

[Redacted]

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Copy 4 of 10

25 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller, OSA

SUBJECT : Funding Request for the Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamics Reconnaissance System under the FY-69 General Research and Development (Aircraft) Budget

Attached is [Redacted] which supercedes in total

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[Redacted] and its exhibits.

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[Redacted]

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Deputy for  
Research and Development  
Special Activities

Attachment:

[Redacted]

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ASD/R&D/OSA/[Redacted] 25 Nov 1968

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Distribution:

- Copy 1 - COMPT/OSA
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- 8 - ASD/R&D/OSA
- 9 - ASD/R&D/OSA (Chrono)
- 10 - RB/OSA

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[Redacted]

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Copy 4 of 1

25 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller, OSA

SUBJECT : Funding Request for the Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamics Reconnaissance System under the FY-69 General Research and Development (Aircraft) Budget

REFERENCE : (a) [Redacted] FY-1969 Budget Issue No. 9, Advanced Aircraft

1. This memorandum is a request for authorization for the expenditure of [Redacted] to pursue the Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System. This is a new FY-69 effort and is appropriate to the General Research and Development (Aircraft) program.

2. The program, as discussed in detail in Attachment I, is to explore various methods of achieving a survivable quick reaction reconnaissance capability (manned or unmanned). The primary objective would be to survive in the lethal envelopes of projected Sovbloc and other defensive environments through the 1975 - 1980 period. In evaluation of an approach to this program, attention is directed to reference (a) wherein it is pointed out that the decision to phase-out the OXCART vehicle and the decision to discontinue work on the ISINGLASS concept represented a trend away from continuing maintenance of a high-performance covert manned overflight capability in the NRP. Reference (a) further notes that the cost and effectiveness of alternative vehicle concepts must be examined; for example, should the vehicle be manned or unmanned and in each case what type of launch operation, propulsion, recovery, etc. offers the most promise. These questions are addressed in the elements of the task.

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3. It is requested that funds in the amount of [Redacted] be allocated to CIA, for use in FY-69, for the Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Acrodynamic Reconnaissance System, under the General Research and Development (Aircraft) program.

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Deputy for  
Research and Development  
Special Activities

Attachment:  
As stated

ASD/R&D/OSA/[Redacted] 25 Nov 1968

Distribution:

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Attachment I to



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PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

I. TITLE Concept Evaluation Phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System

25X1 REFERENCE  dtd 5 Sept 1967, "Funding Request for Certain FY-68 General R&D (Aircraft) Activities"


II. OBJECTIVE To explore various methods of achieving a survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance capability. Primary objective would be to survive in the lethal envelopes of projected Sovbloc and other defensive environments through the 1975 - 1980 period. Elements of the task encompass items 3 and 4 of the referenced memorandum.

III. BACKGROUND In anticipation of approval for this study, the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) was requested to provide their most realistic estimate of the Soviet Bloc and the non-Soviet Bloc defensive environments for the 1975 - 1980 period. A summary of the results of the OSI effort are presented in Exhibit (A). These results in Exhibit (A) together with a quick reaction capability are used to establish an approach to the problem.

IV. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Survivability would be considered as two distinct environments, i.e., Soviet Bloc and non-Soviet Bloc. Exhibit (B) identifies how each of these two environments would be investigated. Since a "wait and see" approach is recommended for the non-Soviet Bloc environment, the effort for FY-69 reduces to concentrating only on the Soviet Bloc task. This task

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would be performed by a "Think Group" and an airframe contractor. The proposed program organization and elements of the task are shown in Exhibits (C) and (D).

#### V. ELEMENTS OF THE TASK

The elements of the task would encompass the specifics as outlined in Exhibit (E). Further amplification of this exhibit is noted below:

a. Profiles and Tactics - Using the [redacted] as the limiting minimum threat, investigate maximum capable concepts. Implicit in the development of these concepts will be the realization that future defensive systems expected 10 years hence can only be postulated. Therefore, the sensitivity of survival to variation in defensive system performance parameters must be considered. All conceivable and potentially feasible vehicle profiles and tactics would be considered for survivability. No technological constraints would be imposed on either altitude or speed. Realistic maneuvers, countermeasures, and radar cross-section, as they effect the engagement geometry between the SAM and the vehicle, would be evaluated.

