Soviet Union on September 20, 1957, rejected these proposals, especially the collective sharing of nuclear weapons. In 1959, the United Nations adopted a general resolution urging efforts to be undertaken to prevent nuclear proliferation.

In 1961, the United States undertook its first significant change in its position. It abandoned the transfer of nuclear weapons for defense purposes to individual nations. But it still retained collective sharing under an alliance as a part of its policy.

From 1962 to August 17, 1965, the main issue at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Proliferation was whether such an agreement would prevent nuclear sharing arrangements within a collective defense organization like NATO. The Soviet Union was anxious to make sure it did, whereas the United States did not want to close the door on possible arrangements within NATO.

On August 17, 1965, the United States made the second major change in its position. It retained the concept of nuclear sharing, but only if the total number of nuclear states did not increase. Ambassador Foster stated that this U.S. position would not preclude the establishment of nuclear arrangements within NATO so long as the arrangement did not constitute an additional entity having the power to use nuclear weapons independent of existing nuclear nations. In other words, if the United States independently surrendered its control over all its own nuclear weapons to a NATO

arrangement then a sharing arrangement would be possible. This proposal, in light of the 1964 presidential campaign in which the President reiterated that the United States would never surrender control of nuclear weapons was a farce. Since the Soviet Union realized that the United States was not about to turn over voluntarily its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons to a new organization and renounce its right of veto over them, Moscow could see light at the end of the tunnel in their efforts to prohibit any sharing arrangement. On September 24, 1965, the Soviet Union insisted again that any sharing arrangement within a military alliance was out of the question.

Objective evidence indicates that the Soviet Union patience was rewarded on October 10, 1966, when President Johnson and Secretary Rusk met Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the White House. The New York Times reported on August 25, 1967:

It has since become clear that in their talks that day President Johnson and Mr. Rusk gave Mr. Gromyko strong indication that the previous United States reservations, aimed at accommodating some nuclear sharing device in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been withdrawn.

After that time the Geneva Conference marked time waiting for the United States to finish "consultation" with its allies. Within less than a year, on August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union came to an agreement on all particulars except the inspection provision which was soon remedied by absurdly "agreeing to agree" at some later date.

In the 10-year period from 1957 through 1967, the United States changed its position on three major points. It no longer suggested that the nuclear powers reduce their own stockpiles at the same time nonproliferation measures were taken. It no longer insisted upon some arrangement for individual self-defense. Most important, it dropped the requirement that nuclear sharing within NATO be protected.

The advisability of the United States reducing its nuclear stockpiles is questionable, but it is imperative, for reasons I shall outline below, that the United States insist upon some provision for establishing nuclear defense within its regional defense organizations, principally NATO.

THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR GUARANTEES

The United States should ask itself whether it wants to make such guarantees. By holding out the promise of guarantees the United States may find its role as world policeman greatly expanded. Instead of defense treaties with 43 nations we may soon be responsible for defending an additional 50 nations. For instance, the United States presently has no treaty with Nepal or Afghanistan, both of which border China. Suppose, for example, that China threatens nuclear attack against either one of these states. Are we bound to give them, in the words of President Johnson, "strong support"? Are we bound to defend two countries, one a remote Himalayan kingdom, which previously we did not consider to be vital to the security of the United

States? These are questions that should be answered before we proceed further on the draft treaty.

Another problem connected with guarantees is the ambiguity in language. The President has had little to say on guarantees. His most important public statement was this one made on October 18, 1964:

The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.

To date, however, the President has not been specific about how such guarantees might work. Before proceeding further on the treaty, should we not move beyond the domain of the speechmaker, where the matter presently rests, to specific measures upon which nations act? Since the President's position is couched in sufficiently ambiguous terms not to disturb anyone, we should not expect it to have a measurable effect on the decisions of governments which possess the ability to develop nuclear weapons. The nonnuclear nations are not interested so much in defense, as in deterrence. A U.S. guarantee therefore must be really dependable, indeed automatic, to have value. Nations are not interested in accepting a Hiroshima on their soil as the condition precedent to U.S. defense. A policy for the benefit of a particular nonnuclear nation may have some utility, especially if expressly addressed to an imminent nuclear threat. A unilateral declaration, such as the President's, addressed to the world at large probably will not be taken seriously by anyone. Empty guarantees to the world at large, on the other hand, tend to weaken the credibility of the guarantees given to our allies in NATO.

Ambassador Foster, in his testimony, sought to meet some of the problems on guarantees. He stated that the U.N. could guarantee nations in Southeast Asia and Asia against nuclear blackmail, but when I asked him if he anticipated the U.N. would own and control nuclear weapons he replied, "Not under present circumstances."

Regarding India the only thing he could promise was "we are working on a set of assurances that will partially meet the concern of India." I, of course, do not know what these assurances are and by his own testimony they will only "partially" meet the concerns of India. Ambassador Foster stated that under the treaty we are not bound to use nuclear weapons to defend India or Israel. What did he offer these countries in the way of U.S. guarantees? In Israel's case he said only:

I refuse to speculate on that possibility—

That we might use nuclear weapons. Of India, he said:

I think that the record of the U.S. in supporting this great democracy of India over the last twenty years is a very clear record. I think that other nations are aware of the interest the U.S. has in India.

Apparently Pakistan treated this interest casually at the time of the Kashmir war and it did not deter China's invasion of India in 1962.

It is unlikely that New Delhi—or anyone else—will take such assurances seri-

ously—especially when Ambassador Foster said further that there "is not a specific commitment at this moment in history" to defend India.

The proffer of U.S. guarantees is simply not credible. The announcement of virtuous ends does not discharge our responsibilities or deter aggression. The futility of unilateral allied guarantees for the political integrity of independent smaller states did not deter aggression against Albert's Belgium, Republican Poland, independent China, or Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, nor did it prevent Communist aggression in Korea, South-east Asia, or Eastern Europe.

Ambassador Foster said:

We feel the spread of these (nuclear weapons) is the greatest danger to the survival of the world.

I disagree strongly with that assumption and I believe a majority of the Congress do also. Of the greatest dangers to the survival of the world proliferation ranks well down the list.

