

DRAFT:JABROSS:ag (16/6/65)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Points for DCF's Discussion with Secretary Vance

1. The following are a number of items which require decisions, either within the framework of a new NRO or ad hoc between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. It should be noted that action on many of these items has been intentionally postponed for as much as six months or more, pending reorganization of the NRO. ~~It should also be noted that what will later be referred to as the CIA position on many of these items is based on my understanding of Mr. McCone's or General Carter's recollection of discussions of the Executive Committee of the NRO. Meetings of the Executive Committee were held approximately once a week but no formal record of decisions was kept.~~

2. NRP Budget - FY 1966: In July 1964 CIA submitted

Agency budget estimates for FY 66 which totaled approximately

*In NRO programs for which CIA is responsible.*

CIA has recently requested an apportionment for

25X1A

FY 66 of funds for the NRP to fund projects for which CIA is responsible

25X1A

in an amount which is slightly less than [redacted] Between July 1964

and the present date, the D/NRO eliminated approximately [redacted]

25X1

from the CIA estimate. As far as I can make out, this amount was

NRO review(s)  
completed.

eliminated without any consultation with the elements of CIA responsible. Dr. McMillan, in a personal communication to the DCI on this subject, conveys the impression that CIA is now asking for  more than the original estimate. It is true that some of the items which CIA now wishes to fund are different than the items enumerated in the original request. The aggregate amount, however, is approximately the same. This whole subject of the FY 66 budget raises a number of issues, of which two are particularly important:

a. There is the question of the procedure for reviewing and approving all items in the NRP. In our opinion this should be the responsibility of the Executive Committee of the NRO which should act on the basis of a staff analysis by NRO of all projects comprehended in the NRP and after listening to the proposals and comments of individual agencies.

b. Dr. McMillan is right in asserting that the total appropriation <sup>to</sup> the NRP is limited  This *was* ~~is~~ the figure used in the presentation to the Appropriations

Committee of Congress. It does not necessarily follow that the  deficit should be entirely made up at the expense of CIA projects. At least two of these are

activities of considerable importance and should not be rejected or curtailed unilaterally by the D/NRO.

One of these is ISINGLASS, for which approximately

25X1A

[redacted] has been requested. Nobody questions the need for a very high performance follow-on to the OXCART and the only question is how and where to produce this capability. It should not be postponed or suppressed

for lack of funds. The other important project is [redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

for which [redacted] was requested. Here again, there were sharp differences of opinion but the agreement between Mr. McCone and Mr. Vance was, as I understood it, that

25X1A

a final decision would be made whether to proceed or not to proceed with [redacted] after a review of specific tests.

This project and others should be reviewed at the Executive Committee level before apportionments of the FY 66 budget

25X1A

can be authorized. If [redacted] is inadequate to fund these and other priority intelligence programs, additional funds should be sought elsewhere if necessary through a supplemental appropriations. On this point, I think that the concluding paragraph of Dr. McMillan's letter is misleading. It is not my personal impression that

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100060039-9

either committee of Congress wanted to effect reductions ~~with~~ with the budget at the expense of reconnaissance programs, especially those conducted by CIA.

3. OXCART. Initial plans for the redeployment of OXCART vehicles have been discussed. Ultimately it will be necessary to decide the issue of long-term responsibility for OXCART (and other covert overflight operations conducted in manned aircraft). This, in my opinion, should definitely not be done except in the context of an over-all renegotiation of the NRO.

4. The Selection of a New General Search System. You are aware of the status of the current review of these systems by Dr. Land. It will be necessary at some time to reach agreement, acting on the basis presumably of the PSAC Reconnaissance Panel <sup>TISMANIA, advice from / COST-EFFECTIVE</sup> as to which system to carry into the final testing stage.

5. CORONA Management. The history of the CORONA project is long and extremely confusing. The project was authorized by the White House and CIA was assigned responsibility in April 1958 for development and procurement of the reconnaissance payload, camera film, recovery vehicle and spacecraft. I was advised by the President of Itek as early as 1961 that the Air Force was making every possible effort to eliminate CIA's control of this program.

Many of the subsidiary disputes over relations with the individual

SECRET

contractors in this program must be read against this background.  
It does not follow that CIA must retain control of the program or  
the contracts. The decision, however, should be made on the basis  
of principle and not as a result of the piecemeal erosion of the CIA  
position.

A specific point at issue arises from a recent communication  
from Dr. ~~Wheeler~~ <sup>Mac Millan</sup> to the DCI advising that the D/NRO has taken  
certain action (specifically with regard to ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> contract with Lockheed)  
which has the effect of giving Aerospace responsibility for technical  
direction of the assembly and launching aspects of the CORONA  
program. In his letter, McMillan asserts that Mr. McCone agreed  
to this step. Mr. McCone and General Carter both have ~~consistently~~  
denied that they ~~have~~ made any such agreement. General Carter  
wrote Mr. Vance on the 28th of August 1964 specifically stating:

" . . . we have no record of ~~the~~ discussions regarding  
this proposed contractual change.

