

Monitor pinpointed the perplexing question facing those concerned with our space flight program: What do we plan to do with the space flight capability we are now developing?

The Monitor editorial of July 23, 1966, follows:

GEMINI'S CHALLENGE MONITOR

The flight of Gemini 10 was another thrilling step forward in the American manned space flight program. The ability to rendezvous with multiple targets, the ability to pick up an auxiliary rocket to increase maneuverability, these add considerable scope to what spacecraft can do.

In demonstrating this for the first time, Astronauts John Young and Michael Collins are to be heartily congratulated for a job well done. It has brought closer the day when the United States will have a fully operational space flight capability.

It also underscores the awkward question, for what is this capacity being developed?

It will indeed carry men to the moon. But that is no end in itself. In fact, the moon goal was set largely as a target which would polarize the effort to develop a general space flight capacity. The administration has yet to specify what it wants to use that capacity for.

Vexed with the budget squeeze due to the Vietnamese war, the administration is reluctant to commit itself to costly long-term space objectives. But the lead time for space projects is short. While the lunar landing is several years away, work already is running out for many space engineering teams.

The civilian space budget has been running to roughly \$5 billion a year. To keep its teams together and maintain momentum, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration reportedly would like to see the budget running higher. It also wants an explicit new goal beyond the lunar landing. This goal might be a commitment to send men to Mars or to build and staff a moon base.

Whatever share of the national wealth should be devoted to manned space flight, the United States most urgent need in space is for a clear vision of what to do with the space flight capacity it is developing.

CIA Retains Its Lease on Dangerous Secrecy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN E. MOSS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 12, 1966

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Speaker, the Sacramento Bee on August 1, 1966, editorially comments upon recent developments relating to the CIA. It seems that this Agency has recently been involved in a series of episodes more nearly resembling the script of "Batman" than that of a responsible agency of the Government, with tremendous power for good or evil, with the ability to constructively or destructively contribute to the image of the United States.

I derive no pleasure from finding myself in agreement with the criticism which has been more recently directed against the Agency, but I must confess that after the most careful and thought-

ful evaluation, I think the time for closer congressional supervision and audit has long since passed and failure now to recognize it is a failure to discharge our responsibilities to the American people. There is a widespread suspicion, which is not without basis in fact in the eyes of some, that the CIA has operated on occasion outside the law right here at home. This is an allegation which deserves—indeed requires—further examination.

CIA RETAINS ITS LEASE ON DANGEROUS SECRECY

In the area of secrecy all kinds of evils and suspicions grow. The United States Senate itself incurred some of the suspicion that has been directed against the Central Intelligence Agency when it closed its doors to the public and voted 61-28 not to broaden its "surveillance" of the CIA.

Before the Senate was a resolution to broaden the Senate committee "supervising" the CIA to include some members from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT of Arkansas.

Final Senate action sent the controversial resolution to the Senate Foreign Services Committee, where it will surely die, since its chairman, Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, is strongly opposed to it.

RUSSELL wants to confine Senate "supervisory" powers over the CIA to its present seven-man committee drawn from the Foreign Services and Appropriations Committees.

The Senate has thereby failed to furnish the towering CIA, now bigger than the State Department, with the congressional overlook essential to public confidence and possibly to national safety.

The present CIA watchdog committee has not been allowed to supervise, according to RUSSELL's own admission. After the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, RUSSELL said he never had been apprised of the invasion plan and, if he had, he would have opposed it. Under the present CIA directives it is obliged to advise only the National Security Council a limited obligation which enables it to stay within the shadows of secrecy.

The CIA may not actually make policy but there is strong evidence it can create situations which do make policy. This was so in the intervention of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic, in the Bay of Pigs, in the installation of Ngo Dinh Diem as a preliminary to giving the U.S. lodgement in South Viet Nam, in its enterprise in Iran and Guatemala.

Matters have now reached a point where almost every coup in the world is attributed by most nations to the CIA. Both its activities and its suspected ones are so vital to the national safety that it should be kept under the tight control of the president and certainly under the inspection at least, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Benediction Concluding Millenium Stamp Dinner

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. THADDEUS J. DULSKI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 2, 1966

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, on July 30, the U.S. Post Office Department issued a new 5-cent stamp commemorating the 1,000th anniversary of Christianity in Poland.

This colorful and meaningful stamp was very well received throughout the Nation and the demand for it required an additional printing of 10 million, bringing the total available for sale to 125 million stamps.

The untiring efforts of our Postmaster General, the Honorable Lawrence F. O'Brien, and all those who worked so diligently to make the issuance of this millennium stamp a reality are most praiseworthy.

The anniversary of the event commemorated by this stamp is highly significant in Polish history. Likewise, the tremendous interest that has been shown in making this stamp a part of the anniversary observance is also significant.

An eloquent address was delivered by Postmaster General O'Brien at the first-day ceremony which was placed in the August 1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I would also like to compliment the gentleman from Illinois, the Honorable ROMAN C. PUCINSKI, an able legislator and former newspaperman, who in the same RECORD—page 17009—made an excellent presentation on Poland's role in the family of nations prior to World War II. He has very deftly bounced upon those who would undermine the outstanding contributions and achievements of the Polish people long before the Communists set foot on their beloved land.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to include the benediction offered by the Most Reverend Stanislaus J. Brzana, auxiliary bishop of the Buffalo diocese, upon conclusion of the first-day ceremony and banquet for the Polish millennium stamp held at the Sheraton Park Hotel in Washington, D.C.:

BENEDICTION CONCLUDING MILLENNIUM STAMP DINNER

O God, Father of all men and nations, we thank you for all the blessings showered upon the people of the United States and Poland.

This year we celebrate the Millennium of the Polish nation. For ten centuries, through times of war and peace, invasion, partition and all kinds of upheavals, Christian and civic life among the Poles grew and flourished.

We are happy that our country honors this great anniversary with a special stamp, depicting the white Polish eagle on a shield of red.

The eagle represents the human spirit, ambitious, determined, bold, and unconquered. As this eagle flies unfettered in the sky of blue, may the human spirit ever soar in the atmosphere of freedom.

Two Polish heroes, Thaddeus Kosciuszko and Casimir Pulaski, assisted and inspired our colonial army, fighting for independence. Belonging to the legions of the white eagle, they came to help the American eagle soar in liberty.

The Millennium stamp will carry thousands of messages to our neighbors across the ocean. May it draw our people closer together, and establish a stronger brotherhood.

May this example of solidarity strengthen the bond uniting all people into one great family of nations.

Let this weary world, torn so long by so much strife, tension, and war, finally enjoy a millennium of true understanding, justice, progress and peace.

Unable to achieve all this by ourselves, we ask it of You, our Father, through Christ Jesus, your Son, Our Lord. Amen.

hope for the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

I am in complete agreement with the objectives of these resolutions which follow:

RESOLUTION No. 8—U.S. SHIPBUILDING

Whereas: No nation can achieve true maritime strength and eminence unless its merchant fleet is supported by an adequate shipbuilding capability; and

Whereas: Since the end of World War II, the United States has allowed its shipbuilding capability to dwindle to an alarming and critical point. This has resulted not only in a drastic decline of employment opportunities in the shipbuilding industry, but has reduced the reservoir of skilled shipbuilding manpower which this country must have to meet any contingency; and

Whereas: In recent months new efforts have been made to bring about a further decline of the American shipbuilding industry. The most striking example of this is the Interagency Maritime Task Force report, which recommends that shipowners be permitted to build or buy ships abroad and operate them under the American flag in all trades, including the domestic trades; and

Whereas: The Jackson County Central Labor Union firmly believes that an adequate American shipbuilding industry is as essential to the Nation's military security and economic well-being as is an adequate American Merchant fleet; and

Whereas: The building of ships abroad would further aggravate our balance of payments problem.

Therefore, be it resolved: That the Jackson County Central Labor Union rejects all suggestions for building ships abroad and urges that any Federal program developed for the merchant marine must be predicated on the requirement that all vessels under this program must be built in American yards; and

Be it further resolved: That notice of this action be forwarded to the Convention of the Mississippi AFL-CIO to be held July 25, 26 and 27, 1966 for its support and adoption.

Be it finally resolved: That copies of this resolution be sent to all members of the Mississippi Congressional delegation and that they be requested to work toward its implementation.

Respectfully submitted.

JACKSON COUNTY CENTRAL
LABOR UNION.

RESOLUTION No. 10—VIETNAM

Whereas: The tragic conflict in Vietnam is a supreme test of our Nation's will to resist aggression, to preserve democracy, and to prevent the forces of totalitarianism from extinguishing the hopeful flame of freedom now burning in this tiny, besieged nation so far from our shores; and

Whereas: America's defense of South Vietnam is supported by the obligation of honoring commitments of the Southeast Asia Treaty, an obligation supported by our last three Presidents, and by the hard, realistic logic that Communist aggression must be contained, else it will spread throughout Asia and beyond; and

Whereas: This Nation has consistently and devotedly sought to bring the Vietnam conflict to an honorable settlement through negotiations; and

Whereas: Our policy in Vietnam has stirred sharp differences of opinion among Americans, some developing into organized demonstrations, and although we recognize much of this as an expression of the democratic process itself, we nonetheless deplore the unfortunate impression it creates that our citizens are against their government on the Vietnam issue.

Now, therefore, be it resolved: That the Mississippi AFL-CIO does go on record as supporting the Johnson Administration in its defense of South Vietnam, and in its un-

daunted struggle to reach a speedy and peaceful end to a war which America did not start and does not want, but must certainly pursue as long as aggression threatens everything for which this Nation stands; and

Be it further resolved: That copies of this resolution be sent to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Governor Paul B. Johnson and to each member of the Mississippi Congressional Delegation.

Respectfully submitted.

EXECUTIVE BOARD, MISSISSIPPI
AFL-CIO.

A Lifetime Chance

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 10, 1966

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, the Lincoln Heights Bulletin-News, Los Angeles, on Monday, July 28, 1966, printed a story entitled "Anglo-Mexican Youths Working for Big Trip." It concerns the members of a Los Angeles County Teen Post, a program under the antipoverty effort, and their attempt to go to Mexico.

The Teen-Posters were not able to achieve their end because of the unfortunate airline strike, but I feel that the article expresses a sidelight which is not often found in the official reports and statistics of antipoverty agencies and organizations. I insert this article in the RECORD:

A LIFETIME CHANCE—ANGLO-MEXICAN YOUTHS WORKING FOR BIG TRIP
(By Charles Ericksen)

One hundred poverty-area teenagers had a miracle going for them for a while this summer.

All Southern California Mexican-Americans, they were promised a one-month tour of Mexico, the land of their parents, for \$25 each.

They would meet governors and visit palaces. They would be introduced to civilizations which predate anything north of the Rio Grande.

They would discover a very important part of their heritage as Mexican-Americans.

The whole grandiose plan came from the fertile minds of Santos Zuniga and Richard Jacobs, two young men who direct the activities of a Teen Post in San Fernando.

In the past, Zuniga and Jacobs had taken groups of deprived teenagers from Mexican-American barrios to such places as San Francisco and the Grand Canyon, raising funds for the trips from within the community.

THE BIG ONE

But those trips were only practice runs for the big one to Mexico, set for this August 1.

It was to involve youngsters mainly from the San Fernando-Pacoima area, where half of the Mexican-American students became high school dropouts, according to Jacobs, a teacher at San Fernando Junior High.

"In spite of the fact that they've got a lot of potential, most of these kids don't think very much of themselves," he explained. "Here in Southern California, they live in an environment which emphasizes the values of an Anglo culture.

"Every day, in dozens of little ways, our system teaches them to be ashamed of that part of themselves which is Mexican."

For Mexican-American children to succeed in our society according to Zuniga, a 27-

year-old UCLA graduate, they must believe in themselves.

"They must be just as proud of that part of their personality which is culturally Hispanic and Indian as that part which is Anglo-American," he pointed out.

Jacobs and Zuniga organized the trip—which they titled "Los Hijos Vuelven" (The Children Return)—to give the teenagers a direct exposure to the richness of Mexico's culture.

NEEDED \$24,000

This spring, they quietly set out to raise the \$24,000 they estimated would be needed to turn the dream into reality.

Ironically, their initial successes came not from friends and businessmen in the United States. Instead, it came from Mexico.

One Mexico City industrialist volunteered a \$1,500 contribution. The city of Colima opened its arms with promises of a full week's board and lodging for the group while it visited nearby universities, museums, volcanoes and points of historic interest. A priest contributed an unsolicited ten-peso note (80 cents).

But the big step forward came when an airline representative indicated that he would provide the most expensive item of all—transportation.

With this good news, Zuniga and Jacobs brought their plan into the open. Community support began to pick up.

The pair began working 18 and 20 hours a day each, talking to church groups, merchants, and any other potential contributors. Some checks in the amount of \$100 and \$250 began coming in from service clubs.

Then Zuniga and Jacobs began seeking applications.

They set a \$25 fee for each poverty-area applicant—"to give the trip some extra value, extra significance, to those who would take it," Zuniga explained.

WORK BEGINS

"We had kids working all over San Fernando Valley to raise that money," he said. "I can give you examples of mothers taking in washing, of families making real sacrifices so that their children could go.

But then something called an airline strike came along.

And a few days ago, Jacobs received a phone call expressing regret that the transportation could not be donated, after all.

When Jacobs and Zuniga counted the remaining donations and promises, they came to the conclusion that without the donated transportation, the trip was an impossibility.

So this past weekend they called a meeting in the neighborhood.

Some 250 persons—kids, parents, neighbors—showed up.

Zuniga and Jacobs told the group they were sorry. But they had bitten off more than they could chew. And there was nothing to do—with just a couple of weeks left—but to call off the whole thing. And return the donations.

"Maybe next year," they promised feebly.

But the idea behind "Los Hijos Vuelven" was important to the assembled families. They talked of making tamales and selling them. Of throwing fund-raising parties.

They told Jacobs and Zuniga that the kids from the neighborhood deserve an opportunity to find out, first-hand, who they are.

Gemini's Challenge

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DONALD RUMSFELD

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 10, 1966

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, a recent editorial in the Christian Science

discussed it in depth and at length with the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], who is a cosponsor of the amendment. I have also received the approval for the change from our cosponsors, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN]. It has also been discussed with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT], as well as the majority and minority leaders.

I believe that the amendment is acceptable to all the Senators I have mentioned.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I request that the amendment be read in full.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment in full.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 21, after line 7, add the following:

"CHAPTER 3—RESTUDY

"SEC. 301. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS.—The President is requested to submit to the Congress, on or before January 1, 1968, his recommendations, including legislative proposals designed to carry out such recommendations, for such future foreign assistance programs as may be necessary and appropriate in the national interest and taking into account the principles set forth in section 302.

"SEC. 302. PRINCIPLES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS.—(a) In the formulation and submission to the Congress of proposals for foreign assistance for fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 1968, such proposals should include, among others, the following categories:

"(1) Assistance intended primarily for humanitarian purposes, including grants, loans, contributions, or other aid to be made available for relief purposes through international organizations or relief agencies, or otherwise, famine relief and other assistance authorized by title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, and similar relief programs.

"(2) Assistance for development purposes (A) to be extended only to countries in which progress is being made toward respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and of the press, and recognition of the importance of individual freedom, initiative, and private enterprise; and (B) to be in furtherance of sound plans for economic and social growth to the end of developing the resources of the recipient countries to make them self-sufficient at the earliest possible date.

"(3) Assistance for political or contingency purposes, to be extended to a limited number of countries or areas, primarily for purposes of advancing or protecting the mutual interests of the United States and the other countries or areas concerned, such as programs relating to the creation of special relationships with recipient countries, reinforcement of alliance-type relationships, or other political or contingency purposes.

"(4) Military assistance to be furnished for purposes that serve the military defense of the United States as recommended by the Secretary of Defense, subject to approval by the Secretary of State.

"(b) In order to provide for better coordination of all programs of United States assistance to foreign countries, and for more efficient, economical, and effective administration of such programs, the proposals referred to in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) shall also include provisions for unification, insofar as practicable, of the administration of such programs under a single officer or agency.

"(c) The proposals should include an assessment of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can and should play in economic and social development.

"SEC. 303. TEMPORARY PLANNING COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED.—(a) There is hereby created a Foreign Aid Planning Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee") which shall consist of twelve members, no more than seven of whom shall be members of the same political party, to be selected as follows:

"(1) Four members to be appointed by the President from private life, none of whom shall have served at an executive level in the administration of the AID program in Washington;

"(2) Four members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, to be designated by the Vice President;

"(3) Four members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, to be designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The Committee shall select a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members.

"(b) It shall be the duty of the Committee (1) to make such studies and investigations as may be necessary to enable it to make recommendations to the President and to the Congress concerning the proposals referred to in section 302(a), and (2) to provide the President, or such officer or agency as the President may designate, with such assistance as the President or such officer or agency may request in the formulation of such proposals.

"(c) The Committee is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such secretarial, clerical, and other staff assistants as may be necessary to enable it to perform its functions, and to procure, without regard to the civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized for the departments by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (60 Stat. 810; 5 U.S.C. 55a), but at rates not to exceed \$100 per diem for individuals.

"(d) Members of the Committee appointed under subsection (a) (1) who are not otherwise employed by the United States shall be paid compensation at the rate of \$100 per diem while engaged in the work of the Committee, and shall be reimbursed for travel and other necessary expenses incurred while so engaged, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 73b-2) for persons in the Government service employed intermittently.

"(e) The Committee may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section, hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, administer such oaths, and require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents as the Committee may deem advisable. Subpoenas may be issued under the signature of the Chairman of the Committee and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman. The provisions of sections 102 to 104, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes (2 U.S.C. 192-194), shall apply in the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this subsection.

"(f) Each department and agency of the Government shall furnish to the Committee, upon its request, such information or other assistance as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions.

"(g) The Committee shall from time to time transmit to the President, and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, reports of its activities, including its recommendations, and shall file its final report on or before September 1, 1967. Upon

the filing of its final report, the Committee shall cease to exist.

"(h) There shall be made available to the Committee out of sums appropriated pursuant to this Act such amounts, not to exceed an aggregate of \$400,000, as the Committee deems necessary to enable it to carry out its functions."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the amendment as modified.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I rise to ask the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] a question with regard to subsection (c) on page 3.

It is my understanding from the reading by the clerk that this is totally different language than appears in printed amendment No. 704. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I do not believe it is totally different. There is a difference in language. There are six or seven lines in the beginning that were struck out, and the last four or five lines are substantially the same.

Mr. DOMINICK. I was concerned with the wording under amendment No. 704. I would like to know what difference it makes.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator heard the discussion of the minority leader today, as I did. The section was changed—I think the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] will confirm this to be satisfactory to the objections raised by the minority leader. The portions he discussed have been stricken.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

I would like to know what the wording is at the present time.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask that the clerk read the language.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it was just read in full.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask that the clerk read section (c) of amendment No. 704, beginning on page 3, line 18.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Section (c) will be read again.

Has the Senator from New York modified his amendment accordingly?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator please give to the clerk the amendment as he has modified it, so that the clerk may read it?

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The proposals referred to in subsection (a) should include an analysis of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can play in economic and social development through foreign aid.

Mr. DOMINICK. What is the whole of the subsection?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. The rest has been stricken.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I should like to ask a question of the Senator from New York. On page 2, paragraph 2, the modified amendment reads:

(2) Assistance for development purposes (A) to be extended only to countries in which progress is being made toward re-

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them an understanding, and gain the utmost cooperation that might be forthcoming under better circumstances.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, for the reasons expressed by the Senator from Louisiana, and because of other questions and issues that have been raised here on the floor of the Senate, I renew my motion.

I ask unanimous consent that the names of the following Senators be added as cosponsors of this motion: the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Does the Senator renew his motion?

Mr. McGOVERN. I renew the motion, and ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from South Dakota. On this question, the yeas and the nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] would vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present, and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 34, nays 55, as follows:

[No. 156 Leg.]

YEAS—34

Aiken	Javits	Muskie
Anderson	Kennedy, Mass.	Neuberger
Bartlett	Kennedy, N.Y.	Pell
Case	Kuchel	Saltonstall
Church	Long, La.	Scott
Clark	Mansfield	Smathers
Fulbright	McCarthy	Smith
Gore	McGee	Tydings
Gruening	McGovern	Yarborough
Hart	Monroney	Young, Ohio
Holland	Morse	
Inouye	Moss	

NAYS—55

Bennett	Byrd, Va.	Curtis
Bible	Byrd, W. Va.	Dirksen
Boggs	Cannon	Dominick
Brewster	Cooper	Douglas
Burdick	Cotton	Eastland

Ellender	Magnuson
Ervin	McIntyre
Fannin	Miller
Fong	Mondale
Griffin	Montoya
Harris	Mundt
Hartke	Murphy
Hickenlooper	Nelson
Hill	Pastore
Hruska	Prouty
Jackson	Proxmire
Jordan, N.C.	Randolph
Jordan, Idaho	Ribicoff
Long, Mo.	Robertson

NOT VOTING—11

Allott	Dodd	Metcalf
Bass	Hayden	Morton
Bayh	Lausche	Pearson
Carlson	McClellan	

So Mr. McGOVERN's motion was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD]. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] would each vote "Yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 56, nays 33, as follows:

[No. 157 Leg.]

YEAS—56

Anderson	Griffin	Pastore
Bennett	Harris	Prouty
Bible	Hartke	Proxmire
Boggs	Hickenlooper	Randolph
Brewster	Hill	Ribicoff
Burdick	Holland	Robertson
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Russell, S.C.
Byrd, W. Va.	Jackson	Russell, Ga.
Cannon	Jordan, N.C.	Simpson
Cooper	Jordan, Idaho	Sparkman
Cotton	Long, Mo.	Stennis
Curtis	Magnuson	Symington
Dominick	McIntyre	Talmadge
Douglas	Miller	Thurmond
Eastland	Mondale	Tower
Ellender	Montoya	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Mundt	Yarborough
Fannin	Murphy	Young, N. Dak.
Fong	Nelson	

NAYS—33

Aiken	Dirksen	Inouye
Bartlett	Fulbright	Javits
Case	Gore	Kennedy, Mass.
Church	Gruening	Kennedy, N.Y.
Clark	Hart	Kuchel

Long, La.	Morse
Mansfield	Moss
McCarthy	Muskie
McGee	Neuberger
McGovern	Pell
Monroney	Saltonstall

NOT VOTING—11

Allott	Dodd	Metcalf
Bass	Hayden	Morton
Bayh	Lausche	Pearson
Carlson	McClellan	

So the amendment, as modified, of Mr. BYRD of Virginia was agreed to.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TALMADGE in the chair). The bill is open to further amendment.

TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE IN SECRET SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in accord with Senate resolutions, the transcript of the recent secret session of the Senate has been made available to the chairmen of certain committees as well as to individual Senators who participated in the debate. The offices of all Senators who, under the Senate resolutions, have the right of access to this transcript have been notified of its availability.

I wish to announce today that the transcript, as adjusted, will go to the Printer on Wednesday afternoon, July 27, 1966. Any Senator who has the right of access to the transcript and who desires to exercise it should do so in room S-208 prior to noon on Wednesday. At that time as adjusted, the transcript, will be sent to the Printer for publication.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3534) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, I send to the desk the modified form of amendment No. 704. Section (c) is the only part of the amendment offered yesterday that has been modified, and I ask that that section be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment as modified.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. As modified, section (c), beginning on page 4, line 3, reads as follows:

The proposals should include an assessment of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can and should play in economic and social development.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, there was some discussion about this amendment yesterday afternoon. There were some objections raised by various Senators.

I have discussed the change made in section (c) with the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE]. I have

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discussed it in depth and at length with the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], who is a cosponsor of the amendment. I have also received the approval for the change from our cosponsors, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN]. It has also been discussed with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT], as well as the majority and minority leaders.

I believe that the amendment is acceptable to all the Senators I have mentioned.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I request that the amendment be read in full.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment in full.

The legislative clerk read as follows: On page 21, after line 7, add the following:

"CHAPTER 3—RE STUDY

"SEC. 301. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS.—The President is requested to submit to the Congress, on or before January 1, 1968, his recommendations, including legislative proposals designed to carry out such recommendations, for such future foreign assistance programs as may be necessary and appropriate in the national interest and taking into account the principles set forth in section 302.

"SEC. 302. PRINCIPLES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS.—(a) In the formulation and submission to the Congress of proposals for foreign assistance for fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 1968, such proposals should include, among others, the following categories:

"(1) Assistance intended primarily for humanitarian purposes, including grants, loans, contributions, or other aid to be made available for relief purposes through international organizations or relief agencies, or otherwise, famine relief and other assistance authorized by title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, and similar relief programs.

"(2) Assistance for development purposes (A) to be extended only to countries in which progress is being made toward respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and of the press, and recognition of the importance of individual freedom, initiative, and private enterprise; and (B) to be in furtherance of sound plans for economic and social growth to the end of developing the resources of the recipient countries to make them self-sufficient at the earliest possible date.

"(3) Assistance for political or contingency purposes, to be extended to a limited number of countries or areas, primarily for purposes of advancing or protecting the mutual interests of the United States and the other countries or areas concerned, such as programs relating to the creation of special relationships with recipient countries, reinforcement of alliance-type relationships, or other political or contingency purposes.

"(4) Military assistance to be furnished for purposes that serve the military defense of the United States as recommended by the Secretary of Defense, subject to approval by the Secretary of State.

"(b) In order to provide for better coordination of all programs of United States assistance to foreign countries, and for more efficient, economical, and effective administration of such programs, the proposals referred to in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) shall also include provisions for unification, insofar as practicable, of the administration of such programs under a single officer or agency.

"(c) The proposals should include an assessment of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can and should play in economic and social development.

"SEC. 303. TEMPORARY PLANNING COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED.—(a) There is hereby created a Foreign Aid Planning Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee") which shall consist of twelve members, no more than seven of whom shall be members of the same political party, to be selected as follows:

"(1) Four members to be appointed by the President from private life, none of whom shall have served at an executive level in the administration of the AID program in Washington;

"(2) Four members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, to be designated by the Vice President;

"(3) Four members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, to be designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The Committee shall select a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members.

"(b) It shall be the duty of the Committee (1) to make such studies and investigations as may be necessary to enable it to make recommendations to the President and to the Congress concerning the proposals referred to in section 302(a), and (2) to provide the President, or such officer or agency as the President may designate, with such assistance as the President or such officer or agency may request in the formulation of such proposals.

"(c) The Committee is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such secretarial, clerical, and other staff assistants as may be necessary to enable it to perform its functions, and to procure, without regard to the civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized for the departments by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (60 Stat. 810; 5 U.S.C. 55a), but at rates not to exceed \$100 per diem for individuals.

"(d) Members of the Committee appointed under subsection (a) (1) who are not otherwise employed by the United States shall be paid compensation at the rate of \$100 per diem while engaged in the work of the Committee, and shall be reimbursed for travel and other necessary expenses incurred while so engaged, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 73b-2) for persons in the Government service employed intermittently.

"(e) The Committee may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section, hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, administer such oaths, and require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents as the Committee may deem advisable. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the Chairman of the Committee and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman. The provisions of sections 102 to 104, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes (2 U.S.C. 192-194), shall apply in the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this subsection.

"(f) Each department and agency of the Government shall furnish to the Committee, upon its request, such information or other assistance as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions.

"(g) The Committee shall from time to time transmit to the President, and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, reports of its activities, including its recommendations, and shall file its final report on or before September 1, 1967. Upon

the filing of its final report, the Committee shall cease to exist.

"(h) There shall be made available to the Committee out of sums appropriated pursuant to this Act such amounts, not to exceed an aggregate of \$400,000, as the Committee deems necessary to enable it to carry out its functions."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the amendment as modified.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I rise to ask the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] a question with regard to subsection (e) on page 3.

It is my understanding from the reading by the clerk that this is totally different language than appears in printed amendment No. 704. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I do not believe it is totally different. There is a difference in language. There are six or seven lines in the beginning that were struck out, and the last four or five lines are substantially the same.

Mr. DOMINICK. I was concerned with the wording under amendment No. 704. I would like to know what difference it makes.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator heard the discussion of the minority leader today, as I did. The section was changed—I think the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] will confirm this to be satisfactory to the objections raised by the minority leader. The portions he discussed have been stricken.

Mr. DOMINICK. Thank the Senator from South Dakota.

I would like to know what the wording is at the present time.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask that the clerk read the language.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it was just read in full.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask that the clerk read section (c) of amendment No. 704, beginning on page 3, line 18.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Section (c) will be read again.

Has the Senator from New York modified his amendment accordingly?

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator please give to the clerk the amendment as he has modified it, so that the clerk may read it?

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The proposals referred to in subsection (a) should include an analysis of the role that economic assistance by the United States and other developed nations can play in economic and social development through foreign aid.

Mr. DOMINICK. What is the whole of the subsection?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. The rest has been stricken.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I should like to ask a question of the Senator from New York. On page 2, paragraph 2, the modified amendment reads:

(2) Assistance for development purposes (A) to be extended only to countries in which progress is being made toward re-

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them an understanding, and gain the utmost cooperation that might be forthcoming under better circumstances.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, for the reasons expressed by the Senator from Louisiana, and because of other questions and issues that have been raised here on the floor of the Senate, I renew my motion.

I ask unanimous consent that the names of the following Senators be added as cosponsors of this motion: the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Does the Senator renew his motion?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I renew the motion, and ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from South Dakota. On this question, the yeas and the nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] would vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present, and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 34, nays 55, as follows:

[No. 156 Leg.]
YEAS—34

Aiken	Javits	Muskie
Anderson	Kennedy, Mass.	Neuberger
Bartlett	Kennedy, N.Y.	Pell
Case	Kuchel	Saltonstall
Church	Long, La.	Scott
Clark	Mansfield	Smathers
Fulbright	McCarthy	Smith
Gore	McGee	Tydings
Gruening	McGovern	Yarborough
Hart	Monroney	Young, Ohio
Holland	Morse	
Inouye	Moss	

NAYS—55

Bennett	Byrd, Va.	Curtis
Bible	Byrd, W. Va.	Dirksen
Boggs	Cannon	Dominick
Brewster	Cooper	Douglas
Burdick	Cotton	Eastland

Ellender	Magnuson
Ervin	McIntyre
Fannin	Miller
Fong	Mondale
Griffin	Montoya
Harris	Mundt
Hartke	Murphy
Hickenlooper	Nelson
Hill	Pastore
Hruska	Prouty
Jackson	Proxmire
Jordan, N.C.	Randolph
Jordan, Idaho	Ribicoff
Long, Mo.	Robertson

NOT VOTING—11

Allott	Dodd	Metcalfe
Bass	Hayden	Morton
Bayh	Lausche	Pearson
Carlson	McClellan	

So Mr. MCGOVERN'S motion was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD]. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] would each vote "Yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] is absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 56, nays 33, as follows:

[No. 157 Leg.]
YEAS—56

Anderson	Griffin	Pastore
Bennett	Harris	Prouty
Bible	Hartke	Proxmire
Boggs	Hickenlooper	Randolph
Brewster	Hill	Ribicoff
Burdick	Holland	Robertson
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Russell, S.C.
Byrd, W. Va.	Jackson	Russell, Ga.
Cannon	Jordan, N.C.	Simpson
Cooper	Jordan, Idaho	Sparkman
Cotton	Long, Mo.	Stennis
Curtis	Magnuson	Symington
Dominick	McIntyre	Talmadge
Douglas	Miller	Thurmond
Eastland	Mondale	Tower
Ervin	Montoya	Williams, Del.
Fannin	Mundt	Yarborough
Fong	Murphy	Young, N. Dak.
	Nelson	

NAYS—33

Aiken	Dirksen	Inouye
Bartlett	Fulbright	Javits
Case	Gore	Kennedy, Mass.
Church	Gruening	Kennedy, N.Y.
Clark	Hart	Kuchel

Russell, S.C.
Russell, Ga.
Simpson
Sparkman
Stennis
Symington
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Williams, N.J.
Williams, Del.
Young, N. Dak.

Long, La.
Mansfield
Moss
McCarthy
McGee
McGovern
Monroney

Morse
Moss
Muskie
Neuberger
Pell
Saltonstall

Scott
Smathers
Smith
Tydings
Williams, N.J.
Young, Ohio

NOT VOTING—11

Allott	Dodd	Metcalfe
Bass	Hayden	Morton
Bayh	Lausche	Pearson
Carlson	McClellan	

So the amendment, as modified, of Mr. BYRD of Virginia was agreed to.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER [Mr. TALMADGE] in the chair. The bill is open to further amendment.

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Used on Joint Airport Mileage" printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MISLEADING FIGURES USED ON JOINT AIRPORT MILEAGE

In exploring Appalachia's civil airport needs the Appalachian Regional Commission is searching for the most advantageous means of speeding economic development.

The introduction to the report of Management & Economics Research, Inc., on the feasibility of a joint Huntington-Charleston airport said:

"The overall objective of the study is to develop guidelines for the use of the Appalachian Regional Commission in recommending the location and financing of airport projects within the region and, ultimately, to develop a comprehensive airport plan for the Appalachian Region."

The report said further:

"Transportation facilities have long been recognized as one of the most fruitful areas of public investment for stimulating economic development; the recent predominance of air in common carrier intercity travel makes airports increasingly important to economic development."

The survey pointed out that major airlines are preparing to turn chiefly to jets and warned that unless the Tri-State area and Charleston proceed with plans to expand airport facilities to accommodate such craft, their air service will steadily deteriorate in the future.

With these findings most informed citizens will doubtless agree.

But the discussion of the relative benefits of developing the proposed Sissonville site near Charleston, the available site of a joint airport near Hurricane and the Tri-State terminal now in operation will stir heated controversy.

The report is skeptical about the advisability of attempting a joint airport because of the distance between the Tri-State and Charleston.

And yet this conclusion vital to the entire study is apparently based on an incorrect statement of distances.

The report locates the ridge proposed for the joint development 2.5 miles east of Hurricane and 2.5 miles north of Interstate Highway 64. This information is on page 59.

But on page 62 a table places the site 85 miles both from Huntington and from Charleston and gives the driving time from each city as 40 minutes.

This is in glaring conflict with distances officially accepted by the West Virginia Road Commission.

An official of the commission said the distance from downtown Huntington to downtown Charleston is 50 miles. He frequently drives from here to the state office near the Capitol there in about an hour.

Hurricane is generally accepted as the midway point between the two cities, or 25 miles from each. If the proposed joint airport site is 2.5 miles east of Hurricane and 2.5 miles north of I-64, it would be approximately 30 miles from Huntington and not more than 25 from Charleston.

That would be only nine miles farther from Charleston than the 16 miles given as the distance to the proposed Sissonville site. Certainly Charleston residents interested in flying would not require 40 minutes to drive 25 miles.

Nevertheless, partly on the basis of this finding the survey leans toward developing the Sissonville site rather than the proposed joint location.

Furthermore, the report proceeds to the absurd conclusion that if the Appalachian Commission helps finance the Sissonville airport for Charleston, it should not support an immediate extension of Tri-State field.

In short, after emphasizing the importance of air service to economic development, the presumed specialists find that driving 25 miles to the joint airport would be too much for Charleston passengers but that the people of Ohio and Kentucky west of Huntington should be required to travel twice as far to Sissonville.

This aspect of the report should by all means be called to the attention of Senators COOPER and MORTON, of Kentucky and Senators YOUNG and LAUSCHER, of Ohio, all of whom have expressed interest in the development of Tri-State airport.

The slight to the Tri-State is also in direct conflict with the statement of John L. Sweeney, Appalachian Commission cochairman, in an address here several months ago.

Mr. Sweeney said that in developing new job opportunities emphasis would be placed on Ashland, Huntington and Charleston. We don't believe he will be inclined to neglect the two angles of the important triangle and put all the effort on Charleston.

Although the MERI report seemed to favor the Sissonville development because of the distance of a joint facility from Huntington and Charleston, it further compounded confusion by suggesting that the Tri-State consider a joint terminal with Portsmouth.

That is as bad as its reference to eastern Kentucky as western Kentucky, for Portsmouth by U.S. Route 52 is 46 miles from Huntington, only four miles closer than Charleston.

In spite of the findings of the slipshod survey, the most economical and generally the most advantageous procedure seems to be to build a joint airport.

But if Charleston rejects that proposal the obvious course for the Tri-State is to push the expansion of its own airport.

An important step toward that end is being taken in the application of the Airport Authority to the Federal Aviation Agency and the Appalachian Regional Commission for aid.

Efforts will no doubt continue to assure support for these applications by influential Senators and Representatives from Ohio and Kentucky.

Proceeding with the Tri-State project as a means of providing service here that has been available only in Charleston is the surest way to convince Kenawha County of the advisability of a joint airport.

THE BRITISH ECONOMIC CRISIS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I promise the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] that I will take precisely 3 minutes and no more, so that we may both be able to speak before 12:30 o'clock.

Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate today to Britain's current economic crisis, one of the most portentous events in the history of Britain, concerning the breakdown of the British pound, which would do two things: One, it could herald a world depression. Second, it could seriously jeopardize the dollar, which would then remain the only international currency.

For this reason, I urge the President of the United States to do what J. P. Morgan once did on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, and that was to "put his arm around Britain."

Mr. President, I think that is what the President of the United States should do. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Harold Wilson, is coming here on July 29 and I should like to see our President state to the world the following:

First, that we have a deep interest in

what happens to Britain economically, and that we are going to try to help her. There are various ways in which we can help. Britain needs the benefit of a "modernization fund," financed by the United States and other OECD nations in order to become automated and to get abreast of modernization practices in business. I think possibly it would take \$10 billion, at the rate of approximately \$1 billion a year, but the economic health of Britain is well worth this sum. She certainly is credit worthy.

Second, we must get into some kind of trade deal with Britain and the European Free Trade Area. This is essential since Britain should be assured of an alternative if she cannot get into the Common Market.

It is long past the time that we had an international monetary conference to take the world off the "cross of gold" in respect to trade.

Therefore, I think that if the President of the United States would put his arm around Britain now, and state to the world that we recognize the tremendous implications of the British crisis to the whole world economy, that we intend to do something about it—not with palliatives to support the pound against speculators but by substantial long-range action—the job could be done effectively and would help Britain enormously in this crisis.

I feel that only new and imaginative long-term moves by Britain supported by the United States and other industrialized nations to modernize the British economy can prevent the steady recurrence of runs against the pound and sagging confidence in Britain's ability to help herself.

The forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Wilson provides a unique opportunity to open discussions on major and constructive arrangements for the modernization of the British economy. The U.S. willingness to rescue the pound every time a crisis arises, while temporarily helpful, has not and will not deal with Britain's fundamental problems.

I, therefore, recommend the following steps which, in my view, provide the basis for the revitalization of Britain and which I hope would become part of the discussions between Prime Minister Wilson and the administration:

First. There should be established a sizable "modernization fund" by the United States, the other OECD nations to help industrialized countries, such as the United Kingdom, with long-term structural economic problems. Assistance from the International Monetary Fund is available only to countries which have short-term balance-of-payments problems. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development today makes occasional loans to industrialized nations for electric power stations, ports and railroad construction but these represent only a small portion of its total loans. I would place this "modernization fund" in the IBRD and have the United States contribute at least one-third of a multibillion-dollar fund over a 5-year period—I would estimate that a fund of \$10 billion would be required—

other industrialized nations or international agencies to contribute the rest.