In fact, such acquisition might even preserve the peace in some cases. One wonders whether Hungary might not be independent today if she had had a small arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons to use against Soviet tanks in 1956. In the final analysis, what preserves a nation's independence is its own willingness to defend its territorial integrity, the determination of its allies, the balance of power, strategic frontiers, and an international order which places it in an unassailable position.

Prohibiting nuclear proliferation within the context of the draft treaty does not enhance the survival of the world; it may well threaten it.

THE LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
MAY BE VASTLY OVERRATED

There are numerous obstacles to proliferation. The size of the investment needed to build a strategic nuclear force and the cost of a diversified delivery system are inhibiting factors. Weapons technology does not stand still, and, therefore, research and development are also heavy cost factors. Domestic political pressures may inhibit the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Outright transfer of nuclear weapons from one power to another is possible but not probable. Furthermore, it would not necessarily solve or meet inhibiting factors.

The premise upon which we have negotiated this treaty is a faulty one. We have perceived this treaty to be so important that writing in the July 1965 issue of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Foster said:

A heavier cost could be the erosion of alliances resulting from the high degree of U.S.-Soviet cooperation which will be required if a non-proliferation program is to be successful. Within NATO, there could be concern that the detente would lead to a weakening of our commitment to Western Europe. The problem will be particularly acute in Germany . . .

Certainly this is a backward listing of priorities. But this reasoning of the State Department is internally consistent, because they believe, as Ambassador Foster testified recently that "the Soviet Union is a responsible nuclear power." I cannot accept these premises. Neither did the Foreign Affairs Commit-

March 6, 1968

tee in 1961 when it published a list of 15 countries which the Soviet Union had threatened with destruction.

Was the Soviet Union a responsible nuclear power when it abruptly broke the nuclear explosion moratorium in 1961 and 3 days later inaugurated a lengthy series of tests—tests that must necessarily have been in preparation while the Soviet Union was piously proclaiming its observance of the moratorium?

Was the Soviet Union a responsible nuclear power when it sought to place nuclear-tipped rockets in Cuba?

Was it a responsible nuclear power when it defied world opinion and an outraged United Nations by detonating the 50-megaton bomb?

Was the Soviet Union a responsible nuclear power when Chairman Khrushchev told how he had intimidated the Greek Ambassador who said to him:

I trust the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union will never give the order to drop atomic bombs on the Acropolis and other historic monuments of Greece?

On that occasion Mr. Khrushchev replied:

Mr. Ambassador, I do not like to be unpleasant, but you are deeply mistaken.

Is our fetish to work out empty arrangements with the Soviet Union so strong that we take flight of reality? I sincerely hope not.

In reviewing the language of the treaty, it appears to me there are eight principal arguments against it.

First. It will seriously weaken and may completely destroy the North Atlantic Alliance.

I believe the complete destruction of NATO is a chief aim of the Soviet Union in participating in the negotiations on the treaty. The durability and strength of NATO depends upon its becoming a partnership of equals, an alliance in which the United States permits the other members to have a fair share in nuclear strategy. Such a partnership cannot grow if a nonproliferation treaty renders the European nations who do not possess nuclear weapons forever dependent upon the United States for protection in the event of an attack requiring a nuclear response.

A treaty denying those powers an adequate deterrent in the future while U.S. troops stationed in Europe are cut back is bound to raise questions regarding the sincerity of our commitment. In my view a nonproliferation treaty should not be accorded any priority which prevents the North Atlantic nations from solving the nuclear sharing problem in whatever way they decide is best.

William R. Kintner, deputy director of the foreign policy research institute at the University of Pennsylvania, has written:

Many Europeans who favor a strong Atlantic Alliance would like to replace European military independence on the U.S. with a true partnership based upon the interdependence of a powerful United Europe and a powerful U.S. East-West agreement on nuclear nonproliferation would render the concept of interdependence meaningless. Partnership implies the creation of a European deterrent independent of the American deterrent, yet closely connected with it. The pros-

pects for creating a European nuclear deterrent are now slim. An anti-proliferation treaty might eliminate any future possibility of such a development.

Second. It will have an undesirable effect on the Federal Republic of Germany.

Bonn is in a special situation, because it bears a heavy risk and burden in the defense of Western Europe, yet is subjected to special restrictions concerning nuclear arms which were imposed in the early postwar years. To keep firm ties with the Federal Republic, it will be necessary for the Western allies to treat Germany as an equal. The signature of East Germany, the so-called German Democratic Republic, on this treaty will increase its prestige and standing in the international community at the expense of the Federal Republic. Continued discrimination against Germany might fan the flames of extreme nationalism increasing the strength and appeal of the Neo-Nazi Party. The inspection provisions finally negotiated under the treaty may well lead to industrial espionage, and the treaty may preclude Germany's harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Since the Atlantic and West German agendas seem to be overweighed with hot issues at the present, it is to be wondered whether top U.S. policy officials have given sufficient attention to the questions of timing and priorities in respect to this treaty.

Third. It will not prevent completely the spread of nuclear weapons.

Nations follow the course which they deem in their national interest, and will manufacture, or decide not to manufacture nuclear weapons whether or not there is a nonproliferation treaty. Indeed this treaty, based as it is on unbelievable guarantees, may encourage proliferation. Exaggerated chatter about the damage that additional nuclear forces can achieve encourages the notion of nuclear weapons as "the great equalizer" in international relations.

Fourth. Its inspection features are not clearly spelled out.

To approve a treaty such as has been submitted without knowing what inspection features may be ultimately agreed upon is inviting the creation of a dangerous illusion. Without adequate inspection a nation may covertly transfer or manufacture weapons. The possibility of different standards of inspection being applied is a real one because each state to the treaty negotiates inspection features separately.

Even assuming that the safeguards of the International Agency for Atomic Energy are adequate to prevent diversion of nuclear materials from declared peaceful activities it is unlikely that there will be a provision for inspecting the nuclear stockpiles or weapon production facilities of the nuclear weapon powers to determine whether they may be transferring any to nonnuclear powers. Furthermore, there is no penalty provided for in the treaty and any nation could withdraw upon 3-months notice whenever it decided it wanted to proceed with open production of nuclear weapons. It is still not clear how industrial trade secrets would be protected

under a system of international inspection.

