

laws which subject individual manufacturers or distributors engaged in fraudulent practices in the sale of their goods to criminal prosecution and many States have laws giving the State government the right to seek injunctive relief to procure a remedy against fraudulent practices.

During the Commerce Committee's consideration of this bill, I supported the proposal which requires manufacturers or distributors of packaged goods to print on the outside of such packages in clear, understandable, conspicuous lettering the weight, measure, or numerical count of the pieces contained in the package and if the content is not in pieces but in weight, then the weight contents should not be identified in pounds and ounces but in ounces alone to simplify the housewives task in making comparisons.

My interest in protecting the buyer is just as deep as the interest of anyone else, but I do not subscribe to the policy of passing new laws on a given subject when existing laws are adequate to reach the desired objective.

Every time you pass a new law of this type, you create new bureaus with their plethora of public employees bringing about a scandalous, indefensible expansion of public workers duplicating the work that is already authorized under existing law.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I wish to speak in support of the resolution of the senior Senator from Minnesota to establish a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, as that resolution was ordered reported by the Foreign Relations Committee.

Recent stories in the press indicate that there is a need for oversight over some aspects of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency with particular reference to the effects of this activity on our general foreign policy. Participation of members of the Foreign Relations Committee will permit and be particularly appropriate to such scrutiny.

It appears, for example, that CIA agents used Michigan State University as a "cover" for intelligence activities, in a technical assistance project undertaken in South Vietnam from 1955 to 1959.

What effect does such activity have on our technical assistance projects elsewhere in the world? Surely it gives opponents of U.S. activity in such countries a handle with which to beat our supporters. If so, is the gain from this particular activity worth such a cost? These questions of foreign policy can best be answered by a broadlybased Select Committee.

It is reported in the series of New York Times articles of April 25-29 on the Central Intelligence Agency that the Agency has used money to influence the results of elections in foreign countries on occasions where it appeared that Communists were doing so. Certainly such activity cannot be carried on without becoming known. If the report is correct, how does this affect other foreign policies which we wish to pursue?

The junior Senator from New York recently spoke in this Chamber on the Alliance for Progress, and urged that the United States should take an active part in encouraging democratic forms and traditions in Latin America. I think nearly everyone agrees with him. How is such a desirable policy affected in its execution by the fact that we are in some places using bribery to influence the outcome of elections? Will they not do as we do, not as we say?

Answering such questions involves weighing the intelligence advantages in light of our long range foreign policy—an exercise most appropriately performed by a committee including members of the Armed Forces, Appropriations, and Foreign Relations Committees.

Another question which might well be taken up by the Select Committee is the degree to which our foreign intelligence activities may properly extend into this country. It has recently come to light in the press that Mr. George A. Carver wrote an article on the Vietcong in the April issue of Foreign Affairs without disclosure of the fact that he is a full-time employee of the CIA. The New York Times also reports in its series of articles that the CIA has subsidized U.S. book publishers under circumstances that were not clear. What intelligence goals are furthered by such activities? To what extent do they conflict with historic values and freedoms of our citizens?

The same question may well arise from the position of the Agency, asserted in a slander suit in Baltimore, that its agent when acting under orders, can with absolute immunity slander a man in this country by labeling him as a Soviet agent.

Because these questions extend beyond the intelligence field into areas of foreign policy, I support the motion which would place them within the scope of a select Committee on Intelligence Operations.

VIETNAM: MOMENT OF TRUTH

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, with American battle casualties exceeding those of the South Vietnamese, and with the South Vietnamese fighting one another instead of the Vietcong, the time has come for us to consider what possible justification there is for us to continue fighting in Vietnam.

Incidentally, when I visited Vietnam and Thailand and other places in southeast Asia from last September 28 until October 19, my eyes were opened, and it did not take me very long to see for myself that we were involved in a miserable civil war in an area that is of no strategic or economic importance whatsoever to the defense of the United States.

Our President has two alternatives. One is to escalate the war by increasing our armed forces in southeast Asia, from the present number approximating 400,000 by 100,000 or 200,000 additional American GI's, bombing Hanoi and mining the harbor of Haiphong, and carrying the war more directly to North Vietnam.

The second is to suspend all bombing

of areas of North Vietnam and withdraw to our strongholds, pending the negotiation of a cease-fire and an armistice. This should be followed by elections under the supervision of the International Control Commission or under the auspices of the United Nations, and eventually by the orderly withdrawal of our Armed Forces.

Mr. President, in his usual concise and clear manner, Walter Lippmann, one of the free world's great journalists and outstanding thinkers, has stated the problem extremely well in his column, entitled "Moment of Truth," which was published in the Washington Post on May 24, 1966. I commend this column to my colleagues and am hopeful that administration leaders responsible for Vietnam policy will give serious and careful consideration to the excellent analysis set forth by Walter Lippmann. I ask unanimous consent that his column be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the column was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

MOMENT OF TRUTH (By Walter Lippmann)

The hardest question facing us at the moment is whether or not the disintegration of the Saigon government and army can be stopped and reversed. The official position is, of course, that it can be.

But there is little evidence to support the official will to believe, and there is mounting evidence that General Ky or anyone like him is in an irreconcilable conflict with the war-weary people of Vietnam. There is no prospect now visible that the South Vietnamese people and the South Vietnamese army can be united and rallied for the prosecution of the war.

Unless this condition changes radically, we shall increasingly be fighting alone in a country which has an army that is breaking up and a government which has little authority.

We can already see on the horizon the possibility of an American army fighting on its own in a hostile environment. We must hope that the President and his strategic planners are prepared for such a development. For if the South Vietnamese government and army continue to disintegrate as is now the case, our troops may find themselves without serious organized military support, and forced to find their way in a seething unrest where friend and foe are indistinguishable.

If the Saigon forces disintegrate, it will no longer be possible to continue the war on the theory that the mission of our troops is to smash the hard core of the enemy while the Saigon troops occupy and pacify the countryside. What then? We shall be hearing from the Goldwater faction, whose first article of military faith is unlimited belief in airpower. They are arguing that the way to repair the breakdown in South Vietnam is to bomb Haiphong and Hanoi in the north. The Administration, as we are told by Secretary McNamara and Mr. Brown, the Secretary of the Air Force, knows the folly and the futility of that course of action.

Is there any real alternative to a holding strategy, sometimes called the enclave strategy, pending the negotiation of a truce and agreement for our phased withdrawal from the Asian mainland? If the Vietnamese war cannot be won by the Air Force, if it cannot be won by American troops fighting alone in South Vietnam, what other strategic option is there?

The only other option would be to make no new decisions, pursue the present course, and hope that things are not so bad as they seem, and that something better will turn