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Approved For Release 2002/11/13 : CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110004-2

16 JUN 1965

DD/S&T 2573-65

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director/Computer Services
 Assistant Director/ELINT
 Assistant Director/Research & Development
 Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence
 Assistant Director/Special Activities
 Director, Foreign Missile & Space Analysis
 Center
 Chief, Special Projects Staff

SUBJECT: Fifteen-Year Planning Exercise


REFERENCE: "Proposed Outline for Fifteen-Year
 Intelligence Plan," TS 192619, 28 May 1965.
 Revised 2 June 1965

1. The Executive Director has been designated by the DCI as the Action Officer responsible for development of the Fifteen-Year Intelligence Plan. The ad hoc Agency group which has been engaged for the last six weeks in developing the referenced plan met with the Executive Director on Friday, 11 June to discuss procedures to be used in furthering this matter.

2. It was decided at that meeting that each Directorate designate three senior officers to serve on a committee which will assume major responsibility for further development of the plan. The Director, BPAM was instructed to create a secretariat to render necessary staff assistance to the committee. The goal of the committee is to present the DCI by 1 September 1965 with a complete fifteen-year plan, the nature of which is such that its existence could be formally announced to other members of the Intelligence Community and they, then, could proceed to participate in the same exercise. No target date has been established as yet for completion of the plan as an Intelligence Community document.

3. The DD/S&T representatives appointed to the Agency committee are [redacted] and

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[redacted] In addition to being DD/S&T representatives to the Agency committee, this group will also function as the internal DD/S&T steering group with concomitant responsibilities to bring into being a fifteen-year plan for this Directorate. It is envisioned that the Agency committee will approach the planning exercise from a functional and not an organizational point of view. In pursuit of this approach it is possible that the committee will call for the creation of certain sub-groups to study the various functional problems and present the committee with reports and estimates which can be considered by them. [redacted] on behalf of the Directorate, is authorized to task officers within this Directorate to participate in such groups. From time to time this Directorate group will brief the DD/S&T staff meeting on progress being made and problems being encountered.

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4. The Agency group will first address itself to the referenced Fifteen-Year Intelligence Plan as a possible format and guide for their submission to the DCI. It is the desire of the DD/S&T that, according to the assignments given below, the current planning document be studied and the steering group be furnished with the opinion and comments of the Offices involved. Office comments should be forwarded by 23 June 1965 to [redacted]

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5. There follows a listing of various sections of the referenced plan and an assignment of Office responsibility to review and forward comments:

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a. Attachment A - Assumptions

AD/OSI
Director, FMSAC (in his role as
Chairman, GMAIC)


Attachment B - Intelligence Objectives

All Offices

c. Attachment C - Planning Guides - Section I:
Management, Program Control and Coordination


All Offices
Chief, SAS

*Per [redacted] 6/17/65
Dead line does not
apply. a later date
will be established -
June 28
current
date.*



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- d. Planning Guides - Section II: Collection
All Offices, as appropriate to
their responsibilities
- e. Planning Guides - Section III: Production
and Analysis
AD/OCS
AD/OSI
Director, FMSAC
- f. Planning Guides - Section IV: Operations
AD/OSA
AD/OEL
AD/ORD
- g. Planning Guides - Section V: Support
AD/ORD
AD/OEL
AD/OSI
Chief, SPS
- h. Appendix A and A-1 - Organization of
Functional Categories
Addressees are solicited to recommend
any other categorization which appears
to them more suitable for the purpose.
- i. Appendix A-2 - Information Processing and ADP
AD/OSI
AD/OEL
AD/OCS
Director, FMSAC
- j. Appendix A-3 - Intelligence Production
AD/OSI
Director, FMSAC
- k. Appendix A-5 - Sections I, II, III, V, and VI
Chief, Administrative Staff, DD/S&T



l. Appendix A-5, Section IV: Communications

AD/ORD

m. Appendix A-5, Section VII: Security

All Offices

Signed:

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Executive Officer
Directorate of
Science and Technology

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cc: Dr. Wheelon

Chief, SAS
Chief, Administrative Staff
Chief, Action Staff

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Attachment B

INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

The statement of Assumptions in Attachment A points the way to certain substantive intelligence objectives which must receive priority intelligence effort. Such objectives, while derived generally from the Assumptions, must also take into account the entire gamut of national security requirements which intelligence must meet. For example, although it is assumed that there will be no all-out nuclear conflict within the next fifteen years, intelligence must continue high priority efforts to detect any indications that such a conflict might occur.