Fifth. It may restrict peaceful development of atomic energy for industrial or energy purposes.

The draft treaty outlaws any "nuclear explosive device" regardless of whether it is detonated for peaceful or military purposes. A number of respected nuclear scientists believe the development of "flow-share" depends upon peaceful atomic explosives. Proposals have been advanced, for example, for atomic explosions for such massive excavation jobs as creating a new canal supplemental to the congested Panama Canal. Other large scale nuclear excavation needs might be needed in the CHOCO and NAWAPA water and power projects in Latin America. Underground explosions offer splendid economic potentials. It has been estimated, for instance, that the world's supply of natural gas can be doubled by nuclear fracturing of impervious gas formations deep beneath the surface.

On the other hand critics of this argument claim the draft treaty will not affect peaceful development of nuclear energy. If this be so then I agree with Mr. Adrian Fisher's statement that a nation which can develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes likely can develop it also for military purposes.

Sixth. It would require the nonnuclear nations to sacrifice a nuclear weapon capability which might some day be imperative for their self-defense without placing any counterbalancing limitation on the further acquisition of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers.

The nonnuclear powers are required—under the treaty—to renounce their right to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, but the nuclear powers would not have any limitations placed upon them except a prohibition against transferring to or assisting nonnuclear states in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, something they have already chosen not to do. True, the treaty does require "good faith" bargaining to achieve more concrete steps toward general disarmament, but this has not been achieved in 22 years of disarmament negotiations and its achievement is not likely in the foreseeable future.

The very act of signing a nonproliferation treaty assumes significance even though the treaty does not change an existing de facto situation. The act can be interpreted as one of signing away future national security, in an age when balance of power politics still prevails, when nuclear weapons still appear the ultimate guarantee of security, when regional or international security organizations are far from being capable of taking over national responsibilities for defense an when alliances do not appear to be guaranteed for all time, if at all.

In other words, the treaty strikes at the heart of national sovereignty without providing any substitute organization principle or any meaningful security guarantees.

Rumania, an Eastern European Communist state with a growing streak of external independence, and a member of the ENDC, accurately stated the concern of these smaller nations when its President, Nicolae Ceausescu said:

Without precise, firm and efficient measures, on the part of all states for ceasing the production of nuclear weapons . . . non-proliferation would not only fail to secure progress along the way of liquidating the danger of nuclear war, but would bring about its indefinite perpetuation. Such an approach to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would only legislate the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear states.

Indeed, Rumania proposed that if at the end of 5 years the nuclear powers had not taken steps for reduction of their own nuclear stockpile, then the nonnuclear signatories would reexamine their own position. Rumania has also insisted upon security guarantees for the nonnuclear powers; a precise, just, and efficient control system and the absolute requirement that the treaty not block peaceful development of atomic energy. It would appear that the Rumanian delegation—among others—has a better grasp of “realpolitik” and its own national interest than some of the major powers.

Seventh. It will weaken the relative military position of the United States.

It is unlikely that the nonnuclear powers will sign a nonproliferation treaty unless it is linked with measures to limit the nuclear powers to a comparable degree. The treaty may lead to further disarmament measures which will weaken our security. Such measures may include a comprehensive nuclear test ban or a prohibition against the first use of nuclear weapons.

The treaty will impede the deployment of an antiballistic missile defense system to protect countries from Communist aggression since a successful antiballistic missile system requires nuclear warheads. In the future countries such as India, Japan, and European allies might want to build such a defense system, but the nonproliferation treaty would prevent the United States from assisting them.

Finally the treaty will require the United States to accept new commitments to help defend the states which forgo the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Nonnuclear nations cannot be expected to give up the right to acquire nuclear weapons without some sort of guarantee of protection against an attack requiring a nuclear defense. Such commitments may overextend the United States, whereas if nations could acquire their own nuclear weapons or participate in regional systems, we would be relieved of responsibility.

Eighth. It will be a gain for the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is probably interested in securing a treaty for these reasons:

It will effectively keep Germany from acquiring a nuclear defense either through an ABM system or a control or policy influence in nuclear strategy development.

It will aggravate differences within the Atlantic Alliance among Rome, Bonn, Paris, and Washington.

China's refusal to sign the treaty will further isolate her from the world community and in particular the Communist movement.

It will prevent certain Eastern European countries from obtaining nuclear weapons and perpetuate their reliance on the Soviet Union to defend their position.

It will keep nuclear weapons out of the Middle East and South Asia where Russia, perhaps by “Cuban missile type” arrangements, seeks to expand her influence.

The draft treaty confuses appearance for reality, symbols for substance. It would lump together all the “have-nots” of the world—the backward and the advanced, the neutral and the aligned, the subservient and the independent, the malign and the well intentioned in one category, and the diverse “haves” minus two—China and France—in another category, thus symbolically reversing alignments and priorities that have prevailed for over 20 years.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the gentleman means by the NATO option. If he means by the NATO option, the transfer of nuclear weapons into the sovereign control of NATO, then that is forbidden by law.

Now NATO has these weapons, but it has these weapons through bilateral agreements with certain specific nations which we believe are substantially sound politically and not liable to be changed from within to either Communist or Fascist states.

I was on the committee during the years the gentleman speaks of and I know of no NATO option other than the NATO option which is now in existence. I say that history does not record the vague statements which the gentleman has made.

I am going to leave that point though and I am going to consider the gentleman's amendment. He says in his amendment, and it is on page 12 of the report, that no funds can be used for advancing, negotiating, or preparing proposals which preclude the provision.

I want you to listen to that—“preclude the provision of nuclear weapons for purely defensive purposes.”

Now listen to that—“purely defense purposes.”

Now, what does the word “provision” mean? Does it mean transfer of the weapons? If it does mean that, the transferring of sovereign custody, the Atomic Energy Act prohibits the transfer of weapons to any other nation whether they are in NATO or out of NATO, providing it is transferred into or to sovereign control and not by or under the dual control which now exists on every weapon which is located on the soil of a NATO nation.