The purpose of this "modernization fund" would be to provide a source of capital for the modernization of British production and for the development of programs to effect such modernization. These funds would not be used to finance social welfare programs or to nationalize basic industries.

Second, I also propose a treaty for trade and economic cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom, other EEC and EFTA nations, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and other industrialized countries of the OECD which agree to adhere to the rules of trade of such a Free Trade Area. This trade treaty would take the form of a commitment for lowering tariff and nontariff barriers on an across-the-board basis by 5 percent per year for manufactured products over each of the next 20 years. The aim of the treaty would be to achieve substantially free trade, subject to national security exceptions, on manufactured products among the industrialized countries by the end of the period. Associate membership should be offered to the developing countries, giving them the right of access to this market after a transitional period during which they would be permitted to retain, with appropriate safeguards, protection for infant industries.

The logical place for Britain is within the Common Market and it should make every effort to obtain entry into EEC and become part of an integrated Europe, however, should it become apparent within the foreseeable future that this effort would not bear fruit, the United Kingdom must decide on a realistic alternative, which I believe is the plan I propose.

Due to the relative competitive advantages of the United States in industrial production over that of the other prospective members, and due to the complicated problems involved in the reduction of trade barriers in the field of agriculture, this process would have to be gradual and special arrangements would have to be made to cushion the injury caused by adjustments that would be made in the process. To accomplish this, a multinational adjustment assistance fund could be established with financial participation by all members on a proportional basis.

Third, The United States and the United Kingdom should continue to press for the early convening of an international monetary conference to effect a basic reform in the international monetary system. The United States is already on record that it would participate in such a conference. The United Kingdom and the United States should now make a new and urgent commitment to an international conference at an early date to assure that procedural arrangements do not become an excuse for interminable delay.

The economic and security problems facing the United Kingdom today are serious ones. The need to modernize British industry and the heavy costs which this and maintenance of a modern defense establishment place on the

British pound and its balance of payments cannot be but major concerns both for the United Kingdom and for its other transatlantic allies.

IN SUPPORT OF CREATION OF NEW COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I fully support the resolution reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations to create a new Committee on Intelligence Operations.

As the report clearly states, the effect of this resolution would be simply to authorize the appointment of three members of the Committee on Foreign Relations to the existing Senate committee which deals with the activities of the CIA. The members of the existing committee are drawn exclusively from the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations.

It cannot be denied that the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees have a legitimate interest in the activities of the CIA and a corresponding obligation to exercise congressional oversight. Nothing in the proposed resolution would derogate from this authority.

But it is equally clear that the great bulk of the work done by the CIA has profound implications for the conduct of this Nation's foreign policy. Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate plainly states that all matters relating to the relations of the United States with foreign nations fall within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. Consequently it would seem to me that an arrangement of the sort contemplated by the resolution, which would permit the Foreign Relations Committee to play its proper role in overseeing the activities of the CIA, is long overdue.

A further consideration is the need of members of the Foreign Relations Committee to have at their disposal the intelligence necessary to permit them to make informed judgments on matters within the area of their responsibility. Through its three members on the proposed Committee on Intelligence Operations, the Foreign Relations Committee would be able to open a new channel for the transmission of pertinent information from the CIA to the committee.

It is symptomatic of the problem that not much is known about the means by which the CIA exercises its influence over the conduct of our foreign policy. However, it would seem safe to assume that decisions of a purely foreign policy nature, as well as military decisions with direct or indirect foreign policy implications are regularly made by the President and his foreign policy advisers on the basis of reports, estimates and analyses supplied by the CIA. And it does not require inside information to know that both in the collection and in the interpretation of intelligence data, judgment and selectivity are very much involved.

These considerations apply with far more force to the CIA's non-intelligence gathering activities—facetiously referred to as "dirty tricks." It is hardly neces-

sary to recall the ill-advised Bay of Pigs operation to perceive the vast foreign policy implications of this kind of activity.

My argument is not that the CIA is insufficiently supervised by the Senate, but that it is supervised from a point of view which tends to place too much emphasis on purely military considerations and not enough on foreign policy considerations. The pending resolution is designed to correct that imbalance, and I strongly urge its adoption.

NOMINATION OF ROBERT R. BOWIE TO HIGH STATE DEPARTMENT POST

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an editorial published in the Boston Globe, on July 9, 1966, entitled "A Brinkman to Washington."

The editorial has reference to the current nomination of Robert R. Bowie to a high position in the State Department, an appointment with which I am not in accord.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Boston Globe, July 9, 1966]

A BRINKMAN TO WASHINGTON

President Lyndon B. Johnson on Tuesday named a Harvard faculty member to a high State Department post, but it was not a nomination to please followers of the Kennedy line on foreign affairs.

The nominee is Robert R. Bowie, a professor of international relations and currently director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs.

Reports from Washington are that there will be a battle in the Senate over his confirmation. There ought to be.

Mr. Bowie will be returning to the State Department as counselor. In 1953 he became director of policy planning under then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and three years later was promoted to Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning. He traveled widely with Secretary Dulles and was closely associated with his policy of massive nuclear deterrence and brinkmanship.

Since then, as a frequent consultant to the State Department, he helped originate the proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) including West Germany, and has suggested that it might operate without an American veto. The proposal, fortunately, is now comatose.

Mr. Bowie, then, is a dedicated hard-liner. His nomination is fresh evidence of the new and harsher foreign policy evolving in Washington. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee ought to ask some probing questions about it.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES CONVENTION OF 1949

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONTROYA in the chair). The hour of 12:30 o'clock having arrived, under the unanimous-consent agreement, the Chair lays before the Senate the protocols, Execu-

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tion to this proposal in the interest of the health and welfare of numerous aged American citizens.

USE OF FEDERAL AID FUNDS TO BRING ABOUT FEDERAL CONTROL OF LOCAL PROGRAMS

(Mr. HALEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HALEY. Mr. Speaker, I have asked permission at this time to place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an editorial which appeared in the Bradenton Herald, one of the leading daily newspapers of my State. The author, John T. Hamner, is one of the ablest newspapermen I have ever known. His editorial, "The Obvious Is Admitted," is the finest presentation I have ever read on the subject of the use of Federal aid funds to bring about Federal control of local programs.

I have often reminded my constituents of the fact that Federal control is inherent in Federal aid. Mr. Hamner sets forth very clearly the degree to which this control has developed. He also makes equally clear the fact that these Federal aid dollars come from the same pocketbook the local dollar comes from. I hope that all of my colleagues and all who subscribe to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will read Mr. Hamner's excellent editorial.

For those who are concerned about Federal control in local programs, they can consider Mr. Hamner's conclusion that a "community can decide for itself if the dance is really worth the piper's price."

The editorial follows:

THE OBVIOUS IS ADMITTED

If anyone had any lingering doubts that aim of federal "aid" programs has all along been control of local affairs, that doubt should be removed by the recent declaration of a high federal official with a lot of "aid" money to dispense.

Dr. Tinsley L. Spraggins of the U.S. Office of Education Opportunities put it bluntly: "Money is power, and the government intends to use this power as a lever to pressure school systems both North and South, to eliminate the last vestiges of segregation."

Dr. Tinsley was only admitting what has been obvious for some time, and was speaking only of one particular aspect of federal aid-force intentions. What he says applies generally to the federal programs, and for more purposes than elimination of all traces of segregation—enforced, de facto or volunteer.

The Government gives a community money to help it build a hospital. Then it tells the hospital whom it must admit, where they must be bedded down, what sort of services it may or must offer, what sort of construction it can use.

Then the government gives the hospitals money, via paying patient bills, and begins to tell it what it can charge.

The government gives the schools money, and tells them whom they may and must teach, how the teaching is to be handled, how the program must be run. This swells the programs and the employment rolls and the activities, but does nothing for the real purpose of a school system, which is teaching the regular courses to all students. So the government dangles the bait of still more money to systems hard put for cash, and creates pressures for the schools to invite the government still further into financing—and running—the schools.

The same thing has been going on for years in other areas. The central government gives "matching funds" to states to build highways, and then demands the right to approve or disapprove everything about those highways from where they go to what sort of signs may be placed on private property within sight of them.

It gives "aid" programs to framers to "guarantee" them equal shares of the proceeds of the market place, and then tells them what they can plant, where they can plant it, and what they must do with it when harvested.

The government has been well pleased with the success of its projects. It has slipped the controls in so smoothly behind the checks that many people didn't suspect they were there. And the politicians have succeeded in having these programs come at the "demand" of the public, which now sees growing proposals to solve problems for people that the people didn't even know they had.

Still, many persist in seeking "federal aid" to pay for projects they sometimes need, more often just think would be nice to have. And thus they give new support to the fallacy that the central government can help states and communities do things.

The federal dollar for building hospitals and expanding school activities comes from the same pocketbook the local dollar comes from. The federal road-building dollar comes from the same gas pump the state dollar comes from.

One community can't stop the trend by passing up the temptations of the Pezomao Lorelets. One community can't push the camel back out of the tent.

But one community can decide for itself if the dance is really worth the piper's price. And this one, beginning to show signs of addiction to the federal dollar, needs to be deciding.

CONTROLLING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, this afternoon the other body is considering legislation to establish a Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations, a watchdog committee to oversee the far-reaching activities of the American intelligence community, and especially those of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a debate that we should watch carefully, for the problems involved in the oversight of foreign intelligence have often been the subject of our great concern.

I have made my position on the subject quite clear in the past. In each of the Congresses in which I have served, I have introduced legislation to establish a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence to provide meaningfully oversight. I have stood in the well of the House on many occasions to stress the need for such congressional supervision. On two occasions, I have testified before the House Rules Committee, urging it to recognize Congress' responsibility to supervise closely our intelligence apparatus.

The legislation which the Senate is considering would establish a permanent standing committee, which would act in this area instead of the present subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and add three members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Functioning only in the Senate, it would not provide the unified over-

sight that a joint committee could, but it is a very important step in the right direction because of its recognition of the role the intelligence community plays in American foreign affairs.

The current debate marks only the second time that the problem of controlling foreign intelligence has been debated on the floor of either body since the establishment of the CIA in the National Security Act of 1947. The other time was in 1956, when Senator MANSFIELD's resolution to create a joint committee was defeated.

It is regrettable that the current debate comes at a time when a new Director of Central Intelligence has just been appointed, for it is argued that it would be inappropriate to place checks on a man before he can prove himself. To say this is to miss the point, however, for the idea of congressional control of intelligence is a basic one which transcends whoever fills any of the offices involved. The Founding Fathers believed in the abstract ideal of checks and balances, regardless of personalities, as a necessity for democratic government. It is that concept which is not at stake.

Mr. Speaker, the problems of controlling intelligence are great, but the dangers are even greater. This point is emphasized in a study recently done by a member of my staff, Mr. Gary Sperling, entitled "Central Intelligence and Its Control." The essay examines the history and current workings of the intelligence community and attempts to evaluate the arguments for and against congressional control. I know that many Members of the House will find it of interest.

The study follows:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND ITS CONTROL: CURBING SECRET POWER IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

(By Gary Sperling, May 1966)

This essay is founded upon two assumptions: that the government of the United States must continue to rest upon that most basic principle of the Declaration of Independence, "consent of the governed," and that such consent cannot be meaningful unless the governed are allowed to know to what they are consenting. With the advent of the Cold War, these two assumptions have ceased to characterize properly our American government. Our nation's leaders, motivated by seeming requirements of national security, have increasingly placed large sectors of American policy out of the range of public surveillance. Important information about the workings of our government have been withheld from the people on the theory that potential enemies would also receive the information and use it to advantage. "We have cloaked the operations of the Executive Branch of Government in veils of secrecy unknown to any previous epoch of our history."¹ As a result, the most basic principle of American democracy has become eroded. James Madison, over a century and a half ago, remarked, "It is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to the provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."² Today his prediction has come true, and in no field more so

¹ Walter Mills, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: Putnam, 1956), p. 360.

² Letter to Thomas Jefferson, May 17, 1798, *The Complete Madison*, ed. Saul K. Padover (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 253.

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than in the shadowy, spectacular, and romantic area of foreign intelligence.

At the same time, that governmental secrecy has increased at home, the need for information from abroad has also increased. Almost any area of the world contains either a potential American enemy or a potential crisis spot—and most parts harbor both. The Cold War requires that we monitor all of these, lest the United States be caught unaware of possible danger to it. A missile may strike the United States from a launching site thousands of miles away; every point on the globe is now "strategic". Complex and costly modern weapons systems take years to construct; unknowable future political situations must often be predicted with a high degree of reliability. In addition, there is the difficulty of penetrating the large portion of today's world that lies behind the Iron Curtain; a considerable bureaucracy is required to ferret information out of totalitarian states. For these reasons, the tasks of intelligence have been immense, complex, world-wide, and ever-present. Intelligence has become a way of life to every major governmental leader, who must regard it as a necessary tool in national decision-making. The American intelligence community is well aware of its important role; a former Director of Central Intelligence has said, "There has never been a time in history . . . when Intelligence has had as clear an opportunity to get its views over as it has had in this country in recent years. The National Security Act of 1947 . . . has given Intelligence a more influential position in our government than Intelligence enjoys in any other in the world."³ Certainly, with no immediate easing of the Cold War in sight, with military technology ever developing bigger and better weapons, and especially with America currently involved in a long and costly struggle in Southeast Asia, the prospect is that national security will require even more of our intelligence agencies in the years to come.

Yet this important part of our government remains wrapped, as Senator EUGENE MCCARTHY has put it, "in its cloak of secrecy."⁴ The American public and even its elected representatives hear little of intelligence operations—such as the U-2 flights—until after they have either been completed successfully or failed miserably. The most basic information on our intelligence community, such as its total annual budget or approximate figures on the number of people in its employ, are kept strictly "top secret", lest the enemy find and use the data. Often this reaches the height of absurdity; information which is readily available to the rest of the world is kept from the average American citizen. For instance, the National Security Agency, widely known in both the foreign and domestic press as America's "communications intelligence" arm (making and breaking codes, intercepting secret messages, developing techniques for transmitting secret information, etc.), is officially described only as performing "highly specialized technical and coordinating functions relating to the national security."⁵ Americans were shocked to learn last year of a CIA agent's offer of a three million dollar bribe to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore; they were star-

led to hear recently of the use of Michigan State University as a "cover" for intelligence activities in South Viet Nam. Yet this national outrage does not compare with the international disgrace brought upon the United States by the disclosure of such shady maneuvers as the Bay of Pigs operation.

Its self-imposed ultra-secrecy poses great problems for the intelligence community. Because the public cannot be sure what is and what isn't an American intelligence operation, it tends to suspect shadiness everywhere. "Anywhere in the world, when a minister resigns or a military junta takes over, the handwriting on the wall immediately spells CIA."⁶ The frequent unfairness of these charges once caused Allen Dulles, then Director of Central Intelligence, to remark, "I only wish we had accomplished all that the Soviets attribute to us."⁷ But Dulles realized the difficulty of his situation: "I am the head of the silent service and cannot advertise my wares . . . public relations must be sacrificed to the security of our operations."⁸ John F. Kennedy also stressed this point in commenting to a group of intelligence administrators at the opening of the CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia, "Your successes are unheralded; your failures are trumpeted."⁹ The present secrecy arrangements do not allow intelligence officials to boast of actions that go well and those that go poorly generally speak for themselves.

If it is risky for the intelligence administrator to present the truth, it is all but impossible for the scholar to obtain it. There is always a body of legitimately secret information about any intelligence operation, and beyond that is the general governmental fear of discussion epitomized by Senator HENRY JACKSON's statement that "details with respect to intelligence should not be discussed" during the 1962 debate over the nomination of John A. McCone to be Director of Central Intelligence because it "may be unwittingly giving aid and comfort to the enemy."¹⁰ Only those in charge of any given intelligence action can speak authoritatively of its nature, and these are the very people who would not do so. Harry Howe Ransom, author of a number of books and articles on U.S. intelligence, confesses, "One simply cannot apply the usual rigorous standards of data gathering and documentation to this subject."¹¹ Yet a certain amount of material is available on this subject and within its restrictions one can analyze some of the dilemmas presented by the existence of a secret intelligence apparatus in a democratic society.

It is clear that today's international situation requires some adaptation of the Founding Fathers' principles. In 1822, Madison wrote, "A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both."¹² Today most citizens would agree that the wide dissemination of information on intelligence methods and results is impractical for them

and infeasible for the nation. The subject is both too complex and too fraught with danger for the entire populace to be so informed. However, it must never be considered so sensitive as to be withheld from the people's chosen representatives. Americans must look to a system of careful oversight if the tenuous compromise between defense and democracy is to be reached.

II

While it is common to refer to our intelligence functionaries as *the* CIA, this is only partly true. The Central Intelligence Agency is but one of a large number of executive officers which deal in the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence. Flanking it are the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Intelligence, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a handful of more minor government agencies. Two aspects, however, set the CIA apart. On the one hand, it is the overall coordinating body, with final responsibility for the evaluation and dissemination of intelligence data through all parts of our federal government. On the other hand, though, it is the only one of the agencies listed that is not directly subject to the type of executive oversight Americans have come to expect of their Congress, oversight born of the basic principle of governmental checks and balances. We shall examine this unusual position later on, but for now let us consider the broad organizational outline of the intelligence community.

Perhaps the most closely guarded secret in Washington is the intelligence community's budget. Tucked into Defense Department contingency funds and costly weapons expenditures, its exact amount is known only to a handful of intelligence and Bureau of the Budget officials, as well as the President. In the absence of clear fact, a good deal of speculation has arisen: Hanson Baldwin estimated in 1954 that the total is approximately \$2 billion; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross claim it is about \$4 billion.¹³ Allen Dulles has called figures such as these "several times exaggerated."¹⁴ Yet Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who was one of President Kennedy's chief national security aides, says that the CIA's budget exceeds the State Department's by more than 50 per cent and that *this* amount is but half that of the intelligence expenses of the Defense Department.¹⁵ If we assume that his information is correct (and no better source has as yet become available), the CIA's budget must exceed \$600 million and the total allowance for the entire intelligence community must easily top \$2 billion, or more than, for instance, the cost of the entire War on Poverty for this year. Similar academic detective work reveals that the intelligence community employs about 25,000 persons, approximately 15,000 of whom work directly for the CIA.¹⁶

Currently atop this vast bureaucracy is Rear Admiral William F. Raborn (USN retired), the Director of Central Intelligence; his job has been called "second in importance

³ Sanche de Gramont, *The Secret War* (New York: Putnam, 1962), p. 28.

⁴ *U.S. News and World Report*, March 19, 1954, p. 63.

⁵ Address before the Advertising Council of San Francisco, California, September 19, 1957.

⁶ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 5.

⁷ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, January 29, 1962, p. 1066. This and other CONGRESSIONAL RECORD references are to the permanent edition, unless otherwise noted.

⁸ *Can American Democracy Survive The Cold War?* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), p. 167.

⁹ Letter to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822, *The Complete Madison*, p. 267.

¹⁰ "Myopia on Intelligence," *New York Times*, June 3, 1954, p. 13. *The Invisible Government* (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 277-8.

¹¹ *U.S. News and World Report*, March 19, 1954, p. 67.

¹² *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 427.

¹³ See Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story* (New York: Morrow, 1962), pp. 17-27; Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. vi, 82; and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, p. 232.

only to the President" by Senator RUSSELL, who as Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Armed Services is in a unique position to know.¹⁷ He wears two "hats", serving as both chief coordinator of the intelligence community as a whole and as the everyday administrator of its major component. He sits in on National Security Council meetings as chief intelligence advisor. He has the responsibility, under the National Security Act of 1947, to inspect and evaluate the intelligence product of all government security agencies. He has virtually free rein to hire and fire CIA personnel without regard for Civil Service regulations. Perhaps most important, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 allows him to spend any and all of the CIA's multimillion dollar annual appropriation purely on his personal voucher. As one author has commented, "This is truly an extraordinary power for the head of an Executive agency with thousands of employees and annual expenditures in the hundreds of millions of dollars."¹⁸

The role of the CIA may be seen by merely noting the names of its four subdivisions: Intelligence, Research, Plans, and Support. The CIA is charged with collecting *intelligence* (80 per cent of this material is gained through *research* among such "open sources" as technical magazines and foreign broadcast monitorings), using this data to draw up reports on the economic, political, social, and military situation in all crisis and potential crisis areas (this includes both long-range projections and daily summaries); providing this information to policy-makers to aid in the formation of *plans* for the national security; and providing such *support* for these operations as many prove necessary.¹⁹

The National Security Agency, a part of the Defense Department, has primary responsibility for "communications intelligence": the making and breaking of codes, the interception of secret message of foreign governments, the development of techniques for the secret transmission of information, and the use of electronics for acquiring, communicating, and protecting all forms of information. The NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, contains 1,400,000 square feet of office space and is reputed to have more electric wiring than any other building in the world.²⁰ Its "domestic" budget is well over \$100 million a year.²¹

The Defense Intelligence Agency was established by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs fiasco; its goal is to unify the intelligence efforts of the Department of Defense by combining many of the formerly separate activities of each of the armed services. These smaller staffs—Army Intelligence (G-2), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and Air Force Intelligence (A-2)—still exist and continue to supply particular service intelligence requirements. The DIA is charged with furnishing all Defense Department current operations intelligence, determining all Defense intelligence requirements, and producing all military intelligence estimates for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

United States military commands throughout the world, and the Secretary of Defense. It is, in a sense, a holding company within a higher holding company; the Director both coordinates all military intelligence within the Department of Defense and represents the DIA on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the overall coordinating committee of the intelligence community, on which the Director of Central Intelligence serves as Chairman.

The State Department is the oldest American hand in the intelligence field; it has supplied political, economic, and social information on foreign countries to national policy-makers since its establishment in 1789. Since 1947 it has had only the task of collecting this information from nations in the free world; the extra difficulties of extracting similar information from totalitarian nations has made it necessary to shift this chore to the better-equipped CIA.²² Over the years, there has been considerable conflict between State and the CIA, and today State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research regards itself as the research and analysis arm of the Secretary of State's office.²³ Given the central role of State in the formation of foreign policy, this bureau has great potential importance, but the fact that its budget is dwarfed by the other major intelligence producers hinders it as a vital day-to-day factor.

The Atomic Energy Commission has primary responsibility for intelligence relating to atomic energy, including periodic estimates of the atomic-weapons capabilities of the nuclear powers, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation plays a central role in the important task of *counterespionage*. Other government departments and agencies who supply intelligence data in selected areas include the Department of Commerce, the Post Office Department, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Library of Congress, and certain government-affiliated research organizations, such as the Rand Corporation.

In sum, the intelligence community is a loose confederation of agencies from throughout the federal government, bound together on a continuing basis only by the fact that all coordinate their work with the CIA and the USIB and are officially under the President. In a segmented field, where it is the rule that details of operations are divulged only to those with a "need to know" and where it is therefore common to find a man at one desk totally unaware of what the man at the next desk is doing, it may safely be said that only the Director of Central Intelligence (and perhaps his highest-ranking assistants) can be aware of all the activities of the intelligence community. Yet it is this very man who differs from the other agency directors in that he is not responsible to the Congress for his budget, his employee policies, or the specific details of the operations he heads. The man to whom the system gives the most power is also the man who needs deal with the least checks upon him.

That the intelligence community should have attained such a far-reaching and secure position within our government is in one sense surprising, for the American people came only lately to an appreciation of the value of a coordinated intelligence apparatus. According to its own official history, the United States Army was "slow to recognize the importance of military intelligence and backward in its use in the solution of mili-

tary problems."²⁴ Until after World War II, there was little or no official government intelligence activity except in time of combat. For example, when the United States entered World War I in 1917, Army Intelligence consisted of a tiny section buried within a division of the General Staff—with only two officers and two clerks.²⁵ This was rapidly expanded during the year's involvement in the war, but almost as rapidly dismantled afterwards; symptomatic of official feeling about intelligence is the comment of Henry L. Stimson who, on becoming Secretary of State in 1929, closed down the nation's only cryptographic agency, saying, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."²⁶ During the interwar years, according to George C. Marshall, our foreign intelligence was "quite more than what a military attaché could learn at a dinner, more or less, over the coffee cups."²⁷ Intelligence at this time rarely attracted the most promising officers and usually received meager Congressional appropriations. Many Congressmen looked upon a military attaché as an officer being sent upon a luxurious vacation at the expense of and with no benefit to, the American taxpayer. Yet the neglect of intelligence cannot fully be blamed on such parochialism. More important was the lack of recognition within the State, War, and Navy Departments of the importance, even in peacetime, of coordinated foreign intelligence, and perhaps the most fundamental cause of intelligence neglect was the temper of the times—a period of isolation from world affairs, of America's viewing itself as a moral bastion, and of a military policy of passive defense. For all these reasons, Congress in the 1920's normally appropriated less than \$200,000 annually for Army Intelligence and similarly small amounts for other agencies involved in intelligence.²⁸

Pearl Harbor ended the apathy. The attack came as an almost complete surprise to American officials; when Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox received the news of the Japanese attack, he exclaimed, "My God, this can't be true. This [message] must mean the Philippines!"²⁹ Later investigation of the events leading up to the "day of infamy" proved that the information necessary to anticipate the attack was actually available to the Government, but that a lack of proper evaluation and dissemination apparatus had prevented the information from reaching the President and his chief advisors.³⁰ As in World War I, the response to the recognition of American intelligence inadequacy was a proliferation of temporary agencies; this time, though, there was one improvement: the formation of a Joint Intelligence Committee, a coordinating agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was of little help; General William J. Donovan, head of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, has admitted that President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference, lacking accurate intelligence reports, failed to realize that the

²⁴ Department of the Army, *American Military History, 1607-1953* (Washington, 1956), p. 491.

²⁵ Peyton C. Marsh, *The Navy at War* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1932), p. 226.

²⁶ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, p. 71.

²⁷ U.S. Senate Committee on Military Affairs, *Hearings*, "Department of Armed Forces," 79th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1945, p. 61.

²⁸ Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, pp. 51-3.

²⁹ Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, p. 54.

³⁰ Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission), *Intelligence Activities*, June, 1955, pp. 29-30.

¹⁷ U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Services, *Hearings*, "Nomination of John A. McCone to be Director of Central Intelligence," 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, 1962, p. 9.

¹⁸ Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, pp. 80-83.

¹⁹ I have simplified somewhat here. It is actually the Plans Division that conducts covert operations; the Support Division is merely an administrative arm in charge of such bureaucratic needs as equipment, logistics, etc.

²⁰ David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, p. 221. See note 5.

²¹ Harry Howe Ransom, *Can American Democracy Survive The Cold War?*, p. 136.

²² Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, pp. 48-50.

²³ Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, pp. 121-3. Harry Howe Ransom, *Can American Democracy Survive The Cold War?*, p. 137.

Japanese were almost defeated and "traded important postwar concessions for Stalin's guarantee of entry into the Pacific war."³¹

The lessons of Pearl and Yalta were not lost upon America's leaders. General Eisenhower called the lack of centralized intelligence "a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning," and President Truman commented, "The war taught us this lesson—that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form."³² Early in 1946, Truman took the first step toward the creation of a coordinated intelligence apparatus, issuing an Executive Order that established the Central Intelligence Group.

The Group operated under an Executive Council—the National Intelligence Authority—composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, as well as a representative of the President. It was primarily a holding company, designed to coordinate the work of existing departments, but it was also authorized to perform services which the NIA determined could best be performed centrally.³³

A year later, the 80th Congress legitimized the President's creation of centralized intelligence apparatus. The National Security Act—best remembered now for its unification of the military establishment—has been called a "basic charter of civil-military relations and of security policy formation."³⁴ Its most important creation was the National Security Council, a group of the highest civilian officials responsible for diplomatic and military planning (in 1966, the NSC is composed of President Johnson Vice-President HUMPHREY, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Office of Emergency Planning Director Bryant), to generate the basic policy recommendations in all matters affecting the national security. To inform these top-level administrators, the Central Intelligence Agency was formed. Its purposes, as defined by the Act are:

1. To advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to the national security.
2. To make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government.
4. To perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence activities, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
5. To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. (Italic supplied)

This was an "organic" act, in that the functions of the CIA are defined only generally, with more precise direction left to the President and the NSC, but the Congress did make some attempt to limit the new agency. To insure that the CIA could never be converted into a *Gestapo*, the law provided that "the Agency shall have no police, sub-

poena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions;" in another section of the measure, the power granted to the Director to inspect the intelligence product of all government security agencies for the purpose of "correlation, evaluation, and dissemination" was restricted in that FBI information may be examined only upon "written request". Furthermore, to emphasize that the CIA was not to supersede most of the existing intelligence bureaus, these departments were directed to continue to "collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence."³⁵

The clear thrust of the National Security Act was to establish a confederated, and not a centralized, national intelligence apparatus. However, this goal was undermined by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, a measure designed to strengthen CIA administration by giving the Director of Central Intelligence unprecedented powers. Under the new statute, the CIA was exempted from all federal laws that require the disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency"; the agency was exempted from almost all the major Civil Service regulations; the Bureau of the Budget was directed to make no reports to the Congress on these matters. The Director was given the power to bring one hundred aliens a year into the United States without regard to normal immigration laws. Above all, he was given the staggering power of spending all CIA appropriations "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds. . . the certificate of the Director shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified."³⁶ These provisions constitute voluntary cession by the Congress of all the traditional controls over the Executive, especially the important control over the expenditure of funds. They are an invitation to unchecked secret power.

Since 1949 the Central Intelligence Agency has grown phenomenally; a conservative guess would be that it now has almost three times as many employees as it had then. For this, five major explanations may be advanced. First of course is the increasing requirement of intelligence. A-bombs have given way to H-bombs, IRBM's to ICBM's, in the Cold War race for bigger and better weapons; the complexities of the latest weapons systems require ever more notice of the need for them. Second, one must cite an increasing feeling that certain aspects of national security are best handled centrally; specific intelligence operations are now so closely coordinated by the CIA as to make the other agencies involved almost subservient. Such close coordination often raises the general level of efficiency, but there is always the danger implied in Prof. Ransom's comment that "one man's coordination is another man's dictatorship."³⁷ A third source of growing CIA power over the years has been the policy of rotation within the military services and, to a lesser extent, among the other departments. It has resulted in the CIA's tending to have greater continuity than other agencies in personnel skilled in intelligence evaluation and analysis. "As the experience and competence of CIA personnel increase, so do its power and the relative importance of its role."³⁸ Despite the fact that Harry Truman said in 1963, "I

never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations," a fourth cause—one of the most important—of CIA growth must be laid at his feet. The ambitious objective of the 1947 Truman Doctrine ("to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"), combined with an early lack of precision about the agency's purpose and organization, has caused the CIA to become a secret arm of foreign policy implementation—an arm nobody originally intended and one that has led the United States into disgrace on more than one occasion.³⁹ That this arm should have ever attained such power is largely the fault of the State Department; its inertia must be cited as a fifth cause of the growth of an agency that has all but replaced State in certain areas of foreign policy. Theodore Sorenson reports that President Kennedy felt that State's tendency to excessive delay obscured determination.⁴⁰ Part of the problem is the paucity of State's resources when compared to the CIA's, but even more important is the cession of work from State to the CIA during the Eisenhower years when the Dulles brothers headed these offices. The Hoover Commission found Allen Dulles too much of a work-grabber; Andrew Tully has noted that John Foster relied much more heavily on brother Allen's estimates than he did on the reports from his own ambassadors.⁴¹ Without question, the "CIA problem" is, to a large degree, a "State Department problem."

Perhaps the most noteworthy—and the most frightening—fact is that these explanations seem likely to remain true for some years to come. The demand for intelligence is ever on the rise. The system of military rotation has not been reversed. The present war in Viet Nam illustrates our continuing commitment to the principles of the Truman Doctrine. Unless some outside action is taken, the CIA's secret power is likely to increase even further than it already has.

IV

Americans are presently unable to ascertain whether the CIA is doing a creditable job for two reasons: we are not united in one idea of what "a creditable job" is and, even if we were, we cannot obtain the information necessary to make a sound judgment. The National Security Act defines the duties of the CIA so broadly that there can be many conceptions of what is and isn't within the agency's responsibilities. Paramilitary operations, such as the Bay of Pigs maneuver, provide the best example of this imprecision. During the 1947 hearings, Congressman Fred Busbey of Illinois asked James V. Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, about rumors then prevalent that operational activities were being contemplated for the proposed intelligence agency; Forrestal denied them.⁴² Sherman Kent's *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, which had a generally large influence on early CIA officials, makes a strong case against the CIA's entering into such activities.⁴³ Yet, as has been amply proven, the CIA has entered and continues to enter the field of international conspiracy. Such efforts are officially justified under clause 5 of the National Security

³¹ Harry Howe Ransom, "Containing Central Intelligence," *New Republic*, December 11, 1965, p. 12.

³² Harry Howe Ransom, "Containing Central Intelligence," p. 14.

³³ *Intelligence Activities*, p. 14. *CIA: The Inside Story*, p. 259.

³⁴ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, *Hearings*, "National Security Act of 1947," 80th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1947, pp. 120-1.

³⁵ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 94ff.

³¹ "Intelligence: Key to Defense," *Life*, September 30, 1946, p. 117.

³² *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), p. 32. *Memoirs* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), vol. II, p. 56.

³³ Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, pp. 74-8.

³⁴ Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 178.

³⁵ Public Law 80-253. A further provision of the Act, under which the CIA explains its extreme secrecy, provides that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

³⁶ Public Law 81-110.

³⁷ Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, p. 84.

³⁸ *Central Intelligence and National Security*, p. 84.

Act, the "other functions" clause, but many people feel that this is stretching the point somewhat; to these people (this writer confesses that he is among them), the thrust of the Act is clearly for intelligence only, and not for military activities of any sort. Some Americans feel that the government ought to refrain from all clandestine and especially illegal operations overseas; they feel that such activities contradict the high moral principles to which this nation has traditionally dedicated itself. On the other hand, other Americans believe—and the government has consistently concurred—that "new times demand new conduct." As one member of this school of thought has forcefully put its case:

"While diplomacy is preferable, and usually more reliable and effective than subversion, the United States cannot realistically abstain from espionage or follow an absolute principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. Cold War is by definition a stage in international politics that is neither war nor peace. In this situation, and short of a reign of international law based upon the consent of the governed, the United States may sometimes have to engage in clandestine activities to protect the national interest. The nation cannot accept the claim, in every situation, that the existing government or regime in every foreign country is the legitimate one. The national interest and the common defense may require intervention, even though this confronts us with legal and moral problems. The United States rarely faces comfortable alternative choices in support of foreign regimes. Often we must accept the lesser evil because circumstances fail to provide an ideal option."⁴⁴

No public referendum can ever be conducted on this question, but it is one well worth more discussion than it has heretofore received. The proposition that our government should not indulge in covert operations includes the notion that the CIA should not do so, but the reverse is not true; Americans must distinguish the question of whether we are to undertake such activities from the question of whether the CIA shall be the leading force in this field. Until we do, there will always be objections to the CIA's work.

Even if we assume the government's position on the morality issue, we may question the CIA on grounds of efficiency: does the agency perform its functions in the best possible manner? Governmental secrecy prevents the layman, and even the scholar and the Congressman, from answering this vital question. There is no way to ascertain just how good the CIA's intelligence reports are or to what extent top officials may rely upon the agency's national estimates, for these are never made public. Most of what is known of these documents is based upon pure speculation, though the few facts available suggest that, like government in general, the CIA is sometimes right and sometimes wrong. It is generally accepted that the agency was over five years off in its estimate of the date the Soviet Union would detonate its first atomic bomb, but, on the other hand, the CIA precisely predicted the date on which the Chinese Communists were to explode their first nuclear device.⁴⁵ The agency's failure to predict the Red Chinese invasion of Korea in 1950 or the sudden erection of the Berlin wall in 1961 are balanced by its successes in obtaining a copy of Chairman Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1961 and the now-famous Berlin wire-tap-

ping incident.⁴⁶ Even in covert operations, the CIA has a generally mixed record; it succeeded in overthrowing Iran's Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and Guatemala's President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954, but failed miserably in its attempt to dislodge Fidel Castro.⁴⁷ Perhaps even more common than these clear cases are those which are partial successes, partial failures. Here the outstanding case is the U-2 incident: reconnaissance flights that, according to Allen Dulles, marked new heights in the scientific collection of intelligence, but the discovery of which torpedoed a summit conference.⁴⁸

For all of the cases mentioned above, there is adequate documentation, but of how many instances are we ignorant? Just since last year, the CIA has been accused of provoking war between India and Pakistan, kidnapping Moroccan agents in Paris, and plotting the overthrow of former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, among other nefarious acts. While most of these charges are probably unfounded, fostered either by sheer ignorance or Soviet propaganda (one is reminded of the joke, which ran through Washington last summer and has appeared in many forms, about the two Yugoslavs surveying the wreckage after the Skoplje earthquake: one tells the other, "The CIA did it. Pass the word."), yet there is the possibility of their truth. Certainly they have been officially denied, but then so were the U-2 flights and the Guatemalan and Cuban sorties—at the time.

About all the scholar can conclude is that the CIA is neither perfect nor valueless. The official information which has been disclosed presents entries for both sides of the ledger, and it is sure that these facts barely scratch the surface. There is no way for us to tally up a final score for the CIA's efficiency.

All the while, there is a very distinct threat that the CIA, in performing its functions as best it can, may lead the United States into new and unwanted foreign policy situations. The CIA may at times make its own foreign policy; though this has been hotly denied by every CIA Director, the 1963 disclosure that the agency had been secretly aiding South Vietnamese Special Forces in their raids of Buddhist pagodas—raids that the U.S. Government officially condemned—seemingly presents such a case.⁴⁹ Even if it carries out only official State Department and National Security Council policy, though, the CIA's tactics may lead the nation into trouble. The U-2 flights provide an example of how the United States may be forced to make hurried and contradictory statements because of the CIA's efforts; the bumbling hypocrisy which American presented to the world in the spring of 1960 left us in international disgrace. Perhaps the best example of how the U.S. may be forced to undo itself is provided by the New York Times' recent account of the 1962 plot to doctor Cuban sugar:

"On Aug. 22, 1962, the S.S. *Streatham Hill*, a British freighter under Soviet lease, crept into the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for repairs. Bound for a Soviet port with 80,000 bags of Cuban sugar, she had damaged her propeller on a reef.

⁴⁴ Harry Howe Ransom, *Can American Democracy Survive The Cold War?*, pp. 140-58. Mills, Mansfield, & Stein, *Arms and the State*, p. 284. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, pp. 128-30. Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story*, pp. 1-7.

⁴⁵ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, p. 224. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, pp. 6-96.

⁴⁶ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, p. 67.

⁴⁷ *Washington Post*, September 10, 1963,

"The ship was put in dry dock, and 14,135 sacks were off-loaded to facilitate repairs. Because of the United States embargo on Cuban imports, the sugar was put under bond in a customs warehouse. Sometime during the lay-up, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency entered the customs shed and contaminated the off-loaded sugar with a harmless but unpalatable substance.

"Later, a White House official, running through some intelligence reports, came upon a paper indicating the sabotage. He investigated, had his suspicions confirmed and informed President Kennedy, much to the annoyance of the C.I.A. command.