Mr. McCone dissented from the proposal that Aerospace  
be given a contract as Systems Manager in lieu of the  
current related contract with Lockheed."

The point here is that ~~the~~ future responsibility for the management and control of CORONA <sup>to pay</sup> must be established as a matter of principle. Such issues as selection of the contractor appropriate for systems engineering or technical direction of a given program  should ~~clearly~~ not preoccupy the time of ~~officials at the level of the~~

ILLEGIB

~~Executive Committee of the NRO~~

6. Satellite Operations Center (SOC). As of last April there appeared to <sup>have</sup> ~~be~~ general agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI that the SOC should <sup>be</sup> located in Langley and operate under the control of the DCI. <sup>Originally it was in Langley but</sup> The purpose of this center is to provide operational targetting and camera programs for existing reconnaissance photographic systems. It has not so far provided this service for  although it has functioned for CORONA and ARGON. In April of 1963 it was moved to the Pentagon where, ~~the present proposal is, it should be located.~~ We have recently been advised of NRO proposals to create a capability equivalent to that of the SOC on the West Coast. This would appear to be needlessly duplicative of the SOC which should remain as one of the <sup>primary</sup> instrumentalities through which intelligence controls over the satellite reconnaissance program are maintained.

25X1A

7. The foregoing items illustrate most of the outstanding

issues which have developed between CIA and the NRO and/or the Air Force. They are:

- a. The need for an arrangement through which the DCI can participate, at the level of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in decisions relating to the allocation of funds and the approval of important programs. This was the responsibility contemplated for the Executive Committee.
- b. The question of how the DCI and the intelligence community is going to ensure that the orbital plans for satellite reconnaissance operations are designed to provide coverage in accordance with intelligence priorities. This was the purpose behind the proposal to relocate the SOC in Langley.
- c. There is the question of the role appropriate for CIA in the research, development and production phases of new reconnaissance systems. It has generally been the position of the Agency that CIA should play a role in the invention, selection and development of new systems. Acting on this principle, the Agency has developed a component under DD/S&T with competence for this mission. It is argued that this component should be

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100060039-9

responsible for development and production (as well as conceptual design) for systems for a number of reasons:

(1) CIA is the most important user of the product of the system and the only agency exclusively concerned with intelligence.

(2) The Agency record in the development and production of new systems has been impressive.

(3) Funds are expended for the production of these systems under the DCI's authority to spend money on an unvouchered basis. At least some of the programs should be administered under his direct control.

(4) If CIA (and/or the DCI) is to have any responsibility for the effectiveness and efficiency of systems development in the reconnaissance field, he must have the staff necessary to establish independent judgments concerning the most effective program. Unless CIA is given more than a technical advisory responsibility, it will be impossible to keep a staff with appropriate qualifications.

~~SECRET~~



25X1A


8. The CIA argument is based to some degree on the analogy of the  Program under which the Navy developed a payload which is put into orbit by the Air Force on an Air Force booster. This arrangement in fact has worked on the CORONA program.

9. Opposition to CIA participation in the development and production of payloads is based on arguments to the effect that CIA is trying to build an empire in space and partly on grounds of organizational tidiness. ~~An~~ Alternative to the kind of arrangement we have proposed is allocation of this responsibility to the Air Force, which would then become the single instrument of reconnaissance, or to a new agency to be created under the Defense Department (or elsewhere).

~~10. There are objections to all of these proposed arrangements but this appears to me to be the critical issue to be decided.~~

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

25X1A



16 June 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**


**SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Land, 14 June 1965**

1. The Director entertained Dr. Land at a dinner meeting on 14 June 1965. Mr. Helms, Dr. Wheelon and Mr. Bross were also present. Significant portions of the discussion were as follows.

2. The Director described his interest in a fifteen year plan for resources and activities. He said that the important thing was to define objectives and identify the resources and programs which were best calculated to meet these objectives. He asked Dr. Land how far he could see into the future and what future technology promised for intelligence purposes.