I say that the word “provision” is not a specific word. The term is not in consonance with the rest of the Atomic Energy Act. I is ambiguous. It is confusing. I do not know what it means, and I do not believe the gentleman can explain what it means in terms of the rest of the words in the Atomic Energy Act—“for purely defensive purposes.” What does that mean? The nuclear weapons on NATO territory—and there are over 6,000 of them—are there for defensive purposes so far as we know.

Of course, once a war starts, then you have the problem of deciding, if you throw a nuclear weapon, is it in defense or is it in offense? I say that no one can make that determination between offensive and defensive.

The use of these weapons by a NATO nation are clearly defined in bilateral or multilateral military agreements which have laid before the Atomic Energy Committee and to which Members of the House have had public access for 45 days before their adoption. In those military agreements there are specific procedures and methods whereby nuclear weapons can be used. I will simplify it by saying this, that they cannot be used by the Nation on whose soil they rest unless the user has the acquiescence of the President of the United States. It is a dual control. It must be agreed to by the Nation upon whose soil the weapons are deposited. It must be agreed to by the President of the United States.

If you go fussing around with this arrangement and you get a bunch of fuzzy words that have no legalistic meaning, no traditional meaning, no word-of-art meaning in the Atomic Energy Act and the agreements, you are headed for trouble.

The thing we want to do is to keep the situation the way it is. If the time ever comes when we want to transfer to Italy, to West Germany, to NATO as a group the sovereign use of nuclear weapons, that is the time the Congress ought to debate this question and debate it fully and completely, because you will then be taking a step away from U.S. control of the use of nuclear weapons. I do not want to take that step under the gentleman's ambiguous amendment, and I do not think he wants to take it. If he does, let him say so.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. All my amendment does is to keep open such an opportunity in future years.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. It will be open at the time it is proposed and brought before the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California has just given a very lucid explanation as to why the nonproliferation treaty is of great benefit and does not violate existing statutes. However, this amendment is not really a broad discussion of the nonproliferation treaty. The gentleman from Illinois has wisely surfaced his question so this Committee could debate what we really think of the nonproliferation treaty.

However, the real point here is whether or not this House should take this form to express its pleasure or displeasure with the treaty itself. The gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD] has raised the point that no one in NATO has asked for the authority that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] would like to grant to NATO. So it is a question, really, of our being more Catholic than the Pope.

We are really urging, I think, something, if we adopt Mr. FINDLEY's line, something that they have not asked for.

The real issue here is whether we should eliminate the funding for the Agency itself. The device embodied in Mr. FINDLEY's amendment has been ex-

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 1739

tremely useful in allowing the debate to center around this nonproliferation treaty. But it is not our jurisdiction to discuss whether we consent to the nonproliferation treaty or not. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] has nevertheless given us an opportunity to do so.

He says in effect that if we vote for his amendment, then we are against the treaty in its present form. And the way we do that is by taking away the funds from the people who work in this agency, the very people who do the research, the very people who supply the knowledge and the options for the executive branch. They are going to be deprived of their salaries because they have done their job. Even if we express displeasure with the treaty, we should not take it out of their salaries, merely because they have done their job. This is what this amendment is all about.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. There is another possibility, and a more likely possibility, that should this amendment become law the administration would see a clear signal of disapproval and call back the treaty of nonproliferation and restore the NATO option.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman has stated the case, and it boils down to whether or not we are interested in the nonproliferation treaty. If we vote to take these gentlemen off the payroll, it means we are unhappy with the nonproliferation treaty as it exists. Yet, the issue is whether or not the United States should go beyond what NATO has ever asked. The treaty is a version arrived at through a bipartisan method of the people engaged in this work—men like John McCloy and General Gruenther and Arthur Dean, none of them particularly Democratic, so we are not going to get into that area. These men in their wisdom and liberality feel this is a good treaty. Our Government has sponsored this treaty. Many people are now looking at it. I suggest even if we do not agree with it, we certainly should not take these people off the payroll. That is the only issue here.

I hope we vote this amendment down.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is painfully aware, as I am, that there is wide criticism of this treaty, not only in Germany, but in France and Italy, and the basic question is whether we are more anxious to please the Soviet Union on this treaty, or our NATO allies.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, to my dear colleague I would say the issue here is what is best for the United States of America, and I think we feel that this is in our national interest, and I think this should be our prime motivation, and, therefore, I urge defeat of this amendment.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to get into this argument, but the last sentence of the gentleman from New Jersey motivated me to get into it. I am going to vote

for this thing, because, as pitiful as it is, it is the best we have, this Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I think they are about as sad a group as we could get together under one tent any place in the United States. They have negotiated for the United States, I suppose, to the best of their ability, but how did they negotiate? Well, the Russians have a theory that when they sit down and negotiate, what is theirs is theirs, and what is ours is negotiable. That is what the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency people negotiated about—what is ours—because the Russians took a position over there and we took one here, and these highly praised lawyers inched over until they arrived right at the Russian position. That is about the best we have been able to get out of them.

I am not against it. As I say, I am for some kind of arms control and disarmament, and I will go as far as anybody to talk to the Russians and try to do something about arms control.

I think it is kind of sad that we sit around and praise these people, whom I consider to be incompetent. I like the chairman, Dr. MORGAN, and I try to agree with him, and he was right when he said nobody had ever asked for them to come up. I will clue the Members that I never asked for them to come up, because the less I see of them the better. They are about the most boring outfit anyone can find under God's shining sun.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey, but at the gentleman's own risk.

Mr. GALLAGHER. It may be at the gentleman's risk, too. I would just like to say I have been a member or adviser from the House to some of these negotiations, and I have sat alongside Arthur Dean and Bill Foster and Adrian Fisher, and they have done a good job, and they are as hardnosed and smarter than any Russian I have seen at these meetings.

Mr. HAYS. I ask the gentleman not to drop any names with me. Arthur Dean does not mean a thing to me. This is my time, and I decline to yield further.

Mr. GALLAGHER. All right.