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b. Candidate Concept Survey - Based on using viable profiles and tactics developed above, this survey should ideally result in one or more concepts. This segment would be the sole responsibility of the airframe contractor under Headquarters direction.

Flight Modes - All modes would be examined to determine if one or more emerges as a superior approach. The launch phase would include investigating

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vehicles which are air launched, ground launched, boosted or self-accelerators. The significant, i.e., intelligence gathering phase, would consider but not be restricted to glide, powered, throttling techniques, high-altitude, low altitude and combinations thereof and speeds to encompass from hypersonic to sub-sonic in consonance with the profiles and tactics.

Technology Background - The contractor would avail himself of the latest materials, manufacturing and engineering technology. All of the technology background derived from previous programs would be considered so as not to "replow old ground." The most futuristic NASA data would be considered for applicability.


Operational Considerations - The case of manned vs. unmanned would be considered in depth with all compromises both from the vehicle design standpoint and from the cost and reliability standpoint being weighed. The type of launch and recovery and the basing facilities would be reviewed as they effect the design capability. Considerations necessary to maintain a covert program would be addressed.

c. Analysis - A determination/assessment of how well each concept meets the problem would result from this phase of the task.

Force Fit - It is highly unlikely that any one design would prove superior in all aspects and certain weight would have to be given to the various aspects of the problem during the analysis.

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Reaction - Any intelligence collection system is useful only if the data are available to the users on a "soonest" basis. Therefore, the quick-reaction ability of the concepts would be given prime consideration. Both the reaction time for the actual collection of the data and also the subsequent steps necessary for processing, etc., would be a part of the study.

Man Impact - Since politically an unmanned vehicle would be much more palatable, the presence of a man must prove to be of extreme value from the reliability and mission success standpoint if selected. The influence of the presence of a man on the configuration must be considered, i.e., a large vehicle to accommodate a man compared to a smaller unmanned vehicle. If a man must be included to assure a cost effective program during the early, less reliable test period, the man might be present only during the test phase with the vehicle being droned operationally.

Cost - Naturally any large expenditure of funds committed for intelligence collection can only be justified if (a) the concept has a high chance of success of obtaining the data and (b) a more reliable, less costly, more politically acceptable approach doesn't exist. Therefore, in the analysis, it is envisioned that both the airframe contractor and Headquarters would have an input.

d. Answer - This phase of the task would represent the end result of the effort. Only if the results clearly indicated that both survivability and quick reaction were potentially feasible and practically achievable, would consideration

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Attachment I to




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be given to a follow-on effort to include confirmation of system designs and the investigation of basic technology in certain critical areas.

- VI. The contractor candidates would be selected in accordance with the criteria of Exhibit (F). A cost and schedule estimate is presented in Exhibit (G).

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## PROJECTED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS

### SOVIET BLOC

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INVESTIGATE MAXIMUM CAPABLE CONCEPT WITHIN 1975-80 PROJECTED STATE-OF-THE-ART. THE SENSITIVITY OF SURVIVAL TO VARIATION IN DEFENSIVE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS WILL BE CONSIDERED.

### NON-SOVIET BLOC

FOLLOW TAGBOARD PROGRESS FOR ONE YEAR

IF SATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO TAGBOARD TO IMPROVE ALTITUDE AND ADD EWS.

IF UNSATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO A-12/SR-71 FAMILY TO IMPROVE ALTITUDE.

FOLLOW OTHER PROPOSED ADVANCED AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS ADVANCED MANNED INTERCEPTOR (AMI), ETC.

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PROGRAM ORGANIZATION FOR SOVIET-BLOC STUDY

THINK GROUP - Based on reconnaissance targets and ground rules, identify PROFILES AND TACTICS. Options to be rated in order of preference.

