Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

terest that might arise if the same physician were to treat both a potential donor and a potential recipient of a transplantable organ.[9] On the other hand, they recognized the importance of maintaining adequate channels of communication between physicians caring for the donor and those administering to the recipient. Consequently, the Act provides that "the time of death shall be determined by a physician who attends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death. This physician shall not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part" (Section 7[b]).

UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS

As the above analysis demonstrates, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act represents a sensitive and successful solution to many of the existing legal restrictions related to the donation and procurement of human organs and tissue for medical research and therapy. At the same time, it respects other relevant and important interests in a dead body, such as the wishes of the next of kin for funeral services and the need of society to determine the cause of death under certain circumstances. The Commissioners wisely chose not to legislate certain additional questions that are more properly within the province of medicine, ethics and other disciplines or better dealt with by the individual states. Included here are the criteria for selection of donors and recipients, the determination of time of death, the need for quality control in tissue banking and state transportation requirements that may unnecessarily inhibit the transfer of a body across state lines.[2]

The proper role of the medical examiner or coroner has raised considerable controversy and deserves special mention. Although the medical examiner could be an ideal person to authorize the procurement of organs or tissue from victims of fatal accidents or other cases over which he has jurisdiction, his authority under most statutes is limited to performing an autopsy, and this does not include the donation of organs and tissue for transplantation or medical research.[10] Consequently, such a donation made by a medical examiner without consent from the next of kin might be successfully challenged. Although Virginia[11] has recently joined California[12] and Hawaii[13] in extending medical-examiner authority in the transplant setting, strong criticisms have been expressed in Virginia, and it is far from clear that the climate for this extension is favorable elsewhere. As a gift statute, the Commissioners properly limited the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to the voluntary donation of tissue.[2] The medical-examiner question calls for separate study. The Act specifies that its provisions are subject to the autopsy laws of each state. Thus, it respects existing medical-examiner powers and duties and recognizes the need for tissue for examination in certain specified circumstances (Section 7[d]).

In 1968 donation statutes based on the second tentative draft of the Act were passed in Kansas, Maryland, Louisiana and California. It is virtually unprecedented for a state to enact a uniform act before it is finally approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In addition, the following states have already passed new donation legislation based on the Act this year: Arkansas, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Idaho and North Dakota. This response demonstrates the great need for and acceptability of this reform legislation.

At a meeting of members of the medical and scientific community held on September 30, 1968, sponsored by the National Research Council, there was enthusiastic support for the Act by the representatives of the 35 states who attended. The Act has also received the support of numerous medical groups, including the American Medical Association, the American Heart Association, the National Kidney Foundation, the Eye Banks Association of America, the National Pituitary Agency, the Committee on Tissue Transplantation of the National Research Council,[14] the Fifth Bethesda Conference sponsored by the American College of Cardiology,[15] the Public Affairs Committee of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology and others.[16] In the light of such broad-based legal and medical endorsement, and in the absence of any sizable opposition, prospects for widespread enactment of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act are excellent.

CURRENT MEDICAL AND RELATED IMPEDIMENTS TO WIDESPREAD TRANSPLANTATION

Legal reform in this area must be carried out with an awareness of developments in medicine and related fields that determine the availability of vital organs for all who could possibly benefit from them. A central issue in much of the discussion has been the question of when death occurs. There is a clear need to revise criteria for a definition of death in the light of the widespread availability of methods to support cardiac and respiratory function artificially.

Criteria based on neurologic findings measured clinically and by the electroencephalogram have been proposed by several groups. An ad hoc committee of the Harvard Medical School to examine the definition of brain death has recently issued a definition of irreversible coma. The following criteria were proposed as defining a permanently non-functioning brain: unreceptivity and unresponsiveness to externally applied stimuli and inner need; no spontaneous muscular movement or spontaneous breathing; no reflexes; flat electroencephalogram (all repeated at least 24 hours later with no change).[17] The presence of hypothermia or central-nervous-system depressants invalidates these criteria.

Acceptance of declaration of death based on such neurologic criteria will improve the ability of physicians to maintain whole-organ perfusion after death. As was stated at the Fifth Bethesda Conference of the American College of Cardiology, such a declaration "recognizes that a person can, by a physician with sound medical judgment and with moral and ethical justification, be declared dead while the parenchymatous cellular functions of many organs continue and while the heart may maintain a pulsatile flow."[15]

In addition, improved whole-organ preservation will enable many organs that are now lost through rapid degeneration to be used for transplantation. Adequate tissue matching and donor and recipient selection are also important determinants to successful transplantation. Proper matching requires a large regional or even nationwide pool of recipients.[18] The question of the logistics needed to effectuate such a national program are formidable. Furthermore, the problems of providing enough trained transplant terms and facilities and of meeting the cost of this very expensive mode of therapy prevents the widespread use of this therapeutic method. Even a plethora of cadaver kidneys and hearts will not solve these many difficult problems.

Increased governmental financial support for all aspects of transplantation will come only after successful competition with other important public needs. Decisions regarding overall priorities for public funds inevitably become involved in the political process and therefore are very responsive to public attitudes. Public attitudes regarding donation of organs for transplantation are favorable. A Gallup poll taken on January 17, 1968, stated that seven persons in every 10, or a projected 80,000,000 Americans, indicate they would be willing to have their heart or other vital organs donated to medical science after death.[19] This poll did not, however, seek the public opinion about bearing the extraordinarily large costs from the public treasury.

The above discussion demonstrates the many obstacles to the widespread application of organ transplantation. Any proposal for responsible legal reform in this area must take cognizance of these problems.

AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL—TO ELIMINATE CONSENT

An alternative approach to streamlining consent procedures has been proposed by Dukeminier and Sanders,[20] who suggest that the principles of consent and voluntary donation should be discarded in favor of allowing tissue removed by a physician without his having to give notice to anyone. They propose that a surgeon should be allowed to remove cadaver organs "routinely . . . unless there were some objection entered before removal. The burden of action would be on the person who did not want the organs removed to enter his objection."[20] Under this system, the donor could object during life to the taking of his organs after death. The next of kin could also object to the use of a deceased's organs before removal, provided that the deceased did not specifically authorize donation.

The question, as they see it, is where the burden of action should rest: with the surgeon to obtain consent, or with the next of kin to object. They believe that only by shifting the burden to the next of kin will an adequate quantity of organs be obtained.

This argument is dubious for several reasons. The first is that, in the system proposed, the burden actually remains with the responsible surgeon to assure himself that no objection has been raised either by the deceased himself before death or by the next of kin after death. To absolve himself of this burden adequately would require an inquiry tantamount to obtaining consent itself.

Moreover, it is certain that there are some people who would object to tissue use on religious grounds (as recognized by Dukeminier and Sanders)[20] or because of other beliefs. Such people, if not immediately available at the time of death of a relative, might object strongly and vigorously after the fact. They could forcefully argue that, because they did not know of the demise of their next of kin, they could not exercise their authority to enter an objection to tissue removal. Any system based on this premise would need to include a method of registering objection in a manner to make this information readily available to the interested surgeon. Otherwise, grave constitutional questions, such as the abridgement of religious freedom or the denial of due process, could invalidate the system. Yet the authors describe no such mechanism for recording. To create a registry of objections that would be comprehensive enough to cover all situations would be considerably more cumbersome than the simplified consent procedures specified in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.

Dukeminier and Sanders[20] assert that the "bereaved survivors usually do not want to know what has happened to the body of the deceased in the hospital" and to ask a relative of someone who is about to die "for the kidneys may seem a ghoulish request." We submit that current medical practice strongly shows that this kind of request is usually not offensive when properly presented and the need sensitivity raised. Many people regard such a donation as an opportunity to look beyond their loss and to help someone who may be near death.[2] To obtain permission for the removal of an organ is hardly "ghoulish"—it shows respect for the wishes and rights of others involved. Not to be told of such a removal or to be informed only after the fact would be "ghoulish" indeed.

Footnotes at end of article.

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

As further support for their argument of telling nothing to the next of kin, they cite an example of a detailed description of autopsy procedures or embalming technics as being the usual practice in obtaining permission for autopsy.[20] These authors confuse the obtaining of adequate "informed consent" for such procedures with a detailed technical explanation of them. One asks for an autopsy but does not describe the fine points of the procedure in intimate detail. Similarly, one asks for permission to remove an organ for transplantation without enumerating every nuance of surgical technic. Properly informed consent is admittedly difficult to define, but a discussion of it must be based on currently accepted medical practice.

Their only reference to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act occurs in connection with the concept of a wallet-sized donation card, which they dismiss with the question: "Yet is not there something macabre about a society where people walk around with little cards saying they have donated their organs on death to so-and-so?"[20] It is impossible to reconcile such an assertion with current reality. As stated earlier, it has been estimated that seven out of 10 (or approximately 80,000,000) Americans would be willing to donate all or parts of their bodies for medical purposes. With attitudes of the public so clearly favorable to donation, it is difficult to justify taking the decision-making authority away from them.

In a subsequent letter to this *Journal*, Dukeminier and Sanders[21] equate long waiting lists for kidney transplants with defects in statutory law. As discussed above, there are many factors that determine the availability of kidneys or other vital organs for transplantation for all who could possibly benefit from them. To reason that because there are many who need a kidney transplant indicates that it is necessary to eliminate the principles of consent and voluntary donation, demonstrates a lack of appreciation for these other determinants.

They also suggest in the same letter that "experience with other donation statutes indicates that the prior-consent approach will not produce the number of organs needed for transplantation."[21] But experience with previous donation legislation has little to tell us about the potential success of the Uniform Act. Current legislation is admittedly inadequate and addresses itself to only a portion of the questions handled by the Act. The streamlined consent procedures designed for the next of kin, coupled with modern criteria for determining the moment of death, provide a framework for expeditious donation that did not exist before.

In contrast to the above proposal, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act represents a balanced approach that recognizes the many and conflicting interests and concerns relevant to the transplant setting. The needs of medical science are not relegated to second place. Instead, responsible legal measures have been taken to encourage the successful progress of transplantation and thereby to save human life. Future advances in medical science will raise many issues to be considered by other disciplines. The challenge for the law will be, as it has been here, to respond in a manner that will permit legitimate accomplishments without compromising the sensitivities and rights of other affected parties.

FOOTNOTES

1 Sadler, A. M., Jr., Sadler, B. L., and Stason, E. B. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act: model for reform. *J.A.M.A.* 206:2501–2506, 1968.

2 Sadler, A. M., Jr., and Sadler, B. L. Transplantation and law: need for organized sensitivity. *Georgetown Law J.* 57:5–54, 1968.

3 Stevenson, R. E., et al. Medical aspects of tissue transplantation. In *Report to the Commitee on Tissue Transplantation of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council from the Ad Hoc Committee on Medical-Legal Problems.* Pp. 1–43, 1968. P. 3.

4 Stason, E. B. Role of law in medical progress. *Law & Contemp. Prob.* 32:563–596, 1967.

5 Stickel, D. L. Ethical and moral aspects of transplantation. *Monogr. in Surg. Sc.* 3:267–301, 1966.

6 Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 113 § 7 (Supp. 1967).

7 Zukoski, C. F. Personal communication.

8 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 32–601 (Supp. 1967).

9 Stickel, D. L. Organ transplantation in medical and legal perspectives. *Law & Contemp. Prob.* 32:597–619, 1967.

10 Stevenson et al.[3] Pp. 4–6.

11 Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.1–46.1 (Add. Supp. 1968).

12 Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 7133 (West 1955).

13 No. 188, § 2, 1967 Hawaii Sess. Laws 183, *amending* Hawaii Rev. Laws § 260–14 (1955).

14 Stevenson et al.[3] P. 19.

15 Moore, F. D., et al. Cardiac and other organ transplantation in setting of transplant science as national effort. *Am. J. Cardiol.* 22:896–912, 1968. (Also, *J.A.M.A.* 206:2489–2500, 1968).

16 Curran, W. J. Law-Medicine notes: Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. *New Eng. J. Med.* 280:36, 1969.

17 Definition of irreversible coma: report of Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine Definition of Brain Death. *J.A.M.A.* 205:337–340, 1968.

18 Terasaki, P. I., Mickey, M. R., Singal, D. R. Mittal, K. M., and Patel, R. Serotyping for homotransplantation—XX. Selection of recipients for cadaver donor transplants. *New Eng. J. Med.* 279:1101–1103, 1968.

19 *New York Times,* December 4, 1967. § A, p. 1.

20 Dukeminier, J., Jr., and Sanders, D. Organ transplantation: proposal for routine salvaging of cadaver organs. *New Eng. J. Med.* 279:413–419, 1968.

21 *Idem.* Salvage of cadaver organs. *New Eng. J. Med.* 279:1117, 1968.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 157—INTRODUCTION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING A COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on May 22, 1968, I made a statement on the floor of the Senate in which I said that I believed that the time had come for a thorough, realistic, and objective examination of the operation, in the United States and abroad, of the Foreign Service, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency. I suggested that such an examination should be conducted by a blue ribbon Presidential Commission composed of people who have had broad, relevant experience and whose only interest would be in seeing that the United States has the best possible organization to conduct its foreign relations. I introduced a joint resolution, subsequently entitled Senate Joint Resolution 173, which provided for the establishment of such a commission to be composed of 12 members—two from the Senate, two from the House of Representatives, and eight to be appointed by the President. I said at the time that I did not intend to press the resolution to a vote because I did not believe that the appointement of such a commission should be one of the last acts of an outgoing administration. I added that I believed that the appointment of such commission should, however, be one of the first acts of a new administration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the statement I made on May 22, 1968, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would like to note that since making that statement a year and a half ago, I have noticed a number of articles in the press and in journals which lead me to believe that there may, in fact, be even greater need for the kind of study I proposed. Writing in the Nation on February 3 of this year, Smith Simpson, author of "Anatomy of the State Department," wrote:

> I have known the State Department and its Foreign Service for some forty years and never have I seen them in such a shambles.

Mr. Smith went on to observe:

> A part of the crisis which the diplomatic agency presents to Mr. Nixon arises from its astonishing failure to redefine diplomacy itself in up-to-date terms, so that it might have a clear idea of the kind of people it should be recruiting, the kinds of education and training it should be providing its officers, the criteria it should be following for assignments and promotions, the blend of policy, diplomacy and management it should be developing—all to effect a widespread improvement in our international performance . . .
>
> In such an "anti-organization" department, morale is deplorable. In forty years of observation, I have never known State Department morale to be good, but it is now the worst that I have ever seen it . . .
>
> Morale affects performance; so also do attitudes. They subtly penetrate and influence every view, every decision, every approach to a decision. They are the unspoken premises which cause men to assume they know things they do not know, understand situations they do not understand, are "managing crises" when they are only tinkering with them, disposing of problems when they are only postponing them to reappear in more aggravated form. . . .
>
> An extraordinary cynicism pervades the diplomatic establishment. Even its liberals found themselves welcoming the outcome of the Presidential election. "Nothing could possibly be worse," they said; "a change—any change—just might bring relief." They did not remember that this same hope was engendered in 1932, 1952 and 1960, and gave way to souring frustration. It is not merely change that is needed—it is reform: organizational reform, procedural reform, attitudinal reform, educational and training reform, conceptual reform. That is what confronts Mr. Nixon as he prepares for his seventh crisis.

In the spring 1969 issue of the Virginia Quarterly Review, Charles Maechling, in an article entitled "Our Foreign Affairs Establishment: The Need for Reform," said:

> The foreign affairs establishment cannot be streamlined or invigorated by half-measures confined to the State Department. Individual changes in the Department's organization, personnel system, training programs, and programming methods are going to yield only minimal and probably undiscernible results in terms of improved policy performance unless the Department's role is re-examined within the context of the whole foreign affairs field and especially the mis-

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

sions of other agencies—Defense, CIA, USIA, AID, and Treasury.

I am well aware of the fact that a group of "Young Turks" in the Foreign Service has been seeking to achieve reform from within the State Department. I gather that they feel somewhat frustrated in these efforts which does not surprise me for, as I said a year and a half ago:

I am convinced that those in the executive branch departments and agencies concerned—either the top non-career level in these departments and agencies or the administrative specialists with vested interests in the results to whom such a task ends up being delegated—cannot alone institute the needed reforms.

I said then, and I still believe, that a view from the outside is also needed—a broad and objective view, unencumbered by political considerations or by the obligations that executive branch officers have toward the interests of the particular department or agency in which they serve.

In this connection, I noticed an article, on the front page of the New York Times on August 28, which reported that the "Young Turks" were "showing some impatience with the Nixon administration's pace on reforming the service." The article then went on to report, according to sources in the Foreign Service, that many junior and middle grade were dissatisfied with their lack of responsibility, with promotion policies and with the assignments which they received, and that there had been a large and increasing number of resignations from the Foreign Service.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the above article from the New York Times, the texts of the articles by Mr. Simpson and Mr. Maechling from which I have quoted, and the text of an article by William A. Bell which appeared in the Washington Monthly in July, entitled "The Cost of Cowardice: Silence in The Foreign Service," also be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not only do outside observers and critics argue that there is acute need for organizational reform. Many in the Foreign Service share this view. I was struck by several remarks made by Idar Rimestad, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration since February 1967, at an appearance before the Committee on Foreign Relations earlier this session. The occasion for the hearing was the President's nomination of Mr. Rimestad to an ambassadorial position. But in the course of the hearing, while discussing Mr. Rimestad's previous service in the State Department's top administrative position, I asked him about the recommendations by the "Young Turks" in the Foreign Service. In response, among other things, he told the committee that under 20 percent of the personnel in our large Embassies are from the State Department and pointed to one case in which that figure was 8 percent. The others are from other Government agencies. Mr. Rimestad went on to note that as the size of foreign missions are reduced, the State Department's role is further diminished and that over the years the State Department has "lost a great deal of momentum in the foreign affairs area." He concluded:

Something is in order, whether it is—as you suggested—a Plowden report . . . to take a look at our foreign establishment to see where this direction should come from.

The point made by Mr. Rimestad provides another, and I believe most important, argument in favor of an examination of the kind I have proposed.

Thus, for the reasons set forth in my statement of May 22, 1968, and in my statement today, I hereby introduce a joint resolution, identical to Senate Joint Resolution 173, 90th Congress, second session, which would establish a Commission on Organizational Reforms in the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency. I intend to urge the Committee on Foreign Relations to adopt this resolution, and I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the text of the joint resolution will be printed in the RECORD.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 157), to establish a Commission on Organizational Reforms in the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency, introduced by Mr. FULBRIGHT, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 157

Whereas there is an obvious need to insure that the United States conducts all aspects of its foreign relations in the most effective possible manner; and

Whereas toward this end, it is appropriate to provide for an independent study of the present operation and organization of the Department of State, including the Foreign Service, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency with a view to determining and proposing needed institutional reforms: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby created a commission to be known as the Commission on Organizational Reforms in the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"). It shall be the duty of the Commission to make a comprehensive study in the United States and abroad and to report to the President and to the Congress on needed organizational reforms in the Department of State, including the Foreign Service, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency, with a view to determining the most efficient and effective means for the administration and operation of the United States programs and activities in the field of foreign relations.

SEC. 2. The Commission shall consist of twelve members, as follows:

(1) Two members of the Commission, to be appointed by the President of the Senate, who shall be Members of the Senate, of whom at least one shall be a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(2) Two members of the Commission, to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall be Members of the House of Representatives, of whom at least one shall be a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(3) Eight members of the Commission, to be appointed by the President, who shall not be individuals presently serving in any capacity in any branch of the Federal Government other than in an advisory capacity.

SEC. 3. The President shall also appoint the Chairman of the Commission from among the members he appoints to the Commission. The Commission shall elect a Vice Chairman from among its members.

SEC. 4. No member of the Commission shall receive compensation for his service on the Commission, but each shall be reimbursed for his travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred in carrying out his duties as a member of the Commission.

SEC. 5. (a) The Commission shall have power to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable, in accordance with the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.

(b) The Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized for the departments by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed $100 a day for individuals.

SEC. 6. (a) The Commission shall conduct its study in the United States and abroad and shall report to the President and to the Congress not later than eighteen months after its appointment upon the results of its study, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

(b) Upon the submission of its report under subsection (a) of this section, the Commission shall cease to exist.

SEC. 7. The Commission is authorized to secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purpose of this Commission, office, establishment, or instrumentality and shall furnish such information, suggestions, estimates and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by the Chairman or Vice Chairman.

SEC. 8. There is authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $500,000 to carry out this joint resolution.

EXHIBIT 1

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 173—INTRODUCTION OF JOINT RESOLUTION RELATING TO CONDUCTING FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President—

"Foreign policy will be dynamic or inert, steadfast or aimless, in proportion to the character and unity of those who serve it."

So began the report of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel published in June 1954. The report, entitled "Toward a Stronger Foreign Service"[1] but known popularly as the Wriston report, after the name of the chairman of the committee, continued by saying several paragraphs later:

"The internal morale of a Government institution and public confidence in that institution are inseparable parts of an organic process. The one replenishes or depletes the other."

Footnotes at end of article.

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

How is the internal more and unity of those who serve our foreign policy today—14 years after the Wriston report, 22 years after the Foreign Service Act of 1946, which revised and modernized the Foreign Service, and 44 years after the Rogers Act of 1924, which first established a permanent career Foreign Service? Is the Foreign Service vigorous, inventive, and unified, willing and able to produce a dynamic and steadfast foreign policy? Do the men and women in the Department of State meet the formula of Lord Strang, former Permanent Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, for Foreign Office effectiveness which is to be "on their toes and happy to be on their toes"?[2] And what of those in the other Government agencies who also serve our foreign policy?

From everything I have heard and read and seen, I have regretfully concluded that the internal morale in the Foreign Service and the Department of State, as well as in the Agency for International Development and in the U.S. Information Agency, is poor. As the Wriston report has pointed out, it follows that there is, or will soon be, less public confidence in these institutions. For a country as rich in human resources as the United States, facing the enormous problems in the field of foreign relations that this country faces, I suggest that this is not only an undesirable but an intolerable state of affairs.

On what do I base my contention that morale is low and that the effectiveness of the institutions involved is therefore impaired? Proof is readily available not only in what the members of the institutions themselves say privately but also in what they say publicly. For example, the February issue of the Foreign Service Journal contained an article entitled "Is the Foreign Service Losing Its Best Young Officers?" Summarizing the results of a survey of recently resigned junior officers, the article observed that the typical resignee:

". . . leaves the service primarily because he feel that his work has not been sufficiently challenging and he has seen little to reassure him regarding his future prospects . . . he feels that his present job provides him with greater challenge than he would have had had he remained in the Foreign Service."

A tabulation in the article, showing the reasons these officers left the Foreign Service, indicates that the principal factors were dissatisfaction with the personnel system, a lack of anticipated challenge, dim prospects for responsibility and general frustration with the bureaucracy. The least important reasons, mentioned in only a few cases and never as a primary reason, were low pay, dissatisfaction with supervisors and a slow rate of promotion.

Undoubtedly this is the sort of feeling that led a Foreign Service association "spokesman" to tell a New York Times reporter last September that the election of a write-in ticket to control of the association "reflected a general mood of grievance and concern, a sense of frustration and malaise about the state of morale at the State Department and among career officers at the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency."[3] Even Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, whose interest in the problems of the Foreign Service has been commendable and whose influence has been salutary, has referred, in a public speech, to some of the concern and frustration in the Foreign Service, the kind of acknowledgment of personnel problems that rarely comes from the higher reaches of any Government department. In addressing the Foreign Service Day Conference at the Department of State on November 2, 1967, Mr. Katzenbach said that able younger men in the Foreign Service "complain that their talents are underutilized," and the Under Secretary went on to admit that, while such complaints might be exaggerated "the underutilization of a talented body of men is paradoxical, harmful, and even tragic."

One of the most distinguished alumni of the Foreign Service, when asked recently on a national television program whether he would advise a young man to go into the Foreign Service today, replied:

If he was ambitious, if he wanted to get ahead and if it was going to cause him pain if anyone got promoted ahead of him, I would tell him not to go into it. If he wants to live abroad, keep his eyes open and broaden his horizons intellectually then I would say go right ahead.

That distinguished alumnus was Ambassador George F. Kennan who was saying,[4] it seemed to me, that a young man might serve his own limited short-range interests in the Foreign Service but that his prospects for making a useful contribution, as the institution is now organized, were dim.

Ambassador Kennan is not alone in his views. In a recent letter to the editor of the Foreign Service Journal, another distinguished Foreign Service alumnus, Ambassador Charles W. Yost, wrote that his own experience with many promising young officers who had either resigned or "dispiritedly accommodated themselves" confirmed that these young officers in the Foreign Service often felt that they faced a lack of challenge and an unsatisfactory personnel system.[5] Ambassador Yost added that there was no reason why a personnel system "should be, or should seem, bureaucratic, unresponsive, and and unimaginative." Ambassador Yost concluded his letter by saying:

"It would be a very great tragedy if the Foreign Service, just when the country needs it most and when it offers in fact the most brilliant opportunities, should be eroded at the base through failure to take advantage of the zeal, ambition and expectations of its best qualified and best trained young officers."

I am reasonably confident that these comments could be made just as aptly for young officers in the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency.

Bureaucracies have a tendency to grow, as we all know. In fact, a recent program in the Foreign Service to reduce the size of embassies that had grown unreasonably large was nicknamed "Operation Topsy," a name that strikes me as whimsically accurate. Someone brought to my attention a recent article in the London Daily Telegraph magazine by the renowned C. Northcote Parkinson pointing out that in the period from 1914 to 1967, while the total number of vessels in commission in the British navy fell from 542 to 114, and the number of officers and men in the Royal Navy from 125,000 to 84,000, the number of Admiralty officials and clerical staff rose from 4,366 to 33,574.[6] And while Britain's colonies almost disappeared between 1935 and 1954, in that period the Colonial Office grew from 372 to 1,661 employees.

I suspect, again on the basis of what I have heard from those in the Department of State as well as what I have read, that administrative proliferation has also reached a rather acute stage in our foreign affairs agencies and that too many people are kept busy reading unnecessary reports written by too many other people who have nothing else to do. If this were not so, the recent decision to reduce the size of all embassies overseas in order to reduce our balance-of-payments deficits would not have been made. Surely, we could not afford to cut any essential activities abroad any more than we could not afford not to cut unessential activities.

In "Farewell to Foggy Bottom," Ambassador Ellis Briggs wrote in 1964:

"Foreign Affairs would prosper if the 1960's could become known as the decade in which the American Foreign Service was not reorganized."[7]

Ambassador Briggs has had his wish in some ways and has not had it in others because the Foreign Service has been reorganized—not on a grand scale but piecemeal—with the results that those observers and participants I have quoted have described. And these piecemeal reorganizations have also taken place in the Agency for International Development and in the U.S. Information Agency. But the 1960's are almost over. The question now is what should the Foreign Service, and the other foreign affairs agencies, be like in the 1970's?

I believe that the time has come for a thorough, realistic, and objective examination of the operation in the United States and abroad of the Foreign Service, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency—the principal agencies which conduct this Nation's foreign relations at home and abroad. In October 1966 I wrote the President and suggested the appointment of a blue-ribbon Presidential Commission to perform this function and to suggest reforms that should be made, a commission to be composed of people who have had broad, relevant experience and whose only interest would be in seeing that the United States has the best possible organization to conduct its foreign relations. The executive branch, while not denying my assertions that fundamental and far-reaching changes were needed in the Department of State and other agencies with important responsibilities in the field of foreign affairs, indicated a belief that the needed reforms could be instituted more effectively without outside assistance by the top noncareer level of the Department of State. Two years have now passed and, despite the best efforts of the top noncareer level of the State Department, I do not think that the situation has improved.

It has been argued that such commissions as the one I proposed have been appointed several times in the past and that there is thus no need to repeat the experience. I would disagree. The Hoover Commission examined the entire organization of the Government, including the Department of State, but this examination was conducted over 20 years ago and is now out of date. The so-called Wriston Committee, chaired by President Wriston of Brown University, was appointed by the Secretary of State in 1954. Its deliberations took only 2 months, and its members did not inspect operations in the field. It issued a relatively brief report whose principal recommendation was to consolidate the Department of State and Foreign Service personnel systems—a consolidation which has been gradually unraveling ever since.

The most recent attempt in this field was by a Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel established late in 1961 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and headed by former Secretary of State Christian Herter. Its deliberation appeared to be thorough. It devoted a year to its task, its members visited 32 posts abroad, and it took formal evidence from 18 witnesses. It issued a report with 43 recommendations.[8]

Many of the Herter Committee's recommendations were, however, so general that they were almost truisms. For example, one recommendation was that the Department's leadership capabilities should be strengthened, which is certainly a more desirable goal than weakened leadership. Another was that the State Department, USIA, and AID should "tap more systematically the most promising sources of highly qualified candidates," which, again, is certainly preferable to the unsystematic recruitment of less well qualified candidates. Other recommendations

Footnotes at end of article.

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

of the Herter Committee were ignored. The committee's second recommendation, for example, was that a position of Executive Under Secretary of State be established. Still other recommendations were contradicted subsequently by Departmental decisions—the fate, for example, of the committee's recommendation 27 that "selection out for time in class should be eliminated"—or have had to be abandoned because the Congress, for one reason or another, has not been willing to pass the necessary legislation.

The United States is, of course, not alone in facing the problem of how best to organize the conduct of foreign relations. Six years ago, the British Government decided to conduct a thorough review of the purpose, structure, and operation of its foreign affairs establishment.

I am impressed by the British Government's aproach in this case. The Prime Minister appointed a distinguished "Committee on Representational Services Overseas" headed by Lord Plowden. I should emphasize that the committe was appointed by the Prime Minister, not by the Secretary of State, as was the Wriston Committee, or under the auspices of a private foundation, as was the Herter Committee. The members of the committee included two members of the House of Commons, one Labor Party member and one Conservative, in contrast to the Wriston Committee and the Herter Committee, neither of which included members of the Congress. The Plowden Committee spent a year and a half in its task, visited 42 posts abroad, took formal evidence from 75 witnesses and issued a 176-page report with 52 recommendations.[9]

How has the Plowden Committee report of 1964 fared compared to the Herter Committee of 1962? According to John E. Harr, a Department of State official who, incidentally, had served on the staff of the Herter Committee, while there has been "very slow progress" in implementing the Herter report, the Plowden report was "implemented almost in its entirety, and needed action was taken swiftly and decisively."[10] Mr. Harr termed the report an "overall success" and said that, in the opinion of those in the Foreign Office whom he had interviewed, the amalgamation of the Foreign Service, Commonwealth Relations Service and Trade Commission Service into one diplomatic service, as recommended in the Plowden report, "has indeed given British overseas representation a much needed shot in the arm." He concluded that the British appear to be "moving ahead very progressively" with their Diplomatic Service's administrative problems.

I have felt for several years that while the British do not have the answer to every problem, they may well have the answer to the one I am discussing today. I am convinced that the executive branch departments and agencies concerned—either the top noncareer level of these departments and agencies or the administrative specialists with vested interests in the results to whom such a task ends up being delegated—cannot alone institute the needed reforms. A view from the outside is also needed—a broad and objective view, unencumbered by political considerations or by the obligations that executive branch officers have toward the interests of the particular department or agency in which they serve.

The United States has many distinguished citizens who have served in high positions in the Government, here and abroad, and in the private sector as well. We should put the best available minds among them to work on this problem. To suggest just one example of such a man, I would point to the distinguished career of Douglas Dillon who has served in both Republican and Democratic administrations, in the State Department and in an embassy abroad, in the Treasury Department and in the private sector as well. There are many other men whose experience, while perhaps not as broad, would enable them to bring knowledge and perspective to the work of such a commission which could draw its staff not only from various Government departments and agencies but from foundations and universities, and also from corporations, banks and management consulting firms with large foreign operations of their own.

I am therefore submitting today a joint congressional resolution providing for the establishment of such commission to be composed of 12 members—two from the Senate, two from the House of Representatives and eight to be appointed by the President. The joint resolution stipulates that the members appointed by the President should not, at the time of their appointment, be serving in any governmental position other than in an advisory capacity.

I do not intend to press this joint resolution to a vote at this time because I do not believe that the appointment of such a commission should be one of the last acts of a retiring administration. But I do believe that the appointment of such a commission should be one of the first acts of a new administration. I am introducing the joint resolution today so that the candidates for the office of the Presidency, and Members of the House and the Senate, will have time to think about it. I will introduce the joint resolution again at the beginning of the next Congress and I will then do my utmost to achieve its adoption.

FOOTNOTES

[1] "Toward a Stronger Foreign Service," Department of State Publication 5458, released June, 1954.

[2] Lord Strang, *The Diplomatic Career* (London, Andre Deutsch, 1962).

[3] "Diplomats' Group Elects Activists," *New York Times*, September 29, 1967.

[4] On "Meet the Press," November 5, 1967.

[5] *Foreign Service Journal*, April, 1968.

[6] "Is the Civil Service Swallowing Britain?", *The Daily Telegraph Magazine*, December 8, 1967.

[7] Ellis Briggs, *Farewell to Foggy Bottom*, (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1964).

[8] "Personnel for the New Diplomacy," *Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December, 1962.

[9] "Report of the Committee on Representational Services Over-Seas Appointed by the Prime Minister Under the Chairmanship of Lord Plowden 1962–63," published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1964.

[10] "Some Observations on H. M. Diplomatic Service," John E. Harr, Foreign Service Journal, August, 1967.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 27, 1969]

EXHIBIT 2

GROUP IN FOREIGN SERVICE SEEKS TO BARGAIN ON PERSONNEL AFFAIRS

(By Richard Halloran)

WASHINGTON, August 27.—A group of "Young Turk" Foreign Service officers, showing some impatience with the Nixon Administration's pace on reforming the service, are planning to ask the State Department to recognize their professional association as the exclusive agent with which the department would bargain on a wide range of personnel matters.

Sources close to the group said they wanted the department to recognize the Foreign Service Association, a nonofficial organization, as the sole bargaining agent and to sign a contract giving the association this authority.

Although an Executive order permits Government employees to form such bargaining units, one source called the proposal "revolutionary" for the usually circumspect Foreign Service.

Leaders of the group are scheduled to meet with the Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. Richardson, tomorrow to discuss the union proposal and other dissatisfactions among Foreign Service officers. Mr. Richardson is responsible for the administration of the Foreign Service.

The delegation will be led by Lannon Walker, chairman of the Foreign Service Association. Mr. Walker declined to reveal details of the planned meeting and would say only that "we want to see where we stand" with the department's senior officers.

Other sources close to the group, however, indicated that they felt the Nixon Administration "has been around a while now and it's time to see some action." One source said that the impetus for reform must come from the Foreign Service itself, that "it's time we took a good hard look at ourselves."

Various task forces, the sources said, have been working on position papers to use as talking points with the top management.

Some of the Foreign Service officers said they believed that Mr. Richardson also thinks the time has come for action.

A member of the Under Secretary's staff said that Mr. Richardson feels reform of the Foreign Service to be among his major responsibilities but that each recommendation should be considered on its merits. The source said that Mr. Richardson had met with the association leaders several times since he took office and thought it important to keep the lines of communication with them open.

The dissensions within the Foreign Service began long before the Nixon Administration took office. The sources said that many junior and middle-range officers were dissatisfied with their lack of responsibility, with promotion policies and with the assignments they receive.

These sources pointed to the large and increasing numbers of resignations from the Foreign Service. During the fiscal year that ended on June 30, about 270 officers resigned while only about 60 new appointments were made. The number of Foreign Service officers has dropped from 3,489 to 3,273, as of July 1.

Some sources expressed the fear that the service would gradually drop to about 2,500 officers. They said the Nixon Administration must make up its mind whether it wants to have a career, professional service or "see the whole thing go down the drain."

The sources were almost unanimous in saying that they were encouraged during the early days of the new Administration by the attitude and by the intial steps taken to reform the Foreign Service.

But they indicated that dissatisfaction had returned recently due to the 10 per cent cutbacks ordered in personnel both in Washington and overseas.

The sources said that many professionals were encouraged when Mr. Richardson issued a memorandum on May 2 committing the Administration to "a thorough re-examination of the foreign affairs establishment with a view to a more effective use of the unique human forces found there."

Some, however, charged that the new Administration had instituted criteria for promotion that were unacceptable. One such is the stipulation that no specialist could be promoted beyond, FSO–3, an upper middle grade, unless he had exceptional ability.

The sources complained that the definition of specialist was not made clear and that, moreover, many people in the increasingly complicated profession of diplomacy are required to become specialists in a country, an area of a particular field such as economics.

[From the Nation, Feb. 3, 1969]

NIXON'S SEVENTH CRISIS: DIPLOMATS IN DISARRAY

(By Smith Simpson)

NOTE.—Mr. Simpson, a retired Foreign Service officer with twenty years' experience in and around the diplomatic Establishment, is the author of Anatomy of the State De-

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

partment (Houghton Mifflin). He is also editor of the recent issue, "Resources and Needs of American Diplomacy," of The Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science.)

It seems that President Nixon did not relish as Secretary of State a man of great experience and skill in foreign affairs, one familiar with the State Department, the federal foreign affairs community, our foreign policies and the navigational skills which keep those policies afloat. There are such men in his party, some of them part of the Atlantic seaboard reservoir so often tapped for foreign affairs and defense appointments. But, for the first time in years, a President-elect shied away from the Eastern establishment. The indications are that Mr. Nixon did not even seek the advice of the Lovetts, McCloys, Dillons, et al.

Plainly, also, he had no inclination to resort to older precedent and appoint one of those who had challenged him for his party's nomination. "Forward together" is for national consumption, not for party politics, at least as far as foreign affairs are concerned. Instead of pursuing precedent, Mr. Nixon did something quite novel—novel, anyway, since 1925, when Calvin Coolidge appointed Frank Billings, Kellogg as head of the diplomatic bureaucracy. This suggests that the slogan in foreign affairs is to be "Keep Cool with Nixon."

But another possible meaning to the appointment of William P. Rogers seems to have escaped the commentators. It is well known that Mr. Nixon has turned to this skillful lawyer during three of the six major crises which he says have beset his political career. By calling upon Rogers now for this particular position, does Mr. Nixon suggest that the diplomatic establishment has begun to loom in his mind as a seventh crisis?

Well it might. I have known the State Department and its Foreign Service for some forty years and never have I seen them in such a shambles. Policy planning in the State Department is still of a scatter-shot variety and diplomatic planning is nonexistent. There is no overall management, and therefore operations are not tied together, gaps are not filled, lapses are not anticipated, improvements are not systematically pressed. Even promotions, which should be one of the simpler operations, at least from the numerical standpoint, have been chaotic and without reference to need. Education and training are scandalously neglected, procedures fritter away experience, officers are frustrated rather than developed by conditions of service. Responsibilities, especially in the lower ranks, are vague and unchallenging. There is, in a word, no systematic control; only endless improvisation in administration, endless battling with momentary need, endless reaction to events—as in our diplomacy itself—rather than good, tight, dynamic leadership.

I hate to mention Vietnam in this connection, for it would seem to have been threshed down to the last grain, but several basic elements which it shares with everything else the Department does are being overlooked. One is the failure to bring to bear upon the Vietnamese experience the processes of research, analysis and planning. No systematic analysis of this involvement has been made by the State Department or any contractee of the Department. Hence, the Department has been, and still is, unable to deal profoundly with the problem of intervention, isolating the issues it presents or generalizing from the breakthroughs of technique and the constructive results which here and there ingenious diplomatic, military and aid officers have achieved. Further, there has been no attempt to systematize the errors of this venture for the instruction of future policy steerers and diplomatic pilots. From this failure, we risk not only losing in our negotiations the few precious accomplishments of intervention but of repeating our mistakes in the future. That future, as Thailand and Laos are trying to whisper in our ear, may come sooner than we think. If there is one way to insure a continuation of blunders in Southeast Asia, with their corroding effects on America's world position, this is it.

The *Pueblo* affair is another example of the State Department's chronic inability to subject its diplomacy to any kind of rigorous analysis. No methodical attention has ever been given to this type of spy operation, great though its impact is upon our diplomacy. This neglect led to the U–2 imbroglio in 1960; it will lead to others. The disjointed diplomatic agency has simply not prepared itself to cope with military and intelligence operations which affect the nation's general international efforts. Of course, diplomats would first have to be educated and trained in this area, and one of the more obscure but melancholy aspects of the U–2, Bay of Pigs and *Pueblo* affairs is that our diplomatic officers are not adequately prepared to run any phase of a modern diplomatic operation.

A part of the crisis which the diplomatic agency presents to Mr. Nixon arises from its astonishing failure to redefine diplomacy itself in up-to-date terms, so that it might have a clear idea of the kind of people it should be recruiting, the kinds of education and training it should be providing its officers, the criteria it should be following for assignments and promotions, the blend of policy, diplomacy and management it should be developing—all to effect a widespread improvement in our international performance.

Good management would encourage a contagion of know-how from the better-run to the sloppy offices, thus stimulating and bolstering the Department in areas where it is weakest. But lack of management isolates office from office, bureau from bureau. There is no means, for example, whereby the concepts and techniques of analysis and management employed by Covey T. Oliver to improve performance in Latin American relations can be transmitted to other areas. Nor is there any assurance that the gains in that bureau will be passed on to and developed by the Assistant Secretary who replaces Mr. Oliver.

In such an "anti-organization" department, morale is deplorable. In forty years of observation, I have never known State Department morale to be good, but it is now the worse that I have ever seen it.

Morale affects performance; so also do attitudes. They subtly penetrate and influence every view, every decision, every approach to a decision. They are the unspoken premises which cause men to assume they know things they do not know, understand situations they do not understand, are "managing crises" when they are only tinkering with them, disposing of problems when they are only postponing them to reappear in more aggravated form. They give rise, or are themselves generated by, cliches and myths. If Mr. Nixon wants to avoid his seventh crisis he had better put someone in a managerial position in State who knows what the prevailing attitudes are, their sources and their cures. Otherwise, both he and his Secretary of State, however shrewd and competent they may be as politician and lawyer, will be stymied.

A Middle East crisis is rising to one of its periodic crests and Messrs. Nixon and Rogers would do well to recall what lack of State Department management did to President Johnson and Dean Rusk on the last crest. For four and a half months, as that 1966–67 storm quietly gathered, the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs remained vacant. Career diplomat Raymond Hare resigned in November, 1966, and could not be induced to remain. He was worn out; furthermore, he had given a year's notice of his departure. But no replacement had been prepared. The only one available when the time came, it was said, was Lucius D. Battle, then serving as ambassador in Cairo. But there was no seasoned successor for Battle, and one had therefore to be improvised. At the urging of Under Secretary Katzenbach who, like Mr. Rogers, had served as Attorney General and was not exactly sophisticated in the deployment of diplomatic personnel, the Department appointed as ambassador Richard Nolte, an intelligent, academic type not likely to have much influence on Nasser. Nolte's remark at the Cairo airport remains a classic. Asked by a journalist what he thought of the Middle East crisis, he replied: "What crisis?" He soon found out.

Congressional penny-pinching aggravates the shortcomings of management and planning. Secretarial vacancies cannot be filled; officers become increasing distracted by clerical duties. Supplies are so parismoniously inventoried that even telephone directories must be scrounged. The library—unlike those at the CIA and the Pentagon—is so understaffed that it cannot meet requests for service, cannot acquire needed materials, cannot shelve promptly what it gets, cannot bind what it shelves. This is a particularly illuminating situation, for it not only exemplifies the anti-intellectual attitude of the administrators who parcel out the Department's appropriated funds but shows also how really false is a lot of the economizing. Unbound periodicals stray; they must be replaced; and back copies cost more than the original subscription numbers. Furthermore, when funds at last become available for binding, costs have increased. The State Department is a perfect demonstration, top to bottom, from people to paper clips, that penny-pinching always results is waste.

An extraordinary cynicism pervades the diplomatic establishment. Even its liberals found themselves welcoming the outcome of the Presidential election. "Nothing could possibly be worse," they said; "a change—any change—just might bring relief." They did not remember that this same hope was engendered in 1932, 1952 and 1960, and gave way to souring frustration. It is not merely change that is needed—it is reform; organizational reform, procedural reform, attitudinal reform, educational and training reform, conceptual reform. That is what confronts Mr. Nixon as he prepares for his seventh crisis.

That being so, one of Nixon's most extraordinary pre-inaugural decisions was his choice of Secretary of State. William P. Rogers is by all reports a good lawyer; he is a former Attorney General of the United States, a good negotiator in a domestic context, perhaps a good one in an international legal context, a staunch upholder of civil rights, an upright citizen, a loyal friend and counselor of the President, a cool man. These attributes are splendid, but how completely do they meet the varied diplomatic needs of the President? How sufficient are they for a successful Secretary of State?

Mr. Rogers is not totally without exposure to foreign affairs. He served in 1967 as the United States delegate on the UN's fourteen-nation *ad hoc* Committee on South West Africa. Seven years earlier he headed the American delegation to the independence ceremonies for Togo, and took the occasion to visit the Mali Federation (then Mali, Guinea and Senegal) and Nigeria. He met a number of leaders in those countries (most of whom have since been ousted or assassinated). During the Hungarian revolution of November, 1956, he accompanied Mr. Nixon to Austria to investigate the plight of refugees. Another brief mission took him abroad in 1955 as chief American delegate to a UN conference on prison conditions.

That's about it and it is not very much. No continuous professional experience; not even a sustained professional interest. No background whatever with respect to the State

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Department or the Foreign Service. No experience or known interest in any coordinating machinery in the government's foreign affairs.

This lack of central involvement or even interest in his new area of responsibility becomes the more painfully evident when one sets Mr. Rogers' training alongside the preparation of some of his Cabinet associates. The Secretary of Agriculture has had extensive experience with agricultural matters. The Secretary of Labor has been a student of labor problems for decades, much involved in labor-management contentions, thoughtfully coping for years with the very challenges he will face in his Cabinet assignment. Both Clifford M. Hardin in Agriculture and George Shultz in Labor are seasoned experts in their fields.

In fact, Mr. Hardin seems to qualify better for the position of Secretary of State than does Mr. Rogers. His extensive international experience began in 1947 when he was sent to Europe by Michigan State University to explore the broad question of what roles universities and farm groups might play in the Marshall Plan. The following year, in furtherance of Point Four, President Truman included him in groups to study development possibilities in South America. His interest in this area has continued, and has led to his appointment as a member of the Council on Higher Education of American Republics, which takes him to a different country of South America each year. In 1950, as dean of MSU's School of Agriculture, Hardin helped found the University of the Ryukyus on Okinawa, and that added the Pacific area to his international involvement. Four years later, he became chancellor of the University of Nebraska and introduced in that one-time bastion of Midwest isolationism a Latin American studies program and a Far Eastern Institute; he also continued Nebraska's sponsorship of the new Ataturk University in Turkey which, among other things, has brought to Lincoln more than 200 Turkish professors for advanced study. He has also been involved in educational development in sub-Sahara Africa. This depth of familiarity with the country's overseas objectives and commitments suggested to President Kennedy that Hardin be added to the Clay committee to study the entire foreign aid program. Finally, Hardin thinks in imaginative terms. One of his pet interests is promoting "a massive, long-range innovative effort unprecedented in human history" to solve the world's food and population problem.

Compared with all this, Mr. Rogers and the man he has picked as his deputy are rank amateurs. Neither can innovate because they do not know where to start. Neither can reform becaues they do not know what is wrong. Neither can appreciate the need for any "massive, long-range, innovative effort" to bring our diplomatic establishment up to date because they have yet to learn in what respects it is out of date. As they gradually become enlightened, they will tinker, as all unprepared innovators do. Moreover, they will by then have become overwhelmed by current crises.

Melvin Laird was smarter than Mr. Rogers. Realizing that as Secretary of Defense he would be handicapped by his managerial inexperience, he picked an expert manager for the second spot at the Pentagon. Rogers picked a man in his own image. Mr. Richardson is also a lawyer, also an Attorney General, also inexperienced in management, also a novice in foreign affairs, in the State Department, in the Foreign Service in diplomacy.

This, together with the fact that Laird has been deeply involved in the problems and issues of the Defense Department for fifteen years, with a fairly clear idea of how it operates—its weaknesses, its mistakes, its needs—means that Defense will continue to have an edge over State. In the light of the last eight years, I need emphasize what this means in our foreign policies and diplomacy. There is little likelihood that a "massive, long-range, innovative effort" will tip the scales back to civilian initiative and control.

Both Mr. Rogers and Mr. Richardson may be expected to think that as lawyers and pragmatists they have much to offer American diplomacy. I wish this were so, but I fear that lawyers are poor managers and even slow to see the need for effective management. As a profession, they are given to the belief that all they need are the facts; by rigorous analysis, they can then deduce the answers. Furthermore, since they are trained to argue from briefs prepared by their staff, Mr. Rogers and Mr. Richardson will no doubt believe that they can satisfactorily counsel the President and Congress, as well as the public and officials of other governments, from the "briefs" provided by a State Department staff. If so, they are naive.

"Facts" are hard to come by in foreign affairs. Information is elusively concealed in the manner of its presentation. It is subtly permeated with the drafters' personal impressions, interpretations, hunches. A formidable husk of subjectivity surrounds every "fact." The greatest bulk of our dossiers on other peoples and their government leaders, their cultures and their needs, is comprised of what we *think* we know, and that is precisely what has bedeviled the government's handling of Vietnam. The "information" and calculations available in Washington have been treated by the Secretary of State and other Presidential advisers as reliable "facts"—and we have strayed deeper and deeper into a swamp of conjecture. Because of the man he has selected as Secretary of State and the deputy Mr. Rogers has picked for himself, this can happen to Mr. Nixon in countless situations.

As for pragmatism, we have about come to the end of that road. Within limits, it is a good approach, but relying on it almost exclusively, we have exhausted its possibilities, and our continuing faith in it is leading us into a performance of diminishing returns. Faced with the necessity to synthesize foreign and domestic resources and policies, we are required to make a more fundamental assessment of foreign affairs than we have so far attempted. For this, some philosophy is needed—something akin to the careful, systematic, basic thinking that went into the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. And it requires, as those statements of policy and principle did not, a consideration of world responsibilities. Who is to lead in this "massive, long-range, innovative" effort?

Perhaps, someone may suggest, the number-three man in the Department, he being a career diplomat. But he also is a pragmatist. A smart operator, a man of keen insight into the reactions of foreigners, Alexis Johnson has never acquired any reputation as a thinker, a planner or a manager. And as he has shown throughout the Vietnam years—during much of which he served as a political adviser to the Secretary—he is a follower, not an innovator.

If none of these three men has what it takes to reform the Department, the situation is not yet entirely hopeless. Six other strategic positions remain to be filled: Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Organization and Management, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel, Director General of the Foreign Service, Director of the Foreign Service Institute and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Operations.

If Mr. Rogers can be as smart as Mr. Laird, he can still bail himself out of his limitations and, by the men he selects for these positions, spare the President another major crisis. To do this he must clearly perceive three things: the necessity for superior management of the diplomatic establishment; the requirement that managers be familiar not only with management concepts but also with foreign policy and diplomacy; and the need to delegate adequate managerial powers to such men.

These six officers of the Department must create a program of management (which means, in effect, a program of reform, since the State Department now totally lacks management), and they must become a team to carry it out.

In view of Mr. Rogers' and his deputy's unfamiliarity with the State Department, the filling of this prescription is so difficult as to be unlikely. But there is a remote possibility that it will be done. Several studies of the State Department and Foreign Service of recent date are available for the launching of such a program. If the six are appointed from the career diplomatic service well in advance of vacancies, sent off to a suitable university to be trained in management concepts and techniques and to distill a program for the approval of Messrs. Nixon and Rogers, and if they are delegated adequate managerial powers, the job can be done. There is no other way to do it. If Mr. Nixon really sees the diplomatic establishment as threatening him with his seventh crisis—and whether he does or not, that, in my opinion, is the situation—he would do well to persuade his Secretary of State to take this course. It would be good politics—if Mr. Nixon gives any thought at all to 1972. And, of course, it would be a step toward insuring that there is still a nation to hold elections in 1972.

[From the Virginia Quarterly Review, Spring 1969]

OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ESTABLISHMENT: THE NEED FOR REFORM

(By Charles Maechling, Jr.)

Before the Second World War it was customary to lay the blame for the more flagrant mistakes of American foreign policy on the President and the party in power. Until relatively recently, the major foreign policy problems that confronted each Administration were few in number and generally translatable into simply political issues. As late as the Roosevelt era it was almost unheard of for the press or Congress to ascribe mistakes of policy or deficiencies in program execution to advisers, department heads, or the machinery of government. In the absence of some glaring and well-publicized delinquency on the part of a subordinate, the President or Secretary of State carried the full burden of responsibility for the success or failure of their policies.

With the rise of big government, and the expansion of American involvement in world affairs at every level and in every quarter of the globe, these premises have undergone a subtle change. The President and the Secretary of State are now in some respects exculpated for policy mistakes and breakdowns in program execution. The sudden elevation in 1945 of an inexperienced President to the political leadership of the Western world, and the inability of even the most inveterate opponents of American wartime policy to hold him responsible for the Cold War and the postwar disappointments in Eastern Europe and the Far East, accentuated this trend. For a while, it became the fashion to arraign policy advisers, Cabinet officers, and even interpreters and part-time consultants, for policy failures or program breakdowns. More recently the tendency has been to avoid personalities and focus on the system.

Since the nineteen forties most of the criticism has centered on the Department of State. This is the price of the Department's pre-eminence and high visibility in the field of foreign affairs, and of a consequent propensity on the part of the public

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

and other branches of the government to hold it responsible for unfavorable developments. Out of this chorus of annoyance and recrimination, four specific complaints stand out. It is alleged that too often the Department has proved unable to provide clear-cut definitions of the national interest in advance of specific crises situations. It has been charged that the Department often seems incapable of translating its generalized statements of national goals into specific action programs or into crisply phrased alternative courses from which decisions can be made. It is said that the Department hedges its political estimates to the point of inconclusiveness and obscurity. And, moving from policy formulation to policy execution, it has been alleged that the Department does not exercise effective leadership over the other departments and agencies of the foreign affairs establishment, with the result that programs either fail to reflect policy or are so deficient in direction and co-ordination that they unwittingly frustrate and vitiate it. Readers may remember the epithet, "bowl of jelly," attributed to President Kennedy by Arthur Schlesinger, as perhaps epitomizing these strictures.

The best evidence of the truth behind these charges is the way Presidents have consistently tinkered with the foreign affairs establishment in an effort to cure or at least mitigate some of its deficiencies. Depending on the temperament and philosophy of the incumbent, the problem has been viewed either in terms of personalities or in terms of organization. Broadly speaking, these efforts have fallen into four categories.

The first has been organizational change, some of it real, much of it fictitious. New jobs have been created and old ones abolished; presidential functions have been delegated and redelegated; the chain of command has been realigned; people and offices have been given new labels. Some of the changes have been motivated by the need to re-tailor functions to fit personalities; some of them to achieve *bona fide* changes of responsibility; and perhaps most to satisfy demands for a new look. In recent history, none has been fundamental enough to alter the basic structure and operation of the Department.

A second approach—really a variant of the first—has been to stiffen State's backbone by giving it more authority. This has usually taken the form of re-emphasizing the Department's "leadership" role within the Executive Branch. President Kennedy's letter of May, 1961, placing all United States Government activities in a foreign country under the supervision and control of the Ambassador, is perhaps the best known of these efforts. However, its practical effects have been minimal. The scope of the letter was necessarily limited to activities under the immediate control of the Ambassador and could not alter the legal effect of agency responsibilities in the slightest. A later directive of President Johnson (NSAM 341 of April, 1966), placing all overseas interdepartmental programs and activities under the supervision and control of the Secretary of State, was an attempt to extend this concept to Washintgon. As we shall see, it suffered from similar legal disabilities.

State has also experimented with the interdepartmental committee device to establish control over the overseas programs of other agencies. These have usually been set up under State chairmanship within the framework of a State regional bureau. Some recent examples are the Vietnam Task Force, the former Cuban Co-ordinating Committee, the now defunct Latin American and African Policy Committees, and the new Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs). The effectiveness of these State-sponsored, interdepartmental committees has tended to mirror the willingness and capacity of the regional Assistant Secretaries to make use of them.

A third approach has involved efforts to make the Department, especially the Foreign Service, more responsive to changing conditions by improving its personnel. These have included broadening the selection base, changing promotion criteria, and trying to integrate civil service personnel from the Department and other agencies into the Foreign Service. Among the means employed to achieve these ends have been financial incentives for early retirement; proposed legislation to integrate autonomous agencies like AID and USIA into the Department; and opening—and later closing—the career ranks to lateral entry from the outside. Whether these reforms have actually improved our diplomatic performance is a matter of endless, and inconclusive, debate.

Finally should be mentioned recent attempts to introduce modern systems analysis and data processing techniques into the machinery. These have included personnel planning, country programming systems, and the so-called PPB method of relating objectives to costs and then projecting the latter for a five-year period. Most of these programs have been allowed to fall into desuetude before there was time to permit objective evaluation in terms of results.

Each of these approaches has been aimed at enhancing State's "leadership" of the foreign affairs establishment. Yet none seem to have had any real effect on the quality of American diplomacy. Persons brought in as "new brooms" have exhausted themselves in piecemeal attacks on the problem and futile efforts to cut through bureaucratic redtape. As soon as they depart, the jungle takes over.

II

The foreign affairs establishment cannot be streamlined or invigorated by half-measures confined to the State Department. Individual changes in the Department's organization, personnel system, training programs, and programming methods are going to yield only minimal and probably undiscernible results in terms of improved policy performance unless the Department's rôle is re-examined within the context of the whole foreign affairs field and especially the missions of other agencies—Defense, CIA, USIA, AID, and Treasury. Moreover, the effectiveness of the machinery must be measured in terms of the realities of contemporary international life—not in terms of traditional concepts of the diplomatic function dating back to the days when statecraft chiefly involved political relations between governments.

The task must begin with a realistic appraisal of the real power of the Secretary of State as compared with his mythical power. Ostensibly, the Secretary is the President's principal adviser on foreign affairs, and the Department of State, with its 25,000 employees overseas and in Washington, is his ancillary and supporting arm. The Secretary is also the prime executant of United States foreign policy—but only in the sense that he translates the President's policy decisions into instructions for Ambassadors and other United States representatives abroad, and acts as a conduit of communication between the United States and foreign governments. In addition, the Department exercises a policy advisory function for the rest of the government by furnishing other agencies engaged in overseas operations with what is termed political guidance. The Secretary and the Department do not, of course, make policy; that is the President's function.

In these capacities, the State Department's actual role has always been cloudy and cannot really be understood except in an historical context. The concept of a department of foreign affairs dates from an era when the relations between sovereign independent states were confined to a narrow range of political and economic matters, and were the exclusive province of the monarch or chief of state; the first foreign ministries were small bureaus of specialized clerks attached to the royal household who later expanded their functions to handle the routine concerns of foreign embassies and provide staff and clerical support for the King's Ambassadors. The narrow view held by many Foreign Service officers that the Department's functions should be confined to the conduct of diplomatic relations between heads of governments is therefore the *bona fide* legacy of an earlier age. A more pernicious part of the tradition is the conviction that all the manifold relations between states—economic, financial, strategic, technological, cultural—are unimportant until elevated to the level of political relations between governments.

This limited outlook is reinforced by the values built into the Foreign Service promotion system which put a premium on political reporting and the handling of intergovernmental communications. The Department abounds with political generalists parading a sham expertise in the specialities of other agencies—poltico-military "experts" who have never worn a uniform, technological "experts" with no scientific background, and economic negotiators who are neither ex-bankers no ex-businessmen—whose careers depend on the pre-eminence of the political factor over other elements of the foreign affairs equation. In background and experience most of them are bureaucrats rather than diplomatists. They have lost the foreign area familiarity, language fluency, and cosmopolitan outlook of the traditional diplomat, without acquiring the assurance, versatility, and professional skill that goes with a sound professional or business background.

More important is that in recent years the Secretary of State's real authority has suffered serious dilution. The expansion of United States interests overseas, the proliferation of relations with allies and adversaries at every level, and the growth of United States overseas programs in support of these responsibilities and relationships have multiplied the voices entitled to give advice and orders on matters of foreign policy. The Secretary is now only one of several cabinet officers and agency heads carrying heavy responsibilities in the field of foreign affairs.

Thus, in the sphere of policy formulation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff each make a contribution on specialized aspects of foreign policy that is often more essential to the decision process than the generalized political "input" of the Secretary of State. The effort of the Department to label all important matters political, on the ground that a synthesis of these different elements is required, or to reduce them to a political formulation simply because governments are involved, is a transparent artifice to retain control. It is also a dangerous one. No President can afford to have his analyses of vital problems distorted to gratify the jurisdictional vanity of one department, or to have vital information filtered through a sieve of inexpert generalists.

Even when a Secretary of State enjoys the complete confidence of the President and plays a leading role in policy formulation, his Department does not necessarily partake of his influence within the Executive Branch. Much depends on the person stature and influence of the other members of the Cabinet. Not that the heads of other Departments and Presidential appointees are inherently rivals of the Secretary of State or are out to undermine him. On the broad outlines of foreign policy, they usually take great pains to defer to him. But in matters of policy execution the Secretary's pre-eminence as the President's principal adviser on foreign affairs is very largely a fiction for the very good reason that policy execution is action far more than words. The verbal noti-

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

fication, however skillfully phrased, is only the official message.

Even the State Department's authentic diplomatic function of representing the United States in negotiations and conferences is now often a formality. When the main ingredients of an agenda are military, economic, financial, technological, or legal, the harassed generalists of the Department can usually contribute so little in the way of substance that they are hopelessly dependent on the experts of other departments. If they try to play a more active part, the consequences are likely to be disastrous: a career diplomat will frequently trade off important technical advantages, whose significance escapes him, in favor of some ephemeral political advantage.

The most striking example of the Department's limitations in policy execution, however, is its lack of control over the overseas programs and activities that are now the real instruments of policy execution.

Since the end of World War II, the deployment overseas of large United States land, sea, and air forces has been both a major instrument of policy implementation and a source of involvement in foreign internal affairs. Our military and economic assistance programs—now chiefly centered in the less developed countries—are also important arms of policy and sources of overseas involvement. Covert assistance programs and the use of modern electronic and satellite technology for intelligence collection have enmeshed the United States in an ominous web of subterranean relationships with foreign government personalities and political factions. Even the anodyne public information function of the United States Information Agency has been broadened to include a technical assistance function aimed at helping shaky governments to program political broadcasts for strengthening their ties with disaffected rural areas.

Few of these programs and activities are under the operational control of the State Department. All the important ones are the statutory responsibility of other powerful autonomous departments and agencies. Many are the subject of special and sometimes complex legislation. Appropriations for these programs and activities are often hedged about with special requirements and restrictions, some of them specifically designed to protect them from outside interference or control.

President Johnson's directive of April, 1966, already mentioned, ostensibly endowed the Secretary of State with responsibility for the overall direction, co-ordination, and supervision of interdepartmental programs and activities overseas. In fact, the directive was legally powerless to affect the program responsibilities of the departments and agencies concerned, each of which is acutely conscious of its unique mission and prerogatives. At least two other agencies—Defense and CIA—are fully the equals of State in power and influence, not only within the Executive Branch but on Capitol Hill; while AID, USIA, and the Disarmament Agency, although nominally part of State, are in fact semi-autonomous organizations, with separate budgets, personnel hierarchies, and top-level management by energetic, independently-minded political appointees.

In theory, the Department of State has the authority and prestige to synchonize these multifarious activities and programs and make them conform to policy. Every overseas program of the other departments and agencies is subject to the Department's political guidance. But this guidance (usually furnished at "bureau level") is often general to the point of abstraction. Its formulations are difficult to apply to concrete program situations. Often the guidance is susceptible to such a wide range of interpretations that it justifies the most aberrant departures in program execution.

All too often, the Department's solution to this embarrassing anomaly is a tacit arrangement whereby acquiescence in the program decisions of other agencies is traded off for lip-service compliance with the Department's political guidance. This usually works until the moment when vital agency interests are engaged or when there are real differences of opinion on questions of policy implementation, at which time the compact tends to come apart. Since the Department cannot afford to endanger the Secretary's prestige by engaging his authority in every wrangle, the result is usually a disguised surrender, in which the program at issue is either redefined to bring it into conformity with policy, however it may diverge from or even vitiate that policy, or the policy is reformulated to provide room for wider divergencies.

The truth is that the growing complexity of the international environment renders not only the State Department but every other single agency of government incapable of coping with the full range of international problems. Today, these embrace every aspect of national life, internal social and economic considerations included. Consequently no statement of foreign policy goals can hope to make sense unless it takes into account two factors normally excluded from policy deliberations within the Department—the national resources available to carry out a policy and the domestic political climate. Yet up to now, the Department's guidance to both the White House and other departments has invariably assumed unlimited national resources and complete unanimity of public opinion, in defiance of contemporary economic and political reality. Such weighty factors as creeping inflation, racial unrest, deteriorating public services, an adverse balance of payments, mounting demands from the cities for federal dollars, and the obvious incapacity of the country to finance both an ambitious domestic program and a global security system are deliberately excluded from Department position papers. Nor are the master plans and grand designs drawn up by the deskbound Policy Planning Council ever tested against the prevailing background of public and congressional opinion.

The same narrow approach stultifies the implementation of policy. To cite only one example: The Communist and extreme left-wing threat to vulnerable countries of the underdeveloped world is not simply subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. It also involves the establishment of an underground political network, a shadow government, a clandestine system of taxation and financial levies, a propaganda campaign aimed at disaffected segments of the population, a system of internal conscription, and partial (but not necessarily total) disruption of certain (but not all) parts of the economy. It can only be defeated, or at least frustrated, by a carefully synchronized counter-insurgency program structured to fit local conditions and embracing such variegated elements as economic assistance, police assistance, military assistance, public information guidance, and covert activities. Since these elements necessarily depend on the contributions of different departments and agencies, there must be a single hand to manipulate the threads or they will start to operate at cross-purposes. Today, in Washington at least, this hand is absent.

III

It is the incapacity of the foreign affairs establishment, headed by State, to give active direction, or at least co-ordination, to the overseas programs of the rest of the government that has periodically led the White House to intervene in the policy implementation process, even at the cost of depriving the President of his Olympian freedom from operational detail.

Several approaches have been tried at one time or another. The first has been the creation of a White House foreign affairs staff. Dating back to Woodrow Wilson, and even before, some Presidents have placed heavy reliance on a personal foreign affairs adviser. Colonel House is one example, Harry Hopkins, McGeorge Bundy, and now Henry Kissinger are three others. Bundy and his successors have been provided with a staff, informally organized along regional lines, which has operated freely at every level of government.

The main advantage of the private adviser approach is the ability to obtain objective advice from a trusted confidant, who is unimpeded by departmental loyalties. The principal defect is that the more active and ambitious the adviser and his staff as a stimulus and catalyst for the rest of the government, the more they enfeeble institutional authority and induce over-reliance on the White House. Persons in government develop such an acute sensitivity to political power that proximity to the throne creates lines of magnetic attraction that utterly disorient normal centers of responsibility. This was the main reason why President Johnson sharply curtailed the power and latitude of the National Security Council staff after McGeorge Bundy's departure.

A second and less well known device for injecting the White House into the foreign policy decision process is the Presidentially-sponsored interdepartmental committee, usually established at Cabinet or sub-Cabinet level to handle major questions of national security policy. In theory the National Security Council exists for this purpose, but statutory membership requirements make it a cumbersome instrument for any purpose short of a major crisis. (It may be remembered that the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was handled by an *ad hoc* Executive Committee of the National Security Council to keep deliberations small and secure.) There are four prominent examples of White House-sponsored interdepartmental committees in recent history.

The Planning Board and Operations Co-ordinating Board were established by the Eisenhower Administration for the express purpose of co-ordinating policy with overseas programs. Their interdepartmental organization borrowed heavily from the joint staff committee structure developed in World War II. However, the OCB soon mushroomed into a multi-layered structure of committees, subcommittees, and working groups in which co-ordination became an end in itself and the status report was raised to a fine art. One of President Kennedy's first acts in office was to abolish the OCB, on the grounds that the organization had become a "paper mill." The Planning Board was allowed to fall into desuetude.

In its time the OCB did, however, succeed in imposing some degree of co-ordination on the foreign policy process, and its abolition left departmental and agency programs disjointed and without common purpose and direction. President Kennedy was therefore forced to resort to several *ad hoc* arrangements to take up the slack, of which the first was the Special Group. This was a sub-Cabinet committee, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security, which was established after the Bay of Pigs to keep the covert programs of the CIA in line with foreign policy. No attempt was made to place the Group under the chairmanship of State, since it was recognized that State was legally and morally incapable of controlling the CIA.

The second high-level interdepartmental committee established by President Kennedy was the Special Group (Counter-insurgency). It was created in January, 1962, to supervise policy and co-ordinate overseas assistance programs aimed at countering the Communist and extreme left-wing insurgency threat to the underdeveloped world. Originally chaired by General Maxwell D. Taylor when he was President Kennedy's Military Representative, the chairmanship was later given to State. The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) had its

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

most successful period under the chairmanship of W. Averell Harriman, when he was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1962 to 1965. The Group's most vocal and energetic member was Robert Kennedy, who sat more as the President's brother than in his capacity as Attorney General. It was so effective, however, that Secretary Rusk regarded it as a competing center of power. At his insistence, the President abolished it after a *pro forma* review by an outside task force, and its functions were transferred to the newly created Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG).

The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) represented the final effort of the Johnson administration to achieve coordination of overseas policies and programs under the leadership of State. SIG's charter was similar to that of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), but without being confined to a particular kind of foreign policy problem. It was chaired by then Under Secretary of State Katzenback and met in State rather than in the White House—an important distinction—but its muscle sprang from its Presidential sponsorship. Unfortunately, SIG was an outstanding failure, owing to excessive paperwork, feeble chairmanship, and flabby staffwork—all the vices of the old OCB. SIG was abolished by President Nixon in February, 1969, and its functions were taken over by a new interdepartmental committee of Under Secretaries chaired by Under Secretary Richardson.

The virtue of the White House-sponsored co-ordinating committee, when properly managed, lies in its ability to refer troublesome interdepartmental differences to top-level mediation before positions have hardened to the point of becoming infected with the malignant virus of agency prestige. The committee technique can also produce prompt action on disputes over program execution that might otherwise remain bogged down in a bureaucratic impasse. The mere existence of such a high-level group is therefore a powerful stimulus to action, the alternative being exposure of low-level rigidity and red-tape.

The defects of the White House-sponsored committee are some derogation of departmental responsibility and a tendency to lean on the committee for decisions that should have been made earlier by each department. Moreover, all such committees, regardless of their imposing charters and brass-encrusted membership, suffer from intermittency. Sub-Cabinet officers and heads of independent agencies rarely have time to meet more than once a week. Each meeting last for an hour or two. Once a decision is made, responsibility for implementation and follow-up necessarily devolves on the officials and institutions whose inadequacies made the Group necessary in the first place. And the war council atmosphere tends to lull everyone into the comfortable delusion that well-staffed papers, decisively handled in Washington, are synonymous with effective solutions in the field. The high-level interdepartmental committee is therefore most effective when restricted to handling only important matters in which the issues are carefully defined in advance.

IV

None of these devices, alone or in combination, really gets to the heart of the matter. They grossly underrate the expanded scope of foreign relations and the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy. They utterly neglect the peculiar structure of the Executive Branch, with its system of essentially independent departments and agencies, each endowed with a carefully defined mandate and set of statutory responsibilities. Innovations of far greater depth and ingenuity are necessary to make the foreign affairs establishment more responsive to Presidential needs.

There must first be complete acceptance of the fact that foreign relations are now a medley of social, economic, financial, strategic, ideological, and technological interrelationships in which the foreign and domestic elements are inextricably mingled. Second, all agencies of the Executive Branch, and especially the State Department, must recognize that the underlying forces in international relations take their shape, direction, and momentum from the evolution and interplay of societies—not from the political pronouncements of governments and foreign ministries. The traditional emphasis on intergovernmental relations must be discarded and the political side of foreign affairs viewed more as a reflection or manifestation of underlying trends than as an autonomous factor in its own right. Third, it must be universally accepted that the field of foreign relations transcends the jurisdictional scope of any single department or agency, and can only be comprehended and dealt with on a supra-agency level.

Ideally, the most satisfactory way of creating a unified entity capable of comprehending and dealing with the full range of contemporary foreign policy problems would be to terminate the separate agency responsibilities in the foreign affairs field and combine them under a single Department of Foreign Affairs. But it would require half a generation to prepare the ground for legislation of so sweeping a character. Hence, the only practical course is to reorganize the foreign affairs establishment within the framework of existing law.

A first step to revitilize policy planning by placing it under the control of the President's Special Assistants for National Security Affairs was taken by the Nixon administration in February, 1969. The next step should be to establish, by Executive Order, a permanent interdepartmental Foreign Affairs Council to make recommendations on key issues of foreign policy and the national security, and to resolve major interdepartmental problems concerning overseas programs and activities. The Council would consist of the heads of the principal departments and agencies of the foreign affairs establishment—State, Defense, Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency, AID, and USIA, with other agencies represented *ad hoc* as necessary—and would be chaired by the President's Special Assistant for Security Affairs, now elevated to the new Cabinet post of Secretary for National Security Affairs. It would meet not more than twice monthly and would depend on a small staff and secretariat to keep its agenda important and meaningful, and to arrange for the implementation of its decisions.

The Staff and Secretariat of the Council would be composed of a cadre of career military and civilian officials drawn from every agency of government, supplemented by a diversified and rotating element of skilled professionals from civilian life and the staffs of Congress. The rotating element would be deliberately appointed on a political basis, (i.e., its adherence to the policies of the administration in power) so as to provide an organic link between the permanent bureaucracy and the electorate.

The two principal functions of the Staff would be national policy planning and the co-ordination of overseas programs and activities. In its planning role, the Staff would be particularly charged with weighing all the factors, foreign and domestic, that enter into the sound formulation of policy and making recommendations of both courses of action and allocation of resources. When refined and endorsed by the Council, these recommendations would be forwarded to the President and become the basis for major policy decisions and program actions. Under this system, the President's responsibility for actually making policy would remain undiminished.

In mission and organization, the departments and agencies represented on the Council would remain substantially the same as before, but with a few important modifications. State would continue to be the sole conduit for official communications with foreign governments. It would also continue to handle all routine diplomatic and consular business, and would dominate the formal and ceremonial aspects of intergovernmental relations, including representation on international organizations at non-specialized levels. The Secretary of State would not, however, be cast in the rôle of a policy advisor and program co-ordinator in areas beyond his competence.

As a corollary, the regular Foreign Service would revert to being an authentic diplomatic corps, much smaller in size and more selectively chosen. On the other hand, the Foreign Service Reserve would be expanded and diversified by offering open lateral entry at every level to well-qualified economic, financial, scientific, and legal specialists. Whether or not AID and USIA should be merged into State could be decided later, but all three agencies would gradually reduce their inflated corpus of foreign affairs generalists and replace them with specialists. Administrators would be confined to administration, in the sense of housekeeping and technical management. However, an orderly but flexible promotion system would be devised for each track of category, offering parallel routes to the top, and in special cases allowing transfer from one track to another. Ambassadors and Ministers would be drawn from every personnel track, from other agencies, from the Council's staff, and from private life. Corresponding organizational changes would be made in Defense, Treasury, CIA, and other agencies concerned with foreign affairs.

The effect of this reorganization would be to raise policy planning, assignment of resource priorities, and program co-ordination to a supra-agency level, and these would be the main responsibilities of the new Secretary for National Security Affairs and Foreign Affairs Council. Responsibility for program execution would, however, stay decentralized in the existing departments and agencies, as required by law. Skillfully managed, the Council and Staff would close the present gap between policy formation and program execution. If successful, the new system would provide the Presidents of the nineteen seventies with a foreign policy machinery capable of integrating all the diverse elements of statecraft into a coherent, unified whole and responding with delicacy and vigor to the exigencies of the times.

[From the Washington Monthly, July 1969]

THE CULTURE OF BUREAUCRACY: THE COST OF COWARDICE—SILENCE IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE

(By William A. Bell, former Foreign Service officer)

In 1966, when the commitment of American ground forces in Vietnam took its greatest leap forward, criticism of U.S. policy became widespread among Foreign Service Officers, or at least among those stationed in Washington. A number of young officers, some of whom had been expressing their misgivings in private conversation, were called together at the Department for a briefing before setting out on campus recruiting trips. One of them asked the recruitment director what they should say to students who were interested in the Foreign Service but had qualms about the American role in Vietnam. The answer—in no uncertain terms—was that there is no place in the Foreign Service for persons who do not support this war. No one spoke.

At the beginning of the Dominican rebellion in 1965, U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett declined a request to moderate the rapidly growing dispute at a time when moderate leftists were still in control of the

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

"constitutionalist" forces. Bennett's predecessor, John Bartlow Martin, states in his book *Overtaken by Events* that Bennett, having missed this chance at conciliation, probably had little choice but to bring in the Marines.

The book fails to relate, however, a scene in which Bennett summoned a large portion of his staff and told them that he was planning to call for help. After briefly describing the situation as he saw it, Bennett made it clear that U.S. military forces, if summoned, would be ordered to thwart the attempted revolution, not just "protect U.S. lives and property." He then asked his staff if there were any alternate views or proposals. No one spoke.

When John Bowling, a stimulating lecturer at State's Foreign Service Institute, suggested that flag desecrators were philosophically identical to the bomb-throwing anarchists of previous decades, and that draft resisters were unmanly and cowardly, not one of the Foreign Service Officers in his audience challenged the statement, despite Bowling's invitation to do so. After several moments of silence, Bowling himself finally felt constrained to express the other side of both positions.

If such examples lead to doubt as to whether Foreign Service Officers are capable of speaking out in a group situation, even when there is a clear invitation to do so, one can easily imagine the prevailing timidity in one-to-one conversations where there is a disparity in rank or bureaucratic authority. FSO's may proudly relate the vehemence with which they have rebuffed officers or other agencies—notably USIA and AID—but direct argument with one's superiors in State is not a generally accepted mode of conduct. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball enjoyed a reputation as a courageous devil's advocate on the subject of Vietnam, but anyone who opposed Ball's hard line vis-a-vis General de Gaulle had to be wary of the consequences. At least one senior officer with the temerity to play devil's advocate on this issue received word that the Under Secretary no longer desired to share the same room with him during policy discussions.

The State Department country director in Washington is the official perhaps most likely to take advantage of his colleagues' reluctance to force an issue. He tends to believe that his job—and his chances for career advancement—lies in maintaining a cordial daily relationship between the United States and Country X. He tends to turn aside any potential disturbance in this relationship, including those changes which could be in the long-run national interest. Unless he is an exceptional man, he is fearful that any such disturbance will adversely effect his reputation and career. Worse, he is probably right.

A desk-officer prerogative particularly prone to abuse is the power to cut off the flow of outgoing reports prepared by State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which is supposed to render judgments independent of existing policy considerations. This right of suppression exists for the alleged purpose of correcting "factual inaccuracies." But intelligence reports are often timed for release at an optimum moment. When desk officers withhold clearances of such reports temporarily, it reduces the unfavorable impact of views contrary to official policy.

The intelligence section of the State Department has few operational responsibilities; hence it is viewed by many FSO's as a kind of purgatory. For example, David Nes, who had the ill grace to tell the press and the Congress that he had warned the Department of the imminence of the 1966 Arab-Israeli war while serving as charge d'affaires in Cairo, was summarily assigned to the intelligence section until he chose to resign. A number of Foreign Service Officers in intelligence are thus more interested in returning to "policy-making" than in arguing a fresh point of view before those with whom they may soon again be working.

THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM

The occupational diseases of desk and intelligence officers are, of course, only symptomatic of the personality characteristics impeding the State Department. Back in 1963, Dean Rusk told a Senate Government Operations Subcommittee that "the heart of the bureaucratic problem is the inclination to avoid responsibility . . . organization seldom gets in the way of a good man . . . if a man demonstrates that he is willing to make judgments and live with the results." Governor Averell Harriman has stated repeatedly that "good organizational machinery can never substitute for good people"—a disturbing thought when juxtaposed with his assertion that "regardless of the talent brought in on top, the backbone of the State Department is the Foreign Service."

Professor Chris Argyris, Chairman of Yale's Department of Administrative Sciences and a respected authority on organizational behavior, was unkind enough to write a report on "Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State." After attending three long sessions with senior officers, Argyris judged the norms of personal interaction among most FSO's to be characterized by "withdrawal from interpersonal difficulties and conflict; minimum interpersonal openness; mistrust of others' aggressiveness; and withdrawal from aggressiveness and fighting." In calling for a further study of the causes for such norms, Argyris suggested the distinct possibility that "the problem is primarily one of individuals who fear taking initiative, and not the system suppressing their initiative."

HIGH-RISK OUTHOUSE

A study like the one Argyris suggested might well begin with the Foreign Service basic training course for young men entering our diplomatice corps. In 1963, it was conducted by a senior officer whose constant (and sincerely expressed) maxim was: "Find out who Big Brother is—and knuckle under."

The usual defensive explanation for Milquetoastian behavior on the part of individual Foreign Service Officers is the promotion system. FSO's are fond of describing it as a high-rise outhouse, constructed so that each person—except for those at the very bottom—is subject to deposits from those above but can deposit in kind upon those below. Although this is hyperbole, this general view of the system is widely shared within the Department. Whether it is accurate or not, *belief* in its validity creates a formidable operating reality; it hardly encourages dissent with one's "superior."

A classic example occurred in Rome in the late 1950's, when an astute political officer boldly tried to convince the Embassy that the U.S. government should support the "opening to the left" in Italian politics and quietly bestow a blessing upon the proposed creation of a left-of-center government in place of the traditional conservatives. This officer pressed his views on the Ambassador and on influential U.S. officials back in Washington—at which point outhouse residents at the intermediate levels let fly with reports of "insubordination." The offender was on the brink of removal from the Foreign Service when the incoming Kennedy Administration decided to support the "opening to the left." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., saved the State Department from losing that officer, who is now highly regarded.

Despite the outhouse symbol, there has been encouraging evidence that the personnel system is a paper tiger, that it will reward the dissenting activist rather than punish him. One of the new criteria for promotion of junior men is the officer's ability to suggest or embark upon untested courses of action. Close attention is now given to screening out biased personnel reports, and efforts are being made to see that the most demanding assignments are given to the self-starters. In order to shore up this system, the personnel officer jobs in Washington are now being manned by individuals with deserved reputations for tough-mindedness. There are numerous examples of initiative being rewarded by promotion to the higher ranks, perhaps the most notable being the rapid rise of William H. Sullivan, who recently completed a long and distinguished tour as Ambassador to Laos and is now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific.

NO EXIT

If retribution at the hands of the personnel system is something of a bogeyman, are there other reasons why Foreign Service Officers so regularly prefer discretion to valor? One might begin with a look at the personal circumstances of the older officers. They joined the Foreign Service when the bulk of new officers came from gentlemanly schools and "nice" families. Later, they saw John Foster Dulles sacrifice some of their colleagues to Senator Joseph McCarthy. Many of these men now have children of college age; they are unlikely to take risks which they (rightly or wrongly) believe could jeopardize their jobs. And they are aware of a harsh fact about the Foreign Service: it trains in skills not readily transferable to other forms of employment.

Whimsical critics of the Foreign Service have suggested that only individuals with professional degrees or independent incomes be accepted into the ranks, on the theory that such persons are less likely to worry about the risks associated with outspokenness. It has also pointed out numerous times that the toughest fighter of all—"the old crocodile," Averell Harriman—never had to lose any sleep over where his next paycheck might be coming from.

Other factors that dull the cutting edge of senior officers include the personnel rating report and the transient nature of Foreign Service assignments. The rating report, which is no longer withheld from the officer being rated, requires detailed comment on the officer's abilities and characteristics, as well as the degree to which his family is, or is not, an asset. One officer, now retired, recalls his first post abroad well. One day he puffed up three flights of the Consulate steps to tell a superior about an incident which had just occurred in the city. He was somewhat out of breath when he told his tale. The subsequent rating report said that the officer "does quite well, in spite of a slight speech defect." Although this is an extreme and ludicrous example, it does have its point: only the most thickskinned officers can accept a lifetime of these reports, however ridiculous, without tending towards self-consciousness.

Smith Simpson's *Anatomy of the State Department* ascribes Foreign Service faintheartedness to the constant cycle of assignment and re-assignment, which encourages officers to think more about their future possibilities than about their present challenges. Regulations requiring automatic dismissal of those Foreign Service Officers repeatedly passed over for promotion, wise as those rules may be in some ways, create an extra measure of pressure toward conformity.

While the timorous nature of those officers who survive to seniority is perhaps understandable, younger officers often display the same attributes, and perhaps to an even greater degree. Far from brimming with ideas, most young officers are concerned almost exclusively with career advancement into areas of substantial responsibility. Given the nature of most jobs at the bottom of the ladder, this may not be surprising.

DISTILLED WATER

One of the most promising efforts at renovating the State Department has been the

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Open Forum Panel, originally created as an avenue for out-of-channel policy ideas that could be passed on to the Secretary. Rusk gave this Panel his firm endorsement and sent an open letter to all posts, urging the submission of ideas. The silence was deafening.

Of the 100 or so ideas received, almost all came from the three Department bureaus whose directors had asked their subordinates to "let 1,000 flowers bloom" by noon on Friday. The remaining handful came from five or six individuals who had received no such "request" from above. The most imaginative suggestions were submitted by senior officers. Secretary Rusk met twice with the Panel and approved several of the policy suggestions. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* wrote articles praising the creation of the Panel, and CBS sent Dan Rather to do a TV news cut on the subject. But the effervescence of long-frustrated ideas within the Department remained roughly equivalent to that in a bottle of distilled water. It was curiously unrefreshing.

The Junior Foreign Service Officers Club is another hotbed of intellectual dissent. There is a fair amount of militancy in this group, but the demands are exclusively in the personnel field. The club never discusses the policy issues which younger officers might handle if given the positions to which they aspire. In pressing for higher entrance salaries for junior officers, however, JFSOC did wangle one important statistic out of administrative files: the average raw score achieved by Foreign Service applicants on the standard entrance exam has been dropping notably since 1963. This trend is particularly disturbing because it has occurred at a time when the raw test scores of applicants for just about every other program in this nation are going up rapidly.

In considering the disappointing caliber of younger officers, it is necessary to visualize what the State Department looks like to today's applicant. The pay is adequate, but it is significantly below that available in most other jobs, including the Civil Service. The first several years of employment will probably entail mostly consuler work, which can be (and in many instances is) handled by intelligent highschool graduates. The State Department expects its employees to work closely with military officials and employees of the CIA, with whatever hang-up that may entail for many college students. But more important for recruiting, of course, few college students are at ease with the Department's rationale for fighting a cruel war in Southeast Asia. In addition, the style of the present Administration is notably less exciting than that of its predecessors; the most important foreign policy responsibilities seem to have moved to the White House for good; and domestic problems are rising to the top of the nation's priority list anyway.

Thus, it seems likely that the State Department has already screened itself out of consideration by many, if not most, of today's brightest college graduates.

The second category consists of beneficiaries of the State Department.

Of those entering the Foreign Service, most fall into one of three categories. The first—and probably the largest—category is that of patriotic expatriates. Many former Peace Corps volunteers see the Foreign Service as a way of continuing to lead interesting lives abroad. Many Americans with foreign wives find the Foreign Service a means of avoiding the cultural and marital strains of forcing total 'Americanization" upon their wives and families. There is also a large number of Foreign Service personnel who get great satisfaction out of eating at foreign restaurants, shopping at foreign stores, employing inexpensive household servants, drinking tax-free liquor, and patronizing the natives of their post of assignment—all while paying off a mortgage on a house in Washington, which they can rent out at a profit and live in themselves during assignments back home.

* * * * *

The third type of tenant into the Foreign Service is the one with a consuming interest in foreign affairs. George Kennan is possibly the most outstanding example of such a person, although there are other such dedicated and brilliant Soviet specialists, plus numerous experts in various geographic areas and functional fields. If the Foreign Service brings forth 10 such men a year, the shortcomings of the remaining officers can perhaps be disregarded.

TIRED NEW BLOOD

But the clammy atmosphere of the Foreign Service, combined with the highly responsible positions available outside (some in foreign affairs), acts to skim off many, if not most, of the most promising younger officers. The February, 1968, issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* contained an article entitled, "Is the Foreign Service Losing Its Best Young Officers?" The conclusion to be drawn from it is: "Probably so."

The three authors of this article (one of whom has since resigned himself) reviewed 57 questionnaires filled out by men who had entered the Foreign Service between 1960 and 1965 and had subsequently resigned. The authors found that the resignee differs in two ways from his colleagues still in the Service: "He is more likely to have a graduate degree, and . . . he is also more likely to be regarded as an above average officer by his superiors." There is, in the authors' view, "very strong evidence that the resignees do indeed represent the high-performance young men which the Service strives to attract and retain." The attrition rate for FSO's during their first five years of service has lately been about 20 per cent and is now rumored to be rising markedly.

Even more distressing, perhaps, are the reasons given for resigning. Low pay and dissatisfaction with supervisors were listed as of only marginal importance. Over half the respondents, however, gave as their primary reason for leaving either lack of challenge, or lack of long-range prospects for jobs of significant responsibility. Most of them listed "dissatisfaction with the personnel system" as an element, although not a major one, in their decision to resign. Of those who did mention personnel, the largest proportion (39 per cent) checked "pressure to conform" as a specific complaint.

This information inevitably raises some questions and doubts about those who remain in the Service. Are they more dedicated? Less employable elsewhere? More tolerant of mediocrity? Or mediocre themselves?

PRESCRIPTIONS

Unfortunately, cures for the Department of State have traditionally proved more debilitating than the original illness. However, this time around Secretary of State William P. Rogers has taken an important and constructive first step toward reform by calling for a Department open to innovation and debate. And Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson has expressed uncommon interest in adjusting the machinery. These words must be followed up by specific measures.

The previously-mentioned Open Forum Panel has now shifted its attention to contacts outside the State Department, having found so little food for thought within. The Secretary should support the Panel in this role, if for no other reason than to display to the public and to prospective Foreign Service applicants a number of bright and aggressive young officers who believe that the Department can be a Better Place. The Panel should also continue to promote discussion groups and projects among the various Departmental bureaus. These sessions may not change policies overnight, but they are already breaking down inhibitions.

Dissenting opinions should be encouraged as a matter of official policy. Officers who have in the past written such opinions from posts abroad (including a report which predicted North Korea's invasion of South Korea) have found, upon arrival back in Washington, that their reports were suppressed or disparaged. Such forms of information management should perhaps be made a punishable offense.

In the long run, however, the Department of State will be a creative institution only if it directs its recruitment efforts toward men with proven leadership qualities. It will not be enough just to attract such officers; they must be given substantive jobs, not consular work, if they are to be retained.

Intellectual courage is hardly the sole criterion in seeking a Foreign Service prepared to promote our national interest. But given the various influences pervading foreign policy, such courage may be a prerequisite. During the McCarthy era, one Foreign Service Officer, in charge of a small consulate, received firm orders from Washington to remove certain works of literature from the shelves of the post library. Although outraged, the FSO weighed his personal interest against the national interest. He decided to comply with the order—against the advice of none other than an Air Force officer, his military aide. While superficially surprising, the implications are ominous.

CORRECTION OF COSPONSOR OF BILL

S. 11

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the name of the senior Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN) is indicated erroneously as a cosponsor of S. 11, to reinforce the federal system by strengthening the personnel resources of State and local governments, to improve intergovernmental cooperation in the administration of grant-in-aid programs, to provide grants for improvement of State and local personnel administration, to authorize Federal assistance in training State and local employees, to provide grants to State and local governments for training of their employees, to authorize interstate compacts for personnel and training activities, to facilitate the temporary assignment of personnel between the Federal Government, and State and local governments, and for other purposes.

On his behalf, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, his name be removed from the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INCOME TAX LAW REFORM—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 222

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the text of the amendment I intend to propose to H.R. 13270, an act to reform the income tax laws. The RECORD shows that I submitted this amendment on October 3, 1969.

There being no objection, the text of the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

H.R. 13270

On page 27, strike out line 21 and all that follows through line 8 on page 28 and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R0005
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
FILE COPY

91ST CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 157

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 7, 1969

Mr. FULBRIGHT introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JOINT RESOLUTION

To establish a Commission on Organizational Reforms in the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency.

Whereas there is an obvious need to insure that the United States conducts all aspects of its foreign relations in the most effective possible manner; and

Whereas toward this end, it is appropriate to provide for an independent study of the present operation and organization of the Department of State, including the Foreign Service, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency with a view to determining and proposing needed institutional reforms: Therefore be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That there is hereby created a commission to be known as

II

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL FILE COPY

1 the Commission on Organizational Reforms in the Depart-
2 ment of State, the Agency for International Development,
3 and the United States Information Agency (hereinafter re-
4 ferred to as the "Commission"). It shall be the duty of the
5 Commission to make a comprehensive study in the United
6 States and abroad and to report to the President and to the
7 Congress on needed organizational reforms in the Department
8 of State, including the Foreign Service, the Agency for Inter-
9 national Development, and the United States Information
10 Agency, with a view to determining the most efficient and
11 effective means for the administration and operation of the
12 United States programs and activities in the field of foreign
13 relations.

14 SEC. 2. The Commission shall consist of twelve mem-
15 bers, as follows:

16 (1) Two members of the Commission, to be ap-
17 pointed by the President of the Senate, who shall be
18 Members of the Senate, of whom at least one shall be
19 a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

20 (2) Two members of the Commission, to be ap-
21 pointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
22 who shall be Members of the House of Representatives,
23 of whom at least one shall be a member of the Commit-
24 tee on Foreign Affairs.

25 (3) Eight members of the Commission, to be ap-

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

1 pointed by the President, who shall not be individuals
2 presently serving in any capacity in any branch of the
3 Federal Government other than in an advisory capacity.
4 SEC. 3. The President shall also appoint the Chairman
5 of the Commission from among the members he appoints to
6 the Commission. The Commission shall elect a Vice Chair-
7 man from among its members.
8 SEC. 4. No member of the Commission shall receive
9 compensation for his service on the Commission, but each
10 shall be reimbursed for his travel, subsistence, and other
11 necessary expenses incurred in carrying out his duties as a
12 member of the Commission.
13 SEC. 5. (a) The Commission shall have power to ap-
14 point and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems
15 advisable, in accordance with the provisions of title 5, United
16 States Code, governing appointments in the competitive
17 service, and chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of
18 such title relating to classification and General Schedule
19 pay rates.
20 (b) The Commission may procure temporary and inter-
21 mittent services to the same extent as is authorized for the
22 departments by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code,
23 but at rates not to exceed $100 a day for individuals.
24 SEC. 6. (a) The Commission shall conduct its study in
25 the United States and abroad and shall report to the Presi-

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

1 dent and to the Congress not later than eighteen months after
2 its appointment upon the results of its study, together with
3 such recommendations as it may deem advisable.
4 (b) Upon the submission of its report under subsection
5 (a) of this section, the Commission shall cease to exist.
6 SEC. 7. The Commission is authorized to secure directly
7 from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, com-
8 mission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality
9 information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the
10 purpose of this Commission, office, establishment, or instru-
11 mentality and shall furnish such information, suggestions, esti-
12 mates and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request
13 made by the Chairman or Vice Chairman.
14 SEC. 8. There is authorized to be appropriated not to
15 exceed $500,000 to carry out this joint resolution.

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1

91st CONGRESS
1st Session

S. J. RES. 157

JOINT RESOLUTION

To establish a Commission on Organizational Reforms in the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency.

By Mr. Fulbright

October 7, 1969

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

Approved For Release 2000/09/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500010001-1