Mr. HAYS. I like to travel, I will say to my friend, and so does the gentleman. I can advise him of some places he can go if he wants to go, and he can spend his time better and more interestingly and learn a little more than going around with these fellows.

I have listened to them, too, and I am telling the Members that so far as negotiators are concerned, if they had been negotiating for the coal operators with John L. Lewis he would have owned the coal mines.

If one wants to put it the other way around, if they had been negotiating for the coal miners they would have been paying the operators to work.

That is what I think of them as negotiators.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois, under the same conditions.

Mr. FINDLEY. At my own risk, I express the hope that the gentleman's com-

ments can safely be interpreted as support for the Findley amendment.

Mr. HAYS. We do not want to go too far in interpreting my comments. They might be subject to misinterpretation.

I will say to the gentleman that I would like to see some kind of a NATO option kept open. I would also say this: I believe there has been a lot of sound and fury about something which really is not all that important, because I do not believe the draft they have now is going to be the draft that will be submitted.

I have heard a lot of statements from the administration and from people in the administration who are unhappy about the draft, that there is going to be more work done on it. I believe the chairman shares that view, that there may be a good deal more work done on it. I would hope, if there is, that it can be improved.

I concur that there is a lot of dissatisfaction in Germany, in Italy, and in other places. I would hope that we can get a draft which the Germans and the Italians can be reasonably happy about, which we can sign with some hope that it has something in it which would be good for us, and that the Russians, too, would sign.

Up to now, as I view it—and I know a little about it; I have not sat beside Arthur Dean, but I have followed this—I believe we have gotten the worst end of the bargain.

I just felt I should say that, and that is about it.

Mr. FINDLEY. Would the gentleman not agree, however, that an expression of support for this amendment would be a useful notice to the negotiators and to our executive branch on this very important point?

Mr. HAYS. I am not sure.

I hesitate to oppose the gentleman's amendment, but I am not sure the gentleman's amendment would really do what he hopes it would do.

It might do what some people have said, with all respect to the gentleman. It might close the Agency down.

As pitiful as this Agency is, as I said before, it is the only one we have, so we had better keep it going.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to prolong the debate on this amendment. It was my intention, as the floor manager, to let the debate end after the gentleman from California had spoken, but I cannot let this debate terminate without some good words about the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

I have known Bill Foster, the Director of the Agency, and Adrian Fisher, his deputy, for many years. They are both able and dedicated Americans who are experts in this very difficult field.

Bill Foster has served with distinction in the Department of Defense, in the Department of Commerce, and in the Mutual Security Agency. He has served his country in both Republican and Democratic administrations. He has done a good job.

John McCloy is one of our ablest citizens and Arthur Dean spent many months of hard work over at Geneva. He

is recognized as one of our most able and distinguished negotiators.

I am not one who travels very often. I do not have the advantage of traveling around to the various countries and discussing with members of legislative bodies their individual views about the Nonproliferation Treaty. I suppose that there are minorities in all these countries who oppose the treaty. All the evidence I have, however, indicates that the governments of Germany and of our other NATO allies, with the exception of France, are in favor of the treaty.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. I am sure the distinguished chairman will agree there is nothing in my amendment that would in the remotest convey the idea that an individual nation would ever get control of nuclear weapons.

Mr. MORGAN. I cannot understand, then, why the gentleman from Illinois is so worried about NATO.

Mr. FINDLEY. Because, as a community of nations, they have talked over this same 10- or 15-year period about that day when it might be useful to them to have a jointly owned and operated defensive system.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I agree with the gentleman that it would be the height of folly to cut off the pay of those who are employed by the Agency because we may have some reservations about the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The discussion of the pros and cons of that treaty lends substance to that point of view that many Members of this body would like to be Members of the other body. It seems to me we must trust to the good sense of the Members of the other body in discussing the pros and cons of the treaty itself, and we should protect the Agency and those who have labored so faithfully for it from attack and from an ill-advised cutting off of funds, such as this amendment would provide.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois.

The amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FINDLEY

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY: On the first page, line 7, strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof the following: "and at the end of such second sentence strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof the following: " : *Provided*, That the authorization for appropriations contained in this Act shall not be effective until such time as the Soviet Union, which is the United States' co-sponsor of the draft treaty on non-proliferation (negotiated for the United States by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), ceases to supply military articles to our enemy in Vietnam, as determined by the President of the United States."

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment.

It is not germane and contains matter not covered by the present act under discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Illinois wish to be heard?

Mr. FINDLEY. I do wish to be heard, Mr. Chairman. I call the attention of the Chair to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 144, dated January 8, 1964. On that date the House was considering an authorization bill. In connection with that authorization I offered an amendment which read as follows:

The authorization for an appropriation contained in this Act shall not be effective until such time as the receipts of the Government for the preceding fiscal year have exceeded the expenditures of the Government for such year, as determined by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

On that occasion the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. JONES] made a point of order against the amendment, and the Chair ruled that the point of order was not well taken. Therefore, inasmuch as the amendment that is now before this body is drafted almost to the last letter in conformity with the amendment which was then ruled as germane, I feel confident that the Chair will rule that my amendment is in order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will read the rules. Rule XVI, section 7: "and no motion or proposition on a subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment."

The purpose of this legislation today is it authorizes an appropriation of \$33 million to finance the operation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for a 3-year period. The purpose of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois would delay the use of any appropriated funds pending an unrelated contingency. Therefore, the Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. FINDLEY. Will the Chair hear me further on that point?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has already ruled.

Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. FULTON of Tennessee, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14940) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations, pursuant to House Resolution 1082, he reported the bill back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I am, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. DERWINSKI moves to recommit the bill H.R. 14940 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith with the following amendment: On the first page, beginning in line 6, strike out "and for the three fiscal years 1969 through 1971, the sum of \$33 million" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "and for the two fiscal years 1969 through 1970, the sum of \$20 million."