"The President was not merely annoyed; he was furious, because the operation had taken place on American territory, because it would, if discovered, provoke the Soviet Union with a propaganda field day, and because it could set a terrible precedent for chemical sabotage in the undeclared "back-alley" struggle that rages constantly between the West and the Communist countries.

"Mr. Kennedy directed that the doctored sugar not leave Puerto Rico. This was more easily ordered than done, and it finally required the combined effort of the C.I.A., the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department, customs agents and harbor authorities to dis-intrigue the intrigue.

"The Soviet Union never got its 14,135 sacks of sugar; whether it was compensated for them has not been disclosed.

"It would be unfair to conclude that this was a typical C.I.A. operation. On the other hand, it cannot be dismissed as merely the unwise invention of some agent who let his anti-Communist fervor get out of control.

"There is good reason to believe that a high-level political decision had been taken to sabotage, where feasible, the Cuban economy. The sugar project, *herum-scarum* as it was, developed from a general policy determination in the Plans Division of the C.I.A., and the general policy, if not the specific plot, presumably had the approval of the interagency, sub-Cabinet group responsible for reviewing all operations that have political consequences.⁵⁰

Here, then, is an example of the CIA's carrying out an approved plan which could easily have disgraced this nation and opened up a whole new field of war. It would not have been a blunder or a mishap, as in the Powers flight, that brought the United States to this unhappy position, but the efficient tactical maneuvering of the CIA. This is not divergent foreign policy, but poor implementation, implementation that required the combined forces of many dissimilar government agencies for its correction. Still this incident presents as great a danger as the CIA's setting its own foreign policy would.

v

The general argument is now clear: left to itself, the CIA is the most dangerous agency in the United States Government. It may determine foreign policy, either knowingly or (if we accept disclaimers such as Congressman Bray's statement on the floor of the House last month: "The CIA does what the President tells it to do. It is not autonomous; it does not chart its own course.") accidentally, through its capacity to develop and pursue an operation free from everyday guidance or restriction from the more political parts of the government.⁵¹ It is, in one sense, its own ruler for the only information the National Security Council or other high-level administrators have regarding the CIA's efficiency comes from the CIA itself. Its resources, both in number of em-

⁵⁰ *New York Times*, April 25, 1966, pp. 1, 28.

⁵¹ *Congressional Record*, March 23, 1966, p. 6276 (daily edition).

⁴⁴ Harry Howe Ransom, *Can American Democracy Survive The Cold War?*, pp. 194-5.

⁴⁵ Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story*, p. 267. *New York Times*, April 25, 1966, p. 20.

ployees and funds available, give it a strong advantage over competing departments, such as State, in displaying and selling its wares in the governmental market-place. Finally, its necessary secrecy—and secrecy often beyond what is necessary—shield it from many of the traditional American forms of governmental control.

Extraordinary measures are needed to check this powerful agency, but in the past these measures have not been forthcoming. Despite the fact that the CIA has been surveyed by no less than six *ad hoc* bodies, five different parts of the Executive Branch, and four Congressional subcommittees, little that is meaningful has been accomplished. The *ad hoc* investigations have been too sporadic, the Executive groups too limited, the Congressional subcommittees too eager to be discreet.

None of the first three *ad hoc* investigations was very thorough. The first of them, a task force of the First Hoover Commission headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, reported in 1949 on national security organization in general and gave only passing mention to the still-new CIA. It did, however, find the agency "sound in principle, but . . . not now properly organized," and recommended that "vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and the quality of its product."⁵² Another special survey, conducted by a three-man panel headed by Allen Dulles (then a lawyer in private practice), reported to the President and the National Security Council in 1951; its findings were never opened to the public. It may be presumed that the alleged CIA failure to predict the Communist Chinese invasion of Korea was a central point of consideration for the group; their report is said to have found "much cause for dissatisfaction."⁵³ That their recommendations were probably accepted in large degree is evidenced by the fact that, shortly after the report was circulated, Dulles was made Deputy Director of the CIA. A third survey—this time of general CIA organization and performance—was made in 1954 by a four-man group, chaired by Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle; it came at a time when Senator Joseph McCarthy was threatening to investigate the "Communists" in the intelligence community and probably was meant to head off what would have been a disastrous fishing expedition (the hearings were never held). Like the Dulles panel, Doolittle's group made only a private report, but it simultaneously issued, through the White House, a very brief public statement praising the CIA for "a creditable job" (though it also felt that there were "important areas in which the CIA organization, administration, and operations can and should be improved.")⁵⁴

Far more detailed than any of these investigations, indeed the most thorough governmental study of the intelligence community yet produced, was the work of the five-man task force of the Second Hoover Commission, led by General Mark W. Clark. Originally only instructed to study and make recommendations about the CIA, it enlarged its subject to a comprehensive review of all foreign intelligence activities. It submitted two reports: one for the public; the other—including recommendations covering many overseas operations—for the President only (even the full Commission was not allowed to pass upon it).⁵⁵ Among its findings: that Allen Dulles, Director of

Central Intelligence by this time, had "in his enthusiasm . . . taken upon himself too many . . . duties and responsibilities on the operational side of the CIA's activities;" that "certain administrative flaws have developed in the CIA, which must be corrected to give proper emphasis and direction to its basic responsibilities;" that "the American people can and should give their full confidence and support to the intelligence program," though this presents "a corollary demand for clarification of misunderstandings which have arisen in the public mind, largely as a result of the misapplication of secrecy." To correct these conditions, the task force recommended "a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence . . ." modeled after the Hoover Commission itself, this new body would make periodic reports on the "organization, functions, policies, and results" of the intelligence community to the President and Congress; it would "be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needed for its own use."⁵⁶ The full Commission did not fully accept this recommendation, feeling, no doubt from its own experience, that "while mixed Congressional and citizens committees for temporary service are useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties." It did, however, accept the need for a CIA "watchdog" by suggesting that "the President appoint a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities," as well as that "the Congress consider creating a joint congressional committee on foreign intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy." The Commission believed "the two committees, one Presidential and the other Congressional, could collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security."⁵⁷

Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy asked a former Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to make a special study of the Cuban failure and of America's capabilities for paramilitary operations. Assisting Taylor were ROBERT KENNEDY, Dulles, and Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke.⁵⁸ Their report was never published, but it was no doubt directed to the President's feeling that the CIA was one of the "soft spots" in his administration; following their study, Kennedy tightened up Executive review procedures over the CIA and transferred primary responsibility for any future paramilitary operations from the CIA to the Pentagon.⁵⁹ It may also be assumed that the shake-up in the CIA administration in the late months of 1961 resulted in large part from the Bay of Pigs failure and the Taylor recommendations. A further study of the CIA was made in 1964 by a special Presidential task force composed of Frederick E. Nolting, former Ambassador to South Viet Nam, Major General John M. Reynolds, a vice-director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and John A. Bross, a deputy to the CIA Director. It may also have been a response to an alleged intelligence abuse—the Buddhist pa-

goda incident—and could well have been the most enlightened study of the six, since all three members of the investigating panel were directly involved in the compilation and use of foreign intelligence, but its findings have never been released by President Johnson.⁶⁰

The major faults of the six *ad hoc* groups are clear: they have been too sporadic, occurring only once every three years or so, and lacking continuous information; and they have been far too secretive to settle the strong fears of many Americans. Their recommendations have been all too often ignored, and thus have had only small impact upon the CIA. Furthermore, they are almost totally useless as a check on the everyday activities of the intelligence community. The offices of the Executive Branch which oversee the CIA offer far more hope of effective control than these periodic studies. They are regularized and better funded. Yet these have not been fully effective either.

Though the CIA was established to inform the National Security Council, the Council is not a prime check upon it. Many CIA activities are considered so mundane (even though they may have disastrous consequences) that the NSC may never learn about them. Basic oversight comes rather through the Special Group, also known as the 54-12 Group (from the number of President Eisenhower's directive establishing the panel).⁶¹ General guidelines set down by the NSC theoretically control CIA operations, but it is the 54-12 Group that controls the rules' everyday application. The Group's current membership includes Admiral Raborn, U. Alexis Johnson (Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), Cyrus R. Vance (Deputy Secretary of Defense), and William D. Moyers and Walter W. Rostow (Presidential assistants with special responsibilities for national security). Meeting once a week, they concentrate almost exclusively on operations, attempting to head off actions that might prove politically embarrassing to the United States.⁶² But it does not clear most of the routine intelligence-gathering activities of the CIA, nor does it maintain continuing supervision over those operations it does approve. It is confined to basic decisions, leaving everyday affairs to the agents "in the field". As the Cuban sugar sabotage plot almost proved, this is not close enough surveillance to insure against national disgrace. Moreover, the Group is currently especially handicapped by the fact that a majority of its members are still relatively inexperienced in national security intelligence affairs.

Another controlling body, more aimed at improving general CIA efficiency than approving specific operations, is the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This group succeeded the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1961. Its predecessor, which had been set up by President Eisenhower in 1956 to implement the Hoover Commission's first recommendation, had never gained the President's close attention and had lapsed well before 1961; one explanation was that President Eisenhower was "too busy to be bothered by it."⁶³ The FIAB has been more successful, no doubt due to the fact that its present Chairman, Clark Clifford, is one of President Johnson's closest confidants. But the FIAB has a basic problem (which was even worse for the Board of Consultants): meeting only once a month or so, it often finds itself exercising only *ex post facto* control. And, like the Special

⁵² Hoover Commission, *Intelligence Activities*, p. 14.

⁵³ Hoover Commission, *Intelligence Activities*, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁴ Harry Howe Ransom, *Can American Democracy Survive The Cold War?*, pp. 184-5.

⁵⁵ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*, p. 290. Harry Howe Ransom, "Containing Central Intelligence," p. 13. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, pp. 202-4.

⁶⁰ Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion* (Chicago, Quadrangle, 1964), p. 275.

⁶¹ David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, p. 278.

⁶² *New York Times*, April 28, 1966, p. 28.

⁶³ Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story*, p. 13.

⁵² Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, *Report No. 1570*, "Joint Committee on Central Intelligence Agency," 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, February 23, 1956, pp. 6-7.

⁵³ Warren Unna, "CIA: Who Watches the Watchman?" *Harper's*, April, 1959, p. 51.

⁵⁴ *New York Times*, October 20, 1954, p. 1.

⁵⁵ Hoover Commission, *Intelligence Activities*, pp. 17-20.

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Group, it does nothing to inform the Congress and the people of its findings with regard to the CIA's general competence.

A third check is the Bureau of the Budget, which considers the CIA's budget in some detail before it is hidden in the Defense Department appropriation request that is finally sent to the Congress. Allen Dulles has stressed that the CIA always stands ready to account for every dollar it spends.⁶⁴ But this control is merely budgetary, which is to say that it makes no substantive judgments. The Bureau of the Budget, sworn not to interpose policy judgments in its decisions, can merely weigh a proposed operation against the total amount of funds available for this and other projects; it cannot make crucial political judgments.

The State Department and United States Ambassadors also exercise some control. The *New York Times* reports that the Ambassadors are now kept well-informed of CIA activities in their area, quoting Thomas Mann, Under Secretary of State: "I am sure that the policy is made here [at State] and that nothing is done without our consent;" it notes that Secretary Rusk feels "quite certain the CIA is doing nothing affecting national policy that he does not know about." But Rusk goes on to contradict Mann in adding that he is sure he is "the only one in the State Department informed about some of the things being done."⁶⁵ Such control is obviously not nearly as thorough as is needed; it is still quite conceivable that a CIA agent in some foreign land and the U.S. Ambassador to that nation are working in directly opposite directions.

A new hope in the area of executive oversight is the recently-formed Senior Interdepartmental Group. Charged with "responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas (less exempted military activities)," SIG includes Under Secretary of State George Ball (who will serve as "executive chairman"), Cyrus Vance, Admiral Raborn, USIA chief Leonard Marks, JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler, AID administrator David Bell, and Bill Moyers—an unusually powerful and qualified contingent. While it is clear that this panel will have far more to do than control the CIA, it is just as obvious that SIG will enhance the State Department's ability to perform that task. As one high-ranking Foreign Service officer observed, "If State really gets hold of this thing, it could be the biggest shift in years."⁶⁶ Given the traditional State Department inertia, though (see page 20), only time will disclose the true significance of the Senior Interdepartmental Group.

If executive oversight has not been complete enough, congressional oversight has been far, far worse. As one political commentator puts it, "The CIA has always had near sacred-cow-status on Capitol Hill."⁶⁷ The most shocking aspect of the situation is that it is the Congress' own fault; the wall between it and the CIA is self-imposed. By defining the CIA's duties in the National Security Act in the broadest possible terms, it left the actual limitation of the new agency not in its own hands, but in those of the NSC. The CIA Act of 1949 went even further, as we have seen; all the standard procedures inherent in Congress' traditional "power of the purse" were voluntarily waived. The conclusion that a majority of the Congress then felt many aspects of intelligence to be "too hot to handle" is ob-

vious, but worse than this is the fact that this extraordinary sense of discretion (accorded to no other governmental area) still persists.

Congressional control is vested in four subcommittees on the Central Intelligence Agency—one each from the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations. These groups meet infrequently and do not accomplish much at those meetings they do hold. In 1963 the House Armed Services Subcommittee on the CIA met five times, with the other subcommittees holding about the same number of sessions; this, sparse as it is, is a sharp rise over the years just before the Bay of Pigs fiasco, of which Congressman Walter Norblad of Oregon once noted, "We met annually—one time a year, for a period of two hours in which we accomplished nothing."⁶⁸ The basic fault is not a lack of meetings, though, but a reluctance to act; were the latter not the case, the former would not be either. Senator SALTONSTALL of Massachusetts, who serves on two of the subcommittees (he is the senior minority member of both Senate bodies), provides the best example of this problem. He has repeatedly asserted that the CIA is willing to produce information for his groups: "Whenever a suggestion was made as to whether there was anything more we should be told, or any information we might need, we always received it. . . . We could do more than we have done if we felt it were necessary to do so."⁶⁹ Yet, he has just as consistently voiced strong feeling that the subcommittee should not do too much: "The difficulty in connection with asking questions and obtaining information is that we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have. . . . It is not a question of reluctance on the part of the CIA to speak to us. Instead it is a question of our reluctance. . . ."⁷⁰

The sessions these subcommittees hold are all closed, but there is sufficient evidence that the groups function less for investigation than for shielding the CIA from its critics. After the U-2 disclosures, WILLIS ROBERTSON of Virginia, one of the most influential members of the Senate, complained, "I had been hearing testimony presented before the Committee on Appropriations by the Central Intelligence Agency for 13 years. Never during that time were we told what the money was to be used for. It was a deep, dark secret. . . . I asked a number of members of our Defense [Appropriations] Subcommittee if they knew that the Central Intelligence Agency owned and operated planes, and they said they did not. . . . It embarrassed me to know that the CIA had planes. . . ."⁷¹ Senator Henry C. Dworshak's account of his experiences with congressional control of the CIA is more sarcastic:

"A year ago I was assigned to membership on the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. For a long time I had had certain misgivings and uncertainty with respect to the operations of the CIA. I was very eager to find out something about the CIA, because it is a very vital and important agency in the executive department of the Government.

"When the director of the CIA appeared before the Senate appropriations subcommittee, I was so naive as to think that, as a member of the committee, and as a member of the Senate, I might be entitled to some information.

⁶⁸ Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion*, p. 274.

⁶⁹ *Congressional Record*, January 29, 1962, p. 1067, 1070.

⁷⁰ *Congressional Record*, April 9, 1956, p. 5924. For convenience and efficiency, the two Senate subcommittees often meet as one.

⁷¹ *Congressional Record*, May 9, 1960, p. 9078.

"I ventured to ask certain questions of the director. I was told very emphatically, 'This information is classified.' Information as to the number of personnel is classified, whether there are 1,000, 10,000, or 20,000 employees and officials working for the CIA. Oh, Mr. President, that is highly classified information!

"Then when I directed questions to the director about the amount of money required to operate the CIA. I was again told, quite forthrightly, 'This is classified information.' Hush hush! Members of the Appropriations Committee must be willing to assume that the CIA, as a part of our Defense Establishment, is operating efficiently. We are told that it should not be our concern to inquire whether we are obtaining full value for the several millions of dollars which are appropriated annually for the CIA."

Their excessive discretion, and the plain fact that they are often completely ignorant of important covert operations before and after—keep the present subcommittees from functioning as effective surbs upon the CIA.

It was the recognition of these faults that led MIKE MANSFIELD, now the majority leader but then a Senate freshman, to introduce legislation in the 83rd Congress to set up a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence. The bill did not get out of committee in that Congress, but in 1956, the Committee on Rules and Administration prompted by both the reasoned recommendations of the Hoover Commission and the well-charged of Senator McCarthy) favorably reported the bill by an 8-1 vote to the full Senate. The ensuing discussion was the only time either House, as a whole, has considered the possibility of stronger methods of congressional control over the intelligence community.

The measure was not merely MANSFIELD'S idea; he had, by this time, been joined by 34 cosponsors. The bill provided for a twelve-man joint committee, six from each House. Initial membership was limited to those Senators and Representatives already serving on one of the existing four subcommittees dealing with the Central Intelligence Agency. These members would select their own chairman and staff and have full cognizance and supervision over matters relating to the CIA, with power to advise, inquire, and report. Staff and other committee expenses for its first year were set at \$250,000 by the Rules Committee.⁷²

The general points made in floor debate on the bill will be considered in the next section of this essay, a discussion of the proposal's merits and demerits. It will suffice here to say that MANSFIELD, then just breaking into "The Club", soon found himself up against almost all the notables in what Senator CLARK has since referred to as "the Senate Establishment."⁷³ Just before the final vote, MANSFIELD commented, "From beginning to feel a little like David facing Goliath, although I fear the results will not be the same"; in retrospect, he summed up the political situation by saying, "What you had was a brash freshman going up against the high brass. I got a good education."⁷⁴ Among "the high brass", all both politically influential and deeply committed to the existing system of control, were Senator Barkley (a former Vice-President and NBC member), HAYDEN, RUSSELL, SYMINGTON, and SALTONSTALL. To these men the two most crucial objections to the resolution were its "fully informed" clause and its provision for a com-

⁷² *Congressional Record*, April 11, 1956, p. 6058.

⁷³ S. Con. Res. 2, 84th Congress.

⁷⁴ *The Senate Establishment* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963).

⁷⁵ *Congressional Record*, April 11, 1956, p. 6051.

⁶⁴ *The Craft of Intelligence*, pp. 259, 261.

⁶⁵ *New York Times*, April 28, 1966, p. 28.

⁶⁶ *Newsweek*, March 14, 1966, p. 27.

⁶⁷ Mary McGrory, "The CIA Chief," *New York Post*, March 25, 1966, p. 46.

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mittee staff.⁷⁶ Allen Dulles had been especially vehement about the latter point, feeling he would be making "unauthorized disclosures" by discussing CIA matters before such a staff; selected legislators were all right, for they carry the mandate of the electorate, but, to Dulles, professional staff members were quite another matter.⁷⁷ The final vote on the bill, 27-59, reflects the pressure of the Establishment; every member of the two Senate CIA Subcommittees (with the exception of Senator Chavez of New Mexico, who was absent), the only Senators eligible to serve on the proposed joint committee, voted against it.⁷⁸ Even ten co-sponsors of the resolution switched.⁷⁹ Perhaps it is worth noting that Senator John F. Kennedy voted for the bill; Senator Lyndon B. Johnson voted against it.⁸⁰

Since 1956, every Congress has seen at least a score of similar resolutions, but none have emerged from committee. The House Rules Committee held two days of hearings on CIA oversight on March 1 and 2, 1960, but later voted to shelve all seventeen resolutions on the subject.⁸¹ Periodic reports of CIA abuses have aroused cries for renewed consideration of such measures, but no committee has as yet responded. In the present Congress, there are over two dozen resolutions on the subject, but none should be accorded more than a very slight chance of ever passing either House.

VI

Its one complete airing in the Senate, plus a large number of articles in the press, have provided a considerable background of debate for the proposal to establish some kind of strong Joint Committee on Intelligence. The major points in this heated discussion may be briefly summarized.

The major argument of those who see a need for such a committee is based upon Lord Acton's statement that "power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." While a certain need for secrecy is recognized, it is held that excessive secrecy invites abuse. There is no way at present for the Congress meaningfully to determine whether the CIA is doing a creditable job. "It is difficult to legislate intelligently if there is a dearth of the information upon which Congress must rely. . . ."⁸² Free from the reins of Congress, the CIA is able to mount operations, such as the Bay of Pigs effort, which would face very difficult chances of ever being approved by the Congress. As Congressman ROGERS of Florida has put it, ". . . we have trusted a Government agency to make all but war without the consent of Congress."⁸³ There are those who would argue that even limited wars are not impossible for the CIA under present arrangements.

A second important argument in favor of a strong "watchdog" committee is that the half-dozen investigations of the CIA, which functioned largely in a manner similar to that of a weak Congressional Special Committee, have not provided adequate investiga-

tion, even in combination with the other existing control bodies. Each of the six surveys has found inadequacies in the CIA, but their recommendations for correction have usually been kept secret; the inadequacies were usually still there when the next investigation took place. Perhaps, it is argued, this is because the Congress didn't have a chance to exert some prodding political pressure. "It is not enough that CIA be responsible alone to the White House or the National Security Council," the Senate Rules Committee concluded. "Such responsibility should be shared with Congress in a more complete manner."⁸⁴

Another argument, first put forth by Senator MANSFIELD in the Senate floor debate, is that the development of the CIA under essentially only Executive control, if that represented an "arrogation of power on the part of the Executive and a diminution to that extent of the equality between the executive and the legislative." Both MANSFIELD, and Senator MORSE of Oregon expressed strong fears that, through its control of secret information vital to foreign policymaking, the CIA abetted the Executive's increasing domination over this field, to the exclusion of Congress.⁸⁵

To illustrate their feeling that a "watchdog" committee would be a proper and efficient control over the CIA, many propose the analogy to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Regular Congressional supervision in the field of atomic energy has existed through this committee since 1946.⁸⁶ It acts upon matters just as sensitive as foreign intelligence and has had no major difficulties in ironing out jurisdictional lines with the other standing committees. Above all, it has functioned well:

"The work of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been of benefit to the country at large. It has maintained congressional liaison with, and congressional control of, much of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. It has provided a forum where information can be solicited and exchanged to the mutual satisfaction of all parties. It has given to Congress, for its guidance and assistance, a trained staff especially concerned with atomic energy matters. It has, at the same time, provided the Atomic Energy Commission with a legislative group familiar with its problems and alert to its particular needs and objectives. "The members of the Atomic Energy Committee have the full confidence of the other Members of Congress. Their legislative actions are based on the knowledge that trusted Members of both Houses are fully cognizant of developments in atomic energy. They do not have to depend upon the unilateral judgment of the executive branch as to what Members of Congress ought or ought not to know."⁸⁷

The Senate Rules Committee not only praised JCAE, but concluded, "What is true of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy can be true of a new joint committee organized to oversee the Central Intelligence Agency."⁸⁸

A fifth argument is that a strong "watchdog" committee would provide new public and Congressional confidence in the now much-maligned agency. It could prove useful in denying the various unfounded international rumors of nefarious CIA activities, denials that mean little from the present clearly-biased subcommittees; it could also assist in safeguarding the agency from such

domestic demagogues as former Senator McCarthy. In addition, it could help to safely publicize, without disclosure of vital information, the strength of our intelligence agencies, publicity which Allen Dulles has conceded would be one of the most effective deterrents to a potential enemy's appetite for attack.⁸⁹

Sixth, it is argued that a "watchdog" committee might prove of definite value in exposing and counteracting possible prejudice that may slip in to the CIA's factual judgments, prejudice that Dulles has called the intelligence field's "most serious occupational hazard."⁹⁰

In sum, the proponents of a strong joint committee argue that, in an era of increasing reliance upon foreign intelligence, there is a wide area in which the Congress could help to improve the intelligence product and safeguard American democracy. Congressional avoidance of this area is considered to be nothing less than an evasion of constitutional responsibility.

Opponents of a strong joint committee are, by and large, more vehement than those in favor of such a committee, for while the latter generally see the proposal as necessary to halt an indirect threat to American democracy, many of the former see the idea as an immediate surrender of American security. To these men, the extent of present CIA secrecy is vital, lest important national secrets be disclosed to America's enemies. They quote from George Washington: "The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add, is, that . . . the whole matter [be kept] as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprises of this kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favorable issue;" and from James Forrestal: "There is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency, on which, I am sure you will agree, if one is to secure improvements, one must undertake to secure them without fanfare."⁹¹ There are clearly solid reasons for their position. Sources of certain types of data would immediately "dry up" if disclosed. Underground actions must by definition be kept secret if they are to succeed. Referring again to Allen Dulles: "Any investigation, whether by a congressional committee or any other body, which results in a disclosure of our secret activities and operations or uncovers our personnel would help a potential enemy just as if the enemy were able to infiltrate their agents right into our shop."⁹² This is a problem not merely for the United States, but also for our allies, many of whom contribute to and make use of our intelligence services.

Most of those who hold the present secrecy arrangements vital also feel that the existing control apparatus is adequate. They point out that the public is represented by a small group of its most experienced Congressmen and that the entire intelligence system functions, in theory at least, under responsible Presidential leadership. The willingness of the CIA to cooperate with the present subcommittees is cited; "no information has been denied and all desired information has been candidly supplied."⁹³ The large number of *ad hoc* investigations is held to be equivalent to what any joint committee could safely do without impinging on

⁷⁶ *The Craft of Intelligence*, p. 51.

⁷⁷ *The Craft of Intelligence*, p. 51.

⁷⁸ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, pp. 7-8. Letter to Hanson Baldwin, *The Forrestal Diaries*, ed. Walter Mills (New York: Viking, 1951), p. 449.

⁷⁹ *U.S. News and World Report*, March 19, 1954, p. 67.

⁸⁰ Individual views of Senator Hayden, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, *Report No. 1570*, p. 24.

⁸⁴ *Report No. 1570*, p. 19.

⁸⁵ *Congressional Record*, April 9, 1956, p. 5927.

⁸⁶ Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, *Government of the Atom* (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 2-5.

⁸⁷ Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, *Report No. 1570*, p. 18.

⁸⁸ *Report No. 1570*, p. 18.

⁷⁶ *Congressional Record*, April 9, 1956, pp. 5922-5939; April 11, 1956, pp. 6047-6063, 6065-6068.

⁷⁷ Warren Unna, "CIA: Who Watches the Watchman," pp. 52-3.

⁷⁸ *Congressional Record*, April 11, 1956, p. 6068.

⁷⁹ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, p. 261.

⁸⁰ *Congressional Record*, April 11, 1956, p. 6068.

⁸¹ *Congressional Quarterly*, March 10, 1961, p. 389. Harry Howe Ransom, *Can American Democracy Survive the Cold War?* p. 179.

⁸² Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, *Report No. 1570*, 84th Congress, p. 20.

⁸³ Cited in Fred J. Cook, "The CIA," *The Nation*, June 24, 1961, p. 569.

the efficiency of the CIA. As Senator HAYDEN said in his lone dissent to the Senate Rules Committee report, "The greatest service we can do . . . is to facilitate the important work of the Agency and to let it get its job done without being watchdogged to death."⁸⁴

Third, it is argued that the functions of the CIA are essentially executive in character, since the agency serves the President, the National Security Council, and other departments in a staff capacity. Senator JACKSON has said that, given this relationship, he cannot understand the contention that there is no constitutional control.⁸⁵ If we are to have a joint committee for the CIA, must we have a similar joint committee for the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and other executive agencies? Should the FBI be overseen by a new joint committee? Furthermore, a Joint Committee on Intelligence might raise a constitutional issue on the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. Senator HAYDEN felt that, since the CIA officially undertakes activities only in accordance with National Security Council directives, any Congressional action which seeks to interfere with or pry into this relationship "would tend to impinge upon the constitutional authority and responsibility of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs."⁸⁶

Those who oppose a "watchdog" committee do not accept the analogy to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. During the Senate debate, Senator SALTONSTALL especially emphasized the motion that the JCAE deals with a much larger operation, having possible effect on the domestic economy. The JCAE overlooks a field in which the Government is basically involved in manufacturing; it is closely involved in detailed legislative considerations. Intelligence, however, is vastly different from the field of atomic energy; a Joint Committee on Intelligence would have little or no legislation to consider.⁸⁷ Also, there is disagreement over whether the JCAE is doing an appropriate job. There is strong feeling, both in the Congress and among scholars, that it has, in some respects, taken over many tasks which should be performed by the AEC. "The JCAE," it is said, "is . . . not merely a legislative mechanism, but also a coparticipant in executive decision-making."⁸⁸ Such extension of power might not only raise serious constitutional questions, but prove disastrous to the intelligence apparatus.

A fifth argument is that the proposed committee might someday give an overly powerful forum to an irresponsible demagogue or even a mere ideologue, of which there are many in the Congress. Such a person could not only endanger the intelligence system with actual or threatened disclosures, but might also prove a potent behind-the-scenes roadblock to vital operations. Intelligence is held to be far too important to be hindered by politicians searching for political capital.

Finally, it is said, somewhat threateningly, that the present committee chairmen would oppose such a committee on the grounds that it might impede them in their own jurisdictions. The loss of control over military intelligence would hardly sit well with Richard Russell.

Summing up for the opposition, then, one might cite Senator Hayden's comment, "How it would be possible to keep the American people fully informed and at the same time keep our Communist enemies in the dark,

it is difficult to imagine. There must be secrets. There are men all over the world who are engaged in the service of the CIA. Are we to tell the dictators in Moscow how much money we are spending in employing these men and where they are employed?"⁸⁹ Certainly not, indeed, says Senator Russell, rather than disclose vital secrets of the CIA, "It would be better to abolish it out of hand."⁹⁰

Once again the Central Intelligence Agency is prominently in the news. The recent disclosure that Michigan State University served as the "cover" for CIA agents in South Viet Nam during a multimillion dollar technical assistance program the university conducted for Ngo Dinh Diem's regime has spread fear among many Americans that the CIA is far more pervasive than had been previously suspected. All of those universities now receiving some CIA aid are currently suspect. At almost the same time, it has become known that an Estonian refugee, Juri Raus, who is being sued for slander in a Federal District Court in Baltimore, is basing his defense on the fact that the alleged slander was committed in the course of his duties as a CIA agent. Raus is claiming immunity from the suit on the ground that he had acted as an official agent of the Federal Government. Here again, the CIA appears in an unusually dim light.

Partially as a response to these incidents, the *New York Times* has published a 25,000-word study of the Central Intelligence Agency, compiled by a staff of writers and researchers, and based not only upon much of the data cited here, but as reports from foreign correspondents and interviews with high government officials as well.⁹¹ It concludes that "while the institutional forms of political control appear effective and sufficient, it is really the will of the political officials who must exert control that is important and that has most often been lacking . . . the control question, while real and of the utmost importance, is one of 'not measures but men'. The forms of control mean nothing if there is no will to control, and if there is a will to control, then the form of it is more or less irrelevant."⁹² This conclusion seems reasonable: certainly the Congressional subcommittees could be stronger bodies if their members chose to make them so, and both the 54-12 Group and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board could do more by meeting more often and demanding greater information from the CIA. But it is easy to misinterpret this fact: The *Times*' survey finds little to criticize in the Executive Branch control bodies, proposes that the Director of Central Intelligence be the key figure in any system of control, and suggests that control can be attained only peripherally through congressional supervision—in short, the basic control structure should be within the Executive Branch. These recommendations echo Allen Dulles' comment that in the field of intelligence "you have to take certain things on faith. You have to look to the man who is directing the organization and the results he achieves. If you haven't someone who can be trusted, or who doesn't get results, you'd better throw him out and get somebody else."⁹³ It is this reliance upon the executive—to the almost complete exclusion of the legislative—that must be examined.

⁸⁴ *Congressional Record*, April 11, 1956, p. 6058.

⁸⁵ *Congressional Record*, April 11, 1956, p. 6049.

⁸⁶ *New York Times*, April 25-9, 1966, pp. 1 ff each day.

⁸⁷ *New York Times*, April 25, 1966, p. 20; April 28, 1966, p. 28.

⁸⁸ *U.S. News and World Report*, March 19, 1954, p. 67.

A good deal of secrecy cannot be denied the CIA, for it is certainly true that some secrecy is indispensable to much of its work. None of the responsible proponents of a "watchdog" committee has suggested, for instance, that the agency divulge the names of all its employees. What is being sought is not a completely open intelligence apparatus, but merely one that will be prevented from entering the Alice-in-Wonderland world that excessive secrecy can cause. Complete oversight may be impossible, but strong liaison is not, and this liaison does not now exist. The shock to Congress following the U-2 and Bay of Pigs disclosures indicates that many of the most important CIA operations are completely hidden from Capitol Hill. Yet the executive cannot be merely self-controlled; the Founding Fathers recognized this over 175 years ago and deliberately set up a governmental system filled with checks and balances.

To say that the CIA's activities are essentially executive in character is to say little; the Departments of State, Commerce, Interior, etc.—all clearly executive—are closely checked by Congressional committees. Even the FBI, a favorite example of "watchdog" opponents, is supervised; as a part of the Justice Department, it is monitored by the two Committees on the Judiciary. All that those who stress the CIA's executive nature are really saying is that, since it is executive, the CIA should be singled out for separate treatment by a joint committee. Look at the JCAE, it is said; it has abrogated executive power. But arguing against a "watchdog" committee in this way misses the point of the analogy. The JCAE was set up by the Congress because of a widespread feeling that the particular problems of the field of atomic energy could best be handled in this manner. Most proponents of strong Congressional supervision of the CIA feel that intelligence too could best be handled jointly, but would be almost as happy to have separate "watchdog" committees in each House. Unity is proposed only to save the CIA from redundant testimony and to help prevent harmful security disclosures. When the analogy to the JCAE is made, it is done so merely to prove that a "watchdog" apparatus can keep a secret, and resist being overrun by cheap politicians in search of demagogic fodder, while effectively curbing hidden power.

The joint committee format has its weaknesses. No matter how it is constituted, it will not be able to conduct wide-ranging public investigation of the CIA; some discretion will always be necessary. Furthermore, if the Mansfield method of starting such a committee with present CIA subcommittee members is used, the new committee will suffer from the same biases as the old ones. These are relatively unimportant, though, when balanced against the prospect of Congress effectively fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities. Let us put an end to arguments that the joint committee proposal is unsafe. It is certainly no more unsafe than the present subcommittees and, more generally, it must always be remembered that democratic government will always involve personnel risks. On the other hand, a joint committee has no added advantage of easily lending itself to the addition of Congressmen and Senators from the Foreign Affairs (Relations) and Government Operations Committees, many of whom would bring useful insights to Congressional surveillance of the intelligence community. Far more than the present segmented system of four subcommittees, a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence presents the possibility of intelligent oversight with the fewest possible security leaks.

A "watchdog" committee would not be a panacea though, and this writer believes further action is needed. The Senior Interdepartmental Group offers new hope of

⁸⁴ Report No. 1570, p. 25.

⁸⁵ *Congressional Record*, January 29, 1962, p. 1066.

⁸⁶ Report No. 1570, p. 27.

⁸⁷ *Congressional Record*, April 9, 1956, p. 5936.

⁸⁸ Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, *Government of the Atom*, p. 268.

greater executive surveillance of the field of intelligence, but its wide range of duties will probably prevent it from realizing this hope. A stronger possibility for better oversight would be presented by reconstituting the 54-12 Group in such a way as to include Congressional representation; this panel might then serve as an additional "watch-dog". Even more crucial is the need for an informal national discussion of what we should expect from our intelligence apparatus. "Those who believe that the United States Government on occasion resorts to force when it shouldn't," Richard Bissell, former CIA Deputy Director, once correctly noted, "should . . . direct their views to the question of national policy. . . .¹⁰⁴ Many of the abuses attributed to the CIA might never have occurred had the United States not let its intelligence apparatus develop so haphazardly. Intelligence is an ugly business, but today it must be accepted, and the sooner we do so—and decide how we are going to carry it out—the better. If the American people are against covert operations, for instance, let them rise up and say so—and not let the Government assume their feelings on the matter.

There is no easy solution to the problems of controlling central intelligence, but some delicate compromise must be sought. No issue is more basic than whether we can preserve rule by "consent of the governed" in today's troubled world. No challenge is greater than the combination of adequate intelligence machinery with the principles of popular government. It is imperative that we meet the challenge, or American democracy will either be rapidly destroyed or slowly whittled away.

PROGRESS REPORT ON NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO SAVE THE U.S. CAPITOL

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and include three editorials.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, about a month ago I announced the formation of a National Committee To Save the U.S. Capitol. The purpose of the committee was to mobilize public opposition to the proposals of the Architect of the Capitol, Mr. George Stewart, to extend the historic west front of the Capitol. Mr. Stewart's project would not only cost \$34 million at a time when we are being asked to forego every possible unnecessary expenditure, but it would also destroy and cover up for all time the last remaining face of the historic original U.S. Capitol Building.

Since that time the response to this appeal has been most encouraging. Some 10 Members of the Senate and 20 Members of the House have accepted honorary cochairmanships on this committee. Legislation has been introduced in both Houses of Congress to block the Architect's move, at least until the whole matter can be more fully and publicly discussed and the best possible engineering and architectural advice can be submitted to the Congress.

In addition, the response from the people back home, the grassroots sentiment, has been tremendous. These are not just the architectural purists. These are the people who do not believe Congress ought to spend \$34 million when we are faced with overwhelming military expenditures in Vietnam.

These are the people who do not believe Congress needs 119 "hideaway" offices in the U.S. Capitol only a couple of years after we spent \$125 million to build a new House office building, including a modern electric subway to speed Members back and forth between the Capitol and their offices.

These are the people back home who believe our most treasured national shrine should be preserved, not defaced and destroyed, especially on the basis of a plan that was put forward by a man who is not an architect, and a plan that was developed in secrecy without any public review or debate.

I am confident the views of the people back home will be heard in this Congress and will block the unnecessary and most deplorable extension project.

Under leave to extend my remarks I include thoughtful editorial comments from three outstanding upstate New York newspapers, the Syracuse Herald-Journal of June 29, 1966, the Binghamton Evening Press of June 28, 1966, and the Freeman's Journal of Cooperstown, N.Y., of June 29, 1966, one of the oldest and most distinguished weekly newspapers in the Nation:

[From the Syracuse (N.Y.) Herald-Journal, June 29, 1966]

THE CAPITOL PROFANERS

Representative SAMUEL S. STRATTON is issuing a call to join him in "fighting city hall". He wants our support in the form of protest letters to our Washington representatives to halt a proposed \$34 million extension of the U.S. Capitol.

After thinking it over, we are angry enough to back up STRATTON's call with one of our own.

Our Capitol at Washington, in the words of Allen Nevins, is the "best loved and most revered building" of our nation, and no one yet has publicly attempted to justify the idea of this extension on a basis of need or of money.

This grandiose proposal by a handful of men (J. George Stewart, the congressional architect, and the Commission on the Extension of the Capitol) would destroy the western front of the building with its handsome classic walls and cascading staircases. In their place would be another restaurant, two movie theaters and 109 new "hideaway" congressional offices, STRATTON reports.