Intelligence Objectives will provide the basis for projecting intelligence goals and programs. Objectives will be responded to directly by many intelligence programs involving collection, analysis and action, and indirectly by programs involving support functions such as communications and training. The interrelationship of objectives and responsive programs is extremely complicated in terms of even a single objective. It is therefore important that Intelligence Objectives deal strictly with substantive considerations and avoid reference to the particular obligations of one or more intelligence techniques, methods, or sources.

The various specialized programs responsive to the Intelligence Objectives should be described in the portions of the Fifteen Year Plan dealing with Long-Range Goals and Program Forecasts.

The Intelligence Objectives which follow are only examples, to be considered as illustrative of the general scope and subject matter involved.

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INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

To provide early warning of intentions of the USSR and Communist China to attack the US, its possessions overseas, and its allies.

To determine the strategic plans and intentions of nations having a nuclear strike capability.

To determine Bloc and Free World research, development, production, and deployment of advanced weapons and weapons systems.

To determine the strategy, intentions, and plans of the Soviet Bloc, Chinese/Asian satellites, and other countries to engage in general war.

To determine the solidarity and cohesiveness of the Communist Bloc and their agreement concerning support and collaboration in the event of full scale war.

To determine the strength, capability, doctrine, and deployment of Soviet Bloc and Chinese/Asian satellite general purpose forces.

To determine the military/economic capability of the Soviet Bloc and Chinese/Asian satellites to support a general war.

To determine the intentions of nations regarding their alignment and alliances in the event of general war.

To determine the intentions and capabilities of communist countries to initiate and support insurgency, rebellion, and anti-regime activities in other countries.

To determine the strength, deployment, capabilities, and tactics of communist initiated or supported groups engaged in insurgency and rebellion.

To determine the intentions and capabilities of communist countries to penetrate, subvert, and dominate other countries by means short of rebellion and insurgency.

To determine the composition, capabilities, and tactics of communist parties and international organizations outside the Bloc engaged in insurgency.

To determine the policies and reactions of other nations with respect to US diplomacy, foreign programs, and activities.

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To determine the strength and cohesiveness of NATO, SEATO, etc. and the intentions of countries to form new blocs and alliances.

To determine the causes and probable results of friction within the Communist Bloc, the Free World, and between Bloc and Free World countries.

To determine the internal political stability and military and economic strength and weaknesses of non-Bloc countries where communism and other anti-US activities and ideas are now or may be significant.

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Attachment A *for*

ASSUMPTIONS

For the full period (1966-1980):

- No all-out nuclear conflict.
- No universal disarmament with true safeguards.
- Radically new--and increasingly expensive--weapons and space systems are developed; technological break-through will occur but no single power will monopolize such achievements.
- The trend of U. S. economic growth generally continues; U. S. continues as the leader of the free world.
- Gradual proliferation of advanced weapons--viz. nuclear missiles; continued testing of these weapons.
- Gradual proliferation of power centers (U. S., USSR, Communist China, Japan, Europe, and perhaps others), with attendant complications and dangers to the world scene.
- Gradual proliferation of international abrasive, international crisis, and small war situations (stimulated by communism, nationalism, racism, and radicalism).
- The industrialized nations grow richer, while most of the underdeveloped nations' difficulties (population explosion, economic, and social disarray, etc.) increase.
- U. S. influence and presence recede in various cases in Europe, Asia, and Africa.
- U. S. becomes more discriminating in its commitments abroad; stakes more on certain key allies and neutrals.

For the first five-year period (1966-1970):

- USSR remains the principal threat to U. S. national interests.
- Communist China acquires both increased stature and influence in Asia and the world, and a modest nuclear missile capability.

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Attachment A

- The activity in the U. S. - USSR space race accelerates without meaningful collaboration.
- "Wars of national liberation," encouraged or fostered by Communist states, continue to occur.
- Polycentrism increases among the Communist states, but does not significantly lessen Communist threats to free societies.
- NATO shaken to its foundations, if not dissolved; French and West German assertiveness rise; disunity increases in the Western Alliance.
- No definitive solutions are achieved with respect to major international problem areas (such as Kashmir, Arab-Israel, etc.).

For the following ten-year period (1971-1980):

- An ambitious, irresponsible, and increasingly powerful Communist China poses the major threat to peace and to U. S. national interests.
- Hostile Soviet competition with the U. S. continues; the USSR nevertheless periodically explores detente with the U. S.
- Manned space race proceeds; new nations enter the unmanned space field; hostile competition in space becomes possible.
- Local armed clashes increase in the world.
- Severe economic dislocations occur in individual countries.
- Solutions are reached for some present international crisis areas, but others arise.
- Growing cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe.
- U. S. interests come under increasing threat from certain new sources (such as Indonesia, France, Germany, Japan).

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OUTLINE FOR A FIFTEEN-YEAR PLAN

PURPOSE:

1. The course of recent history, the actions of four Presidents, and prospective international developments all point inescapably to a continuing key role for intelligence in our Government. It is the purpose of this Plan to outline and project over the next fifteen years the intelligence goals and programs of the Intelligence Community in order to ready ourselves for the tasks ahead. By so doing in the light of new or modified functions, new methods, techniques and associated equipment, and the requirements for personnel and funding, we shall be prepared to discharge the important responsibilities upon which our national well-being and even our survival may depend.

2. When completed the Plan will provide a means of expressing U.S. intelligence goals and programs for the period 1966-1980 and will furnish the Director of Central Intelligence and USIB a basis for reviewing and evaluating:

a. The general direction of the total U.S. intelligence effort for the next fifteen years, within the context of U.S. national security interests during this period; and

b. The specific actions which are proposed by USIB agencies over the next five years to meet expressed goals and the human and material resources required to implement these actions for each of the first five years.

AUTHORITY:

The authority for developing this plan rests upon the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, appropriate National Security Council Intelligence Directives, and the President's letter to the Director of Central Intelligence of _____ 1965.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE:

The Fifteen-Year Plan would be divided into three five-year periods with the near term (first five years) spelled out by years; the entire Plan would be updated annually. National and international developments and trends in the form of assumptions will be projected over two time periods, 1966-1970 and 1971-1980.

ORGANIZATION OF PLAN:

1. Assumptions

As a first step we look ahead for 15 years to derive a set of gross assumptions regarding likely developments in the world situation which will most significantly affect U. S. security interests and by extension point up the most important intelligence tasks. The initial step would be coordinated by the Board of National Estimates and, expressed as assumptions (Attachment A), will furnish basic guidance to planners in the establishment of goals and programs. The assumption exercise should be completed no later than 15 July 1965.

2. Intelligence Objectives

Given an agreed set of gross assumptions, the Plan calls for setting forth a wide and comprehensive range of substantive intelligence objectives which are translatable within categories of the Plan to specific projects and tasks for intelligence organizations. These substantive intelligence objectives should extend from the assumptions and reflect the kind and variety of situations which require coverage in U. S. intelligence programs for the period. Examples of selected intelligence objectives are set forth by way of illustration at Attachment B. It would be expected that all intelligence organizations would contribute to the listing of intelligence objectives and that a careful coordination of all contributions would be made and reported to the DCI and USIB (due 1 September 1965).

3. Planning Guides

In addition to the substantive intelligence objectives described in paragraph 2. above which lead directly to specific projects and tasks, there are also a range of intelligence-related needs and issues which require identification for action consideration by the DCI and USIB.

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In most instances these intelligence needs and issues will require careful consideration and coordination within and among the intelligence organizations, and will include such things as R&D, intelligence training, tradecraft, methods, systems, and institutional (organizational and functional) matters likely to have a direct bearing on long-range intelligence requirements. The Planning Guides at Attachment C provide a sample listing of these needs and issues. In order that the DCI and USIB have the full benefit of the thinking of all intelligence organizations on this aspect of the exercise, submission of additional planning guides should coincide, timewise, with the completion of intelligence objectives as outlined in paragraph 2. above.

4. Goals and Programs

a. The Fifteen-Year plan will be the instrument for describing:

(1) major goals and emphasis in intelligence programming over the long term (1966-1980), and

(2) specific programs required to meet intelligence objectives for the next five years (1966-1970) using FY 1966 as the base.

b. The following categories of intelligence functions will be used:

(1) Intelligence Collection

(2) Information Processing (including ADP)

(3) Intelligence Production

(4) Covert Action

(5) Program Planning and Support

Each of these categories will be sub-divided to accommodate the many categories of sub-functions of intelligence (see Appendix A). With respect to the first five-year term, contributors will be required to describe programs (in format to be designed) and specific human and material resource requirements related to these programs.

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PROCEDURES:

1. A call for Fifteen-Year goals will be issued to each USIB agency. This call will require the submission of statements by category of intelligence function for each of the three five-year periods (year by year projections are not required in this phase). See Appendix B for examples.

2. Specific programs will be projected for the first five-year period. A call for a five-year projection of programs and of resource requirements for the period 1966-1970 will be issued to each USIB agency. This call will require the submission of statements briefly describing each major program foreseen and the resources required (e. g. people/money, R&D, capital investment, etc.). See Appendix B for examples.

RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. During the preparation of the Fifteen-Year Plan and the specifying of programs and resource requirements, the myriad of interrelationships involved will obviously require extensive discussion among a large number of intelligence components throughout the Community. If a particular program is planned to meet specified intelligence needs, it may reduce the need for other programs and/or increase support requirements to satisfy that specific program. Moreover, being done annually, the proposed review will permit assessment of the success of intelligence programs which may make possible certain offsetting activity in other lines. Likewise successes in meeting certain programs and goals may generate additional intelligence programs in any one or all of the categories. Because of this complex situation, it is obvious that goals identified by individual components of the Intelligence Community are always subject to adjustment.

2. The Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation will be assigned by the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for acting in his behalf in coordinating the Fifteen-Year Plan and in preparing such specific reviews and analyses as are appropriate for reporting to USIB and the DCI.

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- Attachment A- Assumptions
- Attachment B- Intelligence Objectives
- Attachment C- Planning Guides
- Appendix A - Organization of Functional Categories
- Appendix B - Formats for Long-Range Goals and Program Forecasts
- Appendix C - Project Schedule for Fifteen-Year Plan

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SAMPLE

Attachment C

PLANNING GUIDES

The following is an attempt to describe briefly the most important existing and probable future problems facing the U.S. intelligence effort. The entries on the list are necessarily general; other considerations and problems essential to an effective long-term intelligence system may have been overlooked. Each contributor to the Fifteen-Year Plan should therefore consider this listing as only general guidance to his development of goals and programs.

In the consideration of long-range intelligence goals and in the preparation of programs over the next five-year period, U.S. intelligence agencies should give consideration to the following needs:

I. Management, Program Control and Coordination

1. Definition and allocation of responsibilities among agencies and the coordination of Community assets to achieve U.S. aims.
2. Evaluation of the performance and potential of collection and analysis activities in terms of their costs.
3. A 24-hour manning situation of all primary intelligence collection, processing and analytic elements.
4. Allocation of resources to analytical and collection tasks, both intra- and inter-agency.
5. Organization structures to meet revised responsibilities and requirements.
6. A comprehensive "reserve" capability to meet emergencies and new developments.

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Attachment C

II. Collection

1. Continued photo-surveillance capability for large areas.
2. Quick-response photo recce capability for crisis situations and current intelligence.
3. An extensive atomic energy detection system in view of nuclear proliferation.
4. SIGINT programs to offset predictable COMSEC gains over cryptanalysis, traffic analysis and readout.
5. SIGINT capability to cope with predictable expansion of world-wide communications.
6. SIGINT capability for coping with world-wide trend toward high-capacity, sophisticated communications.
7. Alternatives to close-in fixed stations for SIGINT and other technical collection in view of the decreasing availability of foreign real estate.
8. Plans for accommodating to the increasing independence of third-party SIGINT sources; the question of multi-lateral relations.

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10. Capabilities for real-time collection and identification systems for strategic missile launches and ABM activity; (e. g. an AFTAC-type system).
11. Expansion and integration of reconnaissance sensors to include all forms of remote sensing; multiple readout and reporting.

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Attachment C




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13. Exploration of technical intelligence collection via artificial stimulation with emphasis on the characteristics and performance of target devices; use of transponding devices.
14. National priority intelligence guidance and coordination of collection guidance; effective use of source capabilities.

III. Production and Analysis

1. Improved early warning techniques.
2. Quick-reaction, round-the-clock intelligence capability responsive to operational and crisis situations.
3. Determination of the depth and nature of research and analysis required on key substantive problems.
4. Centralized diagnosis and evaluation of space/missile events on real-time basis.
5. Programs for greater basic and environmental intelligence.
6. Community principles and policies concerning external vs. in-house research on foreign areas.
7. Coordination and management of counterintelligence analysis.

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Attachment C



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V. Support

1. Capabilities for rapid and accurate processing, storage, manipulation and retrieval of information of all types and for mechanical translation.
2. Development of adequate, flexible communications capabilities throughout the intelligence system and in agent operations; advanced modes of communication.
3. Emphasis on security programs, devices and research in all respects (personnel, physical, communications, operations, technical); standard Community policies and practices.
4. Specialized intelligence personnel practices; career programs; means of meeting commercial competition.
5. Specialized, comprehensive training capabilities and facilities to meet analytic and operational requirements; the establishment of a National Intelligence College.
6. Specialized medical research programs and facilities and clinical capabilities to support intelligence operations and analysis activities.

Handwritten notes:
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3. 1/15
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5. 1/15
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