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 241, nays 161, not voting 30, as follows:

[Roll No. 49]

YEAS—241

Abbott	Fino	Martin
Abernethy	Fisher	Mathias, Calif.
Adair	Flynt	May
Anderson, Ill.	Ford, Gerald R.	Mayne
Andrews, Ala.	Fountain	Meskill
Andrews,	Fulton, Pa.	Michel
N. Dak.	Fuqua	Miller, Ohio
Arends	Gallfanakis	Mills
Ashmore	Gardner	Minshall
Ayres	Gathings	Mize
Baring	Gettys	Montgomery
Bates	Goodling	Moore
Battin	Gross	Morse, Mass.
Belcher	Grover	Morton
Bell	Gubser	Mosher
Betts	Gurney	Myers
Bevill	Hagan	Natcher
Biester	Haley	Nichols
Blackburn	Hall	O'Konski
Bolton	Halleck	O'Neal, Ga.
Bow	Hammer-	Pelly
Brinkley	schmidt	Pettis
Brock	Hansen, Idaho	Pike
Broomfield	Hardy	Pirnie
Brotzman	Harrison	Poage
Brown, Mich.	Harsha	Poff
Brown, Ohio	Harvey	Pollock
Broyhill, N.C.	Hébert	Pool
Broyhill, Va.	Heckler, Mass.	Price, Tex.
Buchanan	Henderson	Pryor
Burke, Fla.	Herlong	Purcell
Burleson	Horton	Quie
Burton, Utah	Hosmer	Quillen
Bush	Hull	Railsback
Cabell	Hunt	Randall
Cahill	Hutchinson	Rarick
Carter	Ichord	Reid, Ill.
Casey	Jarman	Reifel
Cederberg	Johnson, Pa.	Reinecke
Chamberlain	Jonas	Rhodes, Ariz.
Clancy	Jones, N.C.	Riegler
Clausen,	Keith	Rivers
Don H.	King, N.Y.	Roberts
Cleveland	Kleppe	Robison
Collier	Kornegay	Rogers, Fla.
Colmer	Kupferman	Roth
Conte	Kuykendall	Roudebush
Corbett	Kyl	Rumsfeld
Cowger	Laird	Ruppe
Cramer	Landrum	Sandman
Cunningham	Langen	Satterfield
Curtis	Latta	Saylor
Davis, Ga.	Lennon	Schadeberg
Davis, Wis.	Lipscomb	Scherle
Dellenback	Lloyd	Schneebell
Denney	Long, La.	Schwengel
Derwinski	Lukens	Scott
Devine	McClory	Shriver
Dickinson	McCloskey	Sikes
Dole	McClure	Skubitz
Dorn	McCulloch	Smith, Calif.
Downing	McDade	Smith, N.Y.
Duncan	McDonald,	Smith, Okla.
Dwyer	Mich.	Snyder
Edwards, Ala.	McEwen	Springer
Erlenborn	McMillan	Stafford
Esch	MacGregor	Steed
Eshleman	Mahon	Steiger, Ariz.
Everett	Mailliard	Steiger, Wis.
Findley	Marsh	Stephens

March 6, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 1741

Stubblefield
Stuckey
Taft
Talcott
Taylor
Teague, Calif.
Teague, Tex.
Thompson, Ga.
Thompson, Wis.
Tuck
Ullman
Utt

Vander Jagt
Waggonner
Walker
Wampler
Watkins
Watson
Watts
Whalen
Whalley
White
Whitener
Whitten.

NAYS—161

Adams
Addabbo
Albert
Anderson, Tenn.
Annunzio
Ashley
Aspinall
Barrett
Bennett
Bingham
Blanton
Blatnik
Boggs
Boland
Bolling
Brademas
Brasco
Brooks
Burke, Mass.
Burton, Calif.
Button
Byrne, Pa.
Carey
Celler
Clark
Cohelan
Conyers
Culver
Daddario
Daniels
Dawson
Delaney
Dent
Diggs
Dingell
Donohue
Dow
Eckhardt
Edmondson
Edwards, Calif.
Edwards, La.
Eilberg
Evans, Colo.
Evins, Tenn.
Farbstein
Fascell
Feighan
Flood
Foley
Ford,
William D.
Fraser
Frelinghuysen
Friedel

Fulton, Tenn.
Gallagher
Garmatz
Giaino
Gilbert
Gonzalez
Gray
Green, Pa.
Griffiths
Gude
Halpern
Hamilton
Hanley
Hanna
Hansen, Wash.
Hathaway
Hays
Hechler, W. Va.
Heistoski
Hicks
Hollifield
Holland
Hungate
Irwin
Jacobs
Joelson
Johnson, Calif.
Jones, Ala.
Karsten
Karth
Kastenmeier
Kazen
Kee
Kelly
Kirwan
Kluczynski
Kyros
Leggett
Long, Md.
McCarthy
McFall
Madden
Mathias, Md.
Matsunaga
Meeds
Miller, Calif.
Minish
Mink
Mize

Widnall
Wiggins
Williams, Pa.
Wilson, Bob
Winn
Wyatt
Wydler
Wylie
Wyman
Zion
Zwach

NOT VOTING—30

Ashbrook
Berry
Bray
Brown, Calif.
Byrnes, Wis.
Clawson, Del.
Conable
Corman
de la Garza
Dowdy
Dulski

Fallon
Gibbons
Goodell
Green, Oreg.
Hawkins
Howard
Jones, Mo.
King, Calif.
Macdonald,
Mass.
Machen

Moss
Nelsen
Passman
Pepper
Philbin
St. Onge
Scheuer
Selden
Stanton

So the motion to recommit was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:
Mr. Passman for, with Mr. Philbin against.
Mr. Del Clawson for, with Mr. St. Onge against.
Mr. Berry for, with Mr. Pepper against.
Mr. Nelsen for, with Mr. Mosher against.
Mr. Stanton for, with Mr. Corman against.
Mr. Ashbrook for, with Mr. Moss against.
Mr. Bray for, with Mr. Fallon against.
Mr. Dowdy for, with Mr. Hawkins against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Howard with Mr. Conable.
Mr. Dulski with Mr. Goodell.

Mrs. Green of Oregon with Mr. Byrnes of Wisconsin.
Mr. King of California with Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts.
Mr. Burton of California with Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Scheuer with Mr. Selden.