Whether the exterior walls are or are not safe is a matter for competent engineers. If they are unsafe, they can be rebuilt and replaced without alteration of the original design. The British restored their House of Commons after Nazi bombing, and they insisted that it be restored, not modernized or modified.

Let's not let a few men in Washington tell us that our Capitol building (and it certainly belongs to all of us) must be defaced . . . This is our shrine of democracy . . . We want it to remain as it is.

[From the Binghamton (N.Y.) Press, June 28, 1966]

THE NOISY WESTERN FRONT

The humble but honest Virginia sandstone of the West Front of the U.S. Capitol is crumbling after 166 years. A face of the nation, so to speak, needs repair.

Something called the Commission for the Extension of the Capitol has decided on a major face-lifting—replacement of the sandstone with marble and extensions of the West Front 88 feet to accommodate another Capitol restaurant, two theaters, some offices, some conference rooms and a tourist center.

The estimated cost is \$34,000,000, but in the light of experience with Congressional

construction of recent years, the figure cannot be taken seriously. The hideous Rayburn Building, for example, started out with a \$20,000,000 estimate and ended up at somewhere around five times that.

The Commission for the Extension of the Capitol has five members, Capitol "architect" J. George Stewart, House Speaker JOHN McCORMACK, Senate Minority Leader EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, Vice-President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, and House Minority Leader GERALD R. FORD.

Mr. Stewart's title has 'quotes around it because he is not really an architect. The commission has the power to alter the Capitol without asking further Congressional approval and the decision on the West Front was made at a meeting which neither Mr. FORD nor Mr. HUMPHREY attended.

Since then the cries of outrage have risen. Some of the most outspoken comment has come from Democratic Representative SAMUEL S. STRATTON of Amsterdam. Mr. STRATTON attacks the project as too costly, and a needless defacement of the "last remaining section of the original building." He also argues that most of the things that would be provided in the expanded building are not needed.

Mr. STRATTON is in good company. The National Capital Fine Arts Commission and the American Institute of Architects take about the same view. Such varied editorial voices as those of the Milwaukee Journal, the New York Times and the Washington Post have thundered in protest.

At the risk of being a copycat, we'd like to get on the bandwagon.

There is something essentially wrong with a five-man commission having the complete say about what is to be done with a national monument of a democracy. There also is something wrong about the office of Architect of the Capitol not being headed by an architect. There also is something wrong about Congressional buildings being the only public structures in the capital that do not have to be submitted to the Fine Arts Commission for approval.

Representative STRATTON is organizing a National Committee of One Million to Save the U.S. Capitol. That's all right, but we'd suggest that he might look into sponsoring a bill to recognize the Capitol architect's office to make sure that Congressional minions no longer can build unsupervised, unchecked and unreviewed.

[From the Freeman's Journal, June 29, 1966]

ARCHITECTURAL CAUTION

Swirling controversy once again surrounds proposed changes in the architecture of the United States Capitol. Reconstruction of the East Front of the imposing structure was completed in 1961, despite a storm of architectural controversy. Now the Vice-President and the distinguished legislators who serve on the Commission for the Extension of the Capitol have approved a proposal to enlarge, resurface, and redesign the West Front.

That the West Front is in a state of structural deterioration and even in danger of collapse is a fact. Something must be done and without delay. The question, however, is what?

William Walton, chairman of the Federal Fine Arts Commission, leveled a heavy barrage of criticism at the proposal for extending the West Front. He charged that the plan would be "a national tragedy" and that it would "vandalize" and "vulgarize" a great historic monument.

Some senators and congressmen have added their criticism. Our own Rep. SAMUEL S. STRATTON announced formation of a National Committee of One Million to Save the United States Capitol.

Few will contest the charm, grace, and inspirational quality of the Washington Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, or the Supreme Court, to cite but a few of the structures

¹⁰⁴ New York Times, April 29, 1966, p. 18.

Congressional oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies of similar purpose—such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and others—would rest with a formal nine-member Commission, composed of three members each of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations Committees. At the present time, oversight of such operations rests with several Members appointed by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Mr. President, such oversight has rested with the Armed Services Committee since the creation of the CIA. There has been no challenge to the functions of the Armed Services Committee in this regard, and I might say that I know of no reason to suppose that the arrangement is not proving viable and effective, as, indeed, it seems to be.

It is obvious that in sensitive and secret matters of this kind, with human lives involved in some aspects of intelligence operations, there is every reason to confine critical information to as few ears as possible.

While it is perhaps true that decisions made by these agencies do have some ultimate bearing on foreign policy, it is also a fact that almost every bill which comes before Congress has ramifications beyond the scope of the particular committee to which it is referred. There is certainly a great deal of correlation in these matters.

I do not think that the present instance is significantly different. If joint jurisdiction and oversight should be accorded both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, then there is no reason why joint jurisdiction should not be accorded committees on any of the many bills which affect more than one legislative area.

As I understand it, the members of the Armed Services Committee who oversee operations of the CIA and other similar agencies have been quite cooperative in providing information to the Foreign Relations Committee on such subjects as the intelligence estimates for various countries, without divulging aspects of their operations.

The reasoning behind the proposal is, in my opinion, rather tenuous; and the justifications for maintaining the present methods of oversight and supervision are strong. There is much to be said for keeping the apparatus of supervision small and select, and I urge that my colleagues vote accordingly. I intend to vote to support the present, quite workable methods.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROPOSED COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I report to the Senate a resolution creating a Committee on Intelligence Operations approved by the Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 14 to 5 on May 17, 1966. On June 27, I sent to all Members of the Senate a copy of this resolution and report for their information. I did so in anticipation of the subject being taken up under the circumstances as they have developed this morning.

Therefore, I report the resolution to the Senate and ask that the clerk read it for the information of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be stated for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That there is hereby created, effective at the beginning of the Ninetieth Congress, a committee to be known as the Committee on Intelligence Operations to consist of nine Senators, of whom three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations from among the members of that committee, three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services from among the members of that committee, and three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations from among the members of that committee. No more than two of the members appointed from each such standing committee shall be from the same political party. The chairman of the committee shall be elected by the members.

SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the Committee on Intelligence Operations to keep itself fully and currently informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and other agencies of the Government insofar as the activities of such agencies relate to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. The committee's duties shall include, but not be limited to, review of intelligence and counterintelligence activities and legislative oversight of the coordination of such activities among the various agencies concerned.

SEC. 3. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, and to take such testimony as it deems advisable.

SEC. 4. A majority of the members of the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that a lesser number, to be fixed by the committee, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony.

SEC. 5. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the Government.

SEC. 6. The committee shall take special care to safeguard information affecting the national security.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me without losing the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, notwithstanding rule XXVI, I ask unanimous consent that it now be in order to proceed to the consideration of the resolution just reported, on the investigation

of the CIA, for the limited purpose of determining any procedural problems relating thereto.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the resolution is not to "investigate" the CIA; it is to create a committee. The original McCarthy resolution was to investigate the CIA. This resolution was reported in place of that one.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the change be inserted in the request.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] is recognized.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to address a few remarks to the substance of, the necessity for, and the justification for the resolution which has just been stated. It is reported in place of the original resolution proposed in January by the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY].

Mr. President, the resolution which I bring before the Senate this morning would authorize the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations. It would consist of a total of nine members, three each from the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations. Its mandate would be "to keep itself fully and currently informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and other agencies of the Government insofar as the activities of such agencies relate to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence."

Our sponsorship of this resolution proceeds from the belief that the CIA plays a major role in the foreign policy decisionmaking process and that by its activities it is capable of exerting—and has exerted—a very substantial influence on our relations with other nations. The resolution which we bring before you is an assertion of the duty of the Foreign Relations Committee to be aware of all the developments and activities of our Government as they relate to foreign affairs.

When the CIA was created, the extent and nature of its present role could not be foreseen. From a modest beginning in an entirely different context of world politics, the operations of the CIA have grown today to exceed the Department of State in both number of personnel and budget. The CIA is an efficient organization and I compliment it because in many countries its representatives stay longer and in many ways are better prepared—certainly they are better financed and, in many cases, have more influence—than our ambassadors.

The CIA has certain unique characteristics which set it apart from other institutions involved in the foreign policy process of the Government. These characteristics give the Agency unusual advantages and influence and suggest the desirability of the Foreign Relations

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**MOLYBDENUM PRICE ROLLBACK
 ANOTHER L.B.J. ANTI-INFLATION
 VICTORY**

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, once again the administration has demonstrated that it is fighting inflation hard and well.

This morning's newspapers announced that the Johnson administration has succeeded in forcing the cancellation of a 5-percent increase in the price of molybdenum that had been announced 6 days ago.

Such a price increase could have been a crucial factor in showing prices up generally, across the board. For some kinds of high quality steel the molybdenum increase could have added up to \$18 per ton.

Other types of steel also would have been pushed up in price and of course with the bellwether steel prices increases, the whole structure of our industrial pricing would move up. The administration stopped that cold.

The management of American Metals Climax—by far the largest molybdenum producer made that clear in the announcement that the administration had persuaded them not to raise prices after all.

And Mr. President, this price increase should have been rescinded. Economic council chairman Gardner Ackley called the proposed price increase unconscionable. Profits of American Metals Climax related to stockholders equity have been well above the average of industry in the country.

Profits of the molybdenum division of American Metal Climax are more than twice as high as American industry—and this of course is without any price increase.

Mr. President, this tough, fast, effective action of the administration will not make big industry throw their hats in the air. Of course the administration's vigor in holding down prices will be unpopular with much of industry.

But it should be mighty popular with the rest of the country—if only the consumers in the country would take notice of what the administration has done and recognize its significance.

Mr. President, the leveling off of production growth, the reduced volume of new orders, the increase in unemployment since it hit its low several months ago at 3.7 percent and since has risen to 4 percent, the enormous increase in plant capacity in the past 3 years and the huge influx into the labor force, plus the immense upgrading of the skills of that labor force, all suggest that excessive demand is unlikely to cause prices to rise from now on.

But, Mr. President, this doesn't mean that the inflation threat is over. Far from it. What happened in molybdenum—or threatened to happen before the administration stepped in could very easily happen in the rest of industry without a vigorous, alert administration willing to take action, powerful interests don't like.

And there is every possible danger that the wage price guidelines may be so generally and substantially breached—that wage increases might shove prices up.

To enforce—or to try to persuade labor to continue to live by those guidelines—is a hard, unpopular business.

But this is just what the administration is trying to do in precisely such cases as the molybdenum story that the newspapers reported today.

Prices may rise sharply this year as they did from 1957 to 1960 in the face of rising unemployment and falling demand. How can this happen? It can and without tough administration action certainly will happen because of the ability of both labor unions and big business to shove prices or wages or both up simply through superior bargaining power.

And finally, Mr. President—and I might say most important—we should recognize that this molybdenum story is just part of a long fight that started in the Kennedy administration in 1961. When President Kennedy persuaded the United Steel workers to hold down their wage demands. When big steel later broke the agreement and proposed a \$6 a ton increase in steel prices, the President made his historic and winning fight to keep prices down.

Several times subsequently steel prices were held down. The auto agreements a few years later in the Johnson administration were held close to the guidelines and auto prices were kept down. Copper and aluminum companies agreed to rescind announced price increases after Johnson administration warnings and the announcement of stockpile sales.

Just this week we acted on a government pay raise—within the guidelines—as a noninflationary example to the country.

Mr. President, this fight by the Johnson administration against inflation is far too little noted. For the last 5 years—for the first time in American history, we have a national administration that is effectively fighting to keep prices down.

The good news on molybdenum today is a fine example of that struggle.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from the New York Times to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GOVERNMENT WINS A PRICE ROLLBACK FOR MOLYBDENUM—TOP PRODUCER ANNOUNCES RESCISSION OF A 5-PERCENT RISE MADE 6 DAYS BEFORE—LABOR PACTS A FACTOR—EXPIRING UNION ACCORDS AND STRONG CORPORATE PROFITS ARE CONSIDERED BY UNITED STATES

(By Eileen Shanahan)

WASHINGTON, July 13.—The Administration succeeded today in forcing the cancellation of a 5 per cent price increase on molybdenum announced six days ago.

As the price rescission was announced in New York by American Metal Climax, Inc., the largest producer of molybdenum, Government officials here disclosed their basic motive for applying pressure on the company for the rollback.

They wanted to demonstrate to unions, as much as to management, that the Administration's anti-inflationary wage-price guidelines are not a dead letter.

The announcement came after the close of trading on the New York Stock Exchange and therefore had no impact on the market.

In deciding to make the attempt to force the first outright price rollback since January, the Government had its eye on the airlines mechanics' strike and on the many major labor contracts that expire next year, officials said.

The direct inflationary impact of the molybdenum price increase was also a major factor, officials stressed. They said the price rise, announced on Friday, could add as much as \$18 a ton to certain high-quality steels used in tool-making, which require the use of considerable molybdenum.

STAINLESS STEEL IMPACT

For stainless steel, in which relatively small quantities of molybdenum are used, the direct additional cost would be around 50 cents a ton, they said.

In addition, officials were motivated to make an issue of the molybdenum increase because of the unusually high profits of American Metal Climax, they said. The company's earnings amounted to 17 per cent of stockholder's equity last year, and in its molybdenum division have exceeded 30 per cent, officials said. These figures compared with an average of 13 per cent for all manufacturing corporations.

Even the Administration's consideration of the company's profits was focused in the context of future union demands for big wage increases, however, officials indicated.

They foresee large union demands over the next 12 months or so, partly because industry profits generally are high. The striking airline mechanics, for example, have repeatedly emphasized the "unprecedented prosperity" of the airlines.

Among the major labor contracts that will have to be negotiated in the next 12 months are those in the electrical equipment, trucking and rubber industries. Auto industry labor contracts expire next fall. There have been almost no major union contracts that have expired this year.

The Government's pressure on American Metal Climax to rescind the price increase began, so far as the public knew, on Saturday, when Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, issued a statement denouncing the increase.

The statement was received with considerable surprise in industry circles, because it had appeared that the Administration had abandoned all attempts to force businesses to lower prices once they had been raised.

Rollbacks were forced on the aluminum and copper industries last fall and a partial rollback on the price of structural steel in January.

Thereafter, while Administration figures publicly criticized certain price increases—on cigarettes, for example, there appeared to be no real attempts to force reversals of price increases that had already been announced.

Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor said flatly at a press conference in May that there would be no more "public confrontations" between the Government and business over price increases, although the Administration would continue to exert quiet pressure to prevent or moderate price increases.

Some increases were, in fact, held to less than the manufacturer originally planned, on newsprint, for example, and shoes, after conference with Administration officials.

**CIA FOREIGN RELATIONS
 RESOLUTION**

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee has reported out a resolution aimed at replacing the present review operations of Congress over the CIA and other intelligence agencies with a formal Committee on Intelligence Operations.

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Committee being more aware of its activities.

As is natural with any organization—particularly one staffed by intelligent and dedicated individuals—the CIA becomes a factor in the decisionmaking process as an advocate for its own recommendations. Its ability to provide the facts on which decisions are made gives it a great advantage over the Department of State in this respect. The Agency is not under the same compulsion to subject its data or analyses to the bureaucratic clearance procedures which affect and often retard the efficiency and imagination of the Department of State. Insofar as the collection of basic intelligence data is concerned, this immunity is proper. The desirability of scrutiny becomes more obvious in the case of conclusions which the Agency draws from its own data—conclusions which may be virtually unchallengeable given the Agency's freedom in its choice and presentation of supporting evidence.

There are certain other advantages, seldom mentioned, which the CIA enjoys. It is not required to expend any significant portion of its energy in dealings with either the public at large or the Congress. It is not expected, for example, to play host and guide to visiting Members of Congress, and we do not refer to it a regular flow of constituent mail and problems. Furthermore, its officers are relatively free from the social and ceremonial requirements which so greatly distract their State Department counterparts.

These aspects of the CIA's nature and functions were well stated in the recent series of very thorough articles on the CIA appearing in the New York Times. One passage reads:

It is the CIA, unlike the Defense Department with its service rivalries, budget concerns and political involvements, and unlike the State Department with its international diplomatic responsibilities and its vulnerability to criticism, that is freest of all agencies to advocate its projects and press home its views; the CIA can promise action, if not success.

And both the Agency and those who must pass upon its plans are shielded by security from the outside oversight and review under which virtually all other officials operate, at home and abroad.¹

And in another of the articles, the Times pointed out:

Nevertheless, the CIA enjoys an inherent advantage in any conflict with the State or Defense Departments because of its undeniable expertise—especially in economics and science—and because it is free from such political entanglements as trying to build up a missile budget (as in the case of the Air Force) or of having to justify the recognition of a foreign leader (as in the case of State).²

In urging the creation of a select committee or a Committee on Intelligence Operations, I am not suggesting that the Congress can or should assume control of the CIA or the other intelligence gathering activities of our Government. This is clearly a function of executive responsibility directly related to the con-

duct of our foreign relations and the maintenance of national security.

It has been asserted that the CIA functions under the National Security Council and initiates no activity which has not been ordered by the NSC. This seeks to imply close, continuous supervision by an organized mechanism. In this connection, I noted with great interest a recent report that the National Security Council met on May 9 of this year, for the first time since July 1965. Furthermore, the formal NSC machinery in existence in earlier years has atrophied to the point of nonexistence.

It seems to me, therefore, that if there is a chance that the executive branch may not adequately assure the proper relation of the CIA to overall national interests—particularly those in the field of foreign policy—it is imperative that the Senate know enough about the CIA's activities to be able to offer its own suggestions in this respect. As my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY], has said, this is "not a question of passing judgment on any activities, but of proper procedures of the Government of the United States * * * it is a concern for the proper function of government, for the maintenance of proper relationships, and it is a desire to provide procedures by which the Senate, in this case through the Committee on Foreign Relations, can exercise its basic constitutional responsibility."—Senator EUGENE J. McCARTHY, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 16, 1966, page 10132.

The general public and congressional concern and uncertainty over the nature of the CIA's role in foreign affairs have found expression over the years in some different 200 resolutions which have come before the Senate on this subject. Of these, the proposal before us today is probably the most moderate. I believe that its adoption would contribute to the quieting of criticism, the allaying of public fears, and the restoring of confidence in the Agency.

The Senate has in the past created new mechanisms to meet new responsibilities. This precedent is at least as compelling in the situation before us today as that which vests legislative oversight in the committee which reports creating legislation. In instances where there are legitimate questions of jurisdiction and clearly intertwined responsibilities, I believe the Senate is far better served by the creation of a specially tailored select committee. As my respected colleague from Georgia has already acknowledged:

The Central Intelligence Agency occupies a very peculiar position in our scheme of things.³

I believe that it is time for the Senate to take formal action which recognizes the true and evolved nature of this "peculiar institution."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. While I recognize the limitations of institutional forms of control, I believe that the creation of the select committee called for in this resolution will strengthen our position in deal-

ing with executive branch officials who must ultimately exercise the control which is so essential if we are to be assured that our most honorable national principles and aspirations are not sacrificed to the immediate requirements of intelligence operations.

Another advantage which would result from the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations would be a more efficient coordination of the various intelligence activities of the Government. This aspect of the resolution has not received the attention which I believe it deserves. The overlapping and confusion of activities among the CIA, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency are a matter of common knowledge to those in the intelligence field. Last year's lamentable Camelot affair, resulting from an ill-advised project of the Department of Defense, was an excellent example of this situation.

The size of our overall intelligence effort is difficult to establish. However, an idea of its extent can be gained from the New York Times' estimate that its annual cost exceeds \$3 billion a year. According to the same source, this amount is more than six times that specifically allotted to the CIA. The Times estimated that the National Security Agency alone spends about \$1 billion of this total figure.

There is little doubt in my mind that a careful study of the entire intelligence community would result in a more efficient distribution of functions and, in turn, a reduction in its size and expense.

Finally, Mr. President, I believe that the failure of the Senate to take this small step in formal recognition of its duty to exercise a more comprehensive oversight of U.S. intelligence activities will evidence an abdication of our clear duty in an area where the activities of the executive branch can spell the difference between national honor and national discredit or, conceivably, between war and peace.

Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I believe that with the responsibility, for good or bad that this committee has, it is entitled to access to the kind of information which would be available from the CIA.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, at this moment I shall not digress to discuss the merits of the proposal as was done by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, because I wish to raise a procedural question, based, Mr. President, on rule XXV, of the Standing Rules of the Senate.

This has been a most extraordinary procedure since its very inception. For example, Mr. President, this resolution has not been introduced. It did not follow the ordinary course of a Senator's sending it to the desk for appropriate reference; if that had been done, the resolution would not have been referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. It would have been referred to the Committee on Armed Services. But we have it here before us now, under this very unusual legal, though extraordinary,

¹ The New York Times, Monday, Apr. 25, 1966.

² The New York Times, Thursday, Apr. 28, 1966.

³ Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 16, 1966, p. 10124.

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procedure of having a committee meet and write within itself a self-serving resolution that affects other committees of the Senate, without the rules of the Senate governing reference of legislation having been applied.

I raise a point of order, Mr. President, that before this resolution goes to the calendar, it must be referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Under paragraph (p) (1) (A) of section 1 of rule XXV matters pertaining to the payment of money out of the contingent fund of the Senate or creating a charge upon the same are referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I missed the citation of the rule.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Paragraph (p) (1) (A) of section 1 of rule XXV prescribing the jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The provision then continues:

except that any resolution relating to substantive matter within the jurisdiction of any other standing committee of the Senate shall be first referred to such committee.

Mr. President, this resolution, as originally introduced, provided, as the Senator has stated, for an investigation by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and for the appropriation of \$150,000 for the purpose of providing a staff and the facilities for conducting that investigation. Of course, such provisions immediately placed it within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules. So that part of the resolution was rewritten. It was redrafted as a Senate resolution creating a committee.

The distinguished Senator from Arkansas has referred to the fact that this is a select committee. It is only called a select committee in his statement to the Senate. It does not anywhere else appear so in the proceedings.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is not a select committee. Despite the fact that the Senator has called it that, it is a standing committee of the Senate that would be created. The resolution reads: "is hereby created a committee to be known as the Committee on Intelligence Operations." This is not a select committee in the ordinary sense of the word. It is a standing committee of the Senate of the United States that is proposed to be created, without reference to the Committee on Rules—which usually handles the creation of standing committees—or to the Committee on Armed Services—whose jurisdiction it invades in a number of instances.

I wish to point out further, Mr. President, that this is proposed to be done without hearing a single witness by the committee, in this self-serving, self-seeking resolution. It is presented here in this novel fashion to change the procedures of the Senate as they have existed since its creation, without a single witness appearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, so far as I am advised, to support the resolution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We had the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on two occasions before the committee.

His testimony, which was restricted to the very superficial aspects of their activity, was the most persuasive witness with respect to the necessity of this resolution. I do not know of any further witness. In effect, this resolution is the outgrowth of the failure of the committee to receive what it believed to be significant intelligence from the Director of the CIA.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I intend to discuss that. But when the distinguished Senator from Arizona, who is the chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, wrote a letter to the members of that committee, pointing out that the Foreign Relations Committee was proposing to create a Subcommittee on Appropriations to deal with the appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency and all of the other agencies that are listed in the resolution, the Committee on Foreign Relations, to avoid that criticism, changed the resolution again, and struck out the asserted authority to deal with the appropriations and budgetary affairs of all these various investigative and intelligence agencies.

I use that illustration to show the unusual length to which the committee went in seeking to avoid the normal procedures of the Senate, in reporting the resolution without its having been introduced and without having been introduced at any hearings except that the distinguished chairman of the committee may have been dissatisfied with the refusal of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to divulge his methods and sources of obtaining information when he appeared before the committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not wish to impose on the Senator's time, but he has said that the Central Intelligence Agency occupies a very peculiar position. I do not think it is fair to say that the Foreign Relations Committee is trying to be self-seeking, self-serving, or trying to monopolize anything when it seeks participation. It is not trying to take this over.

All the resolution provides is that the Foreign Relations Committee be allowed to be a part. It does not seem to me to be a very extreme move. We are not trying to oust anybody from jurisdiction.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Why does not the Senator from Arkansas introduce a resolution from the floor for appropriate reference? Why does he bring it in from the committee in this form?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has said it is a very peculiar situation.

In consultation with the Parliamentarian about the point of order the Senator is about to make, the Parliamentarian said the Senate has no precedent for this kind of situation.

Actually, there is no precedent in the history of the Senate that I know of, for dealing with a body like the Central Intelligence Agency. This is a most peculiar agency, as the Senator said.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I decline to yield further.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very well; but the Senator himself has said that.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not deny it at all. It is a peculiar agency.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The formal supervision which we are seeking has never been acted on. The Senate has never taken any specific action with regard to one of the largest agencies, one of the most expensive agencies in the entire Government. It is all done very informally. I think that is very unusual.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I challenge the Senator from Arkansas to bring forth a single other precedent since the Senate was first created in 1789 where a committee brought forward a resolution to create a new committee of which it would be a part that was not referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration or to another appropriate committee.

If this is not a case which is self-serving, I do not know what self-serving means.

This proposal is presented in an unusual and unprecedented fashion. I realize we are living in a new day; but I know of no other instance in which a committee has been created on which the members were selected by the chairman of a standing committee.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield for a question.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not true that the committee is reporting a resolution of which it does not have jurisdiction?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is true. They avoided jurisdiction by reporting it out and not introducing it for reference to the appropriate committee.

The proposal departs from the general practice of having the chair appoint the membership of a committee or having it done by a caucus of the two parties and ratified by the Senate. I have never heard of another instance like this and I do not believe that the Senator from Arkansas has.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what the Senator does now with the committee that functions in connection with the CIA, and this committee is following his precedent.

The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services designates members without the authority of the Senate, and the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations designates members—also without authority from the Senate. That is the way they presently operate. This is a peculiar situation of which there is no precedent.

The committee is asking the Senate, in its wisdom, to make up its mind whether it wants a committee such as this to be formal or not. That is all that it is asking. It is not asking to oust anybody.

This procedure is the procedure that is now being followed. The present informal committee, with no formal recognition, is selected by the respective chairmen.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am utterly surprised that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], who has graced this Senate for so many years, does not know the difference between a subcommittee and a committee. The Senator is talking about the subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services that now has responsibility for the

Central Intelligence Agency, but he is proposing to create a standing committee, not a subcommittee, and he proposes to do it by having the selections made by the members of three other standing committees of the Senate.

I know of no instance where that has been done. Of course, a subcommittee can be extinguished at the end of a session of the Senate—it is extinguished—unless it is renewed by the full committee. This resolution proposes what would be a permanent committee.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator from Georgia saying that if the resolution now before us and reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations in its present form had been sponsored from the floor, the resolution would have been referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It would have been referred either to the Committee on Rules and Administration or to the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, may we have a parliamentary ruling?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am confident it would have gone to one of those two committees. In my judgment, it would have been referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. PASTORE. May we ask for an official ruling?

At the same time, in connection with that, may I ask if the resolution which the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY] introduced was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That was because he asked to have the Committee on Foreign Relations conduct the investigation. He spelled that out in the resolution. He was not letting anyone else in on that.

Mr. President, there are some other unusual features about this.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As to selection, I would be disposed to accept an amendment to have the members selected in the same way as any other committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am not taking an unusual privilege. It should be the same as any other committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is not essential to the resolution at all. If the Senator wishes to have members selected in the other fashion, it is perfectly all right with me, and I am sure that it is with the other members of the committee.

The simple proposition is whether or not the Senate, in its wisdom, wishes to take action on a matter of this kind or continue this vague situation.

There have been 200 resolutions showing discontent about it.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That would be revision 10 or 12 in the effort to get this resolution approved in some form. It has been rewritten, rewritten, and rewritten to avoid the jurisdiction of the appropriate committee, or committees, which should handle it.

Let me point out another novel thing. On every other standing committee of

the Senate, the chairman is selected by the Senate. What does this resolution provide? It provides that the chairman be elected by members of the standing committee.

It deviates from the practice that has obtained since the inception of the Senate. The Senate has elected the chairmen of committees. Here it is proposed that this is a special case, that owing to the peculiar nature of this agency, we should let the new committee take away jurisdiction from the Senate itself to elect the chairman. That is a most unusual provision. It is one that the Committee on Rules should examine after the Committee on Armed Services has examined into the functions of the subcommittee.

Now, Mr. President, as I say, this resolution has been rewritten and rewritten and rewritten time and again in an effort to avoid the ordinary parliamentary processes of this body. Under rule XXV, there is no doubt in my mind that this resolution should be considered by the Armed Services Committee. I do not know what the Parliamentarian would say, but I do know what the rules provide.

I am therefore glad to submit this parliamentary inquiry. If this resolution were introduced for appropriate reference, to what committee would this resolution be referred?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair wishes to ask the Senator from Georgia, is he referring now to the resolution as it was reported—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

The VICE PRESIDENT (continuing). By the clerk from the Committee on Foreign Relations?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under a cursory examination of this resolution, there is a feeling on the part of the Chair that in light of the—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I ask the Chair if he would examine into the resolution as to the agencies covered, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the others which are involved, and the jurisdiction that is now fixed, before he makes a ruling.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is posing a hypothetical case. I want to make that clear at this point, because the resolution before the Senate comes from the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is correct.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator poses the question, if this resolution had been introduced from the floor of the Senate, and asked for appropriate referral, where would it have gone? On a cursory examination, it appears to deal with matters of national security, which is the subject matter covered by the Committee on Armed Services and that is the committee to which the resolution would be referred.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield at that point?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would not wish to yield right now, although I am glad to—

The VICE PRESIDENT. This ruling does not relate to the proposition that is presently before the Senate.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I understand that. I am not complaining. I am not saying this is an illegal procedure. I say it is an extraordinary procedure that is resorted to only for special purposes by committees when they write bills within the committee and do not introduce them from the floor. That is the objection I am making. I say for that reason, that a point of order should be sustained by the Chair, and this resolution should not go to the calendar but should be referred to the Committee on Armed Services, so that we would at least have an opportunity to have some kind of hearing from the agencies affected as to what effect they think this resolution might have upon them and their operations.

Mr. President, I want to clear up a misconception which has arisen here, particularly in the distinguished newspaper published in New York which the Senator quoted with authority about a dozen times in the course of his remarks, as to what legislative oversight means.

That particular paper seems to have the idea that legislative oversight means that a legislative committee which is overlooking has some control over the administration of that agency.

That is not true. Nothing could be further from the facts. All that we can do by overlooking is to keep ourselves informed as to what an agency is doing, with the exception of the Committee on Appropriations. I want to make that exception. They have the power of the purse. If they feel disposed, they can reduce the appropriation. But the other standing committees, when they are exercising legislative oversight, cannot control the operations of the agency.

I would say, Mr. President, that the most illuminating example of that of which I have any knowledge is the fact that the Committee on Foreign Relations has legislative oversight over the Department of State.

Anyone who has read the newspapers for the last 8 months knows just how far the Foreign Relations Committee has missed in controlling or directing the activities of the Department of State. That shows just how much this legislative oversight function gives a committee control over an agency. All that it does is to enable committees to keep themselves informed about what an agency is doing and undertake to measure up to our legislative responsibilities in that light.

The State Department itself has an intelligence operation apart from the CIA. Each of the military departments has intelligence activities. The CIA is somewhat of a coordinating institution for other intelligence gatherers.

Mr. President, I want to say also that the Foreign Relations Committee has available to it practically all the information which is available to the subcommittee on the CIA of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, with one or two minor exceptions.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee can get any intelligence estimate that has been arrived at in the Govern-

ment on a particular situation in any country that bears upon our international relations.

One of the incidents that gave rise to this matter was when the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency declined to testify as to his sources of information and his methods of acquiring information. That matter is so sensitive, Mr. President, that only in the most extraordinary circumstances has the Armed Services Subcommittee, as careful as it has been, gone into the sources of information and the methods which the CIA has used in gathering information.

Why, Mr. President, if there were evidence of the slightest disclosure of the sources of information to the CIA from any source, if the report got out tomorrow—and I use this purely as a hypothetical illustration—that the Secretary of the Soviet Legation in Tasmania was revealing information to the CIA, our intelligence sources throughout the world would dry up. It would frighten them all to death. We could not get one iota of information. The act creating the CIA particularly charged that the Director of that agency protect and maintain the highest classification of secrecy on the methods and sources of his information. That is properly so. If he does not do this, the CIA is not worth a plugged nickel so far as getting any clandestine information is concerned, because the slightest indication that a source of information is likely to be revealed would discourage the flow of information immediately and instantly.

Mr. President, at times an effort is made by committees to exercise an influence over executive agencies by the process of publicity. They publicize certain things. They leak information to the press in an effort to build up public sentiment, to control the editorial policy of great newspapers, thereby to influence national policy. I am not going to debate the merits of such tactics in ordinary circumstances, but I am going to say that they do not work where the CIA is concerned. The first time such methods were tried, we will have destroyed the usefulness of the CIA and we might as well abolish it.

The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee can call the Director of the CIA before his committee any time he wishes and he can get from him any information available to the Committee on Armed Services except as to sources and methods, and as to budgetary matters and how much money is spent for certain things.

Let me emphasize that when I refer to all these cloak and dagger operations, that they constitute a very small part of the total operations. They are vital. We must have them. Much of the rest might be of little value without those operations. However, the relative cost of the secret operations is not large.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield for a question.

Mr. MORSE. I have listened with great interest to the remarks of the Senator. When he says that the Foreign Relations Committee can get what-

ever information it seeks on intelligence matters from the CIA except information with respect to sources and methods used in connection with the collection of that information and the expenditure of money, is the Armed Services Committee able to get that information?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We can get information as to sources and methods, but I want to be very frank with the Senator. I do not want the information except in the very rarest of cases. And the other members of the committee do not want that information except in unusual circumstances.

I want to say further that I do not think it is wise for the legislative branch of the Government to know all the sources from which the CIA gets its information. We should be interested in the validity of it and the importance to be attached to it. All of that is weighed in what they call the intelligence community, which consists of representatives of several agencies and departments of the executive branch.

Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator yield for one additional question to seek information?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Is it the argument of the Senator from Georgia that if this select committee—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is not a select committee. It is a standing committee.

Mr. MORSE. Is it the argument of the Senator from Georgia that if the Subcommittee of the Armed Services, in connection with receiving the CIA report, had added to it three members of the Foreign Relations Committee, which would be bound by the procedures of the committee in regard to the CIA, that that would increase the danger that information as to the sources and the methods of collection and financing would be made public?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Without the least intention of giving offense to the Senator or to his committee, I want to say that every time we add one person from any committee to the subcommittee, we increase the chances that there will be some leak.

Mr. MORSE. But there would be no danger if it were limited to Members of the U.S. Senate who are members of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No. There is also a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, and by a strange coincidence of parliamentary life, the membership of the two committees happen to contain some duplications. The members of the Appropriations Committee, of course, have the last word because they can cut off the means of existence of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other agency.

Mr. MORSE. Does it not follow that the Senator is arguing, when he makes the statement in regard to the protection of the source and the method of collecting and financing of the material of the CIA, that there is no question about its protection if the committee is limited to its present members in the availability to such material, but that if

three members of the Foreign Relations Committee are added who will be bound by the same rules as those by which the Armed Services Committee is bound, we would then run into some danger of disclosing matters of secrecy?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I have been here for some time. I want to say that there is a great deal of difference in the application that some Senators give to their responsibilities for maintaining matters that they get in executive session and the application that some other Senators give to such responsibilities.

Sometimes I have seen classified matters, given in executive session, printed in the newspapers before the committee adjourned.

Any Senator who has been here for any time knows that there is a difference between the approach of some Senators to matters of classification and the approach of other Senators to such matters.

I say that without any invidious comparison. It is true on the Armed Services Committee. It is true on every other committee, and it is true in the Senate as a whole.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield first to the Senator from North Carolina. I will have to stop yielding. I want to complete this argument.

Mr. ERVIN. My question is very simple. This does not reflect on any member of any committee. However, is it not a self-evident fact that every time an additional person is given secret information there is danger of it being disclosed? The more people who know a secret, the more apt it is to be disclosed, no matter who those people are?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I say, if we increase the membership of the committee by one, we increase the danger of material being disclosed. I do not care who it is. It is a fact of life.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the ranking minority member on both committees.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I appreciate the statement of the Senator. If we were to add Foreign Relations Committee members to the subcommittee of the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, why should we not add members of the Committee on Government Operations and members of other committees?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think there is some merit in the statement of the Senator. However, I will not debate all the merits of it today.

I am taking the position that the Senate should not agree to this unusual parliamentary procedure under which a committee sits in its own committee room and writes a resolution concerning something that belongs in the jurisdiction of some other committee. They then report it here and seek to deny jurisdiction

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to the other committee as a result of their procedure.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, a point of order.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Senator from Georgia yield for a point of order?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I would like it to be quiet so that we can all hear this colloquy.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I am doing my best to bring the matter to a conclusion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I did not interrupt him in the course of his remarks, but it is all right.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The remark of the Senator from Massachusetts seems to leave the impression that we should prevent action on the part of the Foreign Relations Committee because it has no concern with the subject matter.

I tried to make it clear that the Committee on Foreign Relations is charged by the Senate and by the rules with responsibility on foreign relations and is in a very peculiar relationship to this activity.

The activity that we are interested in is the foreign relations activity. Our interest has nothing to do with the domestic activities. If the CIA should seek to intervene in a domestic matter, we would not be interested. We have never asked for that information. If they were participating in an election on domestic matters, that would be something beyond our interest.

It is well known that this country is in great difficulty and is involved in a most dreadful and tragic war in which activity this country is the least unified of any country that I know of. It involves a grave responsibility of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

We think we ought to know what part the CIA plays in situations such as we are involved in in Vietnam, and such as we have been involved in in Guatemala, in Iran, and in other parts of the world. When they refute reports by reputable organizations and reports written by well-established journalists, we cannot have the information that would prove or disprove the refutation. But, when he insinuates that the Foreign Relations Committee has no more interest in this than does any other committee, he is absolutely wrong.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not think he said any other committee; he said the Government Operations Committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have a more direct responsibility for foreign relations than does the Armed Services Committee, to be frank about it. I do not know why the Senator monopolizes the CIA.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am not trying to muscle in on the Senator's committee. I am trying to keep the

Senator from muscling in on my committee. That is what I am doing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the legislation that gives the Armed Services Committee exclusive jurisdiction on this subject. This is a power that his committee has assumed simply because the National Security Act came out of that committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I do not yield further, and I do not accept that statement. There is nothing here that would justify the statement that the Central Intelligence Agency will not give the Foreign Relations Committee any information.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. "Significant," I said.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not believe that is correct. It would be far from the purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency. In my opinion, the President of the United States was correct in not authorizing the CIA to give details on the methods and sources of obtaining information.

Mr. President, the sponsors of this resolution emphasize that the CIA affects foreign policy. But it seems to me that affecting the subject is insufficient, under our practice, to confer legislative jurisdiction. If every committee that had some small degree of interest in a subject insisted upon the creation of special committees like this to deal with it we would have such a proliferation of committees around here that the Members of the Senate could not possibly name them all. They could not bear their names in mind. If we are going to create a special committee every time there is apparently any overlapping or conflict of jurisdiction, we would have such proliferation that it would destroy the present and existing committee system of the Senate of the United States.