HEADQUARTERS - PROFILES AND TACTICS to be selected based on think group data plus in-house assessment.

AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER - Technological survey of all potential CANDIDATE CONCEPTS compatible with PROFILES AND TACTICS.  
- ANALYSIS of concepts to provide rating in order of preference with supporting data.

HEADQUARTERS - Review and final judgement.

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EXHIBIT C

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ELEMENTS OF THE TASK

1. PROFILES AND TACTICS - THINK GROUP
2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER
3. ANALYSIS - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS
4. ANSWER - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS

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EXHIBIT D

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1. PROFILES AND TACTICS/SURVIVABILITY

LOW TO HIGH ALTITUDES

SUBSONIC TO HYPERSONIC SPEEDS

MANEUVERABILITY

COUNTERMEASURES

RADAR CROSS-SECTION TRADE-OFFS

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EXHIBIT E

2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY

FLIGHT MODES - AIR LAUNCHED VS. GROUND LAUNCHED  
BOOSTED VS. SELF-ACCELERATION  
GLIDE, POWERED, THROTTLING TECHNIQUES

TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND - OXCART  
ISINGLASS



OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - MANNED VS. UNMANNED  
TYPE OF LAUNCH  
TYPE OF RECOVERY  
BASING FACILITIES  
COVERT OPERATION

SENSOR CONSIDERATIONS - BROAD SPECIFICATIONS FOR WEIGHT AND  
VOLUME ALLOTMENT

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3. ANALYSIS

FORCE FIT - CANDIDATE CONFIGURATIONS RELATIVE TO WEIGHTING OF  
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PROBLEM

REACTION - TIME FOR COLLECTION OF DATA

TIME FOR PROCESSING AND DELIVERY TO INTERPRETER

MAN IMPACT - RELIABILITY AND MISSION SUCCESS

POLITICAL  
CONFIGURATION

TEST

COST - JUSTIFIED ONLY IF:

A. ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

B. NO MORE RELIABLE, LESS COSTLY, MORE POLITICALLY  
ACCEPTABLE APPROACH

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EXHIBIT E

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4. ANSWER

- A. SURVIVABILITY POSSIBLE?
- B. QUICK REACTION POSSIBLE?
- C. IF BOTH A AND B POSSIBLE, DEVELOP PLAN

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EXHIBIT E



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IV. CONTRACTOR CANDIDATES  
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION

THINK GROUP

- \* AERODYNAMIC TYPE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE
- \* VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE
- \* TACTICS/ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE

LOCATION OF FACILITY

SECURITY CLEARANCE CONSIDERATIONS

COST

TIME

AIRFRAME/SYSTEMS

DEPENDENT UPON RESULTS OF THINK GROUP EFFORT.

SPECIFIC FLIGHT REGIME EXPERIENCE

HARDWARE VS. DESIGN STUDY

PROGRAM SUCCESSES

PREVIOUS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE

PREVIOUS AGENCY AFFILIATION.

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*For 11/13/68 EXCOM*

*File  
Adv Veh  
11/13/68*

3. Budget Issue No. 3: "Advanced Aircraft" R&D

25X1 The [ ] program cost quoted includes, in our estimate, costs for a five-year operation, as well as the development and procurement of [ ] aircraft. It is possible that the vehicle would be a "new hypersonic aircraft", but this point is, indeed the subject of the study. Such a solution to the provision for a survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance system would require expenditure of similar funds; however, other options may be surfaced which would require less funds. This determination is the intent of the study.

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Any decision therefore should not address at this time the need for a hypersonic capability involving a large expenditure; rather, a discussion should confirm the necessity for performing a thorough study.

Comment 2, with respect to the inconsistency between consideration of such a system in light of OXCART phase-out and potential down-grading of SR-71 capability is not germane, inasmuch as the OXCART/SR-71 do not provide a survivable, quick reaction capability over the Soviet Union.

While at this time, we cannot forecast unequivocally that the technology should be pursued in FY 70, [ ] [ ] if the hypersonic system were to be selected as the only viable option.

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