Messrs. GRAY and LEGGETT changed their votes from "yea" to "nay." Mr. HARDY changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House, in the motion to recommit, I report back the bill H.R. 14940 with an amendment. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On the first page, beginning in line 6, strike out "and for the three fiscal years 1969 through 1971, the sum of \$33 million" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "and for the two fiscal years 1969 through 1970, the sum of \$20 million."

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered. The question was taken; and there were—yeas 305, nays 96, not voting 31, as follows:

[Roll No. 50]

YEAS—305

Adair
Adams
Addabbo
Albert
Anderson, III.
Anderson, Tenn.
Andrews,
N. Dak.
Annunzio
Arends
Ashley
Aspinall
Ayres
Barrett
Bates
Bell
Bennett
Betts
Biester
Bingham
Blanton
Blatnik
Boggs
Boland
Bolling
Bolton
Bow
Brademas
Brasco
Brooks
Broomfield
Brotzman
Brown, Mich.
Brown, Ohio
Broyhill, Va.
Burke, Mass.
Burton, Calif.
Burton, Utah
Bush
Button
Byrne, Pa.
Cabill
Carey
Cederberg

Celler
Chamberlain
Clark
Cleveland
Cohelan
Colmer
Conte
Conyers
Corbett
Cowger
Culver
Cunningham
Daddario
Daniels
Davis, Ga.
Dawson
Delaney
Dellenback
Denney
Dent
Derwinski
Diggs
Dingell
Donohue
Dow
Downing
Dulski
Dwyer
Eckhardt
Edmondson
Edwards, Calif.
Edwards, La.
Eilberg
Erlenborn
Esch
Eshleman
Evans, Colo.
Everett
Evins, Tenn.
Farbstein
Fascell
Feighan
Fino
Flood
Foley

Ford, Gerald R.
Ford,
William D.
Fountain
Fraser
Frelinghuysen
Friedel
Fulton, Pa.
Fulton, Tenn.
Galifianakis
Gallagher
Garmatz
Gettys
Giaino
Gilbert
Gonzalez
Goodell
Gray
Green, Oreg.
Green, Pa.
Griffiths
Grover
Gubser
Gude
Halleck
Halpern
Hamilton
Hammer-
schmidt
Hanley
Hanna
Hansen, Wash.
Hardy
Harrison
Harsha
Harvey
Hathaway
Hays
Hébert
Hechler, W. Va.
Heckler, Mass.
Helstoski
Henderson
Hicks
Holland

Horton
Hull
Hungate
Hunt
Hutchinson
Ichord
Irwin
Jacobs
Joelson
Johnson, Calif.
Johnson, Pa.
Jonas
Jones, Ala.
Jones, N.C.
Karsten
Karth
Kastenmeier
Kazen
Kee
Keith
Kelly
Kirwan
Kleppe
Kluczynski
Kornegay
Kupferman
Kyros
Laird
Landrum
Latta
Leggett
Lloyd
Long, Md.
Lukens
McCarthy
McClary
McCloskey
McClure
McCulloch
McDade
McDonald,
Mich.
McEwen
McFall
MacGregor
Madden
Mahon
Mailliard
Mathias, Calif.
Mathias, Md.
Matsunaga
May
Mayne
Meeds
Miller, Calif.
Miller, Ohio
Minish
Mink
Mize

Monagan
Moore
Moorhead
Morgan
Morris, N. Mex.
Morse, Mass.
Morton
Mosher
Murphy, Ill.
Murphy, N.Y.
Myers
Natcher
Nedzi
Nix
O'Hara, Ill.
O'Hara, Mich.
Olsen
O'Neill, Mass.
Ottinger
Patman
Patten
Pelly
Perkins
Pettis
Pickle
Pike
Pirnie
Poage
Podell
Poff
Pollock
Price, Ill.
Pryor
Pucinski
Quie
Rallsback
Randall
Rees
Reid, N.Y.
Reifel
Resnick
Reuss
Rhodes, Pa.
Riegle
Robison
Rodino
Rogers, Colo.
Ronan
Rooney, N.Y.
Rooney, Pa.
Rosenthal
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roudebush
Roush
Roybal
Rumsfeld
Ruppe
Ryan

NAYS—96

Abbitt
Abernethy
Andrews, Ala.
Ashmore
Baring
Battin
Belcher
Bevill
Blackburn
Brinkley
Brook
Broyhill, N.C.
Buchanan
Burke, Fla.
Burlison
Cabell
Carter
Casey
Clancy
Clausen,
Don H.
Collier
Cramer
Curtis
Davis, Wis.
Devine
Dickinson
Dole
Dorn
Duncan
Edwards, Ala.
Findley
Fisher

NOT VOTING—31

Ashbrook
Berry
Bray
Brown, Calif.
Byrnes, Wis.
Clawson, Del.
Conable
Corman

Flynt
Fuqua
Gardner
Gathings
Gooding
Gross
Gurney
Hagan
Haley
Hall
Hansen, Idaho
Herlong
Hosmer
Jarman
King, N.Y.
Kuykendall
Langen
Lennon
Lipscomb
Long, La.
McMillan
Marsh
Martin
Meskill
Michel
Mills
Minshall
Montgomery
Nichols
O'Konski
O'Neal, Ga.
Pool
Price, Tex.

St Germain
Sandman
Saylor
Schneebeli
Schweiker
Schwengel
Scott
Shipley
Shriver
Sisk
Skubitz
Slack
Smith, Iowa
Smith, N.Y.
Springer
Stafford
Staggers
Steed
Steiger, Wis.
Stephens
Stratton
Stubblefield
Sullivan
Taft
Taylor
Tenzer
Tiernan
Tunney
Udall
Ullman
Van Deerin
Vander Jagt
Vanik
Vigorito
Waldie
Wampler
Watts
Whalen
Whalley
White
Widnall
Wiggins
Williams, Pa.
Willis
Wilson, Bob
Wilson,
Charles H.
Winn
Wolf
Wright
Wyatt
Wydler
Wylie
Wyman
Yates
Young
Zablocki
Zwach