I submit to the Senate, Mr. President, that this point of order is valid, and that the Committee on Armed Services, to which this resolution would ordinarily be referred if normal procedures were followed, should have an opportunity to consider this resolution before it goes to the Senate calendar.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Senator from Georgia please restate his point of order?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. My point of order is that under rule XXV, the provision of which I have read, the subsection of the rule dealing with the Committee on Rules and Administration, this resolution relates to a substantive matter within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services, and therefore should be first referred to such committee, before it goes to the calendar. That is the point of order I made.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I wish to ask a question.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Does not the President of the United States have sole jurisdiction over the operations of the CIA and as to what information it can disclose?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. He has

complete control of it, through the National Security Council.

The Senator from Arkansas referred to the fact that there had been only one full meeting of the National Security Council for many months, but there are constant meetings of subcommittees of the National Security Council.

I do not believe the President has failed so signally in his duty that he has bypassed and neglected and shown as important an agency of the Government as the National Security Council.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate go into closed session.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I second the motion. (At 12 o'clock and 25 minutes p.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed.)

At the conclusion of the closed door session, the doors were reopened at 4 o'clock and 5 minutes p.m., and the Senate was called to order by the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUVE].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, would the Chair state the question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the point of order of the Senator from Georgia, that under rule XXV the original resolution reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations consists of subject matter predominately under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services and therefore is improperly before the Senate and must be referred to that committee before it can properly be placed on the Senate Calendar.

The yeas and nays have been ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I just bring this to the attention of the Senate. Immediately following this vote, there will be a vote on the International Wheat Agreement Treaty, which was reported unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Relations and which I understand is up against a time limitation tomorrow.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. The vote "yea" sustains the point of order; the vote "nay" is to overrule the point of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. When is it the intention of the majority leader that the Senate again take up the agricultural appropriation bill?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Tomorrow.

Mr. HOLLAND. At what hour?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Twelve o'clock tomorrow, Mr. President.

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ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow; and, furthermore, I ask unanimous consent that after a 15-minute morning hour the unfinished business, the agriculture appropriation bill, be laid before the Senate and debate begun.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate has heard the question. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NELSON (when his name was called). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." I withhold my vote. The rollcall was concluded.

Mr. MANSFIELD (after having voted in the negative). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the distinguished Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS]. If he were present and voting he would vote "yea." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore, I withhold my vote.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS], and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] would each vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] is absent because of illness, and if present and voting, would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 61, nays 28, as follows:

[No. 137 Leg.]

YEAS—61

Allott	Hayden	Neuberger
Bartlett	Hickenlooper	Pastore
Bayh	Hill	Pearson
Bennett	Holland	Prouty
Bible	Hruska	Randolph
Brewster	Inouye	Ribicoff
Byrd, Va.	Jackson	Robertson
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Russell, S.C.
Cannon	Jordan, Idaho	Russell, Ga.
Carlson	Kuchel	Saltonstall
Cooper	Lausche	Simpson
Cotton	Long, Mo.	Smith
Curtis	Long, La.	Stennis
Dirksen	Magnuson	Symington
Dominick	McClellan	Talmadge
Douglas	McIntyre	Thurmond
Eastland	Miller	Tower
Ellender	Montoya	Tydings
Ervin	Morton	Young, N. Dak.
Fannin	Mundt	
Harris	Murphy	

NAYS—28

Aiken	Hartke	Moss
Boggs	Javits	Muskie
Burdick	Kennedy, Mass.	Pell
Case	Kennedy, N.Y.	Proxmire
Church	McCarthy	Williams, N.J.
Fong	McGovern	Williams, Del.
Fulbright	Metcalf	Yarborough
Gore	Mondale	Young, Ohio
Griffin	Monroney	
Hart	Morse	

NOT VOTING—11

Anderson	Gruening	Scott
Bass	Mansfield	Smathers
Clark	McGee	Sparkman
Dodd	Nelson	

So the point of order of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] was sustained.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to consider executive business, for the purpose of considering Executive F—89th Congress, 2d session—a protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

PROTOCOL FOR THE FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT AGREEMENT, 1962

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate Executive F, 89th Congress, 2d session.

There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider Executive F, 89th Congress, 2d session, the protocol for the further extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962, which was read the second time.

EXECUTIVE F—PROTOCOL FOR THE FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT AGREEMENT, 1962

The Governments signatory to this Protocol,

Considering that the International Wheat Agreement, 1962 which was extended by Protocol in 1965, expires on 31 July 1966, and

Desiring to extend the Agreement, in accordance with the recommendations of the International Wheat Council under paragraph (2) of Article 36 of the Agreement, for a further period,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962

The International Wheat Agreement, 1962 as extended by the 1965 Protocol (hereinafter called "the Agreement") shall continue in force between the parties to this Protocol until 31 July 1967.

ARTICLE 2

Signature, acceptance, approval and accession

(1) This Protocol shall be open for signature in Washington from 4 April 1966 until and including 29 April 1966 by the Government parties to the Agreement, or which are provisionally regarded as parties to the Agreement, on 4 April 1966.

(2) This Protocol shall be subject to acceptance or approval by the signatory Governments in accordance with their constitu-

tional procedures. Instruments of acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America not later than 15 July 1966.

(3) This Protocol shall be open for accession:

(a) until 15 July 1966 by the Government of any country listed in Annex B or C to the Agreement as of that date, in accordance with the conditions specified in the Agreement or prescribed by the Council before its accession to the Agreement, or

(b) as provided in paragraph (4) of Article 35 of the Agreement.

(4) Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

(5) Any Government which has not accepted, approved or acceded to this Protocol by 15 July 1966 in accordance with paragraph (2) or (3)(a) of this Article may be granted by the Council an extension of time for depositing its instrument of acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 3

Entry into force

(1) This Protocol shall enter into force among those Governments which have deposited instruments of acceptance, approval or accession in accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol by 15 July 1966, as follows:

(a) on 16 July 1966, with respect to Part I and Parts III to VII of the Agreement, and

(b) on 1 August 1966, with respect to Part II of the Agreement, Provided, that such Governments and the Governments which have deposited notifications in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article by 15 July 1966 are Governments which held not less than two-thirds of the votes of exporting countries and not less than two-thirds of the votes of importing countries under the Agreement on that date, or would have held such votes if they had been parties to the Agreement on that date.

(2) This Protocol shall enter into force for any Government which deposits an instrument of acceptance, approval or accession after 15 July 1966 on the date of such deposit except that the Protocol shall not enter into force with respect to Part II of the Agreement earlier than 1 August 1966.

(3) For the purposes of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article, any signatory Government or any Government entitled to accede in accordance with paragraph (3)(a) of Article 2 of this Protocol or any Government whose application for accession has been approved by the Council on conditions established under paragraph (3)(b) of Article 2 of this Protocol may deposit a notification with the Government of the United States of America not later than 15 July 1966 containing an undertaking to seek acceptance, approval or accession to this Protocol as rapidly as possible in accordance with its constitutional procedures. It is understood that a Government which gives such a notification will provisionally apply the Protocol and be provisionally regarded as a party thereto for a period to be determined by the Council.

(4) If by 15 July 1966 the conditions laid down in the preceding paragraphs of this Article for entry into force of this Protocol are not fulfilled, the Governments of those countries which by that date have accepted, approved or acceded in accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol may decide by mutual consent that it shall enter into force among them or they may take whatever other action they consider the situation requires.

ARTICLE 4

Final provisions

(1) For the purposes of the operation of the Agreement and this Protocol, any reference to countries the respective Governments

in Boston. He organized our dental school and then went on to head the entire Medical Center in 1962. His interest stems from the fact Dr. Volker has traveled to many parts of the world as a health advisor for the World Health Organization, Unitarian Service Committee and U.S. Government, i.e. to Thailand, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Jamaica and Israel.

Finding the right Spanish speaking individuals for our tour was a real pleasure. We discovered two Peruvians on our staff—Dr. A. Sam, a research fellow in medicine in the artificial kidney area—and in psychiatry, Dr. Jorge Lazarte, who left Peru many years ago after graduation from the University of San Marcos, Lima. Both were most helpful when the miners arrived.

Dr. Mario Martinez and Dr. Jesus Lastra, graduate students in the school of dentistry, not only detailed how our dental school ranks in the upper fifth in the nation for dental research and gives international leadership in dentistry, but they spoke enthusiastically of their new home. Dr. Martinez concluded his talk with an emotional tribute to the nation that sheltered him and his family after Fidel Castro made it necessary to flee Cuba. The Peruvian miners were visibly moved by his talk and applauded.

We began our five hour "seminar" with coffee served in the paneled Reynolds Historical Library, which houses early manuscripts and books on medicine and dentistry, including unpublished letters of Louis Pasteur and Sir William Osler and correspondence between George and Martha Washington and their dentists, as well as one of four copies of William Harvey's *De Montu Cordis*.

I opened the program earlier with a short introduction in Spanish. Then our Coordinator of Research, Dr. John Dunbar, a veteran traveler with great interest in international health, greeted the Peruvians on behalf of Dr. Volker, who was out of town, and described the varied research projects that have a combined annual budget of \$6,000,000. He told the miners about our yearly budget of \$2,000,000, about our 3,000 employees, about other hospitals in the complex and future plans to expand the center to 60 blocks through Urban Renewal.

Tour interpreter Carlos Guevera, exhausted from fifteen hours of daily translation on the tour, was pleased by and highly complimentary of our efforts to tell our story in Spanish. He had little to do but listen.

Dr. Albert Wolff, associate professor of biostatistics and a former employee of U.S. agencies in Latin America, gave insight into our new department of biostatistics and its function. He spoke fluent Spanish. Our varied Spanish accents became Castillian when Dr. Ricardo Ceballos, associate professor in pathology, explained his work in the clinical laboratories of University Hospital. The native of Spain with an infectious sense of humor kept his audience interested and laughing. Then he led the group next door to the newly renovated Roy Kracke Clinical Services Building, where 1,200,000 tests are processed annually for the 650 bed University Hospital. He told how this division of the center is unique in that every report is processed with an electronic processing system. Since many of the staff there are girls and pretty Southern ones, the tour got off schedule immediately. One of the miners wanted a blood sample taken, and the technicians obligingly complied. Because of the girls we had difficulty getting the men to the artificial kidney unit next, to hear Dr. Sam explain how life is prolonged this way.

For lunch we selected the newest and most attractive conference room in our complex—the Spain Rehabilitation Center Library. We considered serving a typical Southern meal of black eyed peas, fried chicken and turnip greens, but our Argentine psychiatrist suggested turkey and dressing since the miners would not be in this

country for Thanksgiving. We did this with success. Two secretaries from the dental school provided folk songs and music for entertainment, and we followed lunch with two more talks.

Dr. Carlos Gaos, a cardiologist from Mexico, was delighted to give an illustrated lecture on the fine work in the cardiovascular field which has attracted so much attention to the Medical College of Alabama through his colleagues, Dr. Tinsley Harrison, Dr. Joseph Reeves and Dr. Sterling Edwards. He fascinated the Peruvians with samples of teflon arterial grafts (perfected at our center by Dr. Edwards), pace makers and artificial heart valves. Then Dr. Gaos acted as interpreter for his colleague Dr. Ben Branscomb, director of the pulmonary disease division in the medical center. Dr. Branscomb explained facts about lung disease that afflicts miners the world over. On a later tour of pulmonary treatment rooms the miners were intrigued with a portable oxygen machine for emphysema sufferers that Dr. Branscomb helped perfect in collaboration with a Birmingham firm now manufacturing the units for worldwide use. The Peruvians then toured other rehabilitation areas in the Spain Center.

Directly behind Spain is the Smolian Psychiatric Outpatient Clinic, like the rehabilitation center made possible in part by gifts from public spirited Birmingham citizens. Dr. Maria Gamboa, instructor in child psychiatry and from Argentina, took over with help from Dr. Lazarte, showing the union leaders two way mirrors for studying children's reactions, conference rooms and testing areas. The tour ended in the large conference room where the tired Peruvians could sit, watch slides, and ask questions about psychiatry, which they did with enthusiasm.

With the five-hour tour concluded, Orlando Arenas, spokesman for the group, stood up and thanked us for our courtesy and generosity. He said the tour had been a highlight of their visit to the United States. The good feeling was mutual. Our people were impressed with the Peruvians. They were most intelligent, asked good questions, seemed alert and interested in everything we showed them. Despite what they may have read about Birmingham in past years, these Peruvians could see for themselves that they had visited a completely integrated hospital serving many patients of all races with white and Negro staff members.

The tour was well reported as the daily News and Post-Herald carried three column articles and photographs of the Peruvians in the Medical Center and one television station aired a newsclip taken at the luncheon. Medical Tribune, a national publication, published a photograph of Dr. Sam explaining the artificial kidney to his countrymen. Thanks to Congressman ARMISTEAD SELDEN and Senator JOHN SPARKMAN, the U.S. Information Service and the Voice of America reported our visit. VOA recorded a beeper telephone interview with Senor Arenas who then described our Medical Center in glowing terms. That interview was beamed on short wave to Spanish Latin America later that evening and was included in a daily taped program, "Focus the World", sent the next day to USIS representatives in 19 Latin American countries for local distribution to radio stations.

A local free lance movie cameraman sent his movie films to USIS in Washington for processing, editing and distribution. Prints were then shipped to TV stations in Peru for local coverage.

Helping me on this unusual Spanish tour were Miss Jane Williams, foreign student advisor, Richard Gunthorpe, the center's photographer, George Winston, my assistant, Miss Audrey Brown, my secretary, and Miss Gaudy Call, who handled all the details for the tour.

Much that we do in public relations is

felt indirectly or; at best over a period of time, but the feeling immediately after this project was so satisfying that it was one of those rare experiences one has too seldom in public relations.

FRED A. WOODRESS

Fred A. Woodress, a native of Webster Groves, Missouri, is Public Affairs Director of the University of Alabama Medical Center in Birmingham. His interest in Latin America dates back to a high school sociology trailer trip to Mexico in 1939. His other visits South include one to Guatemala as guest of President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes in 1959 and another as a member of a three man U.S. Salvation Army relief team to Haiti following hurricane Flora damage in 1963.

SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. President, as chairman of the Select Committee on Small Business, I submit the 16th annual report of the committee and ask unanimous consent that it be printed.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RACIAL INTEGRATION AND THE HOSPITALS

Mr. ERVIN, Mr. President, the use by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of Medicare as an instrument to promote racial integration could result in many unfortunate cases of old people being denied what is rightfully theirs. Medicare, or so we were led to believe, belongs to citizens over 65 because they have paid for it. To make this insurance dependent on something over which these people have no control—the irreconcilable positions of Federal bureaucrats and some local hospital boards—is inequitable and should have been avoided.

As an editorial written in the Greensboro Daily News recently said:

There can be no case for denying a private citizen his lawful right under a program into which he may well have paid hundreds of dollars in premiums.

Mr. President, for a candid discussion of the dangers of the present policies of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, I recommend the editorial which appeared in the Greensboro Daily News on May 28, 1966, entitled "Racial Balance in the Hospitals," and I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Greensboro (N.C.) Daily News, May 28, 1966]

RACIAL BALANCE IN THE HOSPITALS

The mounting frenzy over the preparedness of the nation's hospital beds—woefully short in any case—has been needlessly complicated by the decision of Health, Education and Welfare officials to use Medicare payments as a lever to force their own program of anti-discrimination.

We have no brief here for local hospital boards that needlessly defy national policy; and like it or not, Congress and the courts have established the principle that federal

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On line 2, strike out the words "House adjourns" and insert in lieu thereof "two Houses adjourn"; and on line 3, strike out "it" and insert "they".

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana.

The amendment was agreed to.

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 804), as amended, was agreed to, as follows:

H. CON. RES. 804

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That when the two Houses adjourn on Thursday, June 30, 1966, they stand adjourned until 12 o'clock noon on Monday, July 11, 1966.

The title was amended so as to read: "Concurrent Resolution Relative to the Adjournment of the two Houses of Congress on June 30, 1966."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, so that the Senate will be aware of the resolution which has just been agreed to, it is contemplated that, the House concurring—and I anticipate no objection—the Senate will begin its recess at the close of business today, rather than tomorrow.

AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN BILLS, RECEIVE MESSAGES, AND FILE REPORTS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the adjournment of the Senate from the close of business today until noon, July 11, 1966, the Vice President and the President pro tempore be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills.

I further ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, July 7, while the Senate is adjourned, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the House of Representatives, and that committees be authorized to file reports, together with any minority, individual, supplemental, or additional views.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I send to the desk a concurrent resolution, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 805) providing that the Speaker of the House of Representative and the President of the Senate be authorized to sign enrolled bills and joint resolutions duly passed and found truly enrolled.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution?

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 805) was considered and agreed to.

PROGRAM FOR THE WEEK AFTER THE FOURTH OF JULY RECESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate the leadership intends to take up the following program upon our return from the Fourth of July recess.

On Monday, July 11, it is our intention to call up and hopefully pass the Federal pay bill and to follow it with the child nutrition bill, S. 3467, which we also hope to complete that afternoon. Both of these measures we anticipate will require a roll call vote, so Members should be alerted to that fact.

Upon the completion of these measures we will proceed with consideration of the air pollution control bill on Tuesday, July 12, following it immediately on that date with the water pollution program, which, if not completed on Tuesday, we hope will certainly be completed by the conclusion of business Wednesday. The military procurement conference report, which contains the military pay raise, is scheduled for floor action in the House on Tuesday and we shall consider it in the Senate immediately upon its receipt on Tuesday from the House.

On Thursday, July 14, by previous announcement, the so-called CIA resolution will be reported from the Foreign Relations Committee during the morning hour. Hopefully, the disposition of the referral of this resolution will be completed during the early part of the day and we will then proceed to the agriculture appropriation bill. We are hopeful that by Friday of that week the water resources development investigation, S. 3034, and its counterpart, H.R. 13419, will be ready for consideration. If so, they will be taken up on Friday to be followed upon completion by the commencement of consideration of the foreign aid authorization for 1967.

BRIDGING THE COMMUNICATIONS GAP WITH SPANISH

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, last November it was my pleasure and privilege to work with the University of Alabama Medical Center in Birmingham to bring some Peruvian miners to the center for a tour. Mr. Fred A. Woodress, public affairs director of the University of Alabama Medical Center in Birmingham, described this visit in a paper which he has written. I ask unanimous consent that this article be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRIDGING THE COMMUNICATIONS GAP WITH SPANISH*

(By Fred Woodress**)

All of us have conducted tours of our institutions at some time or other. Some are

*This paper was selected in the nationwide New Look competition conducted by the American College Public Relations Association to be delivered at the ACPRA convention in Boston at 2 p.m. on Thursday, July 7 at the Sheraton Hotel.

**A biography of the author is on the last page.

for VIP's turned over to us at the last minute and others are carefully planned months ahead. The most unique one planned by our Public Affairs Office at the University of Alabama Medical Center in Birmingham took place last November. It was different because we bridged the communications gap by telling our story in the language of the visitors—Spanish. If you have ever attended an international meeting, you know what I mean. Even the best interpreters cannot be experts in every field, so much is often lost in translation including the spontaneity of questions and answers.

My life long enthusiasm for Latin America, dating back to my first trip South while still in high school, made this assignment a personally challenging one. The final results were rewarding. Our tour created comment all over Latin America. More important, on a people to people basis, this special event gave us a chance to do creative public relations and an opportunity to further international understanding.

It all started with a telephone call from City Hall. Mayor Albert Boutwell like most Alabamians, is very proud of the Medical Center. He knows it is one of the city's five largest industries, and that it has brought many outstanding scientists from this country and abroad to Birmingham. Bill Hamilton, the mayor's public relations director, asked if we would show our center to a group of miners from Peru in this country on a ten city tour sponsored by the United States Department of Labor and Department of State.

We answered "yes" and silently thanked them for giving up thirty days to make arrangements. Then we wondered among ourselves, if we were Peruvian miners, what would we want to see? Birmingham is at the end of the Appalachians in an area abundant in coal, iron ore and limestone. Knowing the pride our own steelworkers and miners have in the Medical Center, we believed there were some aspects of our institution that would interest the Peruvians. We also knew the ever-present new construction in the 15-block complex always intrigued foreign visitors.

It is an axiom of public relations that one must know his public. The Bureau of International Affairs of the Labor Department was very helpful. Mr. Joseph Pitcher of that office sent us information listing facts about each miner. He explained they came from mines owned by U.S. and Peruvian interests with the former companies mining copper and the latter lead, zinc, mercury, and silver. Most of the miners live in rather isolated and barren mountain settlements provided by the company and earn from 45 soles (\$1.95) to 59 soles daily with an equal amount in fringe benefits. Of the 60,000 miners in Peru, 40,000 are organized. The fact sheet reminded that the Peruvians "will naturally be interested in American life in general . . . it is said that for the Latin American, friendship is stronger than the law". Tour leader for the group was to be Eugene Sullivan, a retired bricklayer from New York.

You probably do not think of us as an international center. On an undergraduate level we are very provincial. The University of Alabama Medical School, previously a two year school of basic medical sciences in Tuscaloosa, began its four year program in Birmingham in 1945 to provide physicians for Alabama, and our dental school was established in 1948 to furnish dentists. Almost all our undergraduate students are Alabamians. However, in our graduate, internship, residency, and fellowship programs, we are very international. It is part of the broad creative educational philosophy of the University's Vice President for Health Affairs, Dr. Joseph Volker, my immediate supervisor, who came to us from Tufts here

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First, some have suggested that if we pass this resolution, we would be implying that the present committee and its chairman have been derelict in their duty. This is not at all the opinion of members of the Foreign Relations Committee. The Senator from Georgia has served this body ably, with distinction and dedication for many years. He serves it today as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, as a ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations, and as chairman of the Joint CIA Subcommittee of those two standing committees. He served it as a member of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. He also serves as a member of the Democratic Policy Committee and of the Democratic Steering Committee. He was also a member of the Warren Commission which investigated the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. President, I suggest rather that it is the Foreign Relations Committee which would be guilty of dereliction if it did not seek to provide itself with the information which it requires to fulfill its constitutional responsibility. Rather than making a claim to be included, we are attempting to resist exclusion from an area in which we have a right to knowledge. The committee is not muscling in.

Second, it has been suggested that individuals who serve as sources of information for the CIA would be compromised or even their lives threatened if members of the Foreign Relations Committee were permitted to exercise their responsibility. It has even been suggested that the very discussion of the CIA on the floor of the Senate may imperil lives—one presumably excepts those instances where Senators have risen to defend the CIA. I believe there is no substance to these charges. For the Foreign Relations Committee to fulfill its responsibility, it is not necessary, in my judgment, for it to know the identity of the individuals who may serve the CIA as sources. Our proper concern is policy, and the actions which can have a determining effect on that policy.

Third, it has been implied that some Members of the Senate cannot be trusted with information which involves the national security of the United States.

All members of the Senate appreciate the distinction between information relating to the national security and the kind of information which in one way involves the national security. I believe it serves no useful purpose to debate whether one committee or another, or one side of the aisle or the other, is more frequently the source of leaks. But I do not know of a single instance in which a member has divulged information affecting the national security which was made available to him in the Foreign Relations Committee.

If it is the judgment of the Senate that the present membership of the Foreign Relations Committee is unreliable, then consideration should be given to changing its membership. The important thing is that the Foreign Rela-

tions Committee be in a position to meet its responsibilities.

Fourth, some have stated that the number of persons with access to information about the Central Intelligence Agency ought to be quite limited. I would agree with that. I cannot agree that the addition of three members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the present subcommittee would inordinately increase the number. Rather, the contrary may well be the case; for if the Senate fails to act on this resolution, if it fails to establish a formal structure for oversight of the CIA, the present arrangement, whose informal nature permits considerable expansion beyond nine will be continued.

Let us examine the present situation. In the Senate, the CIA Subcommittee has a potential membership of nine—five from Armed Services and four from Appropriations—although at present only seven Senators are actually serving because of overlapping membership on the two committees. In the House, oversight of the CIA is exercised by a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee under the chairmanship of Congressman L. MENDEL RIVERS; this subcommittee is composed of the 11 ranking members of the Armed Services Committee including, in addition to the chairman [Mr. RIVERS], Congressmen PHILBIN, HEBERT, PRICE, FISHER, HARDY, BENNETT, BATES, ARENDS, O'KONSKI, and BRAY. Oversight of the CIA is also exercised by the House Appropriations Committee, which has always declined to state publicly: One, who the members are who perform this function; two, how many members are involved; three, how they are selected; four, whether a subcommittee exists to perform this function. We just do not know how many House Members are involved. We do know, however, that the nine members of the President's Advisory Board are included among those who receive full information and also that a number of members of the Bureau of the Budget are informed as to CIA activities.

Mr. President, one may surely assume that nine responsible Members of the Senate of the United States will guard at least as carefully as an undetermined number of Members of the House, nine members of the President's Advisory Board, or any one of the thousands of members of the executive branch, information affecting the national security of the United States and the lives of its citizens.

Finally, it has been suggested that there is no need for members of the Foreign Relations Committee to receive CIA information because there is a new Director. But those in favor of the Foreign Relations Committee's playing a role have never suggested that the person of the Director had any relation to the problem. Actually it is irrelevant, for this problem of the CIA's foreign policy role has developed over the years, under a series of Directors.

It is my judgment that to permit the Foreign Relations Committee to share this responsibility would strengthen the CIA and help protect it from some of the

charges that are made; failing to formalize the oversight structure, the whole Senate would be made its responsibility more effectively. This in turn would lead to increased public confidence that the CIA is being adequately controlled, a confidence that to some extent now appears lacking.

FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AMENDMENTS AND CLEAN RIVERS RESTORATION ACT OF 1966

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1332, S. 2947, the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments and Clean Rivers Restoration Act of 1966. I do this so that the bill will become the pending business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be read by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2947) to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in order to improve and make more effective certain programs pursuant to such Act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Public Works, with an amendment, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That this Act may be cited as the "Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments and Clean Rivers Restoration Act of 1966".

TITLE I

SEC. 101. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, is amended by inserting immediately after section 18, as added by this Act, a new title to read as follows:

"TITLE II—CLEAN RIVERS RESTORATION PROGRAM

"Short title

"SEC. 201. This title may be cited as the "Clean Rivers Restoration Act of 1966".

"Statement of purpose

"SEC. 202. It is the purpose of this title to authorize pollution control and abatement programs designed to reclaim, restore, and maintain the natural waters of the Nation through the preparation and development of comprehensive river basin pollution control and abatement plans and through the establishment of economic incentives to encourage waste treatment consistent with water quality standards effected as a result of section 10(c) of this Act.

"Planning agencies

"SEC. 203. In furtherance of the purposes of this title, the Secretary shall, at the request of the Governor or Governors of one or more States, designate a planning agency which provides for adequate representation of appropriate Federal, State, interstate, local, or when appropriate, international interests in the river basin or portion thereof involved and which is capable of developing an effective, comprehensive water quality control and abatement plan that is part of or consistent with a comprehensive river basin water resources plan.

"Comprehensive river basin plans

"SEC. 204. Each planning agency designated pursuant to section 203 of this title shall develop a comprehensive pollution control

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NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—24

Anderson,
Bass
Byrd, Va.
Clark
Dirksen
Dodd
Fulbright
Griffin

Hart
Hayden
Hickenlooper
McClellan
McGee
Neuberger
Pastore
Fell

Robertson
Russell, Ga.
Saltonstall
Scott
Simpson
Smathers
Symington
Williams, N.J.

So a bill (S. 3467) was passed.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, with the passage of the child nutrition measure which expands our school lunch program, the Senate again witnessed the effective and highly able leadership of the senior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the great chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Both vigorous and articulate, his strong handling of the measure assured swift approval. But the action was typical for most measures backed with the exceptional talents of Senator ELLENDER.

And to the ranking minority member of the committee, the distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], goes equally high commendation for his characteristically outstanding leadership which assured a decisive victory for this measure. As always, we are most grateful for Senator AIKEN's outstanding cooperative efforts.

Perhaps no Senator deserves more credit for or may share more justly in this great success for our Nation's youngsters than the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIER]. We all know how long and how vigorously he has pressed for an expanded school lunch program. So today's success indeed is an achievement for Senator PROXMIER, won largely by his strong and abiding devotion.

Others too played vital roles in obtaining the Senate's unanimous acceptance of this measure. I refer to the effective advocacy of the senior Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] and to the persuasive cooperative assistance of the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF].

But most of all we are again grateful for another unanimous adoption of a proposal achieved with the splendid cooperation of all Senators.

PROPOSED COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, on Thursday of this week the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations intends to report to the Senate a committee resolution proposing the creation of a Senate Committee in Intelligence Operations.

Over the past several months, the question of the proper exercise of the Senate's responsibility for foreign intelligence operations, and particularly of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been the subject of considerable com-

ment in the press and some debate on the floor of the Senate. This is a most serious matter which involves the constitutional responsibility of the Senate of the United States. When the Senate is called upon to make a decision in this matter, it should be permitted to act on the merits and substance of the issue. I am hopeful the issue will not be obscured by irrelevant arguments.

Although the Central Intelligence Agency has rarely been the subject of legislation and of congressional comment infrequently over the years, much attention and discussion has been devoted to the problem of congressional supervision of that Agency. This concern was reflected in the 1955 Hoover Commission recommendation that "the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy." The concern was further reflected in the debate in the Senate in 1956 on the resolution offered by the present majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD]. The present proposal is much more modest than that recommended by the Hoover Commission. It relates only to the Senate. I would provide for a nine-member committee composed of three members each from the Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations Committees, and it would be empowered to keep itself informed of activities in the field of foreign intelligence operations. The practical effect of the resolution would be to add three members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the present CIA oversight subcommittee. Its effect would be to authorize the Central Intelligence Agency to provide to three members of the Committee on Foreign Relations information it now provides to selected members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and to the nine members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

What is at stake is nothing less than the constitutional responsibility of the Senate to advise and consent to the foreign relations of the United States. In the Senate the burden of this responsibility is assigned to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The Standing Rules of the Senate list, among other areas of jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "relations of the United States with foreign nations generally" and "interventions abroad and declarations of war." Leaving aside the matter of interventions abroad, in which one would certainly have to include the Bay of Pigs, the responsibility of the committee for the "relations of the United States with foreign nations generally" makes it clear that the Committee on Foreign Relations does have at least partial responsibility for the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies which operate more or less exclusively in the foreign relations area. Its jurisdiction appears, from a reading of the rules of the Senate, much clearer in this matter than that of the Armed Services Committee, whose jurisdiction under the rules would not appear to extend to areas where the foreign relations of the United States are concerned. The

jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee derives—and this is apparently the case made by its distinguished chairman—from the precedent of the Senate that legislative oversight of a Government agency is traditionally vested in the committee which reported the bill by which the agency was created.

AID—BEFORE FINANCE—OTHER AGENCIES

In this connection the chairman of the Armed Services Committee has suggested that if the Foreign Relations Committee can claim representation on the CIA oversight committee, then the Armed Services Committee should have representation on the Foreign Relations Committee. I would certainly have no objection to that if it could be demonstrated that the Secretary of State refused to make available to the Armed Services Committee information he was willing to make available to the Foreign Relations Committee. As Senators are aware, the Director of the Central Intelligence has advised the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations that he is unwilling to make available to members of that committee information that is made available to selected members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and to the President's Advisory Board.

The issue then turns on whether or not the Central Intelligence Agency does, in fact, carry out actions which affect the foreign relations of the United States. It is my judgment that it does, and that, further, its role in this area has increased over the years and is still increasing. It is not relevant to contend that the CIA is not authorized to make foreign policy. Of course, it is not so authorized. The foreign policy of the United States is "made" by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate and, to a lesser extent, of the whole Congress. But I believe it is difficult to argue against the conclusion that the CIA has in the past and does by its present actions continue to create situations to which policy must be adjusted. In such cases, whether it is "making" policy or merely "influencing" policy is largely a question of semantics.

This aspect of its activities, as opposed to its purely intelligence-gathering role, has been called by some an expansion of its original mandate. In 1963, former President Harry S Truman wrote:

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our difficulties in several explosive areas.

I never had any thought that when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue—and a subject for cold war enemy propaganda.

Public debate on this important matter has unfortunately been hampered by irrelevant considerations.

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out of the White House recently to the effect that because we have never backed down anywhere we will never back down in Vietnam, we are giving complete control over our hemorrhage to the Communists.

It is the administration, and the White House, who are sacrificing flexibility in Vietnam policy. It is they who have hardened the American position to one of not leaving no matter what happens in South Vietnam. By so doing, they have eliminated local responsibility for the war, for everyone in South Vietnam is put on notice that Americans will stay and take over whether South Vietnamese want to continue fighting or not.

If we shift the containment policy of the past, which originally featured viable local governments, into a containment around the fringes of China and Russia by American arms and American fighting men, we can expect only to be drawn into more and more of these conflicts.

This is not an issue of asking others to do our fighting for us. It is a question of whether Americans can do all the fighting for everyone in the world. Of course, we think we can now. We think we can keep over 300,000 men in Europe while Europeans decline to fulfill their subscriptions to NATO. We think we can send over 260,000 men into Vietnam, 15,000 into Thailand, and tens of thousands more into nearby areas of southeast Asia, plus thousands of others into the Dominican Republic, and keep all these balls in the air at one and the same time with little or no help.

This is not containment. It is not another case of "Munich" in Vietnam, when the foreign soldiers who have come from 8,000 miles away are ours.

The escalation and widening of the war by the United States has resulted only in similar measures by the other side. With each new step, we were assured that this was the one that would end the war, and each time our officials have been wrong. It is time to adopt a new approach. Therefore I recommend to the President again today that he study the offerings of General Gavin, General Ridgway, George Kennan, and the others who are urging that we stop escalating the war, that we call upon the other nations of the world for a cease-fire order, and that we make it perfectly clear that if the other nations of the world are not willing to enforce a peace in Vietnam, we then will get out. But we must stop making ourselves the unilateral policeman of the world, based upon our draftings of the law, our proposals, irrespective of who shares our views.

Militarily, the tactics advocated by Generals Gavin and Ridgway are sound, if adopted along with political steps I have mentioned. Those tactics call for maintaining the positions we now have, from which we cannot be dislodged by the Vietcong. Politically, I would have the President go not to Honolulu to meet with the military flunkies we put in charge in South Vietnam, but go to the United Nations and ask that body to exercise in South Vietnam its peace-keeping duties. He should ask the Security Council to order a cease-fire and to send into South Vietnam whatever

U.N. troops are needed to enforce it. If that appeal is vetoed by some Security Council member, he should ask the General Assembly to take the action. The U.N. has done this effectively in the Middle East, in Cyprus, in the Congo, and more recently it obtained a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. A prevailing view at the U.N. now is that it cannot act against the United States without our good faith cooperation because we are too big and too powerful. A vast number of U.N. members take it for granted that when we enlarged the war to include North Vietnam we were not acting like a nation that wanted to end the war or to get the U.N. to help us end it.

South Vietnam is not ours, to decide her fate as we please. The United Nations is the only agency that has that right. We should turn the problem over to it in good faith. Other U.N. members should realize, too, that if they fail to discharge their peacekeeping duty, the U.N. will be destroyed, for it will not hold the confidence of anyone if it fails to act on the greatest threat to world peace since Korea.

Mr. President, as I close, I shall read from two letters, and then a brief quotation from Mark Twain. I wish to read portions of two letters from a very important and responsible newspaper correspondent, whose name I shall not reveal, but whose letters speak for themselves; and I shall read all parts of the letters that do not disclose his identity:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am an American foreign correspondent who has covered South Vietnam continuously for several years.

He then describes his duties since he has been there:

I have lived here longer than any other American correspondent and longer than nearly any other American.

I have not always agreed with your views over the years, but somehow I find myself increasingly drawn to your point of view with respect to the American involvement in this country. You have consistently shown the courage, furthermore, to keep fighting against enormous odds, for beliefs that deserve to be heard.

The tragedy of Viet Nam, it seems to me, has been not so much the basic political defeat the United States has suffered here, but rather the reasons for that defeat. There have been many dedicated young Americans working in this country over the years for things they believed would match the challenge of Asian communism. They have been thwarted, I believe, by the kind of thinking that motivates the Pentagon, and by all those who find the police-state solution the most practical approach to foreign policy.

Perhaps, after all, Americans as a nationality lack the political wisdom to be able to cope with the great issues of Asia. If that is true, Asia is surely best left to itself to decide its own fate.

But apart from that, it seems that sometimes the entire Congress has been cowed by the Directorate. In recent votes, your voice has been one of the very few retaining the courage of dissent.

Thank God there is still WAYNE MORSE in the Senate.

Thereafter, I wrote to him to ask permission to use the letter. I received permission to use it in full, but I am not using it in full, Mr. President. Although I respect his courage, nevertheless I shall

use it only to the extent that I am using it today.

I received a reply to my letter from this great correspondent as follows:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Warm thanks for your very thoughtful letter of April 14. Of course, you may use my letter to you in any way you see fit. I would only ask that you not suggest that my views in any way reflect those—

And then I paraphrase of his previous employees.

I speak only for myself. Indeed, my views probably are not shared even by a majority of the press corps in Saigon.

I feel the press corps in general must be shielded from the continuous charges of bias and malice and such that come from such of our critics as Senators. Privately, newsmen in Viet Nam are at bitter odds with each other and have strong views on every aspect of this problem. Most of them, I'm happy to say, discipline their personal feelings to such a degree that their news copy remains undistorted.

But there are those who feel the press should be uniform in its support for official policy, and that its reporting should conform to this idea. There are those who delight in watching reporters beaten up, maligned and restricted. There are even those who take some pleasure in the fact that ten of us have been killed and about 30 wounded covering this war. Today we were treated once again to the spectacle of Vietnamese police assaulting foreign newsmen, and somehow I had the sensation that nothing changes here; that since 1963 there has not been the slightest vestige of progress, despite the billions of dollars and all the lives.

Against this background there are some of us who feel the survival of a free press is in grave danger. My own deepest hope is that I will not live to see the day when either our nation's Congress or its news media become obsolete.

Respectfully

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my remarks there be printed in the Record certain newspaper articles, telegrams, and correspondence which I have received dealing with the subject matter of my speech today.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, I spoke earlier in my speech today about Memorial Day. I suggested that on Memorial Day we should not only bow our heads in reverence to the brave soldiers of our country who have died in war under the direction of various Commanders in Chief, but that we should also pray that we bring to an end what I consider to be a war that constitutes a sin against humanity in Vietnam; that we stop killing American boys in South Vietnam in a war I consider to be immoral, unconstitutional, and unconscionable. I expressed the hope that on Memorial Day, from their pulpits, the clergy of America would give serious thought, as spiritual leaders, to the question: "Have I, as an individual and minister of God carried out my spiritual responsibility in connection with this war?"

I spoke earlier today about those of us who take the position that this issue is more important than politics; that this issue leaves no room for any con-

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takes, the white man will be thrown out of Vietnam and all of Asia.

That is why we are building a great race war. The color line is becoming an important factor in American foreign policy in Asia because it is unilateral American foreign policy. We do not pursue a strictly unilateral policy toward industrial nations, which are largely white, only toward backward ones which are largely nonwhite.

Today, General Ky is traveling around Vietnam in a U.S. military jet in an effort to consolidate his military forces and is killing his own people.

The Buddhist religion is an interesting religion. Those who are directing American foreign policy could well afford to spend some time analyzing the philosophy of the Buddhist religion, because, in my judgment, force will not conquer a Buddhist. I believe that we are creating a spirit of hatred and revenge against Americans that will rise to plague us for decades to come.

Many people do not like to face one facet of the war in Vietnam. But it must be discussed. South Vietnam has many of the overtones and undertones of a religious war between Buddhists and Christians, with the Christians in a small minority. But eventually, Mr. President, we shall learn, after we have expended untold quantities of American blood, that the Buddhists will prevail.

They will not prevail on the battlefield, but they will prevail with long-time public support.

Administration spokesmen have tried to ascribe racist motives to those of us who oppose the war. They suppose the world does not see that we respect France, Britain, Germany, and other white NATO countries—yes, Portugal, too—as equals, while we jerk General Ky and his fellow generals of Vietnam around like puppets on a string.

What the world does see is that the United States respects only power and regards weakness as a power vacuum that must be filled by the United States wherever any of the worldwide security interests of this country are thought to be affected.

The great innovation and contribution of the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) has been to try to help the United States break away from the pattern of power that has seen all the empires of the world dissolve because they thought their material wealth and power could accomplish things it could not in fact accomplish. If he can succeed in modifying even to a small degree that dismal pattern of history, then he will have made a remarkable addition to human affairs.

He has to be a born optimist even to make the effort. Many more people believe that the United States can only go down the same fatal path that all other empires have trod before us, seeing everything they did not control as a potential threat, constructing outposts of empire, then lifelines of empire, then outposts to guard the lifelines, fighting wars to protect the outposts that guard the lifelines, setting up and subsidizing governments from which to wage the wars, through military and economic aid, ad infinitum,

until the structure collapsed of its tremendous weight.

I do not want to leave that legacy to future generations of American boys and girls. What my Government does and what the people of this country do in the months immediately ahead will determine the destiny of this Republic from the standpoint of answering the question, "Will it survive?"

In my judgment, my country has no hope of surviving in history if it leads mankind into a massive war, as it is presently doing in Asia, only to end up in a third world war.

The colonial empires of Western Europe were centuries in the building and only decades in the collapse. Others, like Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, were years in the building and only months in the collapse.

We are engaged in a major war in Vietnam today for these very same purposes of empire. We upset the Geneva agreements of 1954 because we feared that if we did not control South Vietnam, someone else would, and a hostile power might some day use it to threaten our "lifeline" through the Malacca Straits to the Indian Ocean. That is the reason for the present war, and all the window dressing about fighting for freedom and democracy is becoming more and more of a hollow mockery not only to the world, but also to the American people themselves.

Our trouble is that there is hardly a corner of the globe that we do not now regard as vital to our security. Our "lifelines" are everywhere; every continent is an outpost for some American security interest.

We maintain more troops on foreign soil than any other nation, and we maintain more military bases abroad than any other nation.

It is the United States that has become the great military occupier of many parts of the world and is frightening increasing millions of people, including many in France. We cannot eliminate from the NATO crisis in France the determination of many Frenchmen to see to it that the American military presence is taken out of France. And if I were a Frenchman, I would insist on it, too.

Why do we think that we can maintain these security interests by force of arms when no one has been able to do it before us? Why do we think we can occupy and use South Vietnam to serve American security interests without eternal war?

The fighting among the Buddhists and the government factions does not differ much from all the other disorders that have beset colonies or occupied territories in the last century and a half. The American forces and the South Vietnamese Army which has become little different from what it was under the French can continue to suppress revolts and uprisings throughout the portions of Vietnam we still control. But they will not end; they will not stop.

We may suppress the organized armies of the Vietcong, but it was not an organized army that dislodged all the other colonial powers from Africa and Asia. It was continuing, unceasing resistance

that largely took the form of terrorism that finally caused them to give up these territories. The U.S. Government has decided its national security requires us to control South Vietnam. For home consumption, we said we were fighting for freedom, and when that became untrue on the face of it, we said we were fighting to save face because Americans have never backed down anywhere.

How many lives will it take to save our face? If we are lucky, North Vietnam at some point will not pour in more of her own forces, though we probably are far from that point as yet. But even if the opposition army does not grow, we have only a future of terrorism in South Vietnam.

CONTAINMENT IN ASIA

That is not the containment of communism which I have supported and voted for in the past. The Greek-Turkish issue was not one of Greeks and Turks against an American army of occupation and a puppet government of the United States. The Korean war was not fought to maintain South Korea as an American outpost—it was fought by the United Nations to repel an intrusion of one government against another. The Marshall plan was designed to help local governments rebuild their internal economies, not to buy American entree and occupation of the kind we have imposed upon South Vietnam.

How well do I remember the day of the enunciation of the Truman doctrine. When I returned from that historic joint session, I took the floor of the Senate on the other side of the aisle that afternoon, and I was the only Senator who did. I pledged my support to President Truman in support of the Truman doctrine. But the Truman doctrine has no analogous relationship whatsoever with South Vietnam.

The obsession with the concept of containment has led us into a frightening abuse of the concept in Vietnam. Containment must mean firm local governments, enjoying the confidence and support of their people. Where those conditions do not exist today, the United States cannot create them. Where we substitute ourselves for local forces, as we have in Vietnam, we create not containment, but a hemorrhage of proportions over which the other side and not the United States has control.

I would like to see us return to an effective and workable containment in Asia. I would like to see us recognize that an obsession with "winning" everything, everywhere to which someone once committed us 10 years ago is not containment, but paranoia. I say respectfully that in my judgment, I think our Government is suffering from paranoia in its foreign policy. Successful containment must recognize that where a local people cannot or will not help themselves, the United States jeopardizes itself and does not serve itself when we substitute American bodies for Asian bodies.

South Vietnam is becoming a hemorrhage of the American military, financial, and spiritual body. When we make the statements that have been coming

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cause they believed he meant it when, in that campaign, he made it perfectly clear he held to the view that an Asian war was for Asian boys to fight and not American boys. They believed that he meant it when he made clear in that campaign that he would follow a course of action opposite to the proposals of a Barry Goldwater.

I, too, thought he meant it.

I shall never be able to understand why we have not had a single word of explanation from the President, and why almost immediately after that election he proceeded to follow the Goldwater line.

There is going across this country a wave of disillusionment in the President. That is why I believe that more Democrats in Congress than political dopesters, writing for the administration, want to admit will be defeated in November, and should be—will be defeated in November, Mr. President, and should be.

As a Democrat, I wish to say that one of the great needs of my party is to have cleaned up the foreign policy of this country. The way to clean up that foreign policy is to clean out those who are supporting the immoral course of action that we are following in South Vietnam.

I have made it clear that if the Governor of my State continues to stand for the foreign policy that he has enunciated, I shall vote for him. I shall not be campaigning for him. I shall be campaigning across America for Democratic candidates to Congress who are seeking to change my party's foreign policy vis-a-vis the war in Asia.

Furthermore, I hope I am enough of a "pro" in American politics to know that, as a Democrat, I should not involve myself in the Republican campaign in my State. I have no right, in my judgment, to inject myself into that campaign. That is the Governor's responsibility. It is a campaign for him to run. As a Democrat, however, I have the responsibility to my party, as I see my trust, to come to the assistance of Democratic candidates in other States who will run in opposition to the foreign policy programs of the Johnson administration. I shall do what I can to help elect peace candidates as against war candidates. That means those both in and out of Congress.

The faith and confidence of the American people in the Democratic Party as the one best able to maintain peace must be restored if we are to win elective office in 1966. May I say that goes for 1968, too.

That is why I think the White House is making a grievous mistake in cranking up its public relations machinery to try to rally support for a bigger war in Vietnam. I do not doubt that between now and November, the avenue between Capitol Hill and the White House will be heavily traveled. But the traffic will not be for the purpose of seeking congressional advice: it will be for the purpose of telling Congress, not asking Congress.

FAILURE OF THE WAR POLICY

A leading congressional Democrat has begun the process by repeating what many of us have recognized as administration policy for a long time.

He said in the East Room of the White House that the United States is not going to get out of Vietnam, no matter what. The discussion of what to do if a government came to power that sought negotiations or asked us to leave is wholly unreal, because no such contingency will be allowed to happen. The American Armed Forces will not leave under any circumstances, according to present administration policy, because we have put too much emphasis upon saving our face and using southeast Asia as the testing ground for American containment of China.

I want to say to the Johnson administration that it had better start putting emphasis on saving lives of American boys, not face—saving the lives of the young draftees that we are sending over there to die, while we, safely at home, talk about face.

These justifications of the American presence in Vietnam do not leave any room for a South Vietnamese Government that does not lend itself to this American cause.

The evidence of the American takeover was highlighted by the reaction of American military commanders during the recent disturbances in Da Nang, when even General Ky's air force was warned that any more mistakes on their part that endangered American planes would bring retaliation. A Marine Corps spokesman announced that 40,000 U.S. marines in the northern part of South Vietnam were preparing to fight without any help at all from the South Vietnamese Army. The United States is making it clear to Vietnam and to the world that we will fight anyone in Vietnam who opposes the United States.

This policy can avoid no other interpretation than that our administration is on its way to taking over the war when the Vietnamese fight among themselves. What the President should have done at the first outbreak of the disturbances at Da Nang and Hue was order a cease-fire and notify the South Vietnamese that we are not going to kill American boys while they fight among themselves; that the theory of our administration has been that we are there to aid them in their war, not ours—I repeat, in their war, not ours.

In my judgment, the undeniable fact is that we are taking over the war and apparently we are going to fight in one part of Vietnam with 40,000 U.S. marines without any Vietnamese soldiers joining them.

When the American people come to understand those trends the American people will answer the administration's bullets in Vietnam with ballots in the United States.

If this is not making South Vietnam an American colony, what is? If this is not a territorial design upon Vietnam, what is? There can no longer be a pretense that we are in Vietnam at the invitation of a legitimate government. Of course, it never was legitimate. It was born out of the womb of illegality.

In open violation of the Geneva accord, the United States turned the 17th parallel from a military demarcation line into a political demarcation line. It was the United States, in open violation of the Geneva accord, that decided on two

Vietnams. We created an illegal government in South Vietnam. Read the accords. I have read them on the floor of the Senate time and time again during the past 3 years. The 17th parallel was drawn as a military demarcation line, and the accords so indicate.

There was no provision for two separate governments. The French military forces—and there were thousands of French troops in Vietnam at the time—were to go to the south of the line. The Viet Minh, who had won a victory over the French, were to stay to the north.

During the next 2 years, under the direction of an international control commission composed of India, Canada, and Poland, negotiations and procedures were to be set up leading to a united Vietnam based upon elections. We stopped those elections, although we Americans talked a good hypocritical line about self-determination. But we prohibited self-determination in Vietnam in 1956.

It will take more time for the American people to come to a realization that the statements of spokesmen for the U.S. Government that our government made a commitment to South Vietnam is itself completely fallacious.

They involved themselves in a civil war, and they should be allowed to settle their civil war without dictation from the United States. I think that history will prove me correct in my belief that the struggle within Vietnam will continue no matter how much we maintain our presence there over the decades, until at long last there will be one country and one government, and there should be.

The U.S. Government has been able to sell to the American people the false assumption that we are justified in insisting on two Vietnams—of our own illegal creation.

AMERICAN COURSE OF EMPIRE IN ASIA

Mr. President, the world will not overlook the contrast between our use of a weak, disorganized Asian country as an American battlefield, and our policy toward France and NATO.

It is generous to call what we are doing to Vietnam "arrogance of power." We are ruthlessly occupying South Vietnam to serve American security interests as we see them. More than that, we are building yet another huge air base in northeast Thailand, which will serve first to step up American air attacks upon Laos and North Vietnam, and which will serve secondly to enlarge the battlefield to include Thailand.

In Europe, we recognize and deal with De Gaulle as an equal. When he tells us to leave, we begin making plans to depart, despite our conviction that French soil is vital to our security.

But in a small Asiatic country we appoint a new set of national leaders when the existing ones do not do our bidding and do it effectively. General Ky is now doing what the American Embassy told him to do, and is putting down all opposition by force of the arms we gave him.

That will not end the opposition. Using arms against people who are without arms will not win them over to our side, but will cause them to dig deeper into their hate and to resolve more firmly that, no matter how many decades it

ence between the sacrifice that American soldiers have made during our glorious past, in justifiable wars, and the responsibility of the Johnson administration and of this Congress for causing now, already, more than 3,200 American boys to be killed in South Vietnam, and over 15,000 to be wounded, in a war we had no right to enter in the first place. The responsibility rests not only on the President, but also on the Members of Congress who have been supporting that war.

I know also, Mr. President, that when one votes as I vote, and as I shall continue to vote, short of a declaration of war—in opposition to all funds sought to be appropriated for this war—that the charge is to be expected that those of us who so vote are letting down the boys from South Vietnam. Well, let the record be clear again: Those who are letting down the boys in South Vietnam are those who are voting the funds to escalate this war and send them forward into more and more battlefields to die in increasing numbers.

They are the ones who are letting the boys down in South Vietnam, because they are walking out; they are abdicating a trust that they owe the American people, that our Founding Fathers wrote into the Constitution; namely, the check of the purse strings. If this Congress would stop voting President Johnson the funds to kill American boys in increasing numbers in South Vietnam, he would have to fall back on the sound advice of General Ridgway, of General Gavin, of George Kennan, and of the others, Mr. President, who are pointing out that we should stop escalating this war.

We should proceed to take our position at those points in South Vietnam that we can defend, without escalating the war, and that will stop the advance of the enemy, but will not involve our own advance. Then, let us put it squarely up to the other nations of the world: Do you want to assume your responsibilities to keep the peace? Do you other nations of the world want to decide, as you should have decided long ago, that there must be a cease-fire in Vietnam, and decree it?

We should then serve notice on all combatants that they must stop their fighting and pledge themselves as signatories to the United Nations Charter that they will send over whatever number of divisions of men are necessary to enforce a peace, as the United Nations has done in the Congo, is doing in the Gaza Strip, and Cyprus, and did in stopping the war between India and Pakistan.

My faith is such that in the due course of time the American people will come to understand the facts and realize that all the sacrifices we are making in American blood, plus the shocking killing of Asians, will win for us the hatred of Asians for years to come.

Mr. President, I make these remarks today in part because I think they are most appropriate before a Memorial Day. On a Memorial Day we ought to bow our heads as Americans, not only in tribute to our courageous soldiers that we have sent to South Vietnam—who are carrying

out the orders of their Commander in Chief, which is their responsibility and duty—but we should bow our heads also with feelings of shame that as a people—may I say to the American people sitting in our places of security—we are not over there doing the dying. We ought to bow our heads in shame that as free men and women we have permitted this situation to develop to the shocking point at which we now find it.

Young American draftees, 18, 19, 20, and 21 years of age, are being sent into South Vietnam, increasing percentages of them to die in a war to which we should be no party whatsoever.

I hope that on this Memorial Day the voters of this Republic, as they bow their heads in tribute to those we have lost in the past in justifiable wars, and those we are losing in Vietnam in an immoral and sinful war, will come to a better realization of their responsibility to exercise their power as free men and women to check this administration.

Sometimes, as I meditate on this matter, I ask myself the question, What is happening to us as a people? As a religious man, I speak respectfully of the churches, but would raise in this speech, to the clergy of America, the question: What has happened to you? As Mark Twain warned—and I shall use his great statement before I finish this speech—as war hysteria starts to sweep the country, soon the clergy will begin to preach sermons about God being on our side.

Already those sermons are coming forth, when what should be happening is that the church bells of America should be tolling in grief, on behalf of the religious men and women across this land, that our Government should be following such an irreligious course of action.

Already the old, superpatriotic slogans are being dusted off. We are reading them in the daily press. "My country, right or wrong."

Oh, that is the way of a country to go into oblivion, when patriotic Americans should be saying "When I find my country to be wrong, I intend to insist upon its righting its course."

What is needed in America, during these dark hours, is for the Government to right its wrong course and stop its international outlawry and return not only to the framework of the Constitution, the framework of its treaty obligations, but also return to the framework of its spiritual beliefs and obligations.

If only the pews in the churches of America could speak out against the hypocrisy of the people who occupy them by the millions each Sunday.

If only the clergy of America would live up to its responsibilities of spiritual leadership.

If only the men who speak from the pulpits of America would have the courage of the Great Master whom the Christian faith worships, or the belief in the one God whom the Jewish faith worships, or the dedication to the existence of an Almighty that all religious men and women say they believe in.

That is what is needed this Memorial Day weekend.

OREGON ELECTION AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. President, much attention has been focused in the last few days on the primary election in Oregon and its bearing on public attitudes toward the war in Vietnam.

For myself, I am heartened by the results because I think they show that the American people are deeply suspicious of administration policy there, and I think they show that candidates who have nothing to offer except the administration's war policy are not going to be elected in November in very large numbers.

Democratic voters in Oregon nominated two "peace candidates" for Congress, Malcolm Cross in the First Congressional District, and Charles Porter in the Fourth District being vacated by Mr. DUNCAN. Both overcame primary opponents who were running on the administration war policy.

In the Senate race, Howard Morgan polled well over a third of the Democratic vote, his percentage being between 35 and 40 percent.

Those of us who know where Howard Morgan started from when he announced his candidacy in March on the war or peace issue, cannot feel anything but confidence that this issue is the dominant one with the people of my State and the Nation. We take confidence only in the wisdom of the voters in judging where the interests of the Nation lie as the issue becomes clear to them.

This will not be done overnight, and it was not done overnight in Oregon among Democratic voters, who were being asked to curb a President of their own party.

Nonetheless, more than a third of them did respond. I think a major reason they did is that they know a war candidate will have tough sledding this fall against Governor Hatfield. Governor Hatfield has long been identified as one of only two or three Governors who have not rubberstamped the administration's Vietnam policy. He has continued to urge a United Nations jurisdiction over the Vietnam issue. The Republican primary voters had a chance to repudiate him for that stance if they wanted to, but instead they nominated him for U.S. Senate by nearly 4 to 1, the one being the combined vote of three rivals.

Mr. President, in spite of the downgrading of his opponent by the press that wants to misinterpret and misrepresent what happened in Oregon, Governor Hatfield's opponent, who happens to be a very respectable and well-financed businessman in Oregon, ran on the war issue. The administration supporters of the war in Vietnam can add these Oregon results in any way they like, and they will never spell victory for Democratic candidates for Congress this fall.

That is why many of us are taking this issue into Democratic primaries. Our party has reneged on its campaign promises of 1964 in the field of foreign policy.

Millions upon millions of Republicans voted for Lyndon Johnson in 1964 be-

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Staff, and by other top-ranking military officers of our country, has created more Communists in the last 10 years than has any other one cause existing on the face of the earth.

It would be more appropriate to confine the CIA oversight role entirely to the Appropriations Committee than to extend the oversight of the Armed Services Committee over so important an ingredient of foreign policy as intelligence services.

I am not at all impressed with the argument made on the floor of the Senate that some of our colleagues do not want the Foreign Relations Committee to have jurisdiction over a subject matter that deals with foreign relations because they wish to cast reflections upon the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Such arguments are not befitting a U.S. Senator. I served on the Armed Services Committee for many years prior to going on the Foreign Relations Committee. I have served now on the Foreign Relations Committee since 1955.

There is not a scrap of evidence or justification in support of the reflections that some members of the Armed Services are casting indirectly, and sometimes not too indirectly, and frequently by innuendoes, upon the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

As a member of those two committees during my period of service in the Senate, I have never seen a partisan vote cast in either committee. It has been my observation that Senators do not sit on the Foreign Relations Committee as Democrats or Republicans. Nor do they sit on the Armed Services Committee as Democrats or Republicans. They sit on those committees as U.S. Senators.

When differences of opinion develop on the committees, those differences are shown by the votes. The split is not reflected by Republican votes against Democratic votes. The split is a split of sincere men, Democrats and Republicans on one side, and Democrats and Republicans on the other side, of men who have come to an honest difference of opinion in regard to what the decision of the committee should be.

The argument that a larger committee would endanger secrets is a wholly false issue and it is to be regretted that it has been even mentioned on the floor of the Senate by the opposition of the McCarthy-Fulbright resolution. We are talking about three members from the Foreign Relations Committee. I am only sorry it is not possible to put into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the number of employees of CIA—who number in the thousands—the number of persons in the Budget Bureau, the number of persons on the White House staff, the number of persons in the House of Representatives, the number of persons in the State and Defense Departments, the number of persons in other Cabinet jobs who are part of the National Security Council, and the number of persons from private life who are not even in the Government, much less elected, all of whom have much knowledge and information about the activities of the CIA.

Apparently many of those people who oppose the McCarthy-Fulbright resolution think it is perfectly all right to have those hundreds of governmental personnel that never have faced a vote, as far as qualifications for office are concerned, have information which some colleagues of mine in the Senate think should be denied to the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate or the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.

There are hundreds, and probably thousands, of foreigners in foreign governments who are well advised of CIA activities in their areas, and who presently know more than the Foreign Relations Committee knows about these matters.

I am especially intrigued by the argument against the resolution which holds that the appointment of a supervisory council of private citizens is a reasonable and presumably "secure" check on CIA but three Members of the U.S. Senate would not be. The senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], mentions the group President Kennedy appointed after the Bay of Pigs to review CIA organization and activities. Who is on that board? James Killian, president of MIT, was one of the original members. He is an educator, and an outstanding citizen. I have great confidence in him, but no more than I have in 100 U.S. Senators, including the senior Senator from Massachusetts.

Another private citizen on the intelligence consulting group is Clark Clifford. He is another fine and trustworthy man, but no more trustworthy than the 100 men and women elected to the Senate.

Another member of this group is Dr. Edwin Land, an inventor with the Polaroid Corp. Are Senators prepared to say he is worthy of being privy to CIA secrets, but Senators are not? Professor William Langer is a historian of great renown in the academic world. Is he more worthy of confidence than Senators? I do not believe so.

Others in the consulting group are William Baker—about whom I have no information—Maxwell Taylor, Admiral Sides, and former high civilians in the Defense Department, Gordon Gray and Frank Pace.

All are presumed to be private citizens at the present time. Some of them have outstanding qualifications. But do they have better qualifications than U.S. Senators, or at least better than some Senators but not others?

I am amazed that anyone would point to these private citizens and contend that they are entitled to supervise the Central Intelligence Agency, but that three Members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee are not.

If Congress is anxious to divest itself of more and more of its duties, and to invest more and more of them in the executive branch, the way to do it is to turn over CIA supervision to a group of private citizens appointed by the President and responsible only to him, and to deny all supervision to the Senate's committee in charge of foreign policy matters.

I believe it is time that the Senate began to restore, to a very modest and moderate extent, at least, the normal role this body was intended to play in foreign policy. I can't all do I see anything desirable in turning over foreign policy supervision to the Armed Services Committee, as we do with the present system.

For 21 years, in this body, I have pleaded against the trend toward the development of Government by executive supremacy and secrecy; but I am deeply alarmed—yes, frightened—for the welfare of my country, to see the galloping speed with which the Johnson administration has sought to vest more and more unchecked power in the executive branch of this Government. I want to warn the American people that in my judgment, the Johnson administration must be checked, and checked now, if we are to retain our system of three coordinate and coequal branches of Government.

We cannot continue, Mr. President—under the various flag-waving slogans that are being used these days to whip up the people of this country into a war hysteria—granting more and more unchecked power into the hands of the President of the United States and his executive Cabinet members and their associates. A basic issue faces the American people, in my judgment—basic, when you can have, as we are having at the very hour that I now speak, Mr. President, American boys dying in South Vietnam in a Presidential war that has not even been declared by the Congress of the United States.

VIETNAM WAR

Oh, I know all the advice that I have received from dear friends here in the Senate, that I should not commit political suicide, that I should not burn my political bridges. Mr. President, it is more important that political bridges be burned in the United States in these critical hours than that steel bridges be bombed in North Vietnam.

It is more important that increasing numbers in the Senate and the House of Representatives be willing to commit political suicide—if that is the price one must pay to plead for peace in the world, and to bring to an end an immoral and shocking war that cannot be reconciled with Article I, section 3 of the Constitution—than that Members of Congress think only of their political hides.

Mr. President, it is a small sacrifice for any Member of Congress to pay—if that is the sacrifice he has to pay in order to try to bring this shocking war to a halt—to lose his office, in comparison with the supreme sacrifice, for which Members of Congress must bear the historic responsibility, because they have not stopped the President from conducting this immoral and shocking war.

I say it is a small sacrifice to pay for any Member of Congress to lose his position, if it comes to that, in comparison with the loss of American life in South Vietnam, in a war that never has been justified from the beginning.

As we approach Memorial Day, that we had better think of the great differ-

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eral matters, which I am able to do through arrangement with the leadership of the Senate.

The leadership very graciously agreed to this course of action because it recognized, as one of a minority in the Senate who opposes the policies of the Johnson administration in respect to the matter I shall discuss, that the minority was entitled to present this point of view prior to the long weekend we are about to take.

I appreciate very much, as I always do, the courtesy the leadership always extends to me.

I would not have asked for this rather extraordinary procedure today if the Senate had convened at 12 o'clock noon, as I had anticipated, but it was my fault because of my duties downtown as Chairman of the Emergency Board that I did not know of the leadership's plan to convene at 10 o'clock this morning.

Mr. President, as a matter of fact, my work as Chairman of the President's Emergency Board seeking to find a fair and amicable solution to the threatened national airlines strike has kept me away from the Foreign Relations Committee markup sessions on the foreign aid bill, which I also regret, because I would like to be there to uphold the arm of Chairman FULBRIGHT as he leads the committee in a badly needed reshaping of the aid program. But my vote has been cast by proxy for most of the changes made so far, many of which I have been struggling to bring about for some time, and I hope to be present next week to offer some more amendments on my own.

I am not at all moved by the charge already being leveled that these changes in the aid program discriminate against African countries. The changes will prove eventually to be in the interest of the African countries, for we are trying to correct the mistakes of past aid commitments that have brought disaster to South Vietnam and encouraged and made possible armed conflict among others. We are trying to apply to Africa, and to future aid everywhere, the lessons learned from the failures of the past, which include the arming of military juntas in Latin America, the giving of huge amounts of aid for political purposes that did nothing for the good of the people, and eventual American armed intervention in countries where we thought our face had to be saved because we were so heavily committed to a certain local faction through the aid program.

Aside from that, the first obligation of the committee, of Congress, and of the administration is not to any foreign country or bloc of countries. Our first obligation is to the American people and the good of the United States, and I hope that obligation will remain first in the consideration of this legislation.

A second subject that I want to mention briefly is the resolution expanding the Senate oversight committee of the Central Intelligence Agency. This issue is expected to be taken up in the Senate next week, and I want these observations to appear in the RECORD now.

NEED FOR EXPANDED CIA OVERSIGHT

In all the discussion about the form a Senate oversight of CIA should take, we have largely lost sight of the real issue. The issue is not whether CIA makes foreign policy. The issue is not whether it is controlled in its decision-making by the President and the Department of State and by a civilian group appointed by President Kennedy—and in my opinion it is.

The issue is whether it is sufficiently concerned and involved in international affairs to warrant the addition of Foreign Relations Committee representation in its oversight. It seems to be inconceivable that it is so involved.

The chairman of the Armed Services Committee emphasizes that CIA does not make foreign policy. Yet I am sure he would agree that CIA does not make military policy, either. Does this mean the Armed Services Committee oversight should be abolished as unnecessary? That is the conclusion one would draw from the argument of the Senator from Georgia.

If anything, the Central Intelligence Agency is much more an operating arm of American foreign policy than it is of American military policy. It is on that basis that all logic should have put the Foreign Relations Committees of the House and Senate in charge of its surveillance in the first place, and not the Armed Service Committee. The Department of Defense has its own intelligence. The CIA is separate from both, but it remains deeply involved in intelligence activities that are vital even more to foreign policy formulation than to military policy formulation. Moreover, its operations are almost entirely political. How can it be said that its activities which are operations rather than information-gathering are more military than diplomatic or political?

In 1954, CIA plotted and carried out the overthrow of the government of Guatemala. Was that a military operation or a foreign policy operation? In 1961, CIA organized the Cuban refugees and masterminded the Bay of Pigs. Was that a foreign policy program or a military program?

As I have said on many occasions in the Senate, in my capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and as chairman of the committee that conducted executive hearings by way of investigation of the CIA vis-a-vis the Bay of Pigs, the Bay of Pigs situation would not have occurred except for the foreign policy intervention of the CIA. Not even Congress was aware of what the CIA was up to, and certainly the American people were not aware of what the CIA was up to.

I repeat again: the CIA is a police state institution. We must see to it that every agency of the Federal Government is constantly under the surveillance of the representatives of the people of this country.

The fact that there are those in the Senate and in the executive departments who do not want the Foreign Relations Committee to be represented in the sur-

veillance of the CIA, in connection with the CIA intervention in foreign policy, ought to be a warning signal to the people of the country.

The American people are entitled to have the Senate see to it that the Foreign Relations Committee is in a position of surveillance over the CIA.

In 1958, CIA helped organize opposition to Sukarno in Indonesia. Was that a foreign policy operation or a Defense Department operation? Throughout the fifties, CIA helped supply Nationalist Chinese within Burma. Was that a foreign policy program of the United States, or a Defense Department operation?

In 1956, the CIA did much through its broadcast facilities to encourage the Hungarian uprising, though when it came, we made no American military effort to help. Was that a foreign policy or a military policy effort on the part of the United States?

I think that in all these instances which have been described in books and articles, the CIA has carried out foreign policies rather than military policies for the U.S. Government. In none of the instances I have mentioned did the American Military Establishment involve itself directly. Only where events have become uncontrolled by other means, such as in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam, has the Department of Defense taken an active role.

I do not think it is at all relevant to this resolution to argue whether CIA makes the decisions on the merits of these operations. The issue of the degree of Presidential control does not concern us here. What does concern us is whether the committees of Congress whose subject matter is most affected by the Central Intelligence Agency are part of the surveillance, and at the present time they are not.

Both the intelligence-gathering and the operation functions of CIA are at least as relevant to foreign policy formulation and execution as they are to military postures and activities. In most cases, they are much more relevant to foreign policy.

The present arrangement whereby the Armed Services Committee shares in this oversight and the Foreign Relations Committee does not is a gross intrusion of the Armed Services Committee into the subject matter of foreign policy.

We see that intrusion showing its head in another form in the movement within the Senate to have military aid separated from the foreign aid program and consigned to the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. President, the evidence is undeniable that military aid is constantly used by the Pentagon to meddle in foreign policy. In my opinion, the military aid that we are furnishing to many countries in the world constitutes one of the greatest threats to world peace. The Pentagon Building has much to answer for in connection with the military aid program.

I have said before, and repeat in this address today, that in my judgment, the military aid program of the Department of Defense, as represented by the Secretary of Defense, by the Joint Chiefs of

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administration does not either, as is evident by the fact that it has never really consulted with the members of the organization in regard to our Vietnam policy.

Mr. President, the administration talks most often about a commitment to the nation of South Vietnam as if we had entered into some solemn and binding agreement with the Government and the people. In this respect, President Johnson frequently implies that whether we like it or not President Eisenhower made a commitment to Vietnam which we are honorbound to observe. In point of fact, the so-called Eisenhower commitment is nothing more than a letter to the Diem government offering economic aid and technical assistance with the conditional provision that the Diem government begin to institute extensive social, economic and political reforms.

Being fully aware of the niceties of diplomacy and the necessities of politics, one can appreciate why the administration cannot always simply and directly say that we are in Vietnam because we believe it to be in our national interest. But continual harping on the notion of honoring commitments no one understands, ultimately destroys public confidence in our position there.

Too often the administration justifies our position in terms of narrow legalisms. This not only obscures our basic reasons for being there, but also raises doubts that the administration itself is convinced that we are, in fact, fighting a form of expansionist, imperialistic communism.

Mr. President, reduced to its simplest and most meaningful terms our objective is to prevent the spread of totalitarian communism to South Vietnam and into the rest of southeast Asia. Prior to 1965, this objective was sought primarily by the use of technical advice and economic aid aimed at the internal strengthening of South Vietnam so that it could better prevent a Communist takeover. Increasingly of late, however, we have committed vast military forces in an effort to achieve that objective.

The administration says that our objectives are limited; to guarantee an independent and peaceful South Vietnam. And, I believe that our objectives are, in fact, really limited. But simple declarations do not prove it or convince our adversaries or our potential allies. If we are really willing, as I believe we are, to settle for a truly independent South Vietnam, one that is neither controlled nor dependent upon the United States or Hanoi, Moscow, or Peking, we must do more than simply mouth the words. Our adversaries and those around the world who are inherently suspicious of our intentions need more than vague verbal declarations.

The administration has declared our objectives to be limited but its words and actions have given rise to considerable doubt and suspicion as to the precise limits of those objectives. The picture has been particularly confused by the administration's words and actions regarding a settlement that would satisfy those objectives.

The administration has said that we would be willing to negotiate anywhere

at any time without prior reservations or conditions. But at the same time that we issue such unconditional statements, we also assert that we will not negotiate directly with the Vietcong. Now it may be that there are sound reasons for refusing to negotiate with the Vietcong. Certainly it would be foolhardy for the United States to agree to negotiate only with the Vietcong as Hanoi and Peking continually demand.

But the tragic thing, Mr. President, is that if our position is really sound it has been lost to world opinion by the inevitable loss of faith in the credibility of a government which loudly proclaims with one mouth that it will negotiate without prior reservations and then quietly asserts with another mouth that it will actually negotiate only under prespecified conditions.

Moreover, the practice of escalating our military commitment in Vietnam at the very same time we announce anew our desire for a settlement only serves to increase doubts among friend and foe alike as to the precise nature of our intentions, even though those intentions may in fact be entirely honorable and our objectives truly limited.

The credibility of the administration was further weakened by the disclosure that we may have rejected several "peace feelers" from the Communists. It might well have been the case that these feelers were not worthy of serious consideration, that they did not provide a reasonable basis for negotiation. But again, as so often in the past, the administration was discredited in the eyes of many not necessarily because its position was unsound, but because it acknowledged those contacts only after documentation in the public press made it impossible to deny their existence.

Against the background of ringing declarations to explore all possible avenues for a peaceful settlement the disclosure that the administration had rejected these feelers added fuel to the growing doubts and criticism about our Vietnam policy.

Mr. President, when our changed position in Vietnam became evident in late 1964 and early 1965, it brought forth the first serious public questioning and debate of our policy. The administration sought not to clarify that debate but to prevent it. Ultimately the questioning and criticism could not be prevented. The administration then adopted a strategy of attempting to nullify each fresh wave of criticism by seeming to agree with the demands of the critics. But this only served to bring confusion and more questioning of the Government's credibility.

Two recent examples are illustrative. As doubts, at home and abroad, as to the sincerity of our desire for a peaceful settlement continued to grow in late 1965 the administration staged a massive peace offensive during January of 1966. The bombing of North Vietnam was temporarily halted and top administration officials and ambassadors were sent scurrying around the world, all proclaiming that the United States really did want a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Ambassador Harriman went

to Poland, Yugoslavia, and India. McGeorge Bundy went to Ottawa. Arthur Goldberg visited the Vatican, Rome, Paris and London. Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY made a country-hopping tour in the Far East. Ambassador Kohler conferred with the Soviet officials in Moscow. Lt. Mennen Williams talked to leaders of several African nations, and Thomas C. Mann did the same in Mexico City.

It was indeed a Texas-sized peace offensive. And while the administration was obviously sincere in hoping that this display might actually serve as a catalyst for the beginnings of realistic negotiations, it was generally apparent that this was a staged affair, political display aimed more at nullifying the mounting criticism than at the sincerity of our offer for negotiation rather than a careful calculated effort to secure a peaceful settlement.

If in fact, Mr. President, we had been making the proper efforts in exploring all possible diplomatic channels, then such a spectacular display was unnecessary. If we had not been doing these things, then this display of just diplomacy would convince no one, friend or foe.

Another example of this type of administration strategy was the calling of the recent Honolulu conference. The peace offensive had failed, the bombing in North Vietnam had been resumed, and the internal political situation in South Vietnam showed no improvement. Increasingly, criticism was being directed at the failure of the United States to bring about any of the desperately needed economic, social, and political reforms in South Vietnam which all observers, including our top military leadership, recognize as being absolutely necessary to any genuine solution in South Vietnam. Thus, the President and an impressive number of top Government officials flew off to a hastily convened conference in Honolulu with Premier Ky and other members of his government. After a few hectic days at the conference table, the Honolulu declaration was issued with great fanfare.

The administration has hailed the Honolulu declaration as a historic document and has bitterly complained that the public press and congressional critics had failed to give it the recognition and praise that it deserves. In point of fact, American public and world reaction to the conference was precisely what it deserved. Again, while no one would argue that the goals announced by the conference were not genuinely desirable, all recognized that the impetus for the conference was the growing criticism of the administration's conduct in Vietnam rather than a logical extension of its long-range policy. There is depressingly little evidence that we are ready or capable, even at this late date, of instituting the programs of aid and reform that would be needed to achieve the goals so proudly proclaimed.

Mr. President, it is no wonder, then, that the American people and the world in general are confused about our policy in Vietnam. Our basic reasons for being in Vietnam have never been adequately explained. The objective we seek there

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have never been clearly delineated. And the administration's zigzagging and contorted efforts to answer every critic simultaneously have beclouded our entire involvement.

But none of these has so eroded the American public's faith in the administration's credibility as has the yawning gap between what we have said would be necessary to achieve our objectives there and what we have actually done there. It is here that we find the essence of the credibility gap.

The most glowing example of the lack of credibility is to be found in the depressing record of the administration from time to time telling the American people that we would not perform a certain act, but then later initiating that very act. And in so doing on each occasion the administration has proclaimed that the performance of that particular action would solve the situation in Vietnam. But, in reality, as the American people have seen, the situation remains the same or grows worse. And as the administration's promises for a solution continue to flow, the public's faith that a solution will really be achieved continues to wane.

In 1964 President Johnson frequently and fervently proclaimed that our objectives in Vietnam would be achieved without the commitment of major American military forces and loss of American lives. Millions of American people voted for Mr. Johnson in November 1964, because they agreed with this declaration of policy. But our position in Vietnam today bears no resemblance to that of 1964 or to the President's declaration of what it would be. President Johnson said we would not commit American lives, and that we would not extend the war to North Vietnam, and that the major effort against the Communists in South Vietnam would have to be carried by the South Vietnamese themselves. But today we bomb North Vietnam around the clock and in recent weeks more Americans have died on the battlefield than South Vietnamese.

Our military commitment and effort in Vietnam has been increased in a series of graduated moves. Each step of the escalation has occurred after the administration had proclaimed that such steps would be unnecessary and undesirable. However, when the administration felt that conditions forced it to abandon its former position, it has stated, or at least implied, that each additional extension in the military commitment would solve the problem. The decision to bomb North Vietnam was at least implicitly justified on the basis that cutting supply lines would isolate the Vietcong and allow the South Vietnamese Army to defeat its adversary. But today more men and more equipment flow from North Vietnam into the south than ever before.

If the administration knew that the act they denied would take place would be performed, then it is an act of misrepresentation to the American people and a display of callous cynicism. If the administration thought that the performance of that given action would solve the problem in South Vietnam then

the record can only show that the administration has continued to compound misjudgment with misjudgment.

Likewise, on the political scene each change in the Saigon government has been heralded by the administration as the one which would at last bring true stability to South Vietnam. But none of this has come to pass. And the present Government to which the President has given his personal endorsement has not only failed to achieve stability but has so acted to increase internal tensions and conflicts among the South Vietnamese. Mr. McNamara's statement that the present conflict between the Buddhists and the Ky regime is a healthy sign, is naive and ridiculous and an example of the fantastic contortions which the administration has had to go through to try to justify and explain the internal situation in Vietnam, which cannot be anything else but a severe indictment of our lack of vision and leadership in that troubled land.

In September of 1964 President Johnson proclaimed:

We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys . . . I want to be very cautious and careful and use it as a last resort when I start dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American boys in a war in Asia with 700 million Chinese . . . so we are not going north and we are not going south; we are going to continue to try to get them (the South Vietnamese) to save their own freedom with their own men.

Mr. President, the American people are mature and wise enough to recognize that in a complex situation like Vietnam things do not always happen as we would like them to, or as we expect them to. But constant repetition of proclamations to the effect that a particular action will not take place, followed by ringing declarations, when this very act occurs, that this, finally, is the action that will provide the solution is destroying the public faith and is feeding the growing belief that this administration neither knows what it wants in Vietnam nor how to achieve it.

The record of the past can only create anxiety and fear of the future.

Mr. President, one hears a great deal about the agony of Vietnam, and it is indeed America's most agonizingly difficult and complex foreign involvement of the 20th century.

One of the greatest tragedies of this experience is that although America's intentions there are basically honorable and our objectives truly limited, we have conducted ourselves in such a way that ever larger numbers of people, both at home and abroad, find it impossible to believe the sincerity of our actions there.

Throughout the noncommunist world there is a great reservoir of support for this country's dedicated opposition to the expansion of communism. Thus, although internal political conditions may make it impossible for many foreign leaders, particularly in Asia, to openly identify with the United States, most of them at least share in the general objective of containing communism in Asia.

At home the overwhelming majority of the American people support the containment policy, and most believe that a

takeover by the Communists in South Vietnam would be a discouraging defeat for the United States and against the long-range interests of the free world. Thus, the American people, at heart, genuinely want to support the administration's policy in Vietnam.

Mr. President, no one of the numerous examples of mismatched words and deeds, which have been reviewed here, has been enough to destroy faith in the credibility of the administration's Vietnam policy. But the ever accumulating list of inconsistencies, contradictions, vague explanations, and persistent refusal to acknowledge even minor mistakes inevitably sows the seeds of doubt, disillusionment and apathy. The result is that eventually even candid statements and forthright explanations become suspect.

Thus, Mr. President, even though the administration's basic intentions and goals may be sound and worthy, the policy which it pursues may fail, not because it is basically wrong, but because its conduct of that policy has been so shoddy that even those who believe in its ultimate rightness refuse the administration their positive and energetic support out of disillusionment and despair.

RECESS

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Thereupon (at 10 o'clock and 43 minutes a.m.) the Senate took a recess subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 12:39 p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. HART in the chair).

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 13712) to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend its protection to additional employees, to raise the minimum wage, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 13712) to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend its protection to additional employees, to raise the minimum wage, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

PERSONAL STATEMENT

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it is a matter of regret to me that my duties as chairman of the mediation panel in the airline machinist dispute have occupied me all morning and have prevented my being here earlier to speak.

I very much appreciate the indulgence of the Senate and the Senate staff which enables me to speak at this time on sev-

Each year, the SBA has been achieving greater amounts in set-asides by dollar value. These set-asides are largely responsible for the reversal of the downward trend in the percentage of prime contracts awarded to small business. (Figure 6) In the fiscal year 1965, 51,556 joint set-asides were made with an estimated value of \$3,051,057,000.

This is a larger amount than in any previous year (figure 7) (not printed in the Record) accounting for approximately 20.3% of prime contracts being awarded to small business in 1965 as compared to 18% in 1964. In view of the growing success of this program, SBANE cannot understand the reasons for its discontinuance.

The removal of SBA PCR's denies small concerns an independent champion for their interests in government procurement agencies. Although the surveillance program agreed to by the SBA in the Department of Defense may yield some constructive results, it cannot, nor is it intended to, replace the set-aside program now being handled on a unilateral basis in the procurement centers. Under the present system, small business specialists at the Center initiate set-asides to the contracting officers.

In many instances, these contracting officers are the people to whom they report in the performance of collateral duties. SBANE appreciates the helpfulness of the small business specialist, but recognizes that no man can equitably serve two masters.

2. NOTIFY SMALL FIRMS OF NON-RESPONSIBILITY

SBANE suggests that revisions be made in the Federal Procurement and Armed Forces Services Procurement Regulations, requiring that the small business bidder be notified when his bids are declared non-responsible. [Figure 8 résumé]:

Notify small firms of non-responsibility

1. Inadequate financial resources.
2. Lacks production capacity to meet delivery schedule.
3. History of past unsatisfactory performance.
4. Unsatisfactory record of integrity.
5. Does not meet applicable laws and regulations.

XYZ Company has been awarded contract # AB 97531-W, \$1,850,000.00.

1. Advise reason.
2. Delay for investigation.

Under present regulations (figure 8) (résumé above) in three of the five reasons under which a bid can be declared non-responsible, the small businessman receives no notification. If his bid is rejected, he is sent a notice, usually a post card, informing him solely of the name of the company receiving the award and its amount. Our Association believes that a bidder deserves at least the courtesy of notification by wire of the reason for the non-responsibility. Further, we recommend that the final award be delayed until the validity of the non-responsible decision has been investigated.

At present, once an award has been made, there is little hope of cancelling or reversing this decision in the interest of the small businessman.

The contracting officer can declare a bid non-responsible when in his judgment the contractor:

1. Falls to possess adequate financial resources;
2. Lacks the capacity to produce what is required in accordance with the specified delivery schedule;
3. Has a history of past unsatisfactory performance due to failure to apply tenacity and perseverance;
4. Lacks satisfactory record of integrity; and
5. Does not meet the requirement of applicable laws and regulations; e.g., the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act.

In the first two cases, where lack of credit or capacity are the main factors, the case must be referred to SBA for a Certificate of

Competency review if the amount involved is \$10,000 or more. In these cases, the SBA, not the contracting authority, notifies the small concern. In the last three cases, the businessman is not notified that his bid was determined non-responsible. In our opinion, this practice violates long-established ethics in contract bidding.

3. REVISE "WEIGHTED GUIDELINES METHOD"

The Smaller Business Association of New England proposes that the weight range for subcontracting to small businesses be increased to provide an incentive to the major prime contractor to increase subcontracting to competent small businesses. In recent years, greater emphasis has been placed on incentive contracts with rewards or penalties imposed depending on the contractors' performance, utilizing what is known as the "Weighted Guideline Method" (figure 9) (not printed in the Record). For example, a target cost for a contract is set by the Government and the company through negotiations. If this figure should be exceeded then the company is penalized in an amount determined through a formula of which the "Weighted Guidelines" are an essential consideration.

By this same negotiated method, the company is rewarded if it is able to save money. The Armed Forces Services Procurement Regulations list many factors to be considered, and one of these elements, subcontracting to small business, receives very little consideration.

Subcontracting to small concerns combined with the same for surplus labor area concerns is one of nine elements such as Management, Cost Efficiency, Reliability of Cost Estimates, Cost Reduction Program Accomplishments, Value Engineering Accomplishments, Timely Deliveries, Quality of Product, Inventive and Developmental Contributions, Small Business and Labor Surplus Area Participation, which together are accorded a weight range of only minus 2% to plus 2%. Obviously, the effect of subcontracting is all but lost where it is given such minute consideration. In comparison, here are some other items considered with their weight ranges: engineering labor, 9-15%; engineering overhead, 6-9%; manufacturing labor, 5-9%; manufacturing overhead, 4-7%; and general and administrative expenses, 6-8%.

We recommend weight ranges for subcontracting to small concerns be increased to minus 1½% to plus 1½% in the "Weighted Guideline Method" for incentive contracts.

In 1965 100 companies received approximately 70% of the DOD military awards; 25 received 48%, and one received 7.1%. Yet 300,000 small businesses received only 20%. We believe our proposal will provide an effective incentive to the major prime contractors to increase their subcontracting to small firms.

We also believe that the ASPR's should be revised to require the contracting authorities to consult with the SBA to determine the adequacy of the prime contractor's subcontracting program.

4. STRICTER ADHERENCE TO PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS

One reason the percentage of prime contracts going to small business has remained unchanged from 1956 to 1965 is the tendency of some government agencies to group their procurement rather than divide their requirements.

Such grouping usually results from an attempt to lessen the administrative workload despite regulations against this grouping in procurement guidelines.

We recommend that corrective action be taken to insure that procurement agencies abide by the small business policies spelled out in their regulations.

The Armed Services Procurement Regulations, the Federal Procurement Regulations and the NASA Procurement Regulations provide for division of procurement that will encourage bidding by small business.

A Lesson in Fortitude

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 24, 1966

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, we can all profit from reflecting on the courage and persistence of men and women who have overcome obstacles more formidable than any we ourselves have had to face. Such an individual was Lowell White, son of the Reverend Ralph E. White, of Frederick, Md., who lived a rich, generous life despite the handicap of being partially paralyzed at the age of 11.

We can all admire the firmness of Lowell White's faith, the breadth of his ingenuity, and the creative range of his activities. We can also pay tribute to his family and the many friends who shared his efforts and gained inspiration from their partnerships with this remarkable man.

I would like to include in the Record the following essay on Lowell White's life, from the Church of the Brethren magazine, the Messenger, of March 31: HIS SPIRIT WAS FREE—A STORY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE HANDICAPPED AND UNHAPPY

(By Pearl Clague)

Until he was eleven years old Lowell White's life as the son of a pastor in Chicago, in Piney Flats, Tennessee, and in Naperville, Illinois, was much like that of any minister's son. The real difference began one day when he said, "Mother, my feet are going to sleep." This happened at Naperville, and a doctor, who was a specialist at Rush Medical School in Chicago but who lived in Naperville, was called. After a careful examination he asked, "Are you set for a siege? Your son will be at least partially paralyzed in twenty-four hours. He may never recover."

In the Presbyterian hospital in Chicago Lowell remained three months while a great carbuncle deep in his back between his shoulders drained the spinal cord. Three problems now presented themselves: (1) What was he to do when paralysis came up to his arms? (2) How long could he expect to live? (The doctor's answer to this was, "Maybe a week, but not past the twenty-first birthday.") He really lived until he was almost forty-five. (3) How shall he employ his time? What training should he have? One church leader of that day, when told of the problems and asked for a solution, said, "Poor boy, he would be better off dead." The following story will show how false that answer was.

The best advice from an educator, and a number were consulted, was given by Dr. A. C. Weiland, founder and president of Bethany Seminary. When asked what kind of education such a boy needed, he answered, "The same as anyone else, but more of it."

The next problem was how to get an education when you must spend months in bed and never be able to walk, even on crutches. Doctors, interns, and nurses helped to solve this, even in the hospital by helping Lowell to keep up with his class in school. His teacher sent in assignments each day and so he lost no time. He even read some things which others did not. In occupational therapy class he learned leather tooling. When he came home from the hospital the Naperville Board of Education sent him private teachers for a number of years.

His schoolwork was without much point until he got Mrs. Kline as a teacher. She was well-trained herself and inspired him to

Al. Com

materially from that employed generally by reading clinics and specialists in this country and abroad. Where the school does differ is in its successful effort to carry over into group teaching tested clinical methods by which children are taught individually, thus accomplishing in a classroom what has previously been achieved only in tutoring sessions. This requires detailed interpretation of the test patterns of each child's learning strengths and weakness, which, in turn, determines the specific teaching methods to be employed and the way in which students are grouped in the classroom.

Another contribution is its continuing staff effort to refine these techniques and to develop specific adaptations of them to "unlock" the special problems of individual children. Mrs. McGlannan's clinical assistants, Mrs. Clara Leonard and Mrs. Norma Banas, classify and edit these special methods so that they are available to the entire staff immediately.

Learning in the schools is usually approached through the eyes and the ears—the visual and auditory senses. But since the dyslexic child cannot receive symbolic data through these senses without distortion, they must be supplemented by other channels of communication. For him, then, touch and movement—the tactile-kinesthetic avenue to learning—add a "third dimension" to the teaching-learning process. He becomes increasingly familiar with the symbols that he finds so elusive visually through a wide range of activities that allow him to feel them, trace them, arrange them in various sequences, and associate their shape and sound with familiar objects. Starting with simple geometric forms and directionality training, he gradually works through to the letters of the alphabet, and finally to complete words. In this process, his whole being has become involved.

The same approach proves useful in the later grades. Social studies is built upon time lines and sequences that cannot be "seen" and upon geographic locations that are lines on a map. When a dyslexic child looks at a map of the continents, it may appear to him to be a mere collection of symbolic designs. "Looking," therefore, does not necessarily mean that the child "sees" that Africa is larger than Australia, or that England has a jagged coast line while Florida's is smooth. But if he traces the continents, colors them, cuts them out, and then pastes them in proper position on a styrofoam globe, he is able to see them and their relationship to each other.

There is, obviously, no real barrier to teaching a dyslexic child. The basic prerequisite is a teacher with knowledge of the problem and its treatment, patience, and ingenuity in adapting techniques to the individual child. A second necessity is parents who understand the problem and are willing to learn along with the child. A third, and most important, is early identification. Given these three necessities, a year or two of intensive treatment—depending upon the severity of the disability—will prepare most children to enter regular school classrooms. But these children will continue to need special help and understanding from their families and teachers.

What, then, are the chances for the hundreds of thousands of boys and girls whose disability has not been discovered? Today, though better than ever before, they are far from encouraging. A very few public schools are attempting to help dyslexics—along with other nonreaders—in their remedial programs. A limited number of university-based reading clinics are equipped to identify and treat the problem. Yet even in these cases the child is likely to spend an hour in the afternoon being tutored at a clinic—after spending a frustrating five or six hours in a classroom where there is little or no understanding of his problem.

Yet it need not be so. The knowledge that is necessary to institute full-scale programs for dyslexics in the schools is already available. When asked whether the clinical teaching techniques could be introduced into a public school system, Mrs. McGlannan said, "With properly trained personnel in each school, it could be done virtually overnight. But until the public and the profession understand the human cost of failure to act, the future holds little promise for these children. They will continue to be as handicapped by the public and professional ignorance surrounding their problem as they are by the problem itself."

CRUCIAL NEXT STEP

The crippling gap between the findings of medical and educational research and the practical application of this knowledge in the classroom derives, at least in part, from the fact that three separate disciplines are involved. Identification of the cause and the eventual prevention of specific dyslexia is the responsibility of the medical profession; the development of more exact methods of diagnosis falls in the field of psychology; and increasingly effective, practical remedies must be found in the field of education.

The problem is also international in scope. Dr. Knud Hermann and the famed Orblind Institute in Copenhagen, for instance, have long pioneered in the genetic aspects of SLD. A number of eminent researchers in England and the U.S. have, for a number of years, been probing various aspects of the problem. And more recently the Neurological Institute of Moscow has been exploring promising avenues of research.

A growing number of authorities in the field, therefore, believe that the need is now urgent for an international, inter-disciplinary conference to coordinate developments in the field since the 1961 Johns Hopkins Conference on dyslexia. Such a conference, they feel, will focus professional interest on current knowledge and pave the way for more rapid progress in the immediate future. A conference of this kind would also, they believe, help to dramatize, for both the profession and the public, the urgent necessity for more effective diagnosis and treatment in local communities where the children are.

CIA: Is CIA Becoming a Sacred Cow?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RAY J. MADDEN

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 24, 1966

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, the Congress after the experience of recent years is justified in becoming alarmed over the power and secret operations without congressional oversight of the mysterious powers of the Central Intelligence Agency.

A RIGHT TO FIND OUT

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee should push on with its attempt to become more of a watchdog over the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency. For years the CIA has been regarded as a mysterious, untouchable arm of government. In one sense it has to function that way. Spies must remain under cover, and we need spies. However, there have been CIA steps into the policy level where the more wisely grounded legislative arm should exercise more control.

Sen. EUGENE McCARTHY's resolution to upgrade the subcommittee now ineffectively doing the job would expand the group and give

it the title of full Committee on Intelligence Operations. The resolution faces certain opposition, on the grounds that the CIA should be immune from much prying because its activities are so sensitive.

Certainly the senators should not get carried away by the watchdog activities, but there is no reason to believe that responsible, periodic looks at the CIA will hamper its work or threaten national security.

McCARTHY is a responsible senator, one whose ability and good judgment has never been seriously questioned. His connection with the watchdog resolution should help to quiet fears about irresponsible prying.

There is sharp disagreement over contentions that the CIA has over stepped its intelligence gathering mission to influence foreign policy. But it is not infallible, and the Senate committee's desire to find out appears justified.

Procurements—Report of Smaller Business Association of New England

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 24, 1966

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, the Smaller Business Association of New England has presented its 1966 proposals for congressional action and it is my honor to be able to enter these proposals in the RECORD at this point.

The SBANE report was introduced by Mr. Ernest H. Osgood, Jr., of the State Street Bank & Trust Co. of Boston, Mass. Three areas of possible legislation affecting small business are explored and the report concludes with a summary of the proposals. The association and its members who participated in this project are to be commended for their sacrifice of valuable time and their sincere hard work in presenting this report to the Congress.

The first area covered and printed below concerns "Procurements" and was prepared by Robert S. Goodyear, president of Fenwal Electronics, Inc. I will enter the remaining sections in the RECORD during the rest of the week.

PROCUREMENT

1. Reinstate set-asides and PCR's.
2. Notify firms of nonresponsibility.
3. Revise weighted guidelines.
4. Adhere to procurement regulations.

1. REINVESTMENT OF SBA SET-ASIDE PROGRAM & PCR'S

Once again SBANE strongly urges your support of a measure that will reinstate the Small Business Administration's Set-Aside Program and Procurement Center Representatives. Last year the number of Small Business Administration PCR's was reduced from 46 to 14 by the Administration, thus eliminating SBA's role of initiating small business set-asides.

In our judgment, this move was ill conceived and will mean a substantial reduction in the amount of Government procurement exclusively restricted to small business, at a critical time when defense requirements are increasing to support the conflict in Vietnam.

Small business set-asides

Contracts:	Value
For 1963 (45,628) -----	\$2,381,715,350
For 1964 (51,417) -----	3,041,055,857
For 1965 (51,556) -----	3,951,057,000

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences with an amendment to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration the sum of \$5,008,000,000, as follows:

- (a) For "Research and development," \$4,248,600,000, for the following programs:
- (1) Gemini, \$40,600,000;
 - (2) Apollo, \$2,974,200,000;
 - (3) Advanced missions, \$8,000,000;
 - (4) Physics and astronomy, \$131,400,000;
 - (5) Lunar and planetary exploration, \$197,900,000;
 - (6) Bioscience, \$35,400,000;
 - (7) Meteorological satellites, \$43,600,000;
 - (8) Communication and applications technology satellites, \$26,400,000;
 - (9) Launch vehicle development, \$33,700,000;
 - (10) Launch vehicle procurement, \$152,000,000;
 - (11) Space vehicle systems, \$36,000,000;
 - (12) Electronics systems, \$36,800,000;
 - (13) Human factor systems, \$17,000,000;
 - (14) Basic research, \$23,000,000;
 - (15) Space power and electric propulsion systems, \$42,500,000;
 - (16) Nuclear rockets, \$53,000,000;
 - (17) Chemical propulsion, \$37,000,000;
 - (18) Aeronautics, \$35,000,000;
 - (19) Tracking and data acquisition, \$279,300,000;
 - (20) Sustaining university program, \$41,000,000;
 - (21) Technology utilization, \$4,800,000.
- (b) For "Construction of facilities," including land acquisitions, \$100,500,000, as follows:
- (1) Electronics Research Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts, \$10,000,000;
 - (2) Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, \$710,000;
 - (3) Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California, \$350,000;
 - (4) John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida, \$37,876,000;
 - (5) Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, \$6,100,000;
 - (6) Lewis Research Center, Cleveland and Sandusky, Ohio, \$16,000,000;
 - (7) Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, \$12,800,000;
 - (8) George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama, \$581,000;
 - (9) Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans and Slidell, Louisiana, \$700,000;
 - (10) Mississippi Test Facility, Mississippi, \$1,700,000;
 - (11) Wallops Station, Wallops Island, Virginia, \$205,000;
 - (12) Various locations, \$6,478,000;
 - (13) Facility planning and design not otherwise provided for, \$7,000,000.
- (c) For "Administrative operations," \$658,900,000, as follows:
- (1) Personnel compensation and personnel benefits, \$397,444,000,
 - (2) Other expenses, \$261,456,000.
- (d) Appropriations for "Research and development" may be used (1) for any items of a capital nature (other than acquisition of land) which may be required for the performance of research and development contracts and (2) for grants to nonprofit institutions of higher education, or to nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is the conduct of scientific research, for purchase or construction of additional research facilities; and title to such facilities shall be vested in the United States unless the Administrator determines that the national program of aeronautical and space activities will best be served by vesting title in any such grantee institution or organization. Each such grant shall be made under such

conditions as the Administrator shall determine to be required to insure that the United States will receive therefrom benefit adequate to justify the making of that grant. None of the funds appropriated for "Research and development" pursuant to this Act may be used for construction of any major facility, the estimated cost of which including collateral equipment, exceeds \$250,000, unless the Administrator or his designee has notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and the Committee on Science and Astronautics of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the Senate of the nature, location, and estimated cost of such facility.

(e) When so specified in an appropriation Act, (1) any amount appropriated for "Research and development" or for "Construction of facilities" may remain available without fiscal year limitation, and (2) maintenance and operation of facilities, and support services contracts may be entered into under the "Administrative operations" appropriation for periods not in excess of twelve months beginning at any time during the fiscal year.

(f) Appropriations made pursuant to subsection 1(c) may be used, but not to exceed \$35,000, for scientific consultations or extraordinary expenses upon the approval or authority of the Administrator and his determination shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers of the Government.

(g) No part of the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection 1(c) for maintenance, repairs, alterations, and minor construction shall be used for the construction of any new facility the estimated cost of which, including collateral equipment, exceeds \$100,000.

(h) When so specified in an appropriation Act, any appropriation authorized under this Act to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration may initially be used, during the fiscal year 1967, to finance work or activities for which funds have been provided in any other appropriation available to the Administration and appropriate adjustments between such appropriations shall subsequently be made in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.

Sec. 2. Authorization is hereby granted whereby any of the amounts prescribed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), and (12), of subsection 1(b) may, in the discretion of the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, be varied upward 5 per centum to meet unusual cost variations, but the total cost of all work authorized under such paragraphs shall not exceed a total of \$93,500,000.

Sec. 3. (a) Not to exceed one-half of 1 per centum of the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection 1(a) hereof may be transferred to the "Construction of facilities" appropriation, and, when so transferred, together with \$10,000,000 of the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection 1(b) hereof (other than funds appropriated pursuant to paragraph (13) of such subsection) shall be available for expenditures to construct, expand, or modify laboratories and other installations at any location (including locations specified in subsection 1(b)), if (1) the Administrator determines such action to be necessary because of changes in the national program of aeronautical and space activities or new scientific or engineering developments, and (2) he determines that deferral of such action until the enactment of the next authorization Act would be inconsistent with the interest of the Nation in aeronautical and space activities. The funds so made available may be expended to acquire, construct, convert, rehabilitate, or install permanent or temporary public works, including land acquisition, site preparation, appurtenances, utilities, and equipment. No portion of such sums may be obligated for expenditure or

expended to construct, expand, or modify laboratories and other installations unless (A) a period of thirty days has passed after the Administrator or his designee has transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate and to the Committee on Science and Astronautics of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the Senate a written report containing a full and complete statement concerning (1) the nature of such construction, expansion, or modification, (2) the cost thereof including the cost of any real estate action pertaining thereto, and (3) the reason why such construction, expansion, or modification is necessary in the national interest, or (B) each such committee before the expiration of such period has transmitted to the Administrator written notice to the effect that such committee has no objection to the proposed action.

(b) Not to exceed an amount which is equal to 1 per centum of the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection 1(c) (1) hereof may be transferred to the appropriation for "Personnel compensation and personnel benefits" from any other funds appropriated pursuant to this Act, but no portion of such amount may be obligated for expenditure or expended unless a period of thirty days has passed after the Administrator or his designee has transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate and to the Committee on Science and Astronautics of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the Senate a written report containing a full and complete statement concerning the need for such a transfer.

(c) Not to exceed an amount which is equal to 10 per centum of the funds appropriated pursuant to subsection 1(c) (2) hereof may be transferred to the appropriation for "Other expenses" from any other funds appropriated pursuant to this Act, but no portion of such amount may be obligated for expenditure or expended unless a period of thirty days has passed after the Administrator or his designee has transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate and to the Committee on Science and Astronautics of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the Senate a written report containing a full and complete statement concerning the need for such a transfer.

Sec. 4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act—

(1) no amount appropriated pursuant to this Act may be used for any program deleted by the Congress from requests as originally made to either the House Committee on Science and Astronautics or the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,

(2) no amount appropriated pursuant to this Act may be used for any program in excess of the amount actually authorized for that particular program by section 1(a), and

(3) no amount appropriated pursuant to this Act may be used for any program which has not been presented to or requested of either such committee,

unless (A) a period of thirty days has passed after the receipt by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and each such committee of notice given by the Administrator or his designee containing a full and complete statement of the action proposed to be taken and the facts and circumstances relied upon in support of such proposed action, or (B) each such committee before the expiration of such period has transmitted to the Administrator written notice to the effect that such committee has no objection to the proposed action.

Sec. 5. It is the sense of Congress that it is in the national interest that considera-

The people have listened to Senator RIBICOFF because he speaks with authority and experience—and because he is a fair and reasonable man. Even the representatives of the auto industry who feel injured by this discussion will agree, I think, that my colleague from Connecticut has treated them honorably and justly from the very start.

When Senator RIBICOFF was elected to the Senate he was already a veteran in the cause of highway safety. As Governor of Connecticut he had achieved a national reputation for his determination in pursuing a policy of strict enforcement designed to control the speeder and the drunk and dangerous driver on whom severe penalties were imposed—as they should be everywhere. This policy, coupled with a vigorous highway construction and improvement program, helped give Connecticut the safest roads in the Nation. Mr. RIBICOFF reinforced the enforcement program further with a campaign of public education, driver training, and spot inspections that made Connecticut motorists more safety conscious than they had ever been before. It was a great achievement.

People also listened to Senator RIBICOFF because they knew that as chairman of the Traffic Safety Committee of the Governors' Conference he helped persuade the auto manufacturers to abandon, for a time at least, their strident advertising clamor exalting speed and horsepower. They knew that he spoke from his previous experience when as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare he directed the traffic safety efforts of the Public Health Service.

Senator RIBICOFF's efforts in behalf of greater safety on our highways deserve our respect and admiration. He had demonstrated once again the value and importance of leadership in a democracy. He has shown that one man—armed with good sense, courage, and a willingness to hold to his convictions—can achieve far-reaching and significant victories in the constant struggle to make a better life for the American people. In this respect, he deserves to stand with some of the great figures in the history of our Nation for his lifegiving efforts to reduce the shocking toll of highway travel.

His effort has never been a war on the automaker. It has been the studied and persistent pursuit of a national policy. For in the absence of a national policy, the public interest has not received adequate protection. Decisions affecting the very lives and well-being of our citizens were being made, not in public bodies, but in the offices of industrial managers who, by the very nature of their corporate responsibilities, could not always serve the public interest well.

Senator RIBICOFF deserves a vote of thanks from the American people for giving the problem of traffic safety the searching examination it required. What is noteworthy is the speed with which this examination produced a basic shift in public attitude toward this problem. Where once there was a docile acceptance of the highway death toll as an inevitable byproduct of modern life, there is now a growing insistence by the

motorist that he be protected from the consequences of his own mistakes and those of others. The American public is no longer willing to be victimized and brutalized by the tragic inadequacies of a transportation system that we cannot do without.

One measure of this shift in attitude was the public acknowledgment by the President of the United States that the traffic safety situation had reached serious proportions and was now a national problem. The full weight of the President's concern has now been commendably thrown into the struggle and for the first time in history we have a national traffic safety bill drafted in the executive branch of the Federal Government.

One very helpful factor in promoting the public's consciousness for the need of highway safety has been Ralph Nader's book, "Unsafe at Any Speed." His has been a different approach to the problems from Senator RIBICOFF's but it has been of enormous value and is already producing results toward the paramount objective of highway safety.

Mr. President, I feel hopeful that some kind of highway safety legislation will become law before Congress adjourns. If so we will have the satisfaction of knowing that we have taken an important step toward stemming the wholesale slaughter and mayhem on our highways. And it was ABE RIBICOFF who led the way.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

The Chair suggests the absence of a quorum.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

NOTICE OF INTENTION OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS TO FILE RESOLUTION ON CIA ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 1966

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, after consulting with some of my colleagues, specifically the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], I wish to put the Senate on notice that a week from Wednesday, on June 1, I will file the report on the resolution reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations relating to the creation of a special committee on the CIA.

I make that statement at this time in order that Senators who are interested in it may be prepared to debate the matter a week from Wednesday, on June 1, 1966.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. KUCHEL. So that I may understand, has the majority leadership sched-

uled it for debate immediately after the resolution is filed? Does the majority leader intend to call it up then?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have not consulted the majority leader.

I had understood that a point of order would be taken against it.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I have discussed this matter with the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], and others who are interested in it. This, it seems to me, is the most orderly way of disposing of this matter.

Of course, when next Wednesday arrives, the matter will be before the Senate; but if the leadership has other plans, there are ways of carrying it over to another day. I do not know of any matter the leadership has that is more pressing than this one. We have about run out of business at this time. But the Senator from Arkansas has put the Senate on notice that a week from Wednesday he will file the report. At that time, I shall propose to make a point of order against the consideration of the matter until it is first considered by another committee of the Senate.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have just entered the Chamber. As a point of information, is there any thought of bringing the CIA matter up today or in the immediate future?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. I just announced, before the Senator entered the Chamber, that after consultation we had decided for various reasons to submit it to the Senate a week from tomorrow. We understand that during the Memorial Day holiday Senators may have other engagements. Everyone is to be on notice that a week from Wednesday, the 1st of June, the report of the committee will be filed. It is anticipated that at that time a point of order will be made, and debate referral to another committee probably will take place at that time.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator from Arkansas.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will state the bill by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 14324) to authorize appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research and development, construction of facilities, and administrative operations, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Michigan?

Daily Digest

HIGHLIGHTS

Senate adopted resolution on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Senate committee approved resolution authorizing creation of a Committee on Intelligence Operations.

Senate

Chamber Action

Routine Proceedings, pages 10224-10281

Bills Introduced: 11 bills and 5 resolutions were introduced, as follows: S. 3362-3372; S.J. Res. 160-161; and S. Res. 261-263. Page 10224

Bill Reported: Report was made as follows: S. 3031, to establish in the D.C. a National Visitor Center, with amendments—pursuant to order of March 17, 1966, the bill was then referred to Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Page 10224

Bills Referred: 12 House-passed bills were referred to appropriate committees. Pages 10223-10224

Railroad Freight Cars: Senate concurred in House amendments to S. 1098, to amend the Interstate Commerce Act so as to insure the adequacy of the national railroad freight car supply. This action cleared bill for President's signature. Pages 10250-10252

Nuclear Weapons: By unanimous vote of 84 yeas, Senate adopted S. Res. 179, expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the nonproliferation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Pages 10281-10297

Committee Assignments: S. Res. 262, assigning Senator Griffin to membership on Committees on Labor and Public Welfare and Public Works, was submitted and adopted. Page 10236

Canada-U.S. Interparliamentary Group: It was announced that Vice President has appointed Senator Griffin to the Ninth Canada-U.S. Interparliamentary Group meeting May 18-22 at Washington, D.C., and Oak Ridge, Tenn., vice Senator Jordan (Idaho) who has resigned from this appointment. Page 10313

Senate Schedule: Authority was granted during adjournment of Senate until noon Thursday, May 19, for (1) Secretary of Senate to receive messages from the President and from the House, (2) for Vice President and President pro tempore to sign enrolled bills, and (3) for all committees to file reports. Page 10312

Foreign Decorations: Senate passed with committee amendments S. 2463, granting congressional consent for

individuals to accept gifts and decorations of minimal value from foreign governments. Pages 10312-10313

Nomination: Nomination of Henry E. Stebbins, of Massachusetts, to be Ambassador to Uganda, was received. Page 10313

Record Vote: One record vote was taken today. Page 10297

Program for Thursday: Senate met at noon and adjourned at 3:29 p.m. until noon Thursday, May 19. The program for Thursday is as yet undetermined. Pages 10312, 10313

Committee Meetings

(Committees not listed did not meet)

APPROPRIATIONS—INDEPENDENT OFFICES

Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee continued its hearings on H.R. 14921, fiscal 1967 appropriations for independent offices, receiving testimony in behalf of funds for their Department from Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, and Robert C. Wood, Under Secretary, both of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Hearings continue tomorrow.

APPROPRIATIONS—NIH

Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee heard further testimony from public witnesses on proposed funds for the National Institutes of Health, Department of HEW.

Subcommittee recessed subject to call.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Committee on Banking and Currency: Subcommittee on Financial Institutions resumed its hearings on S. 3158, to strengthen the supervisory authority of Federal agencies over insured banks and insured savings and loan associations, having as its witnesses Joseph F. McMurray, president, Queens College, New York City, and former Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board; Lewellyn A. Jennings, chairman of the board, Riggs National Bank, Washington, D.C., representing the

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D424

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American Bankers Association; Edward L. Johnson, president, Council of Savings & Loan Financial Corporations; and Wallace M. Mulliken, an attorney of Champaign, Ill.

Hearings continue tomorrow.

COMMITTEE BUSINESS

Committee on Commerce: Committee, in executive session, ordered favorably reported the following: S. 2858, to extend the 55-percent ceiling on merchant vessel construction differential subsidies (amended so as to provide a 1-year extension); S.J. Res. 29, authorizing a survey of marine and fresh water commercial fishery resources of the U.S., and its possessions (amended); S. 2267, extending the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act relating to war risk insurance; S. 3096, extending the time for making grants under the Federal Airport Act; S. 1015, authorizing FCC to prescribe regulations for the manufacture and sale of devices causing harmful radio interference (amended); S. 2102, to protect and conserve fur seals on the Pribilof Islands (with amendment in the nature of a substitute); and the nominations of William H. Shaw, to be Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs, and Capts. Chester I. Steele and Leo G. Telsey, for promotion to the rank of rear admiral in the Coast Guard.

Committee agreed that it will hold an additional day of hearings on H.R. 13881, to regulate the transportation of dogs and cats intended to be used for experimental purposes.

FISH PROTEIN CONCENTRATE

Committee on Commerce: Committee concluded its hearings on S. 2720, to authorize development of a practical means for production of fish protein concentrate, after receiving testimony from Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts; J. Steele Culbertson, National Fish Meal & Oil Association; Jacob J. Dykstra, Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association, Inc., Rhode Island; Dr. Thomas L. Meade, J. Howard Smith, Inc., Port Monmouth, N.J.; Dr. I. A. Parfentjev, fellow of the New York Academy of Science; William R. Reagan, Avco Corp., New York City; Walter D. Thomas, FMC Corp.; Richard Whittington, of Bellaire, Tex.; and Gordon D. Zealand, Industrial Development Commission, Carteret County, N.C.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Committee on Foreign Relations: Committee, in executive session, by a vote of 14 to 5, ordered favorably reported an original resolution authorizing the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations.

WATER RESOURCES

Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs: Committee continued its hearings on S. 3107, establishing a National Water Commission to review national water resource problems, with testimony from Representative Duncan

of Oregon, and Reinecke; John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Director, Office of Science and Technology; Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel and Special Assistant for Civil Functions, Department of the Army; Dr. James Crutchfield, professor of economics, University of Washington; Irving K. Fox, Resources for the Future; Dr. Stephen C. Smith, professor of economics, Colorado State University; Dr. Maynard M. Hufschmidt, professor, City and Regional Planning and Environmental Sciences and Engineering, University of North Carolina; Eugene B. Waggoner, Consulting Engineers Council; and Dr. Nathaniel Wollman, department of economics, University of New Mexico.

Hearings were recessed subject to call.

FOREIGN TRAVEL

Committee on the Judiciary: The Internal Security Subcommittee held hearings on S. 3243, to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act so as to restrict certain areas from travel by U.S. citizens, with testimony from Robert H. Goldsborough, American Committee on Immigration Policies; Francis W. Stoyer, Veterans of Foreign Wars; Mark Jones, National Economic Council, Princeton, N.J.; and Paul Beach, a George Washington University student.

Hearings continue tomorrow.

QUININE

Committee on the Judiciary: Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly continued its series of hearings to study the cause of the skyrocketing prices of quinine and quinidine, receiving testimony from Harry Y. de Schepper and Ira Vandewater, both of R. W. Greeff & Co., Inc., New York City.

Hearings continue tomorrow.

SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER UTILIZATION

Committee on Labor and Public Welfare: Special subcommittee held hearings on S. 2662, to facilitate the utilization of scientific engineering and technical manpower resources of the Nation, with testimony from Alain C. Enthoven, Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, Department of Defense; and Henry S. Rowen, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget.

Hearings continue tomorrow.

NOMINATION

Committee on Public Works: Committee, in executive session, ordered favorably reported the nomination of Donald Opie McBride, of Oklahoma, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

HIGHWAYS

Committee on Public Works: Subcommittee on Public Roads continued its hearings on S. 3155, proposed Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, receiving testimony

Next meeting of the SENATE
12:00 noon, Thursday, May 12

Next meeting of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
12:00 noon, Thursday, May 12

Subcommittee on Rivers and Harbors, and the Subcommittee on Flood Control, executive, to consider in a joint hearing H.R. 13313, and related bills, concerning fees at Corps of Engineers reservoirs, 10 a.m., 2251 Rayburn House Office Building.

Full committee, executive, to consider H.R. 13313, and related bills, concerning fees at Corps of Engineers reservoirs, 11:30 a.m., 2251 Rayburn House Office Building.

Committee on Ways and Means, executive, to continue con-

sideration of H.R. 8282, the Federal unemployment benefits program, 10 a.m., committee room, Longworth House Office Building.

Select Committee on Small Business. Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory and Enforcement Agencies Relating to Small Business, to continue consideration of problems within industries regulated by the Federal Communications Commission, 10 a.m., B-374 Rayburn House Office Building.



Congressional Record

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May 11, 1966

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ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT

Committee on Rules: Action was deferred on H. Res. 670, and similar resolutions, to create a select committee to investigate the operation of the Economic Opportunity Act.

FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

Committee on Ways and Means: Met in executive session and continued on H.R. 8282, the Federal unemployment benefits program. No final action was taken.

Joint Committee Meetings

PRIVATE PENSION PLANS

Joint Economic Committee: Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy continued its hearings on the role of private pension plans in the overall program of income protection for the aged, having as its witness Robert M. Ball, Commissioner, Social Security Administration.

Hearings continue on Monday, May 16.

BILL SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT

New Law

(For last listing of public laws, see DIGEST, p. D394, May 9, 1966)

S. 1924, to amend the Bankruptcy Act so as to prohibit a part-time referee from acting as trustee or receiver. Signed May 10, 1966 (P.L. 89-414).

COMMITTEE MEETINGS FOR THURSDAY, MAY 12

(All meetings are open unless otherwise designated)

Senate

Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Subcommittee on Agricultural Production, Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices, on S. 2921, proposed Children's Special Milk Act, 10 a.m., 324 Old Senate Office Building.

Committee on Appropriations, subcommittee, on H.R. 14921, fiscal 1967 appropriations for independent offices, 10 a.m. and 2 p.m., room S-128, Capitol.

Committee on Armed Services, open and executive, on pending nominations, including that of Judge Robert E. Quinn, for reappointment to the Court of Military Appeals, 10:30 a.m., 212 Old Senate Office Building.

Committee on Foreign Relations, executive, to discuss and vote on proposed draft resolution re the CIA, 10 a.m., room S-116, Capitol.

Executive, to meet with Ambassador to South Vietnam Lodge, 2:30 p.m., room S-116, Capitol.

Committee on the Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee, on S. 2152, proposed Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, and related bills, 10 a.m., 318 Old Senate Office Building.

Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, to resume hearings on alleged price fixing of library books, 10 a.m., 1318 New Senate Office Building.

Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, executive, on pending postmaster nominations, and on H.R. 14122, Federal employees pay bill, 10 a.m., 6200 New Senate Office Building.

Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Roads, on S. 3155, proposed Federal-Aid Highway Act, 10 a.m., 4200 New Senate Office Building.

Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, on pending bills proposing amendments to the Federal water pollution control laws, 10 a.m., 4232 New Senate Office Building.

House

Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, executive, 10 a.m., H-309 U.S. Capitol Building.

Subcommittee on Legislative, executive, 10 a.m., H-310 U.S. Capitol Building.

Subcommittee on Military Construction, executive, 10 a.m., B-300 Rayburn House Office Building.

Committee on Armed Services, to continue consideration of H.R. 13715, the military construction authorization bill, 10 a.m., 2118 Rayburn House Office Building.

Committee on Banking and Currency, to continue consideration of H.R. 14026, to prohibit insured banks from issuing negotiable interest-bearing or discounted notes, certificates of deposit, or other evidences of indebtedness and related matters, 10 a.m., 2128 Rayburn House Office Building.

Committee on Education and Labor, executive, on pending legislation, 9:45 a.m., 2175 Rayburn House Office Building.

Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Handicapped Children, to meet for an organizational meeting, 2 p.m., 1409 Longworth House Office Building.

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, to continue consideration of the NATO crisis, 2 p.m., 2255 Rayburn House Office Building.

Full committee, to continue consideration of H.R. 12449, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; and H.R. 12450, to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward internal and external security, 10 a.m., 2172 Rayburn House Office Building.

Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, to continue consideration of H.R. 4671, and related bills, to authorize the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Lower Colorado River Basin project, 9:45 a.m., 1324 Longworth House Office Building.

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to continue consideration of H.R. 13228, and related bills, to provide for a coordinated national safety program and establishment of safety standards for motor vehicles in interstate commerce to reduce traffic accidents and the deaths, injuries, and property damage which occur in such accidents, 10 a.m., 2123 Rayburn House Office Building.

Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, to continue consideration of civil rights legislation, 9 a.m., 2141 Rayburn House Office Building.

Subcommittee No. 2, to consider private claims bills, 10 a.m., 2226 Rayburn House Office Building.

Subcommittee No. 3, executive, to continue consideration of H.R. 4347, regarding copyright law revision, 10 a.m., 2237 Rayburn House Office Building.

Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, executive, to consider H.R. 14904, the parcel post bill; and H.R. 13822, regarding an additional Assistant Postmaster General for Research and Development, 10 a.m., 346 Cannon House Office Building.

Committee on Public Works, Special Subcommittee on the Federal-Aid Highway Program, and the Subcommittee on Roads, to continue joint hearings on the relationship of toll facilities to the Federal-aid highway program, 10 a.m., 2167 Rayburn House Office Building.

House of Representatives

Chamber Action

Bills Introduced: 27 public bills, H.R. 15017-15043; 8 private bills, H.R. 15044-15051; and 7 resolutions, H. Con. Res. 649-654, and H. Res. 853, were introduced.

Pages 10029-10030

Bills Reported: Reports were filed as follows:

H.R. 11781, to improve and clarify certain laws of the Coast Guard, amended (H. Rept. 1523);

H.R. 12270, regarding Boy Scouts World Jamboree and World Conference, amended (H. Rept. 1524);

H.R. 13366, to authorize the disposal of aluminum from the national stockpile (H. Rept. 1525);

H.R. 13768, to authorize the disposal of celestite from the supplemental stockpile (H. Rept. 1526);

H.R. 13769, to authorize the disposal of cordage fiber (sisal) from the national stockpile (H. Rept. 1527);

H.R. 13770, to authorize the disposal of crocidolite asbestos (harsh) from the supplemental stockpile (H. Rept. 1528);

H.R. 13772, to authorize the disposal of metallurgical grade manganese ore from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile (H. Rept. 1529); and

H.R. 13773, to authorize the disposal of opium from the national stockpile (H. Rept. 1530).

Page 10029

Late Report: The Committee on Public Works was granted permission to file a late report by midnight Saturday, May 14.

Page 9941

Railroad Freight Cars: The House passed by a record vote of 306 yeas to 27 nays, after adopting committee amendments, S. 1098, to amend the Interstate Commerce Act to insure the adequacy of the national railroad freight car supply.

Rejected an amendment regarding compensation to be paid by and payable to any group of carriers.

H. Res. 830, the rule under which the legislation was considered was adopted earlier by a voice vote.

Pages 9942-9965

Boy Scout Jamboree: The House passed by unanimous consent H.R. 12270, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to lend certain Army, Navy, and Air Force equipment and to provide transportation and other services to the Boy Scouts of America in connection with the 12th World Jamboree and Conference of Boy Scouts to be held in the United States of America in 1967, amended.

Pages 9965-9966

Canada-United States: The House received a communication of resignation from Representative Dulski from the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group and the Speaker appointed Representative Pike of New York to replace him.

Page 9968

Calendar Wednesday: Agreed to dispense with Calendar Wednesday business of May 18.

Page 9966

Legislative Program: The legislative program for the week of May 16-21 was announced by the majority leader. Agreed to House adjournment from Thursday to Monday.

Page 9966

Quorum Calls and Record Vote: Two quorum calls and one record vote developed during the proceedings of the House and they appear on pages 9962, 9960, 9964-9965.

Program for Monday: Adjourned at 6:04 p.m. until Monday, May 16, 1966, at 12 o'clock noon when the House will call the Consent Calendar and will consider the following nine bills under Suspension of the Rules:

S. 693, Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments.

H.R. 12676, temporary suspension of duty on certain forms of copper.

H.R. 14347, to liberalize dependency and indemnity compensation payments to parents and children of veterans.

H.R. 13313, concerning admission fees at Corps of Engineers reservoirs.

H.R. 7402, providing for the establishment of the Chamizal Treaty National Memorial, El Paso, Tex.

H.R. 11775, providing for the popular election of the Governor of Guam.

H.R. 11777, providing for the popular election of the Governor of the Virgin Islands.

H.R. 13277, providing for the reappointment of the Legislature of the Virgin Islands.

H.R. 13298, authorizing the Legislature of Guam to provide by law for the election of its members from election districts.

Also will begin consideration of H.R. 14544, the Participation Sales Act of 1966 (open rule, 4 hours of debate).

Committee Meetings

STOCKPILE

Committee on Armed Services: Met in executive session and ordered reported favorably to the House the following bills:

H.R. 13366, to authorize the disposal of aluminum from the national stockpile;

H.R. 13768, to authorize the disposal of celestite from the supplemental stockpile;

H.R. 13769, to authorize the disposal of cordage fiber (sisal) from the national stockpile;

H.R. 13770, to authorize the disposal of crocidolite asbestos (harsh) from the supplemental stockpile;

H.R. 13772, to authorize the disposal of metallurgical grade manganese ore from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile; and

H.R. 13773, to authorize the disposal of opium from the national stockpile.

White, Chairman, who was accompanied by David S. Black, Charles R. Ross, and Lawrence J. O'Connor, Jr., members, all of the Federal Power Commission; and Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, who was accompanied by A. Everette MacIntyre, John R. Reilly, and Mary Gardner Jones, members, all of the Federal Trade Commission.

Hearings continue on Monday, May 16.

NOMINATIONS

Committee on Armed Services: Committee, in executive session, ordered favorably reported the nominations of Gen. Earle G. Wheeler for reappointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Judge Robert E. Quinn for reappointment to the Court of Military Appeals; and 2,248 nominations in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

Prior to this action, in open session, Judge Quinn was present to testify and answer questions on his own behalf.

WARSAW CONVENTION, AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Committee on Foreign Relations: Committee, in executive session, approved the following committee resolution:

Resolved, that it is the sense of the Committee that the Department of State should not withdraw its notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention unless all air carriers operating within the United States adhere to the proposed concord regarding liability of \$75,000.

Committee also considered a proposal to create a Select Committee on Intelligence Operations to keep itself informed of activities of the CIA, DIA, and other agencies of the Government dealing with intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Committee took no action on this proposal, and will meet again for its further consideration on Tuesday, May 17.

VIETNAM

Committee on Foreign Relations: Committee met in executive session to discuss with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the situation in South Vietnam.

PRICE FIXING OF BOOKS

Committee on the Judiciary: The Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee concluded its hearings to receive testimony on the alleged price fixing of library books. Witnesses heard were Vincent Meyer, Library Book Service Co., Richmond, Va.; Henry Z. Walck, of Henry Z. Walck, Inc., New York City; and Dan Lacy, Ameri-

can Book Publishers Council Association, New York City.

LSD

Committee on the Judiciary: The Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee resumed hearings on S. 2152, proposed Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, and on the matter of increasing use by young people of hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD. Witnesses heard were Dr. Donald B. Louria, representing Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York; John Neurauter, director, vice control, accompanied by Lt. Thomas Kernan, both of the Chicago Police Department; and Joseph J. Healy, superintendent, Division of Narcotic Control, Illinois Department of Public Safety.

Hearings continue tomorrow.

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' PAY AND NOMINATIONS

Committee on Post Office and Civil Service: Committee met in executive session to consider H.R. 14122, providing salary increases for Federal employees, but did not conclude action thereon, and will meet again on Monday, May 16.

Committee ordered favorably reported 161 postmaster nominations.

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

Committee on Public Works: Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution concluded its series of hearings on several pending bills proposing amendments to the Federal water pollution control laws, after receiving testimony from Senator Yarborough; Representative Vanik; William R. Adams, St. Regis Paper Co., representing the American Paper Institute; A. J. von Frank, Manufacturing Chemists Association Water Resources Committee; P. N. Gammelgard, Director of American Petroleum Institute's Committee on Air and Water Conservation; Thomas Niles, representing the Consulting Engineers Council; and Walter A. Hahn, president, Soap & Detergent Association.

HIGHWAYS

Committee on Public Works: Subcommittee on Public Roads continued its hearings on S. 3155, proposed Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, having as its witnesses Charles E. Shumate, president, accompanied by A. E. Johnson, executive secretary, both of the American Association of State Highway Officials; and Maj. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, USA (ret.), executive vice president, accompanied by Burton F. Miller, both of the American Road Builders Association.

Hearings continue tomorrow.

February 17, 1966

The Texan-by-adoption, who looked like a polished cowboy and wore bushy white sideburns, has been recognized by many as the idea man behind the Marshall plan after World War II.

He was a financial backer of the Liberty League that fought the New Deal in the 1930's. But in 1940 he joined the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs under Nelson A. Rockefeller, and later became a deputy to Jesse Jones, then Federal Loan Administrator. He was named Assistant Secretary of Commerce in charge of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation's foreign activities and, as such, headed several of its wartime subsidiaries and was vice president of the Export-Import Bank.

Early in 1944 he resigned his Commerce post to become War Surplus Administrator, to handle disposal of Government plants and surplus material after the war. He resigned as Administrator 8 months later after Congress repudiated his ideas on the sale of Federal real estate.

OPINION OF CARTELS

During hearings on his appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, Congress made clear it had not forgotten the dispute that preceded his withdrawal as Surplus Administrator. He was asked:

"How do you feel about cartels?" and "What are your business connections?" On cartels, Mr. Clayton shot back: "A cartel smells the same to me by whatever name it may be called." To the other, often-asked question, he replied that he received daily reports of the total sales and transactions of Anderson, Clayton & Co., which "are thrown in the wastebasket." His frankness impressed the Senators and they approved his nomination.

When diplomacy became inextricably interwoven with economics in the final months of World War II, Mr. Clayton was appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in December 1944, to keep the diplomatic and economic fields coordinated within the State Department.

Twenty months later he was elevated to the higher post of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Although a neophyte diplomat at the start of his State Department days, Mr. Clayton carried on and developed the reciprocal trade policies inaugurated by Cordell Hull. In reply to Congressional criticism of his big business background and trading policies, Mr. Clayton always contended that he was laboring for the good of his country, not for any private business interests.

As a cotton merchant, Mr. Clayton traveled in many countries and acquired early the international viewpoint that made him one of the chief architects of the postwar foreign policy of the United States. His observations in Europe and as his country's representative at the Geneva Trade Conference in 1945-46 produced the memorandum to Secretary of State George C. Marshall that was one of the principal bases of the Marshall plan—a plan for the economic recovery of wartorn Europe.

WORKED FOR COURT CLERK

Will Clayton was born in Tupelo, Miss. He moved with his family to Jackson, Tenn., and at 13 he left school and went to work in a local court clerk's office. He became a deputy clerk at 15, studied shorthand and became a court reporter. Among his clients was William Jennings Bryan.

Still in his teens, he became stenographer to a cotton broker. He went to New York seeking advancement, and got a job with the American Cotton Co. and rose in that company to the post of assistant general manager.

In 1904, with his brothers-in-law, Frank D. and M. E. Anderson, he formed Anderson, Clayton & Co., which moved its operations to

Houston in 1917 so that it would have available the facilities of a deepwater port. Mr. Clayton temporarily withdrew from the company in 1918 to become a member of the Committee of Cotton Distribution for the War Industries Board.

In 1961, Mr. Clayton agreed with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in discussion before a Senate-House economic subcommittee, that the United States should make some arrangement with the European Common Market or split the non-Communist world and vastly strengthen the Soviet Union and its allies. "Together," they agreed, "Western Europe and North America can forge a free world economic system which nothing can equal and the power of which nothing can threaten."

With Christian A. Herter, who succeeded John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, Mr. Clayton was named in 1962 as cochairman of a congressionally appointed Citizens Commission on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The creation of a permanent high council and a high court of justice for the nations of the organization were subsequently among the chief recommendations submitted to Congress by the group.

In the same year, Mr. Clayton was one of 21 American business leaders who, in full-page newspaper advertisements, appealed for a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

Until close to the end of his life, Mr. Clayton kept himself in good physical condition. He was a proficient horseman, and he worked regularly with Indian clubs in a home gymnasium. During his years in Washington he customarily walked from his home in Rock Creek Park to the State Department Building.

In 1908, Mr. Clayton married a Kentucky girl, Susan Vaughan. She died in 1960. Four daughters survive.

LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, it is once again my privilege to mark and honor the declaration of Lithuanian Independence Day. This declaration was made 48 years ago, and the great Lithuanian people have never ceased to courageously fight for their freedom. Despite these long years of Communist rule, the Lithuanian people have not lost their strong sense of what liberty means. Their struggle still stands as a symbol to other nations yearning to be free.

After years of subjugation by Russia, and after the German occupation of World War I, the Lithuanian people declared the establishment of an independent Lithuania on February 16, 1918. Russia again moved in by the end of that year, only to discover once again that the Lithuanian people would fight. Because of this, the Soviet Union was forced to recognize Lithuania as a sovereign state in 1920.

But this brief respite was too short lived. In 1940, Soviet troops once again occupied the country and annexed it. And history further repeated itself with another German occupation until 1944. In 1944, Soviet troops again crushed Lithuanian uprisings.

For more than 7 years during and after the war, the Lithuanian people fought for their own country. Thirty thousand Lithuanian people died in this cause, and many more were deported to the Soviet Union only to die in Soviet concentration camps.

The Lithuanian people should never

abandon hope for a truly independent state. We, in the United States, who know what freedom is, commemorate their courage and the principle for which they stand: Freedom and self-determination.

IN SUPPORT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO OVERSEE THE CIA

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the time has come for the Congress to exercise legislative oversight on the intelligence community generally and the CIA in particular in a consistent, formal, continuing, and responsible way. Since the CIA was instituted in 1947 as a part of the National Security Council, the Congress has proscribed itself by statute from checking the activities of the CIA to the extent that Congress normally oversees governmental policy. As a result, the activities of the CIA are monitored by the Congress only in a limited way and this monitoring is done by a number of congressional committees, but mainly in the appropriations process.

Before elaborating on the need for a Joint Congressional Committee on the Central Intelligence Agency as proposed by Senator Young, from Ohio, I should like to review the statutory background and congressional committee responsibility as regard the CIA.

In the National Security Act of 1947, Congress made the Director of the CIA responsible for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." In the CIA Act of 1949, Congress specifically exempted the CIA from existing statutes which required all governmental agencies to publish "the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel" which they employed. The act also forbade the Director of the Budget from issuing the usual reports to Congress.

In 1956, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] moved to establish a joint committee, but his bill was defeated on the floor of the Senate by 59 to 27. Subsequent bills have been introduced, but they have all died in committee. Recognizing the necessity and importance of intelligence activities, Congress has deliberately tied its own hands in an attempt to maintain the security and integrity of the CIA.

Rather than establish a joint committee, Congress has decided to oversee the CIA through a variety of separate committees. There are, at least, six different committees in both Houses of Congress which monitor the CIA to greater and lesser degrees: the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees. None of these committees has the time or the inclination to probe the CIA carefully and deeply, except in cases of sensational events such as the U-2 flights and the Cuban missile crisis.

Most Americans recognize the need for intelligence agencies in a dangerous world; most Americans also recognize the need for security in these matters.

These gentlemen used the petition as a means of making known to Congress their concern over the pending Herlong-Hartke bill (H.R. 8510 and S. 2045).

I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Adams' remarks on this petition, as expressed in a letter to the presidents of both Houses of Congress, be printed at this point in the RECORD in order that Senators may be aware of them.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY,
 January 24, 1966.

Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
 President, U.S. Senate, New Senate Office
 Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: At the national convention of the American Economic Association, held in New York City on December 27-30, 1965, a group of leading economists decided to make known to the Congress its concern and alarm over the pending Herlong-Hartke bill (H.R. 8510 and S. 2045).

The following petition, addressed to you and the Speaker of the House, was circulated informally and initially signed by some 100 members of the association:

"As members of the American Economic Association, we support the liberalization and expansion of international trade and endorse the recent congressional action toward that goal, embodied in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

"By the same token, we oppose such measures as the Herlong-Hartke bill (H.R. 8510 and S. 2045, 89th Cong.) which would erode our national commitment to trade expansion and liberalization. The Herlong-Hartke bill, while intended to prevent unfair import competition, would have the effect of suppressing any import competition. As such, it represents as great a threat to the international trade of the United States as some of the most onerous tariff acts of the Past."

The signatories include Prof. Fritz Machlup (Princeton), the current president of the American Economic Association; Prof. Milton Friedman (Chicago), the president-elect of the association; and the following ex-presidents of the association: Prof. Alvin Hansen (Harvard), Prof. Edward S. Mason (Harvard), Prof. Joseph J. Spengler (Duke), and Prof. George Stocking (Vanderbilt).

The following officers and former officers of the association also signed the petition: Profs. William Baumol (Princeton), Kenneth Boulding (Michigan), Lester V. Chandler (Princeton), Frank W. Fetter (Northwestern), Harry G. Johnson (Chicago), Ben W. Lewis (Oberlin), Richard Musgrave (Harvard), Lloyd G. Reynolds (Yale), and Clair Wilcox (Swarthmore).

The current secretary-treasurer of the association, Prof. Harold F. Williamson (Northwestern), as well as his predecessor in that post from 1936 to 1961, Prof. James Washington Bell (Northwestern), signed the petition.

So also did Profs. Alfred E. Kahn (Cornell) and Oswald H. Brownlee (Minnesota) who are ex-members of the editorial board of the American Economic Review, the Association's publication.

Other distinguished signatories include, inter alia, Dean Richard Lindholm (Oregon), Dean Arthur E. Warner (Tennessee), Dean William S. Devino (Maine), and Professors Jesse Markham (Princeton), Richard Hefebower (Northwestern), Joel B. Dirlam (Rhode Island), M. E. Kreinin (Michigan State), Warren L. Smith (Michigan), Alexander Eckstein (Michigan), Robert F. Lanzillotti (Michigan State), Forest Hill (Texas), John Lettiche (California, Berkeley), Thomas Mayer (California, Davis), Karl

Brunner (UCLA), Samuel M. Loescher (Indiana), Caleb Smith (Brown), Melvin Eggers (Syracuse), Charles M. Tiebout (U. of Washington), Nathan Rosenberg (Purdue), Robert F. Wallace (Montana), and many others.

In view of the enthusiastic response to the informal, initial circulation of this petition, it has been decided to solicit an expression of opinion on a more systematic basis from most of the major universities and colleges in the country. Once this effort is completed, we shall take the liberty of forwarding to you and to the Speaker of the House a complete list of the signatories—in the hope that this might in some small measure contribute to the defeat of the Herlong-Hartke bill which is so utterly incongruous with our national commitment to trade expansion and trade liberalization.

I need not point out that the signatories to the petition are expressing only their own views and do not presume to speak either for the association or the universities with which they are affiliated.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Senator DOUGLAS, a past president of our association, as well as to Senator LONG, chairman of the Finance Committee, and to Congressman MILLIS, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.

Respectfully yours,

WALTER ADAMS,
 Professor of Economics.

DEATH OF WILLIAM L. CLAYTON, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, it was with great sadness that I learned of the passing on February 8 of William L. Clayton, a longtime friend and a man I very much respected.

Will Clayton's quiet but highly effective role in the liberalization of U.S. foreign economic policies at once combined belief in the ideal of economic internationalism with high courage and toughness of mind.

As Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Will Clayton carried on and developed the reciprocal trade policies inaugurated by Cordell Hull. He was one of the chief architects of the postwar foreign economic policy of the United States, and was one of those responsible for the Marshall plan. The policies he stood for continue to serve us well as the guidelines for the step by step and essential liberalization of our trade policies. In the past 20 years, our international trade has expanded from \$18.5 to \$47 billion.

Will Clayton strongly urged the United States to seek a closer relationship with the Common Market as a means to strengthen our ability to meet the growing demands of developing nations and to meet the economic competition caused by the Soviet Union and its allies.

Two years ago, in order to assist the economic development of Latin America, he proposed before the Joint Economic Committee the creation of a Western Hemisphere free trade area limited to raw materials, but also involving free trade in industrial products among Latin American nations within the next 10 years. I have espoused this initiative and I am indebted to Will Clayton for his inspiration.

Will Clayton's life is evidence that the American dream can, and does, still

exist; from a position of stenographer at the age of 16, he rose to leading American businessman as a cotton broker at the age of 63. Clayton combined his skill as a diplomat and his determination as a businessman to serve his country as it created a new and viable means of continuing as world economic leader in the crucial transition period of the postwar years.

It is with regret and a deep sense of loss that I join my fellow Americans in this tribute to Will Clayton.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a Washington Post editorial of February 13 and a New York Times article of February 10 on Mr. Clayton be pointed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WILL CLAYTON

"Economic nationalism," Will Clayton used to say, "just won't mix with political and military internationalism." In his quiet, courtly way, Clayton fought with a ruthless missionary determination for his creed, and it was Clayton as much as anyone who made economic internationalism come alive during the crucial transition period spanning the war and postwar years. He picked up where Cordell Hull left off in the newly created role of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Economic expertise found a place within Foreign Service sanctums for the first time in the heady early days of the Clayton regime at the State Department when the Marshall plan was born. Later, as an elder statesman peering down on Washington from retirement in Houston, he became one of the first to see the interrelationship between trade and aid in the western approach to the developing countries.

The personal charm which gave Will Clayton his special finesse as a negotiator and bureaucrat was a blend of warmth and commanding dignity. His manner and style instantly conveyed the story of the self-made man who could go from a sharecropper's cabin in Mississippi to the cotton brokerage houses of Manhattan and then, at 63, to fulfillment in a new career as one of our exemplary public servants.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 10, 1966]

WILLIAM L. CLAYTON DEAD AT 86; ONCE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE—ROOSEVELT AID WAS FORMER NEW DEAL Foe—FOUNDED GIANT COTTON COMPANY

HOUSTON, February 8.—William Lockhart Clayton, a cofounder of what is believed to be the world's largest cotton company and a former Under Secretary of State, died of a heart attack in Methodist Hospital here Tuesday afternoon. The tall, stooped, white-haired, 86-year-old Mississippian died at 4 p.m. after he was stricken in his Houston home.

STARTED AS STENOGRAPHER

Will Clayton, who became stenographer to a cotton broker at 16 and an economic diplomat at 63, was a cofounder in 1904 of Anderson, Clayton & Co., at Oklahoma City. The firm today buys and sells a large part of the country's cotton crop and operates cotton-producing and marketing subsidiaries in Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, and Egypt.

It was estimated a few years ago that, with his family, Mr. Clayton held over 40 percent of the \$50 million capital, surplus, and undivided profits of the cotton company.

Mr. Clayton retired from administrative duties for the cotton company in 1951 but remained a director and worked in his Houston office 6 days a week.

We in Congress also appreciate the fine job now being done with the CIA by the various congressional committees. But there is a need for line authority and responsibility in exercising the legislative oversight function of the Congress. The joint committee proposed by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Young] seems to fit the bill, for the following reasons:

First. Intelligence gathering is a major operation in foreign policy and national security affairs, involving the expenditure of vast amount of funds.

Second. Intelligence agencies sometimes find themselves making policy rather than simply executing it. This sometimes occurs without conscious design on the part of the intelligence agency either because policy directives from above do not exist in certain areas or because the CIA has people on the scene when the action happens who are not responsible to the local ambassadors. By force of circumstance, then, the work of the CIA sometimes in effect creates the policy where the President has not acted or even had a chance to act. There must be accountability to Congress for these on-the-spot decisions.

Third. The intelligence field is broad and complicated. Congress needs expertise on these matters, and the staff of the joint committee would be a step in that direction.

Congress has demonstrated restraint and reliability in past cooperation with the executive branch in respect of intelligence. The Joint Atomic Energy Committee is a good example of this: There is little reason for the executive branch to fear that Congress through the joint committee would now abuse this privilege. Congress has the responsibility to exercise legislative oversight over future intelligence operations and activities on a closer, continuing, and formal basis. For these reasons, I join with the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Young] in cosponsoring S. 2815, a bill to establish a Joint Committee on the Central Intelligence Agency.

PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN ASSEMBLY

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I invite the attention of Senators to a forthcoming meeting in the Philippines which will have significant effect on our relations with the Philippines. Philippine-American friendship from time to time is taken for granted, or even overlooked. This relationship, forged before Philippine independence, has survived a war and has been strengthened through the years. I do not mean to suggest that there have been no irritants in our relationship, nor that there are none now. Innumerable differences have arisen which could have weakened the bonds between our two countries. Nevertheless, the benefits of the friendship and the mutuality of interest have caused us to work just a little harder to resolve these disagreements before they reached the danger point.

There are probably many explanations for the strong bonds of friendship that exist between our two peoples—so unlike each other in culture, history, and temperament. They are all probably

correct. How they were forged is not so important as how they are kept strong. Filipinos and Americans, both, have continued this friendship on the government level, through the trade that flows between our two countries, and in the cultural exchange that draws us closer together. We all owe a debt of gratitude to these people, for without their determination, the traditional ties might have weakened.

Less than 3 years ago, prominent citizens of both countries established the American-Philippine Society, a nonprofit and nonpolitical organization devoted to clarifying and elevating United States-Philippine understanding.

The first honorary chairman of the society was Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Mr. MacArthur has succeeded her husband and shares his desire to perpetuate the good will between the two countries. Other prominent Americans and Filipinos—Howard Cullman, chairman of the New York Port Authority; George S. Moore, president of the First National City Bank; Miss Helena Benitez, Philippine educator and diplomat; and Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Education, are among the society's officers.

The society was organized for the purpose of promoting intercultural relations between the peoples of the two nations through the mutual exchange of persons, groups, exhibits, and publications and through the presentation of lectures, forums, and similar media with respect to education and the humanities; namely, music, dance, language, and other art forms. It also seeks the clarification and elevation of United States-Philippine understanding through conferences by leaders of both countries.

The society's first major project is such a conference on the future of United States-Philippine relations soon to take place in Davao, in the Philippines, on February 23 to 26. The conference will be under the direction of the American Assembly, an affiliate of Columbia University established in 1950 by Dwight D. Eisenhower when he was president of the university.

The assembly at Davao, the first binational meeting of its kind under the American Assembly, will bring together a group of distinguished Filipinos and Americans to discuss social, political, military, and economic ties between the two countries.

In small discussion groups these Filipino and American representatives of government, industry, finance, labor, the humanities, science, and the press will consider the full range of problems of United States-Philippine relations. They will hear formal addresses by three persons of stature. On the fourth day, in plenary session, the participants will draw upon their own experiences and knowledge to review a final report of conclusions and recommendations for the improvement of Philippine and United States relations. As is the practice for these assemblies, the statement will be issued immediately to the press and then printed for distribution in both nations. It is expected that this consideration of questions such as military bases and mutual security, foreign policy, and the

Laurel-Langley agreement will be repeated in subsequent regional assemblies in both nations.

I hope that their conclusions and recommendations will receive the most serious consideration by both our governments. We would be negligent if we did not listen to this distinguished group of Filipinos and Americans. I shall await their report eagerly and hope that my colleagues in these Chambers and in the Philippine Congress will accept the report as the judgments of responsible men seeking to perpetuate a friendship which has been mutually advantageous. I also hope that by giving this dialog the importance it deserves, we will encourage the organizations of other binational assemblies.

RESOLUTION RELATING TO PURCHASE OF SURPLUS OR USED EQUIPMENT

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the Record three resolutions adopted by the three counties of Delaware, Ontario, and Essex, in my State, dealing with the purchase of surplus or used equipment.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. Briggs offered the following resolution and moved its adoption:

"RESOLUTION No. 24—RESOLUTION RELATING TO PURCHASE OF SURPLUS OR USED EQUIPMENT

"Whereas counties and towns frequently have need for certain types of machinery and equipment, the use of which will be for a limited time and surplus machinery and equipment or used machinery and equipment would be adequate and the ability of a county or town to purchase at reduced prices would result in considerable savings to taxpayers; and

"Whereas the State finance law permits the office of general services to sell surplus, obsolete, or used machinery and equipment and it has been the experience that much of such machinery and equipment is sold to dealers who then offer the same items for sale to counties and towns at a large increase in price; and

"Whereas the Federal Government from time to time disposes of surplus machinery and equipment and about the only way a municipality is permitted to make purchase of particular items is through the local office of civil defense; and

"Whereas it is the consensus of opinion of this board that such surplus, obsolete, or used machinery and equipment should be made available to counties, towns, cities, and villages at a fair price before being sold to dealers: Be it

"Resolved, That the board of supervisors of the county of Delaware hereby urges the legislature to amend the State finance law, the general municipal law and other applicable statutes to require the several departments of the State having surplus, obsolete or used machinery and equipment for sale to prepare an inventory of the major items, such as trucks, power shovels, bulldozers, cranes, and other highway equipment, and the price established for each item, and that copies of such inventories be furnished to each county, town, city, and village and that such municipalities be given a limited time in which to purchase such items at the price indicated on the inventory and

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that any items not sold to municipalities be and he hereby is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the Supervisors' Association, Association of Towns, the County Officers Association, county superintendent of Highways Association, Town Highway Superintendents Association, Senator Niles, Assemblyman Mason, Congressman Dow, Senator JAVITS, and Senator KENNEDY."

The resolution was seconded by Mr. Eckhardt and adopted by the following vote: Ayes, 19; Noes, 0.

I, Edward McCandlish, clerk of the Board of Supervisors of Delaware County, do hereby certify that the above is a true copy of a resolution passed by the board of supervisors at regular meeting held February 2, 1966.

EDWARD McCANDLISH,
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors.

RESOLUTION 43—PURCHASE OF SURPLUS OR USED EQUIPMENT

Whereas counties and towns of New York State frequently have need for certain types of machinery and equipment, the use of which will be for a limited time, and surplus machinery and equipment, or used machinery and equipment, would be adequate, and the ability of a county or town to purchase such machinery and equipment at reduced prices would result in considerable saving to taxpayers; and

Whereas the State finance law permits the Office of General Services to sell surplus, obsolete, or used machinery and equipment; and it has been the experience that much of such machinery and equipment is sold to dealers, who then offer much of such machinery for sale to counties and towns at a large increase in price; and

Whereas the Federal Government from time to time disposes of surplus machinery and equipment, and about the only way a municipality is permitted to make purchase of such particular items is through the local office of civil defense; and

Whereas it is the consensus of this board that such surplus, obsolete, or used machinery and equipment should be made available to counties, towns, cities, and villages at a fair price before being sold to dealers: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the board of supervisors of the county of Ontario hereby urges the State legislature to pass legislation to require the several departments of the State having surplus, obsolete, or used machinery and equipment for sale, to prepare an inventory of the major items, such as trucks, power shovels, bulldozers, cranes, and other highway equipment, with prices established for the items, that copies of such inventories be furnished to each county, town, city, and village, that such municipalities be given a limited time in which to purchase such items at the prices indicated on the inventory, and that any items not sold to municipalities then be sold at public sale; and be it further

Resolved, That the U.S. Congress be urged to enact legislation which will permit municipalities of the United States to purchase surplus, obsolete, or used machinery and equipment at appraised value before the same are sold to the public; and be it further

Resolved, That the clerk of this board be, and she hereby is, directed to transmit certified copies of this resolution to the senator and assemblyman representing Ontario County in the State legislature and the U.S. Congressman and the U.S. Senators repre-

sending the people of Ontario County, and all other county boards of supervisors of the State of New York, to the supervisors' association, the association of towns, the county officers' association, the county superintendent of highways' association, and the town highway superintendents' association.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of Ontario.

I do hereby certify that I have compared the preceding with the original thereof, on file in the office of the clerk of the board of supervisors at Canandaigua, N.Y., and that the same is a correct transcript therefrom and of the whole of said original; and that said original was duly adopted at a meeting of the board of supervisors of Ontario County held at Canandaigua, N.Y., on the 27th day of January 1966.

Given under my hand and official seal at Canandaigua, in said county, this 2d day of February 1966.

RUTH G. KAVENY,
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors of
Ontario County, N.Y.

RESOLUTION RE PURCHASE OF SURPLUS OR USED EQUIPMENT

Whereas counties and towns frequently have need for certain types of machinery and equipment, the use of which will be used for a limited time and surplus machinery and equipment would be adequate and the ability of a county or town to purchase at reduced prices would result in considerable savings to taxpayers, and

Whereas the State finance law permits the office of general services to sell surplus, obsolete or used machinery and equipment and it has been the experience that much of such machinery and equipment is sold to dealers who then offer the same items for sale to counties and towns at a large increase in price, and

Whereas the Federal Government from time to time dispose of surplus machinery and equipment and about the only way a municipality is permitted to make purchase of particular items is through the local office of civil defense, and

Whereas it is the consensus of opinion of this board that such surplus, obsolete or used machinery and equipment should be made available to counties, towns, cities, and villages at a fair price before being sold to dealers: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the board of supervisors of the county of Essex hereby urges the legislature to amend the State finance law, the general municipal law and other applicable statutes to require the several departments of the State having surplus, obsolete of used machinery and equipment for sale to prepare an inventory of the major items, such as truck, power shovels, bulldozers, cranes, and other highway equipment, and the price established for each item, and that copies of such inventories be furnished to each county, town, city, and village and that such municipalities be given a limited time in which to purchase such items at the price indicated on the inventory and that any items not sold to municipalities then be sold at public sale; and be it further

Resolved, That Congress be urged to enact legislation which will permit municipalities to purchase surplus, obsolete or used machinery and equipment at appraised value before the same are sold to the public; and be it further

Resolved, That the clerk of this board of supervisors be and he hereby is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the Supervisors' Association, Association of Towns, the County Officers Association, County Superintendent of Highways Association, Town Highway Superintendents Association, Senator Ronald B. Stafford, and Assemblyman Richard Bartlett, Congress-

man CARLETON J. KING, Senator JACOB JAVITS, Senator ROBERT KENNEDY, and all other county boards of supervisors of the State of New York.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of Essex, ss:

I, Zelma A. Cook, clerk of Essex County Board of Supervisors, do hereby certify that I have compared the foregoing copy with the original resolution filed in this office on the 1st day of February 1966, and that it is a correct and true copy thereof.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal this 4th day of February 1966.

ZELMA A. COOK,
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors of
Essex County.

DEATH OF ALEXANDER "CASEY" JONES, INFLUENTIAL AND FIERY EDITOR

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to the death of Alexander "Casey" Jones, an influential and what the press calls, a fiery editor of one of the leading newspapers in the State of New York, the Syracuse Herald-Journal.

Mr. President, Casey was a great reporter and a great newspaperman and a man greatly responsible—through his hard-hitting editorials—for much that is good and true in the politics and public policy of our State.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD two obituary notices on Mr. Jones.

There being no objection, the obituaries were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune]
ALEXANDER "CASEY" JONES, INFLUENTIAL, FIERY EDITOR

ORLANDO, FLA.—Alexander F. Jones, 74, former president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, died here yesterday, apparently of a heart attack.

Former managing editor of the Washington Post, Mr. Jones once fought the admission of Tass (the Soviet news agency) representatives to the Senate press gallery on the grounds that they were not newsmen, but government representatives.

Later in his career, he successfully fought an order by President Truman that put severe curbs on information made available by Federal departments. He urged the Nation's newspaper editors to investigate the possibility of Federal legislation that would break down governmental news barriers.

Mr. Jones, who retired after 53 years in the newspaper business last April, became executive editor of the Syracuse Herald-Journal in 1950.

Surviving are his wife, Edna, two sons, and a daughter.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post]
ALEXANDER JONES RITES SET AT ARLINGTON MONDAY
(By Edward T. Follard)

Alexander F. (Casey) Jones, managing editor of the Washington Post from 1935 to 1947 and executive editor of the Syracuse Herald-Journal and Herald-American from 1950 to 1965, will be buried in Arlington Cemetery at 10 a.m. Monday.

Jones, one of the most colorful figures in American journalism, died after a heart attack Tuesday night in the Florida Sanitarium and Hospital in Orlando, Fla. He was 74.