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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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[Redacted]

Copy 2 of 3

3 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT: OXCART and SR-71 Operation

1. Per your request, the attached comments on the five options of OXCART/SR-71 operation are forwarded for your information.

2. It is recognized that some of the comments on additional requirements may be minor in nature, but are listed for identification and information purposes.

3. No specific mention is made herein of costs or lead time factors. These were informally discussed at the JRC working level meeting held at the Pentagon, 30 December 1967, and are included in the minutes of that meeting.

4. The information contained in the attachments has been given to [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

CARL E. DUCKETT

Director, CIA Reconnaissance Programs

Attachments  
As stated

NRO and USAF review(s) completed.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification

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**SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:**

[Redacted Signature]

Director of Special Activities

3 Jan 68  
Date

SAS/O/OSA / [Redacted] (3 Jan 68)

**Distribution:**

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*Series B:*

- 1- OXC/O/OSA
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
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ATTACHMENT I TO




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
**OPTION A: UPDATE OF CURRENT PLAN FOR PHASE-IN OF THE SR-71,  
NO OVERLAP WITH THE A-12.**

1. The Ground Support Equipment, Test and Shop Equipment that is to remain in place for SR-71 support has already been identified and tagged. Supply spares and hardware also tagged. Items to be returned to  after re-deployment have been identified. 25X1
2. SAC has already surveyed assets at Kadena for SR-71 operations permitting facile transition from OXCART to SR-71 operation.
3. Housing now used by OXCART will be available for SR-71 personnel based on scheduled OXCART withdrawal.
4. Kadena Air Base support now geared to accept influx of SR-71 program per previously co-ordinated plan.
5. No additional major construction required. SR-71 would use current OXCART facilities.
6. Orderly OXCART re-deployment and SR-71 deployment plan with necessary supporting plans are published and being kept current.
7. No problems from a security standpoint which have not been previously considered and for which provisions have been made.
8. Possibility exists of intelligence collection gap between dates of OXCART operational cessation and actual reconnaissance operation date of SR-71.

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**OPTION B: JOINT OPERATION OF BOTH AIRCRAFT FROM KADENA, USING WHERE POSSIBLE, COMMON FACILITIES AND RESOURCES.**

1. Space throughout the Kadena AB complex would be most critical both for personnel and equipment, due to lack of commonality of OXCART/SR-71 systems and maintenance concepts. (SR-71 uses "Field Maintenance" concept, i.e., work orders, materiel control, etc., versus OXCART contractor maintenance concept). Additional shop space would be required to support the SR-71 project.
2. Power facilities in shops and hangar are peculiar to OXCART. Must be reworked to SR-71 requirements.
3. Additional POL storage requirement (OXCART requirement plus 80% of OXCART requirement for SR-71) necessary for concurrent operation of both fleets.
4. Additional housing, messing facilities and transportation for SR-71 personnel would have to be provided.
5. Additional SR-71 operational command, control, and flight planning space is necessary.
6. Physiological Equipment area would have to be increased to support 6-10 additional SAC flight crew personal equipment.
7. Security restrictions dictate that SAC personnel (approximately 1200 (3 TDY teams of 400 each) be O-3 cleared.
8. Co-mingling of the two aircraft could degrade the cover story and cause possible political problems.
9. No additional tankers would be necessary based on assumption that only single operational mission (OXCART or SR-71) would be flown on a single day.
10. There would be a definite benefit gained by the SR-71 project having immediate access to OXCART experience and know-how.
11. This option would provide OXCART backup of the SR-71 insuring against any reconnaissance intelligence gap.

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Attachment III to




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**OPTION C: SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF THE A-12 AND SR-71 FROM KADENA WITHOUT USE OF COMMON FACILITIES AND RESOURCES EXCEPT ON A NON-INTERFERENCE BASIS.**

1. This option would require use of and minor modification to the two corrosion control hangars presently at Kadena to provide shop and hangar space.
2. Additional POL storage space (80% increase over current OXCART requirement) would be necessary.
3. Additional housing, messing and transportation facilities as well as an enlarged Physiological Equipment area would be necessary.
4. Space for SR-71 operational command, control, and flight planning would have to be provided.
5. Co-mingling of the two aircraft could cause cover story and political problems.
6. Based on a single mission per day (OXCART or SR-71), no additional tankers would be necessary.
7. The SR-71 project would have a definite benefit in the immediate access to OXCART experience and know-how.
8. Both SR-71 and OXCART on Kadena would insure against any gap in reconnaissance intelligence collection.

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Attachment IV to

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**OPTION D: OPERATION OF THE SR-71 FROM ANOTHER BASE IN THE FAR EAST WITH THE A-12 REMAINING AT KADENA FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO THREE MONTHS AFTER THE START OF SR-71 OPERATIONS.**

The cost and lead time necessary for this option were discussed at the JRC working group meeting at the Pentagon on 30 December 1967. No further comment in this paper is felt necessary.

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Attachment V to

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**OPTION E: OPERATION OF BOTH AIRCRAFT FROM THE SAME BASE UTILIZING COMMON FACILITIES AND/OR OPERATING SEPARATELY. OVERLAP PHASING OF AIRCRAFT WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THIS OPTION.**

1. This option would require minor modification and utilization of the two corrosion control hangars at Kadena for shop and hangar space.
2. Additional requirements include
  - a. POL storage space.
  - b. Expanded Physiological Equipment area for additional crew equipment.
  - c. Housing, messing and transportation facilities.
  - d. Space for SR-71 command, control and flight planning.
3. Where possible, common items of supply would be utilized.
4. Use of present OXCART communication facilities on a non-interference basis would be possible. Additional communications facilities might be necessary.
5. OXCART backup of the SR-71 will insure against any intelligence gap.
6. The SR-71 project will benefit from on-the-spot OXCART experience and know-how.
7. This option will provide for orderly transition of the SR-71 to assume the military mission of North Vietnam reconnaissance without serious degradation of the OXCART capability.
8. Use of the OXCART against other possible Southeast Asia reconnaissance requirements would be possible under this option.

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