Purcell
Quillen
Rarick
Reid, Ill.
Reinecke
Rhodes, Ariz.
Rivers
Roberts
Rogers, Fla.
Satterfield
Schadeberg
Sikes
Smith, Calif.
Smith, Okla.
Snyder
Steiger, Ariz.
Stuckey
Talcott
Teague, Calif.
Teague, Tex.
Thompson, Ga.
Thompson, Wis.
Tuck
Utt
Waggonner
Walker
Mills
Watkins
Watson
Whitener
Whitten
Zion

de la Garza
Dowdy
Fallon
Gibbons
Hawkins
Hollifield
Howard
Jones, Mo.
King, Calif.
Kyl
Macdonald,
Mass.
Machen
Moss
Neisen
Passman

Pepper Scherle Stanton
Philbin Scheuer Thompson, N.J.
St. Onge Selden

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Philbin with Mr. Passman.
Mr. St. Onge with Mr. Del Clawson.
Mr. Pepper with Mr. Berry.
Mr. Machen with Mr. Nelsen.
Mr. Corman with Mr. Stanton.
Mr. Moss with Mr. Ashbrook.
Mr. Fallon with Mr. Bray.
Mr. Hawkins with Mr. Dowdy.
Mr. Brown of California with Mr. Kyl.
Mr. Howard with Mr. Byrnes of Wisconsin.
Mr. King of California with Mr. Conable.
Mr. Gibbons with Mr. Scherle.
Mr. Holifield with Mr. Scheuer.
Mr. Selden with Mr. de la Garza.
Mr. Thompson of New Jersey with Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my remarks inserted in the RECORD of March 4, beginning at page E1439 be expunged from the RECORD because of numerous typographical errors therein and that I may be permitted to extend and revise my remarks today in that section of the RECORD entitled "Extensions of Remarks" and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 4 OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY TO SIT TOMORROW DURING GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary may be permitted to sit on Thursday, March 7, 1968, during general debate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

DR. ROBERT H. BAHMER, ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED STATES

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay my respects, on the occasion of his retirement, to a distinguished public

servant, the Archivist of the United States. Dr. Robert H. Bahmer began his Federal career 33 years ago as an assistant to a former Member of this House, the Honorable Frank E. Hook, of Michigan. In 1936 he joined the staff of the newly created National Archives establishment. With a number of his colleagues, he left the agency in 1942 to assist the military services in developing and administering systems for the efficient control and disposition of the tremendous quantities of records generated by the American war effort. In 1948 he returned to the National Archives as Deputy Archivist of the United States. He served in this capacity during the 17 years that my good friend, Dr. Wayne C. Grover, gave leadership to the National Archives and Records Service. In January of 1966, Dr. Bahmer was himself appointed by the Administrator of General Services to the distinguished post of Archivist of the United States. He will retire at the end of this week, March 8.

Dr. Bahmer rejoined the National Archives in 1948 just a few months before recommendations of the First Hoover Commission resulted in a substantial enlargement of the responsibilities of his agency, and made it a part of the newly created General Services Administration. It has been during the ensuing period, when Dr. Bahmer served first as Deputy Archivist of the United States and more recently as Archivist, that the National Archives and Records Service has experienced its period of greatest growth and development.

A nationwide network of Federal records centers has been established, which by economically storing and disposing of inactive records of temporary value, saves the American taxpayers \$14 million each year.

A program of helping Federal agencies to improve their paperwork systems has been developed, and this results annually in a savings of \$10 million.

A system of Presidential libraries has been created, which has resulted in the free gift to the public of the papers and memorabilia of every President of the United States beginning with Herbert Hoover, and in the gift of excellent buildings in which to house these collections.

The National Historical Publications Commission has been revitalized and now serves a splendid purpose in encouraging and supporting with modest grants the publication of the source materials from which the history of this great Nation has been and will be written.

The Federal Register which has among its responsibilities the publication of the slip laws and the United States Statutes at Large, has risen to even greater levels of efficiency and effectiveness.

And the National Archives itself, the nucleus around which has developed this comprehensive system for the care of the Nation's records, and which is responsible for preserving and making available for use the permanently valuable records of the Federal Government, has constantly improved its manifold services to the cause of scholarship.

The National Archives and Records Service, to which Dr. Bahmer has given

such distinguished and innovative leadership, is practically unique among Federal agencies, because of its dual mission. It is vitally—and successfully—concerned with efficiency and economy in the management of the Government's records, and it is equally concerned with contributing to the cultural and educational enrichment of our society.

The Archivist of the United States must therefore be not only an effective Federal administrator but also a scholar of vision and integrity. Bob Bahmer is such a man, and I am proud to claim him as a friend. It gives me great pleasure to salute him as he concludes a distinguished career that has ever been characterized by a high sense of devotion to the public good and to the cause of excellence in scholarship. I am confident that a great many Members of this House join me in conveying to him every good wish on the occasion of his retirement.

VIOLENCE IN THE STREETS

(Mr. CLARK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Speaker, it almost seems as though the entire Nation, within the past few months, has become concerned with the problem of violence in the streets. Without assuming the role of a prophet, I am compelled to point out that this has been a subject on which I have been speaking for some time—sometimes feeling in the past like a voice crying in the wilderness.

An examination of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of last year will indicate that I made a plea for greater support for law-enforcement people—a forceful plea from me, to provide, equip, and train our law-enforcement people to deal with the problems of crime in the streets. Until the recent plea of the President, in the form of a special message, my plea went unheard. Now, all across the land the cry is up to protect our cities and our citizens. But the cry may be coming too late to effectively deal with the problem that faces us.

At the risk of localizing the problem—and perhaps generalizing, within the past week I was presented with a novel approach to one of the many law-enforcement problems that will face this Nation in the months ahead. There is now available to the police departments of the Nation a specially made police car cover—made of highly developed plasticized material similar to nose cone hardness that can be superimposed on an existing police car that will provide added protection to police vehicles entering a riot area. It was explained to me by one of my own constituents who felt that my prior and continuing interest, plus my own law-enforcement experience, would lead me to direct him to the proper Federal and State authorities. I did so and found to my consternation that even if such new and imaginative equipment were available and even if the President's crime prevention bill were to pass, there is not now sufficient time to order, pay for, and get delivery