3. Dr. Land felt that fifteen years is too far to look ahead. He said it was possible to project the state of the art in various technologies. What is difficult to predict is the specific application which can be made of a given technology. He said that a lensless camera could be made in which films would register impressions which could be made visible when seen through a light. Application of this device to intelligence missions is possible. The Director pressed him as to whether photographic observation from 22,000 miles at a very low resolution was perhaps a future possibility. Dr. Land said that tremendous improvement could be made in photographic surveillance. On the other hand, he wondered whether the Agency was perhaps overpreoccupied with scientific achievements

25X1A




25X1A



Copy No. 3 of 5

25X1A




which could as well be accomplished by another agency of the Government. He thought that CIA should concentrate on the development of techniques which are truly secret. For example, he cited the development of the U-2 which was opposed by Air Force officers largely on the ground that they thought it impossible to achieve the altitude and performance predicted for the U-2. The fact that nobody, presumably including the Russians, thought it could be done added to the potentialities for secrecy and it was appropriately given to CIA largely because of the security implications. Dr. Land thought that the Agency should concentrate on human resources and develop really clandestine resources. This led to a discussion of the problem and potentialities of deep cover. The Director questioned whether a really searching effort had been made to identify all the possibilities for deep cover and for agent activity in critical areas,  Improvement of the Agency's capabilities for espionage would be, he felt, an appropriate objective for the proposed fifteen year plan. The Director emphasized the importance of identifying as specifically as possible the objectives of operations, the methods and techniques best suited to achieve these objectives with a view to initiating necessary action, including the allocation of funds, as promptly as possible in view of the leadtime required to establish required resources.

25X1C

5. After dinner there was a short discussion of the two Perkin-Elmer general search systems. Dr. Land indicated that he had been impressed with the demonstration of the oscillating platen. He was inclined to favor the M system and thought that Perkin-Elmer should be given adequate time to prove the feasibility of this system. He stated that there would be a preliminary review of the PE systems prior to the end of the month (tentatively, the 25th of June). The Director stated that it was his intention to cut back on the supporting contracts for associated components (spacecraft, re-entry vehicles, etc.). Dr. Wheelon pointed out that these associated contracts ran through the end of the month and that a final decision as to their continuation or termination could be taken

25X1A

25X1A




SECRET

25X1A



25X1A

after the preliminary review by Dr. Land's Panel. He pointed out that associated contracts for the two Air Force systems (EK and Itak) were running at approximately  and that the configuration of these cameras was quite different from the two PE systems and too long and narrow to be accommodated in the space vehicles designed for the latter.

5. The Director and Dr. Land talked together alone for approximately half an hour.

6. Dr. Land and I reviewed the discussion at breakfast this morning. As regards fifteen year planning, Dr. Land said that he thought that the Director's objective was to provide leadership to the community as a whole and that as such a fifteen year plan would be useful. He thought that a guidance, which served to identify the critical problems of the future, could perhaps be more useful than an attempt at a detailed plan. In Polaroid he said that he had two groups of people. One of these attempts to look well into the future and identify concepts, designs and ideas which might have useful application. The other group are in fact planners who proceed, on a very conservative basis, to develop detailed plans for rather specific development of projects which are costed, etc.

25X1A




8. We had a fairly long discussion of the NRO. He felt that both the Agency and the Defense Department should be continued as partners in the venture. He thought that both DD/S&T and the D/NRO have been stretching their respective franchises to the limit. He felt that some solution to the problem was possible within two or three weeks. He suggested that Benny Shriever might play a useful role in the NRO and suggested an interim committee to deal with

25X1A


SECRET



25X1A



25X1A



NRO problems and allocate responsibility consisting of himself, Drs. McMillan and Wheelon, and General Shriever. I said that his introduction into the problem would be very helpful; that General Shriever might overload the committee in the direction of the Air Force, although he had undoubted personal qualifications for the job. I pointed out that the critical question was the extent to which the Agency should remain in systems development. All Agency officials involved in the NRO so far (Bissell, Scoville, Wheelon) felt it essential to preserve for the Agency a role in the actual development and production of systems. This responsibility could not be turned over to a single instrumentality under DoD, particularly one dominated by the Air Force, and be sure that systems development would be intelligence oriented. Moreover, if this responsibility is divorced from CIA, the mission of DD/S&T would be largely nullified. Dr. Land undertook to discuss the matter further.


/s/ JOHN A. BROSS

**JOHN A. BROSS**  
**D/DCI/NIPE**

Distribution:

- Cy No. 1 - DCI
- 2 - DDCI
- 3 - DD/S&T
- 4 - NIPE
- 5 - NIPE

25X1A



25X1A



- 4 -

**SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

*6/27*

*NK 6S Range*

25X1A

CONTROL NO.

Copy No. 3

REFERRED TO OFFICE	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY	
	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
DD/S&T							
<span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 40px;"></span>	✓						

Handle Via Indicated Controls

25X1A

Access to this document will be restricted to those persons cleared for the specific projects;

.....  
.....

**WARNING**

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to  Control System.

25X1A

**TOP SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification