

September 4, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S10245

YARBOROUGH, CARLSON, MURPHY, and BYRD of Virginia.

I feel that it is most important that these funds be provided at this time, and I urge the Senate to move to make them available.

Mr. President, today, in accordance with Senate procedures, both Senators RIBICOFF and MUNDT filed notice of intent to offer amendments dealing with impacted area funds, including the supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1968.

Their amendments relate directly to the appropriation contained in amendment No. 928. Senator RIBICOFF's amendment deals specifically with the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. In addition to the 1968 act, Senator MUNDT's amendment also deals with the anti-deficiency statutes.

In view of the notices filed today, and because I believe the Senate should have the full benefit of a thorough discussion on all approaches to this very important matter, it is not my intention to ask for action on amendment No. 928 today. I shall withhold the amendment from further action until such time as the other two amendments have been presented to the Senate and the Senate has had the benefit of hearing all these approaches to the problem.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I fully support the effort to make available to our federally impacted school districts the money that was withheld from them.

Furthermore, in accordance with rule XI of the Standing rules of the Senate, I hereby give notice in writing that it is my intention to move to suspend paragraph 4 of rule XVI for the purpose of proposing to the bill (H.R. 18037), making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare, and related agencies, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes, the following amendment:

On page 16, line 5, before the period insert a colon and the following: "And provided further, That (1) the additional amount of \$90,965,000 appropriated, under the heading 'School Assistance in Federally Affected Areas' in the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1968, for payments to local educational agencies for the maintenance and operation of schools as authorized by title I of the Act of September 30, 1950 (Public Law 874, Eighty-First Congress), as amended, 20 U.S.C. ch. 13, shall remain available for obligation until October 31, 1968; and (2) the limitations, and requirements for effectuating such limitations, contained in sections 202 and 208 of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 with respect to total expenditures and lending authority and total new obligational and loan authority shall be inapplicable to obligational authority herein, heretofore, or hereafter enacted for the fiscal year 1968, or by the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1968, and to expenditures pursuant to any such obligational authority, for payments to local educational agencies for the maintenance and operation of schools as authorized by title I of the Act of September 30, 1950 (Public Law 874, Eighty-First Congress), as amended, 20 U.S.C. ch. 13."

This amendment will extend to October 31, 1968, the availability of the appropriation of \$91 million made by the

Second Supplemental Appropriation Act for payments to federally impacted school districts.

It will also exempt from the expenditure and obligational authority limitations of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 the \$91 million provided by the second supplemental of 1968 and for any funds provided for impacted areas for fiscal year 1969. This will prevent any reductions made by the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 from being applied to expenditures and obligational authority for carrying out title I of Public Law 874. It will, moreover, exclude the Public Law 874 amounts from the aggregate expenditure and the appropriation ceilings so that the preservation of Public Law 874 funds are not at the expense of other programs.

Congress voted this money once because we felt an obligation to fully fund those schools which had a high concentration of Federal dependents including the children of military personnel.

The schools counted on this money to pay teachers, to buy textbooks, and to purchase other materials. But now it appears the impacted schools program has become part of the \$8 billion budget cut.

We can not let this happen. Education of our young is an investment for the future. Education is one of our great priorities. Saving money here is a false economy. In the long run it will be the most expensive kind of economy.

Connecticut's share of the \$90.9 million supplemental appropriation that was withheld from the federally impacted school districts across the Nation is \$646,000. Thirty-nine Connecticut communities are affected. All have a high concentration of federally employed parents. This is not only a question of budgeting and financing it is a question of children and their education.

The Public Law 874 program is a most important source of Federal aid to public education. It is not hard to appreciate the difficulties faced by school districts which drew up their budgets in the spring of the year for the coming school year expecting to receive the full entitlements provided them by the Congress and then learn well into the new school year that they would receive only 80 percent of what they had anticipated. Efficient school programs simply can not be run that way. Educational programs can not be dropped nor teachers let go in midyear without great cost of taxpayers' dollars, as well as the cost of educational opportunities of our children.

Education is an investment in our future. It is one of our great priorities. Budget cuts in this area make no sense at all.

But we must do more than make available to these school districts the money that Congress already has voted. We must also make sure this situation does not occur next year.

That is why my amendment exempts the federally impacted school program from future budget cuts required by the 1968 tax bill, in addition to extending the deadline for allocating current funds to the school districts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the pleasure of the Senate?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RADIATION HAZARDS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement prepared by the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT] entitled, "Experience Abroad in Regulating Medical and Dental Use of Ionizing Radiations."

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXPERIENCE ABROAD IN REGULATING MEDICAL AND DENTAL USE OF IONIZING RADIATIONS

Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. President, H.R. 10790, the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968, which has been reported by the Senate Commerce Committee and is being considered by the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, will give to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare sorely needed authority to set performance standards for electronic products that emit X-rays and similar radiations.

One fact that stands out in the record of hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee in 1967 and again this year, and also in the hearings held in the other body, is that most of today's man-made exposure to X-radiation comes from medical and dental X-ray machines. Many competent witnesses testified that the means are now at hand to reduce this exposure while still providing the physicians and dentists with the diagnostic information that they need. Throughout the hearings this committee has recognized the great value of medical diagnostic radiology. We recognize also that the needs of patients and advances in medical knowledge may well call for an increase in various forms of medical radiology, and we realize that much individual suffering would follow any unnecessary curtailment of these uses of X-rays. But because of the fact that medical uses of X-rays seem likely to further increase, it becomes all the more necessary to assure that exposure of patients in each case is kept to a minimum. One vital means to that end is the setting of performance standards for the design and manufacture of medical and dental X-ray equipment.

A logical question at this point is to ask what experience there may be with government regulation of exposure to X-rays in medicine and dentistry. There exists a body of relevant experience in the Ministry of Health in England. I would draw attention to this experience.

In 1957, in keeping with the Radioactive Substances Act, a Standing Advisory Committee prepared a code of practice for the protection of persons exposed to ionizing radiations. Part of this code dealt with use of X-rays for diagnosis and therapy. While the code was intended primarily to protect machine operators, it did lay down rules of protection which included technical requirements for the X-ray equipment and its installation.

The Ministry of Health updated this code in 1964 to include consideration of patients,

and to show this new emphasis, retitled it the Code of Practice for the Protection of Persons against Ionizing Radiations arising from Medical and Dental use. This revised code applies to the use of X-rays arising from all forms of medical and dental practice. It is based upon recommendations of the Ministry's Medical Research Council and recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.

Once again, this code lays down technical standards for X-ray equipment used in diagnosis and therapy. For example, it touches upon the issue of fitting the size of an X-ray beam to the size of the X-ray film being used. This question came up before the committee during our hearings when the National Center for Radiological Health testified about its efforts to perfect an automatic collimator for this purpose. There is at present no government requirement that medical X-ray machines have such equipment. Four years ago the British code specified:

"All X-ray apparatus must be equipped with adjustable beam-limiting devices or cones to keep the useful beam within the limits of the X-ray film selected for each examination. . . . The film selected should be as small as possible consistent with a good result."

The committee heard much testimony about fitting dental X-ray machines with cones to limit exposure to patients. Four years ago this British health code specified:

"Localising cones must be employed with all dental equipment. Such cones must provide the maximum practicable focus-skin distance and the minimum practical field size."

Unlike the situation in the United States where regulation of ionizing radiations is split up among different federal and state agencies, this British health code in one place deals with medical and dental exposure from all sources of radiation, whether X-ray machine, natural or artificial radioactive materials.

Of special interest to the committee is the provisions of the Ministry's code of practice that sets out protection for the patient, which in this country is left exclusively to the professional judgment of the radiologist and physician. The British code opens with the frank acknowledgement that there is reason to avoid unnecessary radiation:

"Patients exposed to radiation for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes may be subject to some personal hazard, and the direct or indirect irradiation of their gonads (testes and ovaries) may constitute a hazard to future generations. Consequently it is important to carry out only those radiological examinations and treatments that are strictly necessary and in doing so, to avoid all unnecessary irradiation."

Concerning techniques of diagnostic radiography, the code specifies that in every case the dose given should be the minimum necessary for the purpose. Considerable reductions can be achieved, it states, by strict limitation of field size and by adequate shielding of the gonads. The code calls for use of the fastest films and screens consistent with satisfactory diagnostic results and for use of automatic timers.

Mr. President, my point in bringing this code of practice to the attention of the Senate is to show that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare will not venture into unknown territory as he uses the authority assigned to him in H.R. 10790, the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968. There is experience that can be looked at and analyzed. There is evidence that regulation of X-ray machines and other sources of ionizing radiation for medical and dental use can be accomplished without freezing the technology of the industries that supply them. The company that de-

signs and makes X-ray equipment with attention to safety will not be burdened, but rather will be relieved of possible unfair competition by those who are tempted to take short cuts in design or to skimp in manufacture. And the performance standards to be set by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare will assure the public, who are in no position to know for themselves, that new X-ray equipment sold in interstate commerce is designed and made to minimize possible radiation exposure to radiation workers, patients and the public alike.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, notwithstanding rule VIII, I may be permitted to proceed out of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

CLOSE UP ON THE CZECH CRISIS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the arrival of Russian tanks and men in Prague in late August thrust the United States into the center of another major international crisis, with effects not yet fully discernible. The political and moral issues as related to our national aspirations and international commitments, are certain to be discussed here in Congress.

I have collected a number of newspaper articles and editorials which appeared during the eventful last 2 weeks of August in leading newspapers in the British Isles, where I happened to be during the invasion period. These provide close-up views of the Czech crisis. Of added value, I believe they offer an opportunity to weigh the thinking of our own Western allies on the Czechoslovakian crisis.

It will be noted that the Irish Independent, Dublin, Ireland, in its August 22 editorial, "Jackboots From the East" graphically stated the issue:

The world heard of Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia with shudders of horror that have not lessened since the first Soviet paratrooper flew into a country not his own, in defence of a creed he barely believes in.

The Sunday Times, London, England, took the long view of "The Problems That Tanks Can't Solve," in an August 24 full-page analysis of Czechoslovakia, its intellectual aspirations, economic reform, and Slovak nationalism. Pointing out that the Russian military victory over the Czechs was easy, it opened its dissection of the situation by stating:

The two peoples of this beleaguered country, the Czechs and the Slovaks, are caught up with the Russians and the Germans in a contest of nationalities and economic forces that scarcely seems resolvable. At least, every time there is an attempt at resolution, in 1938, 1948 or 1968, the product is bloodshed and violence.

And Americans who have persistently advocated disarmament as the only sure road to world peace might wish to consider the words of the London, England, Daily Express, Opinion published on Saturday, August 24. Under the title, "The Best Answer to Bullies," it stated:

The Czech leaders' journey to Moscow to plead their cause. As one humiliation after another is heaped on them, for the British people there is a grim object lesson. It is one that must not be ignored. For this is the kind of treatment a nation can expect if it cannot defend itself.

The Sunday Telegram, London, England, on August 25, projected a portrait of British governmental helplessness in the face of the Czech crisis which could well be a description of the situation here in our own U.S. Congress. An editorial, "This Picture and That," stated as its premise:

Parliament meets tomorrow to protect Britain's name, against an international crime it could not prevent and can do nothing to reverse.

Particularly important, and certain to be a factor in future United States-West German relations, is the development of a feeling that the U.S. Government, because of its own commitment in Vietnam, directed that warnings of the impending invasion of Czechoslovakia be "played down." In an article carried by The Sunday Times, London, England, on August 25, entitled "Early Warning on the Invasion Was Ignored," Antony Terry reported from Bonn, West Germany:

Angry Intelligence officials here allege that a general "play it down" order from the U.S. Government, because of Vietnam, resulted in vital early warnings of the impending Czech invasion being ignored by the West, and that an early leak of Soviet intentions on Czechoslovakia, they argue, might have mobilised world opinion and made the Russians draw back at the last moment.

The reporter further stated:

There are also increasing demands for an independent European nuclear force and for a strengthening of West Germany's ground defense and early warning system.

I recommend these, and a selected group of related British newspaper articles and editorials on the Czechoslovakian situation, to the Members of this body for consideration. I ask unanimous consent that these newspaper editorials and articles be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Irish Independent, Aug. 22, 1968]

JACKBOOTS FROM THE EAST

The world heard of Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia with shudders of horror that have not lessened since the first Soviet paratrooper flew into a country not his own, in defence of a creed he barely believes in. From the biggest to the smallest free nation in the world comes news of protest and condemnation, couched in—quite often—angry words. The Soviet Union risked earning the hate of the world (and she knew this) by stamping on a small nation; the risk was fatal and she has added another reason to existing ones why we must regard her rulers with contempt and loathing.

If these may seem futile words and of little help to the Czechs, let it be remembered that they are applied to a country which has claimed to have unlocked the secrets that will dissipate the threat of "imperial aggression" and bring peace to the working people of the world. They are a reminder that for the 50 years of its existence, Moscow has preached drivel and forged new chains wherever she has gone. By now, even

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the most dyed-in-the-wool admirer must recognize that the last imperial power on earth has acted like those Mongol hordes of old who raided Moscow when tribute was late or little.

The Czechs have done their bit for truth and decency. The 10,000 people who, according to one report, massed yesterday between Russian tanks and the broadcasting station in Prague had their priorities right, and showed their understanding of the Communist mind; they were defending, not an administrative building, but freedom of speech itself; they knew that their station would no longer be trustworthy once it was lost to the Soviets—who cannot handle or cope with the truth. Soviet Communism and deceit are partners to death.

Of course the Czech leaders were right when they said their armed forces had not been told to resist. Heroics would say something else, but the Czechs have weighed all in the balance and remembered, no doubt, a Hungary left to bleed. They must also be keeping in mind the effect on the world of the second invasion on Czechoslovakia in 50 years. It is here we can do something for the peaceless people of that country—something, indeed, which has already been started by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Aiken.

Every Irishman will agree wholeheartedly with him that the Security Council should call on the aggressors to withdraw at once from the territory they seized in violation, as the Czechs put it in their last few statements, of the principles of international law. Ireland has made a name for itself at the United Nations and its efforts bore fruit when the agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms was signed. That this initiative was noticed and admired in distant parts is clear from a recent report by our Political Correspondent who is with the Taoiseach in the Far East. If, then, we have accumulated any capital in international circles it should be spent now in aid of the Czechs; we have nothing else to give them but our sympathy, and that is not enough.

At this stage it would be an exercise in frustration to probe the motives behind the Russian invasion. The stated reasons are not good enough; the Czech National Assembly (the Dal, in a form) has repudiated the Russian announcement that aid was asked for. In the long run we are left with the certain fact that the Russians are afraid of liberalisation spreading throughout Eastern Europe and into their own territories. But in the past such reckless adventures have been the results of divided councils, and therefore frightened ones, at the top. A similar situation could be in the making in the Soviet Union now.

At the moment there are reports coming in from Czechoslovakia of anti-Russian demonstrations, and of some shooting. The world will watch the Russians and their spineless allies (who would have thought that Hungary and Poland, both raped in the past by the Russians, would have found common ground?) to see that murders such as Nagy's and Pal Malator's in Hungary will not be perpetrated on the Dubceks and Svobodas of Czechoslovakia. There are no limits to the senseless destruction of a bear on the rampage.

[From the London Sunday Times, Aug. 25, 1968]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS, ECONOMIC REFORM, AND SLOVAK NATIONALISM—THE PROBLEMS THAT TANKS CAN'T SOLVE

(Military victory was easy. But for the Russians, or any new Government, complex economic, political and social issues remain. Dr. Z. A. B. Zeman, whose authoritative history of the crisis is to be published soon by Penguin, defines the problems.)

The two peoples of this beleaguered country, the Czechs and the Slovaks, are caught

up with the Russians and the Germans in a contest of nationalities and economic forces that scarcely seems resolvable. At least, every time there is an attempt at resolution, in 1938, 1948 or 1968, the product is bloodshed and violence.

The Soviet tanks that ground into Prague (one of the squares, incidentally, is called in commemoration of the second world war, the Square of the Soviet Tank Crews) solve nothing. The Russians can force the people to submit. Men can be found in Prague to whom the Moscow brand of "socialism" is acceptable. But the growths and tensions which caused the rise and fall of Alexander Dubcek will continue in some form. They spring, after all, from things as ineluctable as the European history since 1917-19, and as irresistible as the appetite of a modern economy for computers and plastic mouldings; the Russian memories of twenty million war dead, and the demands of Czech intellectuals to write the truth as they see it, from arguments about the accents of the politicians in Prague to arguments about the price of Russian oil on the world market.

The way these tensions developed tells us much about the limited set of options that the Russians now face in dealing with them.

The birth of Czechoslovakia occurred at a moment when both Germany and Russia had simultaneously retreated into defeat and confusion, leaving a power-vacuum in Central Europe: that is to say, the birth occurred at the Versailles Peace Conference after the first world war. It might be argued that but for this vacuum the conference would not have been able to assemble a new country out of the Bohemian, Moravian and Slovak fragments of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which had been destroyed in the war.

Certainly the resurgence of these great powers has been too much for the Czechoslovak Republic in each case: first Germany in 1938, and now Russia in 1968.

Awkwardly for great powers, however, this cobbled-up republic remains the home of two stubbornly durable nationalisms. The Czechs, the people of Bohemia and Moravia in the West, came under the Austrian or German-speaking part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and in the nineteenth century they were supposed to forget their peculiar language and traditions, and turn into Germans. Far from doing so, they actually rebuilt their culture.

INDEPENDENCE

Similarly the Slovaks in the east, who came under the Hungarian side of the empire, were expected to turn into Hungarians. Some did, but a fierce independence remained.

It is often said that the tough, slightly primitive Slovak peasants have little in common with the sophisticated townfolk of industrialised Bohemia and Moravia: indeed, their languages differ, and the tough Slovaks feel a kind of magnified version of the Scots' distaste for the over-privileged English.

The tension between them, after all, was one of the major reasons for the loosening-up of Party discipline in the last two years. But still, if the twentieth century has taught these two small peoples anything, it is that if they do not look after each other, no one else will.

The trickiest problem the Russians now face is probably that of dealing with the Czechoslovak economy. Very largely, this is still the economy of the Czech part of the country: building on its pre-war development, this is easily the most advanced economy in the Communist bloc except for East Germany. But a prime underlying cause of the Czechoslovak ferment of the past two years has been the realisation that under the regime of the old-style party this economy can develop no further. (The force of this realisation, together with the thrust of Slovak nationalism and the revolt of the Czech intellectuals made a combination which the old-guard Novotny regime could not hold off.)

Probably more important than any of the explosive political novels and essays which have appeared in the last two years has been a rather technical work called "Civilisation at the Crossroads." This is the work of Radovan Richta, of the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences and a commission of economists, sociologists, physicists and other scholars set up to examine the impact of the scientific and technological revolutions on society. Its effect, among other things, was to demolish Khrushchev's famous optimism about the ease with which the capitalist economies would be "over-taken."

The argument of *Civilisation at the Crossroads* was that Czechoslovakia was about to enter a scientific-technological industrial revolution of the kind that is well under way in most developed Western countries—but that it could be impeded or altogether deflected by low-quality industrial management in Czechoslovakia. It is said that the "administrative-directive" system of management, with its bias in favour of old-fashioned heavy industries, could not cope with the new challenge. (In Czechoslovakia the quality of management has not been raised by the tradition that jobs in the administrations of nationalised industries have frequently been rewards for Party hacks.)

Richta and his colleagues calculated that automation in machine industries in Czechoslovakia was three to six times less developed than in the U.S. The production of computer equipment—the highest form of automation—was where the worst discrepancies occurred. They calculated that production of "cybernetic systems" was 50 times lower than the U.S. and 10-15 times lower than England, France or Sweden. Czech industries produced three to four times less plastic materials than America or West Germany, and the textile industry was far behind in use of artificial fibres.

The gap between the capitalist and socialist "systems" seemed to be lengthening: at this rate, overtaking the capitalist system would take "about twenty or thirty years, or more."

Claiming that the potentialities for orthodox heavy industry had been exhausted in 1959 in Czechoslovakia, "Civilisation at the Crossroads" demanded rapid expansion into science-based industries, arguing that the whole system of jerky economic advancement had been replaced by continuous and universal change—and that the permanent revolution would take place in science, not politics.

PRICE OF OIL

The infuriating thing for the Czechs was the knowledge that unlike Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria or the Soviet Union itself, they had the concentration of industrial capital and educational resources to break through into a new prosperity—but were not doing so. One economist calculated that the average industrial wage in Czechoslovakia was 1,448 crowns, compared to 2,250 in France, 3,660 in West Germany, 4,170 in Britain and 10,400 in America.

Also, the more the Czech economists looked at the details of their economic arrangements with the Soviet Union, the less they liked them. Pushed towards Eastern trade both by political direction and by the problems of competing in the West with an unreconstructed economy, they found themselves being turned into a workshop for processing Russian raw materials at little benefit to themselves. To find, then, that the Russians preferred to shop for advanced equipment, in the West—on grounds of quality—made it even worse.

Pressed by the desires of their own people for some economic relief, Russian negotiators have driven tough bargains with their Communist partners. The Czechs resent, for instance, their oil agreement in Russia: under which, by their figures, they pay eighteen roubles a ton till 1974, which is exactly twice the highest amount the Russians charge the Italians and the Japanese.

Antonin Novotny, the Stalinist functionary who clung to power until Dubcek removed him early this year, apparently believed that he could allow economic reform to begin without any risk that it would spread into the political sphere. Particularly for someone accustomed to the compartmentalisation of a Stalinist State, it was an understandable mistake. But Novotny's mishandling of the Slovak nationality issue was altogether more inept.

His crucial blunder occurred at what was supposed to be a celebration just one year ago this month. The Slovaks were celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of their high school, and of the Matica, an organisation which looks after Slovaks abroad. The existence and energy of the Matica is a testimonial to the powerful national feelings of the Slovaks: as a people, they still feel that they are entitled to a separate government within the Czechoslovak state, and that they will never get a fair deal from Bohemian Prague without it.

Novotny's speech at Turcansky Sv. Martin said flatly that the nationality problem had been solved, and that the Slovaks were best off inside the centralised national framework. The speech was totally unsuitable for a Slovak national celebration. There was worse to come.

After his speech, Novotny talked to Vasil Bilak, then one of the secretaries of the Slovakian Communist Party. Bilak said that the Matica building was too small; Novotny suggested that its papers should be transferred to Prague, and that anyway the Foreign Institute should look after both Czechs and Slovaks living abroad.

It was a bureaucrat's answer, devoid of political sensitivity, and it infuriated Bilak (no wild man, as his willingness, last week, to co-operate with Moscow shows). He asked Novotny, rather loudly, how dare he make such an offensive suggestion. The President and his wife called up their car, and left the celebration early.

The set-up of Communism in Czechoslovakia gives an indication of the lop-sidedness of the nationality arrangements. There is a national (Czechoslovak) Communist Party, and there is a specialised Slovak Communist Party. But there is no specialised Communist Party for Bohemia and Moravia: presumably because dominant Czechs like Novotny saw themselves as incarnating the national spirit of the two peoples simultaneously. But, of course, the Slovaks did not agree: possibly the ineptitude with which Novotny handled them was exacerbated by his economic and cultural troubles in Bohemia; anyway, in the latter half of 1968 organised demands began to come from the Slovak party branches for the removal of Novotny.

Novotny, last autumn, trundled out the standard counter to Slovakian contrariness: the charge of "bourgeois nationalism," which had been used in show trials in the 1950s. It did not work, any more than the cumbersome device of trying to shroud the nationality of leading Party figures, and the attempt to develop in official mouths a kind of "mid-Moravian" accent which would approximate to both languages at once.

It was a question of time before an opponent to Novotny arose in the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak party. The right man was sure of support by the Slovaks as well as the discontented economic reformers.

THE SICK WORDS

Economics and nationalism are mighty social forces, but the role of cultural development cannot be ignored: especially among the Czechs, the revival of whose nationalism in the nineteenth century was very much an intellectual revival, centered around creative writers and historians. Two novels which appeared last year, suddenly smashing the tradition of safe, mechanical politically inert literature, indicate what is happening.

The authors are Milan Kundera, who wrote *The Joke*, and Ludvik Vaculik, who wrote *The Axe*. Both are Moravians in their forties, former working journalists and members of the Communist Party. In *The Joke*, a young student is ruthlessly persecuted in early Stalinist Czechoslovakia for making a political joke ("Optimism is the opium of the people. Long live Trotsky!"). The injured man sets out, many years later, to revenge himself by humiliating the wife of the man he held responsible for his persecution. He finds revenge useless: the woman, who married as part of "party discipline," has separated from her husband, and even beating her is pointless, because she is a masochist.

The *Axe* is narrated by a successful Prague journalist who knows "the hard work of writing something that will be published and yet leave part of my honour untouched." The story is stocked with characters who have rejected Czech society, like the countryman who says "this era favours the stupider half of man. Let it do so, but without me."

The journalist writes an article about a young girl's suicide of uncertain morals: a doctor giving evidence to an investigating committee perjures himself when describing the condition of the body because "she was much more a virgin than those bastards were the elected representatives of the people."

When Vaculik's journalist gets into trouble for writing about the case, he declines to be defended on the grounds of his impeccable working-class origins, saying he will have no more of the act of "self-terrorisation" that the party expects of its members. "That's all the Czech invention is: we terrorise ourselves so democratically that there's no one left to assassinate."

DRAB OPTIMISM

The effect of this sardonic realism among the drab optimism of most Prague publishing was staggering. This kind of writing has appeared more and more frequently in the past two years: fully politically committed, and healing the relationship between word and object. ("Killing of words," wrote Miroslav Holub in May, 1968, "precedes the killing of people." Democracy, Holub thought, was "a very sick word in Czechoslovakia.")

The Fourth Writers' Congress was the arena the Novotny regime chose for its ideological counterblast. Jiri Hendrich, one of Novotny's most loyal henchmen, made opening and closing speeches declaring the need for hewing to the party line—but they were ignored because of the stream of libertarian speeches in between. (Not that they were specifically pro-Western in the main. A. J. Liehm, while criticising the political pressures on writers in Czechoslovakia, pointed out that writers in the West were subject to commercial pressures which could also be crippling.)

"Assuming," said Ludvik Vaculik, "that none of us was born for the sake of being governed easily, I suggest the Union of Writers takes the initiative, possibly together with the Union of Journalists and ask the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences for an expert revision of the constitution, and demand if necessary its revision." He said: "We have accomplished social revolution—and the problem of power continues. Though we have taken the bull by the horns, and we are holding him, somebody goes on kicking our backsides all the time."

The impact of these writings, and these words, on the Czech consciousness was hardly something from which there could be a going back—either for the readers or the writers. For Ludvik Vaculik, it developed to authorship of the *Two Thousand Words* manifesto, published and signed by a large group of intellectuals just before the talks with the Russians: and last week to election to the clandestine Central Committee of the

Czechoslovak Communist Party to replace men seized by the Russians.

The three forces that acted against Novotny, and for the break-up of the old bureaucracy, could coalesce behind Dubcek: a Slovak, with a flexible attitude to economic reform, an unimpeachable record of resistance to Germany—he was wounded, and his brother killed, in the Slovak resistance—and "clean hands"—he had the reputation of having stood aside from the persecution of writers under Novotny.

Although their degree of overtness will depend on the degree of Soviet control in the future, these interlinked forces will continue to exist: particularly the question of the economy. The Russians may feel that they can tolerate a run-down Czech economy, but it may well be that if someone in the Communist bloc does not solve the problem of modernisation, their own economic goals will become harder to attain. So far, the Russians have made no visible attempt to understand the situation in Czechoslovakia. The situation there over the past year was complex and needed careful reporting and interpretation. It has been withheld from the Russian people, and possibly from their government as well.

Why did the Russians invade, seventeen days after the Bratislava meetings? It may be pointless to speculate on whose voice was decisive in the Kremlin, but there can be little doubt of the immediate reason for the timing.

The Slovak party congress was to open tomorrow, and the Czechoslovak congress on September 9. Judging by the way votes had gone in the regions, the "conservatives" remaining in the central committee and the other top party posts had little chance of survival. Last week was the last chance of intervention.

The optimism of the Dubcek faction in Czechoslovakia about Russian intentions springs in good part from the way they interpreted Brezhnev's attitude when he visited Prague in December, 1967. He seemed understanding, and gave little sign of willingness to exert himself on Novotny's behalf.

But at the grass-roots level the Czechoslovak and Russian Communists have two different kinds of political and national experience. More often than not the Russian party faced conditions of exile, underground work and persecution. When it came to power in 1917 it had vast, almost unthinkable problems to solve. It always placed discipline above all other virtues.

The Czechoslovak Party operated from 1922 until 1938 as a legal, parliamentary party, and during the war years it faced problems also faced by other anti-Nazi groups. It might be said that the Czechoslovak party, having tried the Russian model for 20 years and got itself into a difficult position largely of its own making, decided to try its older tradition.

But the Russians are suspicious of Czechoslovakia's western traditions, and tend to overestimate their political significance. In May, one of their newspapers called Thomas Masaryk, a sinister plotter involved in the attempt to assassinate Lenin. It infuriated the Czechs, who had just "rediscovered" Masaryk.

The historical validity of the charge, presumably based on the presence of a few of Masaryk's Czech troops in action against the Bolsheviks immediately after the Revolution, is not particularly relevant. The point is that the Russians see the great Czech hero as a man involved in one of the most troubled episodes of their troubled history.

And from the Russian viewpoint, the problem of whether they, or the Germans, dominate Central Europe has yet to be solved. Behind their propaganda about "revanchism" and "imperialism" lies comprehensible foreign policy: twice in this century the Russians have had to face an onslaught

from the centre of Europe. Only they know how many people they lost in the last war—twenty million or more.

SOVIET DEFENSES

Obviously, they are bitterly resentful of the idea of having to alter their arrangements in Eastern and Central Europe just because—as they see it—a few economists and politicians in Prague have caught sight of the bright lights of Western Europe.

Apparently, they were somehow fooled into thinking that the arrival of Soviet tanks would bring the truly loyal population flocking to support the Russian cause. Even their somewhat inflexible political intelligence must by now be disabused of that idea.

Czechoslovakia has often been called "a bridge between the East and the West." It was not a description which appealed to Jan Masaryk, the gay, tragic son of the founder of the Czechoslovak Republic—the man who was found lying dead under his bathroom window one month after the Communists seized total power in 1948.

"I don't want Czechoslovakia to be a bridge for anything," he used to say. "What happens to a bridge. In wartime, the first thing that happens is you get blown up. In peacetime, the bullocks walk across and drop dung all over you." At the moment the Russians are finding the bridge difficult to "blow." But the danger will not go away while Europe remains divided.

[From the London, England, Daily Express, Aug. 24, 1968]

THE BEST ANSWER TO BULLIES

The Czech leaders journey to Moscow to plead their cause. As one humiliation after another is heaped on them for the British people there is a grim object lesson. It is one that must not be ignored. For this is the kind of treatment a nation can expect if it cannot defend itself.

Is Britain herself as strong as she can be in an age in which the certainty of retaliation is the only safeguard against aggression?

She has, it is true, nuclear forces under her control.

Unhappily Britain's nuclear force is not strong enough to be, beyond dispute, a credible deterrent.

When Parliament meets on Monday, then, the Government must announce that—as a beginning—another nuclear missile submarine will be built without delay. And that the existing four Polaris-type submarines will be converted to carry the vastly more advanced Poseidon missile battery.

The four nuclear submarines we have at present do not provide a sufficient margin of safety because we can count on only one being on patrol at any one time. A fifth warship would effectively double the fleet at sea. And double the power of the deterrent.

The original aim of five submarines should be reached with all speed. For then, at any moment, at least 60 targets would face immediate retribution.

Arguments of economy are of secondary importance. In fact, Britain today is spending a smaller proportion of her national income on defence than in the Edwardian era.

A Polaris-type submarine costs some £50 million. That is about one third of one per cent of what the Government spends annually. And look what it buys:—

Security against aggression. Real independence for our people.

America has carried, virtually alone, the burden of defending the West.

It is unacceptable that we should place on our friends the obligation of risking their own destruction to secure our safety.

We must be ready to defend ourselves.

As soon as practicable the nuclear fleet should be built up to eight Polaris submarines to provide us with the effective sinews of self-defence.

This is the best answer we can give, with the dreadful image of Prague before us, to the bullies who are tempted by weakness.

[From the London Sunday Telegraph, Aug. 25, 1968]

THIS PICTURE AND THAT

Parliament meets tomorrow to protest, in Britain's name, against an international crime it could not prevent and can do nothing to reverse. It is right, nevertheless, that the ideal of freedom and the principle of national sovereignty should thus be solemnly upheld by all parties in the highest council of the nation.

But there is another item on the order paper, the Nigerian civil war. Czechoslovakia may no longer be "a faraway country of which we know little," yet it is behind the Iron Curtain. Nigeria, on the contrary, is still open to Western influence. Moreover, it owes its frontiers, its federal structure and, indeed, its very existence to the British Parliament itself. Is it not the plain duty of our elected representatives to offset their unavoidable impotence on one plane with a full acceptance of their responsibilities on another, where their deliberations can still have some effect?

The final Federal assault on the Ibos trapped in the rump of Biafra may not yet have begun. Nevertheless, the advance from Port Harcourt can only be a prelude to it. In political terms, General Gowon has failed more miserably than the tyrants of the Kremlin. They have begun to recruit their political puppets after a two-day exercise, whereas he has found none after 13 months of bloody fighting.

We may avert our eyes from the slaughter that will accompany the final stages of the Biafran tragedy. We shall not, however, be able to ignore the aftermath. No experienced British administrator ever supposed that Nigeria could exist against the will of its leading tribe; and no serious student of Africa ever supposed that the West Coast could escape anarchy if Nigeria disintegrated. Yet these are the probable results of the war that has been sustained by a British decision to continue to supply arms to "a sister Government of the Commonwealth."

The immediate challenge is still the saving of civilian lives, now threatened by renewed fighting as well as by starvation. By this time it must be clear to the most glib that this objective never rated very high with the combatants of either side, even if Colonel Ojukwu has at last agreed in principle to accept relief by surface routes. When fighting Biafra becomes occupied Biafra the essential horror will remain.

Colonel Adekunle, leader of today's assault, declares he wants to see "no Red Cross, no World Council of Churches, no Pope, no missionary and no U.N. delegation," adding for good measure: "We shall shoot at everything, even things that don't move."

He can talk like that because the British Government has, in practice, washed its hands of the whole affair, in order, presumably, to preserve on paper the Commonwealth myth. It would be better to turn that myth into a reality by intervening to restore a minimum of order and humanity to a continent relapsing into savagery.

The Russians are using their strength to prevent a country in their sphere of influence from climbing upwards towards civilised freedom. We deplore this in vain if we are not ready to save a country in our own sphere from plummeting downwards into barbarous repression.

[From the London, England, Sunday Times, Aug. 25, 1968]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA REPORTS FROM BONN—EARLY WARNING ON THE INVASION WAS IGNORED

(By Antony Terry)

Angry intelligence officials here allege that a general "play it down" order from the U.S. Government, because of Vietnam, resulted in vital early warnings of the impending Czech invasion being ignored by the West.

They are demanding from West Germany's Chancellor Kiesinger that in future their warnings and predictions of developments in Eastern Europe should not be deliberately put on ice because of global Washington policy moves. An early "leak" of Soviet intentions on Czechoslovakia, they argue, might have mobilised world opinion and made the Russians draw back at the last moment.

The West German intelligence Service, under its new dynamic young chief, General Gerhard Wessel, was among the first to present concrete evidence to the Bonn Government and NATO countries that the Warsaw Pact "manoeuvres" were an elaborate cover for the full-scale invasion plan. Their detailed advanced information, obtained partly through the German network of agents in Warsaw Pact countries, dovetailed with reports from U.S. intelligence, obtained from "spy in the sky" satellites.

FORCES EARMARKED

General Wessel reported three months ago that non-Czech Warsaw Pact troops were being trained and earmarked for the invasion. The figure given at the time was 10,000 to 12,000 troops from various Soviet bloc countries, which were named as planning a first-stage crossing of the Czech border.

By the end of May, most of the Bonn Government leaders, including the heads of the Defence, Interior and Foreign Ministries, as well as Chancellor Kiesinger himself, had been warned of the plan. Only the Foreign Ministry, under Socialist chief Willy Brandt, expressed doubts that the Russians would "risk going that far."

On May 24, the only attempt to "leak" the news was made by the West German Government's official spokesman, Herr Diehl apparently without the knowledge of Chancellor Kiesinger, at a Press Conference in Bonn. This statement was later officially denied in Bonn and Herr Diehl was reprimanded. It is said here that this denial, which described his statement as "irresponsible and panic-creating talk," was made at U.S. request.

So, although the news was out, it made no impact.

However, information received by early August ended all doubts that the Russians would invade with massive forces—the only question was when. The information passed on to the U.S. and other NATO allies was that the Russians would delay moving in until immediately before the Czech Communist Party Assembly, scheduled for September 9. The delay had been due to disagreement between the "hawks" and the "doves" inside the Kremlin.

But things began coming to a head on August 18, through the Czech ambassador in Moscow, Vladimir Koucky, an old-time "hard liner" of the anti-Dubcek minority inside the Czech Communist Party's Central Committee.

Koucky, who was to be recalled to Prague because of his views—and who was in touch with Oldrich Svetska, editor of the party newspaper Rude Pravo and since named as one of the alleged Prague "quislings"—warned General Yebichev, senior political commissar of the Red Army, that Mr. Dubcek's move to summon an emergency meeting of the Central Committee on the following Tuesday was a final sign that the Czech

Communist Party leaders had "sold out to Right-wing elements" and were set on an anti-Soviet course.

MILITARY MEET

In fact, the Czech party meeting was designed to legalize the reforms introduced by the Dubcek Government and establish a new liberal charter for the Czech Communist leadership and its members.

But the information garnered by West German Intelligence shows that Koucky's move in Moscow was followed at once by urgent consultations among Soviet Military leaders. Gen. Yebichev and the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshall Ivan Grechko, met the supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, Gen. Yakubovsky, and all three went to see Mr. Brezhnev.

The result was an order to speed up the "prophylactic" invasion. According to the Bonn Intelligence reports—which, again, were immediately forwarded to Nato—the arguments by Koucky which finally convinced the Kremlin leaders were that Mr. Dubcek secretly planned to sidetrack the undertakings he had given at the Clerna and Bratislava meetings, that the Czech Party leaders had made secret and dangerous contacts with the West through "illegal and anti-Soviet channels," and that they were planning to accept economic aid from Western countries on a scale that would create problems for Comecon, the Soviet bloc equivalent to the Common Market.

It was Koucky's role that gave the Russians the tenuous but valuable excuse to talk of "influential Czech Party circles," having asked them to intervene to save Czechoslovakia.

As for the current situation, the latest information from the West German Intelligence Service is that only about half the 23 Warsaw Pact divisions assembled for the invasion have actually entered the country. The remainder are still bivouacked, in readiness, along the Czech borders.

Most of these troops are Russians, but there are also two East German divisions, three Polish divisions and rather less than one division from Bulgaria, which was flown in as recently as last Saturday.

Bonn Intelligence officials claim that their advance news of the Soviet build-up and probably invasion spearheads, was confirmed by sensitive electronic listening devices along the West German border with Czechoslovakia—devices with a range sufficient to scan the area up to the Soviet frontier and some way beyond.

Yet the only time the Russians took action against this electronic probing was on the actual night of the invasion, when a massive jamming operation blacked out the devices.

TELEPHONE THREAT

Frustration at the invasion warnings going unheeded led General Wessel, at one stage, to threaten to telephone Chancellor Kiesinger direct, to stress the seriousness of the reports. A further outcome now is that West German military and political circles are to mount a campaign inside NATO for tighter control of military planning intelligence by the European countries and for better co-ordination to prevent their intelligence information being blanketed by any similar American "hold down" order in the future.

There are also increasing demands for an independent European nuclear force and for a strengthening of West Germany's ground defences and early warning system.

[From the London Sunday Times, Aug. 26, 1968]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA NICHOLAS TOMALIN REPORTS THE DEEP SCHISMS OPENING IN WORLD COMMUNISM—THE COMMUNISTS' GREAT CRISIS OF FAITH

Pravda was aghest. As the discordant criticisms of hitherto obedient foreign comrades

pooured into Moscow the official voice of Soviet Communism plaintively declared:

"It is difficult to understand the incoherent position adopted by the leaders of some Communist Parties who are showing a lack of confidence in the actions of healthy forces in Czechoslovakia and sister countries. Perhaps they have been disorientated by Imperialist propaganda, and have not understood the nature of the situation."

If Pravda found such "incoherence" difficult to understand, its meaning was all too clear outside Russia. Perhaps, historically, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia will be remembered even more for its effect on world Communism than on the country itself. The concept of Communism as a mammoth international ideology, overwhelming patriotic loyalties, may have been finally killed off.

There was a second radical consequence. Since Wednesday morning a romantic idealist searching for a new belief might look to anarchy, to pure Marxist-Leninism, to Trotsky, to Che Guevara or even to Peking. He could no longer look to Moscow for a Communist Truth which, like Catholic Truth, has been so dramatically eroded by doubt. From now on, Marxists can only be protestants.

"Yes, you can talk of a crisis of faith," one stalwart British Communist observed. "Our bloody Russian Vatican has done precisely the same as Rome. First they seemed to offer some kind of liberalisation. Then, as we began to take them seriously, they kicked us in the teeth."

"But there's one important difference between the Communist Party and the Catholic Church. When the Pope condemned the Pill he knew that his followers would bash away at sex regardless. In our crisis the followers will bash away at the party."

INGENUOUS

There is endless variety in the way each individual national party is striving to establish independence without agnosticism. Analysis of their shifting positions is a demanding exercise in Marxist theology.

Perhaps the most ingenious formulation of all came from Stalinist Albania whose party, taking the Chinese line, was obliged to condemn both the Dubcek liberalsers and the Moscow revisionists.

Before the invasion, the Albanian official party paper *Zeri i Popullit* managed a blanket condemnation of everyone involved: "The cliques that have come to power, or will come, are pawns in the hands of the Soviet revisionists and the U.S. Imperialists. An international Mafia is acting with a free hand in Czechoslovakia." (Such picturesque abuse was only rivalled in imagination by the Lebanese Communist Party, which blamed "an elite of Jewish intellectuals," and the Beirut newspaper which lyricised about Russian "freedom tanks.")

Since the invasion, the Albanians have become the only Communist Party actually to urge the heroic citizens of Czechoslovakia to use armed resistance against the Red Army Mafia. But they do not praise Dubcek.

China, whose only previous comment on the situation had been the reprinting of Albania's strictures, on Friday issued a violent denunciation of Russian intervention as a Fascist move, reminiscent of Hitler. But again, of course, there was no support for Dubcek.

North Vietnam did not follow this line. Military and economic support from Russia and East Germany is so important to her that promptly on Thursday Radio Hanoi declared that it was with "the noble aim of responding to an appeal from reliable elements in the Czechoslovak Party to defend the socialist regime" that the Warsaw Pact armies had marched in. Logic did not force Hanoi also to approve of the noble aim of the American forces to support reliable elements in Saigon.

Cuba, unlike Hanoi, had the ideological sophistication to remain officially silent for several days, while their leaders wrestled with the rival demands of their principles and Russian economic aid. By Friday Cuba had responded to the purse strings.

It would be only natural for many in the Cuban leadership secretly to gloat over the troubles. Czechs, and particularly Slovaks have always resented the economic aid that Socialist solidarity obliged them to send their allies. Cubans have in their turn always resented what they saw as the selfishness of richer European Socialist States—Che Guevara openly attacked the Russians and other about this in 1965.

In the Capitalist west, precious few parties rallied to the Russians. Some Latin American countries, such as Chile, fell into line. The tiny rump of the American Communist Party, presumably still living in Stalinist isolation, issued a statement "regretting" the intervention but conceding it was "necessary." So, for no explicable reason, did brave little Luxembourg.

Otherwise, the only Westerners to succour Russia were the illegal and exiled parties such as Spain, Greece and West Germany. These, dependent on Soviet support, could hardly do otherwise.

DENUNCIATION

The two most important reactions were those of the Italian and French Communist Parties. Each, in their characteristic fashion, were against the Russians. But the real messages were passed in the nuances of denunciation.

Of these the most complex, and interesting to students of Communist dogma and rhetoric, was that of the Italians. As the largest, and most practised in Jesuitical logic of all European parties this was hardly surprising. But they only just outdid the French. In an intricate ideological gavotte the Italians started soft and moved hard, while the French started hard and moved soft.

The Italians had two special circumstances to cope with. First, their Secretary-General Luigi Longo was away on "holiday" in Moscow. Second, secret news of the impending invasion reached several important party officials in Italy by eight o'clock on Tuesday evening, fully three hours before the actual attack was launched and six hours before Soviet ambassadors began to inform the rest of the world.

Italian Communists firmly deny that Signor Longo, conveniently near the source of information, passed any message. It therefore may be that experienced party men made inspired deductions from the Moscow meeting of the Central Committee.

Another complicating factor was that the senior party man at the drafting of the Italian statement was Pietro Ingrao, leader of the extreme Left wing of the party.

This, perhaps, is the reason why the key phrase in the Italian denunciation of the Russian invasion expressed mere "grave disagreement," which Communist theologians regard as significantly less tough than the "surprise and reprobation" of the French.

On the way home Longo stopped off at Paris for talks with the French Communists. Everyone thought this must result either in Longo—not with Moscow explanations—rallying the French to Russia's side, or a concerted hostile action by both parties. In fact his visit achieved neither. The French discovered him, to their surprise, to be more militantly anti-Russian than they. He found them having second thoughts.

Waldeck Rochet, leader of the French Communists, argued that an early meeting of all European Communist parties could only lead to a total break with the Russians. It would be far better to keep "lines of brotherly friendship" open in the hope of influencing Russian policy.

September 4, 1968

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Longo was disappointed, and did not try to hide it. He concluded a statement made after the meeting by saying: "For the moment no common or collective initiative is planned." When he got to Rome, he endorsed his Italian colleagues' statement with such enthusiasm that textual theologians judge that he hardened the Italian attitude.

Meanwhile, back in Paris, the French were moving faster in the opposite direction. After a four-hour meeting the Central Committee of the party issued its re-think on the matter. "Reprobation" of the Russian action moved down the scale to "disapproval." There was now a long preamble which accused "forces hostile to socialism" of being active against Czechoslovakia.

The French slide was understandable. The whole business hit their party harder than any other in Europe. It could not have come at a worse time, just when—after their poor showing in the last French election—they were trying to sell a new image, that of a dynamic party of the left which had revitalised its policies in the light of the Revolution of the Imagination which the students forced upon it in May.

Like the Italians, the French party had spoken well of the developments in Czechoslovakia. More than that, they let it be known that M. Rochet, on a visit to Moscow, in July, had warned the Russians that any intervention would have grave dangers to international Communism.

Such a flexible and progressive line was excellent propaganda. What no one knew, of course, was that M. Rochet had received definite assurances from Moscow that there would be no interference with Dubcek and therefore the party's stand was somewhat less spectacular than it seemed.

As the French Maoists, already in the streets of Paris, declared on their huge banners: "Revisionism, imperialism: same interests, same methods."

MORAL PROBITY

The British Communists were at the same time formulating their home-bred denunciation. Not for them Continental "reprobations" or "grave disagreements." King Street, with splendid British moral probity, "deployed" it all.

British reaction could fairly be said to have begun at the moment Assistant Secretary Reuben Falber heard the news over his radio at breakfast.

"We could have got a statement out before lunch," says Falber. "Except that it was damn difficult to get it cleared by essential committee members. As it was the French and the Italians beat us to it, basically because their leadership is more centrally organised and more easily available."

When the statement eventually appeared in the early evening it had still not been seen by John Gollan, the Party Secretary, who was up a Scottish mountain, and Jack Woddis, head of the international section, who was holidaying abroad. Nevertheless, drafting was an almost routine matter for the eleven out of 14 committee members who were contacted: the British party already had a clear policy line on the Czech liberalisation.

Gollan arrived back from his mountain on Thursday, and that evening was on television emphasizing the fragmentation more forcibly than a British Communist leader has ever done before. "There is no such thing as an organised international Communist movement," he told his interviewer Alistair Burnet. "Each party is independent and sovereign and the differences between them are natural."

The party doesn't fear mass resignations, as in 1956 over Hungary. The "deploring" statement ensured that. And such is the rigor mortis of hard-line supporters that both they and the leadership will probably move slowly back to their tacit loyalty to Moscow. The serious political damage, party workers

admit, will be from "seepage," a passive decline in the already dwindling support.

More dramatic is the reaction of the official party's youth branch. The Young Communist League. Twelve of them were outside the Soviet Exhibition on Wednesday, belabouring every Russian in sight. "I found myself shouting 'Nazi Swine' at every one I saw," said one. "I think all of us were sick to the very pit of our stomachs."

To seek less official opinion on the situation from British CP members is more difficult. Generally, middle rank members are pointedly avoiding comment. But the more militant of the younger members, both of the YCL and the party proper plan a call for an even larger meeting than the 42-member executive council which met yesterday. They want to summon an Emergency National Conference of the entire party to seek a really strong protest against the Russian action.

A BETRAYAL

One man, at least, was not afraid to speak out. Will Paynter, General Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, for instance.

"The whole business," he said, "can only be seen as a disgusting betrayal of all the principles of the international Communist movement. Its result will be an enormous destruction of faith in an ideal."

Paynter, and two other members of the Miners' executive committee had agreed to visit East German miners on September 18. Last Thursday he wrote to the East Germans to say it was cancelled.

But if any scholar wanted final evidence of the curiously British flavour of unofficial reactions, he need only turn to the Scottish Highlands, last bastion of progressive eccentricity, where Scots poet Hugh MacDiarmid, the only Briton to join the Communist Party at the time of Hungary, declared his unswerving support for the fraternal Russian tanks.

"For weeks the British Press has tried to drive a wedge between the Czechs and the Warsaw Pact powers," he declares. "As a result there was real danger of a counter-revolutionary movement there. The Russians have felt that, just as they realized firm action was needed to stop Fascist infiltration in Hungary, I'm for them whole-heartedly."

"No, I'm not going to resign from our party because the leadership has taken a hostile line to the Russians. Such differences of opinion are always permissible amongst Communists. We are the most democratic of organizations."

Mr. Dubcek and his countrymen would have been most reassured to hear it.

HOW THE NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTIES REACTED TO RUSSIA

	Hungary, 1956	Czechoslovakia, 1968
Minority Communist Parties in capitalist countries:		
Britain	Pro	Anti.
France	Pro	Do.
Italy	Pro	Do.
Austria	Pro	Do.
Holland	Pro	Do.
United States	Pro	Pro.
Belgium	Pro	Anti.
Luxembourg	Pro	Pro.
Illegal Communist Parties in exile:		
Spain	Pro	(C)
Greece	Pro	Pro.
West Germany	Pro	Pro.
Ruling Communist Parties:		
Rumania	Pro	Anti.
Yugoslavia	Pro	Do.
Albania	Pro	Do.
Bulgaria	Pro	Pro.
Hungary	Pro	Do.
East Germany	Pro	Do.
Poland	Pro	Do.
China	Pro	Anti.
Korea	Pro	Pro.
North Vietnam	Pro	Do.
Mongolia	Pro	Do.
Cuba	(C)	Do.

1 Not available.
2 Not in power.

[From the Cork (Ireland) Examiner, Aug. 22, 1968]

AN ABOMINABLE INVASION

The myth of co-existence, that facile doctrine which saw nothing incompatible in a civilised accommodation between Communism and democracy, was finally exploded yesterday when Soviet Russia headed the power grab of Czechoslovakia. The midnight marauders who seized hold of an erstwhile ally because its people opted for a measure of democratic freedom have acted in the very best Stalinist tradition. In advance of action they lied, they dissembled, and they threatened and when these failed to achieve the desired end they cast aside every vestige of civilised behaviour and applied the weapon of brute force. This is the Communism of 1945, 1948, and 1956, and its re-emergence now is proof positive that the successors of Stalin and Khrushchev are of the same tyrannical mentality which counts freedom as a crime and sovereignty as a bourgeois concept to be despised.

Five countries took part in this abominable invasion, five countries which profess to be civilised and to have proper regard for all the accepted standards of international behaviour. Time and again they have subscribed to and offered testimony to the inviolable rights of independent states. They have been the first to profess righteous indignation at real or fancied infringements of these rights by other states. By skilful propaganda they persuaded the world that the darker side of Communism had disappeared for ever and that they were amongst the foremost of the peacemakers. There are five such countries but only one, Soviet Russia, that matters. This crime was conceived in and directed from Moscow with the automatic endorsement of the other jackal states which make up the Warsaw alliance. Its commission exposes the chief instigator for what it really is, a wolf which has discarded its sheep's clothing to bring a new dark age to Europe.

In the larger sense the fate of Czechoslovakia has already been decided. The attempt to break free from bondage has been frustrated and it stands helpless before invaders who having taken the irrevocable step of flouting every canon of civilised behaviour, will not hesitate to behave still more brutally in order to consolidate what they have gained. The Czechs did not resist and who is to say that in their isolated circumstances they were unwise? But there is the aftermath which must be a period of terrible trial for a defenceless people. At the very least their constitutionally elected leaders will be overthrown, the new-found freedoms will disappear, and the country will be handed over to puppets who will do the will of Moscow. This is the least that will happen and it will be sufficient to throw Czechoslovakia into the kind of prison it knew, first in 1939 at the hands of the Germans and again in 1948 at the hands of the Russians. But what if the people resist, what if the people decide to fight for their lives instead of submitting once again to that familiar captivity.

This is the tragedy which the free world is now being forced to witness without being able actively to intervene on behalf of a people threatened with political extermination and the very worst evils of a police state. It will be said that Czechoslovakia is a Communist state and that this is a Communist quarrel in which outsiders cannot interfere. Up to a point this is true but it fails to take into account one great fact of life in that country. That fact is that out of a population of 16 millions only 1.4 million are members of the Communist Party. The peaceful revolution of the past seven months was not made by the elite of party members, although some of these were in the forefront of the new liberal thinking, but by the great mass of the people who gave unmistakably proof that their desire was for

democratic freedom. And, as far as they are concerned, this has not been a Communist quarrel but the struggle to break free from Communism. Now that they have entered their hour of greatest trial the world simply cannot stand idly by while they are punished by their oppressors.

Possibly not for the reasons given the nations of the West are now on the alert. As they see it the crisis has only begun and no one can foretell how it is likely to develop. They must, therefore, be ready to move and one eventuality which could compel active intervention would be a popular uprising in Czechoslovakia. Twelve years after the event the consciences of freedom loving nations are troubled by the failure to come to the rescue of the Hungarian people. A second such failure would constitute an indictment of such magnitude that Russia and her allies would acquire a concept of power which would point an arrow at the heart of world order. It may be that democracy will not be put to the test, that Czech freedom will be snuffed out without resistance, but should it be otherwise a gallant people must not be allowed to be crushed when timely aid would avert that tragedy. It is not enough that Russia and her confederates in this crime should be condemned by world opinion; they must be made to see that crime of this order will not be tolerated.

[From the London, England, Sunday Telegraph, Aug. 25, 1968]

SOVIET FEAR IN UKRAINE

(By Gordon Brook-Shepherd)

Fear of a spreading disaffection inside the Soviet Union itself—above all of separatist agitation in the Ukraine, which actually borders on Czechoslovakia—is thought in the West to have been the final spur which pushed the Soviet leaders over the brink.

Though contingency plans to invade Czechoslovakia were first made at least three months ago, the Kremlin's final decision to march seems to have been a hurried one, taken last Sunday or even last Monday, only 24 hours before the blow was struck.

It is thought that warnings uttered by Mr. Petr Shelest, who is First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party as well as a favourite member of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Presidium, led to the "doves" among his colleagues being finally silenced.

Mr. Shelest is believed to have been echoing in Moscow the urgent pleas sent by Herr Ulbricht, the East German leader: "Stop Dubcek or I cannot guarantee the outcome at home."

Trouble in East Germany would be bad enough for the Kremlin but trouble in the Ukraine could prove catastrophic. With its population of nearly 46 million, it is by far the largest of the 15 Soviet Republics.

It is also the seat of one of the deepest-rooted nationalist movements inside the Soviet Union, with strong anti-Russian traditions and a language and culture of its own.

These separatist tendencies have been steadily increasing of late and Shelest himself has been leading the battle to suppress them. Exactly as in Czechoslovakia, the agitation has been headed by writers and intellectuals.

The most recent test case was the latest novel by Oles Honchar, head of the Ukrainian Writers Union, which was published earlier this year in the Ukrainian language. Called "Sobor", its hero is eventually killed in the struggle for a Ukrainian cathedral (the symbol of Ukrainian culture) which is being pulled down by the state.

Its message—a protest drawn from the historical past against an inhuman present—was too dangerous to be ignored. Shelest ordered his Communist youth groups to burn copies of it in the streets of Kiev, and plans to get it translated into Russian were blocked.

Finally, as recently as May 31, eight of the nine secretaries of the Ukrainian Writers' Union (including Honchar) were summoned to Shelest in Kiev and given a warning. He had already appointed one of his Committee Secretaries Fedor Ovcharenko, to carry out a "cultural purge" in the Ukraine.

Thousands of Ukrainian emigrés live in the West, including a large colony in England. They called on the British Government at a meeting in London yesterday to stand up against Communist tyranny.

[From the Sunday Telegram, London, England, Aug. 25, 1968]

WHAT DID YOU DO, DADDY?

We are in no two minds about the Red Army shooting its way into Prague, but what must we think about the Red Army dancing and singing next month in the Albert Hall? This is an important question for a generation accustomed to regard post-Stalinist Russia and its "Communist camp" as an entity subject to outside influences and capable of a gradual liberalisation. Cultural and personal contacts, we had come to think, could do no harm and might do good.

The rape of Czechoslovakia, and even more the emergence of a groundswell of resistance against it, should cause us to think again. The Soviet empire is no longer a monolith to be reluctantly accepted; it has become a defensive tyranny, flagrantly holding down subject peoples—in no way less repulsive than that of Hitler's Third Reich—whose whole future is in doubt. In these new circumstances civilised and non-political contacts can only confirm the tyranny; they cannot modify or undermine it.

Let us not assume too easily that an evil equilibrium will eventually be restored behind the Iron Curtain. The Czechs may never abandon their passive resistance, nor may the rest of the subject nations maintain their passivity.

This is a fundamentally different situation from what has been developing in recent years. The seeds of imperial disintegration are beginning to sprout. British businessmen seeking Russian trade, ballet or music lovers seeking Russian culture, or even simple tourists seeking Russian holidays, cannot carry on as if nothing is happening. For the time being, at any rate, Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges are as out of place, as obscene, as they would have been between neutral States and Nazi Germany at the climax of the liberation of Europe in 1945.

Admittedly, the members of the U.S.S.R. State Symphony Orchestra are not personally responsible for the fate of Mr. Dubcek. But it is the very normality of these contacts, against a background of revolutionary abnormality, that now constitutes a scandalous offence. They give the impression to our Russian guests that we are a friendly, decent people, which we are. But at this juncture we have the right and duty to be an angry people as well.

"What did you do, Daddy, when the Red Army rolled into Prague?" At least let not the answer be "I bought a ticket to watch the Red Army singers and dancers performing in the Albert Hall."

PIERCING RUSSIA'S NAKED SKIN

Why don't we care? was the title of an article I wrote on this page five weeks ago, when the big bear and the little Bohemian lion were having their first fraternal tussle. Though the issues at stake and the dangers ahead, both for Britain and the whole of the free world, seemed crystal clear even then, the protestors of Britain were not protesting, the open-air orators were not orating, and the Labour Government—as always when anything happens to threaten its courtship of the Kremlin—studiously looked the other way.

Now that the inevitable has happened in Prague (though admittedly in an incredible

way) we have rediscovered our voices and our consciences. The professional protestors, ranging from Tariq Ali to Pat Arrowsmith, have hoisted the Czechoslovak pennant above their Vietnam banners. The Labour party has remembered the things it was supposed to be fighting for 30 years ago, and at Hyde Park today the wheel turns full circle with Mr. Crossman—a leader of the anti-Hitler agitation in the Czech crisis of 1938—speaking up at last against Hitler's spiritual and functional successors in Eastern Europe.

More important than all this, the ordinary people of Britain are themselves aroused, and angry letters demanding protest action of some sort are pouring into newspaper offices. What failed to stir the nation as a dark prospect has profoundly an even darker reality. The question is no longer why we don't care but what can be achieved now that we do?

How can Britain and the West most suitably show their resentment at Russia's action; and what good, apart from belatedly purging our political souls, would any retaliation do?

Already one can detect the sounds of flannel beginning to flap again along Whitehall. The same advisers who told the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stewart, not to provoke the Russians and all would be well are now presumably warning him about the dangers of "empty gestures" and "counter-productive" measures.

Action never was the business of bureaucrats. But it is, or used to be, the business of politicians. It is time the present Government took sufficient time off from its nervous absorption with the economic crisis to realise that, or it will betray what is left of its mandate from the electorate.

The challenge of this latest crisis will be with us for long weeks and long months to come. But the very nature of that crisis means there is an opportunity—however slight—for Western pressure to influence the actual outcome. Prague 1968 is not Budapest 1956. There is no Czech Kadar for the Kremlin to install swiftly in power. The Russians, militarily supreme in Prague, are still politically floundering. Moreover, there is no Suez tragedy that will enable them to get away so lightly with another Budapest bloodbath. (Vietnam, unlike Suez, is an accepted part of the political landscape, not a sudden eruption actually coinciding with an East European crisis.)

The Russians themselves are only too aware of these differences, and underneath all the 6 in. armour of their tanks is a naked skin which is acutely sensitive to world opinion. The truth is that like the Americans (and quite unlike the Chinese, French or ourselves) the Russians yearn to be liked and accepted.

For 50 years we have lived under the backlash of their monumental inferiority complex, and it is still operating today. They are not aristocratic imperialists nor proletarian imperialists but petty bourgeois ones. The first concern of these frightened men (after that for their own jobs) is for respectability.

It was this that prompted them to deliver polite and disarming notes last week in all major Western capitals, giving advance warning of their invasion of Czechoslovakia—like a burglar handing in his visiting-card. It was this that caused them to undertake a similar advance lobbying operation last Tuesday among all the Afro-Asian delegations at the United Nations. (Indeed, according to one report, it was the Mauritian delegate there, after being approached by the Russians, who first warned our own Lord Caradon of the impending attack.)

In their heart of hearts the Russian leaders (or at any rate some of them) know that their present action is disreputable. What they want is the spoils without the odium. It is this result we must deny them. And,

in this particular situation, by pinning the odium more firmly on them, we could even weaken their hold on the spoils.

One obvious step in this direction has already been taken by Britain: a refusal, declared in advance, to recognise any collection of straw men the Russians may declare to be the "legal" Government of Czechoslovakia.

There are other less obvious steps. The British Ambassador in Moscow, now back in London for "consultations," could be kept here for a while as a mark of displeasure, though it is pitching it too high at the moment to talk of severing diplomatic relations altogether. Britain, in common with her Western partners, could also boycott for the time being any meetings involving the Russian delegations at all international organisations such as the I.L.O. All semi-official contacts with Russia—the to-ings and froings of mayors, parliamentarians and the like—could also be suspended. Even if normal commercial trade with Russia were continued, an immediate review could be announced of the Western strategic goods embargo policy, which has been getting steadily more liberal in interpretation during recent years.

Finally, if the West really wanted to try its own hand at moral blackmail for a change, it could threaten to review also its entire disarmament strategy at Geneva, thus facing the Kremlin with at least the possibility that it may have to resume the ruinous arms race if it cannot behave as the civilised power it purports to be.

These are, all of them, governmental actions which fall short of a total severance of either diplomatic or economic relations. (Cultural, professional and sports boycotts are more complicated matters which are perhaps best left to the individual and private bodies concerned to determine.) Such measures could never, by themselves, shift the Russian troops out of Prague. But, by pricking a sensitive Russian skin, by encouraging such doves as exist in the Kremlin to go on cooling and by applauding the mass of the pro-Dubcek patriots in their firm stand, they could have some indirect effect on the political battle in Prague itself.

The outcome of this battle, as President Svoboda's enigmatic journey to Moscow shows, is still completely open, even in this initial stage. And whatever compromise is agreed or imposed to reconcile Czech defiance with Soviet embarrassment, the political struggle in Prague will then only enter another and equally indecisive stage, still so finely balanced that the slightest weight on the right side of the scales could be important. In a situation of this unprecedented fragility, gestures become deeds, and even hot air has substance.

Above all, let us not be distracted from embarking on such a calculated tactical switch in policy by lamentations, either from bureaucrats or politicians, that it would "destroy the *détente*. That much-abused word is acquiring an altogether unwholesome and unnatural sanctity of its own. It is not a banner which, once laid aside, can never be picked up again. It is a diplomatic yo-yo, which the Russians have been pulling up and down entirely as it suits them for years. Let the West now yank it sharply up on a short string for a few months. We might help ourselves, as well as the Czechs, in the process.

[From the London, England, Daily Telegraph, Aug. 23, 1968]

TRAGEDY AND COMEDY

Russia's hopes of a quick, clean and relatively "comradely" take-over in Czechoslovakia, so that the whole affair might soon be forgotten and relations with the outside world return to normal, have gone awry. Politically and administratively the operation was as bungled as militarily it was efficient—although with such superiority this hardly merits a campaign medal. Never, in the whole history of Russian coups, has it taken so

many troops so long to produce so few stooges of such low calibre. For many hours Czechoslovakia's real leaders were able to denounce the aggression, while the ingenious and courageous Czech radio and television men were able to get the full grim story out to the world. Even Czechoslovakia's man at the United Nations had not been suborned or de-credentialed in time to prevent him from appearing as a star witness for the prosecution.

One reason for most of this must have been the Kremlin's persistent and gross over-estimation of the strength of its supporters in Czechoslovakia, combined with a cynical view of satellite Communist politicians. They thought that, with such irresistible force at their command, and with such patronage within their gift, a presentable array of Stalinists and quislings could be mustered before you could say K.G.B. In addition, by giving the Czech Assembly and Praesidium some apparent freedom of action to appoint a new régime, the Russians would have gained at least some sort of case to present to outside Communist parties and world public opinion. Evidently there are doves in the Kremlin who are much more concerned about public relations than their predecessors were, or than the ascendant hawks are now.

All in vain. The velvet gloves had to be replaced, if not yet by steel gauntlets, yet by serviceable leather mitts. Mr. Dubcek and his colleagues were bundled off to prison in more familiar style. The National Assembly delegation invited to the Russian Embassy duly disappeared from ken—like Hungarian, Polish and other political guests on previous occasions. The number of Czech civilians killed by Russian troops is growing. Some deaths were the result of desperate acts of heroism. Many were inflicted for mere passive resistance or even demonstrations of the type without which no weekend in most Western capitals is complete, but which in this sterner context were acts of great courage.

The future is obscure and dangerous. The restraint evidently enjoined upon Russian troops is wearing thin. Strikes are spreading—giving the lie to the Russians' claim that they came at the call of the workers. The Czech Army Command has put out a strict order not to co-operate with the Russians. The pathetic team of Judases which the Russians, after 36 embarrassing hours, at last got together is hardly more than a laughing stock. In all these circumstances, it should not have been necessary for Mr. Stewart to say that Britain will not recognise a puppet régime. Yet with memories so short, and thinking so wishful, it is good that he said it so forthrightly. The British Ambassador should be withdrawn for a start.

Another of Mr. Stewart's forceful platitudes should reverberate like a clarion. "No country within reach can feel entirely safe." The independent-minded Mr. Ceausescu had already got the message and has called out Rumania's Home Guard. If it indeed be true that NATO took no special precautions, then it took a chance in assuming that the Warsaw Pact array had no relevance to a possible grab at Berlin. We have clear notice now that the Red Army and the "hawks" call the tune in Moscow now. Mr. Stewart, dangerously late in the day, recognises the need for military preparedness. In addition, the West must not, by glossing over this unpardonable aggression, enable the Kremlin hard-liners to confound the moderates by saying—like Hitler before them: "You'll see: we always got away with it in the past, and the democracies soon came round."

[From the Edinburgh and Glasgow, Scotland, Scottish Daily Mail, Aug. 23, 1968]

WHO ARE THE PUPPETS?

It is not only dirty work. It is botched work. The rape of Czechoslovakia bears all

the marks of panic and division in the Kremlin.

Russia had not even strung together her puppets before invading. The quislings have had to be herded into the limelight in the wake of the Soviet tanks.

At the UN Mr. George Ball, the U.S. Ambassador, challenged the Russian envoy, Jacob Malik, to name 'the party and Government leaders' who had asked the Russians for help. Malik could not reply, because Moscow had no answer.

Who are these pitiful quislings—Kolder, Indra, Bilak? A handful of party hacks, leftovers from the Novotny era, uneducated replacements who know little and care less.

DEPOSED

What do they count for against the entire Czech Government, the loyalty of the Czech Communist Party Congress yesterday, and the cheers for Dubcek in the streets?

The desperate search for Czech puppets betrays deep panic. The Russians' real puppet was Novotny. And if force was to be used, they might have duped a few gullible oafs by coming to his aid before he was deposed.

By allowing Dubcek six months to build support, the Russians have ensured a lasting Czech resistance. By withdrawing the Red Army and then sending it in again, they have added the brutality of invasion to the misery of occupation.

Why did they let the Russian Symphony Orchestra play music at the London Proms by the beloved Czech composer Dvorak? Why did they name their occupation Radio Vltava, after the river which runs through Prague and which provided the title for part of Smetana's famous hymn to Czech patriotism?

DEFAMED

It all shows a hamfisted insensitivity which must signal a long and bitter tug-of-war between the hawks and the doves in Moscow.

The hawks have won for the moment. If they are not to have their way in the future, they must be taught a firm but careful lesson.

That does not mean stepping up the arms race or shouting superfluous insults.

But why should we go on trading with the Russians when we buy twice as much as we sell? Why should they be allowed to show their wares at trade fairs in Britain when elsewhere they are showing only their brutality?

It seems there is sadly little hope of a lasting East-West detente under the present Russian leadership. Should we not use what leverage we have to influence a change in those leaders?

[From the London, England, International Herald Tribune, Aug. 24-25, 1968]

COMMUNISTS AND PRAGUE

Grimness settled over Prague Thursday as the Soviet conquerors sought to consolidate their grip on Czechoslovakia and began filling the prisons with patriotic intellectuals and other liberals opposed to Moscow's tyranny. The resistance of the great majority of Czechs and Slovaks continued unbroken, spiritually sustained both by the great wave of national indignation and by the leadership provided by the courageous operators of clandestine radio stations.

It became clear, too, Thursday that the conservative figures in the Czechoslovak Communist party leadership had played the role of Quislings in welcoming the invaders, but the political weakness of these turncoats was attested by the inability of the Soviet occupiers to name a new Prague "government" that might command even reluctant popular assent.

As fears grew for the safety of Alexander Dubcek and his imprisoned colleagues, the moral bankruptcy of Moscow's policy was reflected in such acts as the Kremlin decision to resume jamming of Voice of America and other foreign broadcasts whose unhindered

reception had been permitted since well before Khrushchev's ouster. Until their tanks and troop carriers rumbled into Prague, the Soviet rulers felt their case to their own people was strong enough to meet the competition provided by Western broadcasts; now they implicitly acknowledge it is too weak to withstand contradiction over the air waves.

Western criticism, of course, can always be dismissed as "Imperialist propaganda," as Ambassador Malik has been proving at tiresome length at the United Nations. But the irrefutable judgment, even by Moscow's standards, is the denunciation of the Soviet assault by Communist states and Communist parties. The largest public demonstrations protesting against the seizure of Czechoslovakia, for example, have been the gatherings of tens of thousands of protesters in Bucharest and Belgrade and in Prague itself. President Ceausescu of Romania has called the Soviet invasion "a grave danger to peace in Europe, to the fate of socialism in the world." Yugoslavia's Communist leaders have labeled that same violation of international law "a significant, historical point of rupture" among Socialist countries. Throughout Western Europe, Communist parties and leaders have condemned the Soviet action.

The reality, in short, is that no act of the Soviet government—not even the subjugation of Hungary—has ever been condemned with such near-unanimity on both sides of the Iron Curtain as this week's unprovoked, brutal violation of small, defenseless Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leaders who made the ill-starred decision to take this move have only themselves to blame if much of the world today compares this week's crimes against Czechoslovakia with earlier misdeeds of Hitler and Stalin.

Already the Soviet Union has paid a heavy price in prestige and world respect for this blunder. But there is still time to cut those losses by evacuating Czechoslovakia promptly and permitting the people and the duly elected leaders of that country to decide their own fate.—The New York Times.

[From the London, England, Sunday Times, Aug. 25, 1968]

THE REALPOLITIK OF PRAGUE (By Frank Giles)

Comparisons between what happened in Czechoslovakia last week and what happened in 1948 are only superficially valid. The Prague coup of twenty years ago, which set the alarm bells ringing all over the free world and led directly to the creation of NATO, was unquestionably a Communist, Soviet-backed conspiracy; but at least they were Czechoslovak Communists who carried it out. The true comparison this time is with March, 1939, when the hapless Prime Minister Hácha was summoned to Berchtesgaden and told, in effect, that henceforth his country was to be a German protectorate.

That is what the Russians are trying to do to Czechoslovakia. They do not appear to be succeeding. The measure of their failure is dramatically reflected in last night's reports of a new summit meeting in Moscow. But whatever happens, the events of last week present a tragic and disgusting spectacle, which has rightly drawn down upon them the opprobrium of much of the world, non-Communist and Communist alike. Obviously, the men in the Kremlin weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of their decision. That they decided as they did, knowing that they would split the Communist world in half and dim all hopes for an East-West détente, anyway for a long time to come, is a highly significant comment upon conditions within the Soviet Union itself and in its rigidly faithful satellites. The almost overwhelming drawbacks to what has been done were evidently considered preferable to letting Czechoslovak "deviationism" take hold and spread to Ulbricht's Germany, Gomulka's

Poland and, above all, to Brezhnev's Russia. Whole volumes of Kremlinology and its allied sciences could not possibly convey a more telling message than this.

What the effect of the rape of Czechoslovakia will be upon international relations in general is a good deal less clear. Indignation and revulsion at what has happened lead naturally on to the thought that we are back once more in the worst days of the cold war, with the Soviet menace in Europe again at its height and communication between East and West reduced to a frosty minimum. But this is not in fact necessarily true. I am in no way seeking to justify or excuse Soviet conduct in Czechoslovakia when I say that despite its enormity it has not moved the post-war balance of power by one centimetre.

The Russians, in a crude and intolerable way, are trying to trample on men and ideas and human rights. But they are trampling in their own backyard in a manner comparable in kind, though not of course in degree, with the American armed intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The motive then was to forestall Communism, just as it is the Soviet motive in Czechoslovakia today to preserve it.

In a perfect world, the protagonists of national independence, whether they be British or Yugoslav or American, would rush to the aid of the beleaguered Czechs in their hour of trial. Nothing in fact is less likely. It is not even sure whether the Czechoslovaks would welcome such succour. They seem on present showing admirably able to stand up for themselves. Nor will the United Nations be able to do anything, except express varying degrees of indignation. This may be useful, but not nearly as effective, in the context, as the indignation within the Soviet backyard itself.

The plain facts, however disagreeable, are that the division of Europe and large parts of the world into two blocs, a division that in essence dates back to Yalta, is still the ruling system, which the events of Czechoslovakia, far from upsetting have tended to confirm.

This, however, is the language of *realpolitik*, which may influence statesmen but cannot control the movements of men's hearts and minds. Even if it could be shown that the Russians are content, as they have been in the past, to stay in their own backyard, a huge wave of mistrust of their motives and intentions is likely—and with reasons—to sweep the Western world. The victim, at least in the short term, will be the détente which successive Western leaders, from Winston Churchill to Lyndon Johnson, have sought as the highest prize for statesmanship.

Who can now seriously contemplate that lofty vision of General de Gaulle's of a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals"? What man will be listened to who argues that the Soviet threat in Europe is still minimal and that Western troop reductions can therefore be safely envisaged? How can the encouraging growth of cultural and scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union hope to be sustained?

Some of these reactions will be exaggerated but they will be nonetheless real. What the Russians have done is to make the life of a dove, whether in Washington, London, Paris or Bonn, increasingly difficult. Conversely, the hawks, secure in the thought that they have been proved right in their suspicion of every Russian move, will be on the wing.

In the Middle East, Soviet support for the Arab cause and the Russian build-up in the Mediterranean will appear even more disturbing than previously; an Arab-Israeli settlement, never much more than a pious hope, becomes even more illusory. In Asia, even if there is no obvious connection between the events in Czechoslovakia and the

quest for peace in Vietnam, that quest must become, where American public opinion is concerned, more difficult. In Europe, the reasonable expectation that the two Germans might learn, if not to accept each other, at least to live and trade together, now needs the unthinking optimism of a Coub.

If in the Western world the hawks have been given a golden opportunity to preen their feathers, the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia must also have had the same effect in the Kremlin. Last week, the Soviet hawks carried the day. This week, depending upon what emerges from the Moscow Summit meeting, they might well be seen in humiliating retreat, driven back by Czechoslovak fortitude. This would scarcely sweeten their tempers. Whatever happens, the prospects for expanding co-existence between East and West will have been darkened.

The gloom of this forecast may yet be belied by events. If it is not, then "no war, no peace"—Trotsky's formula—seems to be about the maximum degree of consolation which can be got out of the present situation. Yet the prevailing twilight, in which the heroic tragedy of the Czech people flickers bravely, must not be allowed to obscure totally the prospects for East-West détente. Two facts stand out: nothing that has happened has upset the balance of power; secondly, the spirit of independence and freedom of which the Czechoslovak episode is an outstanding example can only flourish in the long run in an atmosphere of détente.

At the present emotional moment it is easy and natural—as no doubt tomorrow's debate in the House of Commons will show—to demand a breaking-off of trade and contacts with the Soviet Union and its slaves. But apart from affording a moral thrill, the practical effect of such a step would be minimal, where it is not actually negative. Senator Eugene McCarthy's dismissal of the Czechoslovak drama as not a "major world crisis"—"an invasion of France would be a serious matter"—may be a little too cool for the present state of feeling, although there is hard realism in what he said. I prefer Mr. George Brown's thoughtful and constructive approach in a speech at the Socialist International last week, when he urged that, in spite of events, the search for détente must go on.

Looking at the gruesome television pictures of what has been happening in Prague and Bratislava in the last few days, it is all too easy to think that the ghost of Stalin walks again. In fact, this cannot be. The defection of Western Communist parties, the rising tide of national independence in Eastern Europe, and the resistance of the Czechoslovaks, are events which speak for themselves and cannot be unsaid. Whether or not the Communist leaders gather in Moscow, the right course for the outside powers is to remain cool and patient, and mindful that the men in the Kremlin may last week have made a truly historic mistake.

[From the London, England, Sunday Times, Aug. 25, 1968]

EPIC BLUNDER?

Is Czechoslovakia the Russians' Bay of Pigs? If Mr. Dubcek does return, it will certainly look like it. What we have seen this week is an epic miscalculation. The Kremlin's military plan went smoothly enough. But the political plan is in ruins. The Czechs have not submitted; puppets have not been easily found; the party has not deserted its imprisoned leaders; the resistance has not been silenced. Not a single voice, in fact, has been heard to support the invasion. Every one of the half-million troops now said to be in occupation would clearly be needed if the Russians were to achieve their original objective of extinguishing Dubcek-

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ism. It is now fairly clear that that objective may have to be modified.

This is a quite astonishing situation. Only six months ago Czechoslovakia was an apparently fixed part of the Soviet empire. It has been under Moscow's heel for twenty years. Many of its people have had only the most fragmentary experience of freedom. The only habit they had the chance to acquire was that of bored obedience. Their lives were joyless and bound by very small hopes. Now, almost universally, they have shaken off the worst shackles of the past. For such people, at all their social and intellectual levels, to achieve this in so short a time is beyond the common range of imagination. It is evidence enough that the existence of the Dubcek regime, brief as it was, will prove to be a more durable political phenomenon with wilder consequences, than the act of its attempted destruction.

Whatever the outcome of President Svoboda's talks in Moscow, this needs to be asserted. No language is too rich to be applied to the barbarity which Soviet fear and Soviet trickery have now visited upon Europe. No one can contemplate the familiar apparatus of the Soviet secret police without anger and sympathy on the Czechs' behalf. But this should not go so far as to credit the Russians with a triumph. In the short term the job was bungled. At best it will be seen to have landed its perpetrators with an unmanageable problem. Just how unmanageable was revealed by last night's reports of a Communist summit meeting in Moscow. The Communist family's affairs are badly awry, and a family council has apparently become urgent.

It follows from this that Western protest remains exceedingly relevant. People as well as Governments can give the Czechs priceless encouragement. They are still capable of receiving it, and the Russians are still capable of being embarrassed by it. But it must, of course, be based on the right promise. To welcome Prague as a friend of the West is to play exactly the game of the Russians. If Mr. Dubcek's Czechoslovakia is to be lamented, it must be as a steadfastly Communist State. That is the whole point of his achievement. It is also the essence of the case against the Kremlin. The Czech experiment, with its relevance for Western as well as Eastern societies, is a way of extending and modernizing the Communist system. Moreover it strengthened the possibility of European co-existence.

But much more than protest has been recommended to Western Governments and their citizens. Various courses are being canvassed. One is an immediate increase in armaments in Europe. Another is an expansion of the British nuclear arsenal. Yet another is an embargo on all economic and cultural contacts with Moscow. Another is the election of Mr. Richard Nixon as the next American President.

All these are based more or less on the assumption that the Cold War has reopened with all its rigour, and that confrontation has replaced co-existence. But those are assumptions which it is a little early to start acting on. It is not the brutal outrage of this Soviet action which should be decisive in Western counsels so much as any evidence that the Kremlin intends to alter the strategic balance between East and West. This is discussed in an adjoining column. In that relationship all that has so far changed is the climate. Until more becomes clear, it would be unnatural to receive even the matchless Bolshoi ballet with the customary feelings of friendship. But it would be unreasonable to instantly reverse policies which recognise that, in the nuclear age, there is no alternative to co-existence. For if the history of the Dubcek regime suggests one truth above others, it is that the monolith of Eastern Europe is more likely to be fragmented by inner breakdown than by a reversion to implacable hostility in the West.

[From the London, England, Sunday Telegram, Aug. 25, 1968]

AN EMPIRE BREAKING UP
(By Tibor Szamuely)

"Communism has now revealed its true face." This phrase has often been repeated in the past few days, but it is very wide of the mark.

The Russian rape of Czechoslovakia has revealed nothing whatever about the nature or the methods of the Communist system—nothing that had not been known for a great many years. Or, rather, that had not been known to those who wished to be informed of the facts and to understand the nature of the Communist phenomenon.

For the truth is that the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, with all its brutality, treachery, cynicism, and complete disregard for public opinion, fits perfectly into the long line of acts of vicious imperialist aggression carried out by the Soviet Government over the past half-century: the invasion of Georgia in 1922, the partition of Poland and the attack upon Finland in 1939; the annexation of the Baltic States in 1940, the forcible Communisation of Eastern Europe in 1944-48, the intervention in Hungary in 1956.

Nor is this a tradition which began with the "Socialist" revolution of 1917; like Russian imperialism itself, it goes back much further in time; to the invasion of Hungary in 1849 and the bloody suppression of the Polish revolutions of 1830 and 1863, and even further.

In those days Russia was known as the "Gendarme of Europe"—an object of fear and abhorrence for every progressive and democratic person in the world. Today her Government calls itself "Communist"; it has murdered millions, both within and without its borders—but solely because 50 years ago it nationalised the means of production, it has been regarded as a beacon of enlightenment by our present-day perverters of the progressive ideal.

Yet the Gendarme of Europe is what Soviet Russia has remained throughout her history. Her oppression, her barbarism, her cruelty have never been modified or changed.

Of late, however, a new factor has appeared, which is influencing Soviet policy to an ever tighter degree; not liberalisation or "bridgebuilding"—these are strictly for gullible foreigners—but the obvious moral, political and economic bankruptcy of the Communist system. No more talk of competing with the West, of proving the superiority of Communism by peaceful means; brute force and suppression are the order of the day. Faced with disaffection, resistance and rebellion, the Soviet leaders have proved to be weak and frightened men. And weakness and fright make bad counsellors.

Herein lies the explanation for the most mishandled act of aggression in Soviet history. Panic-stricken by the agonising choice between letting Czechoslovakia go democratic and crushing an "allied" Communist Government by force, the men in the Kremlin did what came naturally: they sent the tanks in. It seems to be 1956 all over again. But is it?

The parallel with the Hungarian tragedy springs instantly to mind. Certainly the ruthless and deceitful methods employed by the Russians are identical in both cases, down to the smallest detail. One often reads that every criminal band has its own particular methods, which rarely vary and thus help the police to recognise them and track them down. The Kremlin gangsters, too, have their own hallmark, and it is indelibly stamped upon the Czechoslovak operation.

But apart from the self-same mark of the beast, the Soviets' 1968 crime is different from that of 1956 in almost every aspect: in its preliminaries, its circumstances, its execution, and, most probably, its outcome. These differences, which have already resulted in an unprecedented political fiasco for the

U.S.S.R., give reason to believe that the effects of Prague will be far more profound and lasting—very possibly even catastrophic in the long run for the Soviet empire and its rulers.

To begin with, never before have the Russians exhibited the present total inability to offer some coherent explanation of their action that might impress anyone above the mental level of an imbecile child. In Hungary's case—although, of course, there can be no question of *justification* for the Russian action—the Soviets were able, by skillfully blending selected facts, falsehoods and half-truths, to present a case that was at least acceptable to many of their subjects, to the international Communist movement, and even to certain sections of Western Leftist opinion.

In Hungary, on the face of it, there had been an armed uprising against the legal Government; the rebels had overthrown Communist rule and installed a multi-party coalition; some Communists (mainly secret policemen) had been lynched; the party, the Government and the armed forces had disintegrated, and law and order could be presented as having completely broken down.

Other factors, too, were adroitly manipulated by Soviet propaganda; Hungary had had a Right-wing, "Fascist" regime between the wars and had been an ally of Hitler's—this made the version of a "Fascist takeover" sound somewhat less implausible to Leftist ears; Hungary had been legally occupied by the Soviet forces for the preceding 12 years; the coincidence of Suez distracted much of world attention from Eastern Europe; injudicious actions like the overheated tone of some Radio Free Europe broadcasts offered additional excuses to grateful Soviet propagandists.

It is easy to scoff at such a tortuous apology; to the ordinary normal Western mind an unprovoked attack by a Great Power against a small nation is an act of aggression which nothing can explain away. But this is to discount the vital importance for a doctrinaire ideological movement of a systematic, factual and theoretical explanation of its actions for the edification and spiritual uplift of its followers.

This time the machine that had run so smoothly for 50 years has broken down. No Communist, whether Russian or Czech or any other, no fellow-traveller, however deeply brainwashed, can accept the pathetic mouthings of *Agitprop* about violations of "democratic centralism" or insults to good Czechoslovak comrades as justification for invasion, rape and murder. The Kremlin gangsters stand naked in their infamy before the contemptuous and hate-filled gazes of their subjects and their hangers-on.

The Russian oligarchs acted in blind panic—and landed themselves in disaster. From the beginning everything has gone wrong (the transportation of the troops and their weapons over a few dozen miles without any resistance can hardly be chalked up as a success). The methods are those of 1956—the results are totally different.

In 1956 the invasion began with the announcement that Janos Kadar had formed a new Government which had called on the U.S.S.R. for help in the restoration of order. In 1968 the names of the mysterious "Czechoslovak leaders" who had invited the Russians have still not been unveiled, days after the invasion. Unlike Hungary, where the whole party apparatus, most of the Central Committee, the Government and the National Assembly welcomed the Russians as their saviours from the people's wrath, in Czechoslovakia no one supports the invaders—not even the People's Militia, upon which the Russians had pinned so many hopes.

Obviously, the Russians are looking for a Czechoslovak Kadar: a loyal servant untainted by association with the Stalinist past. They will find it hard to locate one—

and, even if they do, their problems will hardly be solved. In Hungary at the time of the intervention no Communist party existed; it had been dissolved, and Kadar was able to create his own party from scratch, with no rival political organization in the way.

But in Czechoslovakia the party exists and functions. It possesses properly elected bodies, and has just held a legally constituted congress. The party is loyal to Dubcek. Unlike Imre Nagy, who had no time to establish himself, Dubcek is the acknowledged and immensely popular leader of his nation—and Dubcek has been abducted by the professional Kremlin kidnapers.

The local party bodies, the Government officers, the armed forces, the diplomatic service, the U.N. delegation: all remain steadfast in their loyalty. How unlike Hungary—and what a shock to the Russians.

Intervention has blown up in the Russians' faces. Whereas in 1958 the international Communist movement faithfully closed ranks behind the Soviets, today every single Communist party—with the significant exception of North Vietnam—has bitterly condemned their action. And Rumania has split the Warsaw Pact itself wide open.

What can the Russians hope for at this calamitous juncture? Clearly their forces are sufficient to hold Czechoslovakia down indefinitely. Equally clearly, sooner or later some Quislings will emerge. But without the active collaboration of the Communist party and the central and local state administration, those will be unable to function. At the moment the chances of such collaboration appear remote, to say the least. Nor will the Czechs—traditional, age-old friends of the Russian people—ever be able to forget August 21, 1968.

So, barring a miracle—such as the Russians' recognizing their moral defeat and withdrawing, as the British and French did after Suez—Czechoslovakia seems destined to remain under direct, if slightly camouflaged Russian military government. This would mean an unparalleled and probably irreparable disaster for the Communist system and the Soviet empire.

The Communist regimes in Poland and Hungary—particularly the latter—are too fragile and unpopular to be able to withstand for long the shock of the Czechoslovak imbroglio and the shame of participation in this vile and perfidious act. Colonial subjects who hate their master are not good at policing other colonies on his behalf. The bankruptcy of Communism in Eastern Europe is now irredeemable.

It is within Russia herself that the full weight of this week's catastrophe will be felt most acutely. I know from personal experience how deep was the sense of outrage among progressive Russians in 1956. In recent months, as we have learned from documents like the memoranda of the famous nuclear physicist, Academician Sakharov, democratization in Czechoslovakia offered a flicker of hope to millions of thinking men and women in Russia. Today that flicker has been snuffed out by their own despised ruling clique in an act of cynical brutality unworthy even of Hitler, without a shred of justification.

The outside world has no idea of the extent and the depth of disillusionment among the citizens of Russia. For many of them Czechoslovakia will be the final straw. After 50 years of existence Communism has no argument left to uphold its legitimacy; only guns and tanks. Czechoslovakia has shown that this is not enough: 1956 undermined the Communist world system—1968 has dealt it a blow from which it can never recover. Communist colonial rule over half Europe is beginning to break up.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Young of Ohio in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE CASE OF MRS. SYLVESTER SMITH

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article entitled "The Case of Mrs. Sylvester Smith," written by Walter Goodman, and published in the New York Times magazine of August 25, 1968.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

A VICTORY FOR 400,000 CHILDREN: THE CASE OF MRS. SYLVESTER SMITH (By Walter Goodman)

SELMA, ALA.—In October, 1966, Mrs. Sylvester Smith, once-widowed, once-deserted, 34 years old and black, was notified by the Department of Pensions and Security of Dallas County, Ala., that it was cutting off payments to her family under the Aid to Dependent Children program. This meant a loss of about \$29 a month, more than a quarter of the Smith household income. It also signaled the beginning of a momentous test, resolved by the United States Supreme Court several weeks ago, of a state's power to deprive children of aid to which they are entitled by a Federal welfare program.

At a time when bureaucracy's entire approach to the poor was coming under radical scrutiny, the Court delivered a blow to state authorities, Northern as well as Southern, who have been withholding Federal dollars from residents because of race, sexual activity or other matters irrelevant to their need. The Smith decision, beneficently affecting more than 21,000 children in Alabama and perhaps as many as 400,000 throughout the country, was the first handed down by the high court in a dispute over public welfare; it will assuredly not be the last. Like Linda Brown, the schoolgirl from Topeka who won the 1954 school-integration decision, and Clarence Earl Gideon, the Florida convict whose right to an attorney was upheld in 1963, Mrs. Sylvester Smith has set in motion a dramatic change in American society.

In first giving aid to Mrs. Smith and then taking it away, Alabama was acting as an agent of the Federal Government, which set up the A.D.C. program under the Social Security Act. Last year, Washington contributed more than half of the \$2.3-billion paid to some 4.2 million children around the country. In rich states such as New York the Federal share drops; in poor states such as Alabama it rises. Family payments vary according to need and number of children; in Alabama they average around \$15 a child each month—about half the established level of "need."

Designed to help children who have been deprived of a parent by death, incapacity or simply by "continued absence from the home," A.D.C. has for years been under attack from those who see it as an inducement to immoral behavior, especially among Negroes. "By taxing the good people to pay for these programs," said the esteemed Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas in 1959, "we are putting a premium on illegitimacy never before known in the world." Mrs. Smith's children met all the original requirements for aid, but they did not qualify under one regu-

lation that Alabama, along with most other states of the Old Confederacy and a number in the North,* had added. The Smith children were ruled ineligible because their mother was thought to be maintaining a continuing sexual relationship with a "substitute father"—who, presumably, was expected to help support the children.

Mrs. Smith first applied for A.D.C. in March, 1956, a few months after her husband was killed "in a fight over a woman." She was 23 years old and was left with three children—Ida Elizabeth, 3; Ernestine, 2, and Willie Lewis, 6 months. Aid was granted. In January 1957, she had her fourth child, Willie James, the son of one Lols Fuller. Willie James was added to the A.D.C. lists in June, 1963, after Fuller left town, presumably for New York. The Smith family received about \$87 a month until March, 1966 when Ida Elizabeth, 13 years old and unmarried, bore a daughter of her own and was scratched from the budget.

That summer Mrs. Smith moved with her daughters and baby granddaughter from the country town of Tyler up to Selma, where she had found a job as a cook and waitress in a Negro cafe—3:30 A.M. to noon for \$16 a week, later raised to \$20. (The A.D.C. payments dropped in recognition of this bounty, as they had when she did some picking and hoeing in the cotton fields near Tyler.) Her two sons stayed in the country with their grandparents, joining the family in Selma on weekends. Today all six Smiths are together again in half of a weather-beaten cabin at the end of a dirt road in one of the Negro quarters of Selma. There is a neat sitting room in which three people can watch TV with only a little crowding; a bedroom almost completely filled by two beds; a rudimentary kitchen, and a tiny space which Mrs. Smith hopes some day to turn into a bathroom. For the present the family is served by a backyard privy.

Rent is \$20 a month. The monthly gas bill comes to around \$15 in the winter. Among the other regular expenses are \$5 a month for sickness and accident insurance, \$2 for fire insurance and 60 cents for a burial society. Mrs. Smith has no savings, and after her court case began she found it hard to get credit. "It's that suit you brought against the welfare people," a salesman told her.

One result of the move to Selma in 1966 was that the Smiths were assigned to a new caseworker, a matronly young woman named Mrs. Jacquelyn Stancil whose record bears out the impression she gives of going about her duties in an orderly way. After reviewing the Smith dossier and noting mention therein of one William E. Williams, Mrs. Stancil questioned a third party and was told that Mrs. Smith was receiving weekend visits from Williams, who still lived in Tyler, 15 miles south of Selma. "When I asked who told," recalls Mrs. Smith, "she said, 'It was a little bird.' I'd like to meet that little bird."

Mrs. Smith's caseworker during her years in the country had evidently been content to overlook the visits of Willie Williams; Mrs. Stancil was more fastidious. In September, 1966, Mrs. Stancil notified Mrs. Smith that her aid would be stopped if Williams kept coming around—that, after all, was the rule. Where Mrs. Stancil speaks with practiced reserve, Mrs. Smith tends to let herself go. Where Mrs. Stancil's professional manner approaches stolidness, Mrs. Smith is restless; some plump part of her seems always to be on the move. She grins a lot, a big grin that shows off her bad teeth. Mrs. Stancil keeps

* Some form of the substitute-father rule was instituted in Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North and South Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and Virginia.